Madhya Pradesh High Court
Durgesh Vanshkar vs The State Of Madhya Pradesh on 18 July, 2024
1
IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH AT
JABALPUR
BEFORE
HON'BLE SHRI JUSTICE RAJ MOHAN SINGH
&
HON'BLE SHRI JUSTICE VIVEK JAIN
ON THE 18th OF JULY, 2024
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.225 OF 2014
BETWEEN:-
DURGESH VANSHKAR S/O BHAIYALAL VANSHKAR,
AGED ABOUT 20 YEARS, R/O VILLAGE ANKMAU, PS
BABAI DISTRICT HOSHANGABAD (MP)
...APPELLANT
(BY SMT. DURGESH GUPTA - ADVOCATE)
AND
STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH THROUGH POLICE
STATION BABAI DISTRICT HOSHANGABAD (M.P.)
....RESPONDENT
(BY SHRI ARVIND SINGH - GOVT. ADVOCATE)
2
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.394 OF 2014
BETWEEN:-
HARIOM AHIRWAR, AGED 22 YEARS S/O FADALI
LAL AHIRWAR, OCCUPATION- LABOUR &
AGRICULTURIST, R/O VILLAGE AANKHMAU,
POLICE STATION- BABAI DISTRICT HOSHANGABAD
(MP)
...APPELLANT
(BY SMT. DURGESH GUPTA - ADVOCATE)
AND
STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH THROUGH POLICE
STATION BABAI DISTRICT HOSHANGABAD (M.P.)
....RESPONDENT
(BY SHRI ARVIND SINGH - GOVT. ADVOCATE)
Reserved on : 02.05.2024
Delivered on : 18.07.2024
__________________________________________________
JUDGMENT
RAJ MOHAN SINGH, J:
Vide this common judgment Criminal Appeal No.225/2014 (Durgesh Vanshkar Vs. State of MP) and Criminal 3 Appeal No.394/2014 (Hariom Ahirwar Vs. State of MP) are being decided. Both the criminal appeals have arisen from the common judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated 06.01.2014 passed by the Second Additional Sessions Judge, Hoshangabad in ST No.215/2013, convicting and sentencing the appellants to undergo R.I. for 20 years with fine of Rs.15,000/- each with default stipulations under Section 376(D) of IPC and R.I. for one year under Section 506 (Part-II) of IPC.
The sentences have been ordered to run concurrently.
2. The prosecution story started with the allegations that on 9.6.2013 at about 7:00 PM, the prosecutrix (PW-2) aged more than 17 years had gone to attend the call of nature in the field of Surru Yadav. At about 7.30 PM, appellant Hariom Ahirwar came over there and caught hold of her and after sometime he received the mobile phone of co-appellant Durgesh. Hariom Ahirwar called him to reach near ber tree. After sometime co-appellant Durgesh also reached there and 4 they forcibly committed sexual assault upon the victim/ prosecutrix. The prosecutrix reached home at 9:30 PM. On account of her reaching late in the house, her father scolded her and asked her where she had gone. Due to fear she did not disclose anything to her father, nor disclosed anything to other persons. In the morning her father had gone to Bhopal being a driver of a car. The prosecutrix narrated the incident to her father at about 9:00 AM. Thereafter the prosecutrix lodged the report at the Police Station Babai District Hoshangabad on 10.6.2013 at 7:30 PM. The police investigated the offence and after completion of investigation filed the report under Section 173 of Cr.P.C. The charges were framed against the appellants to which they pleaded not guilty and claimed trial. The prosecution examined 10 witnesses and on the basis of evidence, the trial Court convicted and sentenced the appellants for the offences in question. The trial Court held the prosecutrix to be less than 18 years of age.
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3. Dr. G.S.Soni has been examined as PW-1, who found both the appellants to be medically fit to commit the offence in question. The doctor collected their semen, public hairs and underwear and handed over the same to the Constable Shaitan Singh.
4. The victim/prosecutrix has been examined as PW-2. She stated in her statement that her date of birth was 15.4.1996. She stated that the occurrence took place on 8.6.2013 when she went to meet the call of nature at 7:00 PM in the field, where appellant Hariom arrived and he gagged her mouth and gave threats. He informed co-appellant Durgesh to come near the ber tree. Thereafter Durgesh came there and they tied the neck of the prosecutrix and Durgesh caught hold of her head of the prosecutrix and Hariom caught hold of her legs and threw her on the Medh. They made her naked. Hariom committed the bad act with the prosecutrix and thereafter Durgesh committed the same. They committed rape upon the prosecutrix two times 6 each. The prosecutrix further stated that she wore her clothes but Hariom told Durgesh that the prosecutrix be not allowed to go home and be kept there for the night. If she was allowed to go home, then she would disclose every thing to the family members. They also gave threats of killing to the prosecutrix. The prosecutrix gave a bite to Hariom and thereafter tried to run away. She succeeded in reaching home by having falls at different places. At that time her father came home and on being asked she became frightened and did not disclose anything to the family members. She slept in the night. The prosecutrix further stated that the occurrence of 8.6.2013 was not disclosed to anyone and on the next day her father went to Nagpur on a vehicle and she informed her father about the occurrence on his phone. On 9/6/2013 her father came back from Nagpur and on that very day in the evening she accompanied her father to Babai and got recorded the report (Ex.P-3), which was signed by her at place A to A. The 7 prosecutrix claimed herself to be 17 years of age having date of birth as 15.4.1996. After lodging the report, she was medically examined. She was produced by the police in the Court on 18.6.2013 and her statement was recorded as Ex.P-4, which was signed by her at place A to A. In her cross examination, the prosecutrix had given details of the place of occurrence, which was situated 100 meters away from her house. Before the occurrence Hariom was married and is the only son of his parents. The prosecutrix also stated that on Ex.P-3 and Ex.D-1, she had disclosed that appellant Durgesh caught hold of her head and Hariom caught hold of her legs. If these facts are not recorded in Ex.P-3 and Ex.D-1, then she will not be in a position to tell anything. Regarding other facts as well, the prosecutrix stated the same if the same are not recorded by the police in Ex.P-3, P-4 and P-1 then she will not be in a position to tell anything. The prosecutrix stated that her statement was recorded by the police on 9.6.2013. She further stated that it 8 would be wrong to say that no document was submitted to the police in respect of her date of birth. She also denied that a false report was given by her on the asking of Arvind and Panda. She further admitted in her cross examination that in the event of commission of crime at the place of occurrence, the alarm would have reached to the road and the warehouse. Since her mouth was gagged, therefore she could not cry. She further admitted that she did not visit the house of Hariom and Durgesh, as the family members were not on speaking terms and she did not wish to inform anyone in respect of the occurrence. Her mother died in the year 2006. She had three brothers. She is the only sister of their brothers. She denied that her date of birth was got recorded on approximation by her parents. She was born in Ankhmau. Pradeep is elder to her. She took birth after Pradeep and Pradeep is still unmarried. In respect of her date of birth, she did not collect any certificate from the Kotwar or the Gram Panchayat nor was the same 9 given to the police. She denied that she was 19 years of age at the time of occurrence. She further stated that Lota/Dabba was seized by the police from the place of occurrence and the police prepared the Naksha of the place on the next day. She got injuries on the back and also narrated the same to the doctor. She also got bleeding from her private part at the spot. She also pointed out the blood spots to the police at the place of occurrence. She also submitted the blood stained clothes to the police. On the next day of the occurrence, she took bath and changed the clothes. In the evening, she accompanied her father to the police station for lodging the report. She handed over the blood stained undergarments to the doctor.
