Karnataka High Court
Jayalakshmamma vs State Of Karnataka on 17 March, 2020
Equivalent citations: AIRONLINE 2020 KAR 2023
Bench: B.V.Nagarathna, Pradeep Singh Yerur
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IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA, BENGALURU
DATED THIS THE 17TH DAY OF MARCH, 2020
PRESENT
THE HON'BLE MRS. JUSTICE B.V.NAGARATHNA
AND
THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE PRADEEP SINGH YERUR
WRIT APPEAL No.2908/2019 (LA-RES)
BETWEEN:
1. JAYALAKSHMAMMA
AGED ABOUT 72 YEARS,
W/O. LATE H. DASAPPA
(BENEFIT OF SENIOR CITIZEN
IS NOT CLAIMED)
2. LAKSHMIPATHI H.D.
AGED 56 YEARS,
S/O. LATE H.D. DASAPPA,
3. CHANDRE GWODA H.D.
S/O. LATE H.D. DASAPPA,
AGED 50 YEARS,
4. JANARDHAN H.D.
S/O. LATE H.D. DASAPPA,
AGED 46 YEARS,
5. HEMAVATHI
D/O. LATE H.D. DASAPPA,
AGED 57 YEARS,
6. GEETHA
D/O. LATE H.D. DASAPPA
W/O. JANARDHAN K.N.
AGED 48 YEARS,
ALL APPELLANTS ARE RESIDING AT
NO.395, FARM HOUSE,
20TH CROSS, 'A' CROSS,
VJN III STAGE,
MYSORE - 17. ... APPELLANTS
(BY SRI KARUMBAIAH T.A., ADVOCATE)
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AND:
1. STATE OF KARNATAKA
URBAN DEVELOPMENT DEPARTMENT,
M.S. BUILDING,
DR. B.R. AMBEDKAR ROAD,
BANGALORE - 1,
BY THE SECRETARY.
2. THE MYSORE URBAN DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY
JHANSI LAKSHMIBAI ROAD,
MYSORE - 570 001.
BY THE COMMISSIONER.
3. THE SPECIAL LAND ACQUISITION OFFICER
MYSORE URBAN DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY,
JHANSI LAKSHMIBAI ROAD,
MYSORE - 570 001. ... RESPONDENTS
(BY SRI M.A. SUBRAMANI, HCGP FOR R-1;
SRI H.C. SHIVARAMU, ADVOCATE R-2)
*****
THIS WRIT APPEAL IS FILED UNDER SECTION 4 OF THE
KARNATAKA HIGH COURT ACT PRAYING TO SET ASIDE THE
JUDGMENT AND ORDER DATED 04/07/2019 PASSED BY THE
LEARNED SINGLE JUDGE IN W.P.NO.781-785/2014 AND
W.P.NO.10334/2014 AND ALLOW THE WRIT PETITIONS AS
PRAYED FOR.
THIS APPEAL COMING ON FOR PRELIMINARY HEARING
THIS DAY, NAGARATHNA J., MADE THE FOLLOWING:
JUDGMENT
Though this appeal is listed to consider I.A.Nos.1/2020, 2/2020 as well as 1/2019, we have heard learned counsel for appellants, learned counsel for respondent Nos.2 and 3 and learned H.C.G.P. for respondent No.1.
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2. Appellants are the writ petitioners. They had filed W.P.Nos.781-785/2014 and 10334/2014 connected with W.P.Nos.16724-16729/2014 before this Court, assailing Preliminary Notification dated 01/04/1981 bearing No.LAQ 1/81-82 (Annexure "A") and Final Notification dated 29/03/1984 (Annexure "B") bearing No.HUD 82/MIB 82, issued by the first respondent - State. By the impugned order of the learned Single Judge dated 04/07/2019, the writ petitions have been dismissed. Being aggrieved, the petitioners have filed this appeal.
3. Learned counsel for appellants contended that learned Single Judge was not right in dismissing the writ petitions for the reasons stated in Paragraph No.6 of the impugned order. He submitted that the issue regarding delay and laches or the doctrine of res judicata and constructive res judicata, would not apply in the instant case. Therefore, this Court may intervene in the matter.
4. Per contra, learned counsel for respondent Nos.2 and 3 and learned H.C.G.P. supported the impugned order and contended that there is no merit in this appeal.
5. While, learned Single Judge, has by a detailed order stated reasons in Paragraph No.6 for dismissal of the -: 4 :- writ petition, at the outset, this Court requested learned counsel for appellant to explain the delay of thirty years (three decades) in filing the writ petitions assailing the preliminary and final notifications issued for the purpose of acquisition of land for Vijayanagar Third Stage, Mysore. In that regard, we have also perused the memorandum of writ petitions and we find that there is no explanation whatsoever, as to why writ petitioners remained silent for three decades before taking steps to assail the Notifications of the year 1981 to 1984. On a perusal of the memorandum of the writ petition, we find that there is no explanation whatsoever for the delay in approaching this Court in assailing the acquisition notifications. Hence, this writ appeal would have to be dismissed on the ground of delay and laches.
