Karnataka High Court
Sri Ganganna vs The Deputy Commissioner on 28 February, 2020
Author: B.Veerappa
Bench: B. Veerappa
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IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU
DATED THIS THE 28TH DAY OF FEBRUARY, 2020
BEFORE
THE HON' BLE MR. JUSTICE B. VEERAPPA
WRIT PETITION No.621/2020
C/W
WRIT PETITION No.30653/2019(KLR-RES)
IN WP No.621/2020
BETWEEN:
SRI GANGANNA
S/O LATE CHANNAPPA,
AGED ABOUT 82 YEARS,
R/AT HONNAGANAHATTI VILLAGE,
TAVAREKERE HOBLI,
BENGALURU SOUTH TALUK,
BENGALURU DISTRICT. ...PETITIONER
(BY SRI R.S. RAVI, ADVOCATE FOR
SRI ROOPESHA B., ADVOCATE)
AND:
1. THE DEPUTY COMMISSIONER
BENGALURU DISTRICT,
BENGALURU-560001.
2. THE ASSISTANT COMMISSIONER
BENGALURU SOUTH SUB-DIVISION,
BENGALURU-560001.
3. THE THASILDAR
BENGALURU SOUTH TALUK,
BENGALURU-560001. ...RESPONDENTS
(BY SRI R. SUBRAMANYA, ADDITIONAL ADVOCATE GENERAL
A/W SRI Y.D. HARSHA, ADDITIONAL GOVERNMENT ADVOCATE)
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THIS WRIT PETITION IS FILED UNDER ARTICLES 226 &
227 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA PRAYING TO ISSUE ANY
APPROPRIATE ORDER OR DIRECTION OR A WRIT IN THE
NATURE OF MANDAMUS DIRECTING THE RESPONDENTS TO
CONSIDER THE REPRESENTATION DATED 17.01.2019 VIDE
ANNEXURE-T AND DIRECT THE RESPONDENTS TO CONDUCT
PHODI AND DURASTH OF 1 ACRES OF LAND IN SURVEY No.13
OF HONNAGANAHATTI VILLAGE, TAVAREKERE HOBLI,
BENGALURU SOUTH TALUK ETC.
IN WP No.30653/2019
BETWEEN:
1. THE STATE OF KARNATAKA
DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE
M.S. BUILDING,
BENGALURU-560 001
REPRESENTED BY ITS PRINCIPAL SECRETARY
2. THE TAHSILDAR
BENGALURU SOUTH TALUK
BENGALURU. ...PETITIONERS
(BY SRI R. SUBRAMANYA, ADDITIONAL ADVOCATE GENERAL
A/W SRI Y.D. HARSHA, AGA)
AND:
1. SRI GANGANNA,
S/O LATE CHANNAPPA
AGED MAJOR
HONNAGANAHATTI VILLAGE,
TAVAREKRE HOBLI
BANGALORE SOUTH TALUK-562130
2. SPECIAL DEPUTY COMMISSIONER-2
BENGALURU SOUTH DIVISION
BENGALURU-09. ...RESPONDENTS
(BY SRI R. S. RAVI, ADVOCATE FOR R1;
SRI K.R. NITYANANDA, HCGP FOR R2)
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THIS WRIT PETITION IS FILED UNDER ARTICLES 226 &
227 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA PRAYING TO SET ASIDE
THE ORDER PASSED BY THE SPECIAL DEPUTY
COMMISSIONER-2, BENGALURU SOUTH TALUK, BENGALURU
IN No.RRT (S) CR-31/2016-17 DATED 25.10.2017 VIDE
ANNEXURE-A ETC.
THESE WRIT PETITIONS COMING ON FOR PRELIMINARY
HEARING THIS DAY, THE COURT MADE THE FOLLOWING:
ORDER
The State Government has filed Writ Petition No.30653/2019 against the order dated 25th October, 2017 passed by the respondent No.1-Special Deputy Commissioner, Bengaluru South Taluk, Bengaluru exercising the powers under Section 136(3) of the Karnataka Land Revenue Act (for short, 'the Act') , dropping the proceedings.
