Bombay High Court
Proprietor: Shri Atul Virendrakumar vs Hon'Ble Minister on 13 August, 2012
Author: S.C.Dharmadhikari
Bench: S.C. Dharmadhikari, M.T. Joshi
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kps
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
NAGPUR BENCH, NAGPUR.
LETTERS PATENT APPEAL NO.278 OF 2012
IN
WRIT PETITION NO.3440 OF 2011
M/s Hotel Shobha, through its
Proprietor: Shri Atul Virendrakumar
Jaiswal, Aged about 42 years,
R/o L-7/41, Raghujinagar, Nagpur. ..Appellants
-Versus-
1 Hon'ble Minister,ig
Department of State Excise,
Mantralaya, Mumbai-32.
2 Commissioner,
State Excise, Maharashtra State,
Old Custom House, 2nd Floor,
Fort, Mumbai.
3 The Collector, State Excise,
Nagpur.
4 Sau.Shailaja Rajendra Badwaik,
Aged Major, Occu. Service,
R/o Raghujinagar, Ridge Road,
Vidarbha Housing Board Colony,
Nagpur.
5 Sau.Sunita Moreshwar Mhaske,
Aged Major, Occu. Housewife,
R/o Raghujinagar, Ridge Road,
Vidarbha Housing Board Colony,
Nagpur.
6 Sau.Swati w/o. Amol Mahajan,
Aged Major, Occu. Housewife,
R/o Raghujinagar, Ridge Road,
Vidarbha Housing Board Colony,
Nagpur. ..Respondents
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ALONGWITH
LETTERS PATENT APPEAL NO.314 OF 2012
IN
WRIT PETITION NO.3440 OF 2011
Government of Maharashtra.
Through its Secretary,
Department of State Excise,
Mantralaya, Mumbai-32. ..Appellant
-Versus-
1 Sau.Shailaja Rajendra Badwaik,
Aged Major, Occu. Service,
R/o Raghujinagar, Ridge Road,
Vidarbha Housing Board Colony,
Nagpur.
2 Sau.Sunita Moreshwar Mhaske,
Aged Major, Occu. Housewife,
R/o Raghujinagar, Ridge Road,
Vidarbha Housing Board Colony,
Nagpur.
3 Sau.Swati w/o. Amol Mahajan,
Aged Major, Occu. Housewife,
R/o Raghujinagar, Ridge Road,
Vidarbha Housing Board Colony,
Nagpur.
4 M/s Hotel Shobha, through its
Proprietor: Shri Atul Virendrakumar
Jaiswal, Aged about 42 years,
R/o L-7/41, Raghujinagar, Nagpur. ..Respondents
.............
Mr.M.V.Samarth, for the Appellant in LPA No.278/2012 and for
Respondent No.4 in LPA No.314/2012.
Mr.A.S.Kilor, for the contesting Respondent Nos.4 to 6 in LPA
No.278/2012 and Nos.1 to 3 in LPA No.314/2012.
Ms.B.Dangre, Additional Government Pleader, for the State.
............
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CORAM : S.C.DHARMADHIKARI
AND
M.T.JOSHI, JJ.
Reserved on : 02nd August, 2012.
Pronounced on : 13th August, 2012.
JUDGMENT (Per S.C.Dharmadhikari, J.):
1 Both appeals arise out of the common judgment and order, therefore, they were heard together and can be disposed of by common judgment.
2 These appeals under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent are directed against the judgment and order dated 27.06.2012 of the learned Single Judge in Writ Petition No.3440/2011. That Writ Petition was filed by the Respondent Nos.4 to 6 in LPA No.278/2012, who are original Petitioners and they impugned the order passed by the Respondent No.1 State Government dated 30.10.2010 in Revision Application by which the Revisional Authority has set aside the orders dated 20.02.2010 and 22.06.2010 of the Collector, Nagpur and the Commissioner, State Excise respectively. The Revision Application before the Minister was filed by the Appellant before us in LPA No.278/2012 as its application seeking FL-III licence was rejected.
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3 The facts leading to the filing of these Appeals are that the
Appellant in LPA No.278/2012 made an application for grant of FL-III licence under the Bombay Prohibition Act, 1949. The Appellant, it was stated, had been allotted a tenement bearing No.L-7/41 by the Vidarbha Housing Board. It appears that upon this application addressed to the Collector, District Nagpur, the Licencing Authority caused an inquiry to be made. He called reports from the Police. The Police Department vide their reports dated 06.03.2009, 30.06.2009, 30.11.2009 and 22.12.2009 stated that the residents of the locality/area have opposed the grant of such licence in favour of the Appellant and there would be deterioration in law and order situation if the licence is granted. Accordingly, the Collector, Nagpur District rejected the application for grant of FL-III licence by his order dated 20.02.2010.
4 Aggrieved and dissatisfied with the order of the Collector, an Appeal under Section 137(2) of the Bombay Prohibition Act, 1949 was filed before the Appellate Authority, namely, Commissioner, State Excise, Maharashtra State. The Collector submitted his response to the appeal through the Superintendent, State Excise on 03.07.2010. The Collector pointed out as to how the residents in the locality and the Police Department have opposed the grant of such licence in favour of the ::: Downloaded on - 09/06/2013 18:58:46 ::: *5* lpa.278.314.12.con.sxw Appellant. The Collector, thus, forwarded his report and when the appeal was placed for hearing and final disposal, after hearing the Appellant, eventually the Commissioner by his order dated 22.06.2010 dismissed the appeal of the Appellant.
5 Aggrieved and dissatisfied with the orders of the Commissioner and the Collector, the Revision Application was preferred invoking revisional jurisdiction of the State Government under the Bombay Prohibition Act, 1949. Even before the Revisional Authority, the Collector through the Superintendent, State Excise submitted his say which referred to the adverse reports of the Police Department and the complaints of the local residents. However, it was grievance of the original Petitioners (Respondent Nos.4 to 6 herein) that the Minister of State Excise, who heard the revision application, reversed both orders and by his order dated 30.10.2010 (impugned order in Writ Petition) allowed the Revision Application and directed that the Collector, Nagpur should obtain an undertaking from the Appellants that they would not cause any inconvenience and problems to the residents of area in case the licence is granted and if any complaint is received, their licence is liable to be cancelled. Upon such an undertaking a FL-III licence should be issued in favour of the Appellant.
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6 It is this order of the State Government which has been set
aside by the learned Single Judge in the subject Writ Petition. Aggrieved by the quashing and setting aside of the order of the State Government and restoring that of the Collector and Commissioner, that the Appellants have approached us in our Appellate Jurisdiction.
7 Mr.Samarth, learned counsel appearing for the Appellant in LPA No.278/2012, submits that there are three principal grounds on which the impugned order of the learned Single Judge deserves to be set aside. The first is that the Respondent Nos.4 to 6 (original Writ Petitioners) have no locus-standi and they could not have challenged the order of the State Government in writ jurisdiction of this Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India. These persons were not before any of the authorities when the orders were passed and therefore, were not heard when the orders were passed either in favour of the Appellant or otherwise. The powers vested in the authorities under the Bombay Prohibition Act, 1949 do not envisage or contemplate giving of hearing to anybody other than the Applicant seeking licence. The matter is strictly between such Applicant and the Licensing Authority. No third party is concerned with the request made by the Applicant. Therefore, the ::: Downloaded on - 09/06/2013 18:58:46 ::: *7* lpa.278.314.12.con.sxw learned Single Judge erred in entertaining the Writ Petition at the behest and instance of the Respondent Nos.4 to 6. Once these persons could not have invoked writ jurisdiction of this Court, then, there was no question of exercising that jurisdiction and setting aside the order of the State Government. That has caused serious prejudice and loss to the Appellant.
8 Mr.Samarth submits that hereafter in all such cases, anybody who makes complaint or raises grievance against such establishment or business, would straightaway insist on being heard by the Licensing Authority or Appellate or Revisional Authority or even by this Court in writ jurisdiction. That would open Pandora's box. The order of the learned Single Judge, therefore, sets erroneous and wrong precedent for future.
9 Assuming without admitting that the learned Single Judge could have entertained the Writ Petition, then, that Writ Petition was not maintainable because there is alternate and equally efficacious remedy available to the local residents to complain about the licence issued in favour of the Appellant and their is an Order, namely, "the Bombay Prohibition (Closure of Licence on Resolution by the Village Panchayat or Gram Sabha or Women/ Social Organization or Representation by Voters in the Village or Ward of Municipal Council/ Corporation) Order, 2003", ::: Downloaded on - 09/06/2013 18:58:46 ::: *8* lpa.278.314.12.con.sxw under which such complaint is entertained. Therefore, when there is alternate and equally efficacious remedy in law, then, the Writ Petition should not have been entertained.
10 Thirdly, the learned Single Judge failed to appreciate that the licence was issued on 30.10.2010 under the revisional jurisdiction of the State Government conferred vide Section 138 of the Bombay Prohibition Act, 1949. That order came to be challenged after enormous delay inasmuch the Writ Petition challenging that order was filed in this Court as late as on 04.07.2011. The delay in presenting the Writ Petition has not been explained leave alone any reason assigned for the same. Therefore, the impugned order could not have been passed on such belated Writ Petition. Thus, on all three counts the impugned order deserves to be quashed and set aside.
11 On merits it is submitted that the only ground on which the licence was refused by the Collector and Commissioner is that the area in question is residential and that there is adverse police report. It is submitted that if the records had been perused carefully, it would become apparent that the area in question was earlier predominantly residential, but now there are commercial activities and there are several shops and ::: Downloaded on - 09/06/2013 18:58:46 ::: *9* lpa.278.314.12.con.sxw commercial establishments. Further, even the Police report is vague and does not specify as to what impact the grant of licence would be having on the law and order situation. In fact, there has been no such threat as report of the Police is that there has been no communal tension or disturbance leave alone violence. There is no complaint after 2010.