5. Yashwant Singh has been examined as PW-3, who had demarcated the spot at the instance of the prosecutrix. The Naksha (Ex.P-6) was prepared, which was signed by this witness and the prosecutrix. Pradeep has been examined as PW- 4, who is brother of the prosecutrix. His statement was based on 10 hearsay, but this witness admitted that the family members of the appellants were not on speaking terms due to some grievance and they were not visiting the houses of each other. Purshottam, father of the prosecutrix has been examined as PW-5. He stated that he along with his daughter went to the Police Station Babai at 5:30 PM on 10.6.2013. The year of birth of the prosecutrix was stated to be 1996, but he did not remember the date and month of the birth of the prosecutrix. His marriage was solemnized in the year 1992. Pradeep took birth in 1994 and thereafter the prosecutrix took birth in 1996. This witness admitted that in respect of date of birth of the prosecutrix, he did not submit any document to the school except the mark sheet.
6. Dr. Shobhana Chouksey has been examined as PW-
6. She was posted in CHC Babai as Medical Officer on 10.6.2013 where the prosecutrix aged about 17 years was brought by Constable No.50 Moolchand for medical 11 examination. Before the medical examination, the concurrence of her aunty was taken. On external examination, the prosecutrix was found to be of normal height and was conscious. She was giving correct answers to the questions put to her. Her walk was normal. Her blood pressure was also normal. She was complaining of pain in the neck and chest. Her breast was fully developed. Secondary sex characteristics were developing. Towards the right chest, there were three scratches, which had appeared on account of some nail scratch. The size of scratches were 1/2 x 1/6 cm and 1/3 x 1/6 cm of brown colour. Two scratches were found on the back and the size of the scratches were 1 x 1/2 cm and 1.5 x 1/4 cm, which were possible due to hard and uneven thing. There was slight pain and slight swelling. On both sides of neck, skin was pinkish and there was slight pain and swelling, which could have been possible due to hard and rough kind of thing. These injuries were found to be between 18 to 30 hours. On internal 12 examination, the doctor admitted that one finger was going easily in the private part of the prosecutrix. There was internal fluid/discharge/swab. There was no swelling. There was no infection nor was any redness in the private part. The hymen was found to be torn long ago. The wounds were healed. At the time of internal examination, the prosecutrix did not complain about any pain. The doctor did not give any definite opinion regarding rape, but prepared three slides of internal discharge/swab and sealed the same for chemical examination and handed over the same to the Constable. The doctor sealed black colour underwear and pubic hair of the prosecutrix and prepared the medical report Ex.P-8, which was signed by her at place A to A. In her cross examination, the doctor admitted that the mental state of the prosecutrix was normal. She was having normal walk. On being asked, the doctor submitted that in the event of committing rape upon a lady forcibly for the first time by two persons, her walk may be changed. There was no fresh 13 wound in the private part of the prosecutrix. Normally the vaginal fluid/discharge/swab remains present in the vagina of a woman and if a lady is subjected to forcible rape by two persons, then her vagina is bound to have injuries and cracks. There was no fresh injury or crack in the vagina of the prosecutrix. There were swelling in the neck of the prosecutrix, which could have been self suffered also. The injuries on the chest and back could have been possible due to self scratching. The age of the prosecutrix was written as 17 years, but the doctor did not give any opinion regarding the age of the prosecutrix, as the same was not asked by the police.
7. Atul Vyas has been examined as PW-7. He was posted as Head Master of St. Mary Higher Secondary School on 18.6.2013. He brought the date of birth certificate of the prosecutrix as Ex.P-9, showing the date of birth of the prosecutrix as 15.4.1996. He brought the Dakhil Kharij register of the school in which at page No.158, the entry was made at 14 Sl.No.1352 to 1827. In the aforesaid register at page No.78 at Sl.No.1623, name of Ku. Rajni Ahirwar daughter of Purshottam resident of Village Ankhmau with date of birth as 15.4.1996 was recorded and the date of admission was shown to be 30.7.2011. The Dakhil Kharij register was produced as Ex.P-10. In his cross examination, this witness admitted that the prosecutrix came to the school in the 9th Class. The admission was given to the prosecutrix on the basis of transfer certificate. This witness further admitted that the parents of the students usually got the date of birth entered in the school record by approximation and he admitted that in respect of date of birth of the prosecutrix, he did not see any entry made by Kotwar nor was any birth certificate issued by the Municipal Council.
8. Pramod Patel has been examined as PW-8. He was posted as Constable in Police Station Babai on 12.6.2013. He was witness of the seized articles of the accused/appellants. CP Mishra has been examined as PW-9. He was posted as Sub 15 Inspector in Police Station Babai on 10.6.2013. He investigated the offence in question and submitted the report under Section 173 of Cr.P.C. Vijay Chorey has been examined as PW-10. He was posted as Head Constable in Police Station Babai on 12.6.2013. He was also witness to the seized articles. Vinay Ahirwar has been examined as PW-11. His testimony was also based on hearsay from the prosecutrix. Rajesh Kumar Singh has been examined as PW-12, who was the Nodal Officer in Idea Cellular Ltd. Office Indore from December 2011 to 6.12.2013 that is the date on which his testimony was recorded in the Court.