2. The respondent No.1, who is petitioner in Writ Petition No.621/2020 has filed the petition seeking writ of mandamus directing the respondents to consider his representation dated 17.1.2019 as per Annexure-T and to conduct Phodi and Durasth of 1 acre of land in 4 Sy.No.13 of Honnaganahatti Village, Tavarekere Hobli, Bangalore South Taluk.
3. It is the case of the State Government in W.P.No.30653/2019 that the 1st respondent claims that he is the owner and in possession of the land bearing Sy.No.13 of Honnaganahatti village, Tavarekere Hobli, Bangalore South Taluk which is a Government Gomal Land was granted to him on 20.4.1960. The Special Tahsildar on 8.8.2016 initiated proceedings in respect of the said land and as per the report submitted by the jurisdictional Tahsildar, the Special Deputy Commissioner issued notice to the petitioner to file his objections if any for verification of the title of the property in question. Accordingly, proceedings were initiated and the 1st respondent appeared through his Counsel and submitted the documents stating that the schedule property belongs to respondent No.1-Sri Ganganna on the strength of the documents and 5 therefore, the said land was granted to him. The Special Deputy Commissioner considering the entire material on record passed the impugned order on 25th October, 2017 exercising the powers under Section 136(3) of the Act dropped the proceedings initiated by the Tahsildar. Hence, Writ Petition No.30653 is filed by the State.
4. It is the case of the petitioner in W.P.No.621/2020 i.e., Sri Ganganna that he and his family members were cultivating 1 acre of land in Sy.No.13 of Honnaganahatti village, Tavarekere Hobli, Bengaluru South Taluk, Bengaluru District. As they did not possess any land, he made an application before the Tahsildar, Magadi Taluk under darkhasth on 20.4.1960 for grant of one acre of land which was cultivated by him, who in turn by the order dated 8.9.1960 granted the said land in his favour collecting a sum of Rs.55/- towards upset price for grant of land 6 and Rs.5/- as phodi charges. In the year 1977, as per the granted, the revenue authorities mutated his name in the revenue records as per MR.4/77-78 and accordingly, his name appeared in Column Nos.9 and 12 of the RTC. After computerization of RTC, his name was left out in the RTC and therefore, he made a representation on 26.2.2016 to the 3rd respondent to insert his name in the RTC. After receipt of the said representation, the 3rd respondent wrote a letter to the 1st respondent on 8.8.2016 to initiate proceedings under Section 136(3) of the Act. The Special Deputy Commissioner considering the entire material on record, by the impugned order dated 25.10.2017 dropped the proceedings. Thereafter on 17.1.2019, the petitioner made a representation requesting the 3rd respondent to conduct Phodi and Durasthi of the land, but the same has not been done. Therefore, he is before this Court for a writ of mandamus as sought for.
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5. I have heard the learned Counsel for the parties to the lis.
6. Sri R. Subramanya, learned Additional Advocate General along with Sri Y.D. Harsha, learned Government Advocate for the State Government in Writ Petition No.30653/2019 contended that the impugned order passed by the Special Deputy Commissioner dropping the proceedings under the provisions of Section 136(3) of the Act is erroneous and contrary to the material on record. The learned Additional Advocate General further contended that the Special Deputy Commissioner has failed to give direction to the jurisdictional authorities to adjudicate the matter properly and the impugned order is passed without application of mind. Therefore, the impugned order passed by the Deputy Commissioner cannot be sustained and is liable to be quashed.
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7. The learned Additional Advocate General further contended that the Special Deputy Commissioner while passing the impugned order has not considered the matter seriously and while expressing title under suspicion has proceeded to pass the impugned order ignoring the fact that the property in question is a gomal/forest land. Therefore, the impugned order cannot be sustained. It is further contended that while exercising the powers under Section 136(3) of the Act, it is bounden duty of the Special Deputy Commissioner to verify the genuineness of the original documents maintained by the very office and thereafter to pass orders on the documents produced by the 1st respondent-Sri Ganganna, which are not all reliable. Therefore, he contended that the order passed by the Special Deputy Commissioner is erroneous, illegal and liable to be quashed. 9
8. The learned Additional Advocate General further contended that the impugned order passed by the Special Deputy Commissioner is not a speaking order and is based on the Xerox copies of the documents produced by Sri Ganganna which are not at all admissible. Therefore, sought to allow the writ petition filed by the State.
