Allahabad High Court
Bharat Bhushan vs Anoop Kumar Gupta And Another on 11 January, 2019
Author: Sangeeta Chandra
Bench: Sangeeta Chandra
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD
AFR
RESERVED ON 01.05.2018
DELIVERED ON 11.01.2019
Case :- MATTERS UNDER ARTICLE 227 No. - 3042 of 2018
Petitioner :- Bharat Bhushan
Respondent :- Anoop Kumar Gupta And Another
Counsel for Petitioner :- Bipin Lal Srivastava,Sr. Advocate S.K. Verma
Counsel for Respondent :- Sumit Daga
Hon'ble Mrs. Sangeeta Chandra,J.
1. This writ petition has been filed by the petitioner tenant challenging the order passed by Prescribed Authority in PA Case No. 15 of 2011 (Anoop Kumar Gupta Vs. Bharat Bhushan and another) dated 19.11.2016 and the order passed by the Appellate Authority dismissing the Rent Control Appeal No. 9 of 2016 (Bharat Bhushan Vs. Anoop Kumar Gupta and another) on 31.03.2018.
2. The facts mentioned by the petitioner-tenant in his writ petition are to the effect that the respondents No. 1 and 2 are brothers and sons of late Shri Chandan Swaroop Gupta, resident of 77-C, Naee Mandi, Muzaffarnagar and the respondent No. 1 was an Assistant Engineer in the Department of Public Works and respondent No. 2 was a Doctor retired from a Government Hospital. The respondent No. 2 allegedly left his share in the property in question i.e. House No. 77-C, Naee Mandi, Muzaffarnagar in favour of the respondent No. 1. The respondent No. 1 thereafter filed a Release Application under Section 21 (1) (a) of the U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulations of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Rules, 1972 (hereinafterto referred as "the U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972") alleging that he was about to retire from PWD and needed the house for his own living as it was his ancestral property and his son was going to get married soon. He wished to see the marriage of his son from the ancestral house. It was also stated that the part of ground-floor of House No. 77-C, Naee Mandi, Muzaffarnagar was occupied by the petitioner-tenant, while the rest of the house was occupied by another tenant Pramod Kumar. The petitioner-tenant had originally taken the house on rent from his father @ Rs. 60/- per month and was currently paying Rs. 1,000/- per month which he had not paid since 2009. A legal notice was issued to him under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act for payment of arrears of rent and termination of tenancy. However, the petitioner-tenant did not pay any heed to the said notice.
3. In the Release Application the case set up by the respondent-landlord was that since he was going to retire and he had no other house in Muzaffarnagar to live in, he had a genuine and pressing need for eviction of the tenant from the property in question.
4. The petitioner-tenant filed a written statement disputing that the landlord had any genuine and pressing need. It was mentioned in the written statement that the landlord being Assistant Engineer in PWD had constructed a two storey house in B-Block, Pallavpuram Colony, Meerut and was living therein and his son was staying in Delhi and was not going to get married. It was also stated that the petitioner was the only occupant of the house in question. There was no other tenant. The description of the house had been wrongly given by the landlord in his application. The petitioner-tenant had two rooms, a kitchen, a toilet and bathroom and a verandah in his occupation where he lived with his family and also ran a small cooler repairing shop. It was also alleged that the petitioner was poor and had no other occupation and he would suffer great hardship if he is evicted from the house in question. It was also stated that the house was too small for accommodation of the landlord who had enjoyed a high status in the society being an Assistant Engineer. He could not reside in a small accommodation of 72 to 75 square yards in possession of the petitioner-tenant. Further defence was that the Release Application was not moved for bonafide reasons but with malafide intent to sell the house to his nephew Mukesh Kumar who owns surrounding properties i.e. House No. 78-C and 78-C/1.
