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Chattisgarh High Court

Ajay Pratap Singh vs State Of Chhattisgarh on 15 April, 2026

Author: Ramesh Sinha

Bench: Ramesh Sinha

                                                            1




                                                                             2026:CGHC:17150-DB
                                                                                          NAFR

                                HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR

                                                  CRMP No. 673 of 2026

                      1 - Ajay Pratap Singh S/o Dilip Singh, Aged About 31 Years, R/o- Avika
                      Vihar Colony Simga, Police Station Simga District Balodabazar (C.G.)


                      2 - Dilip Singh Thakur S/o Late Jhumuk Singh Thakur Aged About 68
                      Years R/o- Avika Vihar Colony Simga, Police Station Simga District
                      Balodabazar (C.G.)


                      3 - Pushpa Bai Thakur W/o Dilip Singh Thakur Aged About 60 Years
                      R/o- Avika Vihar Colony Simga, Police Station Simga District
                      Balodabazar (C.G.)


                      4 - Deepika Singh Thakur W/o Rakesh Singh Thakur, Aged About 37
                      Years R/o Tifra P.S. Sirgitti, Dist. Bilaspur (C.G.)


                      5 - Nandani Rajput W/o Late Pukhraj Rajput Aged About 38 Years R/o
                      Laxman Nagar Police Station- Gudhiyari District Raipur C.G.


                      6 - Rakesh Singh Thakur S/o Ramesh Singh Thakur, Aged About 36
                      Years R/o- Tifra P.S. Sirgiti, Dist. Bilaspur C.G.
                                                                                 ... Petitioners
                                                         versus
                      1 - State of Chhattisgarh Through Police Station- Bemetara, District
                      Bemetara C.G.
Digitally signed by
MOHAMMED
AADIL KHAN
Date: 2026.04.20



                      2 - Smt. Nikita Singh W/o Ajay Pratap Singh, Aged About 25 Years, R/o
18:28:41 +0530
                                      2

At Present- Village- Kawardha Road Bahera Bhavesh Rajput Dhaba
Thana Bemetara, Dist. Bemetara C.G.
                                                    ... Respondents
           (Cause title taken from Case Information System)

For Petitioners               :    Ms. Madhunisha Singh, Advocate.

For Respondent                :    Ms. Anusha       Naik,   Deputy    Govt.
No.1/State                         Advocate

For Respondent No.2           :    Mr. Arvind Prasad, Advocate.
             Hon'ble Shri Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice
             Hon'ble Shri Ravindra Kumar Agrawal, Judge
                             Order on Board
Per Ramesh Sinha, C.J.

15-04-2026

1. Vide order dated 10.03.2026 this Court referred the matter for mediation. As per the report dated 17.03.2026, the petitioner No.1 has deposited Rs.50,000/- with the Mediation Center and as per the report of Mediation Center dated 10.04.2026, the case/matter is not settled due to absence of the complainant.

2. Heard Ms. Madhunisha Singh, learned counsel for the petitioners. Also heard Ms. Anusha Naik, Deputy Govt. Advocate for respondent No.1/State and Mr. Arvind Prasad, learned counsel for respondent No.2.

3. The present petition has been filed seeking the following relief(s) -

"A. That the Hon'ble High Court may kindly be pleased to allow this petition and Kindly be pleased to quash the chargesheet bearing no 438/2025 dated 21.09.2025 (Annexure P/1) under Section 85 and 3(5) of B.N.S 2023 in FIR No 358/2025 Dated 03/06/2025 filed by P.S- Bemetra Chhattisgarh Filed against the Petitioners. 3 B. That, this Hon'ble Court may kindly be pleased to quash order dated 10.10.2025 (Annexure P/2) taking cognizance of the Final Report No. 438/2025 dated 21.09.2025. (Annexure P/2) C. That, this Hon'ble Court may kindly be pleased to quash order dated 28.01.2026 passed by learned Judicial Magistrate First Class Bemetra, District- Bemetra the framing of charge vide impugned order framing Charge under Section 85 and 3(5) of the B.N.S 2023 against petitioners (Annexure P/3) D. That, this Hon'ble Court may kindly be pleased to quash consequential criminal proceedings initiated in criminal case no. 6241/2025 pending before Judicial Magistrate First Class Chhattisgarh against the Bemetra ,District- Bemetra against the petitioners for the offence under section 85 and 3(5) of the B.N.S 2023 in exercise of powers under section 528 of the BNSS, in the interest of Justice.
E. Any other relief which this Hon'ble Court deems fit and proper may also kindly be granted to the Petitioners, in the interest of Justice."

