Central Administrative Tribunal - Delhi
Fedration Of Indian Pharmacists vs M/O Health And Family Welfare on 12 March, 2026
1
Item No. 48 O.A. No. 2610/2017
Court No. IV
Central Administrative Tribunal
Principal Bench, New Delhi
O.A. No. 2610/2017
Reserved on :- 25.02.2026
Pronounced on:- 12.03.2026
Hon'ble Mr. Manish Garg, Member (J)
Hon'ble Dr. Chhabilendra Roul, Member (A)
1. Federation of Indian Pharmacists Organisation,
Through its General Secretary,
Shri R.P.Sharma,
S/o-Lal Chand Sharma,
N-2, Charak Palika,
Hospital Campus,
Moti Bagh-I, New Delhi.
2. Shri. Sunil Datt,
Group C-Pharmacist,
S/o Sh. Om Datt,
R/o 367 A/19, Aara Machine Wali Gali,
Kath Mandi, Bahadurgarh,
Haryana - 124507.
...Applicant
(By Advocate : Mr. Sunil Malhotra)
Versus
Union of India,
Through its Secretary to Govt. of India,
Ministry of Health and Family Welfare,
Department of Health, Nirman Bhawan,
New Delhi.
...Respondents
(By Advocate: Mr. S. N. Verma)
ANKIT ANKIT
SAKLANI
SAKLA 2026.03.19
10:23:42
NI +05'30'
2
Item No. 48 O.A. No. 2610/2017
Court No. IV
ORDER
Hon'ble Mr. Manish Garg, Member (J) :
In the present Original Application filed under Section 19 of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985, the applicants have prayed for the following reliefs:-
"(i) to quash and set aside the award dated 13.03.2004 passed by the Learned Arbitrator to the extent that it has denied up-gradation of pay scales to the applicants from 4500-7000 to 5000-8000.
(ii) upgrade the initial pay scales for the post of Pharmacists from Rs.4500-7000/- to pay scale of Rs.5000-8000/- w.e.f.
01.01.1996 with arrears and its replacement scale under the 6th CPC in Pay Band 9300-34,800/- with Grade Pay 4200/- and consequent fixation under CPC.
(iii) pass any other or further relief(s) as this Hon'ble Tribunal may deem fit and proper in the facts and circumstances of the case."
2. Highlighting the facts of the case, learned counsel for the applicants submitted as under:
2.1 The case of the applicants is that, in accordance with the agreed settlement dated 11.09.1997, in case where there is a disagreement in the National/Departmental Anomaly Committee between the official side and the staff side, the matter will be referred to an 'Arbitrator '.
2.2 The said agreed settlement clearly indicates that the Government evolved a mechanism to address anomalies arising in cases where there is disagreement in the ANKIT ANKIT SAKLANI SAKLA 2026.03.19 10:23:42 NI +05'30' 3 Item No. 48 O.A. No. 2610/2017 Court No. IV National/Departmental Anomaly Committee between the official side and the staff side; in such situations, the matter would be referred to an Arbitrator before approaching the Central Administrative Tribunal for redressal of the issues.
2.3 The matter was already pending consideration before this Tribunal, wherein a proposal came from the respondents' side and the applicants accepted the same. Accordingly, this Tribunal vide order dated 13.03.2003 referred the matter to the Learned Arbitrator interalia observing as under:-
"We note that in the counter filed by the respondents, they have stated that in cases where there is a disagreement in the National Departmental Anomaly Committee between the official side and the staff side, the matter will be referred to an 'Arbitrator ' which has also been agreed to by the Applicants.
In view of the above position, we appoint Shri S.R. Adige, Retired Vice Chairman of the Central Administrative Tribunal as Sole Arbitrator to deal with the above claims of the applications. After hearing both the parties, he shall give a reasoned Award. "
2.4 The respondent filed Writ Petition No. CW 5932/03 before the Hon'ble High Court of Delhi against the reference made for appointment of the Arbitrator vide order dated 13.03.2003 passed by this Tribunal, which came to be dismissed as withdrawn on 16.09.2003.
2.5 The Arbitrator appointed in pursuance of the order of this Tribunal thereafter passed the award dated 13.03.2004 without properly considering the submissions made on behalf of the applicants, learned counsel argued. ANKIT ANKIT SAKLANI SAKLA 2026.03.19 10:23:42 NI +05'30' 4 Item No. 48 O.A. No. 2610/2017 Court No. IV 2.6 It has been contended that arbitration is not an alternate remedy under the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985, for redressal of the claims of Government servants. It is submitted that Sections 14 to 18 of the said Act deal with the jurisdiction, powers and authority of the Tribunal, particularly Section 14 thereof.
2.7 The applicants thereafter filed a writ petition before the Hon'ble High Court of Delhi bearing W.P. 21248/2005 against the award dated 13.03.2004 passed by the Arbitrator, which was withdrawn vide order dated 18.10.2016, on the oral observations of the Ld. Judge of the High Court as to how the writ is maintainable when the Central Administrative Tribunal has the jurisdiction to consider all matters related to Central Government Servants and the High Court only interferes with the order/judgment passed by the Administrative Tribunal while exercising jurisdiction under Article 226/227 of the Constitution of India and not the challenge to the Award, which is not an Award as provided under the provisions of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. The then Ld. Senior Counsel Ms. Jyoti Singh, appearing in the matter, withdrew the writ petition filed against the arbitral award dated 13.03.2024, with liberty to pursue remedies before the appropriate forum. The Hon'ble Judge further observed as follows:
ANKIT ANKIT SAKLANI SAKLA 2026.03.19 10:23:42 NI +05'30' 5 Item No. 48 O.A. No. 2610/2017 Court No. IV "Since the petitioner pursued the matter assuming that this Court had jurisdiction on the basis of ill-advice that this Court was the appropriate forum, the petitioner should not be visited with such precipitate consequences as to deprive him of relief as may be otherwise available in law before the appropriate forum.
In the circumstances, the period of pendency of this writ petition shall not come in the way of the petitioners pursuing their remedies in law.
