Delhi District Court
Sarita Kumari vs M/S Nirmal Bhartia School on 22 December, 2025
IN THE COURT OF SH. ARUN KUMAR GARG
PRESIDING OFFICER : LABOUR COURT-III
ROUSE AVENUE COURTS COMPLEX : NEW DELHI.
CNR No. DLCT13-001992-2025
Ref. No. F.24(87)R-19/SWD/Lab./85 dated 20.03.2025
LIR No. 267/2025
Smt. Nirmala Chaubey W/o Sh. Ramesh Chaubey,
R/o B-250, Bharat Vihar, Kakrola,
New Delhi-110078
Mobile No. 8750850788
Through:
Sh. Sachin Kapoor, General Secretary,
Delhi General Mazdoor Morcha (Regd.) 2466,
C-57, Karampura, New Delhi-110015
Mobile No. 9810171964
Also through:
Sh. Ajit Kumar Singh, AR/Advocate of Workman,
Chamber No. B-61, BGS Block,
Tis Hazari Court, Delhi-110054
Mobile No. 9811619336
Email - [email protected] ..... Workman
VERSUS
1.M/s. Nirmal Bhartia School Sector-14, Near Metro Station, Dwarka, New Delhi-110078 Through:
Col. V.K. Chauhan (Retd.), S/o Sh. R.P.S. Chauhan, Authorized Representative/Admin Head, Nirmal Bhartia School, Situated at Sector-14, Dwarka, New Delhi-110078 Mobile No. +91 78952 29052 Email: [email protected] LIR No. 267/2025 Nirmala Chaubey Vs. M/s. Nirmal Bhartia School & Anr.Award dated 22.12.2025 Page 1 of 36
Email Address of Management no. 1:
[email protected] [email protected] Also through:
Sh. Arjun Garg, Counsel for Management no. 1. C-140, Sector 49, Noida - 201301 P: +91 99109 22635
2. M/s. White Fox Support Services Pvt. Ltd., F-298, Kishan Chand Building, Himmat Singh Marg, Lado Sarai, New Delhi-110030 Through:
Mr. Gyanendra Singh Pundhir, S/o Sh. Siyaram Singh, Authorized Representative of Management no. 2, F-298, Kishan Chand Building, Himmat Singh Marg, Lado Sarai, Gadaipur, New Delhi-110030 Mobile No. 9997461124 Email Address of Management no. 2:
[email protected] Also through:
Sh. Georgey V. Mathew, Counsel, E-575A, Greater Kailash-II, New Delhi-110048 Mobile No. 9810026912 Email ID: [email protected] ..... Managements Date of Institution of the case : 07.04.2025 Date on which Award is passed : 22.12.2025 AWARD
1. By this Award, I will dispose of the present claim of Workman, filed pursuant to reference under Section 10(1)(C) & 12(5) of Industrial Disputes Act, received from the office of Dy.
Labour Commissioner (South-West), Labour Department, Govt. of NCT of Delhi vide order Ref. no. F.24(87)R-19/SWD/Lab./85 LIR No. 267/2025 Nirmala Chaubey Vs. M/s. Nirmal Bhartia School & Anr.
Award dated 22.12.2025 Page 2 of 36dated 20.03.2025, whereby, the following issue has been referred to this Court for adjudication:-
"Whether the services of Workman Smt. Nirmala Chaubey W/o Sh. Ramesh Chaubey, (DOB-
01.08.1976), Mobile No. 8750850788, Aadhar Card No. 883087720324 have been terminated illegally and/or unjustifiably by the Management; and if so, to what relief is she entitled and what directions are necessary in this respect?"
2. The aforesaid reference was received by this Court on 07.04.2025 and the present statement of claim was thereafter filed by Workman on 23.04.2025. Brief case of Workman, as per her statement of claim, is that she was appointed by Management no. 1, through Management no. 2, at the post of maid since 06.04.2010 and her last drawn wages were Rs. 14,841/- per month. It is further her case that she was neither provided with any appointment letter, nor, the other statutory benefits, such as- conveyance allowance, leave encashment, bonus or overtime wages, were being provided to her by Management no. 2, despite the fact that Management no. 2 used to take work from her for 12 hours per day. Despite her job being permanent and perennial in nature, according to her, Management no. 1 engaged her through Management no. 2 so as to deprive her of equal wages, though, she used to work under direct control and supervision of Management no. 1.
3. On 01.07.2020, according to Workman, her services were illegally terminated by Management no. 2 on the directions of Management no. 1 without payment of any service compensation or gratuity and without any domestic inquiry in violation of LIR No. 267/2025 Nirmala Chaubey Vs. M/s. Nirmal Bhartia School & Anr.
Award dated 22.12.2025 Page 3 of 36provisions of Section 25F and 25G of Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. Managements, according to her, have failed to reinstate into the job despite repeated visits of the Workman, despite receipt of demand notice dated 14.02.2022 and despite her complaint and claim before the Assistant Labour Commissioner/Conciliation Officer, though, in the month of November, 2021, she was given work by Management no. 2 in Management no. 1 School for a period of two days.
4. It is further her case that despite search for an alternative job, she is wholly unemployed since the date of illegal termination of her services by Managements. Workman has thus prayed for her reinstatement into the services of Managements with full back wages, continuity of service and other consequential benefits.
5. Both Managements appeared in response to notice of statement of claim and filed their respective written statements on 11.07.2025 and 25/26.08.2025 respectively. Brief case of Management no. 1, as per its written statement, is that the housekeeping services at its School were outsourced by Management no. 1 to Management no. 2 and as per the agreement, executed between Managements no. 1 and 2, entire responsibility for appointment, termination, providing of statutory facilities and supervision of the staff, deployed by Management no. 2 at the establishment of Management no. 1, was that of Management no. 2 and there did not exist any employer-employee relationship between Management no. 1 and Workman at any point of time. Furthermore, according to Management no. 1, admittedly, Workman was in employment of LIR No. 267/2025 Nirmala Chaubey Vs. M/s. Nirmal Bhartia School & Anr.
Award dated 22.12.2025 Page 4 of 36Management no. 2 and was deployed at the School as an employee of Management no. 2.
6. It is further the case of Management no. 1 that Workman was not only being provided with weekly off, but, even the monthly leaves were being provided to her as per applicable Labour laws. Further more, according to Management no. 1, even the overtime wages were also being paid to Workman on regular basis. It is further the case of Management no. 1 that in March, 2020, entire world faced an unprecedented situation due to onset of Covid-19 and a nationwide lock-down was imposed by Government of India.
