Central Administrative Tribunal - Jodhpur
Indraj vs M/O Communications on 23 February, 2023
CENTRAL ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL JODHPUR BENCH, JODHPUR Original Application No.397/2015 Pronounced on : 23.02.2023 (Reserved on :10.02.2023) CORAM HON'BLE MRS. JASMINE AHMED, MEMBER (J) HON'BLE Dr. NANDITA CHATTERJEE, MEMBER (A) Indraj S/o Shri Mahi Ram, B/c Nayak, aged about 40 years, Resident of Chak 1 KK Chunawad, Tehsil Padampur, District Sri Ganganagar. .......Applicant By Advocate: Mr. N.L. Joshi Versus Union of India through Secretary, Ministry of Communication Dak Bhawan, Dak Vibhag, New Delhi. Post Master General, Rajasthan Western Region, Jodhpur. Director, Postal Services, Rajathan Western Zone, Jodhpur. Superintendent of Post Officer, Sri Ganganagar. Sunil Kumar Garg, Inquiry Officer and Inspector, Nohar District Hanumangarh. ........Respondents By Advocate : Mr. K.S. Yadav ORDER
Per Hon'ble Mrs. Jasmine Ahmed, Member (J) The present Original Application has been filed by the applicant under Section 19 of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985, praying for the following relief:-
"8 (A) That the impugned order 08.12.2014 (Annexure-A/1) and order 31.07.2015 (Annexure-A/2) may kindly be quashed and set aside.
(B) That the applicant may kindly be ordered to be appointment on the post of Branch Post Master with whole consequential benefits and also ordered to be regularized to his service from day of his selection.
(C) That any other direction/relief/order may be passed in favour of the applicant, which may be deemed just and proper under the facts and circumstances of the case."
2. The brief facts of the case, as narrated by the counsel for the applicant, are that the applicant was appointed as Branch Post Master in post office Chak 1 KK Chundwal through regular process vide Annexure-A/3 on 12.01.1998. He discharged his duties to the entire satisfaction of his superiors. On the basis of a surprise Annual Inspection dated 16.06.2011 by the Inspector Shri Jaspal Singh Sethi, page 22 of the OA (Annexure-A/4), certain irregularities were detected in maintaining the records, and accordingly, a charge of misappropriation of public fund in R.D. and Life Insurance Policy was charged against the applicant. On this basis, he was put off duty by the Inspector of Posts, Sri Ganganagar with immediate effect from 03.05.2012 (Annexure-A/5).
After suspending the applicant, a charge sheet was also given to him by the Superintendent, Post Office, Sri Ganganagar, on 17.12.2013 (Annexure-A/6) levelling the charges under Article-I that the applicant has received Rs.200/- from Smt. Kamla, Rs.1400/- to Chhaminder Singh and Rs.300/- from Krishna Devi, Total Rs.1900/- against their recurring deposit amount, but same was not deposited in the Government Account and made the entries in their Pass Book. Further, in Article-II, it has been alleged that the applicant has received Rs.3366/- from Jaipal Singh on 23.06.2011 against his Life Insurance Policy, but the same was also not deposited in the Government Account.
The applicant filed reply dated 15.09.2014 (page 37 and 37 of the OA) to the said charge sheet before the Inquiry Officer wherein he submitted that no amount was given to him by Smt. Kamla Devi on 26.05.2011, but by mistake he marked the entry in her Pass Book. He further submitted therein that Rs.1400/- was given by Chhaminder Singh on 28.04.2012 which was deposited on the same day in unclassified account and also regretted that the Pass Book was wrongly stamped as dated 31.07.2010 and 31.08.2010. He also denied the charges and stated that Smt. Krishna Devi never gave any amount on 31.07.2010, and as regard the entry in Life Insurance Policy of Jaipal Singh, he submitted that the seal was wrongly stamped in his Pass Book.
The Inquiry Officer, thereafter recorded the statement of all concerned persons as well as of the applicant. It is seen from the statement at page No.63 of the OA dated 28.04.2012, the applicant has admitted the charges against him and also admitted that he utilised those money for his personal/household use, and also requested/prayed that he may be allowed to deposit the entire amount in unclassified account.
It is the contention of the applicant that the aforesaid statement was obtained by the Inspector under undue influence otherwise he has not admitted the alleged charges.