Liberty is granted. "
2.8 It has further been urged that the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985 does not provide for appointment of an arbitrator for considering disputes between Central Government employees and the Government relating to service matters. The Government itself evolved a mechanism, as mentioned in the counter affidavit filed in reply to O.A. No. 570/2002, before approaching this Tribunal for relief. It is submitted that the Arbitrator cannot assume the jurisdiction of the Central Administrative Tribunal as vested under Section
14 of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985. It is further contended that the Central Administrative Tribunal assumes the powers of the Court under the Act and bars the jurisdiction of all courts except the Hon'ble High Court under Article 226/227 of the Constitution of India and the Hon'ble Supreme Court under Article 136 of the Constitution of India. 2.9 Learned counsel for the applicant also submitted that the Hon'ble High Court exercises extraordinary/supervisory jurisdiction under Article 226/227 of the Constitution of India against orders/judgments passed by the Central ANKIT ANKIT SAKLANI SAKLA 2026.03.19 10:23:42 NI +05'30' 6 Item No. 48 O.A. No. 2610/2017 Court No. IV Administrative Tribunal while exercising powers under Section 14 of the Act, and not to entertain a challenge to an award passed by an Arbitrator appointed in pursuance of an agreed settlement between the Government side and the employees' side, which is stated to be purely an administrative mechanism for settlement of disputes instead of approaching the Tribunal.
2.10 It is further submitted that an award passed by an Arbitrator in arbitration proceedings under the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, is binding on the parties and can be challenged under Section 34 of the said Act only on limited grounds. However, the Arbitrator appointed in the present case, in terms of the agreed settlement, was merely a mechanism to settle the dispute without invoking the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985. It is contended that Sections 14 and 15 of the Act confer exclusive jurisdiction upon the Central and State Administrative Tribunals to adjudicate service matters relating to Government employees. These Tribunals exercise all the jurisdiction previously held by courts (except the Supreme Court) concerning recruitment and service matters as defined under the Act. 2.11 It has been primarily urged that when an Arbitrator is appointed pursuant to submissions made by the respondents and an agreement between the parties, as recorded in a ANKIT ANKIT SAKLANI SAKLA 2026.03.19 10:23:42 NI +05'30' 7 Item No. 48 O.A. No. 2610/2017 Court No. IV Tribunal order, the Arbitrator's mandate is to examine and decide issues such as pay anomalies highlighted by Pay Commissions and Anomaly Committees. This process, according to the applicants, is a continuation of the dispute resolution mechanism within service jurisprudence. It is thus contended that this Tribunal retains jurisdiction to entertain a challenge to the Arbitrator's decision since the appointment flows from a service dispute and falls within the statutory mandate under Sections 14 and 15 of the 1985 Act. 2.12 It is further submitted that analogous provisions under the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 deal with jurisdiction of courts; Section 2(1)(e) and Section 42 of the Act provide that the court having jurisdiction to decide the subject matter of the arbitration (if it were a suit) is competent to entertain challenges to an arbitral award. It is contended that if an Arbitrator is appointed by a court to resolve a dispute, the same court would have jurisdiction over challenges to the award, thereby ensuring a single forum for all proceedings relating to the arbitration. Hence, on the said analogy, it is urged that this Tribunal can adjudicate upon service grievances of the applicants within the framework of the 1985 Act. It has been posited that although a challenge to an Arbitral Award may exist in a strict sense, it ought not to be interpreted as an award pursuant to the provisions of the ANKIT ANKIT SAKLANI SAKLA 2026.03.19 10:23:42 NI +05'30' 8 Item No. 48 O.A. No. 2610/2017 Court No. IV Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, but rather as a mechanism for redressal of service grievances.
3. Opposing the grant of relief, the learned counsel for the respondent contended that the reliefs sought in the present Original Application, in the form and manner prayed for, are not maintainable in law.
3.1 On merits, it has been contended that the applicants are seeking the pay scale of Rs.5000-8000 as recommended by the 5th CPC to certain other categories such as Junior Engineers of CPWD, Radiographers, X-Ray Technicians, Dental Hygienists, etc., on the ground that the aforesaid Engineering diploma holders, Radiographers, X-Ray Technicians and Dental Hygienists, as per their Recruitment Rules, require the same essential qualifications or, in some cases, even lower qualifications compared to those prescribed for the applicants/Pharmacists. Despite this, according to the applicants, Pharmacists have been placed in a lower pay scale than their aforesaid counterparts.
3.2. It is further submitted that the issue raised and the relief prayed for by the applicants in the present Original Application is beyond the purview of the answering respondents, as the Department of Expenditure (DOE), Ministry of Finance, is the sole and competent authority with ANKIT ANKIT SAKLANI SAKLA 2026.03.19 10:23:42 NI +05'30' 9 Item No. 48 O.A. No. 2610/2017 Court No. IV regard to pay upgradation of cadres/posts in any Department or Organization functioning under the administrative control of the respective Ministry. It was stated that, in order to address the long pending issue relating to the Pharmacists cadre, the Department of Expenditure had constituted a Fast Track Committee (FTC), pursuant to the recommendations of the 6th CPC, which was entrusted with the task of examining representations received from various quarters, including employees' associations, and to submit its recommendations for consideration and approval of the DOE. 3.3. Accordingly, the recommendations of the FTC concerning Pharmacists were examined by the DOE and approval was conveyed vide Office Memorandum dated 18.11.2009 (Annexure-R-1), whereby the posts of Pharmacists, carrying the essential minimum educational qualification of 10+2 plus two years Diploma in Pharmacy and registration with the State Pharmacy Council, and placed in the entry Grade Pay of Rs.2800 in PB-1, were granted the upgraded Grade Pay of Rs.4200 in PB-2 on completion of two years' service on a non- functional basis. It was further provided that all functional posts in the Grade Pay of Rs.4200, if any existed, were to be de-linked from vacancies and treated as non-functional posts. The said decision was implemented in CGHS as well vide letter dated 16.07.2010.
