Gujarat High Court
Gopal Gangaram Nepali vs Commissioner Of Police And Ors. on 29 March, 1996
Equivalent citations: (1996)3GLR823
JUDGMENT S.M. Soni, J.
1. Petitioner-detenu, being branded as a bootlegger as defined in Section 2(b) of the Gujarat Prevention of Anti-Social Activities Act, 1985 ('PASA Act' for short), has challenged the order of detention dated 7-8-1995 passed by the respondent No. 1 in exercise of power under Section 3(2) of PASA Act with a view to prevent the petitioner from acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order, as his activities are likely to or deem to affect adversely the public health. On the order being served, petitioner was also served with the grounds of detention with necessary documents relied on by the authority to record subjective satisfaction.
2. To brand the petitioner as a bootlegger, the authority has relied on as many as six cases registered under the Bombay Prohibition Act, of which three are pending in Court and three are pending investigation. He was also supplied with necessary documents referred in the grounds, which according to the authority, were relied upon for the purpose of recording subjective satisfaction. According to the detaining authority, petitioner carried out his activity within the area of Amraiwadi Police Station, where he used to store, possess and sell liquor and carried on anti-social activities. The authority has also relied on statements of as many as four persons, from whose statements it appears that the activity of the petitioner was affecting the public order.
3. This order of detention is under challenge on the grounds, inter alia, (i) that the statements of witnesses do not disclose the activity which can be said to affect public order; (ii) that the representation of the petitioner against the order of detention has not been expeditiously decided; (3) that the privilege claimed under Section 9(2) of PASA Act is not a genuine one; (4) that the order of detention is bad for non-application of mind inasmuch as there is no material on record to show as to how the authority came to infer that the detenu is likely to be released on bail; (5) that the order of detention is also bad inasmuch as there are neither compelling nor justifying reasons; nor there is fresh and urgent material which necessitated to pass an order of detention; (6) that the order of detention is bad (a) as the authority has failed to report to the State Government forthwith, meaning thereby there is a delay in making such a report; and (b) the reference is not made within the stipulated time to the Advisory Board; and (7) that the continued detention is bad because relevant documents, namely, (a) report of the Chemical Analyser and (b) copies of the panchnamas though asked for are not supplied with till date and, therefore, right to make effective representation has suffered.
4. Learned A.G.P. Mr. Champaneri has contended before the Court that the statements of the witnesses recorded do disclose that the activity of the petitioner affects adversely the maintenance of public order. He further contended that this is a question which the Court should appreciate perceiving itself the environment in which the concerned authority was and has appreciated the statements of the witnesses to decide that it affects public order. He also contended that this being a question of fact, appreciation afresh will amount to appreciating the evidence, which is beyond the scope and jurisdiction of the Court in exercise of power under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. He further contended that this Court can interfere with question of fact only if it considers that the conclusion arrived at by the authority is either perverse or is based on no evidence. This Court has no jurisdiction to look into the correctness or otherwise of those statements. If the inference arrived at by the authority is neither perverse nor based on no evidence, the subjective satisfaction recorded by the detaining authority that the activity affects the public order can neither be disturbed nor interfered with. Hence, this contention is liable to be rejected. This Court will deal in detail with this contention later on, as both the parties have relied on diverse judgments. I now deal with other contentions first.
5. In reply to the question of delay in deciding representation, Mr. Champaneri stated that the representation dated 20-2-1996 sent by registered post, A.D. addressed to Commissioner of Police and also to Chief Minister, was rejected by the Commissioner of Police on 23-2-1996 on receipt of the same. Thus, the representation made to the Commissioner of Police, i.e., detaining authority, has been decided expeditiously as the same was received by the Commissioner of Police possibly on 22-2-1996. So far as the representation to the Chief Minister is concerned, the same was received in the registry on 22-2-1996 and by the Home Department on 23-2-1996 and the same is considered, decided and rejected on 28-2-1996. The decision was despatched on 29-2-1996 and received by the detenu in Jail on 6-3-1996. This representation was placed before the Principal Secretary, Home Department with necessary and relevant noting on 27-2-1996,24th and 25 th February were holidays, being 4th Saturday and Sunday. The material was placed before the Principal Secretary, Home Department on 27-2-1996 and the same was decided and rejected on 28-2-1996 and despatched on 29-2-1996, which came to be received by the detenu in Jail on 6-3-1996. In view of the facts stated above, it cannot be said that there is any delay in considering the representation either by the detaining authority or by the Government.