6. In this context, a plethora of decisions of the Hon'ble Supreme Court on the issue regarding delay and as to how a Court of equity exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution cannot extend its hands to such persons who approach the Court after several years can be relied upon. In fact, the Apex Court has held in several decisions that stale claims ought not to be entertained by High Courts exercising writ jurisdiction -: 5 :- under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. The relevant decisions in that regard are as follows:-
a) In a decision of the Apex Court reported in 2011 AIR SCW 1332 [State of Orissa & Anr. vs. Mamata Mohanty] the consideration of an application where delay and laches could be attributed against a person who approaches in a writ petition is discussed by stating that though the Limitation Act, 1963 does not apply to writ jurisdiction, however, the Doctrine of Limitation being based on public policy, the principles enshrined therein are applicable and writ petitions could be dismissed at the initial stage on the ground of delay and laches.
b) In the case of Shankar Co-op. Housing Society Ltd. vs. M.Prabhakar & Ors. [2011 AIR SCW 3033], the Apex Court at Para 53 has given the relevant considerations, in determining whether delay or laches in approaching the writ court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. The same reads as follows;
"53. The relevant considerations, in determining whether delay or laches should be put against a person who approaches the writ court under Article 226 of the Constitution is now well settled. They are: (1) there is no inviolable rule of law that whenever there is a -: 6 :- delay, the court must necessarily refuse to entertain the petition; it is a rule of practice based on sound and proper exercise of discretion, and each case must be dealt with on its owns facts. (2) The principle on which the court refuses relief on the ground of laches or delay is that the rights accrued to others by the delay in filing the petition should not be disturbed, unless there is a reasonable explanation for the delay, because court should not harm innocent parties if their rights had emerged by the delay on the part of the petitioners. (3) The satisfactory way of explaining delay in making an application under Article 226 is for the petitioner to show that he had been seeking relief elsewhere in a manner provided by law. If he runs after a remedy not provided in the Statute or the statutory rules, it is not desirable for the High Court to condone the delay. It is immaterial what the petitioner chooses to believe in regard to the remedy. (4) No hard and fast rule, can be laid down in this regard. Every case shall have to be decided on its own facts. (5) That representations would not be adequate explanation to take care of the delay."
c) Similarly, the Apex Court in the case of Sawaran Latha and others vs. State of Haryana and others [2010(4) SCC 532] has held that when the -: 7 :- notification under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 was issued in the year 2001 and the award was passed in the year 2004, writ petitions filed for quashing of the notification in the year 2009 have to be dismissed on the ground of delay as the litigants who dare to abuse the process of the Court in disregard of the law of limitation, delay and laches should not be encouraged.
d) In Tamil Nadu Housing Board, Chennai vs. M.Meiyappan & Others [2010 AIR SCW 7130], when the acquisition proceedings were challenged ten years after notifications were issued, the Apex Court held that the High Courts should not have entertained the writ petition particularly after passing of the award and that the High Court should have dismissed the writ petition at the threshold on the ground of delay and laches.
e) In Swaika Properties (P) Limited and another vs. State of Rajasthan & others [2008 (4) SCC 695], the Apex Court has followed its earlier decisions in the case of Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay vs. The Industrial Development Investment Co. Pvt. Ltd. & others [(1996) 11 SCC 501] by observing as follows:
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"After the award under Section 11 of the Act was made by the Collector he is empowered under Section 16 to take possession of the land, if the possession was not already taken, exercising power under Section 17(4). Thereupon, the land shall vest absolutely in the Government free from all encumbrances. It is well settled law that taking possession of the land is by means of a memorandum (Panchnama) prepared by the Land Acquisition Officer and signed by Panch witnesses called for the purpose.
Subsequently, the collector hands over the same to the beneficiary by means of another memorandum or panchnama, as the case may be. But in this case Section 91 of the BMC Act statutorily comes into play which would indicate that the Land Acquisition Officer while making award should intimate to the Commissioner, Municipal Corporation of the amount of compensation determined and all other expenses. The Corporation shall pay over the same to the Land Acquisition Officer."
It was held that the writ petition had been filed after possession was taken over and the award had become final and therefore, the writ petition had to be dismissed on the ground of delay and laches.