ANKIT ANKIT SAKLANI SAKLA 2026.03.19 10:23:42 NI +05'30' 10 Item No. 48 O.A. No. 2610/2017 Court No. IV 3.4. It was, therefore, contended that the long pending demand of the Pharmacists for pay upgradation, as raised in the present Original Application, stands resolved with the implementation of the recommendations of the Fast Track Committee vide DOE's Office Memorandum dated 18.11.2009. Any request for reconsideration of the said issue can only be examined by the Department of Expenditure, being the competent authority. It is asserted that the CGHS Division or the Ministry of Health & Family Welfare cannot independently take any decision in the matter. It is further submitted that the Department of Expenditure has informed that no proposal for upgradation of the pay scale of Pharmacists to Rs.5000- 8000 w.e.f. 01.01.2016 is under consideration. 3.5. Learned counsel for the respondents also drew our attention to the daily order dated 02.04.2025 passed by this Tribunal, wherein it was observed as under:
"In the present O.A. there is challenge to award dated 13.03.2004 passed by the Learned Arbitrator to extent that it has denied up- gradation of pay scales to the applicants from 4500- 7000 to 5000- 8000. The said order was passed by the Mr. SR Adige, Sole Arbitrator.
For adjudication of the present matter, at this stage, we deem it appropriate to call for the records of the Arbitrator, however, this shall be without prejudice to the contentions and submissions urged qua the jurisdiction of this Tribunal.
Let, learned counsel for the applicant after receiving and perused the records may satisfy as to whether this Tribunal can set aside the award passed by the learned Arbitrator.
Learned counsel for the applicant, at this stage, states that a Writ Petition No. 21248/2005 was filed challenging the said award ANKIT ANKIT SAKLANI SAKLA 2026.03.19 10:23:42 NI +05'30' 11 Item No. 48 O.A. No. 2610/2017 Court No. IV which was ultimately, dismissed as withdrawn vide order dated 18.10.2016.
Keeping the question of jurisdiction stands open, let the same be considered on 19.05.2025."
3.6. Learned counsel further submitted that the issue relating to the jurisdiction of this Tribunal to examine and adjudicate upon the arbitral award passed by the learned Arbitrator has been specifically raised as a preliminary objection, and the same is required to be decided at the threshold before the Original Application can be considered on merits. 3.7. Concluding the arguments, learned Counsel for the respondents stated that the present Original Application is not maintainable before this Tribunal as the applicant seeks quashing of an arbitral award dated 13.03.2004 passed by the Board of Arbitration under the JCM Scheme. It is contended that any challenge to an arbitral award lies exclusively under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 before the competent civil court, and not before this Tribunal constituted under the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985. Accordingly, it is prayed that the present Original Application be dismissed as not maintainable.
4. Even though the respondents have not specifically raised a contention questioning the competence of this Tribunal to quash and set aside the arbitral award dated 13.03.2004, particularly when the learned Arbitrator was appointed ANKIT ANKIT SAKLANI SAKLA 2026.03.19 10:23:42 NI +05'30' 12 Item No. 48 O.A. No. 2610/2017 Court No. IV pursuant to the order of this Tribunal dated 13.03.2003, yet this aspect cannot be brushed aside. Since a pure question of law arises concerning the jurisdiction, powers and authority of this Tribunal, it becomes necessary for us to examine whether, in exercise of powers under Sections 14, 15 and 19 of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985, this Tribunal can be construed as a "Court" within the meaning and scope of Section 2(1)(e)(i) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996.
5. The learned counsel for the applicants has filed a brief note of submissions in compliance with the directions issued by this Tribunal, as recorded in the proceedings dated 19.11.2025. We have heard the learned counsel for the applicants as well as the respondents and have carefully perused the records of the case along with the submissions advanced before us. We propose to first examine the issue of maintainability of the present Original Application, which seeks to challenge the award passed by the learned Arbitrator.
6. ANALYSIS :
6.1 In the backdrop of the above factual aspects of the matter, we have to answer and examine the following questions of law:
6.1.1 When an Arbitral Award is challenged, can it be presumed to be an award issued pursuant to the provisions of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, as opposed to a ANKIT ANKIT SAKLANI SAKLA 2026.03.19 10:23:42 NI +05'30' 13 Item No. 48 O.A. No. 2610/2017 Court No. IV mechanism for the redress of service grievances entertainable under the 1985 Act?
6.1.2 Can the Tribunal, using its powers under Section 14 of the Administrative Tribunal Act, 1985, be considered a "Principal Civil Court" with original jurisdiction to set aside an arbitral award under Section 2(1)(e) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996?
6.1.3 Is an application under Section 19 of the Administrative Tribunal Act, 1985 (the "1985 Act") analogous to an application to set aside an arbitral award under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (the "1996 Act")?
6.2 At this stage, we express our reservation about whether this Tribunal, in exercise of its powers under the Administrative Tribunals Act, was a "Competent Court" to appoint an arbitrator vide its order dated 13.03.2003. Even though a concession was given by the respondents to make such a reference, it is noteworthy that despite the said concession, the respondent challenged the making of the reference in CW 5932/2003 titled as "UOI Vs FEDERATION OF INDIA PHARMACISTS and ORS" and the same vide order dated 16.09.2003 came to be withdrawn. The decision regarding the arbitrator's appointment was not held to be arbitrary or legally unsound at that stage.
ANKIT ANKIT SAKLANI SAKLA 2026.03.19 10:23:42 NI +05'30' 14 Item No. 48 O.A. No. 2610/2017 Court No. IV 6.3 Reference is now drawn to the provisions of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985.
