Central Administrative Tribunal - Delhi
Vishal Upadhyay vs Union Public Service Commission on 13 February, 2026
Central Administrative Tribunal
Principal Bench,
New Delhi
O. A. No. 376/2026
Orders reserved on: 02.02.2026
Orders pronounced on: 13.02.2026
Hon'ble Mr. Manish Garg, Member (J)
Hon'ble Mr. Rajinder Kashyap, Member (A)
1. Vishal Upadhyay S/o Shri Ravindranath Upadhyay, Age 31,
R/o Vivek Nagar Maihar, District Satna,
Madhya Pradesh 485771
2. Anjali Singh D/o Risal Singh, age 30, R/o N- 204,2nd Floor
Shatabdi Rail Vihar, B Block, Near Fortis Hospital, Sector 62,
Noida, Uttar Pradesh- 201309
3. Kajal D/o Bansi Lal, age 26, R/o Sirdhan, PO Bangaon,
District Fatehabad Haryana, 125050
4. Rahil Ingle S/o Vinod Ingle, age 25 , R/o Dhamangaon
Railway, District Amravati, Maharashtra- 444709
5. Akhila Rajan P D/o Govindarajan P, age 29 , R/o House No
27, Pokkalath House Cherpulasery PO Palakkad, 679503
6. Mukesh Godara S/o Hukma Ram, age 28, R/o vpo kinsariya,
teh parbatsar, District Didwana kuchaman, Rajasthan,
341512
7. Krishna Priya Ajith D/o M K Ajithkumar , age 31 , R/o
Murickanattucheril (H),Idamattam P O, Poovarany, Kottayam
District, Kerala - 686578
8. Divyansh Mishra S/o Santosh Kumar Mishra, age 29, R/o
MIG 455 Awas Vikas Colony, Fatehpur, Uttar Pradesh,
212601
9. Parvathy Kurup D/o V. Prakash Kumar, age 30, R/o
Thadathil, Kadammanitta P.O, Pathanamthitta, Kerala
689649
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10. Rajat Aggarwal S/o Adish Aggarwal, age 30, R/o 158, Sanjay
Gandhi colony, Roorkee District Haridwar state, Uttarakhand
- 247667
11. Yadhu Krishna PS S/o Sidharthan PB, age 26, R/o
Perinchery House, Thrissur district, Kerala - 680014
12. Mukund Mishra S/o Shashi Bhushan Mishra, age 30 years,
R/o Village Painal Post Painal PS BihtaPatna Bihar-801111
13. Prateek S/o Harsha Vardhan, age 30, R/o D 303, Kesar
Garden, Sector 48, Noida, Uttar Pradesh - 201301.
14. N. Manikanta Sai Srinadh Reddy, S/o N. Janardana Reddy,
age 25 , R/o 19-14-12/1, Ramachandrupuram, Andhra
Pradesh, 53.3255
15. Sawan Kumar S/0 Sudama Kumar Singh, age 26 , R/o - New
colony behind of raj indane office Silauta Ara road,
Bikramganj Rohtas, Bihar 802212
16. Sagar Kharate S/o Jagannath, age 28, R/o 3/2, Samarpan
CHS, Yashodhan Nagar, Thane (W) Maharashtra 400606
17. Ashish bhargava S/o Anil Bhargava , age 32 , R/o 593/B,
Ward No 3, MehrauliDelhi- 110030
18. Amrit Raj S/o Sanjay Kumar Singh, age 28, R/o Ward No 3,
NH 57, Simrahi Bazar, Supaul Bihar-852111
...Applicants
(By Advocate: Mr. Sarthak Karol and Mr. Suraj Mishra)
VERSUS
1. Union Public Service Commission
through the Chairman,
New Delhi- 11 000 1
2. Union of India
through the Secretary,
Department of Personnel & Training,
New Delhi-110001
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3. Union of India
through the Secretary,
Ministry of Labour & Employment,
New delhi- 110001
4. Employees Provident Fund Organization,
Through CEO/ CPFC,
(Ministry of Labour & Employment)
Plate A Ground Floor,
Office Block-II, East Kidwai Nagar, New Delhi-110023
[email protected] ....Respondents
(By Advocate: Mr. R. V. Sinha and Ms. Asha Gopalan Nair)
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ORDER
Hon'ble Mr. Rajinder Kashyap, Member (A):-
By filing the present O.A. under Section 19 of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985, the applicants have sought the following reliefs:-
"(a) Quash and set aside the final result dated 11.11.2025 and cut off notice dated 22.12.2025, insofar as they exclude the Applicants from selection to the post of Personal Assistant, on the basis of undisclosed and post-examination Skill Test criteria;
(b) Declare that exclusion of the Applicants from selection on the basis of post-examination Skill Test criteria, is arbitrary and violative of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India
(c) Direct the Respondents to exercise the power of relaxation in terms of the recruitment advertisement, revise the result dated 11.11.2025 and consider the Applicants for appointment against the existing vacancies.