Mr.Samarth has invited our attention to the sketch map which depicts, according to him, the other establishments in close vicinity. These other establishments include Bars and Wine Shops. In these circumstances, Mr.Samarth submits that the matter was strictly between the Appellant and the Licensing Authority and the strangers like the original Writ Petitioners cannot object to grant of licence by invoking writ jurisdiction of this Court. When more than 10 months have lapsed from grant of licence, the learned Single Judge should not have set aside the order of the Minister/ State Government. The learned Single Judge lost sight of the fact that this is not a Public Interest Litigation. There is specific order under challenge and the Court cannot entertain any general complaint.
Further, there is no challenge to the policy of granting licence nor is there any plea that the Bombay Prohibition Act, 1949 has been violated or its provisions have been breached in any manner. In these circumstances, when the scope of the proceedings was limited, the learned Single Judge should not have interfered with the order of the State Government/ ::: Downloaded on - 09/06/2013 18:58:46 ::: *10* lpa.278.314.12.con.sxw Minister merely because another view is possible. The order does not disclose any error of law apparent on the face of the record nor is vitiated by malafides. There has been no complaint against the Appellant nor any Police case has been registered. For all these reasons and if the Court feels that the views of the contesting Respondents (original Writ Petitioners) have not been taken into consideration by the Licensing Authority or the State Government, then, the matter should have been remanded so that they are given opportunity of being heard. However, this submission is strictly in the alternative and without prejudice to the above.
12 For all these reasons, Mr.Samarth submits that the appeal be allowed and the judgment of the learned Single Judge be set aside.
Mr.Samarth relies upon the following decisions in support of his above noted contentions:-
1 AIR 1954 SCC 217 Vice Chancellor, Utkal University v/s S.K.Ghosh.
2 AIR 1977 SC 2149(1) The Bihar Eastern Gangetic Fishermen Cooperative Society Ltd. v/s Sipahi Singh and others.
3 AIR 1988 SC 184 Khalil Ahmed Bashir Ahmed v/s Tufelhussein Samasbhai Sarangpurwala.
4 (1996) 9 SCC 309 State of UP and others v/s Harish Chandra and others.::: Downloaded on - 09/06/2013 18:58:46 :::
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5 (2004) 2 SCC 150
Union of India v/s S.B.Vohra and others.
6 (2011) 7 SCC 397
Union of India and another v/s Arulmozhi Iniarasu.
7 AIR 1966 SC 1449 Everest Apartments Cooperative Housing Society Ltd., Bombay v/s State of Maharashtra and others.
8 AIR 1975 SC 2092 Bar Council of Maharashtra v/s M.V.Dabholkar and others.
9 2012(1) ALL MR 150 Shivaji Tulshiram Thakre v/s State of Maharashtra.
13 On the other hand, Ms.Dangre, learned Additional Government Pleader, has submitted that the State has filed another appeal aggrieved and dissatisfied with the order of the learned Single Judge only to the extent that the learned Single Judge makes observations and passes remarks against the State of not having adhered to the Policy of Prohibition which Policy, according to the learned Single Judge, must take precedence over grant of liquor licence. According to Ms.Dangre, the Bombay Prohibition Act, 1949 is not an enactment to only implement the Policy of Prohibition, but that Act has twin objects and it is to amend and consolidate the law relating to the promotion and enforcement of and carrying into effect the Policy of Prohibition, so also, the Abkari law in the State and while amending and consolidating the law it is also necessary to ::: Downloaded on - 09/06/2013 18:58:46 ::: *12* lpa.278.314.12.con.sxw amend and consolidate the Abkari law for the said purpose and for certain other purposes. Therefore, Ms.Dangre submits that this is not an Act enunciating or propagating the Policy of total prohibition, but to regulate and control the issuance of licence and the grant of the same only to those who satisfy the terms and conditions. A perusal of Section 11A of the Bombay Prohibition Act, 1949 would indicate that the same is inserted in the Statute book to enforce the prohibition, as also, to regulate the sale and consumption of any intoxicant. Precisely, this aspect has been lost sight of, by the learned Single Judge. Therefore, if the provisions of the Bombay Prohibition Act, 1949 had been properly perused and read in their entirety, the learned Single Judge could not have reached the conclusion that the State has acted by giving primacy to the issuance of licences and making other object of enforcing the prohibition subservient to the prime object and purpose. All such observations of the learned Single Judge should, therefore, be quashed and set aside. Further, the learned Single Judge has erred in imposing costs of Rs.25,000/- as before such costs are imposed, the learned Single Judge ought to have rendered a finding that the State has committed an act which is totally detrimental to public interest or that the State has acted in a manner by which the original Writ Petitioners have suffered any damage or loss. There is no such finding rendered and therefore, the direction of imposing costs of ::: Downloaded on - 09/06/2013 18:58:46 ::: *13* lpa.278.314.12.con.sxw Rs.25,000/- should be set aside.
14 Mr.Kilor, learned counsel appearing for the Respondent Nos.1 to 3 in LPA No.314/2012 and the Respondent Nos.4 to 6 in LPA No.278/2012, all of whom are the same original Writ Petitioners, supports the order of the learned Single Judge in its entirety and urges that the LPAs should be dismissed as members of public have clear right in law to oppose the issuance of licence for setting up and establishing a business dealing with the intoxicant and liquor if the same causes public nuisance and affects adversely interests of the residents residing nearby. Right to live in peace and tranquility, so also, without any disturbance and nuisance is right guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution of India.
For all these reasons, the judgment of the learned Single Judge does not require any interference and both LPAs should be dismissed.
15 With the assistance of the learned counsel appearing for the parties, we have perused the original Writ Petition and its annexures and the affidavits that have been filed on record. We have also perused carefully the judgment of the learned Single Judge.
16 The learned Single Judge had before him a Writ Petition
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which was filed by certain residents who claim to be aggrieved by issuance of licence to the Appellant's establishment. They claim that they are law abiding citizens of India and are residents of Vidarbha Housing Board Colony, Raghuji Nagar, Ridge Road, Nagpur. They are agitating the issuance and grant of FL-III licence in favour of the Appellant before us.
The Writ Petition was filed on their behalf, so also, on behalf of residents of the Vidarbha Housing Board Colony. It was pointed out that there is great hardship and lot of nuisance caused because of the grant of permission to run an establishment and serve foreign liquor therein. At Raghuji Nagar on Ridge Road, the Vidarbha Housing Board, Nagpur constructed tenements for residential purposes and these tenements were allotted to the economically weaker section. It is contended that the tenements were allotted purely for residential purposes. It is stated that the Appellant before us initially started a hotel in a tenement bearing No.L-7/41. That was strongly opposed, but hotel business has been continued.
17 It is stated that thereafter, on 27.06.2008 an application was made on behalf of the Appellant for grant of FL-III licence in the very same hotel at tenement bearing No.L-7/41. The Collector who is licensing authority caused an inquiry to be made and called for reports from the ::: Downloaded on - 09/06/2013 18:58:46 ::: *15* lpa.278.314.12.con.sxw Police Department. There are four reports referred to in paragraph 7 of the Writ Petition of dated 06.03.2009, 30.06.2009, 30.11.2009 and 22.12.2009.
18 We have carefully perused these reports and which are referred to in the orders of the Collector and the Commissioner. The reports have been relied upon to hold and conclude that the local Corporator and residents in locality have opposed the grant of FL-III licence and by virtue of their vehement opposition, a law and order problem will arise if a licence is issued. That such a licence should not be issued in favour of the Appellant because the local representative of people has objected to issuance of licence. The adverse police reports and complaints have been perused and the Collector holds that there is no establishment adjacent to which such licence is granted. These three reasons are assigned for dismissing the application made by the Appellant. These reports and complaints are also forwarded to the State Government by communication dated 01.10.2010 in the report submitted by the Commissioner, State Excise (Appellate Authority).
19 It is with a view to satisfy ourselves that whether, these reports and complaints were indeed on record or not, that we have ::: Downloaded on - 09/06/2013 18:58:46 ::: *16* lpa.278.314.12.con.sxw perused the memo of appeal and its annexures. What we find from reading thereof is that even after grant of licence and prior thereto, the complaints that were made to Police and the Collector are that the establishment "Shobha's Patiyala Peg Bar & Restaurant" is an establishment wherein business of serving intoxicant and liquor is carried on. That has created nuisance to all those who are residing in its vicinity.
Firstly, it is housing colony and residential area. It is embarrassment for women and children as several persons visit such establishments and come out in an inebriated state. That causes nuisance and annoyance to those who are passing-by and specially school going children and women.
After sunset and during night passing-by these establishments is dangerous and in any event it causes severe embarrassment and serious harassment to the residents in the vicinity. There is nuisance also because people park their vehicles and then visit the Bar. The Bar is functioning even beyond mid night. There is a Bal Hanuman Temple within 100 metres from the establishment. The visitors to the temple suffer inconvenience and embarrassment because abuses are hurled by the drunkards and inebriated customers. There is Eating House licence given to the proprietor of the Appellant. However, without taking into account the views of the residents of the locality, but on account of purely commercial motive, the Appellant's proprietor applied for and obtained ::: Downloaded on - 09/06/2013 18:58:46 ::: *17* lpa.278.314.12.con.sxw the licence and this results in aforementioned activities. The complaint has been signed by several persons and residents.