6.4 The 1985 Act was enacted to provide for the adjudication or trial by Administrative Tribunals of disputes and complaints with respect to the recruitment and conditions of service of persons appointed to public services and posts in connection with the affairs of the Union or of any State or of any local or other authority within the territory of India or under the control of the Government of India or of any corporation or society owned or controlled by the Government in pursuance of Article 323A of the Constitution and for matters connected therewith or incidental thereto. 6.5 The relevant provisions read as under:
Section 3 (q) "service matters", in relation to a person, means all matters relating to the conditions of his service in connection with the affairs of the Union or of any State or of any local or other authority within the territory of India or under the control of the Government of India, or, as the case may be, of any corporation [or society] owned or controlled by the Government, as respects--
(i) remuneration (including allowances), pension and other retirement benefits;
(ii) tenure including confirmation, seniority, promotion, reversion, premature retirement and superannuation;
(iii) leave of any kind;
(iv) disciplinary matters; or
(v) any other matter whatsoever;
Section 3 (r) "service rules as to redressal of grievances", in relation to any matter, means the rules, regulations, orders or other instruments or arrangements as in force for the time being with respect to redressal, otherwise than under this Act, of any grievances in relation to such matters;
CHAPTER III ANKIT ANKIT SAKLANI SAKLA 2026.03.19 10:23:42 NI +05'30' 15 Item No. 48 O.A. No. 2610/2017 Court No. IV JURISDICTION, POWERS AND AUTHORITY OF TRIBUNALS
14. Jurisdiction, powers and authority of the Central Administrative Tribunal.--
(1) Save as otherwise expressly provided in this Act, the Central Administrative Tribunal shall exercise, on and from the appointed day, all the jurisdiction, powers and authority exercisable immediately before that day by all courts (except the Supreme Court) in relation to--
(a) recruitment, and matters concerning recruitment, to any All- India Service or to any civil service of the Union or a civil post under the Union or to a post connected with defence or in the defence services, being, in either case, a post filled by a civilian;
(b) all service matters concerning--
(i) a member of any All-India Service; or
(ii) a person not being a member of an All-India Service or a person referred to in clause (c) appointed to any civil service of the Union or any civil post under the Union; or
(iii) a civilian not being a member of an All-India Service or a person referred to in clause (c) appointed to any defence services or a post connected with defence, and pertaining to the service of such member, person or civilian, in connection with the affairs of the Union or of any State or of any local or other authority within the territory of India or under the control of the Government of India or of any corporation or society owned or controlled by the Government;
(c) all service matters pertaining to service in connection with the affairs of the Union concerning a person appointed to any service or post referred to in sub-clause (ii) or sub-clause (iii) of clause (b), being a person whose services have been placed by a State Government or any local or other authority or any corporation or society or other body, at the disposal of the Central Government for such appointment.
4[Explanation.--For the removal of doubts, it is hereby declared that references to "Union" in this sub-section shall be construed as including references also to a Union territory.] (2) The Central Government may, by notification, apply with effect from such date as may be specified in the notification the provisions of sub-section (3) to local or other authorities within the territory of India or under the control of the Government of India and to corporations 3[or societies] owned or controlled by Government, not being a local or other authority or corporation 3[or society] controlled or owned by a State Government:
Provided that if the Central Government considers it expedient so to do for the purpose of facilitating transition to the scheme as envisaged by this Act, different dates may be so specified under this sub-section in respect of different classes of, or different categories under any class of, local or other authorities or corporations 1[or societies].
ANKIT ANKIT SAKLANI SAKLA 2026.03.19 10:23:42 NI +05'30' 16 Item No. 48 O.A. No. 2610/2017 Court No. IV (3) Save as otherwise expressly provided in this Act, the Central Administrative Tribunal shall also exercise, on and from the date with effect from which the provisions of this sub-section apply to any local or other authority or corporation 1[or society], all the jurisdiction, powers and authority exercisable immediately before that date by all courts (except the Supreme Court 2***) in relation to--
(a) recruitment, and matters concerning recruitment, to any service or post in connection with the affairs of such local or other authority or corporation 1[or society]; and
(b) all service matters concerning a person [other than a person referred to in clause (a) or clause (b) of sub-section (1)] appointed to any service or post in connection with the affairs of such local or other authority or corporation 1[or society] and pertaining to the service of such person in connection with such affairs.
6.6 A plain reading of Section 14, read with Sections 3(q) and 3(r) of the Act, makes it evident that the Tribunal is vested with jurisdiction, powers and authority to adjudicate disputes pertaining to service matters, including recruitment and other conditions of service as specified therein. However, the crucial question that arises for consideration is whether the Administrative Tribunal possesses the power to set aside an arbitral award, particularly when such power is specifically conferred under the special statute governing the field, namely, the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. 6.7 The present case, therefore, requires examination on the touchstone of both the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985 and the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, in order to determine the true scope and extent of jurisdiction exercisable by this Tribunal.
ANKIT ANKIT SAKLANI SAKLA 2026.03.19 10:23:42 NI +05'30' 17 Item No. 48 O.A. No. 2610/2017 Court No. IV 6.8 We now proceed to examine the provisions of the 1996 Act.
6.9 Section 2(1)(e) provides:
(e) "Court" means--
(i) in the case of an arbitration other than international commercial arbitration, the principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction in a district, and includes the High Court in exercise of its ordinary original civil jurisdiction, having jurisdiction to decide the questions forming the subject-
matter of the arbitration if the same had been the subject- matter of a suit, but does not include any Civil Court of a grade inferior to such principal Civil Court, or any Court of Small Causes;
(ii) in the case of international commercial arbitration, the High Court in exercise of its ordinary original civil jurisdiction, having jurisdiction to decide the questions forming the subject-matter of the arbitration if the same had been the subject-matter of a suit, and in other cases, a High Court having jurisdiction to hear appeals from decrees of courts subordinate to that High Court." 6.10 In Nimet Resources Inc. & Anr. v. Essar Steels Ltd.(2009) 17 SCC 313 the Hon'ble Supreme Court considered Section 2(1)(e) in the context of Section 14 observed as under:
"8. Application in terms of sub-section (2) of Section 14, thus, lies before a "court" within the meaning of the 1996 Act
9. It is only thus the "court", within the meaning of the provisions of the said Act which can entertain such an application raised by the parties herein and determine the dispute therein on merit.