7. During this period, according to Management no. 1, School moved to online classes for its students and resumed physical classes only after about two years i.e. in February, 2022. Thus, according to Management no. 1, during the aforesaid period, it did not require the services of housekeeping staff, about which, Management no. 2 was duly informed, in as much as, under the terms and conditions of Contract between Managements no. 1 and 2, Management no. 1 was legally authorized to make changes in the provisions as per requirement. Management no. 1 has thus prayed for dismissal of present claim of Workman qua Management no. 1.
8. On the other hand, brief case of Management no. 2, as per its written statement, is that there did not exist any employer- employee relationship between Management no. 2 and Workman, in as much as, Management no. 2 was merely a liaison/connecting cord between Workman and Management no.
LIR No. 267/2025Nirmala Chaubey Vs. M/s. Nirmal Bhartia School & Anr.
Award dated 22.12.2025 Page 5 of 361 and besides, supply of manpower to Management no. 1 pursuant to a contract between Management no. 1 and 2, against fixed service fee, it had no control or supervision over the Workman. Further, according to Management no. 2, entire responsibility to provide all statutory benefits to Workman was that of Management no. 1 being the principal employer of Workman.
9. Management no. 2 has categorically denied having terminated the services of Workman on 01.07.2020 or that it had any role in resumption of her duties with Management no. 1 for a period of two days in the month of November, 2021. Rather, according to Management no. 2, it was solely due to Covid-19 pandemic and consequential lock-down that Management no. 1 school was temporarily closed and employees were not asked to continue their services, however, Workman continued to have the offer to work elsewhere, should she wish to join elsewhere. Yet, according to Management no. 2, Workman neither contacted Management no. 2, nor, has she ever expressed her desire to work elsewhere.
10. Under the aforesaid circumstances, according to Management no. 2, Workman is not entitled to her reinstatement into the same job, since, not only, she refrained from raising a dispute qua her alleged illegal termination dated 01.07.2020 for a considerable period of time, but, even otherwise, reinstatement of Workman into the same job of Management no. 1 is not within the power of Management no. 2. So for as, the allegations of Workman, qua violation of Section 25H of Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 by Managements, is concerned, it is alleged in the LIR No. 267/2025 Nirmala Chaubey Vs. M/s. Nirmal Bhartia School & Anr.
Award dated 22.12.2025 Page 6 of 36written statement that the aforesaid provision talks about re- employment and not about reinstatement and the Workman continues to have the offer to rejoin another workplace, should the Workman approach Management no. 2.
11. Claim of Workman for her back wages, according to management no. 2, is not tenable, in as much as, not only, the services of Workman were never terminated by Management no. 2, but also, there is an inordinate delay on her part in raising the dispute qua her alleged illegal termination. Besides, according to Management no. 2, Workman has failed to produce any document even to prima facie suggest that she was not gainfully employed since the date of her alleged termination.
12. Had she been wholly unemployed, according to Management no. 2, she would not have sat over her rights for over a period of 3-4 years since the date of her alleged termination. Moreover, according to Management no. 2, a movement order, along with other documents, was filed by Management no. 2 before conciliation officer reflecting that Management no. 2 did offer another employer to the Workman after the dispute was raised by her, however, she chose not to opt for the same. Management no. 2 has thus prayed for dismissal of present claim of Workman against Management no. 2, while, denying the receipt of any demand notice from Workman.
13. No rejoinder to the written statement of Management no. 1 was filed on behalf of Workman despite opportunity, whereas, rejoinder to the written statement of Management no. 2 was filed on 20.09.2025. In her rejoinder to written statement of LIR No. 267/2025 Nirmala Chaubey Vs. M/s. Nirmal Bhartia School & Anr.
Award dated 22.12.2025 Page 7 of 36Management no. 2, Workman has once again reiterated the averments made by her in her statement of claim and has denied the contrary averments made by Management no. 2 in its written statement.
14. Since, Management no. 2, in its written statement, had taken a plea that Workman continues to have an offer from Management no. 2 to work elsewhere, a direction, vide order dated 30.08.2025, was given by this Court to Management no. 2, to come out with a specific proposal with details as to the place and terms and conditions of reinstatement/reemployment of Workman, including qua wages which Management no. 2 was offering to pay to Workman consequent upon her re-engagement/ re-employment, by 20.09.2025, however, Management no. 2 has failed to come out with any such offer till date indicating that the said plea was taken by Management no. 2 merely to defeat the claim of Workman for her reinstatement and back wages, in case, she is otherwise able to prove illegal termination of her services by Management no. 2.
15. Thereafter, on the basis of pleadings of parties, following issues were settled by this Court vide order dated 20.09.2025:-
(i) Whether there existed any employer-employee relationship between management no. 1 and Workman? (OPW)
(ii) Whether the services of Workman were terminated by Management no. 2 illegally and/or unjustifiably on 01.07.2020? (OPW)
(iii) Relief, if any.
16. Workman has later on examined herself as WW-1 i.e. as the LIR No. 267/2025 Nirmala Chaubey Vs. M/s. Nirmal Bhartia School & Anr.
Award dated 22.12.2025 Page 8 of 36sole witness in support of her case and tendered her evidence by way of affidavit Ex.WW1/A along with following documents:
(i) Ex.WW1/1: Copy of complaint dated 29.11.2021 of Workman to Assistant Labour Commissioner, Hari Nagar, New Delhi.
(ii) Ex.WW1/3: Copy of demand notice dated 14.02.2022 of Workman.
(iii) Ex.WW1/4 and Ex.WW1/5: Copy of postal receipts regarding dispatch of aforesaid demand notice to Managements.
(iv) Ex.WW1/6: Copy of statement of claim of Workman, filed before Conciliation Officer, Labour Department, Govt. of NCT of Delhi, Hari Nagar, New Delhi.
(v) Ex. WW-1/7: Copy of Identity card of Workman.
(vi) Ex.WW1/8: Copy of pay slip in the name of Workman issued by Management no. 2.
(vii) Ex. WW-1/9: Copy of ESIC card of Workman.
17. WW-1 was duly cross-examined by Ld. Counsels for both Managements. No other witness was examined on behalf of Workman despite opportunity and hence, on the submission of Ld. AR for Workman, Workman's evidence was closed vide order dated 18.10.2025.
18. Management no. 1 has thereafter examined its Admn. Head Colonel V.K. Chauhan (Retd.) as M1W1 i.e. as the sole witness in support of its case. He has tendered his evidence by way of affidavit Ex.M1W1/A along with following documents:
(i) Ex.M1W1/1: Copy of resolution dated 27.09.2022 of school management committee.
(ii) Ex.M1W1/2: Copy of agreement dated 31.01.2020 between Managements no. 1 and 2.
LIR No. 267/2025Nirmala Chaubey Vs. M/s. Nirmal Bhartia School & Anr.
Award dated 22.12.2025 Page 9 of 36(iii) Ex.M1W1/3(colly): Copies of certificates of registration/licenses of Managements no. 1 and 2 under Contract labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act, 1970.