20 The complaints were made prior to the issuance of licence and what one finds is that throughout the Police Department and those incharge of maintaining law and order of the locality, opposed the grant of such licence. What Mr.Samarth would rely upon is a communication dated 14.10.2008 addressed to the Police Commissioner of Nagpur City by the Deputy Commissioner of Police (Traffic), Nagpur City that conveys no objection for grant of FL-III licence in favour of the Appellant only in terms of parking arrangement and obstruction caused due to parking of vehicles. That may not cause any inconvenience, but by that itself would not be enough to conclude that there was no objection from the local Police Station as alleged.
21 The detailed police reports are on file, that may not indicate as to whether the area is purely residential or whether any commercial activity is permitted in addition to the residential user, but there appears to be opposition from the residents since 2006.
22 It is clear that complaints have been made to the Police
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Commissioner and copies thereof are also placed before us on affidavit by the Respondent Nos.4 to 6. They would indicate that the basis for the complaints is that the area is purely residential and further even the Corporator from that ward as early in October, 2008 complained to the Collector by stating that the establishment where the Appellant is proposing or preparing to start a commercial activity and that too of serving liquor is in residential zone and that would cause serious inconvenience to all residents. Such complaints have been made by the residents and that appears to be clear from perusal of the complaint dated 16.12.2008 addressed to the Collector and the Health Officer of the Municipal Corporation of Nagpur. What has been emphasized therein is that once such activities are allowed, then, ancillary illegal activities would also start inasmuch as those visiting such establishments and places would purchase tobacco and other products and the vendors will set up their business finding it to be lucrative. There may be persons selling other eatables such as eggs and meat. The footpath would be utilized by such vendors and serious embarrassment would be caused to the residents and particularly to women and children. There is Bal Hanuman Temple in the vicinity and there is also establishment of the Provident Fund Commissioner. It appears that the Appellant had already been warned by the Nagpur Housing and Area Development Board by its communication ::: Downloaded on - 09/06/2013 18:58:46 ::: *19* lpa.278.314.12.con.sxw dated 24.04.2009 that the tenement allotted to him cannot be used for commercial purpose. The Sakkardara Police Station was approached, so also, the Collector and the Nagpur Housing and Area Development Board with identical complaints. They, therefore, reported that it would not be advisable to issue such licence. Once the Nagpur Housing and Area Development Board which is a statutory body has also opposed any such user or activity of serving liquor, then, it is futile to urge that the Complainants were having some vested interests or were disgruntled elements. There is no suggestion that the Complainants were acting at the behest of somebody and particularly rival traders. No such argument has been raised before us by Mr.Samarth. He does not dispute that on 06.03.2009 the Assistant Commissioner of Police has pointed out to the Superintendent of State Excise that if FL-III licence is granted to the Appellant, there may be law and order problem in future and possibility of violence and disturbance occurring in future cannot be ruled out. Even the Corporator of the area had made such complaint. The orders of the Collector and the Commissioner specifically refer to this complaint and situation at site. Such reports of the Police Department are referred to in the orders of the Collector and the Commissioner and they point out that at a distance of 90 metres from the establishment there is temple. There may be an establishment to which FL-II licence has been issued and that ::: Downloaded on - 09/06/2013 18:58:46 ::: *20* lpa.278.314.12.con.sxw may be located within 300 metres from the Appellant's establishment, but that is selling sealed liquor bottles. That is not an establishment where intoxicant and liquor are served to the customers and liquor is not consumed in the shop. Further, there are four restaurants and bars within 400 to 600 metres, but those are not on the same road. In such circumstances, the Police reports of June 2009, November 2009 and December 2009 reiterate the position set out in the contents of the earlier reports.
23 We are not in agreement with Mr.Samarth that the distance factor, namely, 75 metres or 100 metres from the schools, religious structures/ temples, hospitals etc. should have been taken into consideration and if no such structures are there within the vicinity of the Appellant's establishment, then, the licence could not have been rejected.
Here, emphasis is not on distance from such establishments and structures which is of course an mandatory requirement. Apart therefrom, in the facts and circumstances of the present case, the foundation of the orders passed by the Collector and the Commissioner is that there is serious objection from the residents and there are complaints made from time to time which highlighted the issue of public nuisance, inconvenience to the residents, embarrassment to women and school and college going ::: Downloaded on - 09/06/2013 18:58:46 ::: *21* lpa.278.314.12.con.sxw children. The situation being unsafe and specially during late evening and late night hours, the scenario where a person in drunken condition and inebriated state coming out of the establishment in case a licence is granted, is a matter equally of concern. It is certainly germane and relevant consideration for grant of licences and particularly to serve liquor and intoxicants in an establishment which is set up for purely commercial gains. If right to trade in intoxicant is not a fundamental right, then, the complaints from local residents, adverse police reports and opposition from the local representative of people, so also, statutory authorities, can be taken into account to deny the licence in individual cases and to such Applicants and establishments who can be potential cause of harassment, nuisance and annoyance to the residents. If public interest and public good is dominant and paramount consideration, then, all such activities have to be regulated, controlled, checked and even prohibited and that can be done by the State. There is no unrestricted and absolute right in anybody and particularly of selling liquor and intoxicants. If public health, public nuisance and public interest are not germane considerations and relevant factors, then, we fail to understand what can be the guiding tests for the authorities in considering the application of the nature made by the Appellant before us. In such cases where there is wide opposition and that is not found to be at the behest of any vested interest or rival traders ::: Downloaded on - 09/06/2013 18:58:46 ::: *22* lpa.278.314.12.con.sxw or on account of personal or pure enmity, then, that cannot be ignored or brushed aside. In these circumstances, we are of the view that both the Collector and the Commissioner committed no error by relying on these complaints and adverse police reports and concluding that no case is made out for issuance of FL-III licence in favour of the Appellant.
24 The State Government while exercising its revisional powers has not held that there were no complaints or that complaints were deliberately invited, concocted or cooked up, but what the Minister in his order states is that such police reports ought to indicate only the aspect of any communal tension or riots and other sensitive matters. The report of law and order situation and comments from the Police ought to project only these aspects and essentially whether, the grant of licence would incite any communal tension or violence. The Minister does not dispute that the police in their reports can take into consideration not just the impact on the community with special emphasis on development of any communal violence or tension, but other sensitive matters also. We do not see how the Minister can comment upon the contents of Police reports. If the Police reports indicate that there are large scale complaints of public nuisance, public inconvenience and serious harassment and embarrassment to the women and children which may give rise to law ::: Downloaded on - 09/06/2013 18:58:46 ::: *23* lpa.278.314.12.con.sxw and order problem in case licence is granted, then, certainly the Police Department and individual Police Stations are well within their authority and powers to include such events and aspects in their reports. It is not for the Minister to express any opinion or make any comment or lay down any guidelines as to how a Police report should be prepared or what it should indicate or what matter it should contain or project.
25 It may be that communal tension or communal violence or communal peace is relevant consideration and factor, however, that alone is not decisive or final. Particular area or colony will have its own peculiar problems or issues. It is combination of several factors which may give rise to conflicts, fights, disturbances and this could be because of peculiar composition of the area. It is not which religious community or group, majority or minority, inhabitates the area. The situation of the present nature has to be judged not by religious or communal standards or in terms of religion or by dividing the inhabitants or residents into minority or majority communities. Even a predominantly minority or majority area can witness communal tension and communal violence. There could be other tensions which may give rise to violence or similar such activities which are prejudicial to public peace. Therefore, it is combination of several factors and one of which may be communal situation, but to ::: Downloaded on - 09/06/2013 18:58:46 ::: *24* lpa.278.314.12.con.sxw suggest that this alone is conclusive, is preposterous to say the least. The Minister of State Excise is no authority to guide the police department and Home Ministry personnel on these matters. He, therefore, exceeded his jurisdiction. That apart he called for Police report himself and which reiterated the contents of earlier reports. However, the Minister discards that report on the ground that within the vicinity of the Appellant's establishment and 300 to 600 metres thereof, there are five Liquor Shops and Bars and which are functional and because of them no law and order problem has arisen or will arise, then, how could such situation arise only if a licence is issued to the Appellant, has not been clarified at all.
Therefore, the Minister terms the Police report as vague.
26 The sweeping and general observations in the State Government's order indicate that the Minister was bent on granting a licence in favour of the Appellant and that is why he ignored and brushed aside cogent and relevant material and considerations. That there is possibility of law and order problem or adverse law and order situation in case the licence is granted to the Appellant is the conclusion in the Police reports based on number of complaints from the residents over a period of time and also from local representative of people. Therefore, this is a valid criteria adopted by the Police and their comments that the law and order ::: Downloaded on - 09/06/2013 18:58:46 ::: *25* lpa.278.314.12.con.sxw situation may be affected adversely in case of Appellant's licence being granted, need not be taken lightly leave alone totally discarded by the Minister because there are other establishments of similar nature on account of which such situation has not developed or arisen for all these years. The Police Department cannot give any guarantee and is not expected to give one. They indicate possibilities. They alone know the law and order situation and how to control the same. Once the Police Department finds that individual establishment can cause law and order situation in future, then, it is not proper on the part of the licensing authority and equally the State Government/ Minister to override their reports or their contents and grant licence to the establishment like the Appellant. It is such conduct of the State Government which has invited certain adverse comments from the learned Single Judge. One could be appalled and disturbed at such an approach of the State which is supposed to uphold public interest and act for maintenance of public peace and in preserving and protecting public good. The State is expected to set such standards so that there is balance in the society and conflicts emerging from exercise of conflicting rights of the nature as in the present case and opposition thereto, are avoided. If larger public interest requires the State to override private interest and that is an expectation from a welfare state, then, if in particular facts and circumstances such an ::: Downloaded on - 09/06/2013 18:58:46 ::: *26* lpa.278.314.12.con.sxw approach is not reflected and the expectation is not fulfilled that is enough justification to make an adverse comment. The order passed by the State Government, in this case, which is based on certain general assumptions, conjectures and surmises by ignoring overwhelming public interest and attempts to justify such order before a Court of Law, certainly can invite the comments of the nature made by the learned Single Judge.
