Himachal Pradesh High Court
Reserved On: 25.3.2026 vs Of on 18 May, 2026
2026:HHC:17427
IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA
RSA No. 58 of 2007
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Reserved on: 25.3.2026
Date of Decision: 18.05.2026
Mast Ram ...Appellant
Versus
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Tulki (deceased) through LRs & ors. ...Respondents
Coram
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Hon'ble Mr Justice Rakesh Kainthla, Judge.
Whether approved for reporting?1 Yes.
For the Appellant : Mr H.S. Rangra, Advocate.
For the Respondents : Mr P.K. Verma, Advocate, vice
Mr K.B. Khajuria, Advocate.
Rakesh Kainthla, Judge
The present appeal is directed against the judgment and decree dated 20.10.2006, passed by learned District Judge, Mandi, H.P. (learned Appellate Court), vide which the judgment and decree dated 16.7.2005, passed by learned Civil Judge, (Junior Division), Chachiot at Gohar, District Mandi, H.P. (learned Trial Court) was set aside. (The parties shall hereinafter be referred to in 1 Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes.
::: Downloaded on - 23/05/2026 08:30:51 :::CIS 22026:HHC:17427 the same manner as they were arrayed before the learned trial Court for convenience.
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2. Briefly stated, the facts giving rise to the present appeal are that the plaintiffs filed a civil suit for declaration that they and proforma defendant are joint owners in possession of the suit land mentioned in para one of the plaint, and the decree of passed in Civil Suit No. 53 of 1995 is collusive and not binding on their rights. A consequential relief of a permanent prohibitory rt injunction for restraining the defendant from interfering with the suit land was also sought. It was asserted that Chaitru, son of Dayal, was recorded as a non-occupancy tenant of the suit land.
He was in possession of the suit land on the appointed day and became the owner after the commencement of the Himachal Pradesh Tenancy and Land Reforms Act. Plaintiffs and pro forma defendant are the legal heirs of Chaitru. The defendant, in connivance with the previous landowners, filed a Civil Suit No. 53 of 1995 before the Court of the learned Sub Judge, Court No. 3, Mandi, H.P., which was decreed on the admission made by the landowners. The plaintiffs and pro forma defendant were not arrayed as parties to the previous suit. The defendant started ::: Downloaded on - 23/05/2026 08:30:51 :::CIS 3 2026:HHC:17427 interfering with the suit land based on the decree. Hence, the suit was filed to seek the relief mentioned above.
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3. The suit was opposed by filing a written statement taking preliminary objections regarding lack of maintainability and locus standi, the suit being bad for non-joinder and mis-
joinder of parties, the suit being barred by the principle of res of judicata and limitation, and the plaint having not been verified as per the law. The contents of the plaint were denied on the merits.
rt It was asserted that the defendant used to cultivate the land and pay rent to the landlord during Chaitru's lifetime. Chaitru relinquished his tenancy rights in the defendant's favour with the consent of the landowners during his lifetime. Mohan, one of the landowners, was succeeded by his widow, Leela Devi and two sons, Krishan Lal and Subhash. The proprietary rights cannot be conferred when the land owner is a widow. The defendant had filed the previous suit against the landowners because they were interfering with his possession. The suit was decreed in the defendant's favour. The present suit has been filed without any basis. Hence, it was prayed that the suit be dismissed.
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4. Learned Trial Court framed the following issues on 8.12.1999: -
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1. Whether the plaintiffs and proforma defendants are joint owners in possession of the suit land? OPP.
2. Whether the decree passed in Suit No.53 of 1995 passed by Court No.II, Mandi is collusive, illegal and not affecting the rights of the plaintiffs and proforma defendants as alleged?
OPP.
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3. Whether the suit is not maintainable? OPD.
4. Whether the suit is bad for non-joinder and mis-joinder of parties? OPD.
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5. Whether the suit is barred by the principle of res judicata?
OPD.
6. Whether the suit is barred by limitation? OPD.
7. Whether the plaintiffs have no locus standi to file the present suit? OPD.
8. Relief.
5. The parties were called upon to produce the evidence, and the plaintiffs examined plaintiff No.1, Tulki Devi (PW1) and Puran (PW2). The defendant no. 2, examined himself (DW1) and Brikam (DW2).
6. The learned Trial Court held that initially, Chaitru was recorded as a non-occupancy tenant in the revenue record;
however, this entry was changed in favour of defendant No.2. He was also declared a non-occupancy tenant in a suit filed by him.