(iv) Mark-M1W1/4(colly): Copy of circulars dated 07.02.2022 of Management no. 1 to parents regarding re-opening of school for classes Nursery to VIII and IX to XII.
(v) Ex.M1W1/5: Copy invoice dated 31.12.2024 raised by Management no. 2 upon Management no. 1 for the services provided during the month of December, 2024.
(vi) Mark-M1W1/6: Copy of payment sheet submitted by Management no. 2 to Management no. 1.
19. Management no. 2, on the other hand, has examined its Area Manager Sh. Gyanendra Singh Pundhir as M2W1 i.e. as the sole witness in support of its case. He has tendered his evidence by way of affidavit Ex.M2W1/A along with following documents:
(i) Ex.M2W1/1: Authority letter in his favour.
(ii) Mark-M2W1/2: Copy of wage sheets for the months of May 2020 and June 2020.
(iii) Ex.M2W1/3(colly): Copy of email dated 15.12.2021 along with Certificate under Section 63(4) of BSA 2023.
(iv) Mark-M2W1/4: Copy of wage sheet for the month of November 2021.
20. Both M1W1 and M2W1 were duly cross-examined by Ld. AR for Workman. No other witness was examined on behalf of Managements despite repeated opportunities and hence, on the submissions of Ld. Counsels for Managements no. 1 and 2, their evidence was closed vide order dated 05.12.2025. Final arguments on behalf of all the parties were thereafter heard on LIR No. 267/2025 Nirmala Chaubey Vs. M/s. Nirmal Bhartia School & Anr.
Award dated 22.12.2025 Page 10 of 3615.12.2025. Besides, written arguments have also been filed on behalf of Managements no. 1 and 2.
21. It is submitted by Ld. AR for Workman that Workman has been able to prove all the averments, made by her in her statement of claim, not only, through her un-controverted testimony in the form of affidavit Ex.WW1/A, but also, through admissions of M1W1 and M2W1 during their respective evidence. He submits that Workman has been able to prove existence of employer-employee relationship between Management no. 2 and herself, since 06.04.2010 until 30.06.2020, through the admission of M2W1 during his cross- examination. Contrary to the stand of Management no. 2, in its written statement, that Workman was working under direct control and supervision of Management no. 1, according to him, during his cross-examination, M2W1 has admitted that Workman had been working under the supervision of Mr. Mukesh, an officer of Management no. 2.
22. Further, according to him, though, in its written statement, Management no. 2 has tried to take a plea that services of Workman were never terminated, however, during his cross- examination dated 05.12.2025, M2W1 admitted that on 30.06.2020, upon receipt of a message from Management no. 1 that services of Workman were no more required by Management no. 1, a message was got conveyed by Management no. 2 to the Workman through its supervisor that w.e.f. 01.07.2020, until continuation of Covid-19, Workman need not report on her duty and that Management no. 2 had thereafter never called the Workman to resume her duties.
LIR No. 267/2025Nirmala Chaubey Vs. M/s. Nirmal Bhartia School & Anr.
Award dated 22.12.2025 Page 11 of 3623. Though, according to him, M2W1 has tried to take a plea that on 30.06.2020 itself, Workman was informed that after the end of Covid-19 pandemic, she should report at Lado Sarai office of Management no. 2, however, his aforesaid plea is clearly an after thought, being beyond pleadings of management no. 2. Even otherwise, according to him, no corroborative evidence in support of his aforesaid plea has been adduced by M2W1. He further submits that M2W1 has taken a false plea qua issuance of a movement order in the name of Workman during pendency of conciliation proceedings, in as much as, no such movement order has been produced by him before this Court.
24. Under the aforesaid circumstances, according to him, Workman has been able to prove illegal termination of her services by Management no. 2 w.e.f. 01.07.2020, in as much as, neither any advance notice in terms of Section 25F of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 was given to her, nor, was she paid any service compensation in consonance with the aforesaid provision. Even, no domestic inquiry against Workman, according to him, was admittedly conducted by Management no. 2 prior to termination of her services.
25. It is further submitted by him that not only, the testimony of Workman, qua she being wholly unemployed since the date of illegal termination of her services by Management no. 2, has remained un-controverted, but, even the Management no. 2 has also failed to lead any evidence that she was gainfully employed at any point of time after illegal termination of her services by Management no. 2. Under the aforesaid circumstances, according to him, considering the fact that Management no. 2 is still having LIR No. 267/2025 Nirmala Chaubey Vs. M/s. Nirmal Bhartia School & Anr.
Award dated 22.12.2025 Page 12 of 36a subsisting contract with Management no. 1 to supply support services to Management no. 1, Workman is entitled to her reinstatement with full back wages, continuity of service and other consequential benefits.
26. On the other hand, it was submitted by Ld. Counsel for Management no. 1 that admittedly, even as per the statement of claim filed by Workman, there did not exist any employer- employee relationship between Management no. 1 and Workman, in as much as, Management no. 1 was merely a principal employer and the Workman was deployed at the school, run by Management no. 1, as an employee of Management no. 2, for providing house keeping services, pursuant to an agreement between Managements no. 1 and 2. He submits that as per the averments made by Workman, in her statement of claim and evidence by way of affidavit, she was not only appointed by Management no. 2, but, even her salary was being paid by Management no. 2. He further submits that even the allegations of Workman, qua non providing of statutory benefits to Workman and qua illegal termination of her services, are also directed against Management no. 2 and not against Management no. 1.
27. It is further submitted by him that during her cross- examination, Workman has admitted that she was an employee of Management no. 2 and not that of Management no. 1 and that she was receiving her salary and other statutory benefits from Management no. 2. Even her duty, according to Ld. Counsel for Management no. 1, was admittedly being assigned by the supervisor deployed by Management no. 2, meaning thereby, she LIR No. 267/2025 Nirmala Chaubey Vs. M/s. Nirmal Bhartia School & Anr.
Award dated 22.12.2025 Page 13 of 36was working under direct control and supervision of Management no. 2. Relying upon the judgments of Hon'ble Delhi High Court in Shyamji Srivastava & Anr. vs. Executive Engineer M-311 of PWD 2023 SCC Online Delhi 1725 and in New Delhi General Mazdoor Union & Anr. v. Standing Conference of Public Enterprises & Anr. 1991 SCC OnLine Del 278, it is further submitted by Ld. Counsel for Management no. 1 that merely because there existed an agreement between Management no. 1 and 2 for engagement of contract Labour by Management no. 2 in any work or in connection with the Work of Principal Employer i.e. Management no. 1, no employer- employee relationship is created between the Principal Employer (i.e. Management no. 1) and Contract Labour (i.e. Workman) and hence, Management no. 1 can't be held responsible for termination of services of Workman. He has thus prayed for dismissal of present claim of Workman against Management no.