Moreover, the observations and conclusions in the order of the Minister and particularly that the area was earlier residential, but now commercial, are clearly contrary to and beyond the record. The Minister refers to the complaint made by the local Corporator and one Mahila Mandal, but proceeds to observe that such Corporator or Women Organization ought to have complained against other establishments selling liquor and serving the same. The Minister seems to suggest that the Corporator and such organizations are targeting only the Appellant, therefore, there is possibility, according to the Minister, that such complaints could be motivated and at the behest of the rival traders.
27 We are equally surprised at such act of exceeding the brief and to such an extent. The powers under the Bombay Prohibition Act, 1949 certainly enable the Government and the State to grant and regulate the issuance of licences to establishments carrying on business similar to ::: Downloaded on - 09/06/2013 18:58:46 ::: *27* lpa.278.314.12.con.sxw that of the Appellant before us. However, if the order of the Minister in this case is perused in its entirety and in totality, so also, in the backdrop of the facts and circumstances in this case, one finds that a holder of public office is expected to uphold public trust. He should have been more careful and responsible. He is the Minister of Prohibition and Excise Department of the State of Maharashtra. However, the State Government comprises of several departments and all such departments are expected to act in coordination so that their orders and actions reflect genuine concern for the public. As a part of welfare state, the Government has to take into account public sentiments. The complaints from public and public voice can be ignored by the welfare state at its own risk and peril.
The State Government cannot evaluate the public interest by looking at it department-wise or by apportioning it departmentally. An activity which is beneficial and generates revenue for one Department may be directly in contravention to the functions and duties of another department and might equally run counter to the obligation of a welfare state. The learned Single Judge has, therefore, emphasized that liquor licences may generate revenue and give tremendous income to the State, however, the State cannot ignore that all discretion and power including to issue licences is coupled with a duty. That power and discretion cannot be exercised as per the whims and fancies of the State. If the orders of the nature passed in ::: Downloaded on - 09/06/2013 18:58:46 ::: *28* lpa.278.314.12.con.sxw the present case show that the discretionary power which is in the nature of a trust, has not been exercised bearing in mind public interest and public good, then, while striking down the act and order, it is equally the duty of the Court to remind the State of doctrine of Good Governance.
Precisely that has been emphasized in the order of the learned Single Judge. Therefore, we are of the view that the comments and remarks of the learned Single Judge must be seen in the facts and circumstances of the present case and considering the order impugned before him. While scrutinizing the order of the State Government impugned before him, he has made observations and comments. We see them as confined and restricted to the facts and circumstances of this case. The learned Single Judge has not laid down any general rule or any principle of law as suggested by the learned counsel appearing for the Appellant and the learned Additional Government Pleader. The comments and remarks of the learned Single Judge reflect his pain and anguish on the approach of the State Government. Even we could not resist the above observations and comments because if the order or opinion of the learned Minister of Prohibition and State Excise is to be taken as a view of the State Government, then, there is likelihood of liquor licences being granted for the asking and even if there are large scale complaints from members of public. It is not expected that protests, which are peaceful and ::: Downloaded on - 09/06/2013 18:58:46 ::: *29* lpa.278.314.12.con.sxw democratic, would be overlooked for some gains, by a elected Government in the Parliamentary System of Democracy. People in residential colonies are not expected to resort to remedies provided by the 2003 Order only. They can lodge complaints and given representations by approaching State functionaries. Even elected representatives at local level can convey public sentiments to the officials.
28 The learned Minister refers to some rule and regulation whereby the members of public can complain to the Collector or the Superintendent of Central Excise against issuance of liquor licences by giving representations and such establishments can be closed down. What his opinion and conclusion overlooks is that there is no prohibition in law for opposing the grant of licence issued to commence and establish a business of serving foreign liquor to customers in restaurant or commercial establishment. It is not as if the people can complain only when the licences are granted and such establishments are functional and operational. That would mean the members of public and their views will never be taken into account prior to commencement of business of the present nature. The suggestion is that let such licences be issued and you have no voice in issuance of same. After issuance of the licence if the activities are detrimental to public interest and cause nuisance to public, ::: Downloaded on - 09/06/2013 18:58:46 ::: *30* lpa.278.314.12.con.sxw then, you can complain for stopping and prohibiting the same. The learned Minister's view of the prohibition law can certainly not be taken and ought not be and possibly is not the view of the State. It would be completely contrary to public interest if the State were to act in terms of the opinion and conclusions of the Minister in this case. That would certainly give rise to conflicts and tension within the society. That means, nobody working or residing in cities and colonies can complain about permission, authorization and licences for setting up hotels, liquor shops, beer bars, etc.. They can only approach and complain to the authorities after such activities commence and are carried out. Taking the views expressed by the Minister in his order as that of the State Government, possibly invited the wrath of the learned Single Judge. The Minister has advised the members of public to take recourse to rules and regulations prescribed for complaining about such acts and they should resort to said procedure and then alone their grievances and complaints can be looked into and taken cognizance of. The learned Minister, therefore, overemphasizes the form and ignores the substance. He gives unnecessary weightage to the procedural rules. Therefore, the observation of the Minister violates basic tenets of an enactment like the Bombay Prohibition Act, 1949.
::: Downloaded on - 09/06/2013 18:58:46 ::: *31* lpa.278.314.12.con.sxw
29 The Minister then suggests that if there are schools and
colleges within the vicinity and located within 75 metres, then, alone the licence can be denied and not otherwise. There is nothing like unrestricted, uncontrolled, unregulated, unbridled permission or licence to serve or sell liquor and Intoxicants. The order of Minister seems to suggest that activities of nature commenced by Appellant are prohibited within 100 metres of the schools, religious institutions and not otherwise.
If it is the distance and that alone is a relevant factor, then, nobody including a Hospital or Medical Practitioners can complain about a liquor Bar, Beer Bar, Restaurant, etc. serving food and liquor and causing nuisance to patients and those who are ailing and suffering, if the nursing homes and hospitals are located in close vicinity, but beyond 75 or 100 metres. Such activities can cause nuisance, annoyance, hindrance and equally breach of peace and tranquility even if they are within a permitted location. The location and distance is certainly a mandatory condition which must be complied with. It is but one of the required and guiding factor and by no stretch of imagination can it be said to be conclusive and decisive. If establishment of the nature of Appellant is located beyond specified and required distance, yet, if it is a cause for public nuisance and adversely affects peace and tranquility of those residing within its vicinity and nearby areas, then, such activity has to be regulated and controlled or ::: Downloaded on - 09/06/2013 18:58:46 ::: *32* lpa.278.314.12.con.sxw even prohibited. Going by distance criteria alone would be hazardous, risky and not conducive to public interest. In these circumstances and because of the observations and conclusions of the Revisional Authority in the order impugned before the learned Single Judge that the learned Single Judge was compelled to emphasize the role of the State, the Policy of Prohibition and regulation and control of activities like grant of licence for selling and trading in liquor. It was the concern of general public and sentiments that found there place in the learned Single Judge's order.
30 The Bombay Prohibition Act, 1949 enables the State Government to grant licences and permits for consumption and sale of liquor. It is clear from the provisions of the Act and its sections which have to be read together and harmoniously that enactment seeks to create a mechanism for regulating and controlling the sale of liquor and intoxicant. Chapter-II of the Act deals with the Establishments. Chapter-III enacts prohibition. Sections 11 to 24A appearing therein would indicate that while permitting manufacture, etc. of intoxicant the State has not ignored but rather upheld public interest and has given due place for public sentiments and grievances (see Section 11A, which has been introduced by amendment to the Act in 1997). Section 12 provides for prohibition of manufacture of liquor and construction and working of ::: Downloaded on - 09/06/2013 18:58:46 ::: *33* lpa.278.314.12.con.sxw distillery or brewery. Section 13 prohibits sale of liquor and enacts absolute provision, namely, no person can bottle any liquor for sale or consume or use liquor, or use, keep or have in his possession any materials, implements or apparatus whatsoever for the manufacture of any liquor. In prior provisions, there is absolute prohibition for manufacture of liquor, construction or working of any distillery or brewery; import, export, transport or possess liquor or sell or buy liquor.
Section 14 prohibits trading in any intoxicating drugs and similar such drugs, drinks and beverages have been dealt with by Sections 15 to 21A.
Then section 22 prohibits allowing any premises to be used as common drinking house. Section 22A enacts prohibition for issuing prescriptions for intoxicating liquor except by registered medical practitioners. There are further provisions prohibiting certain activities in intoxicants. Section 24A states that certain Articles are exempted from the provisions of Chapter-III.
31 Chapter-IV enacts the provisions for control, regulation and exemptions. This is a chapter which enables the State to grant licence of various types so as to permit dealing in liquor. Section 35 provides for Hotel Licences and reads thus:-
"35. Hotel Licences:-
(1) The State Government may, by rules or an order in ::: Downloaded on - 09/06/2013 18:58:46 ::: *34* lpa.278.314.12.con.sxw writing, authorize an officer to grant licences to the managers of hotels to sell foreign liquor to the holders of permits granted under this Act:
Provided that the State Government is satisfied that such hotel has ordinarily a sufficient number of boarders eligible to hold permits.
