Bombay High Court
Sunita Shankarrao Shetewad @ Sunita ... vs The State Of Maharashtra And Others on 18 December, 2014
Author: Ravindra V. Ghuge
Bench: Ravindra V. Ghuge
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kps
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
BENCH AT AURANGABAD
WRIT PETITION NO.11507 OF 2014
Smt.Sunita W/o Shankarrao Shetewad @
Sunita d/o Ganpat Kabade,
Age : 36 years, Occu: Household,
R/o At.Kalambar Khurda, Post.Kalambar Khurd,
Taluka Loha, District Nanded. ..Petitioner
-Versus-
1 The State of Maharashtra.
(Copy to be served on the
Government Pleader, High Court
of Judicature of Bombay
Bench at Aurangabad).
2 The Scheduled Tribe Certificate
Scrutiny Committee, Aurangabad
Division, Aurangabad.
Through it's Deputy Director (R)
& Member Secretary.
3 The Collector,
Nanded.
4 The Tahsildar & Returning Officer,
Loha, Taluka Loha, District Nanded.
5 The State Election Commission,
Through State Election Commissioner,
Madam Cama Road, Mumbai. ..Respondents
...........
Mr.Ajinkya Reddy, Advocate for the Petitioner.
Mr.G.K.Naik Thigle, Additional G.P., for the Respondent Nos.1 and 3.
Mr.K.D.Bade Patil, Advocate for the Respondent No.2.
Mr.S.T.Shelke, Advocate for the Respondent Nos.4 and 5.
...........
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CORAM: RAVINDRA V. GHUGE, J.
DATE :- 18th December, 2014 Judgment:
1 Rule.
2 By consent of parties, Rule made returnable forthwith.
3 This matter was heard for quite sometime on 16.12.2014 and was posted today in order to enable the learned Advocate for the State Election Commission Shri S.T.Shelke to gather certain details so as to address this Court.4
The facts of this case are peculiar. The Petitioner has filed the nomination paper for contesting the election to the post of a member of the Gram Panchayat, Kalambar (Khurd), Post Kalambar (Khurd), Taluka Loha, District Nanded. The said nomination form was filed as against the vacant position of a member of the Gram Panchayat from Ward No.2 which was reserved for Scheduled Tribe category.
5 The Petitioner claims to be belonging to Mahadev Koli tribe which is a Scheduled Tribe. She has been issued with the Caste Certificate dated 14.06.1990 by the Tahasildar & Executive Magistrate, Udgir, District Latur in accordance with the provisions of law as they stood prior to the introduction of the Maharashtra Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes, De- notified Tribes (Vimukta Jatis), Nomadic Tribes, Other Backward Classes and Special Backward Category (Regulation of Issuance and Verification of Caste Certificate) Act, 2000.
6 My attention is invited to the judgment of the Division Bench of this Court dated 11.08.1994 delivered in Writ Petition No.2451/1994 filed by the Petitioner versus the State of Maharashtra and others. The Petitioner was aggrieved by the rejection of her claim as belonging to Mahadev Koli (Scheduled Tribe) by the Caste Scrutiny Committee. It was ::: Downloaded on - 23/12/2014 23:46:27 ::: *3* wp.11507.14.vp.election brought to the notice of the Division Bench that the same Committee has validated the caste claim of the real brother of the Petitioner, namely, Shivaji Ganpatrao Kabade. The caste claim of another real brother of the Petitioner, namely, Subhash Ganpatrao Kabade was also held to be valid as belonging to Mahadev Koli (Scheduled Tribe) by the Division Bench of this Court vide its judgment dated 19/20th June, 1986 in Writ Petition No.438/1985.
7 The Division Bench of this Court by the said judgment dated 11.08.1994 has set aside the order of the Respondent No.3 Caste Scrutiny Committee invalidating the caste claim of the Petitioner and held that the Petitioner belongs to Mahadev Koli (Scheduled Tribe). Rule was accordingly made absolute.
8 The Petitioner, therefore, contends that she was armed with the judgment of this Court dated 11.08.1994 as well as a copy of the writ that was issued by this Court on 11.08.1994. She has annexed these documents to her nomination form and therefore, has made a categoric declaration that she belongs to Mahadev Koli (Scheduled Tribe) and is therefore, eligible to contest the election from Ward No.2 which was reserved for Scheduled Tribe category.
