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[Cites 23, Cited by 0]

Rajasthan High Court - Jaipur

Rameshwar Sharma vs J D A And Anr on 8 May, 2019

Author: Veerendr Singh Siradhana

Bench: Veerendr Singh Siradhana

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         HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN
                     BENCH AT JAIPUR

                    S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 11547/2017

Rameshwar Sharma S/o Late Shri Jagannath Sharma, By Caste
Brahman, R/o Village Chainpura, Tehsil Sanganer, District Jaipur.
                                                                                   ----Petitioner
                                              Versus
1.        Jaipur Development Authority Through Its Secretary,
          Indira Circle, Jawahar Lal Nehru Marg, Jaipur.
2.        New Pink City Grah Nirman Sahakari Samiti Ltd., Through
          Its Secretary, Shri Suresh Jain S/o Late Sh, 7 Farsoiya
          Market, Babu Bazar, Jaipur.
                                                                              ----Respondents


For Petitioner(s)                  :     Mr. R.D. Rastogi, Sr. Counsel with Mr.
                                         Sarthak Rastogi
For Respondent(s)                  :     Mr. K.K. Sharma, Sr. Counsel with Mr.
                                         Sandeep Pathak



     HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE VEERENDR SINGH SIRADHANA

                                              Order

08/05/2019
      By order dated 15th March, 2016, the Jaipur Development

Authority Appellate Tribunal, Jaipur (for short, the 'Tribunal'),

allowed an application for impleadment of third party-New Pinkcity

Grah Nirman Sahakari Samiti Ltd. (for short, 'respondent-Society)

and prayer for its review declined vide order dated 17 th May, 2017;

is the cause for institution of the present writ application praying

for the following relief(s):


      "It is therefore, respectfully prayed that this writ
      application may kindly be allowed and by way of a writ,
      order or direction in the nature thereof, the impugned
      order dated 15.03.2016 and 17.05.2017 passed by the
      Learned JDA tribunal in reference No.205/2009 may
      kindly be quashed and set aside and thereby the

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     application for impleadment submitted by the society may
     also kindly be dismissed.
     Any other orders directions or relief in favour of the
     petitioner as may be deemed fit and proper in the fact and
     circumstances of the case, may kindly be granted."



2.   Briefly, the essential skeletal material facts necessary for

appreciation of the controversy raised are that: the petitioner

claiming himself recorded 'Khatedar' of land bearing Khasra No.

146, 147, 148, 149, 150 and 164, in Village Chainpura, Tehsil

Sanganer, Jaipur, has filed a Reference Petition before the

Tribunal. It is pleaded case of the petitioner that land acquisition

proceedings with reference to subject land were initiated under

the Rajasthan Land Acquisition Act, 1953 (for short, 'the Act of

1953'). Notice under Section 4 and 6 were issued on 26 th April,

1969 and 25th February, 1973, respectively. Award was made on

2nd April, 1981. On an application for regularization of his

possession on a part of subject land measuring 9500 Sq. Yrds.,

the State Government made an order dated 23 rd October, 2008,

directing the respondent-JDA to issue a lease deed for land in

possession measuring 9500 Sq. Yrds., subject to withdrawal of

writ application instituted by the petitioner. The State Government

in continuation of the order dated 23 rd October, 2008, made

another order dated 14th May, 2014, directing the respondent-JDA

to issue lease deed in favour of the petitioner wherein claim of the

respondent-Society was rejected after due examination. According

to the petitioner, the order dated 14 th May, 2014, was not

challenged any further by the respondent-Society. Pending the

proceedings on the reference petition aforesaid; an application


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under Order 1 Rule 10 CPC, was instituted by the respondent-

Society), which has been granted by the Tribunal vide impugned

order dated 15th March, 2016 and an application for review of the

order dated 15th March, 2016, has been declined vide order dated

17th March, 2017; of which the petitioner is aggrieved of.

3.    Mr. R.D. Rastogi, learned Senior Counsel with Mr. Sarthak

Rastogi, emphatically argued that impugned order made by the

Tribunal dated 15th March, 2016 granting the application for

impleadment as party and declining its review prayed vide order

dated 17th May, 2017; are orders, absolutely illegal, invalid and

arbitrary so also contrary to the well settled principles of law.

Learned counsel referring to the prayer clause of the reference

petition instituted, pending before the Tribunal, asserted that no

relief has been prayed by the petitioner against respondent-

Society, and therefore, respondent No.2, is neither a necessary

party nor a proper party.

4.    That apart, the petitioner is a dominus litus, and therefore,

has    a     right      to     choose         whom            to    implead         as     a        party

respondent/non-applicant and determine the relief prayed for. The

Respondent-Society, if has any right or title in the subject land

involved       herein,         is     required           to        undertake          independent

proceedings.

5.    Referring to order-sheets dated 17th February, 2012, 23rd

March, 2012, 1st may, 2012, 12th July, 2012, 23rd August, 2012,

23rd September, 2012 and 11th December, 2018; learned counsel

insistently argued that the so called agreement dated 21 st January,

1976, which is the basis of the alleged claim of the respondent-

Society, was allowed to be brought on record, by the Tribunal, on

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the dates aforesaid. However, no such alleged agreement dated

21st January, 1976, was brought on record and the counsel

representing respondent-Society, before the Tribunal on 11 th

December, 2012, pleaded that sufficient documentary evidence

has been placed on record along with application seeking

impleadment, and therefore, they would proceed to argue the

matter on the basis of those documents and do not want to bring

on record the agreement dated 21 st January, 1976. Accordingly,

the matter was ordered to be proceeded further by the Tribunal

leading to impugned order dated 15 th March, 2016, allowing the

application of respondent No.2, to be pending impleaded as

opposite party respondent No.2, to the reference proceedings.

6.    Mr. R.D. Rastogi, learned Sr. Counsel, referring to prohibition on

transfer of lands acquired and/or under acquisition as contemplated

under Section 3 and 4 of the Rajasthan Land (Restrictions on Transfer)

Act, 1976, (for short, 'the Act of 1976'), contended that no transfer by

sale, mortgage, gift, lease or otherwise of any land or part thereof, in

the State of Rajasthan, acquired by the Government or lands in relation

to which acquisition process having been initiated, is permissible.

Hence, the pretext on which the respondent-Society claimed its stake

for impleadment as a party to the proceedings before the Tribunal on

the Reference Petition instituted by the petitioner; cannot be sustained

in the eye of law.