9. Per contra, Sri R.S. Ravi, learned Counsel appearing for Sri Ganganna, petitioner in W.P.No.621/2020 sought to justify the impugned order passed by the Special Deputy Commissioner and contended that admittedly the grant was made in the year 1961 and when the application dated 26.2.2016 was filed to insert the name of Sri Ganganna in the RTC revenue records as his name was left out after computerization to the 3rd respondent, who instead of considering the material on record, has written a letter dated 8.8.2016 to the Special Deputy Commissioner to 10 initiate proceedings under Section 136(3) of the Act to know the genuinity of the grant. In turn, though the Special Deputy Commissioner has initiated proceedings after a lapse of fifty five years, considering the entire material on record placed by the very Tahsildar has come to the conclusion that the documents produced by Sri Ganganna and the grant made in his favour are genuine and accordingly dropped the proceedings under the provisions of Section 136(3) of the Act. He also contended that the proceedings initiated after a lapse of fifty five years, is nothing but depriving the valuable right of the grantee - Sri Ganganna, who is in settled possession and cannot unsettled which is impermissible.
10. In support of his contentions, the learned Counsel for the grantee relied upon the following judgments about delay in initiation of proceedings as under:
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I) Venkatagiriyappa -vs- The State of Karnataka, Revenue Department reported in ILR 1998 Kar. 4000;
II) The Bangalore Development Authority, Represented by its Commissioner -vs- Smt. Sumitradevi reported ILR 2004 Kar. 1386;
III) State of Karnataka -vs- Sri Nagaraju and Another reported in 2012(4) KCCR 2807;
IV) Santoshkumar Shivgonda Path and Aothers
-vs- Balasaheb Tukaram Shevale and Others reported in (2009)9 SCC 352;
V) Sri J. Rama -vs- M. Vittal Bhat and Others reported in ILR 2011 Kar. 5637 VI) State of Pubjab and Others -vs- Bhatinda District Co-operative Milk Producers Union Ltd. Reported in (2007)11 SCC 363.12
and accordingly, sought to dismiss the writ petition filed by the State Government and to allow the writ petition filed by the grantee as prayed for.
11. I have given my thoughtful consideration to the arguments advanced by the learned Counsel for the parties and perused the material on record carefully.
12. It is an undisputed fact that Sy.No.12 measuring 1 acre of land of Honnaganahatti Village, Tavarekere Hobli, Bengaluru South Taluk was a gomal land; and on the basis of the application filed by the grantee -1st respondent to conduct phodi and Dharkasth, the jurisdictional Tahsildar after initiation of proceedings granted the said land on 9.3.1961 on an upset price of Rs.55/- for grant of land and Rs.5/- for phodi charges. It is also not in dispute that the revenue authorities exercising their power under the provisions of the Act, mutated the name of the grantee in respect of the land in question in the revenue records as per 13 MR.4/77-78 and his name was entered both in Column Nos.9 and 12 of the RTC from the year 1977 till 2016, the name of the grantee was found in the RTCs and other revenue records and only in the year 2016 after computerization of RTC, his name was left out in respect of the property in question. Therefore, he made representation on 26.2.2016 to the 3rd respondent- Tahsildar for necessary corrections in the RTC. The 3rd respondent-Tahsildar instead of considering the representation, very strangely submitted a report on 8.8.2016 to the Special Deputy Commissioner to initiate proceedings under the provisions of Section 136(3) of the Act without verifying the original records.