(2) Such licences shall be issued on the following conditions:-
(i) liquor shall be sold to the permit holders (residing or boarding) at the hotel,
(ii) consumption of liquor sold shall not be allowed in any of the rooms of the hotel to which any member of the public has access,
(iii) the holders of hotel licences shall pay the expenses of any officer of the excise establishment, if any, required for the grant and control of permits on the premises or for the supervision over the issue and consumption of foreign liquor in the hotel."
32 There are permits which are issued for use and consumption of foreign liquor and those provisions are enacted by Sections 40 to 48 and then comes Section 49 which was inserted by Mah.70 of 1981 and reads thus:-
"49. Exclusive privilege of Government to import, etc., intoxicants, etc., and fees levied include rent or consideration for grant of such privilege to person concerned.
Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act, the State Government shall have the exclusive right or privilege of importing, exporting, transporting, manufacturing, bottling, selling, buying, possessing or using any intoxicant, hemp or toddy, and whenever under this Act or any licence, permit, pass, thereunder any fees are levied and collected for any licence, permit, pass, authorisation or other permission given to any person for any such purpose, such fees shall be deemed to include the rent or ::: Downloaded on - 09/06/2013 18:58:46 ::: *35* lpa.278.314.12.con.sxw consideration for the grant of such right or privilege to that person by or on behalf of the State Government."
33 Thereafter there appear several provisions specifying the officers and authorities who will grant the licences and permits. Then comes Section 53 which reads as under:-
"53. General conditions regarding licences, etc.:-
All licences, permits, passes, or authorisations granted under this Act shall be in such form and shall, in addition to or in variation or substitution of any of the conditions provided by this Act, be subject to such conditions as may be prescribed and shall be granted on payment of the prescribed fee:
Provided that every licence, permit, pass or authorisation shall be granted only on the condition that the person applying undertakes, and in the opinion of the officer authorised to grant the licence, permit, pass or authorisation is likely to abide by all the conditions of the licence, permit, pass or authorisation and the provisions of this Act."
34 Section 54 gives power to cancel or suspend licences and permits and there are provisions enabling attachment of licences and supervision over the activities.
35 Chapter IV-A has been inserted by Bombay 26 of 1952 for control and regulation of articles mentioned in Section 24A to prevent ::: Downloaded on - 09/06/2013 18:58:46 ::: *36* lpa.278.314.12.con.sxw their use as intoxicating liquor. The same is the mandate of Chapter IV-B. Chapter V deals with Mhowra flowers. Chapter VI deals with control and regulation of molasses. Chapter VII deals with the offences and penalties for illegal activities.
36 The scheme of Sections and Orders in which they appear in the statute makes it clear that the underlying policy of the State by enacting the Act is to fulfill and perform, so also, act in furtherance of the directive principles referred to in Article 47 of the Constitution of India.
Therefore, the learned Single Judge was in no error and we do not agree with Mr.Samarth and the learned AGP that the learned Single Judge was not required to emphasize or has laid undue emphasis on the directive principles of State Policy and particularly dealing with prohibition. In a recent judgment of the Honourable Supreme Court, reported in AIR 2006 SC 1987 (State of Maharashtra v/s Nagpur Distillers), it has been held thus:-
"9. ................ This factual distinction apart, we have to keep in mind that the right to trade in liquor is only a privilege farmed out by the State. Article 47 of the Constitution of India clearly casts a duty on the State at least to reduce the consumption of liquor in the State gradually leading to prohibition itself. It appears to be right to point out that the time has come for the States and the Union Government to seriously think of taking steps to achieve the goal set by Article 47 of the Constitution of India. It is a notorious fact, of which we can take judicial notice, that ::: Downloaded on - 09/06/2013 18:58:46 ::: *37* lpa.278.314.12.con.sxw more and more of the younger generation in this country is getting addicted to liquor. It has not only become a fashion to consume it but it has also become an obsession with very many. Surely, we do not need an indolent nation. Why the State in the face of Article 47 of the Constitution of India should encourage, that too practically unrestrictedly, the trade in liquor is something that it is difficult to appreciate. The only excuse for the State for not following the mandate of Article 47 of the Constitution is that huge revenue is generated by this trade and such revenue is being used for meeting the financial needs of the State. What is more relevant here is to notice that the monopoly in the trade is with the State and it is only a privilege that a licensee has in the matter of manufacturing and vending liquor."
37 In a judgment reported in AIR 1951 SC 318 (The State of Bombay and another v/s F.N.Balsara), the Supreme Court held thus:-
"17. There is in my opinion another method of approaching the question which also deserves consideration. Remembering that the object of the Prohibition Act was not merely to levy excise duties but also to prohibit use, consumption, possession and sale of intoxicating liquor, the legislature had the power to legislate upon the subjects included in the Act not only under entry 31 of List II, but also under entry 14, which refers 'inter-alia' to public health. Art.47 of the Constitution, which contains one of the directive principles of State policy, provides that:
"the State shall regard the raising of the level of nutrition and the standard of living of its people and the improvement of public health as among its primary duties & in particular, the State shall endeavour to bring about prohibition of the consumption, except for medicinal purposes, of intoxicating drinks & of drugs which are injurious to health".
This Article has no direct bearing on the Act which was passed in 1949, but a reference to it supports to some ::: Downloaded on - 09/06/2013 18:58:46 ::: *38* lpa.278.314.12.con.sxw extent the conclusion that the idea of prohibition is connected with public health, & to enforce prohibition effectively the wider definition of the word "liquor" would have to be adopted so as to include all alcoholic liquids which may be used as substitutes for intoxicating drinks, to the detriment of health. On the whole, I am unable to agree with the High Court's finding, & hold that the definition of "liquor" in the Bombay Prohibition Act is not 'ultra vires'.
18. The learned Attorney-General also relied upon entry 1 of List II which relates among other items to "public order", & though at first sight it may appear to be far-fetched to bring the subject of intoxicating liquor under "public order", yet it should be noted that there has been a tendency in Europe and America to regard alcoholism as a menace to public order. In 'Russel v. The Queen' 1882-7 A C 829, Sir Montague Smith held that the Canada Temperance Act, 1878, the object and scope of which was to promote temperance by means of a uniform law throughout the Dominion, was a law relating to the "peace, order, and good government" of Canada, and, in so deciding, said as follows:-
"Laws of this nature designed for the promotion of public order, safety, or morals and which subject those who contravene them to criminal procedure and punishment, belong to the subject of public wrongs rather than to that of civil rights. They are of a nature which falls within the general authority of Parliament to make laws for the order and good government of Canada." (P.839) Again, referring to liquor laws and liquor control, a learned British author ('The Encyclopaedia Britanica', Edn. 14, Vol.14, p.191) says as follows:-
"The dominant motive everywhere, however, has been a social one, to combat a menace to public order and the increasing evils of alcoholism in the interests of health and social welfare. The evils vary greatly from one country to another according to differences in climate, diet, economic conditions and even within the same country according to differences in habits, social customs and standards of public morality. A new factor of growing importance since the middle of the 19th century ::: Downloaded on - 09/06/2013 18:58:47 ::: *39* lpa.278.314.12.con.sxw has been the rapid urbanisation, industrialization and mechanization of our modern every day life in the leading nations of the world, and the consequent wider recognition of the advantages of sobriety in safeguarding public order and physical efficiency."
These passages may lend some support to the contention of the learned Attorney-General that the Act comes also within the subject of "public order", but I prefer to leave out of account this entry, which has a remote bearing, if any, on the object and scope of the present Act."
The above observations of the Hon'ble Supreme Court have been made while construing the Act of the Maharashtra State, namely, the Bombay Prohibition Act, 1949, but they seem to have no impact and the State is still not abiding by the same. Judicial Notice has been taken of Alcoholism and its menace to the society especially women, youth and children.
38 In a judgment reported in AIR 1978 SC 1457 (P.N.Kaushal etc. v/s Union of India and others), the Supreme Court held thus:-
"6. Why drastically regulate the drink trade? - the Social rationale - on Brandies brief. - Anywhere on our human planet the sober imperative of moderating the consumption of inebriating methane substances and manacling liquor business towards that end, will meet with axiomatic acceptance. Medical, criminological and sociological testimony on a cosmic scale bears out the tragic miscellany of traumatic consequences of, shattered health and broken homes, of crime escalation with alcohol as the hidden villain or aggressively promotional anti- hero, of psychic breakdowns, insane cravings and efficiency impairment, of pathetic descent to doom sans ::: Downloaded on - 09/06/2013 18:58:47 ::: *40* lpa.278.314.12.con.sxw sense, sans shame, sans everything, and host of other disasters individuals, familial, genetic and societal.
7. We need not have dilated further on the deleterious impost of unchecked alcohol intake on consumers and communities but Shri Mahajan advocated regulation as valid with the cute rider that even water intake, if immoderate, may affect health and so regulation of liquor trade may not be valid, if more drastic than for other edibles. The sequitur he argued for was that the two-day ban on liquor licensees was unreasonable under Art. 19(g) read with Art.19(6). He also branded the power to restrict the days and hours of sale of liquor without specification of guidelines as arbitrary and scouted the submission of the Addl. Solicitor General that the noxious nature of alcohol and the notorious fall-out from gentle bibbing at the beginning on to deadly addiction at the end was inherent guideline to salvage the provision from constitutional casualty. Innocently the equate alcohol with aqua is an exercise in intoxication and straining judicial credibility to absurdity. We proceed to explain why alcohol business is dangerous and its very injurious character and mischief potential legitimate active policing of the trade by any welfare State even absent Art.47.
18. Jack Hobbs, the great cricketer, held:
"The greatest enemy to success on the cricket field is the drinking habit."
19. And Don Bradman, than whom few batsmen better wielded the willow, encored and said:
"Leave drink alone. Abstinence is the thing that is what made me."