1.
28. On the contrary, it is submitted by Ld. Counsel for Management no. 2 that the present claim of Workman is not maintainable against Management no. 2, in as much as, she has failed to prove existence of any employer-employee relationship between Management no. 2 and herself. He submits that admittedly, as per averments made by her in her statement of claim, rejoinder as well as evidence by way of affidavit, she had been working, since long, under direct control and supervision of Management no. 1 and even her services were allegedly terminated by Management no. 2 on the instructions of Management no. 1. Direct control and supervision of LIR No. 267/2025 Nirmala Chaubey Vs. M/s. Nirmal Bhartia School & Anr.
Award dated 22.12.2025 Page 14 of 36Management no. 1 upon the Workman, according to him, is further established from the fact that on 15.11.2021, Management no. 1 had independently called the Workman for duty and a month later, had informed the Management no. 2 about the same through e-mail dated 15.12.2021.
29. Relying upon the judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court of India in R.K. Panda & Ors. v. Steel Authority of India & Ors. (1994) 5 SCC 304, he submits that since Workman was admittedly engaged through Management no. 2, to work for Management no. 1, Management no. 2 is not the Principal employer and considering the length of her service with Management no. 1, a direct link of employer-employee ought to be established between the Workman and her principal employer i.e. Management no. 1, eliminating the liability of Contractor i.e. Management no. 2.
30. Workman, according to him, has also failed to prove alleged illegal termination of her services by Management no. 2, since, admittedly, her services were terminated at the instance of Management no. 1. Moreover, according to him, admittedly, Management no. 2 had never issued any show cause notice or termination letter to Workman, nor, has it ever conducted any domestic inquiry against her. Even otherwise, according to him, in the absence of any employer-employee relationship between Workman and Management no. 2, there was no occasion for Management no. 2 to terminate the services of Workman w.e.f. 01.07.2020.
31. He further submits that services of Workman were never LIR No. 267/2025 Nirmala Chaubey Vs. M/s. Nirmal Bhartia School & Anr.
Award dated 22.12.2025 Page 15 of 36terminated by Management no. 2. Rather, it was solely due to Covid-19 that school of Management no. 1 was closed and classes of students were switched to online mode, rendering the services of Workman redundant, where after, Workman herself had left the services of Management no. 1, though, even during Covid-19, despite non-performance of any duty by Workman, she was given her entire wages, which should be considered as adequate compensation for her. Relying upon the judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court of India in BSNL vs. Bhurumal (2014)7 SCC 177, he submits that Court can take judicial notice qua redundancy of services of Workman due to Covid-19.
32. Even otherwise, according to him, even if, it is assumed for the sake of arguments that services of Workman were illegally terminated by Management no. 2, she is not entitled to any retrenchment compensation, lay-off compensation, reinstatement or back wages, having refused to accept the transfer order of Management no. 2 and alternative assignment of Management no. 1 in the month of November, 2021, more so, when she has failed to produce any document to prove that she had ever searched for any alternative employment. Relying upon the judgment of Hon'ble Bombay High Court in Tapi Irrigation Development Corporation, Jalgaon v. Bhanudas Nathu Patil 2008 SCC OnLine Bom 551, it is submitted by him that Workman is not entitled to any relief on account of inordinate delay on her part in approaching the Labour department with a complaint qua illegal termination of her services.
33. Further, though, according to him, in view of authoritative pronouncement of Hon'ble Supreme Court of India in LIR No. 267/2025 Nirmala Chaubey Vs. M/s. Nirmal Bhartia School & Anr.
Award dated 22.12.2025 Page 16 of 36Management of Regional Chief Engineer, Public Health and Engineering Department, Ranchi v. Their Workmen (2019)18 SCC 814, onus to prove, with the aid of evidence, that she remained unemployed since the date of her alleged illegal termination, was upon Workman, however, she has failed to produce any documentary evidence qua her unemployment since the date of her alleged illegal termination. Under the aforesaid circumstances, according to him, she is not entitled to any back wages, in as much as, grant of back wages is not automatic.
34. Even otherwise, according to her, Workman has failed to prove the facts, alleged by her in her statement of claim, otherwise than by way of her self serving statements to the aforesaid effect, which, can't be relied upon by the Court to record a finding in her favour since her entire case is fraught with contradictions and she was found deposing falsely before this Court in material particulars. He submits that in her initial complaint, Workman did not allege any illegal termination of her services and yet she has filed a wholly frivolous claim before this Court by concealing material facts and taking contradictory/inconsistent pleas. Moreover, according to him, in the absence of there being any availability of a permanent post with Management no. 2, her reinstatement would be wholly impracticable.
35. Ld. Counsel for Management no. 2 has thus prayed for dismissal of claim of Workman against Management no. 2, while, relying upon the following judgments:
(i) PVK Distillary Ltd. vs. Mahendra Ram (2009)5 SCC 705.LIR No. 267/2025
Nirmala Chaubey Vs. M/s. Nirmal Bhartia School & Anr.
Award dated 22.12.2025 Page 17 of 36(ii) BSNL vs. Bhurumal (2014)7 SCC 177,
(iii) Management of Regional Chief Engineer, Public Health and Engineering Department, Ranchi v. Their Workmen (2019)18 SCC 814.
(iv) UP State Electricity Board v. Laxmi Kant Gupta (2009)16 SCC 562.
(v) UP State Brassware Corpn. Ltd. & Anr. v. Uday Narain Pandey(2006)1 SCC 479.
(vi) Tapi Irrigation Development Corporation, Jalgaon v. Bhanudas Nathu Patil 2008 SCC OnLine Bom 551.
(vii) R.K. Panda & Ors. v. Steel Authority of India & Ors. (1994) 5 SCC 304.
36. I have heard the submissions made on behalf of all the parties and have carefully perused the material available on record, in the light of judgments relied upon by Ld. Counsels for Managements. My issue-wise findings on the issues, settled by this Court vide order dated 20.09.2025, are as follows:-
Issue no. (i): Whether there existed any employer- employee relationship between Management no. 1 and Workman? (OPW)
37. Onus to prove the aforesaid issue was upon Workman. A bare perusal of record reveals that Workman, in her pleadings as well as evidence by way of affidavit, has categorically alleged that since beginning i.e. since 06.04.2010, her deployment as a Maid in the School of Management no. 1 was through Management no. 2, who was the supplier of manpower to Management no. 1, and that it was Management no. 2, who, has eventually terminated the services of Workman on 01.07.2020 albeit upon the direction of Management no. 1. Even the LIR No. 267/2025 Nirmala Chaubey Vs. M/s. Nirmal Bhartia School & Anr.
Award dated 22.12.2025 Page 18 of 36allegations qua non-providing of statutory facilities, such as- conveyance allowance, appointment letter, leave encashment, bonus and over-time wages, in her statement of claim as well as affidavit Ex. WW-1/A are directed against Management no. 2.