5. It was also stated that the petitioner was being forcibly evicted by the landlord and therefore, an Original Suit No. 82 of 2011 for permanent injunction was filed by him before the Court of Civil Judge (Senior Division), Muzaffarnagar for restraining the landlord from evicting him which suit was pending. Also, another suit for permanent injunction was filed by the petitioner-tenant for restraining Mukesh Kumar, the nephew of landlord who owned the adjoining house No. 78-C and rest of the house No. 77 from interfering in the use and occupation of the petitioner-tenant. The Original Suit No. 469/14 filed against Mukesh Kumar before the Civil Judge (Senior Division), Muzaffarnagar was also pending in which temporary injunction for maintaining status-quo between the parties has been passed by the learned Trial Court, which was subsisting.
6. It was also stated in the written statement that no notice was ever sent by the landlord or received by the petitioner under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act. The petitioner-tenant had never been in default and had regularly paid the rent at the rate of Rs. 1,000/- per month to the landlord.
7. After the written statement was filed the landlord amended his application originally filed under Section 21 (1) (a) and also raised a plea under Section 21 (1) (b) of the Act that the house in question was in a dilapidated condition and before moving into the house in question the landlord needed to demolish it and reconstruct it for which at least two years time would be required. He admitted that he had retired on 31.05.2014 from the Public Works Department and that his son had got married in the meantime in his oral statement before the Prescribed Authority.
8. The landlord in his amended Release Application mentioned that the petitioner and his wife had bought a house in Jwalapuram Bachan Singh Colony, Sarwat and the petitioner-tenant was residing in the said house at Sarwat and was carrying on his cooler repairing shop from the house in question. The house in dispute having been taken for residential purpose initially, was being used for commercial purpose and the tenant was liable for eviction on this ground also.
9. The petitioner-tenant filed an amended written statement disputing that he was not living in the house in question and also disputing that the house was in dilapidated condition. He, however, admitted that his wife Smt. Neera Garg has bought an 120.86 Sq. Meters plot in village Sarwat which lies outside the Municipal limits of Muzaffarnagar. There was no house built thereon. The petitioner-tenant also stated that he was a poor man and could not get an alternative accommodation in Muzaffarnagar on the same rent as he was giving to the landlord.
10. In the oral statements and affidavits filed by the landlord-tenant the pleadings more or less made before the Prescribed Authority were more or less reiterated. The Prescribed Authority in its order impugned in this writ petition, finding that the relationship of landlord-tenant had not been disputed, nor there was a dispute regarding the rate of rent being Rs. 1,000/- per month, came to the conclusion that the property in dispute which was an old house, was amenable to the provisions of the U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972.
11. With regard to the points for determination regarding the bonafide need of the landlord and comparative hardship of landlord and tenant, the Prescribed Authority found that the landlord had retired on 31.05.2014. The house in question was an ancestral house built 70-80 years ago, the landlord needed to carry out renovation of house to make it livable according to his status. It was understandable that the landlord wished to get married his son, who was studying engineering in Delhi, from the ancestral house. The other owner of the house i.e. Mohan Prakash son of Chandan Swaroop Gupta had relinquished his rights over the property and was living in Mumbai with his son. Even though the petitioner might have constructed a house in Meerut, his desire to live after retirement in his ancestral house at Muzaffarnagar was genuine and bonafide. On the other hand, the tenant had bought a piece of land and constructed a house thereon in village Sarwat in Jwalapuram Bachan Singh Colony, Muzaffarnagar and was using the house in dispute for running his business of cooler repairing shop.
12. Since both the parties had filed photographs of houses allegedly owned by them either in Bachan Singh Colony, Muzaffarnagar or in Pallavpuram, Meerut, without expressing any opinion thereon, the Prescribed Authority took into account that it was understandable for an old retired Government Servant to wish to live in his ancestral house in his native place at Muzaffarnagar.