The previous suit was not collusive. The plaintiffs had failed to ::: Downloaded on - 23/05/2026 08:30:51 :::CIS 5 2026:HHC:17427 prove their possession on the suit land. Chaitru had relinquished the tenancy in favour of defendant No.2 with the consent of the .
landlords. The plaintiffs had no locus standi to file the present suit.
Therefore, the learned Trial Court answered issues Nos 3 and 7 in the affirmative, the rest of the issues in the negative and dismissed the plaintiffs' suit.
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7. Being aggrieved by the judgment and decree passed by the learned Trial Court, the plaintiffs filed an appeal which was rt decided by the learned District Judge, Mandi (learned Appellate Court). Learned Appellate Court held that Chaitru was recorded to be a tenant in possession of the suit land on the payment of Galla Battai Chaharam. A tenant could not have relinquished the tenancy in favour of any person except the State. Chaitru was alive on the appointed day and became the owner after the commencement of the H.P. Tenancy and Land Reforms Act. The plaintiffs and proforma defendants were necessary parties in the previous suit filed by defendant No.2, and the judgment passed by the Court does not bind the plaintiffs and the proforma defendant. The previous suit was filed in collusion with the landowners to deprive the plaintiffs of the land. Learned Trial Court failed to appreciate all these aspects. Hence, the learned ::: Downloaded on - 23/05/2026 08:30:51 :::CIS 6 2026:HHC:17427 Appellate Court allowed the appeal and set aside the judgment and decree passed by the learned trial Court.
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8. Being aggrieved by the judgment and decree passed by the learned Appellate Court, defendant No.2 has filed the present appeal, which was admitted on the following substantial questions of law on 30.5.2008: -
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1. Whether the suit for declaration without asking for the relief of possession is maintainable, particularly when the rt plaintiffs are proved to be out of possession?
2. Whether the Appellate Court below is right in law in ignoring the judgment/decree of Civil Suit No. 53/95 and whether the reasoning for this purpose given by the Court is sustainable in law?
3. Whether the judgment and decree of the Appellate Court are vitiated on account of misreading and non-
consideration of relevant evidence produced by the appellant?
9. I have heard Mr H.S. Rangra, learned counsel for the appellant/defendant and Mr P.K. Verma, learned vice counsel representing the respondents.
10. Mr H.S. Rangra, learned counsel for the appellant, submitted that the learned Appellate Court erred in reversing the well-reasoned judgment passed by the learned Trial Court.
Defendant No.2 was found to be a non-occupancy tenant in the previous suit, and the learned Appellate Court erred in brushing ::: Downloaded on - 23/05/2026 08:30:51 :::CIS 7 2026:HHC:17427 aside the judgment and decree passed by the competent Court.
The latest revenue record proved that defendant No.2 was in .
possession of the suit land. Learned Appellate Court erred in holding that the tenancy could not have been relinquished in favour of any person except the State Government, and Chaitru had become the owner on the appointed day. Hence, he prayed of that the present appeal be allowed and the judgment and decree passed by the learned Appellate Court be set aside.
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11. Mr P.K. Verma, learned vice counsel representing the respondents, submitted that the learned Appellate Court had rightly held that it is impermissible to relinquish the tenancy in favour of any person except the State government. Learned Trial Court had not noticed this position of law. Chaitru was recorded to be the tenant of the suit land, and he became the owner on the appointed day. Learned Appellate Court had rightly appreciated the material on record, and this Court should not interfere with the pure finding of fact recorded by the learned Appellate Court.
Hence, he prayed that the present appeal be dismissed.
12. I have given a considerable thought to the submissions made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully.
::: Downloaded on - 23/05/2026 08:30:51 :::CIS 82026:HHC:17427 Substantial Question of Law No.1:
13. Plaintiff No. 1 Tulki Devi stated that Chaitru used to .
cultivate the suit land, who became the owner after the commencement of the H.P. Tenancy and Land Reforms Act. His estate was mutated in favour of his legal heirs. Plaintiffs used to cultivate the suit land after the death of Chaitru.