7.    Learned counsel further pointed out that J.D.A. Appellate Tribunal,

upon hearing the learned counsel for the parties on 2 nd March, 2016,

specifically made an order to the effect that application under Order 1

Rule 10 CPC, would be considered at the time of final arguments on the

matter, as would be evident from the order-sheet drawn on 2 nd March,

2016, while posting the matter to 16 th March, 2016. Hence, the

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impugned order dated 15 March 2016, is bad in the eye of law on that

count as well.

8.    Learned counsel for the petitioner vociferously argued that

the impugned order dated 15th March, 2016, was made in absence

of the counsel for the petitioner, though his presence has been

recorded. Further, an application instituted by the counsel for the

petitioner before the Tribunal specifically detailed out the fact of

his (counsel's) absence on the day, the impugned order dated 15 th

March, 2016, was made. However, that application has also been

declined observing that the matter required no review for the

same was not within the ambit of Order 47 Rule 1 CPC.

9.    Inviting attention of this Court to order dated 12 th June, 2009

(Annexure-11), learned Senior Counsel, contended that Reference

Petition No.97/2003, instituted by the respondent-Society, staking

its claim on the subject land was declined with a specific finding

that the respondent-Society, was not entitled to any relief. That

apart, a Civil Suit No. 154/2012, instituted by the respondent-

Society,     impleading            the      petitioner,         along       with       others,      as

defendant; was also dismissed on an application instituted under

Order 7 Rule 11 read with Section 16 and 151 CPC, vide order

dated 6th October, 2012, which has attained finality as the same

was not challenged any further. Thus, in the face of facts aforesaid

respondent-society is neither a necessary party nor a proper

party.

10.   Learned counsel further added that order dated 1st July,

2008, made by a Coordinate Bench of this Court in SBCWP No.

231/1975 (Rameshwar Prasad Vs. State of Rajasthan and ors.),

instituted by the petitioner impleading respondent-Society as a

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respondent along with others; pointed out that though the writ

application was dismissed; however, relief was accorded in favour

of respondent-Society, impleaded as respondent No.4, in writ

application No.231/1975 (supra). Thereafter, the petitioner as well

as the State-respondents, instituted intra court appeals against

the order made by the learned Single Judge.

11.   According          to     learned        counsel,         the     intra      court       appeal

instituted by the State of Rajasthan (DBSAW No.253/2010),

impleading the petitioner as well as respondent-Society, as party

respondents was decided vide order dated 2 nd April, 2010,

specifically setting aside the observations/directions made in the

impugned judgment by the learned Single Judge pertaining to

relief accorded to the respondent-Society. The Division Bench in

no uncertain terms held that observations/directions made in

favour of the respondent-Society, could not be treated as a part of

the impugned judgment dated 1st July, 2008, made by the learned

Single Judge. Thus, according to the learned counsel for the

petitioner whatever observations/directions were made by the

learned Single Judge contrary to law, were completely wiped out.

However, respondent No.2-Society, has interfered with the subject

land at every stage in order to frustrate the claim of the petitioner

on the basis of the observations/directions made by the learned

Single Judge vide judgment dated 1 st July, 2008, on writ

application that was instituted by the petitioner, in spite of the fact

that those observations/directions, have been completely wiped

out in the intra court appeals aforesaid.

12.   Mr. Rastogi, referring to order dated 11 th November, 2010,

made on SB Civil Misc. Application No. 4/2010 in SBCWP No.

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31/1975: (Rameshwar Vs. New Pinkcity Grah Nirman Sahakari

Samiti Ltd. and Ors.), pointed out that in the backdrop of the

judgment in intra court appeals No.1376/2008 and 253/2010,

wiping out the observations made by the learned Single Judge in

favour of the respondent-Society; it was held that rights of the

parties would be governed by the judgment delivered by the

Division Bench of this Court in intra court appeal No.235/2010,

which had attained finality holding that any party, if made

misrepresentation of any kind, the aggrieved party would be

entitled to maintain proper contempt petition.

       In order to fortify his stand learned counsel for the petitioner

has relied upon the opinion of the Apex Court of the land in the

case     of    Ramesh            Hirachand             Kundanmal               Vs.      Municapal

Corporation of Greater Bombay and ors.: (1992) 2 SCC 524,

Mumbai International Airport Private Limited Vs. Regency

Convention Centre and Hotels Private Ltd and Ors.: (2010) 7

SCC 417, Vidur Impex and Traders Pvt. Ltd and Ors. Vs.

Tosh Apartments Pvt. Ltd. and Ors.: (2012) 8 SCC 384.

Reference has also been made to opinion of a Coordinate Bench of

this Court in the case of Jaipur Development Authority and

Anr. Vs. Ambiance Land Developers (India) Pvt. Ltd and

Anr.:SBCWP No. 15546/2011, decided on 11th April, 2012.



13.    Per contra: Mr. Kamlakar Sharma, learned senior counsel,

while supporting the impugned orders dated 15th March, 2016 and

17th May, 2017, strenuously argued that institution of the writ

application is a gross misuse of process of law. For in the backdrop

of regularization of the Scheme of the State of Rajasthan with

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reference to the land involved herein; the petitioner has no right

worth the name. According to learned counsel, petitioner was

Khatedar of 9 bighas and 5 biswas of the land that was under

acquisition. It is also pointed out that Jagannath (deceased),

father of the petitioner, sold the subject land involved herein vide

an agreement of sale dated 21st January, 1976, to the respondent-

Society. Moreover, while the petitioner has staked claim on the

basis of 9 bighas and 5 biswas of the land acquired; but, the

petitioner has restricted his claim only to the extent of land

measuring 9,500 sq. yrds.

14.   Mr.      Kamlakar            Sharma,           would         further        contend           that

respondent-Society has right and interest in the subject land

involved herein and any order made by the Tribunal would affect

its rights and interest, and therefore, has been rightly impleaded

as a party respondent to the pending Reference proceedings on an

application instituted under order 1 Rule 10 CPC, as would be

evident from the contents of application itself.

15.   Repelling the plea that the application under Order 1 Rule 10

CPC of the respondent-Society was to be considered at the time of

final arguments, in the backdrop of the order sheet dated 2 nd

March, 2016; learned counsel would contend that a glance of the

order sheet on 2nd March, 2016, would reflect that the matter was

fixed for final arguments; and accordingly, the application has

been rightly dealt with and order made on 15 th March, 2016. Thus,

there is no illegality. It is further pointed out that what can be

considered by this Court, in exercise of writ jurisdictional, is, only

jurisdictional error.