6. The learned Advocate for the petitioner, to contend that the privilege claimed under Section 9(2) is not a genuine one, states that the facts showing the satisfaction as to the genuineness of the claim of anonymity by the witnesses are not real one and, therefore, there is non-application of mind and the privilege claimed is not a genuine and real one. Learned A.G.P. has contended that the proposal was made on 6-8-1995 and order to verify the statements who have claimed the privilege was also made on that very day, i.e., on 6-8-1995 and Assistant Commissioner of Police had verified the said statements on 7-8-1995 and submitted the same to the detaining authority on that very day and the order came to be passed. Thus, the statements of the witnesses are verified at the instance of the detaining authority. Therefore, simply because the order is passed so emergently, it cannot be said that the verification is not genuine or the privilege claimed is not a genuine one. From the statements of witnesses also, it is clear that they have given the statements on condition and with a request not to disclose their names. Thus, there is no substance in this contention of the learned Advocate for the petitioner that the privilege claimed is not real.
7. In reply to the contention of the petitioner's Advocate that there is no material to show that the detenu is likely to be released on bail, learned A.G.P. contends that the offence is under Prohibition Act and normally Courts release the person accused of prohibition offence on bail. Offence under Section 66(1 )(b) of the Bombay Prohibition Act is bailable one. Offence under Section 65(e) of the Bombay Prohibition Act is concerned, gravity of this offence is such that normally the Court releases the person on bail. Therefore, when the authority has inferred that the detenu is likely to be released on bail, the same is warranted by the facts of the charges alleged. The charges levelled against the detenu for the offences registered under the Prohibition Act by themselves are sufficient indication to arrive to that conclusion that the detenu may be released on bail. The inference arrived at by the detaining authority that accused is likely to be released on bail is warranted by the material on record. Thus, there is no substance in this contention also.
8. Learned A.G.P. in reply to the contention that there are no compelling and justifiable reasons or a fresh and new material to pass the order of detention, has again brought to the notice of this Court the relevant dates of the cases registered against the detenu. There are as may as three prohibition cases registered against the detenu in the year 1994. Other three offences which are pending investigation are of the year 1995 and to be precise last offence registered being C.R. No. 658 of 1995 is of 5-8-1995. Thereafter, the statements of four witnesses are recorded and the said statements are recorded on 5-8-1995 and 6-8-1995. The order of detention is passed on 7-8-1995. Therefore, there is no substance in the contention that there was no compelling and justifiable reasons to pass the order of detention. It has been time and again held by the Courts that delay in passing the order vitiates the order of detention. However, in the instant case, the action is taken promptly and immediately. It cannot be said that there was no compelling and justifiable reasons; nor there was new material and urgent reason available with the authority. Thus, 1 do not find any substance in this contention also.
9. It is contended on behalf of detenu that report to the State Government is not made forthwith and reference to the Advisory Board is not made within the stipulated time. Learned A.G.P. has stated that the report of the order of 7-8-1995 was sent to the Government on that very day and the Government has received the same on 9-8-1995 and the same is approved on 14-8-1995. Thus, the report is made to the State Government forthwith and the same is approved by the Government within the stipulated time. So far as reference to the Advisory Board is concerned, reference is made on 16-8-1995 and the same is received by the Board on that very day. The Board held the meeting on 31-8-1995 and the Board opined on 8-9-1995, which was then communicated to the Government and the Government received the same on 12-9-1995 and again the Government confirmed the detention order on 15-9-1995. Thus, confirmation has taken place within the time stipulated under the Act. Thus, there is no substance in this contention of the petitioner.