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14. Her statement is duly corroborated by the revenue rt record. A copy of Misal Hakiyat Bandobast Jadeed (Ex. PX/2) shows Padam Nath to be the landowner and Chaitru to be the non-
occupancy tenant of Khasra No. 121, 118, 113 (min), 128 (min) and 129 (min) old, corresponding to new Khasra No. 379, 381, 391, 392 and 394. Copy of Jamabandi for the year 1969-70 (Ex.PY-1 and Ex.PY-2) shows Hari Sukh, Mohan and Padam Nath to be the owners of Khasra Nos. 391, 392 and Chaitru to be in possession as non-occupancy tenants, and Padam Nath to be the owner of Khasra No. 379, 381, 398 and Chaitru to be in possession as non-
occupancy tenants. Similar entries have been recorded in the copy of Jamabandi for the year 1975-76 (Ex.PZ). Therefore, the version of the plaintiff Tulki Devi is duly corroborated by the revenue ::: Downloaded on - 23/05/2026 08:30:51 :::CIS 9 2026:HHC:17427 record showing that Chaitru was in possession of the suit land in the year 1975-76.
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15. Defendant No.2 relied upon the copy of Jamabandi for the 1996-97 (Ex.PX), in which Padam Nath is shown to be the owner and defendant No.2 Mast Ram is shown to be a non-
occupancy tenant. Similar entries have been recorded in the copy of of Khasra Girdawri (Ex.PY) for the year 1996-97. Defendant No.2 admitted the tenancy and possession of Chaitru by claiming that rt Chaitru had relinquished his tenancy in favour of Defendant No. 2 with the consent of the landowners.
16. Section 31 of H.P. Tenancy and Land Reforms Act deals with the relinquishment of a tenancy and reads that no relinquishment of a tenancy shall be made by a tenant in favour of the landowner, however a tenant can make a voluntary surrender of his tenancy in favour of the State, and the State government is free to induct any suitable tenant or a landless agricultural labour to the relinquished land in the manner so prescribed. Rule 12 of H.P. Tenancy and Land Reforms Rules, 1975 deals with the procedure for relinquishment of tenancy under Section 31 of the Act and reads that a tenant wishing to surrender his tenancy shall ::: Downloaded on - 23/05/2026 08:30:51 :::CIS 10 2026:HHC:17427 apply to the Collector in Form LR-1. It further provides the procedure for dealing with the application and the land, which is .
not relevant in the present case.
17. Therefore, it is apparent from the bare perusal of the section that it is impermissible to relinquish the tenancy in favour of any person except the state Government. It was held by this of Court in Babu Ram and Ors. vs. Pohlo Ram and Ors. (14.12.1990 -
HPHC): MANU/HP/0004/1992 that it is impermissible to relinquish rt the tenancy in favour of a landlord as per Section 31 of the H.P. Tenancy and Land Reforms Act. It was observed: -
"Firstly, it purports to relinquish the rights of a tenant. Section 31 of the Tenancy Act puts a clear bar for such relinquishments by a tenant in favour of the landowner, and this provision has been inserted in the Tenancy Act with retrospective effect, that is, much prior to the date when the document came into existence and as such is ineffective...."
18. It was laid down by the Division Bench of this Court in Paras Ram Vs. Bhuru 1973 ILR (HP) 31, while dealing with a similar provision contained in H.P. Abolition of Big Landed Estate and Land Reforms Act, 1953, that the tenancy can only be relinquished by means of a registered document and not in any other manner.
It was observed: -
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11. The other point is with regard to the document Ex. RA.
This document, Ex. RA purports to be a relinquishment deed, and it has rightly been excluded from evidence by the learned Compensation Officer. It purports to extinguish .
rights in immovable property of the value of more than Rs. 100 and as such under section 17 of the Indian Registration Act, it was compulsorily registerable, and in the absence of that, it cannot be looked into. The contention of the learned counsel for the appellant is that this document violates sections 8 and 110 of the Punjab Tenancy Act, of inasmuch as it was the Punjab Tenancy Act that was applicable at the time when this document was executed. Section 8 of the Punjab Tenancy Act provides for the establishment of rights of occupancy on grounds other rt than those expressly stated in the Act. This document, Exhibit RA, which is dated 23rd Kartika, 2010 BK, purports to have been executed by Bhuru, Paras Ram and others for a joint cultivation of the land. But, it appears, that this document was not acted upon inasmuch as the subsequent revenue entries show Bhuru as the tenant in possession of the land. This document was written 17 years ago and, as already stated, it being not registered, is not admissible. Further, this document is really contrary to the provisions of sections 8 and 110 of the Punjab Tenancy Act as applied to the erstwhile Bilaspur State. The tenant had been there for a very long time, and he had also secured the right to acquire the occupancy rights in the land through his long cultivation of the land. The subsequent revenue entries also belie that Bhuru had ceased to be the tenant after the execution of this document, Exhibit RA. Hence, this document Exhibit RA does not assist the landlord in any way. Therefore, this point goes against the appellants- landlords.