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16.   Referring to application under Order 1 Rule 10 CPC,

instituted on behalf of the respondent-Society, it is pointed out

that application was accompanied with as many as 12 documents

which strengthened the claim of the respondent-Society for

impleadment to the pending reference proceedings. The review

application instituted with a prayer for review of order dated 15 th

March, 2016 impugned, was rightly declined for the counsel for

the petitioner was heard, as would be evident from the contents of

the   order       dated       15th      March,        2016;        recording         reasons        for

impleadment. Hence, the statement made on behalf of the

petitioner that the application for impleadment was allowed

without hearing the counsel for the petitioner; is contrary to

record.

17.   Mr. Kamlakar Sharma, learned senior counsel, referring to

"additional agreement" dated 5th May, 1987, urged that the father of the

petitioner late Shri Jagannath did admit the factum of an agreement

dated 21st January, 1976, and also acknowledged the payment received.

Hence, the Tribunal committed no error in granting the application of

the respondent-Society for impleadment as party to the pending

reference proceedings.

18.   Referring to order dated 1st July, 2008, made by a Coordinate

Bench of this Court in SBCWP No. 231/1975: Rameshwar Prasad Vs.

The State of Rajasthan and Ors.; it is urged that writ application

instituted by the petitioner challenging the acquisition proceedings of

the   subject      land      involved       herein;       was      dismissed.         Further,      the

respondent-Society was one of the parties to the writ proceedings

aforesaid      and      while       dismissing          the      writ     application,         certain

observations/directions were made in favour of the respondent-Society.

While upholding the acquisition proceedings of the subject land involved

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herein, this Court directed the respondent-JDA to proceed further and

issue lease-deeds to the members of the respondent-Housing Society.

However, on intra-court appeal(s), the observations/directions made in

favour of the respondent-Society were wiped out; but, the findings

justify impleadment of the respondent-Society to the pending reference

proceedings. Moreover, the Division Bench on an application for

clarification observed that the respondent-JDA may proceed according

to its record and to verify the physical and actual possession on the

spot, and thereafter, do the needful, in accordance with law. Therefore,

the plea raised on behalf of the petitioner that respondent-Society has

no interest in the subject land involved herein; is without any factual

foundation.

19.   Referring to order dated 2nd April, 2010, made by this Court in

DBSAW No. 253/2010, learned senior counsel contended that as to

acquisition, if any party intended to stake his right or claim; liberty was

reserved to take legal recourse. Therefore, impleadment of the

respondent-Society cannot be faulted. Learned counsel emphasized that

the petitioner has right, if any, only to the extent of land measuring

2,111 sq.yrds., and therefore, the claim staked for 9,500 sq.yrds, is a

claim without any factual foundation.

20.   It is further added that a Civil Suit instituted by the petitioner

along with his brothers, was withdrawn by institution of an application

under Order 23 Rule 1 CPC. The Court below allowed withdrawal of the

suit proceedings vide order dated 26 th November, 2009. However, an

application for restoration filed, was allowed only in part. Surely, the

petitioner has not been allowed restoration of the suit proceedings.

Though,     the matter is             subjudice in SBCWP No.4469/2019:                              Pt.

Jagannath Vs. Shri Suresh Chandra Jain, with an interim protection.

Reference has also been made to note-sheet of the JDA, wherein the

matter of regularization has been dealt with while considering the

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transfer of the subject land involved herein as valid or not. And that

issue is to be dealt with by the Tribunal.

21.   In order to fortify his stand, learned counsel has also relied upon

the opinion of the Apex Court of the land in the case of Baluram vs. P.

Chellathangam: (2015) 13 SCC 579, opinion of a Coordinate Bench of

this Court in the case of M/s Omway Buildstate Pvt. Ltd. V.

Divisional Commissioner, Jaipur, decided on 11th June, 2014 and its

confirmation by the Division Bench, declining intra court appeal (DBSAW

No.279/2012):Rajesh Agarwal Vs. M/s Omway Buildstate Pvt.

Ltd. And Ors, decided along with connected intra court appeal (DBSAW

No.222/2012): on 11th June, 2014.

22.   I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and with their

assistance scanned the materials available on record so also gave my

thoughtful consideration to the rival submissions at Bar.

23.   Indisputably, the petitioner assailing the legality, validity and

correctness of the acquisition proceedings of the subject land involved

herein instituted writ application SBCWP No. 231/1975, adjudicated

upon vide order dated 1st July, 2008, upholding the acquisition

proceedings, holding thus:

            "The additional agreement Annexure-R4/1 clearly
            shows that the respondent No.4 housing society has
            purchased the disputed land from the sole
            petitioner late Shri Jagannath vide agreement
            dated 21st January, 1976 and additional agreement
            dated 08.05.1987 and paid the entire sale
            consideration to him as per the details given in the
            additional agreement. Most of the payment has
            been made through Cheques and affidavit duly
            signed by Jagannath and attested by Notary Public
            is also on the record which clearly shows that the
            land, in dispute, was sold by the petitioner
            Jagannath to the respondent No.4 housing society
            in the year 1976. The order dated 30th December,
            1985, passed by the Additional Collector (South),
            Agriculture Land Conversion, Jaipur (Annexure-
            R4/4) also shows that the land, in dispute, along-

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            with other land was converted from agriculture to
            residential scheme. The land conversion and
            regularization order was passed by the State
            Government also vide order dated 18th January,
            1990, a reference of which has been given in the
            letter dated 24th January, 1990 (Annexure R4/3)
            whereby the State Government accorded its
            sanction for change of land use of the disputed land
            in the master plan also. The respondent No.4
            housing society filed the application under Section
            90-B of the Rajasthan Land Revenue Act before the
            Jaipur Development Authority. The Competent
            Officer/Authorized Officer, Zone B-I, Jaipur
            Development Authority, Jaipur, vide its order dated
            9th July, 2001, has already passed an order under
            Section 90-B of the Rajasthan Land Revenue Act.
            In view of the above, it is apparent that the
            petitioners have lost their interest in the disputed
            land and, in these circumstances, the petitioners
            have no right over the disputed land and they
            cannot be said to be aggrieved persons to maintain
            the present writ petition. This is a case where the
            respondent No.4 housing society chalked out the
            residential scheme known as Siddharth Nagar and
            allotted plots to its members, who have already
            raised constructions, which is clear from the order
            of the Authorized Officer passed under Section
            90-B of the Rajasthan Land Revenue Act and the
            respondent JDA is now required to proceed further
            in the matter by issuing lease-deeds to the
            members of the respondent No.4 housing society.

            In view of the above discussions, I find that the
            writ petition filed on behalf of petitioner is liable to
            be dismissed and the same is hereby dismissed with
            no order as to costs."