10. It is contended that the petitioner asked for copy of the report of the Chemical Analyser and the copies of the panchnamas to make an effective representation and the same are not supplied. It is clear from the documents supplied to the detenu that the detaining authority has not taken into consideration the report of the Chemical Analyser for arriving at the subjective satisfaction to pass the order of detention. The detenu is required to be furnished copies of the documents which are taken into consideration by the detaining authority for arriving at the subjective satisfaction. When the detaining authority has not taken into consideration the report of the Chemical Analyser to arrive at subjective satisfaction, non-supply of that document does not adversely affect the right to make representation. So far as copies of the panchnamas are concerned, copies of panchnamas of the cases which are pending investigation are supplied while copies of the panchnamas of the cases which are pending in the Court are not supplied. The cases are pending in the Court after charge-sheet is submitted and the copies of the charge-sheets which do contain panchnamas are supplied to the detenu. It is not disputed that charge-sheet of those cases did not include panchnamas. Thus, when the copies of the panchnamas of the cases which are pending trial in the Court are with the detenu, they are not required to be supplied afresh to the detenu. Thus, non-supply of such documents does not affect and has not affected adversely the right of the petitioner-detenu to make an effective representation. Thus, there is no substance in this contention of non-supply of documents, which, according to the detenu, has adversely affected his right to make an effective representation.
11. This brings to consider the vexed question whether the activity of the detenu affects the public order or law and order. Before discussing this contention, it is relevant to refer to Sub-section (4) of Section 3 of PASA Act, which reads as under:
3. (4) For the purpose of this section, a person shall be deemed to be "acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order" when such person is engaged in or is making preparation for engaging in any activities whether as a bootlegger or dangerous person or drug offender or immoral traffic offender or property grabber, which affect adversely or are likely to affect adversely the maintenance of public order.
Explanation: For the purpose of this sub-section, public order shall be deemed to have been affected adversely or shall be deemed likely to be affected adversely inter alia if any of the activities of any person referred to in this sub-section directly or indirectly, is causing or is likely to cause any harm, danger or alarm or feeling of insecurity among the general public or any section thereof or a grave or widespread danger to life, property or public health.
There are as many as six prohibition cases registered against the detenu and they are under Sections 66(1 )(b) and 65(e) of the Bombay Prohibition Act. Section 66(1 )(b) pertains to consumption, use, possession or transport of any intoxicant other than opium or hemp. Section 65(e) refers to sale or buy of an intoxicant other than opium or hemp. It is clear from the Preamble of the Prohibition Act mat Prohibition Act is enacted to promote, enforce and carry out the effect of the policy of prohibition. The term 'bootlegger' is defined in Section 2(b) of PASA Act, which reads as under:
2. (b) 'bootlegger' means a person who distills, manufactures, stores, transports, imports, exports, sells or distributes any liquor, intoxicating drug or other intoxicant in contravention of any provision of the Bombay Prohibition Act, 1949 and the rules and orders made thereunder, or of any other law for the time being in force or who knowingly expends or applies any money or supplies any animal, vehicle, vessel or other conveyance or any receptacle or any other material whatsoever in furtherance or support of the doing of any of the things described above by or through any other person, or who abets in any other manner the doing of any such thing;
If one reads the offences registered against the detenu and the definition of 'bootlegger', the case of the petitioner squarely falls within the definition of 'bootlegger'. Then the question is whether his activity is in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order. What is the activity of the detenu is firstly disclosed from the offences registered against him and then is further activated by himself and that is disclosed from the statements of the witnesses. There are as many as four witnesses, whose statements are recorded. However, they refer to two incidents. Of the four witnesses, two are the victims and two are witnesses to the say of the victims. First incident is of 27-7-1995. When the witness was passing through the locality where the detenu ordinarily resides at about 8-00 P.M. on 27-7-1995, he was intercepted by the detenu and