9. The material collected by the police and deposed by the prosecution witnesses were put to the accused/appellants in their statements under Section 313 of Cr.P.C. The appellants did not admit the incriminating material and pleaded innocence. In their defence, they led defence evidence. Anjesh Kumar was examined as DW-1. He was the maternal uncle of Hariom. He 16 stayed in the house of Hariom from 8.6.2013 to 10.6.2013 and had dinner with Hariom on 8th and 9th at about 7-8:00 PM. Hariom remained with his wife and parents throughout. On 9.6.2013 there was no light in the village and he denied that appellant Hariom had gone out of the house at 7-8:00 PM on 9.6.2013. Fadali Lal, father of appellant Hariom was examined as DW-2. He also made his statement in favour of the appellants. Bhagwan Singh was examined as DW-3 and similarly Bhaiyalal, father of appellant Durgesh and Ratan Rathore were also examined as DW-4 and DW-5 respectively, who had supported the case of the appellants.
10. With reference to the material on record, learned counsel for the appellants made a stress on the statement of the victim/prosecutrix, who had stated that the occurrence took place on 8.6.2013 and she informed her father on 9.6.2013. Her father went along with her on 9.6.2013 to the police station, whereas the prosecution story started with the allegations that 17 the occurrence took place on 9.6.2013 and the FIR got registered on 10.6.2013. There was a vertical swift in the statement of the prosecutrix as well as the prosecution story. Dr. Shobhna Chouksey (PW-6) had ruled out the possibility of rape. She did not give any positive opinion regarding the rape, however she prepared three slides and sealed the clothes for chemical analysis. The determination of age of the prosecutrix could not be proved with reference to the mandatory requirement of law in terms of Section 94 of Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015. Atul Vyas, Head Master of St. Mary Higher Secondary School while appearing as PW-7 specifically admitted that at the time of recording of date of birth of the prosecutrix, neither any Kotwar register was produced nor was the date of birth certificate issued by the Municipal Council produced.
11. As per the FSL report, the human chromosomes were found on Articles A (underwear of the prosecutrix), 18 Article B (slide of the prosecutrix), Article D (underwear of Hariom), Article E (slide of Hariom), Article F (underwear of Durgesh) and Article G (slide of Durgesh). The chromosomes were not found on Article C (pubic hair of the prosectrix) and Article H (pubic hair of Durgesh). Learned counsel for the appellants submitted that the presence of human chromosome in the FSL report would give rise to a questionable submission. The occurrence took place on 8th or 9th June of 2013. The doctor collected the samples of the accused and the prosecutrix on 12.6.2013 (in case of the appellants) and on 10.6.2013 (in case of the prosecutrix). The samples were sent to the laboratory on 22.6.2013 and the samples were tested on 18.7.2013. The FSL report was silent regarding motile or non-motile form of sperms. The study arising out of Parikh's Textbook of Medical Jurisprudence, Forensic Medicine and Texicology prescribes that the sperms remain motile in the vagina for a certain period and in any case the same cannot remain alive after 18 days and 19 even non-motile form of sperms are detectable for about 24 hours with occasional reports of 48 to 72 hours and very rarely upto 96 hours. The FSL report was totally silent with regard to nature of sperms whether the same were motile or non-motile. If the aforesaid FSL report was to be believed, then the same ought to have been proved in terms of DNA profiling of the accused/appellants. No DNA profile was done. In the absence of any DNA profiling, the presence of sperms that too after period of more than one month from the date of occurrence would negate the theory of rape particularly when as per the medical evidence, no such characteristics of rape were brought forward by the doctor. The doctor found nothing incriminatory , as private parts of the prosecutrix did not have any proof of any characteristics of forcible rape. The hymen had old tears. The wounds were completely healed. The prosecutrix had no pain in her private part. The private part did not have any injury. The opinion of the doctor was subject to scientific test. The 20 presence of chromosome on the articles as pointed out by the FSL could not be tested at the threshold of matching configurations by way of DNA profiling.
12. The appellants were never subjected to any DNA test. Directing the accused to give blood sample for DNA profiling would not amount to violation of Article 20(3) of the Constitution of India. The investigating agency is bound to scrupulously follow the provisions of Section 53-A of the Cr.P.C. The refusal on the part of the accused to give blood sample for DNA profiling under Section 53-A of the Cr.P.C. would entail adverse inference. The duty of the Court in cases arising out of POCSO Act, is not of being a third umpire detached from the ground merely maintaining the score-sheet to announce the verdict at the end of the trial. It is required to be proactive to ensure that the investigating agencies conform to the Rule of Law leading to fairness in investigation. The trial Court has ample power to ensure that the investigating agency 21 and the accused follow the drill of Section 53-A of the Cr.P.C. It is settled law that a Court must discharge its statutory function whether discretionary or obligatory. To ensure compliance of Section 53-A of the Cr.P.C. is certainly an obligatory duty of the trial Court, conducting trial under the POCSO Act. After the insertion of Section 53-A of Cr.P.C. (w.e.f. 23.6.2006), the intention of the legislature is clear that under Section 53-A and Section 164-A of the Cr.P.C., an examination of the victim as well as accused is must and further the material collected during investigation along with the blood sample of the accused should be sent for DNA profiling. The medical practitioner as well as the investigating agency are bound to follow the drill of Section 53-A and Section 16c4-A of the Cr.P.C., especially in rape cases with respect to the minors where the provisions of POCSO Act are attracted. Under Sections 29 and 30 of the POCSO Act, a presumption is drawn against the accused and he is required to rebut the presumption but a perusal of the 22 statement of accused recorded under Section 313 of Cr.P.C. reveals that he has made no attempt to explain or clarify the incriminating circumstances. A simple denial would not absolve him of the presumption as provided under Sections 29 and 30 of the POCSO Act. In order to attract the presumption under Sections 29 and 30 of the POCSO Act, the age of the prosecutrix/victim under Section 34(2) of POCSO Act has to be conclusively determined. The stringent punishment provided under the POCSO Act would proceed mandatory compliance of determination of age of the prosecutrix in terms of applicable laws.