13. The judgments cited by either of the parties were considered by the Prescribed Authority and it came to the conclusion that as per the binding precedents of the Hon'ble Supreme Court a tenant cannot dictate to the landlord as to which accommodation he should occupy for his residence. The tenant having alternative accommodation and also not making any effort to find out an alternate residential or commercial accommodation in the city of Muzaffarnagar itself showed clearly that he would not suffer from any great hardship if he is evicted from the house in question. Since the release application filed under Section 21 (1)(a) of the U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972 was being allowed, the Prescribed Authority directed that the landlord should pay to the petitioner-tenant compensation equal to the amount of two years of rent and direction was issued to the tenant to hand over vacant and peaceful possession of the property in question to the landlord within three months.
14. Challenging the said order the tenant filed Rent Control Appeal No. 9 of 2016. The appellate authority i.e. the Additional District Judge, Court No. 5, Muzaffarnagar while considering the Rent Control Appeal again looked into the points for determination framed by the Prescribed Authority and found that the landlord had a genuine and pressing need after his retirement for staying at his native place in Muzaffarnagar city. He had no other accommodation admittedly at Muzaffarnagar except the house No. 77-C situated in Naee Mandi. On the other hand, the tenant had a house in Jwalapuram Bachan Singh Colony, Sarwat and the house in question although taken on rent for residential purpose, the same was being used for commercial purpose of running a cooler repairing business.
15. The appellate authority took into account the Paper No. 42-C, a copy of the Registered Sale Deed dated 12.09.2008 executed by one Suresh Sharma in favour of Smt. Neera Garg, the wife of petitioner-tenant. He also considered the plea of tenant that the said plot of land bought by his wife was situated in village Sarwat and outside the Municipal limits but rejected his argument on the ground that after Notification dated 01.05.1973 issued by the State Government under Sub Section 3 (d) of Section 1 the municipal limits of the city were extended up to three kilometers and Mohalla Jwalpuram Bachan Singh Colony was situated within the municipal limits of Muzaffarnagar. The argument made by the tenant that the requirements of Section 21(1) (b) of the Act were not satisfied by the learned Prescribed Authority, were rejected by the appellate court holding that the Release Application has been allowed by the Prescribed Authority only under Section 21(1) (a) and not under Section 21 (1) (b) of the Act.
16. The Appellate Authority took into account also the fact that the tenant did not make any genuine effort to search out an alternative accommodation during the pendency of the litigation from 2011 to 2016. Therefore, he drew an inference that the tenant would not suffer greater hardship than the landlord in vacating the said premises. It confirmed the order of the Prescribed Authority and rejected the appeal filed by the petitioner-tenant.
17. Heard Sri S.K. Verma, learned Senior Advocate assisted by Sri Bipin Lal Stivastava for the petitioner / tenant and Sri Sumit Daga for the respondent / landlord.
18. The case of the petitioner before this Court is that the Release Application under Section 21(1)(a) of the U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972 was filed by the landlord / respondent before the Prescribed Authority.
The landlord set up bonafide need of the house in question on the ground that he was due to retire in 2014 and he needed the house in question which was his ancestral house for living after retirement and also to get his son married from the said ancestral house. A written statement was filed by the petitioner / tenant in 2014 in which the petitioner / tenant said that the house in question is not required by the landlord, as the landlord was currently living in Meerut and had already got his son married from Delhi. The need of the landlord cannot be equated with his desire to live in his ancestral house whereas the petitioner / tenant is in dire need of accommodation, as he runs a small repair shop of water / air-coolers in the house in question.
19. Sri S.K. Verma, learned Senior Counsel has cited the following judgments:-
1. Manish Prasad Vs. IVth Additional District Judge 1979 ARC 73;
2. Abdul Hai Vs. IIIrd Additional District Judge, Basti 2001 (3) AWC 1783;
3. Judgement and Order Dt. 25.03.2011 in Civil Misc. Writ Petition No.912 of 2010: Onkar Nath Kesarwani Vs. Smt. Kusum Singh & others ; and
4. Shiv Dev Raj Vs. Additional District Judge 1996 (1) ARC 559.
20. Learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioner/ tenant has also submitted that after this written statement was filed, the landlord opposite party admitted that although his son is married now, he still needs the house to be released in his favour because he has already retired in 2014 and the house is in a dilapidated condition and needs major repairs to be carried out which would take at-least two years time before the landlord could start living in the same according to his status. This amendment application of the landlord was allowed by the Prescribed Authority. In the amendment application, the landlord also brought this fact on record that the petitioner / tenant had no need of the house in question and he has already got a house in Jwalapuram Bachan Singh Colony in village Sarvat which is near the town of Muzaffarnagar.