9 The Petitioner is aggrieved by the impugned order passed on 09.12.2014 by the Respondent No.4/ Tahasildar & Returning Officer, Loha, rejecting her nomination form. It is submitted that the elections are scheduled on 23.12.2014 and the Petitioner was the sole candidate for contesting the position of a member of the Gram Panchayat from Ward No.2. As of today, there is no other candidate who has filled in the nomination form from the said ward.
10 The Petitioner contends that since the order of invalidating her caste claim was quashed and set aside, consequentially her claim of belonging to Mahadev Koli (Scheduled Tribe) stood allowed. As such, her ::: Downloaded on - 23/12/2014 23:46:27 ::: *4* wp.11507.14.vp.election validation claim is construed to have been allowed. It is, therefore, stated that the moment the invalidation order passed by the Caste Scrutiny Committee was set aside, it was incumbent upon the said Committee to thereby put its record straight pursuant to the judgment of this Court and as such, issue the caste validity certificate sheerly as a consequence of the judgment of this Court. The Petitioner, however, concedes that though the Caste Scrutiny Committee did not do so, the Petitioner was not seriously affected as she was armed with the judgment of this Court. 11 The Petitioner has relied upon the judgment of the Division Bench of this Court in the matter of Mayaraju Ghavghave v/s Returning Officer and another reported in 2004(5) Bombay C.R. 146. The Division Bench of this Court (Coram : D.D.Sinha and B.P.Dharmadhikari, JJ) has considered a similar case which is almost on identical set of facts. The Petitioner specifically refers to paragraphs 17 to 20, 23 and 28 to 31 in support of her contentions.
12 She further points out that the Division Bench of this Court while concluding that if the nomination paper of a concerned candidate was rejected without making a summary inquiry under Rule 11 of the Maharashtra Village Panchayat Election Rules, 1959, same would not be sustainable and would be liable to be quashed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. It was further held that in such a situation if the Petitioner was the only reserved category candidate attempting to contest election for a particular reserved constituency and in case his nomination paper is accepted, he is straightaway liable to be declared elected. 13 The Petitioner further points out that the Division Bench of this Court had relied upon the judgments of the Apex Court as well as this Court which are as under:-
(1) Mohinder Singh Gill vs. Chief Election Commissioner, New Delhi, 1978(1) SCC 405.::: Downloaded on - 23/12/2014 23:46:27 :::
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(2) Election Commission of India vs. Ashok Kumar, 2000(8) SCC
216.
(3) Vinod Pandurang Bharsakade vs. Returning Officer, Akot,
2004 (Supp.) Bom. C.R. (N.B.) 1 : 2003(4) Mh.L.J. 359. (4) N.P.Ponnuswami vs. Returning Officer, Namakkal Constituency, AIR 1952 SC 64.
(5) Anant Janardan Patil vs. State of Maharashtra, 2002(4) Bom.
C.R. 270 : 2002(2) Mh.L.J. 238.
14 Shri S.T.Shelke, learned Advocate appearing for the State Election Commission and the Returning Officer, submits, on instructions, that the nomination form filed by the Petitioner was the only nomination for Ward No.2. The elections are scheduled on 23.12.2014. In the event the nomination form of the Petitioner is allowed, she would be the only candidate from the Scheduled Tribe category to contest for the post of a member of the Gram Panchayat from Ward No.2.
15 Shri Shelke has fairly conceded that the Returning Officer has rejected the nomination paper purely going by the thumb rule. Since there was no Caste Validity Certificate attached to the nomination form, same has been rejected. He clarifies that neither the Respondent No.4 Tahasildar & Returning Officer nor the State Election Commission, in any manner whatsoever, are questioning the judgment of the Division Bench of this Court dated 11.08.1994 in the matter of the Petitioner. He submits that by the said judgment the caste claim of the Petitioner stands validated and this Court has confirmed that the Petitioner belongs to Mahadev Koli tribe which falls under the Scheduled Tribe category. He, therefore, submits that there cannot be any doubt that the Petitioner belongs to Scheduled Tribe category. The Respondent No.4 has rejected the nomination only because the Caste Validity Certificate was not visible.