(d) Pass any other order as this Hon'ble Tribunal may deem fit in the interest of justice."
FACTS OF THE CASE
2. The present Original Application has been filed under Section 19 of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985, by the applicants seeking interference by this Tribunal in an ongoing recruitment process conducted by the respondents. The principal grievance raised is that after commencement of the selection process and after the applicants had participated in the Written Recruitment Test (WRT), the respondents allegedly modified or refined the selection procedure, which according to the applicants is arbitrary and violative of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India.
2.1 Respondent No. 2 published an advertisement (Annexure-/3) bearing no. 51/2024 inviting applications for recruitment to 323 posts of Personal Assistants in the respondent no. 4 organization (EPFO). AS NEETU Digitally signed by NEETU SHARMA SHARMADate: 2026.02.17 11:28:26+05'30' Item No. 51/C-4 5 OA No. 1676/2024 per the advertisement, the Written Recruitment Test (WRT) was accorded 100% weightage, while the Skill Test was held to be merely qualifying in nature. Further, the qualifying standard in the Skill Test was relaxable by UPSC. However, the advertisement failed to disclose any qualifying standard or permissible error margin for the Skill Test. On 07.07.2024, the UPSC conducted a Written Recruitment Test (WRT) wherein the present applicants appeared. On 02.08.2024 (Annexure-A/4), the Written Recruitment Test (WRT) results were declared, with 1,376 candidates declared qualified for the next stage of the recruitment process, including the present applicants. On 03.08.2024 (Annexure-A/5), applicant no. 1 filed an RTI application seeking disclosure for the permissible percentage error and the qualifying criteria for the Skill Test. UPSC, in reply to the above- mentioned RTI, stated that the recruitment process was already underway and that the information would be uploaded on UPSC's website in due course. On 11.07.2025, UPSC issued a corrigendum notice regarding the Skill Test, providing details of the Skill Test schedule. However, UPSC still failed to disclose any qualifying standard or permissible error margin for the Skill Test. Pursuant to the said corrigendum, the Skill Test was conducted on 26.07.2025, 27.07.2025, 02.08.2025 and 03.08.2025 and the candidates were forced to appear for the said Skill Test without complete information regarding the qualifying standard and the permissible error margin in the Skill Test. On 11.11.2025 (Annexure-A/1), UPSC declared the results of the recruitment process, with only 22 of 323 candidates NEETU Digitally signed by NEETU SHARMA SHARMADate: 2026.02.17 11:28:26+05'30' Item No. 51/C-4 6 OA No. 1676/2024 qualifying for the post of PA in EPFO. After publication of the result, the applicants preferred representations to the UPSC and the Department of Personnel and Training, which have not been decided till date.
2.2 Aggrieved by the manner in which the selection process progressed thereafter, the applicants approached this Tribunal contending that the respondents were not justified in applying revised or clarified selection parameters after the written examination. According to the applicants, such action amounts to changing the "rules of the game" after the game has begun. Hence, this O.A.
3. Pursuant to notice issued by this Tribunal, the respondent No. 2 has filed reply opposing the claim of the applicant. CONTENTIONS OF THE APPLICANTS
4. The applicants contend that Respondent No. 2 acted arbitrarily and unconstitutionally by failing to prescribe and disclose the qualifying standard and permissible error margin for the Skill Test before its conduct and by introducing such criteria only after the results were declared. This action violates the principle that rules cannot be changed after the selection process has commenced, as well as the principles of natural justice and Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution. Despite qualifying the Written Recruitment Test and being otherwise eligible, the applicants were unfairly excluded on the basis of undisclosed criteria. Calling into question the legality and propriety of the respondents' action in the conduct and outcome of the NEETU Digitally signed by NEETU SHARMA SHARMADate: 2026.02.17 11:28:26+05'30' Item No. 51/C-4 7 OA No. 1676/2024 result, the applicants have advanced the following grounds for consideration of this Tribunal:-
a) The advertisement merely states that the Skill Test is qualifying in nature, but fails to prescribe the qualifying standard. Further, the notice for Skill Test dated 01.07.2025 (Annexure-A/6) and in the Corrigendum Notice for Skill Test dated 11.07.2025 (Annexure-A/7) merely provided the scheme of the Skill Test, i.e. the dictation words per minute and transcription time.