13. It is also not in dispute that the Deputy Commissioner after hearing both parties, considering the entire material on record and after giving sufficient opportunity to both parties including the Tahsildar directed the Tahsildar by the letter dated 21.6.2017 to 14 verify the genuineness of the documents. Based on the documents and report dated 9.8.2017 submitted by the Tahsildar has come to the conclusion that on 20.4.1960, the grantee-Ganganna s/o late Channappa is in possession of 1 acre in Sy.No.13 of Honnaganahatti Village, Tavarekere Hobli, Bengaluru South Taluk and as per the possession, the Surveryor has prepared the sketch and the Tahsildar has made a proposal to the Assistant Commissioner on 8.8.2016 and the Special Deputy Commissioner had issued an Official Memorandum dated 29.1.2061 and the Assistant Commissioner on 16.2.1961 has fixed the upset price of Rs.55/- for grant of land. On 23.2.1961, the grantee has produced the receipt for having deposited Rs.55/- in the Treasury and thereafter, the Tahsildar by the order dated 9.3.1961 granted the land and issued saguvali chit in favour of the grantee -1st respondent. The Special Deputy Commissioner verifying the original records has come to the conclusion that the grant made 15 in favour of the grantee is genuine as per records therein Annexure-1 and directed to continue his possession as per the Surveyor Sketch Annexure-2 therein; the proposal made by the Assistant Commissioner as Annexure-3; the Official Memorandum passed by the Deputy Commissioner Annexure-4; Assistant Commissioner fixing the upset price as per Annexure-5; the receipt for having deposited the amount in the Treasury , Annexure-6; grant made in favour of Sri Ganganna s/o late Channappa as per Annexure-7; Saguvali Chit issued and mutation made in favour of the grantee - Annexure-8, has come to the conclusion that the grant is genuine.
14. Though the learned Additional Advocate General contended that the Special Deputy Commissioner without verifying the original records and based on the fake and created documents produced by the grantee -1st respondent, has proceeded to pass the 16 impugned order, in order to verify the veracity of the same, this Court by the order dated 18.2.2020 directed the jurisdictional Tahsildar to produce the original records and accordingly, the Tahsildar, who is present before this Court along with the original records. The same are produced by the learned Government Advocate in the open Court.
15. After careful perusal of the entire original records as well as Annexures-1 to 8 referred to by the Special Deputy Commissioner, it is clear that the said documents have come into force and issued by the authorities- Tahsildar, Assistant Commissioner and Deputy Commissioner during the course of their official business and all are genuine. Therefore, the contention of the learned Advocate General that the Special Deputy Commissioner has proceeded to pass the impugned order dropping the proceedings based on the created documents produced by the grantee cannot be accepted. 17
16. It is relevant to state at this stage, that the contention of the learned Additional Advocate General is also devoid of merits since the grantee is not the custodian of original records. When a poor person applies for grant of certain land, in exercise of the official powers under the provisions of Section 61 of the Act, i.e., on the basis of the recommendation made by the Assistant Commissioner and permission granted by the Deputy Commissioner, the jurisdictional Tahsildar has granted the land in favour of the grantee to an extent of one acre which was a gomal land. Having been granted in the year 1961 and initiating proceedings in the year 2016 that too after a lapse of 55 years (five decades), initiation of proceedings in the year 2016 is not within a reasonable period and the same cannot be sustained. The contention raised by the State Government is against the original records and cannot be accepted. This Court is afraid of the statement made by the learned Additional Advocate General and in the 18 presence of original documents, the State Government has filed the present writ petition on the ground that the Deputy Commissioner has not exercised his powers judiciously. The original records produced before the Court clearly depict that all the authorities have initiated Dharkasth proceedings in the year 1961; based on the recommendation made by the Assistant Commissioner, the Government has issued a Notification on 31.1.1959 and thereafter, the Deputy Commissioner by the order dated 20.1.1961 has granted the permission to grant the land under Rules GMF of the Karnataka Land Revenue Rules and thereafter, on the basis of the recommendation, the Tahsildar has granted the land in favour of the Grantee. In all fairness, the State Government should not have filed the writ petition.
17. This Court has experienced that where the suo-motu proceedings are initiated by the Deputy 19 Commissioner under the provisions of Section 136(3) of the Act after an inordinate delay, the first and foremost contention of the State Government is that the documents produced by the grantee are fake. But in the present case, the Deputy Commissioner after perusal of the entire original records has rightly come to the conclusion that the grant is genuine, but still the State Government has filed the writ petition which is nothing but to litigate the grant and to harass the original grantee unnecessarily. The jurisidictional Tahsildar, who has granted the land in the year 1961 instead of considering the representation of the grantee for entering his name in the RTC, since his name had been deleted after computerization, very strangely has recommended for initiation of proceedings, which clearly indicates that the authorities are not discharging their institutional responsibility and constitutional obligation strictly in accordance with the provisions of the Act 20 thereby depriving the right of a poor man in respect of immoveable property which is impermissible.