13. Rule 12 of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Rules, 2007 (for brevity "Rules, 2007") came into force on 26.10.2007 in exercise of powers conferred upon the Central Government in view of the proviso to sub-section (1) of Section 68 of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000 (56 of 2000). The aforesaid rule prescribes 23 the procedure to be followed in determination of age. Rule 12(3) of the Rules, 2007 is reproduced as under:-
"(3) In every case concerning a child or juvenile in conflict with law, the age determination inquiry shall be conducted by the court or the Board or, as the case may be, the Committee by seeking evidence by obtaining-
(a) (i) the matriculation or equivalent certificates, if available; and in the absence whereof;
(ii) the date of birth certificate from the school (other than a play school) first attended; and in the absence whereof;
(iii) the birth certificate given by a corporation or a municipal authority or a panchayat,
(b) and only in the absence of either (i), (ii) or (iii) of clause (a) above, the medical opinion will be sought from a duly constituted Medical Board, which will declare the age of the juvenile or child.
In case exact assessment of the age cannot be done, the Court or the Board or, as the case may be, the Committee, for the reasons to be recorded by them, may, if considered necessary, give benefit to the child or juvenile by considering his/her age on lower side within the margin of one year.
and, while passing orders in such case shall, after taking into consideration such evidence as may be available, or the medical opinion, as the case may be, record finding in respect of his age and either of the evidence specified in any of the clauses (a)
(i), (ii), (iii) or in the absence whereof, clause (b) shall be the conclusive roof of the age as regards such child or the juvenile in conflict with law." 24
14. Perusal of Rule 12(3)(a)(i), (ii), (iii) would indicate that in every case concerning a child or juvenile in conflict with law, the age determination inquiry shall be conducted by the Court or the Board or, as the case may be, the Committee by seeking evidence by obtaining the matriculation or equivalent certificates, if available; and in the absence whereof, the date of birth certificate from the school first attended, and in the absence whereof, the birth certificate from a corporation or a municipal authority or a panchayat. In the absence of either (i),
(ii) or (iii) of Clause (a), the medical opinion will be sought from a duly constituted Medical Board, which will declare the age of the juvenile/child as the case may be.
15. Rule 12(6) of the Rules, 2007 deals with the provisions contained in this rule shall also apply to those disposed of cases, where the status of juvenility has not been determined in accordance with the provisions contained in sub- rule (3) and the Act, requiring dispensation of the sentence 25 under the Act for passing appropriate order in the interest of the juvenile in conflict with law.
16. The Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015 (for brevity "Act of 2015") came into force on 15.1.2016 as a result of re-enactment of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000 (for brevity "Act of 2000"). It is enacted with a view to make comprehensive provisions for children alleged and found to be in conflict with law and children in need of care and protection, taking into consideration the standards prescribed in the Convention on the Rights of the Child, the United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for the Administration of Juvenile Justice, 1985 (the Beijing Rules), the United Nations Rules for the Protection of Juveniles Deprived of their Liberty (1990), the Hague Convention on Protection of Children and Co- operation in Respect of Inter-country Adoption (1993), and other related international instruments. Section 1(4) of the Act 26 of 2015 provides that notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force, the provisions of this Act shall apply to all matters concerning children in need of care and protection and children in conflict with law, including
(i) apprehension, detention, prosecution, penalty or imprisonment, rehabilitation and social re-integration of children in conflict with law, (ii) procedures and decisions or orders relating to rehabilitation, adoption, re-integration, and restoration of children in need of care and protection. Vide the aforesaid Act, 2015, the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000 has been repealed. Notwithstanding such repeal, anything done or any action taken under the said Acts shall be deemed to have been done or taken under the corresponding provisions of this Act.
17. Section 94 of the Act of 2015 provides for presumption and determination of age, which reads as under:-
"(1) Where, it is obvious to the Committee or the Board, based on the appearance of the person 27 brought before it under any of the provisions of this Act (other than for the purpose of giving the evidence) that the said person is a child, the Committee or the Board shall record ere such observation stating the age of the child as nearly as may be and proceed with the inquiry under section 14 or section 36, as the case may be, without waiting for further confirmation of the age.
(2) In case, the Committee or the Board has reasonable grounds for doubt regarding whether the person brought before it is a child or not, the Committee or the Board, as the case may be, shall undertake the process of age determination, by seeking evidence by obtaining-
(i) the date of birth certificate from the school, or the matriculation or equivalent certificate from the concerned examination Board, if available;
and in the absence thereof;
(ii) the birth certificate given by a corporation or a municipal authority or a panchayat;
(iii) and only in the absence of (i) and (ii) above, age shall be determined by an ossification test or any other latest medical age determination test conducted on the orders of the Committee or the Board:
Provided such age determination test conducted on the order of the Committee or the Board shall be completed within fifteen days from the date of such order.
(3) The age recorded by the Committee or the Board to be the age of person so brought before it 28 shall, for the purpose of this Act, be deemed to be the true age of that person."
18. The difference in the procedure under the aforesaid two enactments can be appreciated as under:-
"As per the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015, in the absence of requisite documents as mentioned in Clauses (i) and (ii) of Section 94(2), there is provision for determination of age by an ossification test or any other latest medical age determination test to be conducted on the orders of the Committee or the Board as per Section 94 of the Act, 2015. Whereas, under Rule 12 of the Rule 2007, in the absence of relevant documents, the medical opinion has to be sought from a duly constituted Medical Board, which would declare the age of the juvenile or child."
19. With regard to the documents to be provided as evidence, what was provided under Rule 12 of the Rules, 2007 has been provided under sub-rule (2) of Section 94 of the Act of 2015 as a substantive provision.