20. Sir Andrew Clark, in Lachrymal language spun the lesson from hospital beds:
"As I looked at the hospital wards today and saw that seven out of ten owed their diseases to alcohol, I could but lament that the teaching about this question was not more direct, more decisive, more home-thrusting than ever it had been."::: Downloaded on - 09/06/2013 18:58:47 :::
*41* lpa.278.314.12.con.sxw
21. George Bernard Shaw, a provocative teetotaller, used tart words of trite wisdom:
"If a natural choice between drunkenness and sobriety were possible, I would leave the people free to choose. But then I see an enormous capitalistic organisation pushing drink under people's noses of every corner and pocketing the price while leaving me and others to pay the colossal damages, then I am prepared to smash that organisation and make it as easy for a poor man to stay sober, if he wants to as it is for his dog.
Alcohol robs you of that last inch of efficiency that makes the difference between first-rate and second-rate. I don't drink beer-first, because I don't like it; and second, because my profession is one that obliges me to keep in critical training, and beer is fatal both to training and to criticism.
Only teetotallers can produce the best and sanest of which they are capable.
Drinking is the chloroform that enables the poor to endure the painful operation of living.
It is in the last degree disgraceful that a man cannot provide his own genuine courage and high spirits without drink.
I should be utterly ashamed if my soul had shrivelled up to such an extent that I had to go out and drink a whisky."
22. The constitutional test of reasonableness, built into Art. 19 and of arbitrariness implicit in Art.14, has a relativist touch. We have to view the impact of alcohol and temperance on a given society; and for us, the degree of constitutional restriction and the strategy of meaningful enforcement will naturally depend on the Third World setting, the ethos of our people, the economic compulsions of today and of human tomorrow. Societal realities shape social justice. While the universal evil in alcohol has been indicated the particularly pernicious consequence of the drink evil in India may be useful to remember while scanning the rationale of an Indian temperance measure. Nearly four decades ago, Gandhiji, articulating the inarticulate millions' well being, wrote:
"The most that tea and coffee can do is to cause a little ::: Downloaded on - 09/06/2013 18:58:47 ::: *42* lpa.278.314.12.con.sxw extra expense, but one of the most greatly felt evils of the British Rule is the importation of alcohol......... that enemy of mankind, that curse of civilisation - in some form or another. The measure of the evil wrought by this borrowed habit will be properly gauged by the reader when he is told that the enemy has spread throughout the length and breadth of India, in spite of the religious prohibition for even the touch of a bottle containing alcohol pollutes the Mohammedan, according to his religion, and the religion of the Hindu strictly prohibits the use of alcohol in any form whatever, and yet alas, the Government, it seems, instead of stopping, is aiding and abetting the spread of alcohol. The poor there, as everywhere, are the greatest sufferers. It is they who spend what little they earn in buying alcohol instead of buying good food and other necessaries. It is that wretched poor man who has to starve his family, who has to break the sacred trust of looking after his children, if any, in order to drink himself into misery and premature death. Here be it said to the credit of Mr.Caine, the ex-
Member for Barrow, that, he undaunted, is still carrying on his admirable crusade against the spread of the evil, but what can the energy of one man, however, powerful, do against the inaction of an apathetic and dormant Government."
23. Parenthetically speaking, many of these thoughts may well be regarded by Gandhians as an indictment of governmental policy even today.
24. The thrust of drink control has to be studied in a Third World country, developing its; human resources and the haven if offers to the poor, especially their dependents.
Gandhiji again:
"For me the drink question is one of dealing with a growing social evil against which the State is bound to provide whilst it has got the opportunity. The aim is patent. We want to wean the labouring population and the Harijans from the curse. It is a gigantic problem, and the best resources of all social workers, especially women, will be taxed to the utmost before the drink habit goes. The prohibition I have adumbrated is but the beginning ::: Downloaded on - 09/06/2013 18:58:47 ::: *43* lpa.278.314.12.con.sxw (undoubtedly indispensable) of the reform. We cannot reach the drinker so long as he has the drink shop near his door to tempt him."
29. In Madras, prohibition was inaugurated on 2nd October 1948, by the Premier, the Hon'ble Mr. O. P. Ramaswami Reddiar who pronounced it a red letter day.
30. In 1949, West Punjab took steps for the establishment of prohibition. In 1949, nearly half the area of the Central Provinces and Berar got dry, and it was proposed to enforce prohibition throughout the State.
31. In Bombay the Prohibition Bill was passed and became Act in 1949, and Bombay got dry by April 1950.
32. The number of offences; under the Abkari Act is notoriously high. It shows the craving of some persons for liquor in spite of all good efforts of legal prohibition. The remedy lies in making prohibition successful through education (even at the school stage), suggestion, re- education.
35. Of course, the struggle for Swaraj went beyond political liberation and demanded social transformation.
Redemption from drink evil was woven into this militant movement and Gandhiji was the expression of this mission.
"I hold drink to be more damnable than thieving and perhaps even prostitution. Is it not often the parent to both? I ask you to join the country in sweeping out of existence the drink revenue and abolishing the liquor shops.
Let me, therefore, re-declare my faith in undiluted prohibition before I land myself in deeper water. If I was appointed dictator for one hour for all India, the first thing I would do would be to close without compensation all the liquor shops destroy all the toddy palms such as I know them in Gujarat, compel factory owners to produce humane conditions for the workmen and open refreshment and recreation rooms where these workmen would get innocent drinks and equally innocent ::: Downloaded on - 09/06/2013 18:58:47 ::: *44* lpa.278.314.12.con.sxw amusements. I would close down the factories if the owners pleaded for want of funds."
38. The Panorama of views, insights and analyses we have tediously projected serves the sociological essay on adjudicating the reasonableness and arbitrariness of the impugned shut down order on Tuesdays and Fridays.
Whatever our personal views and reservations on the philosophy, the politics, the economics and the pragmatics of prohibition, we are called upon to pass on the vires of the amended order. "We, the people of India', have enacted Article 47 and 'we, the Justices of India' cannot 'lure it back to cancel half a life' or 'wash out a word of it', especially when progressive implementation of the policy of prohibition is, by Articles 38 and 47 made fundamental to the country's governance. The Constitution is the property of the people and the courts know-how is to apply the constitution, not to assess it. In the process of interpretation, Part IV of the Constitution must enter the soul of Part III and the laws, as held by the Court in State of Kerala v. N. M.Thomas, (1976) 1 SCR 906 (AIR 1976 SC 490) and earlier. The dynamics of statutory construction, in a country like ours, where the pre- Independence Legislative package has to be adapted to the vital spirit of the Constitution, may demand that new wine be poured into old bottles, language permitting. ......"
39 Therefore, it is not unreasonable to expect that the State does not depart from its avowed policy of prohibiting indiscriminate sale and consumption of liquor. The Act prohibits sale. The State is not expected to encourage sale and consumption of liquor without any control and regulation. While not completely prohibiting such activities what the law enacts is a measure towards achieving total prohibition, which is the ::: Downloaded on - 09/06/2013 18:58:47 ::: *45* lpa.278.314.12.con.sxw ultimate goal of the welfare state as held by the Honourable Supreme Court. Therefore, it may be that the learned Single Judge fell in some error in making one purpose or object of the Act as inferior and other as superior. However, if the provisions of the Act are seen in above perspective and in their entirety, it would be once clear that the Bombay Prohibition Act, 1949 seeks to achieve twin objects of amending and consolidating the law relating to the promotion and enforcement of and carrying into effect the policy of prohibition and also the Abkari law in the State, which is nothing but an measure seeking to achieve promotion and enforcement of and carrying into effect the policy of prohibition.
Therefore, there is nothing like inferiority and superiority of the objects and purposes. The objects and purposes have to be understood as a whole and there is no intent to depart from to defeat the promotion and enforcement of the policy of prohibition. The Act seeks to further and carry into effect such policy. The provisions of the Act have to be understood and construed in this manner so that absolute privilege which has been given and conferred in the State is seen not in isolation but as a part of larger welfare measure. Section 49, therefore, gives exclusive privilege and exclusive right to the Government of importing, exporting, transporting, manufacturing, bottling, selling, buying, possessing or using any intoxicant, hemp or toddy and whenever under this Act, any licence, ::: Downloaded on - 09/06/2013 18:58:47 ::: *46* lpa.278.314.12.con.sxw permit, etc. are to be issued, the fees are to be levied and collected for the same, that to be seen in exercise of the privilege by the State. If the statement of object and reasons by which Section 49 was inserted is referred to, it would be apparent that there was a doubt with regard to the power of the State to levy and collect fees on licences, permits etc. and with a view to clarify that the State can levy them, that the Legislature had to step in. In these circumstances, it is not for us to elaborate and consider any further and particularly as to whether the Act seeks to effect the policy of prohibition alone or is an Act to permit sale and other related activities in relation to intoxicants including liquor. If the Act is read and understood as above, it does not permit free trade in liquor as commonly understood or to allow the activities of the nature sought to be regulated, controlled and prohibited, to go on unchecked.
40 In view of our conclusions as above, we are of the opinion that there is no merit in appeal preferred by the Appellant M/s Hotel Shobha. Once above view is taken then each of the contentions of Mr.Samarth must fail. There is no question of any alternate remedy and particularly under the Order of 2003. That is but one more opportunity for aggrieved parties like original Writ Petitioners to raise their grievance and make complaints, but existence of that does not prevent them from ::: Downloaded on - 09/06/2013 18:58:47 ::: *47* lpa.278.314.12.con.sxw opposing grant of licence to the establishments like the Appellant as that is the underlying theme of the law of prohibition in the State. Even grant of authorisation and licence for manufacturing and sale of the intoxicant can be opposed and precisely that is the reason why the complaints were entertained by the Police, Collector and Commissioner. The Writ Petition, therefore, could not have been dismissed on the ground of alternate remedy.