21. Learned counsel for the petitioner / tenant submits that the Prescribed Authority did not look into the requirement under Section 21(1)((b) of the Act for the landlord to submit the plan of reconstruction the building in question as required under Rule 17. Also the right of reentry of the tenant as protected under Section 24 has also not been taken care of. The landlord having admitted that the house is seventy to eighty years old and needing major repairs, the petitioner / tenant was entitled for reentry in the house after its reconstruction. Even if the Prescribed Authority and the Appellate Authority allowed the Release Application of the landlord / respondent under Section 21(1)(a), the provision under Rule 16(d) regarding partial release of the premises in question was not considered and the impugned order is vitiated on this ground also.
22. Learned counsel for the petitioner / tenant has also pointed out that the landlord had terminated the tenancy by sending a notice under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act. If the tenancy was terminated, then no application under Section 21(1)(a) could have been moved because application under Section 21(1)(a) can only be filed for release of premises in occupation of a subsisting tenant. The presumption of subsistence of tenancy is a must. Section 21(1)(a) application could not be filed after termination of tenancy under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act.
23. Moreover, the Prescribed Authority did not consider that under Section 1 of the U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972, the extent of application of the Act of 1972 has been prescribed and village Sarvat where the alternative accommodation of the tenant was supposed to be situated, does not fall within the municipal limits of either a city or town area as required under the Act. Village Sarvat infact is 4 Kms away from the boundaries of city of Muzaffarnagar. Moreover, it was also stated in the grounds of Appeal that the tenant had only bought a plot which was surrounded by boundary wall, it was not a living accommodation but the Appellate Authority has failed to look into it.
24. Learned counsel for the respondent / landlord on the other hand has pointed out that both the learned Courts below have considered the Release Application under Section 21(1)(a) and not under Section 21(1)(b) and therefore any application bringing on record subsequent event of retirement of the landlord in 2014 and of the house being in dire need of repairs to make it livable in accordance with the status of the landlord, would not in anyway detract from the application being filed under Section 21(1)(a).
25. Learned counsel for the respondent has pointed out that there are concurrent findings of fact of the learned Courts below regarding the bonafide need of the landlord and this Court sitting in writ jurisdiction should not overturn the current findings of fact.
Learned counsel for the respondent has also relied upon judgments rendered by this Court and by the Supreme Court regarding the tenant's limitation to the extent that he should not dictate terms and point out alternative accommodation to the landlord. The judgments that have been cited by the learned counsel for the respondent / landlord are as follows:-
(i) Faruk Ilahi Tamboli & another Vs. B.S. Shankarrao Kokate LRS & others, (2016) 15 SCC 431;
(ii) Mohd. Ayub & another Vs. Mukesh Chand 2012 (2) SCC 155 ;
(iii) Ragavendra Kumar Vs. Firm Prem Machinery & Co., AIR 2000 SC 534 ;
(iv) Ranjeet Singh Vs. Ravi Prakash 2004 (3) SCC 682 ;
(v) Vijay Kumar Gupta & another Vs. Smt. Sumitra Devi & others 2014 (1) ARC 371 ;
(vi) Manish Mehra Vs. Ramlal Gupta & another 2016 (1) ARC 135 ;
(vii) Amit Kumar Vs. Puttan Babu & another 2016 (1) ARC 71 ;
(viii) Raj Kumar Vs. IIIrd Additional District Judge, Meerut & others 2007 (2) ARC 360.