10. Unlike the 1940 Act, "court" has been defined in Section 2(1)(e) to mean: "2. (1)(e) 'Court' means the Principal Civil Court of Original Jurisdiction in a district, and includes the High Court in exercise of its ordinary original civil jurisdiction, having jurisdiction to decide the questions forming the subject- matter of the arbitration if the same ANKIT ANKIT SAKLANI SAKLA 2026.03.19 10:23:42 NI +05'30' 18 Item No. 48 O.A. No. 2610/2017 Court No. IV had been the subject- matter of a suit, but does not include any civil court of a grade inferior to such Principal Civil Court, or any Court of Small Causes;"
11. As a "court" has been defined in the 1996 Act itself, an application under Section 14(2) would be maintainable only before the Principal Civil Court which may include a High Court having jurisdiction but not this Court.
12. This Court in passing its order dated 27-9-2000, as noticed hereinbefore, did not and could not retain any jurisdiction in itself as could be done in suitable cases under the 1940 Act. It even did not determine the validity or otherwise of the arbitration agreement. It allowed the parties to take recourse to their remedies before the learned arbitrator. When the said order was passed, this Court was considered to have only an administrative power, but the same has since been held to be a judicial power in SBP & Co. v. Patel Engg. Ltd. [(2005) 8 SCC 618] The said jurisdiction, however, does not extend to Section 14 of the Act.
13. The definition of "court" indisputably would be subject to the context in which it is used. It may also include the appellate courts. Once the legislature has defined a term in the interpretation clause, it is not necessary for it to use the same expression in other provisions of the Act. It is well settled that meaning assigned to a term as defined in the interpretation clause unless the context otherwise requires should be given the same meaning.
14. It is also well settled that in the absence of any context indicating a contrary intention, the same meaning would be attached to the word used in the later as is given to them in the earlier statute. It is trite that the words or expression used in a statute before and after amendment should be given the same meaning. It is a settled law that when the legislature uses the same words in a similar connection, it is to be presumed that in the absence of any context indicating a contrary intention, the same meaning should attach to the words."
6.11 In State of West Bengal v. Associated Contractors (2015) 1 SCC 32, it was held:
"25. .... (a) Section 2(1)(e) contains an exhaustive definition marking out only the Principal Civil Court of Original Jurisdiction in a district or a High Court having original civil ANKIT ANKIT SAKLANI SAKLA 2026.03.19 10:23:42 NI +05'30' 19 Item No. 48 O.A. No. 2610/2017 Court No. IV jurisdiction in the State, and no other court as "court" for the purpose of Part I of the Arbitration Act, 1996."
6.12 In R.M Seshadri v. Second Additional Income-tax Officer ITO [1954] 25 ITR 400 (Mad.), a Division Bench of the Madras High Court had occasion to examine whether the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal, constituted under the Income- tax Act, could be regarded as a 'Court'. The learned Judges, after an elaborate consideration of various authorities elucidating the distinction between a Court and a Tribunal, answered the question in the negative. The following passage from the judgment of the learned Judges, at page 808, is apposite and bears relevance to the issue under consideration in the present case:
"A definition of Court is to be found in Stroud's Judicial Dictionary in which it is stated that a Court is a place where justice is judicially administered. The difficulty at the present juncture is created on account of the establishments of administrative Tribunals, which are vested with jurisdiction to decide certain matters of a quasi-Judicial nature. It is often a very difficult task to draw the line, and distinguish a Court from an administrative tribunal exercising quasi-judicial functions."
Merely because the administrative Tribunals have the trappings of a Court, they are not Courts in the sense of exercising judicial power."
6.13 In Brajnandan Sinha vs Jyoti Narain, 1955 SCR (2) 955, the Apex Court held as under:
"The word "Court" was not defined in the Act and' the expression "Courts subordinate to the High Courts" would prima facie mean the Courts of law subordinate to the High Courts in the hierarchy of Courts established for the purpose of administration of justice throughout the Union. It would be relevant, however, to notice the definitions of "Court" available elsewhere.
ANKIT ANKIT SAKLANI SAKLA 2026.03.19 10:23:42 NI +05'30' 20 Item No. 48 O.A. No. 2610/2017 Court No. IV Coke on Littleton and Stroud defined the word "Court" as the place where justice is judicially administered. According to Stephen, "In every Court, there must be at least three constituent parts-the actor, reus and judex; the actor or plaintiff, who complains of an injury done; the reus, or defendant, who is called upon to make satisfaction for it; and the judex, or judicial power, which is to examine the truth of the fact, and to determine the law arising upon that fact, and if any injury appears to have been done, to ascertain, and by its officers to apply, the remedy".
Section 3 of the Indian Evidence Act (I of 1872) defines "Court" as including all Judges and Magistrates, and all persons, except arbitrators. legally authorised to take evidence. This definition, however, has been held to be not exhaustive but framed only for the purpose of Indian Evidence Actand is not to be extended where such an extension is not warranted.
Sections 19 and 20 of the Indian Penal Code (Act XLV of 1860) define the words "Court" and the "Court of Justice" as under:-
"Section 19. The word 'Judge' denotes not only every person who is officially designated. as a Judge, but also every person-who is empowered by law to give, in any legal proceeding, civil or criminal, a definitive judgment, or a judgment which, if not appealed against would be definitive, or a judgment which, if confirmed by some other authority would be definitive, or who is one of a body of persons, which body of persons is empowered by law to give such a judgment.
Section 20. The words "Court of Justice" denote a Judge who is empowered by law to act judicially alone, or a body of Judges which is empowered by law to act judicially as a body, when such Judge or body of Judges is acting judicially".
The pronouncement of a definitive judgment is thus considered the essential sine qua non of a Court and unless and until a binding and authoritative judgment can be pronounced by a person or body of persons it cannot be predicated that he or they constitute a Court. The Privy Council in the case of Shell Co. of Australia v. Fedral Commissioner of Taxation[1931] A.C. 275 thus defined "Judicial Power" at page 295:-
"Is this right? What is "judicial power"? Their Lordships are of opinion that one of the best definitions is that given by Griffith, C. J. in Huddart, Parker & Co. v. Moorehead[1909] 8 C.L.R. 330, 357 where he says: "I am of opinion that the words judicial power' as used in section 71 of the Constitution mean the power which every sovereign authority must of necessity have to decide controversies between its ANKIT ANKIT SAKLANI SAKLA 2026.03.19 10:23:42 NI +05'30' 21 Item No. 48 O.A. No. 2610/2017 Court No. IV subjects, or between itself and its subjects, whether the rights relate to life, liberty or property. The exercise of this power does not begin until some tribunal which has power to give a binding and authoritative decision (whether subject to appeal or not) is called upon to take action".