19. In the present case, the tenancy was over a huge chunk of land and could not have been relinquished without the registered document. Therefore, the learned Appellate Court had ::: Downloaded on - 23/05/2026 08:30:51 :::CIS 12 2026:HHC:17427 rightly held that the tenancy could not have been relinquished in favour of any person except the State, and the learned Trial Court .
had not adverted to this aspect while deciding the matter.
20. Defendant No.2 heavily relied upon the entries made in his favour in the revenue record. He has not produced the order vide which the entries were changed in his favour. He has also not of shown that the procedure required for changing the entries was followed in the present case. It was laid down by the Hon'ble rt Punjab and Haryana High Court in Amal Kumar vs. Bhupender Singh, 1976 PLJ 26, that the person who is likely to be affected by such a change is required to be notified, and proof of such notification is required to be retained on record. It was observed:
"The Financial Commissioner has prescribed the mode for effecting changes in the existing Khasra Girdawaris.
According to the instructions, it is the duty of the Patwari, before making any change in the existing entry at the time of harvest inspection, to notify in writing the person or persons likely to be adversely affected by such a change of the entries and retain on record proof of the notifications. Further, the changes so made should be attested by the Lambardar or the Panch of the village. It is further stated in the instructions that entries made in violation of the said instructions shall be treated as null and void at the time of attestation of the Jamabadi or at an earlier stage. Under Section 11 of the Punjab Land Revenue Act of 1887, the Financial Commissioner had the general power of superintendence and control over ::: Downloaded on - 23/05/2026 08:30:51 :::CIS 13 2026:HHC:17427 all Revenue Officers, and in that capacity, he has got a right to issue such instructions. In this view, I am supported by a decision of this Court in S. Mohan Singh V. The Financial Commissioner, Revenue, Punjab and others, .
1967 PunLR 377, wherein it has been observed that the standing orders can be issued because of the general power of superintendence granted to the Financial Commissioners under Section 11 of the Land Revenue Act. These instructions have been issued to put a curb on the unrestricted owners of the Patwaris to manipulate of the Khasra Girdawaris in the way they desire. It was the duty of the Patwari before changing the Khasra Girdawari and making an entry in favour of the appellants to have informed the landowners so that they rt could come and contest the new entry, which was to be made by him if they so desired."
21. This judgment was followed in Parmanand vs. Sucha Singh 1997(1) PLJ 474, wherein it was held:
"As per para 9.9 of the Punjab Land Records Manual, a duty has been imposed upon the revenue authorities to notify the proposed change to adversely affected parties. In case no notice has been issued, such a change in entry cannot bind the affected person. This matter came up for consideration in the case reported as Ram Sarup v. Balwant Sing and Ors., 1991 P.L.J. 278, and the Court relied upon para No. 9.9. of the Punjab Land Records Manual held it is incumbent upon the concerned revenue authorities to inform the affected person before effecting any change in the revenue entries."
22. This question was considered by this Court in Harbans Singh & ors. vs. Karam Chand & anr. 1991(2) Shim. L. C.222, and it was held:
8. It is well settled that where the earlier revenue entries were changed in the later revenue entries the change was effected without any mutation and there was no ::: Downloaded on - 23/05/2026 08:30:51 :::CIS 14 2026:HHC:17427 order of the Revenue Authorities showing how the change was made, although the presumption ordinarily would be in favour of the later entries, yet that presumption is rebuttable one and it would be deemed to .
have been rebutted by the fact that the alterations in the later entries are found to have been made unauthorisedly or mistakenly, there being no material to justify the change of entries. This is what has been found to have been done in the instant case, while the entries recording the plaintiffs to be the owners in possession of of the suit land have been recorded in the later Khasra Girdawari. In fact, the Financial Commissioner has prescribed the mode for effecting changes in the existing Khasra Girdawaries. According to the instructions, it is rt the duty of the Patwari before making any change in the existing entry at the time of harvest inspection, to notify in writing the person or persons likely to be adversely affected by such a change of the entries and retain on record proof of the notifications Further, the changes so made, should be attested by the Lumberdar or the Panch of the village. It is further stated in the instructions that entries made in violation of the said instructions shall be treated as null and void at the time of attestation of the Jamabandi or at an earlier stage.