Thereafter, one Sh. Arun Kumar Solanki, Inspector, Post Office, Suratgarh, who participated in the inquiry on behalf of the Department, has submitted his Report to the Inquiry Officer and Inspector, Post Office Nohar on 24.09.2014 (Annexure-A/17). In his Report he proved the allegations made against the applicant. Against the said Report, the applicant submitted his reply on 13.10.2014 (Annexure-A/18). Thereafter, on the basis of the inquiry report of Arun Kumar Solanki, the Inquiry Officer and Inspector of Post Office, Raisinghnagar, submitted his Report dated 11.11.2014 (Annexure-A/19) to the Superintendent of Post Office, Sri Ganganagar in which he found that charges levelled against the applicant are fully proved.
The applicant further controverted the charges levelled against him as alleged by the Inquiry Officer by his reply dated 25.11.2014. But, on the basis of the Inquiry Report, the Superintendent, Post Office, Sri Ganganagar removed the applicant from service vide order dated 08.12.2014 (Annexure-A/1). Against which the applicant preferred appeal, which was also dismissed by the Appellate Authority (respondent No.2) vide order dated 31.07.2015. Aggrieved by those orders, the applicant has filed the present Original Application.
3. In reply, the respondents stated that the applicant while working as GDSBPM at 1.K.K. BPO, misappropriated the Government money in three RD accounts, by way of accepting the money from the account holder and made the entries of the same in the respective passbooks, but actually the money was used for personal use by not accounting the same in the respective accounts maintained by the Department. It is further stated that the applicant also misappropriated the Government money of Rural Postal Life Insurance Policy by accepting the instalment from depositor, but the same was also not deposited in the account.
When the aforesaid misappropriation committed by the applicant came to the light of the respondents, he was charge-sheeted vide memo dated 17.12.2013 (Annexure-A/6) which was replied by the applicant on 15.09.2014 alleging that he did not accepted the money as alleged, but the stamp was affixed on the passbook by mistake under peculiar and compelling circumstances. He also stated that the applicant was never properly trained by BPM, thus, he prayed that if any mistake is committed by him which is due to his ignorance, nor deliberate or intentional, liable to be condoned.
The applicant moved an application dated 28.04.2012 (Annexure-R/1), stating therein that the various instalments of RD accounts and PLI account as detailed in the application, comes to the tune of Rs.5736/-, has received by him and the pass-book of account holders as produced by them were returned after affixing the seal of receipt. But such money were utilized by him for his household job and thus, he proposed to deposit the same by accepting his guilt. Thereafter, the applicant was allowed to deposit such amount on the same day vide receipt No.1321 dated 28.04.2012. The applicant deposited the said misappropriated amount after about two years, which clearly shows that the applicant accepted the charges issued in the charge sheet dated 17.12.2013, which ultimately culminated into order dated 08.12.2014, imposing penalty of removal from service and the same remained intact even in appeal decided by the Appellate Authority vide order dated 31.07.2015.
It is also stated in the reply that the applicant has not questioned the veracity of the application dated 28.04.2012 submitted by himself and the contents of the same itself speaks out the true story. The applicant was given ample opportunity to defend himself and all the documents listed along with charge-sheet were duly provided during the course of inquiry, therefore, the respondents have passed the impugned orders after following the due procedure of law, and also taking into consideration the misappropriation of money by the applicant. Hence, the impugned orders are just and proper.
4. Heard learned counsel for both sides and perused the materials available on record.
5. Learned counsel for the applicant states that the applicant before giving the appointment on the post of GDSBPM, was not given any training by the Department and because of that the said irregularities were committed during maintaining the account. Further, the alleged amount has already been deposited by the applicant on 28.04.2012 in unclassified account. He further states that the punishment of removal of service is disproportionate keeping in view the petty amount, which was already been deposited by the applicant.
Learned counsel for the applicant states that the statement of SW.1, SW4, SW5 and SW. 6 were recorded by the Inspector under pressure without disclosing the correct facts of the case during the final inquiry. The account holders stated in their cross examination that no amount was given to the applicant as alleged against him. The applicant also denied the same when questions were put to him by the Inquiry Officer, but while deciding the Inquiry Report, all these facts have not been considered in perspective manner and as such the impugned orders of Disciplinary Authority dated 08.12.2014 (Annexure-A/1) and the Appellate Authority order dated 31.07.2015 (Annexure-A/2) are liable to be quashed and set aside.
6. Learned counsel for the respondents states that the Inquiry Officer after considering all the aspects of the matter submitted its report in which the charges framed against the applicant were found proved, and considering the grave nature of such charges the punishment of removal has been awarded to the applicant which cannot be said unjust or improper. He further states that the allegation in regard to the statement obtained from the concerned account holders under undue influence is nothing but a bald statement on the part of the applicant because the applicant in his application dated 28.04.2012 himself admits his guilt of misappropriation of money.