Their Lordships further enumerated at page 297 certain negative propositions in relation to this subject:
"1. A tribunal is not necessarily a Court in this strict sense because it gives a final decision;
2. Nor because it hears witnesses on oath;
3. Nor because two or more contending parties appear before it between whom it has to decide;
4. Nor because it gives decisions which affect the rights of subjects;
5. Nor because there is an appeal to a Court;
6. Nor because it is a body to which a matter is referred by another body.
See Rex v. Electricity Commissioners [1924] 1 K.B. 171"
and observed at page 298:
"An administrative tribunal may act judicially, but still remain an administrative tribunal as distinguished from a Court, strictly so-called. Mere externals do not make a direction to an administrative officer by an ad hoc tribunal an exercise by a Court of Judicial power".
The same principle was reiterated by this Court in Bharat Bank Limited v. Employees of Bharat Bank Ltd.[1950] S.C.R. 459 and Maqbool Hussain v. The State of Bombay(1953] S.C.R. 730where the test of a judicial tribunal as laid down in a passage from Cooper v. Wilson[1937] 2 K.B. 309, 340was adopted by this Court:-
"A true judicial decision presupposes an existing dispute between two or more parties, and then involves four requisites:-
(I) The presentation (not necessarily orally) of their case by the parties to the dispute;
(2) if the dispute between them is a question of fact, the ascertainment of the fact by means of evidence adduced by the parties to the dispute and, often with the assistance of argument by or on behalf of the parties on the evidence;
(3) if the dispute between them is a question of law, the submission of legal arguments by the parties;
and (4) a decision which disposes of the whole matter by a finding upon the facts in dispute and an application of the law of the land to the facts so found, including where required a ruling upon any disputed question of law".
ANKIT ANKIT SAKLANI SAKLA 2026.03.19 10:23:42 NI +05'30' 22 Item No. 48 O.A. No. 2610/2017 Court No. IV Maqbool Hussain's case, above referred to, was followed by this Court in S. A. Venkataraman v. The Union of India and, Another[1954] S.C.R. 1150 where a Constitution Bench of this Court also laid down that both finality and authoritativeness were the essential tests of a judicial pronouncement. It is clear, therefore, that in order to constitute a Court in the strict sense of the term, an essential condition is that the Court should have, apart from having some of the trappings of a judicial tribunal, power to give a decision or a definitive judgment which has finality and authoritativeness which are the essential tests of a judicial pronouncement.
It was, however, urged by Shri Purshottam Tircamdas for the respondent that the word "Court" should not be limited to a Court of Justice or a Court of law but should be construed in a wide sense, including within the connotation, other Courts which, though not Courts of Justice, were nevertheless Courts according to law and be relied upon a decision of the Court of Appeal in England in Royal Aquarium and Summer and Winter Garden Society Ltd. v. Parkinson 1892 (1) QB 431 and the observations of Fry, L.J. at page 446 therein:
"I do not desire to attempt any definition of a "court".
It is obvious that, according to our law, a court may perform various functions. Parliament is a court. Its duties as a whole are deliberative and legislative: the duties of a part of it only are judicial. It is nevertheless a court. There are many other courts which, though not Courts of Justice, are nevertheless courts according to our law. There are, for instance, courts of investigation, like the coroner's court. In my judgment, therefore, the existence of the immunity claimed does not depend upon the question whether the subject-matter of consideration is a Court of Justice, but whether it is a Court in law. Wherever you find a Court in law, to that the law attaches certain privileges, among which is the immunity in question".
The question involved in that case was whether the defendant was entitled to absolute immunity from action for anything done by him while performing his duty as a member of the County Council in dealing with the applications for licences for music and dancing. It was contended on behalf of the defendant that he was exercising a judicial function when he spoke the words complained of and therefore was entitled to absolute immunity in respect of anything he said. The argument that "wherever you find a Court in law, to that the law attaches certain privileges among which is the immunity in question" was used on behalf of the defendant and Fry, L. J. dealt with the same as under at page 447:-
"It was said that the existence of this immunity is based on considerations of public policy, and that, as ANKIT ANKIT SAKLANI SAKLA 2026.03.19 10:23:42 NI +05'30' 23 Item No. 48 O.A. No. 2610/2017 Court No. IV a matter of public policy, wherever a body has to decide questions, and in so doing has to act judicially, it must be held that there is a judicial proceeding to which this immunity ought to attach. It seems to me that the sense in which the word "judicial" is used in that argument is this: it is used as meaning that the proceedings are such as ought to be conducted with the fairness and impartiality which characterize proceedings in Courts of Justice, and are proper to the functions of a judge, not that the members of the supposed body are members of a Court. Consider to what lengths the doctrine would extend, if this immunity were applied to every body which is bound to decide judicially in the sense of deciding fairly and impartially. It would apply to assessment committees, boards of guardians, to the Inns of Court when considering the conduct of one of their members, to the General Medical Council when considering questions affecting the position of a medical man, and to all arbitrators. Is it necessary, on grounds of public policy, that the doctrine of immunity should be carried as far as this? I say not. I say that there is ample protection afforded in such cases by the ordinary law of privilege. I find no necessity or propriety in carrying the doctrine so far as this argument requires".