41We are of the further opinion that there is no inordinate or unexplained delay in filing the Writ Petition inasmuch as the licence was issued under the order of the Minister after 30.10.2010 and subject Writ Petition has been filed in the month of July, 2011. The members of public had continued grievance not only, in this case, against grant of licence but also against functioning of the Appellant's establishment. Therefore, the cause of action in this case is not such which could be said to have been lost or which cannot be said to be subsisting and continuing one. In these circumstances, the Writ Petition could not have been thrown out on the ground of delay and particularly when it raises fundamental and important questions and has bearing on public interest.
42 Equally, the argument with regard to the original Writ
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Petitioners' locus-standi, must fail. In the very decision that has been cited by Mr.Samarth, namely, in case of Jasbhai Motibhai Desai v/s Roshan Kumar, Haji Bashir Ahmed and other, reported in AIR 1976 SC 578, the Honourable Supreme Court has held that a certiorari jurisdiction or issuance of a writ of certiorari is permissible and can be exercised at the instance of members of public, neighbourers in the vicinity of the commercial establishments like theatre, hotel, etc. if activities therein cause nuisance or annoyance to them. It is only a rival trader or person having interest or any motivated action which has to be thrown out of the Court. The Writ Petition in the present case of the aggrieved members of public can be certainly entertained by the learned Single Judge and particularly when it challenged the order passed under the Bombay Prohibition Act, 1949. That the complaints of members of public highlighted in the police reports and the reports of the Collector and the Commissioner were very much before the State Government and therefore, the State Government ought to have taken them into consideration while exercising its revisional jurisdiction. Having failed to take them into consideration, but rather ignoring them, permits the aggrieved residents to approach this Court in writ jurisdiction and we see no error in the writ petition being entertained at their instance and behest and particularly when it was not motivated or at the instance of any rival ::: Downloaded on - 09/06/2013 18:58:47 ::: *49* lpa.278.314.12.con.sxw trader. The conduct was also not such as would not enable the Court to exercise its discretionary and equitable jurisdiction in favour of the residents. Therefore, the residents who are persons aggrieved could have invoked the writ jurisdiction. They were not parties before the State Government is no ground to refuse to entertain their Writ Petition as that would be taking a very pedantic view of the matter. Without laying down any general rule, but confining ourselves to the facts and circumstances of the present case, we are of the view that the learned Single Judge has committed no error of law in entertaining the Writ Petition and deciding it on merits. All observations and findings of the learned Single Judge on the point of locus-standi must be seen and understood in the facts and circumstances of the present case and clarifying thus, we are of the view that the Writ Petition was maintainable.
43 Even on merits we find that the learned Single Judge was justified in interfering with the revisional order because it was vitiated by errors apparent on the face of record, the State Government ignored vital and important factors, brushed aside germane material and relevant documents and importantly acted contrary to object and purpose sought to be achieved by the Bombay Prohibition Act, 1949. When all this was writ large in the order, then, the learned Single Judge was justified in ::: Downloaded on - 09/06/2013 18:58:47 ::: *50* lpa.278.314.12.con.sxw setting aside and quashing the same and allowing the Writ Petition. We do not repeat the guiding factors as they have been already enumerated by us hereinabove.
44 Once the above view is taken, it is not necessary to refer to each of the decisions which have been cited by Mr.Samarth as some of them lay down settled principles on which a writ of certiorari or mandamus can be issued. Once we have held that the residents in locality have right to oppose the licence, then, we are not deviating in any manner from the principle that is laid down in the decisions brought to our notice. In fact we have applied the tests laid down in the said decisions. In fact in the later decision in the case of S.P.Gupta v/s President of India and others, reported in AIR 1982 SC 149, while elaborating on the rule of locus-standi and particularly in such matters, the Honourable Supreme Court has held as under:-
"14. The traditional rule in regard to locus standi is that judicial redress is available only to a person who has suffered a legal injury by reason of violation of his legal right or legal protected interest by the impugned action of the State or a public authority or any other person or who is likely to suffer a legal injury by reason of threatened violation of his legal right or legally protected interest by any such action. The basis of entitlement to judicial redress is personal injury to property, body, mind or reputation arising from violation, actual or threatened, of the legal right or legally protected interest of the person seeking such redress. This is a rule of ancient vintage and ::: Downloaded on - 09/06/2013 18:58:47 ::: *51* lpa.278.314.12.con.sxw it arose during an era when private law dominated the legal scene and public law had not yet been born. The leading case in which this rule was enunciated and which marks the starting point of almost every discussion on locus standi is Ex parte Sidebotham, (1980) 14 Ch D 458. There the Court was concerned with the question whether the appellant could be said to be a 'person aggrieved' so as to be entitled to maintain the appeal. The Court in a unanimous view held that the appellant was not entitled to maintain the appeal because he was not a 'person aggrieved' by the decision of the lower Court. James, L. J. gave a definition of 'person aggrieved' which, though given in the context of the right to appeal against a decision of a lower Court, has been applied widely in determining the standing of a person to seek judicial redress, with the result that it has stultified the growth of the law in regard to judicial remedies. The learned Lord Justice said that a 'person aggrieved' must be a man "who has suffered a legal grievance, a man against whom a decision has been pronounced which has wrongfully deprived him of something or wrongfully refused him something or wrongfully affected his title to something." Thus definition was approved by Lord Esher M. R. in In Re Reed Bowen & Co. (1887) 19 QBD 174 and the learned Master of the Rolls made it clear that when James L. J. said that a person aggrieved must be a man against whom a decision has been pronounced which has wrongfully refused him of something, he obviously meant that the person aggrieved must be a man who has been refused something which he had a right to demand. There have been numerous subsequent decisions of the English Courts where this definition has been applied for the purpose of determining whether the person seeking judicial redress had locus standi to maintain the action. It will be seen that, according to this rule, it is only a person who has suffered a specific legal injury by reason of actual or threatened violation of his legal right or legally protected interest who can bring an action for judicial redress. Now obviously where an applicant has a legal right or a legally protected interest, the violation of which would result in legal injury to him, there must be a corresponding duty owed by the other party to the applicant. This rule in ::: Downloaded on - 09/06/2013 18:58:47 ::: *52* lpa.278.314.12.con.sxw regard to locus standi thus postulates a right-duty pattern which is commonly to be found in private law litigation.
But, narrow and rigid though this rule may be, there are a few exceptions to it which have been evolved by the Courts over the years.
15. In the first place a rate payer of a local authority is accorded standing to challenge an illegal action of the local authority. Thus, a rate payer can question the action of the municipality in granting a cinema licence to a person, vide : K.R. Shenoy v. Udipi Municipality, AIR 1974 SC 2177. Similarly, the right of a rate payer to challenge misuse of funds by a municipality has also been recognised by the Courts vide : Varadarajan v. Salem Municipality, AIR 1973 Mad. 55. The reason for this liberalisation of the rule in the case of a tax payer of a municipality is that his interest in the application of the money of the municipality is direct and immediate and he has a close relationship with the municipality. The Courts in India have, in taking this view, followed the decisions of the English Courts. Secondly, if a person is entitled to participate in the proceedings relating to the decision making process culminating in the impugned decision he would have locus standi to maintain an action challenging the impugned decision. Vide : Queen v.
Bowman, (1898) 1 QB 663 where it was held that any member of the public had a right to be heard in opposition to an application for a licence and having such right, the applicant was entitled to ask for mandamus directing the licencing Justices to hear and determine the application for licence according to law. Thirdly, the statute itself may expressly recognise the locus standi of an applicant, even though no legal right or legally protected interest of the applicant has been violated resulting in legal injury to him. For example, in J.M. Desai v. Roshan Kumar, (1976) 3 SCR 58 : (AIR 1976 SC
578), this Court noticed that the Bombay Cinematograph Act, 1918 and the Bombay Cinema Rules, 1954 made under that Act, recognised a special interest of persons residing, or concerned with any institution such as a school, temple, mosque etc, located within a distance of 200 yards of the site on which the cinema house is ::: Downloaded on - 09/06/2013 18:58:47 ::: *53* lpa.278.314.12.con.sxw proposed to be constructed and held that as the petitioner, a rival cinema owner, did not fall within the category of such persons having a special interest in the locality, he had no locus standi to maintain the petition for a writ of certiorari to quash the No Objection Certificate granted by the District Magistrate, to respondents Nos. 1 and 2. It is obvious from the observations made at page 72 (of SCR) :
(at p. 586 of AIR) of the Report that if the petitioner had been a person falling within this category of persons having a special interest in the locality, he would have been held entitled to maintain the petition. There is also another decision of this Court illustrating the situation where a statute expressly gives locus standi to persons to complain against a public wrong and that is the decision in Ratlam Municipality v. Vardhi Chand, AIR 1980 SC 1622. The statutory provision which came up for consideration in this case was S.133 of Criminal P. C. which empowers a Magistrate on receiving the report of a police officer or other information to make an order for remedying a public nuisance. What happened in this case was that the Ratlam Municipality filed to carry out its statutory duty of constructing a drain pipe to carry the filth etc. on a particular road. The local residents decided to invoke S.133 of Criminal P. C. against the Municipality. The Magistrate made an order requiring the Municipality to construct drain pipes and this order was confirmed in appeal by this Court. The Municipality pleaded lack of funds but this was not accepted as a valid defence. However, to have a viable scheme keeping in view the financial position of the Municipality, this Court examined the three schemes submitted to it and directed the Municipality to implement one of them. The standing of the local residents to move the Magistrate was recognised since S.133 of Criminal P. C. expressly conferred such right on them.