24.     On the intra-court appeal (DBSAW No.1376/2008), instituted

by    the      petitioner,         the       Division         Bench         wiping         out      the

observations/directions in favour of the respondent-Society, held

thus:

        "20. The relief sought for by the appellants being the
        same and identical to that of involved and prayed for in
        other writ petitions including Writ Petition No.2090/1987
        titled Hathroi Grah Nirman Sahakari Samiti Limited. Vs.

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      State of Rajasthan which cam to be dismissed on 29 th
      August, 1996 and Civil Special Appeal No. 926/1996 and
      Special Leave Petitions Nos. 3690-94 of 1981 already
      stood adjudicated and attained finality vide judgment of
      the Apex Court, maintaining the order of the learned
      Single Judge and the Division Bench. In view of the
      acquisition proceedings being upheld and maintained up to
      the Supreme Court as noticed above, the appellants are
      not found entitled to any relief as prayed for in the writ
      petition. No other point or legal issue, as prayed for, was
      urged before us.

      21. so far as the observations made by the learned Single
      Judge in favour of the Respondent No.4 is concerned,
      these have not been rebutted by the Jaipur Development
      Authority or the appellants and the appellants have also
      not placed on record any substantial evidence to disturb
      it. In the totality of the circumstances, we find that the
      land has already been acquired and the award has been
      passed. The acquisition proceedings have attained finality.
      The acquisition proceedings have also been upheld up to
      the Supreme Court. Therefore, we are of the opinion that
      the appeal having no merit deserves to be dismissed and
      it stands dismissed accordingly."

25.   By order dated 2nd April, 2010, dismissing the intra-court appeal

(DBSAW) No. 253/2010; State of Rajasthan & Ors. Vs. Rameshwar

Prasad & Ors., against the very same order dated 1 st July, 2008,

Division Bench of this Court, held thus;

       "We have heard rival submissions made by learned
       counsel for the parties and scanned the matter carefully.

       The question is as to whether learned Single Judge was
       correct in making observations and issuing directions in
       favour of non-petitioner-cooperative society in a
       challenge to the land acquisition proceedings. It was a
       petition by land holder challenging land acquisition
       proceedings. In view of grounds raised and challenge
       made, learned Single Judge was expected to decide the
       matter accordingly. However, while deciding the writ
       petition regarding challenge to the land acquisition,
       certain observations and directions have been made in
       favour of the non-petitioner No.4-cooperative society as
       if it is a writ petition by them. By virtue of certain
       observations and directions, there exists self


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 contradiction in the judgment of the learned Single
 Judge. The writ petition was dismissed regarding
 challenge to the land acquisition holding it to be legal.
 Once the land acquisition has been confirmed, land vests
 in the government/ JDA but ignoring this, observations
 and directions in contradiction were made for issuance of
 lease deeds in favour of members of respondent No.4-
 cooperative society, which otherwise not prayed in the
 writ petition. It virtually nullifies the right of the State
 and the JDA on acquisition of land. The matter could
 have been discussed in detail but in view of submissions
 of     counsel     for     the      society    that    those
 observations/directions made in the impugned judgment
 pertaining to respondent No.4-society have been wiped
 out by the coordinate Bench of this Court. We find that
 JDA and the Land Acquisition Officer filed a review
 petition against the judgment of coordinate Bench
 deciding the appeal against the same judgment of learned
 Single Judge. Therein certain clarifications have been
 made to give liberty to the JDA to proceed in
 accordance with law. We find that State has
 independently filed an appeal though along with the JDA
 and Land Acquisition Officer, however, appeal has been
 filed by the State Government for the first time. It has
 to be addressed on the issues raised so as to make things
 very clear. The State Government has rightly pleaded
 that there exist self contradiction in judgment affecting
 right of the State. On one hand, acquisition has been
 upheld vesting rights of the land in favour of appellant
 and, on the other hand, a direction in favour of society
 for issuance of lease in favour of the members of the
 society, that too in a writ petition filed by the land
 holder. No observation or direction could have been made
 in favour of non-petitioner society, otherwise, it becomes
 a writ petition on behalf of non-petitioner-society and
 that too when the reply given by the non-petitioner
 society is not made available to the petitioners JDA and
 State. The learned Single Judge should have restricted
 its judgment to the extent of challenge in the writ
 petition, however, in the present matter, the learned
 Single Judge exceeded to his jurisdiction in making
 observations/ directions in favour of non-petitioner
 society affecting rights of other co-respondents State
 and the JDA. In view of aforesaid, the observations/
 directions need to be taken out and is to be set aside.
 We, accordingly, make it clear that any observations or
 direction in regard to respondent No.4-society cannot be
 kept as a part of the impugned judgment thus the

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       observations and directions in favour of non-petitioner
       No.4 society deserve are set aside. This is more so when
       learned counsel appearing on behalf of the society has
       stated that in the review petition filed by the JDA and
       the Land Acquisition Officer, observations and directions
       in favour of the society have been wiped out.

       On acquisition of land, if any party has a right or claim
       they would be at liberty to take legal recourse for their
       rights.

       The outcome of aforesaid is that challenge to the
       acquisition of land in dispute is held to be legal and to
       that extent judgment of the learned Single Judge is
       confirmed however, observations and directions given in
       favour of the respondent No.1-society have been set
       aside. The appeal is accordingly allowed to the extent
       indicated above."


26.   It is also an admitted fact that the respondent-Society staking its

claim on the subject land involved herein in the backdrop of the

observations/directions made by the Division Bench in intra-court

appeal No. 253/2010, instituted suit proceedings (Civil Suit No.

154/2012): New Pinkcity Grah Nirman Sahakari Samiti Ltd. Vs.

Rameshwar Prasad and Ors. The suit was dismissed sustaining an

application under Order 7 Rule 11(d) read with Section 16/151 CPC,

vide order dated 6th October, 2012. Admittedly, the order has attained

finality as the same was not challenged any further by the respondent-

Society.

27.   The fact that a Reference Petition was also instituted by the

respondent-Society            before        the      Tribunal        being        Reference         No.

97/2003:New Pinkcity Grah Nirman Sahakari Samiti Ltd. Vs.

Jaipur Development Authority, staking its claim on the subject land

involved herein, which resulted into dismissal vide order dated 12 th

June, 2009, and that too has attained finality for the same was not

challenged any further; is also not disputed. Thus, the respondent-

Society having staked its claim on the very same subject land involved

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herein, unsuccessfully before the Civil Court as well as the Tribunal as is

evident from the materials available on record; instituted an application

for impleadment to the pending Reference Petition instituted by the

petitioner.