38. No doubt, in her statement of claim, Workman has alleged that despite her job being permanent and perennial in nature, Management no. 1 had engaged her services through Management no. 2 so as to deprive her of the wages equal to the employees of Management no. 1, despite the fact that she used to work under direct control and supervision of Management no. 1, however, during her cross-examination, she has categorically deposed that Management no. 2 had deployed a supervisor in the School of Management no. 1 and her duty used to be assigned by the aforesaid supervisor. The aforesaid stand of Workman, during her cross-examination, is duly corroborated by the testimony of M2W1 during his cross-examination, wherein, he has admitted that a message to the Workman, requiring her not to report on her duty w.e.f. 01.07.2020, was conveyed by Management no. 2 through the aforesaid supervisor.
39. It was further admitted by Workman, during her cross- examination, that she was an employee of Management no. 2 and not of Management no. 1 and that she was deployed at the School of Management no. 1 by Management no. 2, under an agreement between two Managements. She has further deposed that she used to receive her salary from Management no. 2 and not from Management no. 1. Even the statutory benefits, such as- ESI, EPF and leaves etc., according to her, were being provided to her by Management no. 2. She has further admitted that none of the LIR No. 267/2025 Nirmala Chaubey Vs. M/s. Nirmal Bhartia School & Anr.
Award dated 22.12.2025 Page 19 of 36housekeeping staff members or maids, including herself, deployed at Management no. 1 school were on the rolls of Management no. 1 as its employees.
40. The aforesaid admissions on the part of Workman, during her cross-examination, in my considered opinion, negates existence of any employer-employee relationship between Management no. 1 and Workman.
41. On the contrary, Management no. 1 has examined its Admn. Head Colonel V.K. Chauhan (Retd.) as M1W1, who has categorically deposed that there did not exist any employer- employee relationship between Management no. 1 and Workman and that the Workman was deployed at the establishment of Management no. 1 by Management no. 2, pursuant to an agreement for providing of manpower services executed between both the Managements somewhere in the year 2010, which got renewed from time to time. He has further deposed that as per the copy of last agreement dated 31.01.2020, it was Management no. 2, who was responsible for appointment of Workman, for supervision of her work performance, for compliance of applicable laws and rules in respect of the Workman including payment of wages and other statutory benefits to the Workman and for her termination, in as much as, both the Managements were duly registered under the Contract Labour (Regulation And Abolition) Act, 1970.
42. Even during his cross-examination, he has categorically deposed that though the work of Workman was being supervised by Management no. 1, however, for all other purposes, such as-
LIR No. 267/2025Nirmala Chaubey Vs. M/s. Nirmal Bhartia School & Anr.
Award dated 22.12.2025 Page 20 of 36recruitment, termination, payment of salary and other statutory dues of Workman, she was under the control and supervision of Management no. 2. The aforesaid deposition of M1W1 has not even been contradicted by Management no. 2 in its evidence.
43. It is, however, sought to be submitted by Ld. Counsel for Management no. 2 that in view of authoritative pronouncement of Hon'ble Supreme Court of India in R.K. Panda's case (supra), considering the length of service of Workman at the School of Management no 1, a direct link, indicating existence of employer-employee relationship between Management no. 1 and Workman, has been established, thereby, eliminating the liability of Management no. 2 being the Contractor, more so, when admittedly, on 15.11.2021, Management no. 1 had independently called the Workman to its premises for work and has, later on, informed the Management no. 2 through e-mail dated 15.12.2021.
44. I do not find any force in the aforesaid submission of Ld. Counsel for Management no. 2. It is the admitted position of all the parties that the Workman in the present case had been deployed at the establishment of Management no. 1 by Management no. 2, pursuant to a contract between Managements no. 1 and 2, in terms of which, Management no. 2, inter-alia, had agreed to provide 18 number of bus-maids for bus/housekeeping/child care, to Management no. 1 against fixed monthly service charges, while, undertaking to abide by all statutory obligations towards the manpower deployed by Management no. 2 at the School of Management no. 1, including, qua payment of their salaries and other statutory dues in a regular LIR No. 267/2025 Nirmala Chaubey Vs. M/s. Nirmal Bhartia School & Anr.
Award dated 22.12.2025 Page 21 of 36and timely manner.
45. I have carefully gone through the judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court of India in R.K. Panda's case (supra). With utmost respect to Hon'ble Supreme Court of India, I am unable to find, in the aforesaid judgment, any legal proposition to the effect that after expiry of a certain period of time, from the date of deployment of Contract Labour by the Contractor at the establishment of Principal Employer, the contract labour becomes entitled to his/her automatic absorption into the employment of principal employer, or, that the Contractor, through whom he/she had been deployed at the establishment of principal employer, is absolved of its statutory obligations under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 or any other law.
46. Rather, in my humble opinion, instead of supporting the aforesaid plea of Ld. Counsel of Management no. 2, judgment in R.K.Panda's case (supra) counters the aforesaid plea. The aforesaid judgment, in my humble opinion, lays down a legal proposition to the effect that there does not flow any right in favour of the Contract Labour, from the provisions of Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act, 1970, to be absorbed into the employment of Principal employer. It has also been authoritatively held in the aforesaid judgment that neither the Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act, 1970, nor, the Rules framed thereunder, provide that upon abolition of Contract Labour in any industry or process, the Contract Labourers would be directly absorbed by the Principal employer.
47. In fact, a bare perusal of the aforesaid judgment shows that LIR No. 267/2025 Nirmala Chaubey Vs. M/s. Nirmal Bhartia School & Anr.
Award dated 22.12.2025 Page 22 of 36despite the Workmen, therein, having worked in the establishment of Principal Employer for 10-20 years, notwithstanding the change of different contractors from time to time and despite there being a specific clause in the agreement between the Contractor and the Principal employer, mandating the incoming Contractors to employ the workers of out-going Contractors subject to the requirement of the job, it was observed by Hon'ble Supreme Court in the aforesaid judgment that such a clause in the contract, requiring the new contractor to retain the old employees deployed at the establishment of principal employer through an outgoing contractor, is merely benevolently inserted in the contract to protect the continuance of the source of livelihood of the contract labour and the same by itself cannot give rise to a right of regularization in the employment of principal employer.