He further states that the applicant has been punished on the basis of proved misconduct of misappropriating Government money after establishing the same by following due process of law i.e. by affording opportunity of being heard as provided under the rules. He further submitted that the Jaipur Bench of this Tribunal has held the punishment of dismissal in the identical case as justified vide judgment dated 31.08.2009 in OA No.594/2005, Umaid Singh vs. Union of India. While deciding the said case, Jaipur Bench of this Tribunal has placed reliance on the decision rendered by Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Damoh Panna Sagar Rural Regional Bank vs. Munna Lal Jain and judgment of Hon'ble High Court in Amar Singh vs. Union Of India & Ors , wherein it has been observed that "in view of the gravity of charges and misconduct and the fact that the applicant has misappropriated the public money, the penalty of removal of services cannot be held disproportionate." A similar view is taken by this Hon'ble Tribunal in Suraj Bhan vs. Union of India & Ors in OA No.160/2006. Therefore, as the facts and circumstances of the present OA is also on the same footing, hence the same is also liable to be dismissed.
7. Considered the rival contentions of both the learned counsel and perused the materials available on record.
8. The applicant himself admits in his statement dated 28.04.2012 (Annexure-A/16, page No.63 and 64 of the OA) that the money received by him from RD account holders and RPLI was spent by him for his household purposes. In view of this admitted fact on the part of the applicant himself, one cannot find any fault with the action of the respondents including Inquiry Officer in recording a finding against the applicant that he was guilty of the charges. The Disciplinary Authority after considering the report and reply of the applicant has accepted the report and imposed the penalty of removal from service. The Appellate Authority has passed a detailed order after considering the various pleas taken by the applicant and as such one cannot find any fault with the impugned orders passed by the authorities. It is a case of admission of applicant himself and there is evidence also on record to hold the applicant guilty of the charge. In such like cases, it is not for a Court or Tribunal to interfere with, unless it is shown that there has been irregularity or illegality causing prejudice to the defence of the concerned delinquent which is not the case here.
9. It is settled law that no enquiry is necessary when guilt is admitted by the delinquent employee. In the case of Central Bank of India vs. Karunamoy Banerjee, AIR 1968 SC 266 the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed that "the rules of natural justice, as laid down by this Court, will have to be observed, in the conduct of a domestic enquiry against a workman. If the allegations are denied by the workman, it is needless to state that the burden of proving the truth of those allegations will be on the management; and the witnesses called, by the management, must be allowed to be cross-examined by the workman, and the latter must also be given an opportunity to examine himself and adduce any other evidence that he might choose, in support of his plea. But, if the workman admits his guilt, to insist upon the management to let in evidence about the allegations, will, in our opinion, only be an empty formality". It is clear from the above said judgment that if a delinquent officer against whom disciplinary proceedings are instituted, admits his guilt, there is no necessity for the management to hold any enquiry. The Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Channabasappa Basappa Happali, vs. The State of Mysore, AIR 1972 SC32, has observed as under:-
"it was contended on the basis of the ruling reported in Regina v.Durham Quarter Sessions Ex-parte Virgo(1) that on the facts admitted in the present case, a plea of guilty ought not to be entered upon the record and a plea of not guilty entered instead. Under the English law, a plea of guilty has to he unequivocal and the court must ask the person and of' the plea of guilty is qualified the Court must not enter a plea of guilty but one of not guilty. The police constable here was not on his trial for a criminal offence. It was a departmental enquiry, on facts of which due notice was given to him. He admitted the facts. In fact his counsel argued before us that he admitted the facts but not his guilt. We do not see any distinction between Admission of facts and admission of guilt. When he admitted the facts, he was guilty. The facts speak for themselves. It was-,a clear case of indiscipline and nothing less."
10. When an employee admits the charge against him or makes an unconditional and unqualified confession then the department has not more to do in the inquiry but in this case it is seen that the department has followed the proper procedure as per rules. In the case of Manager Boisahabi tea Estate vs. P.O. Labour Court, 1981 Lab IC 557, the Hon'ble High Court has held that - a misconduct owned and admitted by the delinquent is antithesis of the violation of principles of natural justice or victimization as understood in industrial relations, as the question of prejudice does not arise under such circumstances.