Lord Esher, M. R. expressed himself as follows while dealing with this argument at page 442:-
"It is true that, in respect of statements made in the course of proceedings before a Court of Justice, whether by judge, or counsel, or witnesses, there is an absolute immunity from liability to an action. The ground of that rule is public policy. It is applicable to all kinds of Courts of Justice; but the doctrine has been carried further; and it seems that this immunity applies wherever there is an authorized inquiry which, though not before a Court of Justice, is before a tribunal which has similar attributes. In the case of Dawkins v. Lord Rokeby(1) the doctrine was extended (1) L.R. 8 Q.B. 255; L.R. 7 H.L. 744, to a military court of inquiry. It was so extended on the ground that the case was one of an authorized inquiry before a tribunal acting judicially, that is to say, in a manner as nearly as possible similar to that in which a Court of Justice acts in respect of an inquiry before it. This doctrine has never been extended further than to Courts of Justice and tribunals acting in a manner similar to that in which such Courts act. Then can it be said that a meeting of the county council, when engaged in considering applications for licences for music and dancing, is such a tribunal? It is difficult to say who are to be considered as judges acting judicially in such a case".
ANKIT ANKIT SAKLANI SAKLA 2026.03.19 10:23:42 NI +05'30' 24 Item No. 48 O.A. No. 2610/2017 Court No. IV 6.14 Section 19 provides for the procedure for Applications to Tribunal--
(1) Subject to the other provisions of this Act, a person aggrieved by any order pertaining to any matter within the jurisdiction of a Tribunal may make an application to the Tribunal for the redressal of his grievance. Explanation.--For the purposes of this sub-section, "order" means an order made--
(a) by the Government or a local or other authority within the territory of India or under the control of the Government of India or by any corporation 3[or society] owned or controlled by the Government; or
(b) by an officer, committee or other body or agency of the Government or a local or other authority or corporation 3[or society] referred to in clause (a).
(2) Every application under sub-section (1) shall be in such form and be accompanied by such documents or other evidence and by such fee (if any, not exceeding one hundred rupees) 4[in respect of the filing of such application and by such other fees for the service or execution of processes, as may be prescribed by the Central Government]. (3) On receipt of an application under sub-section (1), the Tribunal shall, if satisfied after such inquiry as it may deem necessary, that the application is a fit case for adjudication or trial by it, admit such application; but where the Tribunal is not so satisfied, it may summarily reject the application after recording its reasons.] (4) Where an application has been admitted by a Tribunal under sub-section (3), every proceeding under the relevant service rules as to redressal of grievances in relation to the subject-matter of such application pending immediately before such admission shall abate and save as otherwise directed by the Tribunal, no appeal or representation in relation to such matter shall thereafter be entertained under such rules.
6.15 Section 34 provides the procedure for Application for setting aside arbitral award.--
(1) Recourse to a Court against an arbitral award may be made only by an application for setting aside such award in accordance with sub-section (2) and sub-section (3). (2) An arbitral award may be set aside by the Court only if-- ANKIT ANKIT SAKLANI SAKLA 2026.03.19 10:23:42 NI +05'30' 25 Item No. 48 O.A. No. 2610/2017 Court No. IV
(a) the party making the application 1[establishes on the basis of the record of the arbitral tribunal that]--
(i) a party was under some incapacity, or
(ii) the arbitration agreement is not valid under the law to which the parties have subjected it or, failing any indication thereon, under the law for the time being in force; or
(iii) the party making the application was not given proper notice of the appointment of an arbitrator or of the arbitral proceedings or was otherwise unable to present his case; or
(iv) the arbitral award deals with a dispute not contemplated by or not falling within the terms of the submission to arbitration, or it contains decisions on matters beyond the scope of the submission to arbitration:
Provided that, if the decisions on matters submitted to arbitration can be separated from those not so submitted, only that part of the arbitral award which contains decisions on matters not submitted to arbitration may be set aside; or
(v) the composition of the arbitral tribunal or the arbitral procedure was not in accordance with the agreement of the parties, unless such agreement was in conflict with a provision of this Part from which the parties cannot derogate, or, failing such agreement, was not in accordance with this Part; or
(b) the Court finds that--
(i) the subject-matter of the dispute is not capable of settlement by arbitration under the law for the time being in force, or
(ii) the arbitral award is in conflict with the public policy of India.
2[Explanation 1.--For the avoidance of any doubt, it is clarified that an award is in conflict with the public policy of India, only if,--
(i) the making of the award was induced or affected by fraud or corruption or was in violation of section 75 or section 81; or
(ii) it is in contravention with the fundamental policy of Indian law; or
(iii) it is in conflict with the most basic notions of morality or justice.
Explanation 2.--For the avoidance of doubt, the test as to whether there is a contravention with the fundamental policy of Indian law shall not entail a review on the merits of the dispute.] ANKIT ANKIT SAKLANI SAKLA 2026.03.19 10:23:42 NI +05'30' 26 Item No. 48 O.A. No. 2610/2017 Court No. IV [(2A) An arbitral award arising out of arbitrations other than international commercial arbitrations, may also be set aside by the Court, if the Court finds that the award is vitiated by patent illegality appearing on the face of the award:
Provided that an award shall not be set aside merely on the ground of an erroneous application of the law or by reappreciation of evidence.] (3) An application for setting aside may not be made after three months have elapsed from the date on which the party making that application had received the arbitral award or, if a request had been made under section 33, from the date on which that request had been disposed of by the arbitral tribunal:
Provided that if the Court is satisfied that the applicant was prevented by sufficient cause from making the application within the said period of three months it may entertain the application within a further period of thirty days, but not thereafter.
(4) On receipt of an application under sub-section (1), the Court may, where it is appropriate and it is so requested by a party, adjourn the proceedings for a period of time determined by it in order to give the arbitral tribunal an opportunity to resume the arbitral proceedings or to take such other action as in the opinion of arbitral tribunal will eliminate the grounds for setting aside the arbitral award.
(5) An application under this section shall be filed by a party only after issuing a prior notice to the other party and such application shall be accompanied by an affidavit by the applicant endorsing compliance with the said requirement.