However, both the advertisement and the corrigendum are silent on the permissible percentage error, leaving students to determine the qualifying threshold for the Skill Test. Therefore, the applicants, despite making efforts to determine the percentage of error, were not made aware of the marking of errors in the Skill Test before appearing for the exam. Accordingly, the impugned advertisement is vague, arbitrary and does not specify the necessary qualifying criteria for the mandatory Skill Test.
b) It was only subsequently, and belatedly, that the UPSC issued the Cut off Notice dated 22.12.2025, over a month after the results were declared, and erroneously provided for a permissible error of <=5% for the Unreserved Categories and <7% for the Reserved Categories. (Annexure-A/2).
c) It is submitted that the subsequent and post result declaration of the permissible percentage error in the Skill Test by UPSC violates the settled principle of law that "the rules of the game NEETU Digitally signed by NEETU SHARMA SHARMADate: 2026.02.17 11:28:26+05'30' Item No. 51/C-4 8 OA No. 1676/2024 cannot be changed after the game has been played". The Hon'ble Supreme Court of India in its decision in Tej Prakash Pathak Vs. High Court of Rajasthan, reported in (2025) 2 SCC 1 has categorically held that the benchmark for any recruitment process or exam has to be set before the commencement of the recruitment process and even if the benchmark is allowed to be set at different stages of the recruitment process, it must be set any time before that stage is reached, so that the candidates are not caught by surprise.
d) Laying out the percentage error is a condition vital to the candidates in any exam where stenography is tested, since in the absence of a clearly demarcated percentage error, the candidates approach to a time and accuracy-based test gets materially altered. Sequitur, candidates who may have transcribed a higher number of words despite substantial inaccuracies could be placed at an advantage over candidates who may have transcribed fewer words with greater accuracy, thereby distorting merit, rendering the evaluation arbitrary, and defeating the object of a fair assessment.
e) Advertisement provides for relaxation powers, which must be exercised to appoint well-qualified applicants who cleared the Recruitment Test i. Out of 323 total vacant seats for the position of PA, 301 seats are currently vacant. No prejudice will be caused if the relaxation powers prescribed in the advertisement NEETU Digitally signed by NEETU SHARMA SHARMADate: 2026.02.17 11:28:26+05'30' Item No. 51/C-4 9 OA No. 1676/2024 dated 07.03.2024 are exercised in favour of the applicants who are otherwise qualified.
ii. Moreover, in the context of stenographer examination, the relaxation has already happened and upheld by the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India in Ashok Kumar Uppal Vs. State of J&K, reported in (1998) 4 SCC 179, and Sandeep Kumar Sharma Vs. State of Punjab, reported in (1997) 10 SCC 298, wherein it was held that such a power of relaxation is intended to mitigate hardship or to meet a particular situation.
iii. The recruitment advertisement dated 07.03.2024 for the post of Personal Assistant in EPFO explicitly states in the heading of scheme, syllabus, and weightage section in its point (c) (v) of Weightage, that the qualifying standards in the Skill Test (s) are relaxable at the discretion of the UPSC. This relaxation applies for reasons to be recorded in writing, particularly where candidates are otherwise qualified.
iv. The applicants in the present O.A. have qualified the Recruitment Test, which carried the maximum weightage, as is evident from the result of the recruitment test dated 02.08.2024 (Annexure-A/4). All the applicant's role numbers are reflected in the result of the recruitment test dated 02.08.2024 (Annexure-A/4).
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v. In the present case, the applicants are well qualified in the Recruitment Test, which carries 100% weightage. The Skill Test is merely qualifying in nature, and as per the advertisement, the Job Description of a PA in EPFO is not solely limited to the aspect of stenography, but rather includes other duties. Therefore, the UPSC can exercise the discretion as provided for in Clause (c) (v) under the head weightage of the advertisement to consider the case of applicants as "Candidates otherwise well qualified". CONTENTIONS OF THE RESPONDENTS
5. Learned counsel, by referring to the contents of the written submissions filed on behalf of respondent no. 1 i.e., UPSC, submits that the UPSC has been impleaded as respondent no. 1 through its Chairman, which is not permissible in law in as much as the Chairman, UPSC is a Constitutional Authority and it is trite that he cannot be sued in his name. He further submits that the selection process was completed in fair and transparent manner and the rules of selection have been applied across the Bar and there is no illegality or infirmity. 5.1 Learned counsel for the respondent no. 1 submits that it is trite that having participated in the selection process and failed, the applicants herein are stopped by principle of estoppels i.e., cannot take U-turn and challenge the selection process, after being declared unsuccessful in the said Written Exam.