18. The types of cases which we have dealt with so far for the purpose of considering the question of locus standi are those where there is a specific legal injury either to the applicant or to some other person or persons for whose benefit the action is brought, arising from violation of some constitutional or legal right or legally protected ::: Downloaded on - 09/06/2013 18:58:47 ::: *54* lpa.278.314.12.con.sxw interest. What is complained of in these cases is a specific legal injury suffered by a person or a determinate class or group of persons. But there may be cases where the State or a public authority may act in violation of a constitutional or statutory obligation or fail to carry out such obligation, resulting in injury to public interest or what may conveniently be termed as public injury as distinguished from private injury. Who would have standing to complain against such act or omission of the State or public authority? Can any member of the public sue for judicial redress? Or is the standing limited only to a certain class of persons? Or there is no one who can complain and the public in-Jury must go unredressed. To answer these questions it is first of all necessary to understand what is the true purpose of the Judicial function. This is what Prof. Thio states in his book on "Locus Standi and Judicial Review":
"Is the judicial function primarily aimed at preserving legal order by confining the legislative and executive organs of government within their powers in the interest of the public (Jurisdiction de droit objectif) or is it mainly directed towards the protection of private individuals by preventing illegal encroachments on their individual rights (jurisdiction de droit subjectif)? The first contention rests on the theory that Courts are the final arbiters of what is legal and illegal ...........Requirements of locus standi are therefore unnecessary in this case since they merely impede the purpose of the function as conceived here. On the other hand, where the prime aim of the judicial process is to protect individual rights, its concern with the regularity of law and administration is limited to the extent that individual rights are infringed."
We would regard the first proposition as correctly setting out the nature and purpose of the judicial function, as it is essential to the maintenance of the rule of law that every organ of the State must act within the limits of its power and carry out the duty imposed upon it by the Constitution or the law. If the State or any public authority acts beyond the scope of its power and thereby causes a specific legal injury to a person or to a determinate class or group of persons, it would be a case ::: Downloaded on - 09/06/2013 18:58:47 ::: *55* lpa.278.314.12.con.sxw of private injury actionable in the manner discussed in the preceding paragraphs. So also if the duty is owed by the State or any public authority to a person or to a determinate class or group of persons, it would give rise to a corresponding right in such person or determinate class or group of persons and they would be entitled to maintain an action for judicial redress. But if no specific legal injury is caused to a person or to a determinate class or group of persons by the act or omission of the State or any public authority and the injury is caused only to public interest, the question arises as to who can maintain an action for vindicating the rule of law and setting aside the unlawful action or enforcing the performance of the public duty. If no one can maintain an action for redress of such public wrong or public injury, it would be disastrous for the rule of law, for it would be open to the State or a public authority to act with impunity beyond the scope of its power or in breach of a public duty owed by it. The Courts cannot countenance such a situation where the observance of the law is left to the sweet will of the authority bound by it, without any redress if the law is contravened. The view has therefore been taken by the Courts in many decisions that whenever there is a public wrong or public injury caused by an act or omission of the State or a public authority which is contrary to the Constitution or the law, any member of the public acting bona fide and having sufficient interest can maintain an action for redressal of such public wrong or public injury.
The strict rule of standing which insists that only a person who has suffered a specific legal injury can maintain an action for judicial redress is relaxed and a broad rule is evolved which gives standing to any member of the public who is not a mere busy -body or a meddlesome interloper but who has sufficient interest in the proceeding. There can be no doubt that the risk of legal action against the State or a public authority by any citizen will induce the State or such public authority to act with greater responsibility and care thereby improving the administration of justice. Lord Dip -lock rightly said in Rex v. Inland Revenue Commrs. (1981) 2 WLR 722 at p.
740:
"It would, in my view, be a grave lacuna in our ::: Downloaded on - 09/06/2013 18:58:47 ::: *56* lpa.278.314.12.con.sxw system of public law if a pressure group, like the federation, or even a single public-spirited taxpayer, were prevented by out-dated technical rules of locus standi from bringing the matter to the attention of the Court to vindicate the rule of law and get the unlawful conduct stopped.......... It is not, in my view, a sufficient answer to say that judicial review of the actions of officers or departments of central government is unnecessary because they are accountable to Parliament for the way in which they carry out their functions. They are accountable to Parliament for what they do so far as regards efficiency and policy, and of that Parliament is the only judge; they are responsible to a Court of Justice for the lawfulness of what they do, and of that the Court is the only judge."
This broadening of the rule of locus standi has been largely responsible for the development of public law, because it is only the availability of judicial remedy for enforcement which invests law with meaning and purpose or else the law would remain merely a paper parchment, a teasing illusion and a promise of unreality. It is only by liberalising the rule of locus standi that it is possible to effectively police the corridors of powers and prevent violations of law. It was pointed out by Schwartz and H.W.R. Wade in their book on "Legal Control of Government" at page 354:
"Restrictive rules about standing are in general inimical to a healthy system of administrative law. If a plaintiff with a good case is turned away, merely because he is not sufficiently affected personally, that means that some government agency is left free to violate the law, and that is contrary to the public interest. Litigants are unlikely to expend their time and money unless they have some real interest at stake. In the rare cases where they wish to sue merely out of public spirit, why should they be discouraged?"
It is also necessary to point out that if no one can have standing to maintain an action for judicial redress in respect of a public wrong or public injury, not only will the cause of legality suffer but the people not having any judicial remedy to redress such public wrong or public ::: Downloaded on - 09/06/2013 18:58:47 ::: *57* lpa.278.314.12.con.sxw injury may turn to the street and in that process, the rule of law will be seriously impaired. It is absolutely essential that the rule of law must wean the people away from the lawless street and win them for the court of law.
19. There is also another reason why the rule of locus standi needs to be liberalised. Today we find that law is being increasingly used as a device of organised social action for the purpose of bringing about socio-economic change. The task of national reconstruction upon which we are engaged has brought about enormous increase in developmental activities and law is being utilised for the purpose of development, social and economic. It is creating more and more a new category of rights in favour of large sections of people and imposing a new category of duties on the State and the public officials with a view to reaching social justice to the common man. Individual rights and duties are giving place to meta-
individual, collective, social rights and duties of classes or groups of persons. This is not to say that individual rights have ceased to have a vital place in our society but it is recognised that these rights are practicably meaningless in today's setting unless accompanied by the social rights necessary to make them effective and really accessible to all. The new social and economic rights which are sought to be created in pursuance of the Directive Principles of State Policy essentially require active intervention of the State and other public authorities. Amongst these social and economic rights are freedom from indigency, ignorance and discrimination as well as the right to a healthy environment, to social security and to protection from financial commercial, corporate or even governmental oppression. More and more frequently the conferment of these socio-economic rights and imposition of public duties on the State and other authorities for taking positive action generates situations in which single human action can be beneficial or prejudicial to a large number of people, thus making entirely inadequate the traditional scheme of litigation as merely a two-party affair. For example, the discharge of affluent in a lake or river may harm all who want to enjoy its clean water;
emission of noxious gas may cause injury to large
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numbers of people who inhale it along with the air, defective or unhealthy packaging may cause damage to all consumers of goods and so also illegal raising of railway or bus fares may affect the entire public which wants to use the railway or bus as a means of transport. In cases of this kind it would not be possible to say that any specific legal injury is caused to an individual or to a determinate class or group of individuals. What results in such cases is public injury and it is one of the characteristics of public injury that the act or acts complained of cannot necessarily be shown to affect the rights of determinate or identifiable class or group of persons: public injury is an injury to an indeterminate class of persons. In these cases the duty which is breached giving rise to the injury is owed by the State or a public authority not to any specific or determinate class or group of persons, but to the general public. In other words, the duty is one which is not correlative to any individual rights. Now if breach of such public duty were allowed to go unredressed because there is no one who has received a specific legal injury or who was entitled to participate in the proceedings pertaining to the decision relating to such public duty, the failure to perform such public duty would go unchecked and it would promote disrespect for the rule of law. It would also open the door for corruption and inefficiency because there would be no check on exercise of public power except what may be provided by the political machinery, which at best would be able to exercise only a limited control and at worst, might become a participant in misuse or abuse of power. It would also make the new social collective rights and interests created for the benefit of the deprived sections of the community meaningless and ineffectual."
45 In these circumstances we are of the opinion that the State's appeal, namely, LPA No.314/2012, as also, appeal preferred by the Appellant, namely, LPA No.278/2012 must fail. However, we clarify that the Appeal filed by the State must fail to the extent indicated above.
::: Downloaded on - 09/06/2013 18:58:47 :::*59* lpa.278.314.12.con.sxw However, we allow it to the extent of the direction of the learned Single Judge imposing costs of Rs.25,000/- and that part of the order of the learned Single Judge imposing costs is set aside. For all these reasons, on the main issue, both LPAs fail and they are, accordingly, dismissed, but without any order as to costs.
46 At this stage, the learned Advocate appearing on behalf of the Appellant in LPA No.278/2012 prays for continuation of the ad-interim order so as to enable the Appellant to challenge this judgment in higher court. This request is opposed by Mr.Kilor, learned Advocate for Respondent Nos.4 to 6 (Original Petitioners). Having found that the establishment of the Appellant had been granted a licence, which came to be rejected on the ground of public interest and causing public nuisance, as held concurrently, the request is refused.
47 All Civil Applications do not survive in the light of this judgment.
(S.C. Dharmadhikari, J.) (M.T.Joshi, J.) ::: Downloaded on - 09/06/2013 18:58:47 :::