4. The facts of the case in nutshell is that, the marriage between petitioner No 1. and respondent No.2 was solemnized on 12.05.2017 at District Bemetara according to Hindu customs and rituals. After the marriage the complainant started residing in her matrimonial home along with the accused persons (petitioners). The couple was blessed with a daughter on 19.08.2018. On 03.06.2025 respondent No.2 filed a complaint alleging therein that the petitioners subjected her to physical and mental cruelty and demanded money, gold and vehicle in the name 4 of dowry. Based on the complaint dated 03.06.2025, FIR No. 358/2025 was registered at Police Station- Bemetara under Section 85, 3(5) of Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023. After completion of investigation, the police field a chargesheet bearing No. 438/2025 dated 21.09.2025 before the Judicial Magistrate First Class, Bemetara. The learned magistrate took cognizance of the offences and subsequently framed charges against the petitioners vide order dated 28.01.2026 and presently Criminal Case No.6241/2025 is pending against the petitioners before the learned Judicial Magistrate First Class, Bemetara.

5. Learned counsel for the petitioners submits that even if the allegations in the impugned FIR and charge-sheet are accepted in their entirety, they do not disclose the essential ingredients of Section 85, 3 (5) BNS. At the most the case reflects ordinary matrimonial discord and temperamental incompatibility and it does not amount to cruelty. The contents of the FIR disclose continued cohabitation, repeated reconciliations and voluntary resumption of marital life over several years, such admitted facts completely negate any allegation of continuous, grave or proximate cruelty required to attract criminal liability. The allegations are vague and omnibus, neither the FIR nor the impugned charge sheet discloses such ingredients which are essential for the offence alleged. The allegations in the FIR and the charge sheet filed against the petitioners is manifestly attended with mala fide and maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the petitioners. It has been further argued that petitioner No.4 is a married woman who got married in the year 2012 and has been residing 5 with her husband in Bilaspur, C.G. since 2012. After the marriage of the petitioner No.1, she has never visited her parents' home even once. Further, petitioner No.3 is suffering from paralysis on which the complainant says that she will not serve her mother-in-law and that she wants to live separate. There is no proximate incident preceding registration of the FIR and such stale and remote allegations cannot be revived to invoke criminal proceeding. The allegations are bald and inherently improbable. The order taking cognizance is wholly illegal and has been passed in a mechanical manner without recording any prima facie satisfaction regarding the ingredients of the alleged offence. Thus, the prosecution discloses a case of ordinary matrimonial discord being given a criminal colour after an ordinate delay, amounting to abuse of process and causing grave prejudice to the petitioners. Therefore, the petition may be allowed and the impugned FIR, charge-sheet and all consequential proceedings of the criminal case be quashed.

6. Learned counsel appearing for the State opposes the petition and submits that the FIR in question was registered on the basis of a written complaint made by respondent No.2 alleging cruelty by the petitioners. It is submitted that upon receipt of the complaint, the police conducted investigation in accordance with law and, after recording statements of the complainant and other witnesses and collecting relevant material, found a prima facie case to be made out against the petitioners. Consequently, the charge-sheet was filed before the learned Judicial Magistrate First Class Bemetara. Learned State counsel would further submit that the allegations levelled in the FIR and the charge-sheet 6 disclose the commission of cognizable offence under Sections 85, 3(5)of BNS, which require appreciation of evidence and determination of disputed questions of fact, and the same cannot be adjudicated in proceedings under Section 482 Cr.P.C./Section 528 of BNSS. It is further submitted that the defence raised by the petitioners, are matter which may be examined by the trial Court during trial and do not, by themselves, constitute a ground for quashment of the criminal proceedings at the threshold and submitted that the petition is liable to be dismissed.