alleging that he is a Police informant, he was beaten in public. When he raised shouts, people gathered. Detenu then taking out the knife threatened the witness and then the detenu and his associates rushed towards the public, who had gathered there. In view of this act, the public who had gathered there, ran helter-skelter and there was an atmosphere of panic and it is alleged that the daily routine business was disturbed. This is supported by another witness, who has witnessed the same. Second incident is of 30-7-1995. When the witness was passing in his vehicle at about 4-00 P.M. on 30-7-1995 and was coming towards Amraiwadi area, the vehicle was stopped by the detenu and his associates near the culvert and all of them boarded the vehicle with their liquor stock. When the witness refused them to sit in his vehicle with their liquor stock, the detenu got enraged and drew out the witness from his vehicle and assaulted him. When the witness shouted, people gathered. Detenu then took out his knife, threatened the witness and detenu and his associates rushed towards the public who had gathered there and wielded the knife towards them. This resulted into running away by the people helter-skelter and the atmosphere of terror was created. The area became quite and this has affected the day-to-day routine life. This is also supported by one witness, who had seen the same. Question is whether these acts affect law and order or public order. The detaining authority has from these facts come to the conclusion that this activity has affected the public order and, therefore, has passed the order of detention.
12. Learned Advocate for the petitioner, relying on the judgments in Spl. Criminal Application No. 1000 of 1993 decided on 10-12-1993 and in Spl. Criminal Application No. 913 of 1994 decided on 19-1-1995, has contended that the activity of the detenu as shown in the statements of the witnesses does not affect the public order and it only affects the law and order. In Special Criminal Application No. 1000 of 1993, wherein I was also a party, S.D. Dave, J. speaking for the Court has observed as under:
On a careful reading of the above said four statements we have not been persuaded to take the view sought to be canvassed by the learned Addl. Public Prosecutor before us, namely, these all had the impact on a public order. When even a small incident occurs in a locality, the crowd may be collected there but merely because a crowd is collected following such incident in the locality, it cannot be said to be a creation of a situation in which there is a reach to a public order situation. After a careful analysis of the statements, we are convinced that they demonstrate minor day-to-day incidents affecting individuals, thereby creating law and order situation between the victim and the witnesses, never affecting the public order situation. We are inclined to specify that these statements even if it is accepted on its face value with all the force, cannot be taken as showing a bearing on the public order situation. We are conscious that the decisions of this Court on which the learned Addl. Public Prosecutor has placed reliance have a concern with certain statements and the contents of those statements have been duly demonstrated in these decisions. We have studied rather carefully the contents of those statements also vis-a-vis the contents of the statements with which we are concerned in the petition on hand. After doing so and after hearing learned Addl. Public Prosecutor Mr. Shelat on this for quite a time, we are able to persuade ourselves to come to the conclusion that the activities alleged against or attributed to the petitioner, in the aforesaid all the cases have got a bearing to the public order situation. Therefore, though we proceed on the assumption that the Supreme Court decision in Piyush Kantilal Mehta (supra) and Lallan Prasad Chunilal Yadav (supra) are the decisions on facts, then also on the scrutiny of the statements in the petition on hand, we are not inclined to say that these statements demonstrate a case in which there was a reach or impact to the public order situation. This conclusion of ours is based on the facts of the case.
In that judgment, this Court has come to the conclusion that the activity of the detenu has not affected the public order. However, it be made clear that the judgment is based on the facts of that case and the same has been made clear in that judgment by observing "this conclusion of ours in based on the facts of the case". The principle enunciated by the Supreme Court in the case of Piyush Kantilal Mehta v. Commissioner of Police, Ahmedabad was taken into consideration. However, it will be relevant to state that the principle enunciated in Piyush Mehta (supra) has been considered by the Supreme Court in the case of Harpreet Kaur v. State of Maharashtra AIR 1992 SC 979. I will refer to the said judgment hereinafter, after considering another judgment relied upon by the learned Advocate for the petitioner.