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16 Shri Bade Patil, learned Advocate appearing on behalf of the
Respondent No.2- Caste Scrutiny Committee, submits that there is no doubt as to whether the Petitioner belongs to the Scheduled Tribe category. By the judgment dated 11.08.1994 delivered by the Division Bench of this Court in the case of the Petitioner, the order passed by the Caste Scrutiny Committee invalidating her caste claim has been set aside and this Court has ruled that the claim of Petitioner stands validated and she belongs to the Mahadev Koli tribe which is a Scheduled Tribe. He further submits that the Caste Scrutiny Committee was under an impression that the Petitioner will once again make an application seeking caste validity certificate pursuant to the order passed by the Division Bench. It is for this reason that the Caste Validity Certificate has not been issued. He clarifies that there is no other motive in the mind of the Committee in not issuing the Caste Validity Certificate. 17 Having considered the submissions of the litigating parties, the issue turns upon the judgment of this Court dated 11.08.1994. The Petitioner had already made an application for seeking validation of her claim as belonging to Mahadev Koli. By the impugned order before the Division Bench of this Court, her claim was invalidated. As such, the claim application stood rejected.
18 It would have been a different situation if this Court would have set aside the order of invalidation and referred the matter back to the Caste Scrutiny Committee for re-hearing. Then the Committee would have to hear the Petitioner and pass a fresh order. However, by the judgment dated 11.08.1994 the Division Bench of this Court, while setting aside the order of invalidation, has allowed the caste claim of the Petitioner and which tantamounts to allowing the claim of validation. The Petitioner was declared by this Court to be belonging to the Mahadev Koli tribe falling under the Scheduled Tribe.
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19 In my view, therefore, the application for validation of her
caste claim stood allowed and consequentially, the Caste Scrutiny Committee should have entered the judgment in their records and should have noted that the application was allowed and as such, should have issued the Caste Validity Certificate to the Petitioner. None of the parties have cited any judicial pronouncement which in similar circumstances has taken a different view.
20 The issue, therefore, in this Writ Petition is as to whether the nomination of the Petitioner for contesting the election to Ward No.2 from Scheduled Tribe category could be said to be allowed.
21The ratio laid down by this Court in the Mayaraju (supra) in paragraphs 17 to 20, 23 and 28 to 31 reads as under:-
"17. Further relevant observations made by the Apex Court in Mohinder Singh Gills case (cited supra) are in para (27), which read thus:
"Thus far everything is clear. No litigative enterprise in the High Court or other Court should be allowed to hold up the on-going electoral process because the parliamentary representative for the constituency should be chosen promptly. Article 329 therefore covers "electoral matters". One interesting argument, urged without success in Ponnuswami elicited a reasoning from the Court which has some bearing on the question in the present appeal. That argument was that if nomination was part of election a dispute as to the validity of the nomination was a dispute relating to election and could be called in question, only after the whole election was over, before the election Tribunal. This meant that the Returning Officer could have no jurisdiction to decide the validity of a nomination, although section 36 of the Act conferred on him that jurisdiction. The learned Judge dismissed this argument as without merit, despite the great dialectical ingenuity in the submission. In this connection, the learned Judge observed:
Under section 36 of the Representation of the ::: Downloaded on - 23/12/2014 23:46:27 ::: *8* wp.11507.14.vp.election People Act, 1951, it is the duty of the Returning Officer to scrutinize the nomination papers to ensure that they comply with the requirements of the Act and decide all objections which may be made to any nomination. It is clear that unless this duty is discharged properly, any number of candidates may stand for election without complying with the provisions of the Act and a great deal of confusion may ensure. In discharging the statutory duty imposed on him, the Returning Officer does not call in question any election. Scrutiny of nomination papers is only a stage, though an important stage, in the election process. It is one of the essential duties to be performed before the election can be completed and anything done towards the completion of the election proceeding can by no stretch of reasoning be described as questioning the election. The fallacy of the argument lies in treating a single step taken in furtherance of an election as equivalent to election. The decision of this appeal however turns not on the construction of the single word election, but on the construction of the compendious expression "no election shall be called in question" in its context and setting, with due regard to the scheme of Part XV of the Constitution and the Representation of the People Act, 1951. Evidently the argument has no bearing on this method of approach to the question posed in this appeal which appears to me to be the only correct method."
18. Having considered the above observations made by the Apex Court in Ponnuswamis case the Apex Court in para (28) of its judgment in Mohinder Singh Gills case observed thus:
"What emerges from this perspicacious reasoning, if we may say so with great respect, is that any decision sought and rendered will not amount to calling in question an election if it subserves the progress of the election and facilitates the completion of the election. We should not slur over the quite essential observation "Anything done towards the completion of the election proceeding can by no stretch of reasoning be described as questioning the election". Likewise, it is fallacious to treat a single step taken in furtherance of an election as ::: Downloaded on - 23/12/2014 23:46:27 ::: *9* wp.11507.14.vp.election equivalent to election."