7. We have heard learned counsel appearing for the respective parties and perused the documents appended with the petition.

8. At the outset, it would be appropriate to consider the scope of interference in charge-sheet filed by the police against accused in extraordinary jurisdiction under Section 482 of the CrPC/528 of the BNSS.

9. In the matter of Pepsi Foods Ltd. and another v. Special Judicial Magistrate and others, 1998 (5) SCC 749 the Supreme Court has held that the accused can approach the High Court either under Section 482 of the CrPC/528 of BNSS or under Article 227 of the Constitution of India to have the proceeding quashed against him when the complaint does not make out any case against him.

10. The Supreme Court in the mater of State of Haryana and others v. Bhajan Lal and others, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335 laid down the principles of law relating to the exercise of extraordinary power under 7 Article 226 of the Constitution of India to quash the first information report and it has been held that such power can be exercised either to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. In paragraph 102 of the report, their Lordships laid down the broad principles where such power under Article 226 of the Constitution/Section 482 of the CrPC/528 of BNSS should be exercised, which are as under: -

"102. In the backdrop of the interpretation of the various relevant provisions of the Code under Chapter XIV and of the principles of law enunciated by this Court in a series of decisions relating to the exercise of the extraordinary power under Article 226 or the inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code which we have extracted and reproduced above, we give the following categories of cases by way of illustration wherein such power could be exercised either to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice, though it may not be possible to lay down any precise, clearly defined and sufficiently channelised and inflexible guidelines or rigid formulae and to give an exhaustive list of myriad kinds of cases wherein such power should be exercised.
(1) Where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the 8 accused.
(2) Where the allegations in the first information report and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code.
(3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused.
(4) Where, the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code.
(5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused.
(6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code 9 or the concerned Act (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party. (7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge.

103. We also give a note of caution to the effect that the power of quashing a criminal proceeding should be exercised very sparingly and with circumspection and that too in the rarest of rare cases; that the court will not be justified in embarking upon an enquiry as to the reliability or genuineness or otherwise of the allegations made in the FIR or the complaint and that the extraordinary or inherent powers do not confer an arbitrary jurisdiction on the court to act according to its whim or caprice."

11. The principle of law laid down in Bhajan Lal's case (supra) has been followed recently by the Supreme Court in the matters of Google India Private Limited v. Visaka Industries, (2020) 4 SCC 162, Ahmad Ali Quraishi and another v. State of Uttar Pradesh and another, 2020) 13 SCC 435 and Dr. Dhruvaram Murlidhar Sonar v. State of Maharashtra and others, (2019) 18 SCC 191. The Supreme Court in 10 Google India Private Limited (supra), explained the scope of dictum of Bhajan Lal's case (supra) that the power of quashing a criminal proceeding be exercised very sparingly and with circumspection and "that too in the rarest of rare cases" as indicated in paragraph 103 therein of the report.

12. Having noticed the scope of interference by this Court in the petition relating to quashment of FIR/charge-sheet, reverting to the facts of the present case, it is quite vivid that in the impugned charge-sheet, the petitioners have been charged for offence under Sections 85, 3(5) of BNS.

13. Chapter XXA of the IPC deals with offence of cruelty by husband or relatives of husband. Section 498A of the IPC defines the offence of cruelty as under:-

"498A. Husband or relative of husband of a woman subjecting her to cruelty.--Whoever, being the husband or the relative of the husband of a woman, subjects such woman to cruelty shall be punished with imprisonment for a term which may extend to three years and shall also be liable to fine.
Explanation.--For the purpose of this section, "cruelty"

means--

(a) any wilful conduct which is of such a nature as is likely to drive the woman to commit suicide or to cause grave injury or danger to life, limb or health (whether mental or physical) of the woman; or

b) harassment of the woman where such harassment is 11 with a view to coercing her or any person related to her to meet any unlawful demand for any property or valuable security or is on account of failure by her or any person related to her to meet such demand."

14. A careful perusal of the aforesaid provision would show that in order to establish offence under Section 498-A of the IPC/85 of BNS, the prosecution must establish-

(i) That, woman must be married;

(ii) She has been subjected to cruelty or harassment and

(iii) Such cruelty or harassment must have been shown either by husband of the woman or by relative of her husband.