13. Another judgment relied on is in Spl. Criminal Application No. 913 of 1994. In that case also, it has been made clear that the facts of that case squarely falls with the facts of Piyush Mehta's case (supra). That judgment is based again on the case of Rashidmiya @ Chhava Ahmedmiya Shaikh v. Commissioner of Police, Ahmedabad AIR 1989 SC 1703. In that case also, the Supreme Court has observed that the offences registered in the above mentioned four cases against the detenu on the ground that he was dealing in liquor have no bearing on the question of maintenance of public order in the absence of any other material that those activities of the detenu have adversely affected the maintenance of public order. Thus, it can be said that in case of Rashidmiya (supra), Supreme Court came to the conclusion that the activity of the detenu there affected law and order because there was no other material to show that it affected the public order. Therefore, it can be said that the decision was also on the facts of that case.
14. This brings me to consider the case of Harpreet Kaur v. State of Maharashtra (supra), wherein the cases of Piyush Mehta (supra) and Rashidmiya (supra) are also considered. In Harpreet Kaur's case (supra) Para 21 referred to the facts of that case, is relevant for our purpose, which reads as under:
21. Let us now consider the facts of the instant case.
The substance of the grounds on which detention has been ordered is that the detenu is a bootlegger and in furtherance of his activities and to escape from the clutches of law, he even tried to run over, by his speeding vehicle, the police party, which tried to signal him to a stop, exhorting all the time that he would kill anyone who would come in his way. He continued to drive in a reckless speed and dashed against a pedestrian causing injuries to him, where again he had exhorted that anyone who would come in his way would meet his death. Four witnesses - A, B, C, D - who agreed to give statements to the police on conditions of anonymity, clearly stated that they would not depose against the detenu for fear of retaliation as the detenu had threatened to do away with anyone who would depose against him. The evidence of these witnesses shows that the detenu was indulging in transporting of illicit liquor and distributing the same in the locality and was keeping arms with him while transporting liquor. The activities of the detenu, therefore, were not merely 'bootlegging' as was the position in Om Prakash , Rashidmiya and Piyush Kantilal Mehta's case (supra) but went further to adversely affect the even tempo of the society by creating a feeling of insecurity among those who were likely to depose against him as also the law enforcement agencies. The fear psychosis created by the detenu in the witnesses was aimed at letting the crime go unpunished which has the potential of the society, and not merely some individual, to suffer. The activities of the detenu, therefore, squarely fall within the deeming provision enacted in the Explanation of Section 2(1) of the Act, and it, therefore, follows as a logical consequence that the activities of the detenu were not merely prejudicial to the maintenance of 'law and order' but were prejudicial to the maintenance of 'public order'. The first argument raised by Dr. Chitale against the order of detention, therefore, fails.