19. The Apex Court in para (29) of its judgment in Mohinder Singh Gills case (cited supra) finally observed thus:
"Thus, there are two types of decisions, two types of challenges. The first relates to proceedings which interfere with the progress of the election. The second accelerates the completion of the election and acts in furtherance of an election. So the short question before us, in the light of the illumination derived from Ponnuswami, is as to whether the order for re-poll of the Chief Election Commissioner is anything done towards the completion of the election proceeding" and whether the proceedings before the High Court facilitated the election process or halted its progress. The question immediately arises as to whether the relief sought in the writ petition by the present appellant amounted to calling in question the election. This, in turn, revolves round the point as to whether the cancellation of the poll and the re-ordering of fresh poll is part of election and challenging it is calling it in question."
20. It is, therefore, evident that though in Ponnuswamis case the Apex Court categorically held that election can be called in question only at the appropriate stage in an appropriate manner before a special Tribunal and should not be brought up at an intermediate stage before any Court, however, in Mohinder Singh Gills case, after taking into consideration the law laid down in Ponnuswamis case, the Apex Court laid down that provisions of Article 329(b) of the Constitution can be viewed from two different angles in the form of two different challenges, firstly whether challenge raised to the election at the intermittent stage relates to proceedings which interferes with the progress of the election and secondly, whether it accelerates the completion of the election and acts in furtherance of an election. It is thus clear that Apex Court in Mohinder Singh Gills case undoubtedly expressed that embargo for calling in question election proceedings under Article 329(b) of the Constitution is not absolute and total and ::: Downloaded on - 23/12/2014 23:46:27 ::: *10* wp.11507.14.vp.election would depend upon the type of challenge raised to the process of election and if the challenge is one which accelerates completion of an election and acts in furtherance of an election, such challenge in our view, by necessary implication, would not fall within the ambit of total embargo created by Article 329(b) of the Constitution whereby proceedings of election or election can be called in question only at appropriate stage and in appropriate manner before the special Tribunal and should not be brought up at any intermediate stage before any Court.
23. When we consider above referred conclusions in para (32) arrived at by the Apex Court on the backdrop of the observations made by the Apex Court in earlier paras of its above referred judgment, it is evident that there are different shades enumerated by the Apex Court in respect of analogy, i.e. what is meat by words "no election shall be called in question" mentioned in Article 329(b) of the Constitution and whether prohibition which flows from Article 329(b) in this regard is absolute and total or there are other facets of this issue.
It is, therefore, implicit that restrictive view expressed by the Apex Court in Ponnuswamis case vis a vis words "calling in question the election" used in Article 329(b) is widened by the Apex Court in Mohinder Singh Gills case (cited supra) as well as Election Commission of India's case (cited supra) keeping in view the inherent mandate of Article 329(b) of the Constitution, i.e. Court must guard against any attempt at retarding, interrupting, protracting or stalling of the election proceedings with further caution to the Court that care has to be taken to see that there is no attempt to utilize the Courts indulgence by filing a petition outwardly innocuous, but essentially a subterfuge or pretext for achieving an ulterior or hidden end. At the same time, the decision, which is called in question before the Court pertaining to election shall not amount to "calling in question an election", if it subserves the progress of election and facilitates the completion of the election and, therefore, embargo created by Article 329(b) of the Constitution in this regard will not be attracted.
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28. So far Vinod Pandurang Bharsakades case (cited supra) is concerned, it appears that Division Bench of this Court considered the issue about maintainability of writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution at the intermittent stage of the election only from the point of view of conclusion No. 1 recorded in para (32) by the Apex Court in Election Commission of Indias case (cited supra) as well as laid down in Ponnuswamis case and not from the legal point of view mentioned in conclusion No. 2 recorded by Apex Court in para (32) of its judgment in Election Commission of India's case as well as law laid down by the Apex Court in Mohinder Singh Gills case (cited supra) and in the absence of adjudication by the Division Bench in this regard, it is difficult to ascertain as to whether conduct of the petitioner in Vinod Pandurang Bharsakades case in invoking jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution amounts to calling in question an election of exercise of power by the High Court under Article 226 would subserve the progress of the election and facilitate the completion of the election since Division Bench of this Court without considering merits of the case dismissed the writ petition as not maintainable by upholding the preliminary objection raised by the Government Pleader about maintainability of the writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution and, therefore, in our considered view, the ratio laid down in the said judgment of the Division Bench of this Court does not conclude the issue about maintainability of the writ petition in all circumstances in view of conclusion No. 2 mentioned in para (32) of the judgment of the Apex Court in Election Commission of India's case (cited supra) and, therefore, it does not further the case of the respondents in facts and circumstances of the present case and preliminary objection raised by the respondent No. 1 about maintainability of the petition under Article 226 of the Constitution is rejected.