11. Learned counsel for the applicant vehemently argued that impugned orders, inflicting the punishment of removal from service is too harsh and disproportionate to the charges levelled and proved against the applicant, therefore, he prayed that impugned orders be set aside and lesser punishment be inflicted upon him. The question is as to whether this Court can interfere in the order of punishment by re-appreciating the evidence by acting as an Appellate Court passed by the departmental authorities, is no more res-integra. In one of the earliest decisions in State of Andhra Pradesh and others v. S. Sree Rama Rao, AIR 1963 SC 1723, their Lordship have recorded their finding in para 7 by holding that the High Court, in a proceeding under Article 226 of the Constitution, cannot act as appellate court over the decision of the authorities holding a departmental enquiry against a public servant. Being relevant, para 7 of the said judgment reads as under:-
"7... The High Court is not constituted in a proceeding under Article 226 of the Constitution a court of appeal over the decision of the authorities holding a departmental enquiry against a public servant: it is concerned to determine whether the enquiry is held by an authority competent in that behalf, and according to the procedure prescribed in that behalf, and whether the rules of natural justice are not violated. Where there is some evidence, which the authority entrusted with the duty to hold the enquiry has accepted and which evidence may reasonably support the conclusion that the delinquent officer is guilty of the charge, it is not the function of the High Court in a petition for a writ under Article 226 to review the evidence and to arrive at an independent finding on the evidence. The High Court may undoubtedly interfere where the departmental authorities have held the proceedings against the delinquent in a manner inconsistent with the rules of natural justice or in violation of the statutory rules prescribing the mode of enquiry or where the authorities have disabled themselves from reaching a fair decision by some considerations extraneous to the evidence and the merits of the case or by allowing themselves to be influenced by Irrelevant considerations or where the conclusion on the very face of it is so wholly arbitrary and capricious that no reasonable person could ever have arrived at that conclusion, or on similar grounds. But the departmental authorities are, if the enquiry is otherwise properly held, the sole judges of facts and if there be some legal evidence on which their findings can be based, the adequacy or reliability of that evidence is not a matter which can be permitted to be canvassed before the High Court in a proceeding for a writ under Article 226 of the Constitution."
12. In the case of State of Andhra Pradesh and others v. Chitra Venkata Rao (1975 (2) SCC 557], the aforesaid were further discussed at paragraphs 22 to 24, which read as follows:
"22. Again, this Court in Railway Board, representing the Union of India, New Delhi v. Niranjan Singh said that the High Court does not interfere with the conclusion of the disciplinary authority unless the finding is not supported by any evidence or it can be said that no reasonable person could have reached such a finding. In Niranjan Singh case this Court held that the High Court exceeded its powers in interfering with the findings of the disciplinary authority on the charge that the respondent was instrumental in compelling the shut-down of an air compressor at about 8.15 a.m. on May 31, 1956. This Court said that the Enquiry Committee felt that the evidence of two persons that the respondent led a group of strikers and compelled them to close down their compressor could not be accepted at its face value. The General Manager did not agree with the Enquiry Committee on that point. The General Manager accepted the evidence. This Court said that it was open to the General Manager to do so and he was not bound by the conclusion reached by the committee. This Court held that the conclusion reached by the disciplinary authority should prevail and the High Court should not have interfered with the conclusion.
23. The jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari under Article 226 is a supervisory jurisdiction. The Court exercises it not as an appellate court. The findings of fact reached by an inferior court or tribunal as a result of the appreciation of evidence are not reopened or questioned in writ proceedings. An error of law which is apparent on the face of the record can be corrected by a writ, but not an error of fact, however grave it may appear to be. In regard to a finding of fact recorded by a tribunal, a writ can be issued if it is shown that in recording the said finding, the tribunal had erroneously refused to admit admissible and material evidence, or had erroneously admitted inadmissible evidence which has influenced the impugned finding. Again if a finding of fact is based on no evidence, that would be regarded as an error of law which can be corrected by a writ of certiorari. A finding of fact recorded by the Tribunal cannot be challenged on the ground that the relevant and material evidence adduced before the Tribunal is insufficient or inadequate to sustain a finding. The adequacy or sufficiency of evidence led on a point and the Inference of fact to be drawn from the said finding are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Tribunal. See Syed Yakoob v. K.S. Radhakrishnan.
24. The High Court in the present case assessed the entire evidence and came to its own conclusion. The High Court was not justified to do so. Apart from the aspect that the High Court does not correct a finding of fact on the ground that the evidence is not sufficient or adequate, the evidence in the present case which was considered by the Tribunal cannot be scanned by the High Court to justify the conclusion that there is no evidence which would justify the finding of the Tribunal that the respondent did not make the journey. The Tribunal gave reasons for its conclusions. It is not possible for the High Court to say that no reasonable person could have arrived at these conclusions. The High Court reviewed the evidence, reassessed the evidence and then rejected the evidence as no evidence. That is precisely what the High Court in exercising jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari should not do."