20. Under Section 49 of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000, where it appears to a competent authority that a person brought before it was a juvenile or the child, then such competent authority put after 29 making an enquiry and taking such evidence as was necessary, record a finding as to juvenility of such person and state the age of such person as nearly as may be. Sub-Section 2 of Section 49 of the Act, 2000 stated that no order of a competent authority shall be deemed to have become invalid merely by any subsequent proof that the person in respect of whom the order has been made is not a juvenile or the child, and the age recorded by the competent authority to be the age of person so brought before it, shall for the purpose of this Act, be deemed to be the true age of that person. But, under Section 94 of the Act, 2015, which also deals with presumption and determination of age, the committee or Board has to record such observation stating the age of the child as nearly as may be and proceed with the inquiry without waiting for further confirmation of the age. It is only when the Committee or Board has reasonable grounds for doubt regarding whether the person brought before it is a child or not, it can undertake the 30 process of age determination by seeking evidence. Sub-section 3 of Section 94 of the Act of 2015 states that the age recorded by the Committee or the Board to be the age of the person so brought before it shall, for the purpose of this Act, be deemed to be the true age of that person. Thus there is finality attached to the determination of the age recorded and it is only in case where reasonable grounds exists for doubt as to whether the person brought the Committee or the Board is a child or not, that a process of age determination by seeking evidence is to be resorted to.
21. The Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act of 2015 has repealed Act of 2000, however notwithstanding such repeal, anything done or any action taken under the old Act i.e. the Act of 2000 shall be deemed to have been done or taken under the corresponding provisions of this Act. In view of the aforesaid, Section 111 (2) of the Act of 2015, the action taken under the Act of 2000 and the Rules 31 framed thereunder i.e. Rule of 2007 shall be deemed to have been done or taken under the corresponding provisions of the Act. In case of any difficulty, Section 112 of the Act of 2015 has to be invoked, which provides that if any difficulty arises in giving effect to the provisions of this Act, the Central Government may, by order, not inconsistent with the provisions of this Act, remove the difficulty. Provided that no such order shall be made after the expiry of the period of two years from the commencement of this Act.
22. Evidently the rules framed under the Juvenile Justice Act, 2000 have to be appreciated in the context of Repealed Act of 2000 by the Act of 2015. Section 6 of General Clauses Act, 1897 is relevant to be quoted in the present context, which provides the effect of repeal. Section 6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 is reproduced as under:-
"Where this Act, or any [Central Act] [Substituted by A.0.1937, for "Act of the Governor General-in- Council"] or regulation made after the commencement of this Act, repeals any enactment hitherto made or hereafter to be made, then, 32 unless a different intention appears, the repeal shall not
(a) revive anything not in force or existing at the time at which the repeal takes effect;
(b) affect the previous operation of any enactment so repealed or anything duly done or suffered thereunder; or
(c) affect any right, privilege, obligation or liability acquired, accrued or incurred under any enactment so repealed; or
(d) affect any penalty, forfeiture or punishment incurred in respect of any offence committed against any enactment so repealed; or
(e) affect any investigation, legal proceeding or remedy in respect of any such right, privilege, obligation, liability, penalty, forfeiture or punishment as aforesaid;
and any such investigation, legal proceeding or remedy may be instituted, continued or enforced, and any such penalty, forfeiture or punishment may be imposed as if the repealing Act or Regulation had not been passed.
(6-A) Repeal of Act making textual amendment in Act or Regulation. Where any [Central Act] [Substituted by A.O. 1950, for sub- Section (1)] Regulation made after the commencement of this Act repeals any enactment by which the text of any [Central Act) substituted by A.O. 1937, for "Act of the Governor General or Council"] or Regulation was amended by the express omission, insertion or substitution of any matter, then, unless a different intention appears, the repeal 33 shall not affect the continuance of any such amendment made by the enactment so repealed and in operation at the time of such repeal."
23. Section 6 of the General Clauses Act only applies to repeals and not to omissions. When the repeal is followed by fresh legislation on the same subject, one has to look to the provision of the new Act i.e. whether the new Act indicates a different intention. Mere absence of a saving clause is not material. If different intention appears, then it shall affect the provision/operation of any enactment so repealed. The procedure to be followed in determination of age was given under the Rules framed under the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000. There was no substantive provision in the Act, 2000 itself, whereas in the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015, Section 94 is a substantive provision dealing, with the issue for presumption and determination of age. The model rules i.e. the Juvenile 34 Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Rules, 2016 are silent with regard to presumption and determination of age.
24. In view of the aforesaid position, particularly when the Central Government has not resorted to any such mechanism to explain, the conflict, if any between the Rule 12 of the Rules of 2007 and Section 94 of the Act of 2015, the construction of both Rule 12 and Section 94 has to be harmoniously construed in the light of the fact that notwithstanding such repeal, anything done or any action taken under the Act, 2000 and Rules, 2007 shall be deemed to have been done or taken under the corresponding provisions of Act of 2015.
25. Section 6 of the General Clauses Act will be attracted in a case of repeal, even if there is simultaneous enactment, unless a contrary intention is gathered from the new enactment i.e. unless a different intention appears, the repeal shall not affect the prior operation of any enactment so repealed 35 and shall not revive anything not in force. Reference can be made to Raiyala Corporation (P) Ltd. Vs. Directorate of Enforcement, (1969) 2 SCC 412 and State of Punjab Vs. Mohar Singh, AIR 1955 SC 84.
26. Normal effect of repealing a statute is to obliterate it from the statute book completely, as if it had never been passed, unless there is a saving clause if any, then repealed statute will lapse and any order passed therein will be a nullity thereafter. Repeal of a statute or a deletion of a provision, unless covered under Section 6(1) of General Clauses Act or a saving provision, totally obliterates it from statute book and the proceedings pending thereunder stand discontinued. Reference can be made to the ratio of Kolapur Canesugar Works Ltd. Vs. Union of India, (2000) 2 SCC 536. Section 6 of the General Clauses Act only applies to enactment and not to omission or rule. The provisions of Section 6 of the Act will not be attracted if contrary intention is clearly expressed in the 36 statement of object or repealed Act. Section 6 of the Act will not be applied in case of omission of rule as well. Reference can be made to Sushila N. Rungta Vs. Tax Recovery Officer, 2018 (14) SCALE 739.