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f) The order of the High Court dismissing the writ petition was confirmed by the Apex Court in Banda Development Authority, Banda vs. Motilal Agarwal and others [(2011) 5 SCC 394], as the filing of the writ petition was 9 years after the declaration was issued under Section 6(1) of the Act and the delay of six years after passing of the award and the delayed filing of the writ petition was a reason for refusing to entertain the prayer made in the writ petition. It was held that in a challenge made to the acquisition of land for the purpose of public purpose Courts have consistently held that the delay in filing the writ petition should be viewed seriously, if the petitioner fails to offer plausible explanation for the delay.
g) Reference can also be made to another decision of the Apex Court reported in (1996) 6 SCC 445 in the case of State of Rajasthan & Others vs. D.R.Lakshmi & others, wherein it has cautioned the High Court not to entertain writ petitions where there is inordinate delay, while exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.
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h) Similarly, in the case of The Municipal Council, Ahmednagar & anr. vs. Shah Hyder Beig & others [(2002) 2 SCC 48], it has been opined thus:-
"The real test for sound exercise of discretion by the High Court in this regard is not the physical running of time as such but the test is whether by reason of delay, there is such negligence on the part of the petitioner so as to infer that he has given up his claim or where the petitioner has moved the Writ Court, the rights of the third parties have come into being which should not be allowed to be disturbed unless there is reasonable explanation for the delay."
i) In fact in S.S.Balu and others vs. State of Karnataka [(2009) 2 SCC 479], it has been held that delay defeats equity and that relief can be denied on the ground of delay alone even though relief is granted to other similarly situated persons who approach the courts in time.
j) To a similar effect is the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Andhra Pradesh Industrial Infrastructure Corporation Ltd. vs. Chinthamaneni Narasimha Rao & others [(2012) 12 SCC 797]. -: 11 :-
k) In Chennai Metropolitan Water Supply and Sewerage Board vs. T.T. Murali Babu [(2014)4 SCC 109], on the doctrine of delay and laches and approach of the Court in that regard, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has ruled as under:
"16. Thus, the doctrine of delay and laches should not be lightly brushed aside. A writ court is required to weigh the explanation offered and the acceptability of the same. The court should bear in mind that it is exercising an extraordinary and equitable jurisdiction. As a constitutional court it has a duty to protect the rights of the citizens but simultaneously it is to keep itself alive to the primary principle that when an aggrieved person, without adequate reason, approaches the court at his own leisure or pleasure, the court would be under legal obligation to scrutinise whether the lis at a belated stage should be entertained or not. Be it noted, delay comes in the way of equity. In certain circumstances delay and laches may not be fatal but in most circumstances inordinate delay would only invite disaster for the litigant who knocks at the doors of the court. Delay reflects inactivity and inaction on the part of a litigant - a litigant who has forgotten the basic norms, namely, 'procrastination is the greatest thief of time' and second, law does not permit one to sleep -: 12 :- and rise like a phoenix. Delay does bring in hazard and causes injury to the lis."
(l) Further, recently in the case of State of Jammu and Kashmir vs. R.K. Zalpuri and others [(2015) 15 SCC 602], the Hon'ble Supreme Court has opined that the writ Court while deciding a writ petition he has to remain alive to the nature of the claim and the unexplained delay on the part of the writ petitioner. Stale claims are not to be adjudicated unless non-interference would cause grave injustice.
The aforesaid decisions are squarely applicable having regard to the facts of the present case.
7. That apart, it is noted that there were other writ petitions filed assailing the very same acquisition notifications and this Court has negated the challenge to the said notifications in several writ petitions as well as writ appeals, the details of which are in Paragraph No.6(V) of the impugned order in W.P.No.19116/2006 filed by Sri Chandre Gowda and Sri Janardhana, which were dismissed by order dated 28/01/2009 and also W.P.No.6207/2005 filed by Sri K.Satyanarayana and others vs. State and others, which was dismissed on 17/09/2007. W.A.No.2106/2007 c/w W.A.No.1944/2007, -: 13 :- filed against the said judgments have been dismissed by a Co-ordinate Bench of this Court on 28/01/2008.
8. Similarly, W.P.Nos.6731 and 7131-35/2010 filed by Sri H.N.Basavaraju vs. State and others were dismissed on 03/08/2010. W.A.Nos.3451 and 3654- 58/2010 against the said judgment have also been dismissed by a Co-ordinate Bench of this Court on 08/04/2011 and copies of the said judgments have been produced by respondent Nos.2 and 3 as Annexures "R-1, R-2 and R-3", to their statement of objections. In the circumstances, we do not think that it would be just and proper for this Court to entertain this writ appeal, which has been dismissed on the ground of delay and laches by not following the aforesaid judicial precedent. We find no merit in the writ appeal and hence, it is dismissed.
Consequently, the pending applications also stand dismissed.
Sd/-
JUDGE Sd/-
JUDGE *mvs