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5.2 In this regard, reliance has been placed on the following judgments:-
(a) Judgment dated 16.04.2014 in Civil Appeals Nos. 4455-58 with 4459-80 of 2009 in the matter of Ranjan Kumar & Ors. Vs. State of Bihar & Ors., reported in (2014) 16 SCC 187.
(b) Judgment dated 28.03.2023 in Civil Appeals Nos. 2164-72 of 2023 in the matter of Tajvir Singh Sodhi & Ors. Vs. The State of Jammu & Kashmir & Ors., reported in (2023) 17 SCC 147.
(c) Judgment dated 12.12.2022 in Civil Appeal Nos. 8822-8823 of 2022 in the matter of State of Uttar Pradesh Vs. Karunesh Kumar & Ors., reported in 2022 SCC Online SC 1706.
5.3 It is further submitted that the rules of examination have been applied across the bar and there is no illegality or infirmity. The applicants do not have any indefeasible right to appointment or to seek relaxation, as being claimed.
ANALYSIS
6. We have heard learned counsel for the parties at length and carefully perused the pleadings and documents placed on record. The controversy in the present Original Application revolves around the alleged non-disclosure of the qualifying standard and permissible error margin for the Skill Test conducted as part of the recruitment process for the post of Personal Assistant in the Employees' Provident Fund Organisation (EPFO).
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7. The following issues arise for consideration:
a) Whether the mere act of clearing the Written Recruitment Test (which constitutes only one stage of the selection process) confers any vested or enforceable right upon the applicants to demand selection or to insist upon a particular methodology of selection by the recruiting authority.
b) Whether the respondents acted arbitrarily or illegally so as to warrant judicial interference.
c) Whether the present case falls within the limited scope of judicial review in recruitment matters.
8. At the outset, it is a settled principle of service jurisprudence that the scope of judicial review in matters concerning recruitment is limited. Courts and Tribunals do not ordinarily interfere with the selection process unless the same is shown to be vitiated by arbitrariness, mala fides, or violation of statutory provisions. The recruiting authority is best suited to determine the method of selection and the standards required for assessing suitability of candidates.
9. In the present case, the advertisement clearly provided that the Skill Test would be qualifying in nature and that the qualifying standards were relaxable at the discretion of the UPSC. Merely because the permissible percentage of error was not expressly mentioned in the advertisement would not, by itself, render the selection process arbitrary, particularly, when the respondents have asserted that the same standard was uniformly applied to all candidates.
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10. The contention of the applicants that the "rules of the game" were changed after the conduct of the examination does not merit acceptance. The fixation of a permissible error margin forms part of the evaluation methodology, which falls within the administrative domain of the recruiting authority. There is nothing on record to suggest that the criteria were selectively applied or manipulated to the disadvantage of the applicants.
11. It is also not in dispute that the applicants participated in the entire selection process without protest and only after being declared unsuccessful have approached this Tribunal. The Hon'ble Supreme Court has consistently held that a candidate who consciously participates in a selection process cannot subsequently challenge its procedure upon failure. Reference in this regard may be made to Ranjan Kumar & Ors. Vs. State of Bihar & Ors., (2014) 16 SCC 187, Tajvir Singh Sodhi & Ors. Vs. State of Jammu & Kashmir & Ors., (2023) 17 SCC 147, and State of Uttar Pradesh Vs. Karunesh Kumar & Ors., 2022 SCC OnLine SC 1706. Relevant portion of State of Uttar Pradesh Vs. Karunesh Kumar & Ors., reads as under:-
"21. A candidate who has participated in the selection process adopted under the 2015 Rules is estopped and has acquiesced himself from questioning it thereafter, as held by this Court in the case of Anupal Singh (supra):
"55. Having participated in the interview, the private respondents cannot challenge the Office Memorandum dated 12-10-2014 and the selection. On behalf of the appellants, it was contended that after the revised Notification dated 12-10-2014, the private respondents participated in the interview without protest and only after the result was announced and finding that they were not selected, the private respondents chose to challenge the revised NEETU Digitally signed by NEETU SHARMA SHARMADate: 2026.02.17 11:28:26+05'30' Item No. 51/C-4 14 OA No. 1676/2024 Notification dated 12-10- 2014 and the private respondents are estopped from challenging the selection process. It is a settled law that a person having consciously participated in the interview cannot turn around and challenge the selection process.