23. This position was reiterated in Lal Chand & Ors. Vs. Pala 1999(2) Cur. L.J. (HP) 415, and it was held:
23. It may not be out of place to mention here that there is a legal presumption of truth attached to the latest entries in the record of rights, but this presumption is a rebuttable one. In the present case, in the latest record rights, as discussed above, Pala has been recorded in actual occupation of the suit land as a tenant. His simple case, as pleaded, has been that about 40 years back, when Prem Singh, father of the plaintiff and proforma defendants No. 2 and 3, died, he was inducted as a tenant by the land owners. This only reflected that prior to the ::: Downloaded on - 23/05/2026 08:30:51 :::CIS 15 2026:HHC:17427 death of Prem Singh, that is, Prem Singh was in actual occupation of the suit land, which fact is otherwise reflected from the entries in the record of rights, referred to above. There is no dispute to the proposition .
that the late entries in the record of rights to which a legal presumption of truth is attached were the result of the change made in Kharif 1979 pertaining to the suit land. In case this change was made in Kharif 1979 in favour of Pala, the defendant is held to be a legal one definitely, the later entries made on the basis of the of same would be held to be a legal one. In case this change is not held to be legal, and the change made in Kharif 1979 is avoided, the later entries in favour of the Pala defendant shall automatically fall. There is again no rt dispute to this proposition.
24. At this stage, the definition of the tenant as given in the Himachal Pradesh Tenancy and Land Reforms Act, 1972, can be referred to, which would be essential to appreciate the case of the parties in this particular regard, especially that of the Pala defendant. The tenant has been defined under Section 2(17) of the aforesaid Act :
"2(17) "tenant" means a person who holds land under a land owner, and is. Or, but for a contract to the contrary, would be liable to pay rent for that land to that land-owner and includes -
(i) a subtenant; and
(ii) the predecessors or successors in interest of tenants or a sub-tenant, as the case may be, but it does not include -
(a).......................
(b)................"
25. Taking into consideration the aforesaid definition, a party claiming the status of a tenant has not only to prove the alleged agreement of tenancy but also to plead the same. In the present case, there does not appear to ::: Downloaded on - 23/05/2026 08:30:51 :::CIS 16 2026:HHC:17427 be any dispute that during the "lifetime of Prem Singh, he was occupying the suit land and that too as a tenant, as has been held by the Civil Court. It is correct that the civil court's decree might not be binding on the present .
defendant as he was not a party to that litigation, but so far as the landowners were concerned, the matter between Prem Singh and his successors and them was final.
26. The entries were changed in the name of the Pala defendant vide Ex.DW3/A, referred to earlier. There is of nothing in this document that the present plaintiff and defendants No.2 and 3 were present when this entry was changed. There is nothing on record to suggest even remotely that any enquiry was conducted by the Patwari rt before making this entry, and in that enquiry, the present plaintiff and proforma defendants No.2 and 3 were associated. This report is silent that Pala was inducted as a tenant on payment of rent by the land owners. There is no evidence that, before recording this entry in October 1979, the earlier tenants who were recorded in this record of rights were evicted in accordance with law, or that they had relinquished their tenancy rights. Thus, at the very face of it, so far as the documents are concerned, which have been discussed above, the change in an entry in the name of the Pala defendant was made without any authority and against law and procedure in this behalf. In case this entry is ignored, the subsequent entries made in favour of Pala automatically lose their legal entity.
24. In the present case, defendant No.2 has not brought any material on record to show that the change was made by notifying the plaintiffs or their predecessor, and no reliance can be placed upon the entries recorded in the Jamabandi for the year 1996-97.
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25. Defendant No.2 also relied upon the judgment and decree of declaration passed in the previous suit. A perusal of .
judgment and decree (Ex.DW1/A) shows that the landowner Padam Nath had admitted before the Court that the plaintiff was in possession of the suit land and he was paying rent to the landowners after the death of Chaitru. Subhash Chand and the of learned counsel for Leela Devi and Krishan Chand, the legal representative of Mohan Lal, admitted the claim of Mast Ram.
rt The present plaintiffs were not impleaded as parties. Section 35 of the Specific Relief Act clearly provides that a declaration is binding only on the parties to the suit, persons claiming through them and their trustees. It was laid down by the Bombay High Court in SNP Shipping Services Pvt. Ltd. v. World Tanker Carrier Corporation, 1999 SCC OnLine Bom 584 : (2000) 2 Mah LJ 570 that a declaratory decree is a judgment in personam and not in rem. It was observed at page 586:
"16...By virtue of section 35 of the Specific Relief Act, a declaration given under section 34 is binding only between the parties. It is a declaration in personam and not in rem. Thus, the Indian Authorities would not be bound by the declaration. It would be of no effect and thus futile..."