48. It was further observed by Hon'ble Supreme Court of India, in the aforesaid judgment, that the questions, as to whether the contract labourers have become the employees of principal employer in the course of time and whether the engagement and employment of labourers through a contractor is a mere camouflage and smoke screen, are the questions of fact which need to be decided by the industrial adjudicator on the basis of oral and documentary evidence produced before them. Relevant observations of Hon'ble Supreme Court in the aforesaid judgment are being reproduced herein below for ready reference:
"6. In the case of B.H.E.L. Workers' Assn. v. Union of India [(1985) 1 SCC 630 : 1985 SCC (L&S) 371 : AIR 1985 SC 409] , it was pointed out that Parliament has not abolished the contract labour as such but has provided for its abolition LIR No. 267/2025 Nirmala Chaubey Vs. M/s. Nirmal Bhartia School & Anr.Award dated 22.12.2025 Page 23 of 36
by the Central Government in appropriate cases under Section 10 of the Act. It is not for the Court to enquire into the question and to decide whether the employment of contract labour in any process, operation or other work in any establishment should be abolished or not. That has to be decided by the Government after considering the relevant aspects as required by Section 10 of the Act. Again in the case of Mathura Refinery Mazdoor Sangh v. Indian Oil Corpn. Ltd. [(1991) 2 SCC 176 : 1991 SCC (L&S) 533] , this Court refused to direct the Indian Oil Corporation Ltd., to absorb the contract labourers in its employment, saying that, the contract labourers have not been found to have direct connection with the refinery. In other words, there was no relationship of employer and employee between the Indian Oil Corporation Ltd., and the contract labourers concerned. Again in Dena Nath v. National Fertilisers Ltd. [(1992) 1 SCC 695 : 1992 SCC (L&S) 349] , this Court pointed out that the aforesaid Act has two purposes to serve
-- (i) to regulate the conditions of service of the workers employed by the contractor who is engaged by a principal employer and (ii) to provide for the abolition of contract labour altogether, in certain notified processes, operation or other works in any establishment by the appropriate Government, under Section 10 of the Act. It was further stated that neither the Act nor the Rules framed by the Central Government or by any appropriate Government provide that upon abolition of the contract labour, the labourers would be directly absorbed by the principal employer.
7. It is true that with the passage of time and purely with a view to safeguard the interests of workers, many principal employers while renewing the contracts have been insisting that the contractor or the new contractor retains the old employees. In fact such a condition is incorporated in the contract itself. However, such a clause in the contract which is benevolently inserted in the contract to protect the continuance of the source of livelihood of the contract labour cannot by itself give rise to a right to regularisation in the employment of the principal employer. Whether the contract labourers have become the employees of the principal employer in course of time and whether the engagement and employment of labourers through a contractor is a mere camouflage and a smokescreen, as has been urged in this case, is a question of fact and has to be established by the LIR No. 267/2025 Nirmala Chaubey Vs. M/s. Nirmal Bhartia School & Anr.Award dated 22.12.2025 Page 24 of 36
contract labourers on the basis of the requisite material. It is not possible for the High Court or this Court, while exercising writ jurisdiction or jurisdiction under Article 136 to decide such questions, only on the basis of the affidavits. It need not be pointed out that in all such cases, the labourers are initially employed and engaged by the contractors. As such at what point of time a direct link is established between the contract labourers and the principal employer, eliminating the contractor from the scene, is a matter which has to be established on material produced before the court. Normally, the Labour Court and the Industrial Tribunal, under the Industrial Disputes Act are the competent fora to adjudicate such disputes on the basis of the oral and documentary evidence produced before them."
49. It is significant to note in this regard that the present claim has been filed by the Workman pursuant to a reference under Section 10(1)(C) r/w Section 12(5) of Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, whereby, the only question referred to this Court for adjudication is- whether the services of Workman have been terminated illegally and/or unjustifiably by the Management, and if so, to what relief is she entitled and what directions are necessary in this respect. There is no reference received by this Court qua the question- whether the contract between Management no. 1 and 2 was mere camouflage or smoke screen, so as, to make the Workman a direct employee of Management no. 1 despite her deployment at the establishment of Management no. 1 being through Management no. 2. It is settled legal position that in an adjudication of a claim, filed pursuant to a reference under Section 10(1)(C) and 12(5) of Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, Labour Court cannot go beyond the terms of the reference. The aforesaid issue, even if, raised by the Workman in her statement of claim filed before this Court, therefore, can't be examined by this Court being beyond the LIR No. 267/2025 Nirmala Chaubey Vs. M/s. Nirmal Bhartia School & Anr.
Award dated 22.12.2025 Page 25 of 36terms of reference.
50. Even otherwise, it is apparent from the record that besides a bald plea of Workman, in her statement of claim, that despite the nature of her job being permanent and perennial in nature, Management no. 1 had engaged her services through Management no. 2 so as to deprive her of the pay equal to that of its regular employees, there is not even an iota of evidence led by her that the Contract between Managements no. 1 and 2 was either a camouflage or smoke screen so as to deprive her of statutory benefits. It is significant to note in this regard that under the Contract, executed between Managements no. 1 and 2, rights of Workman to all statutory benefits have been duly protected. In fact, it is not even the case of Management no. 2 that the Contract between Managements no. 1 and 2 was merely a camouflage or smokescreen. Rather, a bare perusal of the written statement of Management no. 2 shows that admittedly, Management no. 2 has supplied the manpower, including the Workman, to Management no. 1 being a service provider and though Management no. 2 has denied having any right to assign or retain the Workman at the establishment of Management no. 1 without its approval, however, there is no whisper in the entire written statement of Management no. 2 that it did not have any control over the Workman in the matters of her recruitment, termination, payment of salary and other statutory dues of Workman.
51. It has not even been disputed by Management no. 2 that it had deployed a supervisor at the establishment of Management no. 1 to supervise the work of the staff, including Workman, deployed by Management no. 2 at the establishment of LIR No. 267/2025 Nirmala Chaubey Vs. M/s. Nirmal Bhartia School & Anr.
Award dated 22.12.2025 Page 26 of 36Management no. 1. In fact, during his cross-examination dated 05.12.2025, M2W1 has tried to take a plea that on 30.06.2020, upon receipt of information from Management no. 1 school that the services of Workman were no more required by Management no. 1, it was Management no. 2, who had got the message conveyed to Workman through its supervisor at the establishment of Management no. 1 that w.e.f. 01.07.2020, until continuation of Covid-19, Workman should not report on her duty, however, after the end of Covid-19 pandemic, she should report at Lado Sarai office of Management no. 2. No doubt, Management no. 2 has failed to prove even the aforesaid fact by examining its alleged supervisor in evidence, however, the aforesaid voluntary statement of M2W1, during his cross-examination, corroborates the plea of M1W1 during his cross-examination that for all purposes, such as-recruitment, termination, payment of salary and other statutory dues of Workman, Workman was under the control and supervision of Management no. 2.
52. It is further significant to note in this regard that, admittedly, Workman was deployed at the establishment of Management no. 1 by Management no. 2, pursuant to an agreement which was lastly renewed vide agreement dated 31.01.2020, wherein, it is categorically stated that the entire manpower, supplied by Management no. 2 to Management no. 1 pursuant to the aforesaid contract, shall be in employment of Management no. 2 and it is Management no. 2, who shall be responsible to discharge all statutory obligations qua the aforesaid employees including the Workman.