56. Observing that the result of the interview cannot be challenged by a candidate who has participated in the interview and has taken the chance to get selected at the said interview and ultimately, finds himself to be unsuccessful, in Madan Lal v. State of J&K [(1995) 3 SCC 486 : 1995 SCC (L&S) 712], it was held as under : (SCC p. 493, para 9) "9. ... The petitioners also appeared at the oral interview conducted by the Members concerned of the Commission who interviewed the petitioners as well as the contesting respondents concerned. Thus the petitioners took a chance to get themselves selected at the said oral interview. Only because they did not find themselves to have emerged successful as a result of their combined performance both at written test and oral interview, they have filed this petition. It is now well settled that if a candidate takes a calculated chance and appears at the interview, then, only because the result of the interview is not palatable to him, he cannot turn round and subsequently contend that the process of interview was unfair or the Selection Committee was not properly constituted."
57. In K.H. Siraj v. High Court of Kerala [(2006) 6 SCC 395 : 2006 SCC (L&S) 1345], it was held as under : (SCC p. 426, para 73) "73. The appellant-petitioners having participated in the interview in this background, it is not open to the appellant- petitioners to turn round thereafter when they failed at the interview and contend that the provision of a minimum mark for the interview was not proper."
58. In Union of India v. S. Vinodh Kumar [(2007) 8 SCC 100 :
(2007) 2 SCC (L&S) 792], it was held as under : (SCC p. 107, para
19) "19. In Chandra Prakash Tiwari v. Shakuntala Shukla [(2002) 6 SCC 127 : 2002 SCC (L&S) 830] ....
xxx xxx xxx It was further observed : (SCC p. 149, para 34) „34. There is thus no doubt that while question of any estoppel by conduct would not arise in the contextual facts but the law seem to be well settled that in the event a candidate appears at the interview and participates therein, only because the result of the interview is not "palatable" to him, he cannot turn round and subsequently contend that the process of interview was unfair or there was some lacuna in the process."
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59. Same principle was reiterated in Sadananda Halo v. Momtaz Ali Sheikh [(2008) 4 SCC 619 : (2008) 2 SCC (L&S) 9] wherein, it was held as under : (SCC pp. 645-46, para 59) "59. It is also a settled position that the unsuccessful candidates cannot turn back and assail the selection process. There are of course the exceptions carved out by this Court to this general rule. This position was reiterated by this Court in its latest judgment in Union of India v. S. Vinodh Kumar [(2007) 8 SCC 100 : (2007) 2 SCC (L&S) 792] .... The Court also referred to the judgment in Om Prakash Shukla v. Akhilesh Kumar Shukla [1986 Supp SCC 285 : 1986 SCC (L&S) 644], where it has been held specifically that when a candidate appears in the examination without protest and subsequently is found to be not successful in the examination, the question of entertaining the petition challenging such examination would not arise.""
22. In the case at hand, the un-selected candidates want to press into service a part of the 1978 Rules while accepting the 2015 Rules. Such a selective adoption is not permissible under law, as no party can be allowed to approbate or reprobate, as held by this Court in Union of India v. N Murugesan (2022) 2 SCC 25:
"Approbate and reprobate
26. These phrases are borrowed from the Scots law. They would only mean that no party can be allowed to accept and reject the same thing, and thus one cannot blow hot and cold. The principle behind the doctrine of election is inbuilt in the concept of approbate and reprobate. Once again, it is a principle of equity coming under the contours of common law. Therefore, he who knows that if he objects to an instrument, he will not get the benefit he wants cannot be allowed to do so while enjoying the fruits. One cannot take advantage of one part while rejecting the rest. A person cannot be allowed to have the benefit of an instrument while questioning the same. Such a party either has to affirm or disaffirm the transaction. This principle has to be applied with more vigour as a common law principle, if such a party actually enjoys the one part fully and on near completion of the said enjoyment, thereafter questions the other part. An element of fair play is inbuilt in this principle. It is also a species of estoppel dealing with the conduct of a party. We have already dealt with the provisions of the Contract Act concerning the conduct of a party, and his presumption of knowledge while confirming an offer through his acceptance unconditionally.