29. In the instant case, scrutiny of nomination form was done by the Returning Officer on 28-5-2003. However, Returning Officer has ignored provisions of Rule 11 of ::: Downloaded on - 23/12/2014 23:46:27 ::: *12* wp.11507.14.vp.election the Bombay Village Panchayat Election Rules, 1959. Sub-rule (2) of Rule 11 requires Election Officer to conduct summary enquiry before rejecting nomination paper on the ground of objection raised to such nomination paper. In the instant case, it is not in dispute that nomination paper of the petitioner was rejected on the ground of objection raised by one Nilkanth Nandurkar that father-in-law of the petitioner did not pay house tax for the year 2002-03 and, therefore, petitioner had incurred disqualification under Clause
(h) of section 14(1) of the Bombay Village Panchayats Act. It was incumbent upon the Returning Officer to conduct summary enquiry in order to ascertain as to whether father-in-law of the petitioner had paid taxes or not particularly in view of provisions of Explanation 2(i) of section 14 of the Bombay Village Panchayats Act, which contemplates that a person shall not be deemed to be disqualified if he has paid the amount of tax or fee due, prior to the day prescribed for the nomination of the candidate.
30. In the instant case, it is not in dispute that father-in-law of the petitioner in fact had paid the house tax for the year 2002-03 on 10-9-2002 i.e. much before the last date of nomination, i.e. 27-5-2003 and if the Returning Officer had conducted the summary enquiry in this regard, the nomination paper of the petitioner would not have been rejected on this count and question of incurring disqualification under Clause (h) of section 14 of the Bombay Village Panchayats Act would not have arisen. Similarly, nomination paper is in the prescribed form "A" and stipulation in the said form do not require candidate to either mention that the taxes for the relevant year are paid by the candidate or his family members or annex with the said form receipt of payment of taxes for the relevant year. In absence thereof, the summary scrutiny by the Returning Officer before rejecting nomination paper assumes importance and failure to follow this procedure undoubtedly has not only caused prejudice to the petitioner, but also resulted in miscarriage of justice. Hence, in the facts and circumstances of the present case and for the reasons ::: Downloaded on - 23/12/2014 23:46:27 ::: *13* wp.11507.14.vp.election stated hereinabove, the impugned order dated 28-5- 2003 passed by the Returning Officer cannot be sustained. The same is quashed and set aside.
31. So far as present case is concerned, the petitioner being the sole candidate from Ward No. 2, who has questioned the legality and propriety of order of rejection of her nomination paper by the Returning Officer in the present petition and having held by us that such order of rejection is not sustainable in law, it is evident that indulgence shown by this Court does subserve the progress of election and in other words, it facilitates completion of election since petitioner being the sole candidate, would be declared elected and, therefore, proceedings initiated by the petitioner by filing the present petition against the order of rejection of her nomination paper, in the facts and circumstances of the present case, shall not amount to "calling in question the election" in view of law laid down by the Apex Court in Election Commission of Indias case (cited supra) and by necessary implication, the embargo created by Article 243-O(b) of the Constitution is not attracted. Similarly, so far as provisions of section 15-A of the Bombay Village Panchayats Act are concerned, there is a prohibition to call in question an election to Panchayat except in accordance with provisions of section 15 and no Court other than Judge referred to in that section shall entertain any dispute in respect of such election.
For similar reasons, same is also not attracted since challenge made by the petitioner to the order of the Returning Officer, in the facts and circumstances of the present case and for the reasons stated hereinabove, cannot be termed as "calling in question and election of Panchayat"."
22 In the Mayaraju case (supra), the Petitioner challenged the order dated 28.05.2003 passed by the Returning Officer rejecting the nomination form which the Petitioner had filed for contesting the election from Ward No.2 of Gram Panchayat, Dhamangaon which was reserved for Other Backward Class (OBC). The Returning Officer has rejected the ::: Downloaded on - 23/12/2014 23:46:28 ::: *14* wp.11507.14.vp.election nomination form on the ground that the tax receipt for the year 2002- 2003 in respect of the house owned by the father-in-law of the Petitioner was not filed. It was stated that the Petitioner was residing along with his father-in-law in the said house.