From this observation, in my opinion, what is required to be considered by the Court to decide whether the activity of the detenu affects the law and order or public order is the length and breadth of the activity, effect of the activity and the purpose of the activity. Ordinarily, there can be an act of commission of an offence, meaning thereby a person may do something or may perform some action, which may amount to an offence, if the said act is in contravention of some prohibition under the law or for such an act if some punishment is provided for under the law. If a person is carrying on such act continuously or repeatedly, then it becomes his activity, meaning thereby it becomes his occupation. What is required under the law of detention is that the activity should be prejudicial to the maintenance of public order. Here, the offences registered against the detenu and the statements of the witnesses show and suggest that the detenu has taken over the occupation of dealing in liquor and carrying out the same uninterruptedly. This activity is simpliciter the commission of an offence under the Prohibition Act and if he does something more to carry out the same uninterruptedly, then, in my opinion, carrying of that activity, which amounts to commission of an offence under the Prohibition Act, may be an act affecting the law and order, would amount to affecting the public order. In the instant case, in the first incident which is of 27-7-1995, the detenu has stopped the witness who was passing through his locality and whom the detenu did not know, beats him alleging that he is a Police informant. This act of the detenu will terrorise the public who pass through that area or locality. Any passerby of the said area or locality having knowledge of such beating may move with fear complex in his mind that any time detenu may come out and assault him, under pretext that he is a Police informant. It may happen that people may stop passing through that locality as a result of exhortion conveyed by beating innocent people under such pretext. This act of the detenu assaulting a person under the pretext of Police informant is exhortion to the public at large that whoever makes an attempt to inform about his activity, whoever is suspected to obstruct his activity, may meet with this fate. This conveys message to the people that they shall not pass through this locality also. If this act of the detenu in the course of his activity of bootlegging does not affect the public order, then what else can be the effect of the same? The detenu has not only assaulted the witness, but when the persons gathered there on hearing the shouts of the witness, he has also conveyed a message that whoever informs the Police of his activity may meet with this fate and whoever gathers either to rescue or witness the incidents may also be assaulted. This cannot be said a simple act affecting the law and order, but this, in my opinion, affects the public order also.
So far as the second incident is concerned, detenu has assaulted a vehicle owner, who refused to transport his illegal goods or associates to carry out his illegal activity. His associates boarded the vehicle with the liquor and when the witness refused to transport them with the liquor, he was assaulted and when the people gathered on hearing the shouts of the witness, detenu and his associates wielded a knife towards the people and asked them to run away. This also exhorts that whenever he desires to ply any vehicle for any of his illegal activity, none shall dare say no. Effect of this may be that people may either stop passing through this locality with the vehicle or people will stop coming to the scene if created by the detenu. This also sends a message that they also should learn from what has happened. This cannot be said to be an act to affect the law and order, but this also affects the public order.
15. Apart from this, in the case of Harpreet Kaur (supra), it has been rightly observed that the activities of the detenu were not merely 'bootlegging' as was the position in Om Prakash ; Rashidmiya and Piyush Kantilal Mehta's cases (supra), but went further to adversely affect the even tempo of the society by creating a, feeling of insecurity among those who were likely to depose against him as also the law enforcement agencies. In the case of Harpreet Kaur (supra), detenu has raised his head against the law enforcing agency. Here, in the instant case, it can be said that to carry out the activity the detenu terrorised the people and created a sense of insecurity among them. It conveys a message that whoever passes through that locality passes with a sense of insecurity that any time detenu may come out and assault him, branding him as a Police informant and anyone who passes with a vehicle in that area passes with a feeling that any time detenu may come and may forcibly hire his vehicle and if he refuses to carry the liquor in the vehicle, may be assaulted. This do terrorise the people to pass through that area or with their vehicles.
16. In the case of Om Prakash , the Court has taken the view that, in the facts and circumstances of the case, the activity of the detenu was no threat to public order. In the case of Mrs. T. Devki , it was held that in view of a solitary assault on one individual, the activity was not considered to disturb public peace or place or public order in jeopardy. In the case of Niranjan Singh (AIR 1990 SC 1990), the case was of a gangwar and one gang wanted to eliminate the rival and in that connection a statement to the effect that the show of violence in question would create terror or fear in the mind of the people and none would dare to oppose them was not constituted to be an activity affecting the public order. So, in the above referred cases, in the facts and circumstances of the case, the activity was not considered to be an activity affecting adversely to the public order.