27. If new Act manifests different intention, the application of General Clauses Act stands excluded. Reference can be made to State of Haryana Vs. HPCL, (2017) 9 SCC
463. A simplicity repeal of an enactment, leaves no room for expression of a contrary opinion. However, if followed by a fresh enactment on the same subject, then applicability of Section 6 of General Clauses Act would require examination to see whether it expresses a different intention from the earlier Act. The enquiry would necessitate an examination whether old rights and liabilities are kept alive or whether the new Act manifests an intention to do away with or destroy them. If different intention is found, then Section 6 will stand excluded. It is a settled principle of law that if the amendment in the Act 37 is procedural and beneficial in nature, then it would have retrospective application. Reference can be made to Trilok Chand Vs. State of Himachal Pradesh, Criminal Appeal No.1831 of 2010, decided on 1.10.2019, Ratanlal Vs. State of Punjab, (1964) 7 SCR 676 and T. Barai Vs. Henry Ah. Hoe, (1983) 1 SCC 177. A statute conferring a benefit in the context of it is to be given a retrospective operation. Commissioner of Income Tax Vs. Vatika Township Pvt. Ltd. (2015) 1 SCC 1 is necessary to be quoted in the context.
28. Since the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015 has repealed the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000 completely without making any reference to Rules of 2007, therefore, a situation arises whether Rules, 2007 are still in force even after coming into force of substantive provision in the shape of Section 94 of Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015. There is mark difference in Rule 12(3)(a)(i), (ii), (iii) and 38 Section 94(2)(i) of the Act. Under Rule 12 of the Rules, 2007, preference has to be given to the matriculation or equivalent certificates at the first instance and the date of birth certificate from the school will be second preference in the absence of matriculation or equivalent, whereas in Section 94 of the Act of 2015, the date of birth certificate from the school or the matriculation or equivalent certificate from the concerned examination Board is the first requirement and in absence thereof, the birth certificate given by the Corporation or a Municipal authority or a Panchayat would be the second preference. The last preference in the Rules of 2007 and the Act of 2015 is determination of age by way of medical opinion/ ossification test etc. The apparent conflict is whether the birth certificate is a condition precedent for examination any other document such as matriculation or equivalent certificate from the Board or not. In the Rules of 2007, the intention was not to appreciate the date of birth certificate at the first instance, 39 whereas in the Act of 2015, the date of birth certificate from the school is a condition precedent for presumption and determination of age. Since Section 94 of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015 is a substantive provision, therefore the case law on the subject has to be considered.
29. In Birad Mal Singhvi Vs. Anand Purohit, AIR 1988 SC 1796 the Hon'ble Apex Court had an occasion to consider the question of determination of age viz-a-viz the birth certificate or matriculation certificate in an election matter. The Hon'ble Apex Court after due consideration, discussed Section 35 of the Evidence Act, 1872, which lays down that entry in any public, official book, register or record stating a fact in issue or relevant fact and made by a public servant in discharge of his official duty, specifically enjoined by the law of the country is itself the relevant fact. To render a document admissible under Section 35, three conditions must be satisfied. 40 Firstly, entry that is relied on must be one in a public or other official book, register or record. Secondly, it must be an entry stating a fact in issue or relevant fact, and thirdly, it must be made by a public servant in discharge of his official duty, or any other person in performance of a duty, specially enjoined by law. An entry relating to date of birth made in the school register is relevant and admissible under Section 35 of the Act, but the entry regarding to the age of a person in a school register is of not much evidentiary value to prove the age of the person in the absence of the material on which the age was recorded. The Hon'ble Apex Court after discussing different precedents, discarded the entry in school register about the age of a party to the suit on the ground that there was no evidence to show on what material, the entry in the register about the age of the plaintiff was made. The Courts have considered the question of probative value of an entry regarding the date of birth made in the scholar's register in school certificate in 41 election cases. The Courts have consistently held that the date of birth mentioned in the scholar's register of secondary school certificate has no probative unless either the parents are examined or the person on whose information the entry may have been made is examined. The Hon'ble Apex Court in para 14 of the aforesaid judgement has observed as under:-
"14.........The date of birth mentioned in the scholar's register has no evidentiary value unless the person who made the entry or who gave the date of birth is examined. The entry contained in the admission form or in the scholar register must be shown to be made on the basis of information. The date of birth mentioned in the scholar's register has no evidentiary value unless the person who made the entry or who gave the date of birth is examined. The entry contained in the admission form or in the scholar register must be shown to be made on the basis of information given by the parents or a person having special knowledge about the date of birth of the person concerned. If the entry in the scholar's register regarding date of birth is made on the basis of information given by parents, the entry would have evidentiary value but if it is given by a stranger or by someone else who had no special means of knowledge of the date of birth, such an entry will have no evidentiary value........"
30. In order to discuss the issue arising out of Section 34 of the POCSO Act as well as Section 94 of Juvenile Justice 42 (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015 and Rule 12 of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Rules, 2007, it would be necessary to produce Section 34 of POCSO Act:-
"34. Procedure in case of commission of offence by child and determination of age by Special Court.-(1) Where any offence under this Act is committed by a child, such child shall be dealt with under the provisions of the [the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015 (2 of 2016)].
(2) If any question arises in any proceeding before the Special Court whether a person is a child or not, such question shall be determined by the Special Court after satisfying itself about the age of such person and it shall record in writing its reasons for such determination.
(3) No order made by the Special Court shall be deemed to be invalid merely by any subsequent proof that the age of a person as determined by it under sub-section (2) was not the correct age of that person."
31. P. Yuvaprakash Vs. State represented by Inspector of Police, 2023 SCC OnLine SC 846 deals with the issue. The Court after analyzing Section 34 of the POCSO Act, the provisions under the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Rules, 2007 and Section 94 of the Juvenile Justice 43 (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015 observed that the Courts have to take recourse to the steps indicated in Section 94 of the Juvenile Justice Act, 2015. Section 94(2)(iii) of the Juvenile Justice Act, 2015 clearly indicates that the date of birth certificate from the school or matriculation or equivalent certificate by the concerned examination Board has to be firstly preferred in the absence of which the birth certificate issued by the Corporation or Municipal Authority or Panchayat and it is only thereafter in the absence of these such documents the age is to be determined through "an ossification test" or "any other latest medical age determination test" conducted on the orders of the concerned authority, i.e. Committee or Board or Court.