28.   In the case of Vidur Impax and Traders Private Limited

and ors.(supra), explaining the expressions "necessary party" and

"proper party", the Apex Court of the land culled out broad principles

which should govern disposal of an application for impleadment, on a

survey of earlier opinions, observing thus:

      "41.Though there is apparent conflict in the observations
      made in some of the aforementioned judgments, the broad
      principles which should govern disposal of an application
      for impleadment are:

      41.1. The Court can, at any stage of the proceedings,
      either on an application made by the parties or otherwise,
      direct impleadment of any person as party, who ought to
      have been joined as Plaintiff or Defendant or whose
      presence before the Court is necessary for effective and
      complete adjudication of the issues involved in the suit.

      41.2. A necessary party is the person who ought to be
      joined as party to the suit and in whose absence an
      effective decree cannot be passed by the Court.

      41.3. A proper party is a person whose presence would
      enable the Court to completely, effectively and properly
      adjudicate upon all matters and issues, though he may not
      be a person in favour of or against whom a decree is to be
      made.

      41.4. If a person is not found to be a proper or necessary
      party, the Court does not have the jurisdiction to order
      his impleadment against the wishes of the Plaintiff.

      41.5. In a suit for specific performance, the Court can
      order impleadment of a purchaser whose conduct is above
      board, and who files application for being joined as party
      within reasonable time of his acquiring knowledge about
      the pending litigation.
      41.6. However, if the applicant is guilty of contumacious
      conduct or is beneficiary of a clandestine transaction or a

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transaction made by the owner of the suit property in
violation of the restraint order passed by the Court or the
application is unduly delayed then the Court will be fully
justified in declining the prayer for impleadment.

43. We are in complete agreement with the Delhi High
Court that the application for impleadment filed by the
Appellants was highly belated. Although, the Appellants
have pleaded that at the time of execution of the
agreements for sale by Respondent No. 2 in their favour in
February 1997, they did not know about the suit filed by
Respondent No. 1, it is difficult, if not impossible, to
accept their statement because the smallness of time gap
between the agreements for sale and the sale deeds
executed by Respondent No. 2 in favour of the Appellants
and the execution of agreement for sale by the Appellants
in favour of Bhagwati Developers would make any person of
ordinary prudence to believe that Respondent No. 2, the
Appellants and Bhagwati Developers had entered into
these transactions with the sole object of frustrating
agreement for sale dated 13.9.1988 executed in favour of
Respondent No. 1 and the suit pending before the Delhi
High Court. In any case, the Appellants will be deemed to
have become aware of the same on receipt of summons in
Suit No. 161/1999 filed by Respondent No. 2 for annulment
of the agreements for sale and the sale deeds in which
Respondent No. 2 had clearly made a mention of Suit No.
425/1993 filed by Respondent No. 1 for specific
performance of agreement for sale dated 13.12.1988 and
injunction or at least when the learned Single Judge of the
Delhi High Court entertained IA No. 625/2001 filed by
Respondent No. 1 and restrained Respondent Nos. 2 and 4
from transferring possession of the suit property to the
Appellants. However, in the application for impleadment
filed by them, the Appellants did not offer any tangible
explanation as to why the application for impleadment was
filed only on 4.2.2008 i.e. after 7 years of the passing of
injunction order dated 22.1.2001 and, in our considered
view, this constituted a valid ground for declining their
prayer for impleadment as parties to Suit No. 425/1993.

44. The ratio of the judgment in Kasturi v. Iyyamperumal
(supra), on which heavy reliance has been placed by the
learned senior counsel for the Appellants, does not help his
clients. In the present case, the agreements for sale and
the sale deeds were executed by Respondent No. 2 in
favour of the Appellants in a clandestine manner and in
violation of the injunction granted by the High Court.

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      Therefore, it cannot be said that any valid title or interest
      has been acquired by the Appellants in the suit property
      and the ratio of the judgment in Surjit Singh v. Harbans
      Singh (supra) would squarely apply to the Appellants case
      because they are claiming right on the basis of
      transactions made in defiance of the restraint order
      passed by the High Court. The suppression of material
      facts by Bhagwati Developers and the Appellants from the
      Calcutta High Court, which was persuaded to pass orders in
      their favour, takes the Appellants out of the category of
      bona fide purchaser. Therefore, their presence is neither
      required to decide the controversy involved in the suit
      filed by Respondent No. 1 nor required to pass an effective
      decree."

29.   In the case of Ramesh Hirachand Kundanmal (supra), the

Apex Court of the land in no uncertain terms held that "necessary

party" or "proper party" would be one, who has direct or legal interest

in the litigation. At this juncture it will be profitable to take note of the

text of para 6 and 8, which reads thus:

      "6. Sub-rule(2) of Rule 10 gives a wide discretion to the
      Court to meet every case of defect of parties and is not
      affected by the inaction of the plaintiff to bring the
      necessary parties on record. The question of impleadment
      of a party has to be decided on the touch stone of Order
      I Rule 10 which provides that only a necessary or a proper
      party may be added. A necessary party is one without
      whom no order can be made effectively. A proper party is
      one in whose absence an effective order can be made but
      whose presence is necessary for a complete and final
      decision on the question involved in the proceeding. The
      addition of parties is generally not a question of initial
      jurisdiction of the Court but of a judicial discretion which
      has to be exercised in view of all the facts and
      circumstances of a particular case.

      8. The case really turns on the true construction of the
      Rule in particular the meaning of the words "whose
      presence before the Court may be necessary in order to
      enable the Court effectually and completely to
      adjudicate upon and settle all the questions involved in
      the suit." The Court is empowered to join a person whose
      presence is necessary for the prescribed purpose and
      cannot under the Rule direct the addition of a person
      whose presence is not necessary for that purpose. If the

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      intervener has a cause of action against the plaintiff
      relating to the subject-matter of . the existing action,
      the Court has power to join intervener so as to give
      effect to the primary object of the order which is to
      avoid multiplicity of actions."