26. It was laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Booz Allen & Hamilton Inc. v. SBI Home Finance Ltd., (2011) 5 SCC 532:
::: Downloaded on - 23/05/2026 08:30:51 :::CIS 182026:HHC:17427 2011 SCC OnLine SC 636 that a judgment in personam binds the parties to the suit and the judgment in rem binds the whole world.
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It was observed at page 547:
"37. It may be noticed that the cases referred to above relate to actions in rem. A right in rem is a right exercisable against the world at large, as contrasted from a right in personam, which is an interest protected solely against of specific individuals. Actions in personam refer to actions determining the rights and interests of the parties themselves in the subject matter of the case, whereas actions in rem refer to actions determining the title to rt property and the rights of the parties, not merely among themselves but also against all persons at any time claiming an interest in that property. Correspondingly, a judgment in personam refers to a judgment against a person as distinguished from a judgment against a thing, right or status, and a judgment in rem refers to a judgment that determines the status or condition of property which operates directly on the property itself. (Vide Black's Law Dictionary.)"
27. In the present case, the plaintiffs are not claiming through the landowners or defendant No.2, but through Chaitru and the decree passed by the Court in the previous suit, where they were not parties, would not bind them, and the learned Appellate Court had rightly held that the judgment and decree passed by the learned Court were not binding on them.
28. The landowners had asserted in the previous suit that after the death of Chaitru, Mast Ram was inducted as a tenant, ::: Downloaded on - 23/05/2026 08:30:51 :::CIS 19 2026:HHC:17427 and he was paying the rent to the landowners. The defendant Mast Ram asserted in the present suit that Chaitru had .
relinquished the tenancy in favour of Mast Ram with the consent of the landowners. When Mast Ram (DW1) appeared in the Court, he only stated that he used to cultivate the land during the lifetime of Chaitru because Chaitru was unable to cultivate the of land. He nowhere claimed that Chaitru had relinquished the tenancy in his favour with the consent of the landowners. He rt claimed that he has been in possession of the suit land since the year 1970, which is contrary to the revenue record, wherein Chaitru has been recorded to be in possession as a tenant.
Therefore, defendant No.2 had taken contradictory pleas at different points in time, and the learned Appellate Court was justified in rejecting the stand taken by defendant No.2.
29. Brikam (PW2) stated that Chaitru used to cultivate the land during his lifetime, which falsifies the defendant's version that he was cultivating the land during the lifetime of Chaitru.
Therefore, the learned Appellate Court was justified in holding that the defendant's evidence was not sufficient to prove his possession, and the plaintiffs' version that they were in ::: Downloaded on - 23/05/2026 08:30:51 :::CIS 20 2026:HHC:17427 possession of the suit land has to be accepted as correct on the balance of probability.
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30. Thus, the plaintiffs and proforma defendant were in possession of the suit land, and the suit filed by them seeking the declaration was fully maintainable. Hence, this substantial question of law is answered accordingly.
of Substantial Question of Law No.2:
31. rt Chaitru was recorded to be the non-occupancy tenant of the suit land. The plaintiffs are the successors of Chaitru. Any decree affecting their right could not have been passed without hearing them, and a decree of declaration granted by the Court in the previous proceedings, wherein the plaintiffs were not parties, will not bind them as noted above. Therefore, the learned Appellate Court was justified in holding that the judgment and decree in Civil Suit No. 53 of 1995 would not be binding upon the plaintiff, and this substantial question of law is answered accordingly Substantial Question of Law No.3:
32. The learned Appellate Court had considered the evidence led by the defendant and the evidence produced by the ::: Downloaded on - 23/05/2026 08:30:51 :::CIS 21 2026:HHC:17427 plaintiff, including the documentary evidence. There is no misreading of the judgment by the learned Appellate Court, as .
noticed above. Therefore, the substantial question of law is answered accordingly.
Final Order:
33. In view of the above, the present appeal fails, and it is of dismissed
34. rt Pending application(s), if any, also stand(s) disposed of.
35. Records of the learned Courts below be sent down forthwith.
(Rakesh Kainthla) Judge 18th May, 2026 (Chander) ::: Downloaded on - 23/05/2026 08:30:51 :::CIS