32. In the aforesaid case the Hon'ble Apex Court relied upon the ratio of Rishipal Singh Solanki Vs. State of U.P., (2021) 12 SCR 502 and Sanjeev Kumar Gupta Vs. State of UP, (2019) 9 SCR 735, wherein the Court considered the provisions of Juvenile Justice Act, especially the various 44 options in Section 94(2) of the Juvenile Justice Act, 2015 and has held as under:-
"16. Speaking about provisions of the Juvenile Justice Act, especially the various options in Section 94(2) of the JJ Act, this court held in Sanjeev Kumar Gupta v. The State of Uttar Pradesh that:
"Clause (i) of Section 94(2) places the date of birth certificate from the school and the matriculation or equivalent certificate from the concerned examination board in the same category (namely (1) above). In the absence thereof category (ii) provides for obtaining the birth certificate of the corporation, municipal authority or panchayat. It is only in the absence of (i) and (ii) that age determination by means of medical analysis is provided. Section 94 (2)
(a)(i) indicates a significant change over the provisions which were contained in Rule 12(3)(a) of the Rules of 2007 made under the Act of 2000. Under Rule 12(3)(a)(i) the matriculation or equivalent certificate was given precedence and it was only in the event of the certificate not being available that the date of birth certificate from the school first attended, could be obtained. In Section 94(2)(i) both the date of birth certificate from the school as well as the matriculation or equivalent certificate are placed in the same category."45
33. In Abuzar Hossain @ Gulam Hossain Vs. State of West Bengal, (2012) 9 SCR 224, the Court ultimately held that school transfer certificate is not acceptable for age determination of victim. The decision in Birad Mal Singhvi (supra) was not brought to the notice of the Court. In Sanjeev Kumar Gupta (supra), the Hon'ble Apex Court after considering the catena of judgments on the subject, appreciated the controversy arising out of conflict and held whether the case is re-approached from stand point of Rule 12 (3) of the Rules of 2007 or Section 94(2) of the Act of 2015. The Hon'ble Apex Court has held that it does not ultimately make any difference to the conclusion. The Hon'ble Apex Court was dealing with the controversy in which the FIR was lodged by the appellant therein under Section 366 of IPC, wherein the allegation was that the appellant received a call from an unknown number and the caller wished to speak to his son, claiming to be his teacher. The appellant's son, who was 13 46 years old was studying in 8th standard in a public school in Shikohabad. After calling back on the number, the appellant's son left the shop after a conversion, never to return. The victim was murdered after demand of ransom. His body was found in a canal. The second respondent in that was arrested during the course of the investigation. On 9.12.2015, the accused filed an application claiming to be a juvenile on the date of the incident under the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000. He submitted that on the date of the alleged offence he was sixteen years ten months and eleven days old and he relied on a matriculation certificate issued by the Central Board of Secondary Education (CBSE), Delhi, reflecting his date of birth as 17-12-1998. On 2-7-2016 the Juvenile Justice Board allowed the application of the second respondent/accused and declared him to be a juvenile on the date of the alleged offence. The appellant filed an appeal before the Court of Sessions Judge, Firozabad. On 16-9-2016, the Sessions Judge remanded 47 the case to the Juvenile Justice Board for determination of the age of the second respondent/accused upon medical examination. The Medical Board was constituted and the Medical Board in its report dated 19-11-2016 found that the age of the second respondent was about nineteen years. Aggrieved by the said order of the Court of Sessions, the second respondent filed a revision before the High Court which was dismissed as withdrawn on 4-1-2017. Thereafter the second respondent filed a petition under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, which was disposed of by the High Court on 27-4-2017, directing the early disposal of the pending application of the second respondent. On 1-7-2017, the Juvenile Justice Board rejected the claim of juvenility of the accused on the basis of driving license, Adhar card in which the accused/respondent had declared his date of birth as 17.12.1995. The Juvenile Justice Board held that the second respondent was an adult on the date of accident. The second 48 respondent filed an appeal against the order of Juvenile Justice Board before the Courts of Sessions, which was rejected on 2.8.2017 on the basis of decision of the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Parag Bhati Vs. State of MP, (2016) 12 SCC 744. The Court observed that credibility and authenticity of the documents depends upon the circumstances of each case and that in a case involving conflicting school certificates, a further enquiry would be required. The Court of Sessions also placed reliance on the decision of the Hon'ble Apex Court in Ramdeo Chauhan Vs. State of Assam, (2001) 5 SCC 714. Against the decision of Court of Sessions, the second respondent filed a criminal revision before the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad. The High Court allowed the revision and declared that on the date of the alleged offence, the second respondent was a minor. Evidently the High Court proceeded to hold the date of birth on the basis of matriculation as per requirement of Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Rules, 2007. 49 The appellant preferred a special leave petition before the Hon'ble Apex Court under Article 136 of the Constitution of India. The Hon'ble Apex Court after discussing the catena of judgments including Abuzar Hossain @ Gulam Hossainm (supra), Ashwani Kumar Saxena Vs. State of M.P., (2012) 9 SCC 750, Jitendra Singh Vs. State of UP, (2010) 13 SCC 523, Pawan Vs. State of Uttaranchal, (2009) 15 SCC 259 and Akbar Sheikh Vs. State WB, (2009) 7 SCC ultimately held that Act of 2015 came into force on 15.1.2016. Section 111 repeals the earlier Act of 2000, but stipulates that despite the repeal, anything done or any action taken under the said Act shall be deemed to have been done or taken under the corresponding provisions of the new Act. Clause (i) of Section 94(2) places the date of birth certificate from the school and the matriculation or equivalent certificate from the Examination Board concerned in the same category [namely (i) above). In the absence thereof category (ii) provides for obtaining the birth 50 certificate of the corporation, municipal authority or panchayat. It is only in the absence of (i) and (ii) that age determination by means of medical analysis is provided. Section 94(2)(i) indicates a significant change over the provisions which were contained in Rule 12(3)(a) of the 2007 Rules made under the 2000 Act. Under Rule 12(3)(a)(i) the matriculation or equivalent certificate was given precedence and it was only in the event of the certificate not being available that the date of birth certificate from the school first attended, could be obtained. In Section 94(2)(i) both the date of birth certificate from the school as well as the matriculation or equivalent certificate are placed in the same category. The Hon'ble Apex Court despite the fact that occurrence took place on 18.8.2015, and the application claiming the benefit of juvenility was filed on 9-12-2015, proceeded to analyse the facts on the basis of the provisions of the Rules of 2007 and ultimately held that the date of birth recorded in the matriculation certificate was not 51 relied in view of the material available on record i.e. affidavit filed by the CBSE, indicating that the date of birth in the records maintained by the CBSE was recorded purely on the basis of final list of students forwarded by Maa Anjani Senior Secondary School, Etah Road, Shikohabad. The CBSE has stated before the Court that the date recorded in the matriculation certificate was purely on the basis of final list of students forwarded by the Headmistress Maa Anjani Senior Secondary School. The date of birth recorded in the Saket Vidya Sthali completely matched with the date of birth, which was voluntarily disclosed by the second respondent both in the driving license as well as in the Adhar card and the same was found to be 17.12.1995. On the basis of these facts, the Hon'ble Apex Court rejected the application of 2007 Rules and preferred to appreciate the source information recorded in the evidence, which was brought on record in the form of certificate of Saket Vidya Sthali, driving license and Adhar card 52 of the second respondent. In the aforesaid judgment, the Hon'ble Apex Court has harmonized the Rule 12 of the 2007 Rules and Section 94 of the Act, 2015.