53. Considering the fact that respective rights and liabilities of LIR No. 267/2025 Nirmala Chaubey Vs. M/s. Nirmal Bhartia School & Anr.
Award dated 22.12.2025 Page 27 of 36both the Managements, in relation to deployment of Workman at the establishment of Management no. 1, have been categorically reduced into writing, in my considered opinion, no oral evidence to the contrary is admissible in view of provisions of Section 94 and 95 of Bharatiya Sakhsya Adhiniyam, 2023, particularly when, none of the Managements have sought to challenge the aforesaid agreement.
54. In view of the aforesaid discussion, I do not find any force in the submission of Ld. Counsel for Management no. 2 that the conduct of Management no. 1, in directly calling the Workman to work for Management no. 1 for two days w.e.f. 15.11.2021 and subsequently intimating the aforesaid fact to Management no. 2 vide email dated 15.12.2021, indicates that the Workman used to Work under direct control and supervision of Management no. 1 so as to indicate existence of employer-employee relationship between Management no. 1 and Workman for the purpose of Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, more so, in view of the fact that the Workman in her evidence by way of affidavit has categorically deposed that in the month of November, 2021, she had worked at the establishment of Management no. 1 for a period of two days, on the directions of Management no. 2 and the aforesaid testimony of Workman has remained un- controverted during her cross-examination.
55. In view of the aforesaid discussion, in my considered opinion, though, Workman has failed to prove existence of any employer-employee relationship between Management no. 1 and herself, however, existence of such a relationship between Management no. 2 and Workman is established on record beyond LIR No. 267/2025 Nirmala Chaubey Vs. M/s. Nirmal Bhartia School & Anr.
Award dated 22.12.2025 Page 28 of 36reasonable doubts.
56. Issue no. (i) is thus decided against Workman.
Issue no. (ii): Whether the services of Workman were terminated by Management no. 2 illegally and/or unjustifiably on 01.07.2020? (OPW)
57. Onus to prove the aforesaid issue was upon Workman. It is submitted by Ld. AR for Workman that Workman has been able to discharge the aforesaid onus, not only, through her un- controverted testimony in the form of affidavit Ex.WW1/A, but also, through admissions of M2W1 during his cross-examination. On the contrary, according to Management no. 2, there did not exist any employer-employee relationship between Management no. 2 and Workman and hence, there was no occasion for Management no. 2 to terminate the services of Workman. Even otherwise, according to Management no. 2, the services of Workman were never terminated by Management no. 2 and it was only due to Covid-19 pandemic that the Management no. 1 school was closed leading to non-continuation of duty of Workman.
58. It has already been observed herein above, during discussion on issue no. (i), that the Workman has been able to establish the existence of employer-employee relationship between Management no. 2 and herself. In fact, it was admitted by M2W1, during his cross-examination, that Workman had joined the services of Management no. 2 on 06.04.2010 and had continuously worked with Management no. 2 as a Maid until 30.06.2020, though, Management no. 2 did not issue any appointment letter in the name of Workman.
LIR No. 267/2025Nirmala Chaubey Vs. M/s. Nirmal Bhartia School & Anr.
Award dated 22.12.2025 Page 29 of 3659. So far as the issue, qua termination of services of Workman by Management no. 2, w.e.f. 01.07.2020, is concerned, it is admitted by M2W1, during his cross-examination, that the last working day of Workman with Management no. 2 was 30.06.2020, on which date, she was informed by the supervisor of Management no. 2 that w.e.f. 01.07.2020, until continuation of Covid-19, Workman need not report on her duty and that after the end of Covid-19 pandemic, she should report at Lado Sarai office of Management no. 2. Management no. 2 has however failed to examine alleged supervisor of Workman, through whom, Workman was directed on 30.06.2020 to report at Lado Sarai office of Management no. 2 after end of Covid-19 pandemic. In response to a question as to whether Management no. 2 had ever served any letter upon Workman requiring her to resume her duties with Management no. 2, M2W1 has tried to take a plea that during pendency of claim of Workman before Conciliation Officer, he had visited the office of Conciliation Officer with a transfer order in the name of Workman requiring her to report at another site and she had refused to accept the aforesaid transfer order. From the aforesaid plea of M2W1, it is apparent that after 30.06.2020, Management no. 2 had never called the Workman to report back on her duty, at least, until filing of the claim by her against Management no. 2 before the Conciliation Officer.
60. Even though, it is deposed by M2W1 that he himself had visited the office of Conciliation Officer with a transfer order in the name of Workman requiring her to report at another site on 01.06.2022, however, he has neither produced the alleged LIR No. 267/2025 Nirmala Chaubey Vs. M/s. Nirmal Bhartia School & Anr.
Award dated 22.12.2025 Page 30 of 36transfer order, nor, the certified copy of conciliation proceedings recording the aforesaid fact. He could not even disclose the exact date, month or year or, for that matter, name of the company, where, Workman was supposed to report pursuant to the alleged transfer order. The aforesaid plea, in my considered opinion, has thus been taken by M2W1 merely to defeat the claim of Workman for her reinstatement and back wages, more so, when, it was categorically admitted by him that Management no. 2 had never called the Workman, after 01.07.2020, to work at Management no. 1 school and that despite being aware of filing of the complaint as well as claim by Workman against Management no. 2 before the Labour Department, Management no. 2 did not file any reply thereto.
61. It is sought to be submitted by Ld. Counsel for Management no. 2 that the Management no. 2 could not file the copy/certified copy of alleged transfer order, since, as per own admission of Workman, in her statement of claim, record of proceedings before Conciliation Officer went missing from his office. I do not find any force in the aforesaid submission of Ld. Counsel for Management no. 2, in as much as, Management no. 2 has neither produced the copy of application, if any, submitted by Management no. 2 to the office of Conciliation Officer for certified copy of Conciliation proceedings, nor, has the Management no. 2 moved any application before this Court for summoning of aforesaid record from the office of Conciliation Officer. The absolutely vague statement of Workman in para 12 of her statement of claim, that she came to know that her file has been misplaced from the Conciliation Office, can't be accepted LIR No. 267/2025 Nirmala Chaubey Vs. M/s. Nirmal Bhartia School & Anr.
Award dated 22.12.2025 Page 31 of 36as a proof of the aforesaid fact, in as much as, though, in the same para, she has alleged that the Conciliation Officer has not sent her case to this Court, however, a bare perusal of record reveals that it was only upon receipt of a reference from the appropriate Government, pursuant to the report of Conciliation Officer, that the present case was registered by this Court and the present claim was filed by Workman.