26. Learned counsel for the respondent has further pointed out Explanation (i) - Section 21(1)(a) wherein it is provided that if the tenant acquires a new accommodation, then it shall be considered as a disqualification for his case to be considered on merits.
27. In rejoinder, Sri S.K. Verma, Learned Senior Counsel has pointed out that the bonafide need of the landlord was not a genuine or pressing need. It was mere emotion or desire and emotion or desire is not equivalent to bonafide, pressing and genuine need. The Authorities cited by the respondent / landlord are inapplicable in so far as none have considered mere desire of the landlord to reside in his ancestral house after his retirement. It was brought on record before the Prescribed Authority and even before the Appellate Authority that another house of the landlord is situated in Meerut and moreover, his wish to get his son married from his ancestral house could no longer be taken into account as his son was married during the pendency of the Release Application at Delhi and subsequent events ought to have been considered by the learned Courts below, as has been held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court. Shri S.K. Verma has also pointed out paragraphs 9 and 13 of the writ petition with regard to grounds taken in the Appeal before the Appellate Authority which have not been considered at all.
28. Learned counsel for the respondent / landlord on the other hand has pointed out that the tenant had taken on rent a residential house and he was using it for commercial purpose as he was running a repair shop for air-coolers in it, which itself is a disqualification for his case to be considered by this Court. Moreover, he has pointed out the specific averment made in the Release Application that since 2009, the tenant has not paid any rent to the landlord which rent in itself was meagre at Rs. 1,000/- per month.
29. Having heard the learned counsel for parties and having carefully perused the orders impugned, this Court finds that originally the Release Application was filed under Section 21 (1) (a) by the landlord. After written statement was filed by the petitioner-tenant the Release Application was suitably amended by adding the grounds relevant for release under Section 21 (1) (b). However, this did not mean that the grounds taken by the landlord under Section 21 (1) (a) of the Act could not have been considered by the Prescribed Authority on their own merits. On the other hand, the learned counsel for petitioner by placing reliance upon Ajit Prasad Vs. IVth Additional District Judge, Meerut and others (supra) cannot say that an application cannot be moved under Section 21 (1) (a) and 21 (a) (b) simultaneously. Reference can be had to paragraph- 6 of the judgment rendered in Ajit Prasad (supra) that the petitioner who was the landlord in the said writ petition could have filed a combined application under Clauses (a) and (b) of Section 21 and that there being no prohibition for doing so, the prayer made by the landlord on the ground of personal requirement had to be considered on its own merit.
30. With regard to the argument raised by the learned counsel for petitioner that Rule 16 (2) (a) was not looked into at all by the Prescribed Authority or Appellate Authority while directing the eviction of the tenant. Rule 16 (2) (a) is being quoted herein below :-
"16. (2) While considering an application for release under clause (a) of sub-section (1) of Section 21 in respect of a building let out for purposes of any business, the Prescribed Authority shall also have regard to such facts as the following: ―
(a) the greater the period since when the tenant opposite party, or the original tenant whose heir the opposite party is, has been carrying on his business in that building, the less the justification for allowing the application."
31. Admittedly, the property in question was residential one. The rule relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioner is only applicable to the commercial accommodation, not to the case in hand.