34. The aforesaid judgment was not brought to the notice of this Court, when the Division Bench of this Court decided Criminal Appeal No.2630/2015 (Ramswaroop Vs. State of MP), decided on 2.8.2023, though P. Yuvaprakash' case (supra) was brought to the notice of this Court and the same was distinguished, but the earlier judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court in Birad Mal Shinghvi (supra) was also not brought to the notice of this Court. The Division Bench of this Court while relying upon different precedents negated the ratio arising out of P. Yuvaprakash's case (supra) and even discussed the Rules 2007 being procedural in nature. The entry in the school register was held to be of probative value. The entry in the school record was given precedence and the age of the prosecutrix was found to have been conclusively determined so 53 as to attract presumption under Sections 29 and 30 of the POCSO Act.
35. The view expressed in P. Yuvaprakash' case (supra) has been re-affirmed by the Hon'ble Apex Court in Manak Chand alias Mani Vs. State of Haryana, 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1397 in which ratio of Birad Mal Singhvi (supra) has been relied.
36. In view of the aforesaid legal position, the latest judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court is in consonance the earlier view expressed in Birad Mal Singhvi' case (supra), which was duly relied in P. Yuvaprakash' case (supra). Therefore, on the subject in issue, the applicability of Section 94 of the 2015 Rules has to be given precedence over the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Rules, 2007 by harmonizing both the rules and substantive provision and also in view of Birad Mal Singhvi' case (supra), Sanjeev 54 Kumar Gupta's case (supra) P. Yuvaprakash' case (supra) and Manak Chand alias Mani's case (supra).
37. In view of the aforesaid legal position, the controversy in question with regard to application of Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Rules, 2007 viz-a-viz substantive provisions under Section 94 of the act, 2015 is no more res integra.
38. In view of M.P. Date of Birth (entries in the School Register) Rules, 1973, on the issue of the declaration of age, the instructions have been provided that the parents or the guardians seeking admission for his ward for the first time into an approved or recognized school shall declare in writing in the form appended to these rules, the date of birth of the ward concerned and submit the same duly signed by him to the head of the institution. In case of an illiterate persons, the declaration shall bear the thumb impression of the parent or the guardian attested by a responsible literate person other than a teacher of 55 the school to which admission is sought. The date of birth of the ward in the declaration shall be given according to the date, month and year of the British Calendar. Where it is not possible for the parent or the guardian to submit the requisite declaration personally, he may authorize a person in writing to do so on his behalf. The aforesaid rules have been brought into the fact keeping in view the percentage of population, wherein requiring a birth certificate from Kotwar, civil surgeon and municipal authority is not feasible and that is how the rules have been made to facilitate such illiterate person to make declaration in the manner as suggested in Rule 3 of M.P. Date of Birth (entries in the School Register) Rules, 1973. These rules are also in consonance with the requirement of law arising of the subject.
39. In view of the aforesaid factual position on record, the age of the prosecutrix was not conclusively proved. As per the medical examination of the prosecutrix, the basic features 56 of forcible rape by two persons could not be established in view of statement of Dr. Shobhana Chouksey (PW-6) and absence of DNA profiling of the accused/appellants. The occurrence took place at 7:30 PM on 8.6.2013 as per prosecutrix and 9.6.2013 as per prosecution. In the month of June at about 7:30 PM visibility used to be quite clear, as the sunset time is nearby 7:50 to 8:00 PM. The place of occurrence was quite visible from the house of prosecutrix and from the road which were admittedly 100 meters away from the place of occurrence. Age of the prosecutrix could not be determined conclusively so as to draw presumption under Sections 29 & 30 of the POCSO Act. The prosecutrix did not allege anything regarding occurrence of 9.6.2013. The medical evidence of prosecutrix did not suggest any rape. No ossification/ radiological test was held for age determination of the prosecutrix. Parties were not visiting terms. No DNA profiling was done. Entire incriminating material including DNA could not put to the appellants under 57 Section 313 of Cr.P.C. and the entire evidence not so put to the accused/appellants cannot be be relied against them.
40. In view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances of the case, this Court draws irresistible conclusion that the prosecution has failed to bring home the guilt of the appellants beyond all reasonable doubt and to the hilt. The prosecution could not bring on record the proof of conclusive age of the prosecutrix so as to attract presumption under Sections 29 and 30 of the POCSO Act and also the factum of forcible rape upon the victim/prosecutrix in view of the medical evidence on record and also for want of DNA profiling after the FSL report, which remained inconclusive as regards motile and non-motile form of sperms found in the FSL report.
40. For the reasons recorded hereinabove, we hereby accept the Criminal Appeal No.225/2014 (Durgesh Vanshkar Vs. State of MP) and Criminal Appeal No.394/2014 (Hariom Ahirwar Vs. State of MP) by setting aside the 58 impugned judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated 06.01.2014 passed by the Second Additional Sessions Judge, Babai District Hoshangabad in ST No.215/2013. It is directed that if the present appellants are not required in any other case, they be set free from the jail forthwith. A photocopy of the judgment be placed on the record of Criminal Appeal No.394/2014.
(Raj Mohan Singh) (Vivek Jain)
Judge Judge
18/07/2024 18/07/2024
MANZOOR Ansari
AHMED
2024.07.19 11:59:32 +05'30'