15. The word 'cruelty' within the meaning of Section 498A of the IPC has been explained in Explanation appended to Section 498A of the IPC. It consists of two clauses namely clause (a) and clause (b). To attract Section 498A of the IPC/ 85 of BNS, it must be established that cruelty or harassment to the wife to coerce her or cause bodily injury to herself or to commit suicide or the harassment was to compel her to fulfill illegal demand for dowry. It is not every type of harassment or cruelty that would attract Section 498A of the IPC/85 of BNS. Explanation (b) to Section 498A of the IPC contemplates harassment of woman to coerce or any relation of her to meet any unlawful demand for any property or valuable security. The complainant if wants to come within the ambit of Explanation (b) to Section 498A of the IPC, she can succeed if it is proved that there was an unlawful demand by the 12 husband or any of his relatives with respect to money or of some valuable security.

16. The Supreme Court in the matter of Priya Vrat Singh and others v. Shyam Ji Sahai, (2008) 8 SCC 232 considered the issue of delay in lodging the complaint as well as role that has been ascribed to the accused therein and quashed the complaint holding the delay of two years in lodging FIR to be fatal and further held that no role has been ascribed to the petitioner/accused therein. It was observed as under:-

"8. Further it is pointed out that the allegation of alleged demand for dowry was made for the first time in December, 1994. In the complaint filed, the allegation is that the dowry torture was made some times in 1992. It has not been explained as to why for more than two years no action was taken.
9. Further, it appears that in the complaint petition apart from the husband, the mother of the husband, the subsequently married wife, husband's mother's sister, husband's brother in law and Sunita's father were impleaded as party. No role has been specifically ascribed to anybody except the husband and that too of a dowry demand in February 1993 when the complaint was filed on 6.12.1994 i.e. nearly after 22 months. It is to be noted that in spite of service of notice, none has appeared on behalf of Respondent No.1."

17. Similarly, in the matter of Sunder Babu and others v. State of Tamil Nadu, (2009) 14 SCC 244 delay in filing complaint against accused therein was taken note of by their Lordships of the Supreme Court holding the case to be covered by Category Seven of para-102 highlighted in Bhajan Lal's case (supra), the prosecution for offence under Section 498A of the IPC and Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition 13 Act was quashed.

18. Similarly, in the matter of Geeta Mehrotra (supra), the Supreme Court held that casual reference to the family member of the husband in FIR as co-accused particularly when there is no specific allegation and complaint did not disclose their active involvement. It was held that cognizance of matter against them for offence under Sections 498-A, 323, 504 and 506 of the IPC would not be justified as cognizance would result in abuse of judicial process.

19. In the matter of K. Subba Rao and others v. State of Telangana represented by its Secretary, Department of Home and others, 15 (2018) 14 SCC 452 their Lordships of the Supreme Court delineated the duty of the criminal Courts while proceeding against relatives of victim's husband and held that the Court should be careful in proceeding against distant relatives in crime pertaining to matrimonial disputes and dowry deaths and further held that relatives of husband should not be roped in on the basis of omnibus allegations, unless specific instances of their involvement in offences are made out.

20. In the matter of Rashmi Chopra (supra) it has been held by their Lordships of the Supreme Court relying upon the principle of law laid down in Bhajan Lal's case (supra) that criminal proceedings can be allowed to proceed only when a prima facie offence is disclosed and further held that judicial process is a solemn proceeding which cannot be allowed to be converted into an instrument of oppression or harassment and the High Court should not hesitate in exercising the 14 jurisdiction to quash the proceedings if the proceedings deserve to be quashed in line of parameters laid down by the Supreme Court in Bhajan Lal's case (supra) and further held that in absence of specific allegation regarding anyone of the accused except common and general allegations against everyone, no offence under Section 498A IPC is made out and quashed the charges for offence under Section 498A of the IPC being covered by category seven as enumerated in Bhajan Lal's case (supra) by holding as under:-