30.   In the case Mumbai International Airport Private Limited

(supra), while dealing with the issue of discretion of Court to strike out

or add parties with specific illustrations in the backdrop of Order 1 Rule

10(2) CPC, the Supreme Court held thus:

        "22. Let us consider the scope and ambit of Order 1 of
        Rule 10(2) CPC regarding striking out or adding parties.
        The said sub-rule is not about the right of a non-party
        to be impleaded as a party, but about the judicial
        discretion of the court to strike out or add parties at
        any stage of a proceeding. The discretion under the
        sub-rule can be exercised either suo moto or on the
        application of the plaintiff or the defendant, or on an
        application of a person who is not a party to the suit.
        The court can strike out any party who is improperly
        joined. The court can add anyone as a plaintiff or as a
        defendant if it finds that he is a necessary party or
        proper party. Such deletion or addition can be without
        any conditions or subject to such terms as the court
        deems fit to impose. In exercising its judicial discretion
        under Order 1 Rule 10(2) of the Code, the court will of
        course act according to reason and fair play and not
        according to whims and caprice.

        23. This Court in Ramji Dayawala & Sons (P) Ltd. v.
        Invest Import reiterated in SCC 80 p.96, para 20 the
        classic definition of 'discretion' by Lord Mansfield in R.
        v. Wilkes 1770 (98) ER 327 that 'discretion'

              "when applied to courts of justice, means sound
              discretion guided by law. It must be governed by
              rule, not by humour; it must not be arbitrary, vague,
              and fanciful, 'but legal and regular'.

        24. We may now give some illustrations regarding
        exercise of discretion under the said Sub-Rule.

        24.1. If a plaintiff makes an application for impleading a
        person as a defendant on the ground that he is a
        necessary party, the court may implead him having

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  regard to the provisions of Rules 9 and 10(2) of Order
  1. If the claim against such a person is barred by
  limitation, it may refuse to add him as a party and even
  dismiss the suit for non-joinder of a necessary party.

  24.2. If the owner of a tenanted property enters into
  an agreement for sale of such property without physical
  possession, in a suit for specific performance by the
  purchaser, the tenant would not be a necessary party.
  But if the suit for specific performance is filed with an
  additional prayer for delivery of physical possession
  from the tenant in possession, then the tenant will be a
  necessary party in so far as the prayer for actual
  possession.

  24.3. If a person makes an application for being
  impleaded contending that he is a necessary party, and
  if the court finds that he is a necessary party, it can
  implead him. If the plaintiff opposes such impleadment,
  then instead of impleading such a party, who is found to
  be a necessary party, the court may proceed to dismiss
  the suit by holding that the applicant was a necessary
  party and in his absence the plaintiff was not entitled
  to any relief in the suit.

  24.4. If an application is made by a plaintiff for
  impleading someone as a proper party, subject to
  limitation, bonafides etc., the court will normally
  implead him, if he is found to be a proper party. On the
  other hand, if a non-party makes an application seeking
  impleadment as a proper party and court finds him to be
  a proper party, the court may direct his addition as a
  defendant; but if the court finds that his addition will
  alter the nature of the suit or introduce a new cause of
  action, it may dismiss the application even if he is found
  to be a proper party, if it does not want to widen the
  scope of the specific performance suit; or the court
  may direct such applicant to be impleaded as a proper
  party, either unconditionally or subject to terms. For
  example, if 'D' claiming to be a co-owner of a suit
  property, enters into an agreement for sale of his share
  in favour of 'P' representing that he is the co-owner
  with half share, and 'P' files a suit for specific
  performance of the said agreement of sale in respect of
  the undivided half share, the court may permit the
  other co-owner who contends that 'D' has only one-
  fourth share, to be impleaded as an additional
  defendant as a proper party, and may examine the issue

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        whether the plaintiff is entitled to specific
        performance of the agreement in respect of half a
        share or only one-fourth share; alternatively the court
        may refuse to implead the other co-owner and leave
        open the question in regard to the extent of share of
        the vendor-defendant to be decided in an independent
        proceeding by the other co-owner, or the plaintiff;
        alternatively the court may implead him but subject to
        the term that the dispute, if any, between the
        impleaded co-owner and the original defendant in regard
        to the extent of the share will not be the subject
        matter of the suit for specific performance, and that it
        will decide in the suit, only the issues relating to
        specific performance, that is whether the defendant
        executed the agreement/contract and whether such
        contract should be specifically enforced."


31.   In the case of M/s Omway Buildestate Pvt. Ltd. and Ors.

(supra), a Coordinate Bench of this Court while considering the effect of

Section 4 of the Act of 1976, in the face of text of Section 48 of Land

Acquisition Act, 1894, held thus:

       "Taking note of Taking note of judgments (supra), in the
       opinion of this Court, after issuance of Gazette
       notification U/S.48 of LA Act the very inception of
       acquisition proceedings stands withdrawn & effect of S.4
       of the Act, 1976 ceases to subsist and slate becomes
       clean and such transaction/transfers of lands which took
       place during the interregnum period are held to be valid
       even against the State Government & in general for all
       practical purposes; however it will not preclude the State
       Govt., if intends to acquire the subject land afresh at a
       later stage, butthat too by initiating acquisition
       proceedings afresh if required for public purposes.

       As regards judgment on which Counsel for respondent

placed reliance in Meera Sahni Vs. Lt. Governor (2009(8) SCC 177), it was a case where the land was purchased after declaration of acquisition U/s 6, but no notification U/s 48 which empowers State Government to withdraw the land from acquisition, was issued/published in gazette and in such circumstances, examining scope of restriction regarding transfer of land, imposed U/s 4, it was held that such transaction being void would not be recognized by State Government but in instant case, on the date when the subject land was purchased, such transfer of (D.B. SAW/760/2019 has been filed in this matter. Please refer the same for further orders) (Downloaded on 28/06/2019 at 11:56:32 PM) (22 of 30) [CW-11547/2017] land might be void qua State Government, but after issuance of notification U/s 48 of LA Act petitioners became holders of subject land & competent enough to submit their application U/s 90-B(3) of LR Act. Thus, the sale might be void qua State Government; at one stage but after issuance of notification by State Government U/s 48 withdrawing subject land from acquisition, such transfer of lands certainly be considered to be valid in general for all practical purposes and whatever rights being available to the land owners are available to the land holders."

32. Intra-court appeal instituted against the opinion of the learned single judge, in the case of M/s Omway Buildestate Pvt. Ltd. & Ors.(supra); DBSAW No. 279/2012; was declined vide judgment dated 11th June, 2014, affirming the opinion, observing thus:

"16. The purchase of land in the face of prohibition and restriction imposed by Section 3 and 4 of the Act of 1976, has to be examined in the backdrop of the fact that the State Government by publication of notification dated 1st December, 2006, under Section 48 of the Act of 1894, released the land in dispute from acquisition. A conjoint reading of the provisions of Section 3 and 4 of the Act of 1976, in juxtaposition to Section 48 of the Act of 1894, would reflect that the prohibition and restriction of transfer imposed is with a view to prevent the mischief during acquisition proceedings and therefore, any transfer of the land, sought to be acquired, without previous permission, would be void qua the State Government, but the same principle cannot be applied in a situation when the same land has been de- acquired in exercise of power under Section 48 of the Act of 1894."