13. The Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Union of India Vs. P. Gunasekaran, 2015 (4) SLR 244, in para No.13 have laid down certain concrete parameters, which deals with interfering in the departmental proceedings, as to when those parameters are not followed by disciplinary authority or delinquent employee is able to prove the violation of principles natural justice, has been carved out in the above said judgment (supra), which reads as under :-
"a. the enquiry is held by a competent authority; b. the enquiry is held according to the procedure prescribed in that behalf;
c. there is violation of the principles of natural justice in conducting the proceedings;
d. the authorities have disabled themselves from reaching a fair conclusion by some considerations extraneous to the evidence and merits of the case;
e. the authorities have allowed themselves to be influenced by irrelevant or extraneous considerations;
f. the conclusion, on the very face of it, is so wholly arbitrary that no person could ever have arrived at such conclusion;
g. the disciplinary authority had erroneously failed to admit the admissible and material evidence;
h. the disciplinary had erroneously admitted inadmissible evidence which influenced the finding;
i. the finding of fact is based on no evidence.
Under Article 226/227 of the Constitution of India, the High Court shall not:
(re-appreciate the evidence;
(ii) interfere with the conclusions in the enquiry, in case the same has been conducted in accordance with law;
(i) go into the adequacy of the evidence;
(iv) go into the reliability of the evidence;
(v) interfere, if there be some legal evidence on which findings can be based.
(vi) correct the error of fact however grave it may appear to be;
(vil) go into the proportionality of punishment unless it shocks its conscience"
14. The ratio, which is emanating from the above judicial pronouncements if applied in the present facts and circumstances of the case, we find that impugned orders require no interference by this Tribunal as the applicant has not been able to point out any irregularity or illegality committed by the Inquiry Officer, Disciplinary Authority, or Appellate Authority, which could have been a cause of prejudice in the case of the applicant herein. Further, there is no violation of principles of natural Justice. Moreover, the charges levelled against the applicant is serious one as he has indulged himself in misappropriation of Government money as well as breach of faith of rural people on Government Institution, and in such like cases dismissal or removal is not treated as harsh penalty.
15. The argument of learned counsel for the applicant that misappropriation/embezzlement of a petty amount did not warrant such a harsh punishment like dismissal or removal from service. In this regard, it is seen that in the case of U.P. State Road Transport Corporation vs. Suresh Chand Sharma, (2010) 6 SCC 555, wherein a contention was raised whether misappropriation/embezzlement of petty sum could warrant the punishment of dismissal, the Hon'ble Apex Court opined as under:-
"21. We do not find any force in the submissions made by Dr. J.N. Dubey, learned Senior counsel for the employee that for embezzlement of such a petty amount, punishment of dismissal Gould not be justified for the reason that it is not the amount embezzled by a delinquent employee but the mens rea to misappropriate the public money.
22. In Municipal Committee, Bahadurgarh Vs. Krishnan Bihari & Ors this Court held as under:-
"In a case of such nature - indeed, in cases involving corruption there cannot be any other punishment than dismissal. Any sympathy shown in such cases is totally uncalled for and opposed to public interest. The amount misappropriated may be small or large; it is the act of misappropriation that is relevant." Similar view has been reiterated by this Court in Ruston & Hornsby (I) Ltd. vs. T.B. Kadam, U.P. State Road Transport Corporation v. Basudeo Chaudhary & Anr. Janatha Bazar (South Kanara Central Cooperative Wholesale Stores Ltd.) & Ors. V. Secretary, Sahakari Noukarara Sangha & Ors. Karnataka State Road Transport Corporation v., B.S. Hullikatti, and Regional Manager, R.S.R.T.C. v. Ghanshyam Sharma.
23. In NEKRTC v. H. Amaresh and UPSRTC v. Vinod Kumar, this Court held that the punishment should always be proportionate to the gravity of the misconduct. However, in a case of corruption/misappropriation, the only punishment is dismissal."
16. From the discussions made hereinabove, we find no illegality and irregularity in the impugned orders passed by the respondent department. Therefore, no interference is warranted by this Tribunal. Accordingly, the OA lacks merit and is dismissed. No order as to costs.
(Dr. NANDITA CHATTERJEE) (JASMINE AHMED)
MEMBER (A) MEMBER (J)
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