xxx xxx xxx 27.2.State of Punjab v. Dhanjit Singh Sandhu [(2014) 15 SCC 144] : (SCC pp. 153-54, paras 22-23 & 25-26) "22. The doctrine of "approbate and reprobate" is only a species of estoppel, it implies only to the conduct of parties. As in the case of estoppel it cannot operate against the provisions of a statute. (Vide CIT v. MR. P. Firm Muar [AIR 1965 SC 1216].) NEETU Digitally signed by NEETU SHARMA SHARMADate: 2026.02.17 11:28:26+05'30' Item No. 51/C-4 16 OA No. 1676/2024
23. It is settled proposition of law that once an order has been passed, it is complied with, accepted by the other party and derived the benefit out of it, he cannot challenge it on any ground. (Vide Maharashtra SRTC v. Balwant Regular Motor Service [AIR 1969 SC 329].) In R.N. Gosain v. Yashpal Dhir [(1992) 4 SCC 683] this Court has observed as under : (R.N. Gosain case [(1992) 4 SCC 683], SCC pp. 687- 88, para 10) „10. Law does not permit a person to both approbate and reprobate. This principle is based on the doctrine of election which postulates that no party can accept and reject the same instrument and that „a person cannot say at one time that a transaction is valid and thereby obtain some advantage, to which he could only be entitled on the footing that it is valid, and then turn round and say it is void for the purpose of securing some other advantage‟.‟ xxx xxx xxx
25. The Supreme Court in Rajasthan State Industrial Development & Investment Corpn. v. Diamond & Gem Development Corpn. Ltd. [(2013) 5 SCC 470 : (2013) 3 SCC (Civ) 153], made an observation that a party cannot be permitted to "blow hot and cold", "fast and loose" or "approbate and reprobate". Where one knowingly accepts the benefits of a contract or conveyance or an order, is estopped to deny the validity or binding effect on him of such contract or conveyance or order. This rule is applied to do equity, however, it must not be applied in a manner as to violate the principles of right and good conscience.
26. It is evident that the doctrine of election is based on the rule of estoppel, the principle that one cannot approbate and reprobate is inherent in it. The doctrine of estoppel by election is one among the species of estoppel in pais (or equitable estoppel), which is a rule of equity. By this law, a person may be precluded, by way of his actions, or conduct, or silence when he has to speak, from asserting a right which he would have otherwise had."
23. The aforesaid principle of law applies to the present case. It is not open to the candidate to contend to the contrary so that he can have the best of both sets of rules. Not only is there a difference in the mode of selection, but also in the constitution of recruiting authority as well. It is pertinent to note, that under the 2015 Rules, there is no such procedure for preparing a waiting-list, as the Respondents seek to contend.
24. We have considered the aforesaid submissions to appreciate the arguments made. Even under the 1978 Rules, we do not find the existence of any waiting-list in operation to be filled up at a later point of time, when a certain candidate does not join. Such a list has been provided under Rule 15(4) of the 1978 Rules only to facilitate the appointing authority to fill up the vacancies. Thus, after the vacancies are filled up, the door for the other candidates gets closed.
25. The same is the position under the 2015 Rules by which the Commission is required to send the merit list alone to the appointing NEETU Digitally signed by NEETU SHARMA SHARMADate: 2026.02.17 11:28:26+05'30' Item No. 51/C-4 17 OA No. 1676/2024 authority which it actually did and in case of non-joining, the vacancies are carried forward to the next process of selection, as has been rightly done by the authority in the present case. An employer shall always have adequate discretion with an element of flexibility in selecting an employee. Interference can only be made when a selection is arbitrary or contrary to law, which we do not find to be the case in the present matter. The approach of the High Court is like a visually impaired person looking for a black cat in a dark room when the cat itself is not there.
26. Now we shall come to the question of repugnancy between the two Rules, namely, the 1978 Rules, being a special Rule, and the general Rule introduced in the year 2015. The 1978 Rules do not exist in the statute once the 2015 Rules came into being. By the introduction of the 2014 Act, the legislature in its wisdom assigned the role of filling up the Class „C‟ posts to the Commission. We have no difficulty in appreciating the legal contentions raised by the Respondents, however, the decisions rendered do not have any application, considering the inconsistency between the two sets of rules. As we have already held the two sets of rules to be inconsistent with each other, it is clear that the later rules, even though general in nature, will govern the field. On this aspect, we wish to quote with profit the decision of this Court in the case of Ajoy Kumar Banerjee (supra), "38....As mentioned hereinbefore if the scheme was held to be valid, then the question what is the general law and what is the special law and which law in case of conflict would prevail would have arisen and that would have necessitated the application of the principle "Generalia specialibus non derogant". The general rule to be followed in case of conflict between two statutes is that the later abrogates the earlier one. In other words, a prior special law would yield to a later general law, if either of the two following conditions is satisfied:
(i) The two are inconsistent with each other.
(ii) There is some express reference in the later to the earlier enactment.
If either of these two conditions is fulfilled, the later law, even though general, would prevail.