33. In the case of Baluram (supra), the Apex Court of the land while dealing with the issue of impleadment of a party in a case of specific performance, held thus:

"13. After due consideration of the rival submissions, we are of the view that the High Court erred in interfering with the order of the trial Court impleading the Appellant as a party Defendant. Admittedly, the Appellant is a beneficiary of the Trust and under the provisions of the Trusts Act, the Trustee has to act reasonably in exercise (D.B. SAW/760/2019 has been filed in this matter. Please refer the same for further orders) (Downloaded on 28/06/2019 at 11:56:32 PM) (23 of 30) [CW-11547/2017] of his right of alienation under the terms of the trust deed. Appellant cannot thus be treated as a stranger. No doubt, it may be permissible for the Appellant to file a separate suit, as suggested by Respondent No. 1, but the beneficiary could certainly be held to be a proper party. There is no valid reason to decline his prayer to be impleaded as a party to avoid multiplicity of proceedings. Order I Rule 10(2), Code of Civil Procedure enables, the Court to add a necessary or proper party so as to "effectually and completely adjudicate upon and settle all the questions involved in the suit".

14. In Mumbai International Airport (supra) this Court observed:

13. The general rule in regard to impleadment of parties is that the Plaintiff in a suit, being dominus litis, may choose the persons against whom he wishes to litigate and cannot be compelled to sue a person against whom he does not seek any relief Consequently, a person who is not a party has no right to be impleaded against the wishes of the Plaintiff But this general rule is subject to the provisions of Order 1 Rule 10(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure ("the Code", for short), which provides for impleadment of proper or necessary parties. The said sub-rule is extracted below:
10. (2) Court may strike out or add parties.--The court may at any stage of the proceedings, either upon or without the application of either party, and on such terms as may appear to the court to be just, order that the name of any party improperly joined, whether as Plaintiff or Defendant, be struck out, and that the name of any person who ought to have been joined, whether as Plaintiff or Defendant, or whose presence before the court may be necessary in order to enable the court effectually and completely to adjudicate upon and settle all the questions involved in the suit, be added.
14. The said provision makes it clear that a court may, at any stage of the proceedings (including suits for specific performance), either upon or even without any application, and on such terms as may appear to it to be just, direct that any of the following persons may be added as a party: (a) any person who ought to have been joined as Plaintiff or Defendant, but not added; or (b) any person (D.B. SAW/760/2019 has been filed in this matter. Please refer the same for further orders) (Downloaded on 28/06/2019 at 11:56:32 PM) (24 of 30) [CW-11547/2017] whose presence before the court may be necessary in order to enable the court to effectively and completely adjudicate upon and settle the questions involved in the suit. In short, the court is given the discretion to add as a party, any person who is found to be a necessary party or proper party.
15. A "necessary party" is a person who ought to have been joined as a party and in whose absence no effective decree could be passed at all by the court.

If a "necessary party" is not impleaded, the suit itself is liable to be dismissed. A "proper party" is a party who, though not a necessary party, is a person whose presence would enable the court to completely, effectively and adequately adjudicate upon all matters in dispute in the suit, though he need not be a person in favour of or against whom the decree is to be made. If a person is not found to be a proper or necessary party, the court has no jurisdiction to implead him, against the wishes of the Plaintiff. The fact that a person is likely to secure a right/interest in a suit property, after the suit is decided against the Plaintiff, will not make such person a necessary party or a proper party to the suit for specific performance.

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19. Referring to suits for specific performance, this Court in Kasturi [MANU/SC/0319/2005 : (2005) 6 SCC 733], held that the following persons are to be considered as necessary parties: (i) the parties to the contract which is sought to be enforced or their legal representatives; (ii) a transferee of the property which is the subject-matter of the contract. This Court also explained that a person who has a direct interest in the subject-matter of the suit for specific performance of an agreement of sale may be impleaded as a proper party on his application Under Order 1 Rule 10 Code of Civil Procedure. This Court concluded that a purchaser of the suit property subsequent to the suit agreement would be a necessary party as he would be affected if he had purchased it with or without notice of the contract, but a person who claims a title adverse to that of the Defendant vendor will not be a necessary party.

xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx

22. Let us consider the scope and ambit of Order 1 (D.B. SAW/760/2019 has been filed in this matter. Please refer the same for further orders) (Downloaded on 28/06/2019 at 11:56:32 PM) (25 of 30) [CW-11547/2017] Rule 10(2) Code of Civil Procedure regarding striking out or adding parties. The said sub-rule is not about the right of a non-party to be impleaded as a party, but about the judicial discretion of the court to strike out or add parties at any stage of a proceeding. The discretion under the sub-rule can be exercised either suo motu or on the application of the Plaintiff or the Defendant, or on an application of a person who is not a party to the suit. The court can strike out any party who is improperly joined. The court can add anyone as a Plaintiff or as a Defendant if it finds that he is a necessary party or proper party. Such deletion or addition can be without any conditions or subject to such terms as the court deems fit to impose. In exercising its judicial discretion Under Order 1 Rule 10(2) of the Code, the court will of course act according to reason and fair play and not according to whims and caprice.

15. In the present case, the Appellant could not be held to be a stranger being beneficiary of the Trust property. The trial Court was justified in impleading him as a party. The High Court erred in interfering with the order of the trial Court."

34. Section 3 and 4 of the Act of 1976, contemplating prohibition and restrictions on transfer of land acquired or in relation to which the acquisition proceedings have been initiated, reads thus:

"3. Prohibition on transfer of lands acquired by State Government.- No person shall purport to transfer by sale, mortgage, gift, lease or otherwise any land or part thereof situated in the State of Rajasthan, which has been acquired by the Government under the Rajasthan Land Acquisition Act, 11953, or under any other law providing for acquisition of land for a public purpose.
4. Restriction on transfer of lands in relation to which acquisition proceedings have been initiated.- No person shall, except with the previous permission in writing of the competent authority, transfer or purport to transfer by sale, mortgage, gift, lease or otherwise any land or part thereof situated in the State of Rajasthan, which is proposed to be acquired in connection with the scheme and in relation to which a declaration to the effect that such land or part thereof is needed for a public purpose having been made by the State Government under section 6 of the (D.B. SAW/760/2019 has been filed in this matter. Please refer the same for further orders) (Downloaded on 28/06/2019 at 11:56:32 PM) (26 of 30) [CW-11547/2017] Rajasthan Lan Acquisition Act, 1953 or under the corresponding provision of any other law providing for acquisition of land for a public purpose, and the State Government has not withdrawn from the acquisition under section 48 of that Act or under any such law."