32. Moreover, with regard to the same, reference may be had to the judgment rendered by a Division Bench/Larger Bench, and reference made to it by Hon'ble Single Judge of Shiv Dev Raj Vs. Additional District Judge and others reported in (1996) 1 ARC 559. The Division Bench/Larger Bench of this Court disagreed with the learned Single Judge in Natthu Vs. Amar Nath Agarwal: (1995) 1 ARC 494 where while considering the scope of Rule 16 (2) (a) it was held that if the tenant is carrying on the business in the building for considerably a long time, the application for release has to be rejected. The Hon'ble Court has observed in paragraph - 4 thus:-
"...............We do not agree with above views of the learned Judge. Rule 16 (2) has neither laid down any particular method and procedure in accordance with which the Prescribed Authority has to decide the application for release, nor has it prohibited the authority from considering other relevant factors. As mentioned earlier the expression "have regard to" certain facts merely means that the authority shall take them into consideration. But the authority is not bound to decide solely on the basis of those facts. As Rule 16 (2) is not exhaustive the authority is free to take other relevant facts into consideration while deciding the dispute. The decision of learned Single Judge in Natthu v. Amar Nath Agarwal, 1995 (1) ARC 494 (supra), does not lay the correct law and is, therefore, overruled. The decisions of the learned Single Judge in Jawahir v. VIth Additional District Judge, 1989 (2) ARC 24 and Ajay Kumar Tandon v. XIVth Additional District Judge, 1989 (1) ARC 509, and other cases which have held that Rule 16 (2) is not exhaustive and has merely laid down certain facts which have to be considered by the Prescribed Authority while deciding the landlord's application for release, represent the correct legal position." (emphasis supplied)
33. The learned counsel for the petitioner has also placed reliance upon the judgment rendered in Abdul Hai (supra) of a Coordinate Bench of this Court, where the Hon'ble Single Judge was considering the orders passed on release application made under Section 21 (1) (b) and held that the conditions mentioned under Rule 17 of the Rules made under the Act had to be first met before the release application could be allowed. There is no dispute on the settled position of law as mentioned by the Coordinate Bench in paragraphs - 19, 20 and 21 of the said judgment. But the fact remains that the Prescribed Authority as well as the Appellate Authority have allowed the case of landlord only on the grounds mentioned in Section 21 (1) (a) i.e. the ground of genuine and pressing need for the accommodation by the landlord himself.
34. The learned counsel for petitioner has placed reliance upon the judgment in Onkar Nath Kesarwani (supra). A Coordinate Bench of this Court while placing reliance on Zamir Ahmad Siddiqui Vs. Dr. Abdul Aleem, 1987 Vol. 2 ARC Page 244 held that a composite application can be filed under Section 21 (1) (a) and Section 21 (1) (b). It could be allowed on both grounds or on one ground mentioned therein. In case it is allowed only on one ground of bonafide need, then, the provisions of Section 24 (2) will not be applicable. The right of re-entry is only restricted in those cases where application for release is allowed under Section 21 (1) (b) of the Act.
35. A careful perusal of the judgment rendered in Onkar Nath Kesarwani (supra), in fact, shows that the law settled by Coordinate Bench is in favour of landlord more than the petitioner-tenant. The writ petitions preferred by tenants of shops in building situated at Tilak Road Bans Mandi, Mutthi Ganj, Allahabad were all dismissed with cost by the Hon'ble Single Judge.
36. With regard to the findings recorded by the Prescribed Authority and Appellate Court, the learned counsel for respondents has placed reliance upon the Supreme Court's decision in Faruk Ilaht Tamboli and another Vs. B.S. Shankarrao Kokate (D) by Lrs. and others, 2016 (1) ARC 1 where the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed that the owner of property has a right to use his property as he chooses.
37. Similar is the observation of the Supreme Court in Mohd. Ayub and another (supra). The Supreme Court has observed on the basis of the earlier binding precedents, that comparative hardship indisputably is a relevant factor for determining the question as to whether the requirement of landlord is bonafide or not within the meaning of provisions of the U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972 and the Rules. But it is essentially a question of fact. If two learned Courts below give a finding on facts regarding the bonafide need of the landlord being genuine and pressing, the length of period of tenancy as provided in clause (a) of sub-rule 2 of Rule 16 can only be one of the factors, and not deciding factor, to order or not the eviction of the tenant. The Supreme Court has observed in paragraph - 15 that it is well settled that "landlord's requirement would not be a dire necessity".
38. The Apex Court also considered the fact that there was nothing on record to show that during the pendency of litigation the tenant had made any genuine efforts to find out any alternative accommodation. Thus, it could not be said that the tenant would suffer a greater hardship in delivering the peaceful possession of the property to the landlord.