39. From the text and the decisions, four tests are deducible and these are: (i) The Legislature has the undoubted right to alter a law already promulgated through subsequent legislation, (ii) A special law may be altered, abrogated or repealed by a later general law by an express provisions, (iii) A later general law will override a prior special law if the two are so repugnant to each other that they cannot co-exist even though no express provision in that behalf is found in the general law, and (iv) It is only in the absence of a provision to the contrary and of a clear inconsistency that a special law will remain wholly unaffected by a later general law. See in this connection, Maxwell on the Interpretation of Statutes, Twelfth Edition, pages 196-198."
27. Merely because the Appellant sought to amend the 1978 Rules subsequently in 2016, it cannot be presumed that the 1978 Rules particularly with respect to Rule 15 continue to exist in the statute book, considering the fact that the 2016 amendment was only clarificatory in NEETU Digitally signed by NEETU SHARMA SHARMADate: 2026.02.17 11:28:26+05'30' Item No. 51/C-4 18 OA No. 1676/2024 nature. We may hasten to add that both the Rules were made in the exercise of power conferred under Article 309 of the Constitution of India.
28. Much reliance has been made on the Government Order passed on 15.11.1999. The said order is very clear on two counts. It speaks of the role being played by the Public Service Commission, and dispensing with the waiting-list except in case of selection to a single post. What is important to be noted is the selection and that too for a single post. It would only mean that selection of an individual to a post, which cannot be interpreted to mean a particular category of post or a single cadre post, as contended by the counsel for the Respondents. The object is very clear that the exercise done in selecting a suitable candidate shall not go waste if that person is not actually selected for any reason, in which case the next in line would get in. Otherwise, the entire process would go to waste, making the recruiting agency to redo it all over for a single post.
29. The learned counsel appearing for the respondents made a specific reference to the decision rendered in the case of Rajiv Kumar Srivastava (supra) to press home the contention that, when a post is not filled due to non-joining of a candidate, another one waiting in the wings merits consideration, as a vested right inures in his benefit.
30. The aforesaid decision, in our considered view, may not have any application to the case on hand. The effect of the relevant rules is not considered therein, as the select list shuts the door to everyone other than the selected candidates. The aforesaid decision was in the context of the 1999 GO, however, as we have held that the 1978 Rules do not apply to the present recruitment, the aforesaid decision would not be of any service. Further, it is settled law that there is no vested right of the unsuccessful candidate to insist upon their consideration, in the absence of any such rule requiring for the preparation of a waiting-list. This Court in the recent decision in Vallampati Sathish Babu v. State of A.P. (Civil Appeal No. 2473 of 2022) has held that:
"7.4 In the present case, the final selection list of 33 candidates was prepared. Thereafter all the selected candidates were called for counselling, but one of the candidates did not report for counselling. The aforesaid event took place after the final selection list was prepared and published. As there was no requirement of preparation of a waiting list, the appellant claiming to be the next in the merit cannot claim any appointment as his name neither figured in the list of the selected candidates nor in any waiting list as there was no provision at all for preparation of the waiting list. Sub-rule (5) of Rule 16 is very clear. Therefore, the post remained unfilled due to one of the candidates in the final list did not appear for counselling and/or accepted the employment. Hence, that post has to be carried forward for the next recruitment.
7.5 The appellant could have claimed the appointment to the post which remained unfilled provided there is a provision for waiting list as per the statutory provision. In absence of any specific provision for waiting list and on the contrary, there being a specific provision that there shall not be any waiting list and that the post remaining unfilled on any ground shall have to be carried forward for the next recruitment. The appellant herein, thus, had no right to claim any appointment to the post which remained unfilled.
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xxx xxx xxx
8.1 An identical question came to be considered by this Court in the case of Suresh Prasad and Ors. (supra). In the said decision, it is specifically observed and held that even in case candidates selected for appointment have not joined, in the absence of any statutory rules to the contrary, the employer is not bound to offer the unfilled vacancy to the candidates next below the said candidates in the merit list. It is also further held that in the absence of any provision, the employer is not bound to prepare a waiting list in addition to the panel of selected candidates and to appoint the candidates from the waiting list in case the candidates from the panel do not join. The aforesaid decision of this Court has been subsequently followed by the Andhra Pradesh High Court in the case of Samiula Shareef and Ors. (supra)."
31. We do not wish to reiterate the situation when two Rules are sought to be pitted against each other, as we find no such repugnancy that has arisen. A court of law is expected to reconcile the rules, and therefore, not to foresee or presume conflicts, if any.