35. From the factual matrix as has emerged from the pleadings of the parties and materials available on record, reflects that the respondent-Society admittedly instituted a Civil Suit staking its claim on the very same subject land involved herein and the Civil Suit was dismissed in view of the application instituted by the petitioner under Order 7 Rule 11(d) read with Section 16/151 CPC vide order dated 6th October, 2012. It is also not in dispute that Reference Petition instituted by the respondent-Society was also declined by the Tribunal vide order dated 12 th June, 2009 (Reference No.97/2003). Both the proceedings on the Civil Suit as well as Reference Petition, have attained finality for the respondent-Society did not challenge those adjudications any further.

36. The issue as to withdrawal of the suit proceedings in Civil Suit No. 343/2018: Pt. Jagannath and Ors. Vs. Suresh Chand Jain and Ors., is still pending consideration before the trial Court. In view of the order dated 18th July, 2018, while adjudicating upon an application under Section 151 read with Order 23 Rule 1(5) CPC, the trial Court has sustained the suit proceedings, partly allowing the application while permitting plaintiff No. 1/2 (brother of the petitioner), to continue the suit proceedings, restoring the Civil Suit which was stated to be withdrawn by the respondent- Society. That apart, permission declined to the petitioner to continue to the suit proceedings, is pending consideration before (D.B. SAW/760/2019 has been filed in this matter. Please refer the same for further orders) (Downloaded on 28/06/2019 at 11:56:32 PM) (27 of 30) [CW-11547/2017] this Court in SBCWP No. 4469/2019, with an interim protection, restraining the Court below to proceed further as would be evident from the order made on the above writ application No.4469/2019.

37. In the case of M/s Omway Buildstate Pvt. Ltd. And Ors. (supra), this Court dealt with the issue with reference to Section 48 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, in juxtaposition to Section 3 and 4 of the Act of 1976. Thus, the opinion was entirely in a different factual matrix and provisions of law.

38. In the case of Baluram (supra), the Apex Court of the land examined the controversy as to impleadment of the appellant-Baluram in the factual matrix wherein the respondent Nos. 2 and 3, acting as trustees of "Subbaiah Paniker Family Welfare Trust" entered into the agreement for sell of suit property in favour of the plaintiff. The price of the property was settled and appellant-Baluram sought impleadment as defendant staking that he would suffer prejudice being beneficiaries of the Trust. Thus, the factual matrix of the case referred to and relied upon, is entirely different and distinguishable from the one at hand.

39. Applying the principles deducible from the opinions referred to and relied upon by the counsel for the parties as taken note of hereinabove; it can safely be said that the respondent-Society did stake its claim on the same subject land involved herein, before the Civil Court as well as by institution of the Reference Petition, before the Tribunal; unsuccessfully, as would be evident from the order dated 6 th October, 2012 and 12th June, 2009.

40. A glance of the order made by the Division Bench of this Court while declining intra court appeal of the State of Rajasthan and ors.:(DBSAW No.253/2010), specifically observed thus:

(D.B. SAW/760/2019 has been filed in this matter. Please refer the same for further orders) (Downloaded on 28/06/2019 at 11:56:32 PM) (28 of 30) [CW-11547/2017] "On acquisition of land, if any party has a right or claim they would be at liberty to take legal recourse for their rights."

41. Thus, the respondent-Society after having exercised its right and having taken recourse to legal remedy unsuccessfully and proceedings attaining finality; cannot be permitted to be impleaded as a party to the Reference proceedings instituted by the petitioner in the factual matrix of the case at hand.

42. By now it is well settled that if Court finds that addition of a party will introduce a new cause of action, it ought to dismiss the application seeking impleadment under Order 1 Rule 10 CPC. In the factual matrix of a case at hand, the respondent-Society intends to re-agitate once again, the same subject matter, for the third time, after having lost on the same claim in the suit proceedings as well as in Reference Petition, as taken note of in the foregoing paragraphs herein above. Further, it is an admitted fact that the subject land involved herein, was purchased vide alleged agreement for sale dated 21 January 1976, subsequent to notices issued under section 4 and 6 of the Act of 1894, in the year 1969 and 1973, respectively. Thus, contrary to restrictions as contemplated under Section 3 and 4 of the Act of 1976. No notification under Section 48 of the Act of 1894, which empowers the State Government to withdraw the subject land from acquisition, was issued. The Reference Petition is not with reference to enforcement of the contract dated 21 st January, 1976, which is the basis of the claim of the respondent-Society. That apart, several opportunities were allowed to the respondent-

(D.B. SAW/760/2019 has been filed in this matter. Please refer the same for further orders) (Downloaded on 28/06/2019 at 11:56:32 PM) (29 of 30) [CW-11547/2017] Society to place on record the aforesaid contract, but the respondent-Society failed to do so for reasons best known to it. Be that as it may, applying the principles deducible from the opinions referred to and relied upon by the counsel for the parties to the factual matrix of the case at hand while considering the attendant facts and circumstances in totality; it is apparent that the respondent-Society is neither a necessary nor a proper party, whose presence is essential for effective and complete adjudication of the pending Reference Petition. The respondent- Society has already availed of legal remedy with reference to its claim on the subject land by institution of Civil Suit and Reference Petition, unsuccessfully. Furthermore, the respondent-Society is guilty of transactions contrary to restrictions as contemplated under Section 3 and 4 of the Act of 1976.

43. For the reasons aforesaid and in view of the conspicuous factual matrix of the case; the writ application merits acceptance and is hereby allowed.

44. In the result, impugned orders dated 15th March, 2016 and 17th May, 2017, made by the Tribunal in Reference Petition No. 205/2009; are hereby quashed.

45. However, there shall be no order as to costs.

(VEERENDR SINGH SIRADHANA),J pcg (D.B. SAW/760/2019 has been filed in this matter. Please refer the same for further orders) (Downloaded on 28/06/2019 at 11:56:32 PM) (30 of 30) [CW-11547/2017] FINAL RESERVED JUDGMENT S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 11547/2017 (D.B. SAW/760/2019 has been filed in this matter. Please refer the same for further orders) (Downloaded on 28/06/2019 at 11:56:32 PM) Powered by TCPDF (www.tcpdf.org)