62. In view of the aforesaid peculiar facts and circumstances of the case, wherein, on 30.06.2020, Workman was admittedly instructed by Management no. 2 not to report on her duty w.e.f., 01.07.2020 at the school of Management no. 1 and Management no. 2 has failed to prove that any transfer order had ever been issued by Management no. 2 in the name of Workman either on 30.06.2020 or on any subsequent date, requiring her to report at the office or any other site of Management no. 2, in my considered opinion, the only irresistible conclusion which can be arrived at by the Court is that services of Workman were terminated by Management no. 2 w.e.f. 01.07.2020. In fact, it was deposed by M2W1, during his cross-examination, that Management no. 2 had never called the Workman to Work at Management no. 1 School after 30.06.2020.
63. Since, it is not even the case of Management no. 2 that Workman was given any advance notice or notice pay/service compensation at the time of termination of her services, in consonance with the provisions of Section 25F of Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, termination of services of Workman by Management no. 2, w.e.f. 01.07.2020, in my considered opinion, was clearly illegal.
LIR No. 267/2025Nirmala Chaubey Vs. M/s. Nirmal Bhartia School & Anr.
Award dated 22.12.2025 Page 32 of 3664. Issue no. (ii) is thus decided in favour of Workman.
Issue no. (iii): Relief, if any.
65. Even if, it is assumed for the sake of arguments that services of Workman were illegally terminated by Management no. 2 w.e.f. 01.07.2020, according to Ld. Counsel for Management no. 2, Workman shall not automatically become entitled to the relief of her reinstatement or back wages. He submits that in view of various authoritative pronouncements of Hon'ble Supreme Court as well as different High Court, pointed out herein above, onus to prove that despite sincere efforts to search for an alternative job, she had remained wholly unemployed since the date of her illegal termination, was upon the Workman, however, she has failed to lead any evidence to the aforesaid effect. Rather, according to him, during her cross-examination, Workman could not produce any document to prove that she had ever searched for any alternative job. The aforesaid omission on her part, according to him, dis-entitles her to the relief of reinstatement as well as back wages. Even otherwise, he submits that the delay of more than two years, on the part of Workman, in approaching the Labour Department with a complaint qua her alleged illegal termination, is sufficient to dis-entitle her to the relief of either her reinstatement or back wages.
66. The judgments relied upon by Ld. Counsel for Management no. 2 during the course of his arguments, as noted herein above, in my considered opinion, do support his submission that a finding of the Court in favour of Workman, qua illegal termination of her services, shall not lead to an automatic relief LIR No. 267/2025 Nirmala Chaubey Vs. M/s. Nirmal Bhartia School & Anr.
Award dated 22.12.2025 Page 33 of 36of reinstatement and back wages and the Court needs to take into consideration various factors before grant of any particular relief to the Workman. It is also true that one of the factors to be considered by the Court at the time of grant of relief to a Workman, whose termination by the employer is found to be illegal, is the delay on the part of Workman in approaching the Management as well as Labour Department/Court, raising a dispute qua illegal termination of his/her services. Another factor relevant for determination of issue of relief to be granted to a Workman shall be the efforts made by him/her in search of an alternative job so as to mitigate the losses.
67. In the case in hand, services of Workman were illegally terminated by Management no. 2 way back on 01.07.2020 and a period of more than five years has thus elapsed from the date of termination of her services by Management no. 2. Prior to termination of her services, Workman had worked with Management no. 2 for a period of more than 10 years. Despite alleging herself to be wholly unemployed since the date of illegal termination of her services, Workman has filed her first complaint before the Labour Department on 29.11.2021 i.e. after expiry of more than 16 months and had served the first demand notice upon Managements on 14.02.2022 i.e. after expiry of more than 18 months from the date of her termination.
68. In the aforesaid peculiar facts and circumstances of the case, this Court is not inclined to grant the relief of either her reinstatement or back wages to the Workman, more so, when admittedly Management no. 2 has already deployed another worker at the establishment of Management no. 1 in place of LIR No. 267/2025 Nirmala Chaubey Vs. M/s. Nirmal Bhartia School & Anr.
Award dated 22.12.2025 Page 34 of 36Workman and grant of relief of reinstatement of Workman into the same job shall have the effect of displacement of the aforesaid Worker, which, shall not be conducive to industrial peace and harmony.
69. However, considering the fact that the services of Workman were terminated by Management no. 2 w.e.f. 01.07.2020 illegally, in violation of provisions of Section 25-F of Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, without any advance notice/notice pay or service compensation, in my considered opinion, ends of justice shall be served by awarding a lump sum compensation to the Workman covering her notice pay, service compensation, loss of interest and cost of litigation. Considering the fact that prior to illegal termination of her services by Management no. 2, Workman, in the present case, had served Management no. 2 for a period of more than 10 years, in my considered opinion, award of a lump sum compensation of Rs. 2,25,000/- (Rupees Two Lacs Twenty Five Thousand Only) in favour of Workman shall be just and reasonable.
70. Management no. 2 is thus directed to pay a compensation of Rs. 2,25,000/- (Rupees Two Lacs Twenty Five Thousand Only) to the Workman within 15 days from the date of publication of this award, failing which, Management no. 2 shall be liable to pay the aforesaid amount to Workman along with simple interest @ 9% per annum from the date of Award till the date of actual payment.
71. Present claim of Workman is thus disposed off and reference dated 20.03.2025 is answered in favour of Workman in LIR No. 267/2025 Nirmala Chaubey Vs. M/s. Nirmal Bhartia School & Anr.
Award dated 22.12.2025 Page 35 of 36the following terms:
"Services of Workman Smt. Nirmala Chaubey W/o. Sh. Ramesh Chaubey have been terminated by Management no. 2 i.e. M/s White Fox Support Services Pvt. Ltd. illegally and unjustifiably w.e.f. 01.07.2020 and hence the Workman is entitled to a lump sum compensation of Rs. 2,25,000/- (Rupees Two Lacs Twenty Five Thousand Only), to be paid by Management no. 2 to Workman within fifteen days from the date of publication of this Award, failing which, the Award amount shall be payable by Management no. 2 to Workman along with simple interest at the rate of 9% per annum from the date of Award till the date of actual payment thereof."
72. Ordered accordingly.
73. Requisite number of copies of this award be sent to the competent authority for publication as per rules.
Announced in the open Court on this 22nd day of December, 2025.
This award consists of 36 number of signed pages. ARUN Digitally signed
by ARUN KUMAR
KUMAR GARG
Date: 2025.12.22
GARG 15:19:17 +05'30'
(ARUN KUMAR GARG)
Presiding Officer Labour Court-III
Rouse Avenue Court, New Delhi
LIR No. 267/2025
Nirmala Chaubey Vs. M/s. Nirmal Bhartia School & Anr.
Award dated 22.12.2025 Page 36 of 36