32. The respondents have also placed reliance on the decision of this Court in the case of K. Manjusree (supra). However, in our considered view, the facts of the aforesaid decision are quite different from the present case. A change was introduced for the first time after the entire process was over, based on the decision made by the Full Court qua the cut off. Secondly, it is not as if the private respondents were non- suited from participating in the recruitment process. The principle governing changing the rules of game would not have any application when the change is with respect to selection process but not the qualification or eligibility. In other words, after the advertisement is made followed by an application by a candidate with further progress, a rule cannot be brought in, disqualifying him to participate in the selection process. It is only in such cases, the principle aforesaid will have an application or else it will hamper the power of the employer to recruit a person suitable for a job.
33. On a perusal of the judgment rendered by the High Court, as found earlier, the impugned decisions are made without considering the appropriate provisions despite an endeavour being made drawing its attention to the same. The High Court in our considered view did not take note of the grounds raised in the Review Petition. In a proceeding initiated under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, the scope of review has to be looked at differently, facilitating an enlarged view. We have already discussed the scope of Rule 15 and the non-availability of any provision for a waiting list in the 2015 Rules.
34. Accordingly, the appeal stands allowed and the impugned judgments dated 09.08.2018 and 30.10.2019 are set aside and consequently the order passed by the learned Single Judge stands restored. No costs."
12. The argument regarding exercise of relaxation powers is equally untenable. The power of relaxation is discretionary and cannot be claimed as a matter of right by the candidates. No material has been NEETU Digitally signed by NEETU SHARMA SHARMADate: 2026.02.17 11:28:26+05'30' Item No. 51/C-4 20 OA No. 1676/2024 placed before us to demonstrate that the respondents acted arbitrarily in not invoking such discretion. The mere existence of vacancies does not confer an enforceable right to appointment, nor does qualification in the written examination create an indefeasible right to selection.
13. The stand taken by the applicants appears to be inherently contradictory and self-defeating. On the one hand, they contend that the qualifying criteria for the Skill Test were not disclosed to them in advance, thereby alleging lack of transparency in the selection process, on the other hand, having participated in the examination and faced disqualification, they seek relaxation of the very criteria whose existence they now question. Such a dual plea cannot be countenanced in law, as it reflects an attempt to approbate and reprobate simultaneously. It is a settled principle that a candidate who participates in a selection process with full knowledge of its terms cannot subsequently challenge the same merely because the outcome is unfavourable. Moreover, a prayer for relaxation necessarily pre- supposes the validity and applicability of the prescribed standard; once the applicants invoke the discretionary power of the recruiting authority to relax the criteria, they implicitly acknowledge the legitimacy of that benchmark. Permitting such inconsistent arguments would undermine the sanctity of the recruitment process and open the floodgates to challenges motivated solely by unsuccessful results. In the absence of any demonstrable arbitrariness, discrimination, or mala fides, the applicants cannot be allowed to question the criteria after having subjected themselves to the process and, at the same time, seek NEETU Digitally signed by NEETU SHARMA SHARMADate: 2026.02.17 11:28:26+05'30' Item No. 51/C-4 21 OA No. 1676/2024 indulgence by way of relaxation. In the present case, the advertisement unequivocally stipulated that the Skill Test was to be qualifying in nature and further clarified that the qualifying standards were subject to relaxation at the discretion of the Union Public Service Commission (UPSC). Such a stipulation inherently vested the recruiting authority with a degree of administrative flexibility to determine the precise parameters necessary for assessing the competence of candidates. The mere omission of the specific permissible percentage of error from the advertisement cannot, in isolation, be construed as fatal to the selection process or indicative of arbitrariness. What assumes greater significance is whether the process adopted was fair, transparent, and uniformly applied. The respondents have categorically maintained that the same benchmark was enforced for all candidates without any discrimination or deviation, thereby upholding the principle of equality enshrined under Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution. It is a settled proposition of service jurisprudence that procedural details, particularly in relation to qualifying examinations, may legitimately be left to the wisdom of the recruiting body, provided they are not manipulated midstream to favour or prejudice any individual or group. In the absence of any material demonstrating differential treatment, mala fides, or a post facto alteration of criteria, the non-disclosure of the exact error margin does not, by itself, vitiate the selection process. Rather, the consistent application of the prescribed standard reinforces the presumption of fairness and lends credibility to the recruitment exercise.
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14. We also find merit in the submission of the respondents that the standards having been applied across the board, no case of hostile discrimination or violation of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution is made out. The applicants have failed to establish that the recruitment process suffered from any illegality warranting interference by this Tribunal.
15. In view of the foregoing discussion, we are of the considered opinion that the applicants have not been able to make out a case for judicial interference.
16. The Original Application, being devoid of merit, is accordingly dismissed. Pending MA(s), if any, shall also stand disposed of.
17. No order as to costs.
(Rajinder Kashyap) (Manish Garg)
Member (A) Member (J)
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