23 It was canvassed before the Division Bench of this Court that Rule 11 of the Maharashtra Village Panchayat Election Rules, 1959 deal with the scrutiny of nomination papers and requires that the Returning Officer shall make necessary inquiry before rejecting the nomination paper. After considering the rival submissions and case law relied upon by the parties, the Division Bench of this Court came to a conclusion on the merits of the matter that the nomination paper was wrongly rejected. The order of the Returning Officer was, therefore, held to be unsustainable and the same was quashed and set aside, as can be seen from paragraph 30 of the said judgment.
24 The Division Bench in Mayaraju (supra), before parting with the judgment has made it clear in paragraph 32 that there cannot be a generalized proposition of law that whenever there is a challenge raised in the petition against the order of the Returning Officer refusing or accepting the nomination paper, such proceedings are not hit by the prohibition created by Article 243-O(b) of the Constitution of India and Section 15A of the Bombay Village Panchayats Act (presently, Maharashtra Village Panchayats Act) and that it necessarily shall depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case. It was also recorded that the Court is entitled to show indulgence only if it is satisfied that such indulgence would subserve the process of election or facilitate completion of election and not otherwise.
25 In the instant case, for the reasons elaborately recorded herein above on the issue of tribe validity of the Petitioner, the order of rejection of her nomination paper is rendered unsustainable. On this count ::: Downloaded on - 23/12/2014 23:46:28 ::: *15* wp.11507.14.vp.election as well, neither of the litigating parties have placed reliance upon any judgment of this Court or the Apex Court in which a divergent view could be said to have been taken on similar set of facts.
26 Rule 15(2)(i) and (ii) of the Maharashtra Village Panchayats Election Rules, 1959 read as under:-
"15. Uncontested elections and failure to elect:-
(1) ......
(2) In any ward in which seats are reserved for Scheduled Castes or
Scheduled Tribes or Backward Class of citizens or women, the Returning Officer shall ascertain the number of candidates qualified to fill each reserved seat and thereafter, proceed as follows:-
(i) where the number of candidates qualified to be chosen to fill any of the reserved seats is equal to the number of such seats, all the candidates so qualified shall be declared by the Returning Officer to be elected to fill the respective reserved seats;
(ii) where the number of candidates qualified to be chosen to fill any of the reserved seats is less than the number of such seats, all such candidates shall be forthwith declared to be duly elected to fill the respective reserved seats; and in respect of the remaining such reserved seats it shall be deemed that the election has not resulted in the return of the required number of qualified persons willing to take office within the meaning of sub-section (3) of Section 10."
27 I am further of the considered view that the nomination form of the Petitioner deserves to be held "valid". In doing so, it will subserve the progress of election and would facilitate the completion of the elections. As such, as has been held by the Division Bench of this Court in paragraph 31 of the Mayaraju judgment (supra), the proceedings initiated by the Petitioner in filing this petition, challenging the rejection of her nomination form, shall not amount to calling in question the election. The embargo created by Article 243-O(b) of the Constitution of India would not be attracted. Needless to state, therefore, the provisions of Section 15- ::: Downloaded on - 23/12/2014 23:46:28 :::
*16* wp.11507.14.vp.election A of the Bombay Village Panchayats Act would not be attracted. 28 In the light of the above, the impugned order dated 09.12.2014 passed by the Respondent No.4 Returning Officer is quashed and set aside. However, in doing so, simultaneously I find it expedient to direct Respondent No.2 to formally issue a Caste Validity Certificate to the Petitioner as belonging to Mahadev Koli (Scheduled Tribe) as expeditiously as possible and preferably on or before 27.02.2015. She shall then supply a copy of the same to the appropriate authority expeditiously.
29 In the light of Rule 15(2) of the Maharashtra Village Panchayats Election Rules, 1959 as reproduced herein above, since the number of candidates qualified to be chosen to fill any of the reserved seats is equal to the number of such seats, all the candidates so qualified are to be declared by the Returning Officer to be elected to fill the respective reserved seats. Therefore, the Respondent No.4 shall proceed to make a formal declaration as regards election of the Petitioner as a member of the Gram Panchayat from Ward No.2 of Gram Panchayat, Kalambar (Khurd), Taluka Loha, District Nanded in accordance with law. 30 At this stage, Mr.Shelke submits that since the Returning Officer is present in the Court for the hearing of this matter and while the order was dictated, he shall comply with the order expeditiously and in accordance with law. The Statement is accepted.
31 The Writ Petition is, therefore, allowed. Rule is made absolute accordingly. No order as to costs.
(RAVINDRA V. GHUGE, J.) ::: Downloaded on - 23/12/2014 23:46:28 :::