(6) An application under this section shall be disposed of expeditiously, and in any event, within a period of one year from the date on which the notice referred to in sub-section (5) is served upon the other party.] 6.16 In Jagdeep Chowgule v Seema Chowgule -2026 INSC 92, it was observed as under:
"21. It is a settled principle of statutory interpretation that a defined term must ordinarily bear the meaning assigned to it "unless the context otherwise requires.(KV Muthu v. Angamuthu Amman, (1997) 2 SCC 53 - "12. Where the definition or expression, as in the instant case, is preceded by the words "unless the context otherwise requires", the said definition set out in the section is to be applied and given effect to but this rule, which is the normal rule may be departed from if there be something in the context to show that the definition could not be applied.' ANKIT ANKIT SAKLANI SAKLA 2026.03.19 10:23:42 NI +05'30' 27 Item No. 48 O.A. No. 2610/2017 Court No. IV 6.17 Significantly, in L. Chandra Kumar vs Union Of India And Others 1997 (3) SCC 261, the Apex Court observed as under:
"Before moving on to other aspects, we may summarise our conclusions on the jurisdictional powers of these Tribunals. The Tribunals are competent to hear matters where the vires of statutory provisions are questioned. However, in discharging this duty, they cannot act as substitutes for the High Courts and the Supreme Court which have, under our constitutional setup, been specifically entrusted with such an obligation. Their function in this respect is only supplementary and all such decisions of the Tribunals will be subject to scrutiny before a Division Bench of the respective High Courts. The Tribunals will consequently also have the power to test the vires of subordinate legislations and rules. However, this power of the Tribunals will be subject to one important exception. The Tribunals shall not entertain any question regarding the vires of their parent statutes following the settled principle that a Tribunal which is a creature of an Act cannot declare that very Act to be unconstitutional. In such cases alone, the concerned High Court may be approached directly. All other decisions of these Tribunals, rendered in cases that they are specifically empowered to adjudicate upon by virtue of their parent statutes, will also be subject to scrutiny before a Division Bench of their respective High Courts. We may add that the Tribunals will, however, continue to act as the only courts of first instance in respect of the areas of law for which they have been constituted. By this, we mean that it will not be open for litigants to directly approach the High Courts even in cases where they question the vires of statutory legislations (except, as mentioned, where the legislation which creates the particular Tribunal is challenged) by overlooking the jurisdiction of the concerned Tribunal."
6.18 Similarly, in this instance, reviewing the disputes and their resolution by the Arbitrator resembles the process of settling claims related to service jurisprudence. This suggests that the Central Administrative Tribunal also possesses the authority to nullify an arbitral award concerning service conditions. However, having regard to the wording used in section 19 of the 1985 Act, read with the explanation to the ANKIT ANKIT SAKLANI SAKLA 2026.03.19 10:23:42 NI +05'30' 28 Item No. 48 O.A. No. 2610/2017 Court No. IV definition of " order," the same does not subsume "arbitral award" as the arbitrator cannot be construed to mean and include an "order" madeby the Government or a local or other authority within the territory of India or under the control of the Government of India or by any corporation 3[or society] owned or controlled by the Government; or by an officer, committee, or other body or agency of the Government or a local or other authority or corporation 3[or society] referred to in clause (a).
To put it illustratively, can it be said that the award under the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 is amenable to the jurisdiction of the Central Adminstrative Tribunal and to entertain applications to set aside under Section 19 of the 1985 Act? This would be a case of overlapping jurisdiction, a case of mistaken jurisdiction under the provisions of Section 19 of the 1985 Act. Ramaswamy, J., Opined that such tribunals, being creaturesof statutes,cannot assume jurisdiction in anycase, claim the status of the High Court, or parity,or act as substitutes. ( See: R. K. Jain v. Union of India.[1993] 4 SCC 119 ). More importantly, Section 34 of the 1996 Act encompasses a statutory right giving powers to recourse to the court within the ambit and meaning of Section 2(1) (e )(i) of the 1996 Act.
ANKIT ANKIT SAKLANI SAKLA 2026.03.19 10:23:42 NI +05'30' 29 Item No. 48 O.A. No. 2610/2017 Court No. IV 6.19 The concession given by the respondents in the earlier round of litigation, the passing of the arbitral award thereafter, we cannot assume mistaken jurisdiction to set aside the arbitral award, even though a reference was made by our predecessor Bench; we cannot assume defective jurisdiction dehors the provisions of Section 34 of the 1996 Act, inasmuch as the Central Adminstrative Tribunal cannot be construed to be " Court " that is to say, a "Principal Civil Court" of original jurisdiction in a district, and includes the High Court in the exercise of its ordinary original civil jurisdiction, within the framework and meaning of Section 2(1) (e )(i) of the 1996 Act. Section 34 of 1996 Act, being statutory in nature, thus has an overriding effect over Section 19 of the 1985 Act to entertain an application for setting aside an arbitral award.
6.20 We can only gauge the relevance of the reference to arbitration disputes by the Tribunal. By necessary implication, the High Court may have been persuaded by a concession from the respondents, coupled with the fact that Parliament enacted the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985, pursuant to the power conferred by Clause (1) of Article 323A of the Constitution. The Act's Statement of Objects and Reasons indicates it was in the express terms of Article 323A and enacted because many service-related cases were pending ANKIT ANKIT SAKLANI SAKLA 2026.03.19 10:23:42 NI +05'30' 30 Item No. 48 O.A. No. 2610/2017 Court No. IV before various courts. It was expected that "the setting up of such Administrative Tribunals to deal exclusively with service matters would go a long way in not only reducing the burden of the various courts and thereby giving them more time to deal with other cases expeditiously but would also provide to the persons covered by the Administrative Tribunals speedy relief in respect of their grievances." 6.21 The relief sought in this application under Section 19 of the 1985 Act cannot be equated with an application to set aside an arbitral award under Section 34 of the 1996 Act. Therefore, the questions are answered negatively against the applicants.
7. CONCLUSION :
7.1. Given the analysis, we dismiss the present Original Application seeking to set aside the arbitral award dated 13.03.2004 under the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985, on the ground of lack of jurisdiction.
7.2. Pending M.A.(s), if any, shall stand disposed of. No costs.
(Dr. Chhabilendra Roul) (Manish Garg) Member (A) Member (J) /as/ ANKIT ANKIT SAKLANI SAKLA 2026.03.19 10:23:42 NI +05'30'