39. Similar observations have been made by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Raghvendra Kumar (supra) where the Supreme Court has observed that whether the requirement of the landlord was bona fide and his need was genuine and pressing is not a substantial question of law. It is only a question of fact and the learned Courts below if they had found such requirement to be genuine and bona fide the High Court ought not to have interfered in the orders passed by the learned Courts below while sitting in second appeal by re-appreciating the evidence on record.
40. The learned counsel for respondents has placed reliance upon Ranjeet Singh (supra) where the Supreme Court has considered the jurisdiction of High Court exercised under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India for issuance of a Writ in the nature of Certiorari by the High Court. It was held that if two opinions on the same material are reasonably possible, the finding arrived at one way or the other cannot be called into question unless there is a patent error on the face of record. The High Court cannot act like an Appellate Court and re-appreciate or re-evaluate the evidence while issuing a writ of certiorari or sitting in supervisory jurisdiction.
41. This Court also in Vijay Kumar Gupta and another (supra) has observed on the basis of binding precedents of the Supreme Court in Prativa Devi Vs. T.V. Krishnan, (1996) 5 SCC 353 and R.C. Tamrakar Vs. Nidi Lekha, AIR 2001 SC 3806 that it is for the landlord to settle how and in what manner he should live and that he is the best judge of his residential requirements. In deciding the question of bona fide requirements, it is unnecessary to make an endeavour as to how else the landlord could have adjusted himself.
42. Similar observations have been made by the Coordinate Benches of this Court in Manish Mehra Vs. Ramlal Gupta and another, (2016) 1 ARC 135 and Amit Kumar Vs. Puttan Babu and another, (2016) 1 ARC 71.
43. The Prescribed Authority in the release application has considered the need of the landlord to be bona fide, genuine and pressing as he retired on 31.05.2014 from government job and for his residence purposes, needed the ancestral house which was his only property in the city of Muzaffarnagar. It is not necessary for this Court to make any observations on the conclusion arrived at by the Prescribed Authority and by the Appellate Court that despite possessing house in Meerut, the landlord could still have a genuine and pressing need to live at his native place at Muzaffarnagar on his retirement. It is well known that as a person gets old, desire to live at his native place gets stronger.
44. Besides, the tenant during the pendency of the litigation had made no genuine effort to search an alternative accommodation. If he was facing great hardship in vacating the house in question, he could have made efforts to find out an alternative accommodation which apparently he did not make as has been found by the Prescribed Authority and Appellate Court.
45. Finding no factual or legal infirmity in the order impugned, the petition is devoid of merit and liable to be dismissed. .
46. At the time when the writ petition was heard as fresh, this Court had passed an order directing the petitioner to file a supplementary affidavit indicating that he deposited the rent of Rs. 1,000/- per month w.e.f. 2009 up to date and also indicating that for the period during which the judgment remained reserved he would pay Rs. 3,000/- per month to the landlord. The petitioner-tenant has filed a supplementary affidavit on 16.05.2018 indicating that he has deposited Rs. 1,15,000/- in a separate account in the Canara Bank Branch at Muzaffarnagar and that he was ready to pay Rs. 3,000/- per month to the landlord.
47. This Court having not interfered in the orders passed by the Prescribed Authority and the Appellate Court, directs that payment of 112 months of rent as already deposited by the petitioner in a separate bank account be made to the landlord forthwith.
48. It is apparent from the supplementary affidavit that the petitioner has not actually paid Rs. 3,000/- per month since May, 2018 to the landlord, he has only expressed his willingness to pay the same. He is directed to pay the damages at the rate of Rs. 1,000/- per month to the landlord w.e.f. May, 2018 to December, 2018.
49. The amount of compensation equal to two years' rent to the petitioner, as directed by the Prescribed Authority and confirmed by the Appellate Court, shall be paid by the landlord to the tenant within one month from today. The petitioner-tenant shall also hand over the peaceful and vacant possession of the property to the landlord within one month from today.
50. The writ petition is dismissed with aforesaid observations.
Order Date :- 11.01.2019 LBY