17. The question which is required to be answered by the Court is whether activity affects adversely the public order or law and order. While the expression "law and order" is wider in scope inasmuch as contravention of law always affects order while public order has a narrower ambit and public order would be affected by only such contravention, which affects the community or the public at large. Public order is the even tempo of life of the community taking the country as a whole or even a specified locality. One distinction between the areas of law and order and public order is one of degree and extent of reach of the act in question on society. It is the potentiality of the act to disturb the even tempo of life of the community which makes it prejudicial to the maintenance of the public order. If a contravention in it effects confined only to a few individuals directly involved as distinct from a wide spectrum of public, it would raise the problem of law and order only. It is the length, magnitude and intensity of the terror waive unleashed by a particular eruption of disorder that helps distinguish it as an act affecting "public order" from that concerning law and order.
The question to ask is 'Does it lead to disturbance of the current life of the community so as to amount to a disturbance of the public order or does it affect merely an individual leaving the tranquillity of the society undisturbed? This question has to be faced in every case of its facts.
18. In view of the above observation in the case of Smt. Victoria Fernandes , it is to be considered in each case whether the activity affects adversely the public order or law and order. It has been rightly held in the case of Smt. Victoria (supra) that a question is to be asked, i.e., Does it lead to disturbance of the current life of the community so as to amount to a disturbance of public order or does it affect merely an individual leaving the tranquillity of the society undisturbed? In every case, when the statements of witnesses are recorded to show that the activity of the detenu affects adversely the public order, whether it really affects the public order or law and order can be answered by the answer to the question referred above.
19. When a witness, who is not known to the detenu, is assaulted either under the guise of Police informant or on his refusal to allow him to store illegal articles, may be liquor, or refuses to ply the vehicle for illegal activity and on his refusal if he is assaulted, it is with a view to send a massage to the society that whoever dares to say no, has to meet with this fate, and whoever dares to pass through the locality where the detenu resides or carries on his occupation, may be apprehended to be a Police informant or may be assaulted. This effect of the assault by the detenu, in my opinion, affects the public order and does not remain a question of law and order. The effect of the act of the detenu in substance disturbs the even tempo of the life of the community. Tempo means rate of movement or activity. In the ordinary normal circumstances, the rate of movement or activity of the public would be a normal one. Anybody may pass through that locality without any fear or apprehension of being assaulted. Anybody can move with his vehicle of hire from that locality without any fear or apprehension of being assaulted or compelled to ply for illegal activity without payment of charges or one may be not compelled to store or allow to store incriminating articles. Because of the high-handed and bully of the detenu, people will apprehend danger to person and property and may avoid that locality to not invite the wrath of the detenu. This in substance is an effect on the rate of movement or activity, which is known as tempo. Thus, the activity affects the tempo of the society and thus the activity of the detenu affects public order.
Similar is the view taken by the Supreme Court in the case of Mrs. Harpreel Kaur , where the relevant observation reads as under:
The activities of the detenu, therefore, were not merely bootlegging, but were further to adversely affect the even tempo of the society by creating a feeling of insecurity among those who were likely to depose against him as also against the law enforcement agencies. The fear psychosis created by the detenu in the witnesses was aimed at letting the crime go unpunished which has the potential of the society and not merely some individual to suffer. The activities of the detenu, therefore, squarely fall within the deeming provisions enacted in the Explanation of Section 2(a) of the Act and it, therefore, follows as a logical consequence that the activities of the detenu were not merely prejudicial to the maintenance of law and order, but were prejudicial to the maintenance of public order....
If this inference is drawn by the detaining authority from the material available with the detaining authority appreciated in context of the environment prevailing in that locality, it can be said that the subjective satisfaction recorded by the detaining authority to the effect that activity of the detenu affects the public order is neither perverse nor based on no evidence. In my opinion, the subjective satisfaction arrived at by the detaining authority, therefore, does not call for any interference. This Court, while exercising power under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, cannot interfere with the subjective satisfaction arrived at by the detaining authority from the material available to it, if the same is neither perverse nor based on no evidence.
20. No contention other than discussed above is raised. In view of the above discussion, all the contentions raised by the learned Advocate for the petitioner are devoid of merits and fails. In the result, the petition is dismissed. Rule is discharged with no order as to costs.