"24. Coming back to the allegations in the complaint pertaining to Section 498A and Section 3/4 of D.P. Act. A perusal of the complaint indicates that the allegations against the appellants for offence under Section 498A and Section 3/4 of D.P. Act are general and sweeping. No specific incident dates or details of any incident has been mentioned in the complaint. The complaint having been filed after proceeding for divorce was initiated by Nayan Chopra in State of Michigan, where Vanshika participated and divorce was ultimately granted. A few months after filing of the divorce petition, the complaint has been filed in the Court of C.J.M., Gautam Budh Nagar with the allegations as noticed above. The sequence of the events and facts and circumstances of the case leads us to conclude that the complaint under Section 498A and Section 3/4 of D.P. Act have been filed as counter blast to divorce petition proceeding in State of Michigan by Nayan Chopra.
15
25. There being no specific allegation regarding any one of the applicants except common general allegation against everyone i.e. "they started harassing the daughter of the applicant demanding additional dowry of one crore" and the fact that all relatives of the husband, namely, father, mother, brother, mother's sister and husband of mother's sister have been roped in clearly indicate that application under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. was filed with a view to harass the applicants....."

21. Having noticed the legal position governing the quashment of FIR and charge-sheet, the question that arises for consideration is, whether taking the allegations made in FIR No. 358/2025 and the charge sheet at their face value, any prima facie offence under Sections 85, 3(5) of BNS (498A, 34 of the Indian Penal Code) is made out against the petitioners.

22. It is the case of the prosecution that the marriage of respondent No.2 was solemnized with petitioner Ajay Pratap Singh (petitioner No.1) on 12.05.2017 as per Hindu rites and rituals, and that soon thereafter she was subjected to cruelty, harassment and demand of money by the petitioner No.1 and her in-laws. On the basis of her written complaint, FIR No.358/2025 was registered at Police Station Bemetara, District Bemetara and after completion of investigation, the police filed charge- sheet for the aforesaid offence against the petitioners.

23. However, a careful examination of the FIR and the statements forming part of the charge sheet reveals that the allegations made by 16 respondent No.2 are general, omnibus and lacking in specific particulars regarding dates, instances, or overt acts attributable to the petitioners. The later allegations made in the FIR reflect substantial improvements and embellishments inconsistent with her earlier version. Except broad and vague assertions that the petitioners ill-treated her and reiteration of adverse situations between the parties, no specific allegation is made against the petitioners to constitute cruelty within the meaning of Section 85, 3(5) of BNS.

24. Considering the submissions of learned counsel for the parties and the material placed on record, particularly the nature of allegations in the FIR and charge sheet, which are bald, omnibus and inherently inconsistent, this Court is of the considered opinion that no prima facie offence under Section 85, 3(5) of BNS is made out against the petitioners. The allegations do not disclose any specific conduct amounting to cruelty as defined under Section 85, 3(5) of BNS (Section 498-A, 34 of the IPC), nor do they disclose any unlawful demand of dowry so as to satisfy Explanation (b). The prosecution appears to be covered by Category 1, 3 and 7 of paragraph 102 of Bhajan Lal (supra), being based on vague assertions, improvements, and indications of mala fide arising out of matrimonial discord and disagreement. Accordingly, continuation of criminal proceedings would amount to abuse of the process of law.

25. As a natural consequence of the above analysis, the impugned FIR bearing No. 358/2025 registered at Police Station- Bemetara, District - Bemetara, (C.G.) on 03.06.2025 for offence under Sections 85, 17 3(5) of BNS, charge-sheet No.438/2025 dated 21.09.2025, order taking cognizance dated 10.10.2025, order dated 28.01.2026 framing charge against the petitioners and all consequential proceedings in Criminal Case No.6241/2025 pending before the Judicial Magistrate First Class, Bemetara (C.G.) against petitioners are hereby quashed. The petition is accordingly allowed.

26. The petitioner No.1 is entitled for refund of the amount deposited by him before the Mediation Center of this Court in compliance of the order dated 10.03.2026.

27. No order as to costs.

              Sd/-         Sd/-                                    Sd/- Sd/-
                 (Ravindra Kumar Agrawal)                    (Ramesh Sinha)
                         Judge                                Chief Justice
Aadil