18. It is also relevant to state that, when the Revenue Authorities are custodian of the documents, they cannot blame unnecessarily the person, who claims grant and cannot initiate proceedings after more than five decades. Therefore, the impugned order passed by the Special Deputy Commissioner dropping the proceedings is just and proper.
19. This Court also appreciates the fairness of the Special Deputy Commissioner, who has verified the original records and proceeded to pass the impugned order. Though a contention was raised about falsity of the documents, in order to verify, the original records were summoned before the Court and verified all the original records stated supra and is satisfied that the grant is genuine. Inspite of the same, the State 21 Government has filed the writ petition. On that ground alone the writ petition is liable to be rejected in limine,
20. It is well settled that in the absence of any limitation prescribed in any statute including under Section 136(3) of the Act, the authorities, where they are exercising suo-motu powers, it should be exercised within a reasonable period. Admittedly, in the present case though proceedings are initiated after a lapse of 55 years, which is impermissible, still the Special Deputy Commissioner has come to the conclusion that the grant is genuine and has dropped the proceedings.
21. With regard to delay of proceeding initiated stated supra, my view is fortified by the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court wherein while considering the provisions of Section 136(3) of the Act in an identical circumstance in the case of Joint Action Committee of Employees Teachers and Workers A.P. vs D. Narsing Rao & Ors. etc. etc reported in (2015)3 SCC 695 relying upon 22 the dictum in the case of State of Gujarat vs. Patil Raghav Natha and others (1969) 2 SCC 187 and adverting to the provisions of Sections 65 and 211 of the Bombay Land Revenue Code, 1879 has held that though there is no period of limitation prescribed under Section 211 to revise an order made under Section 65 of the Act, the said power must be exercised in reasonable time and on the facts of the case in which the decision arose, the power came to be exercised more than one year after the order and that was held to be too late.
22. The Hon'ble Supreme Court while considering the provisions of the Maharashtra Land Revenue Code, 1966 in the case of Santoshkumar Shivgonda Patil and others vs. Balasaheb Tukaram Shevale and others reported in (2009) 9 SCC 352 at paragraph-11 has held that "11. It seems to be fairly settled that if a statute does not prescribe the time-limit for exercise of revisional power, it does not mean that 23 such power can be exercised at any time; rather it should be exercised within a reasonable time. It is so because the law does not expect a settled thing to be unsettled after a long lapse of time. Where the legislature does not provide for any length of time within which the power of revision is to be exercised by the authority, suo motu or otherwise, it is plain that exercise of such power within reasonable time is inherent therein" and in the said case, the revisional power was exercised after a lapse of 17 years and therefore, it was held that the it was unreasonable.
23. The Hon'ble Supreme Court while considering the provisions of Section 84-C of Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1976 in the decision in Mohamad Kavi Mohamad Amin vs. Fatmabai Ibrahim reported in (1997) 6 SCC 71 has held that though the said Section does not prescribe for any time limit for initiation of proceeding such power should be 24 exercised within a reasonable time and on the facts of the case, the suo motu enquiry initiated under the said Section after a period of nine months was held to be beyond reasonable time.
24. My view is also fortified by the dictum of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Chhedi Lal Yadav and Others -vs- Hari Kishore Yadav (Dead) through legal representatives and Others reported in (2018) 12 SCC 527 wherein at paragraphs 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, it has been held as under:
"9. The learned counsel appearing for the appellants vehemently submitted that the delay must be overlooked because the Act is a beneficial piece of legislation intended to bring relief to farmers who had been dispossessed during the proscribed period. The reliance was placed on a judgment of this Court in New India Assurance Co. Ltd. v. C. Padma [New India Assurance Co. Ltd. v. C. Padma, (2003) 7 SCC 713 : 2003 SCC (Cri) 1709] , where this Court held that in a 25 motor accident which took place on 18-12-
1989, a claim petition barred by time but filed on 2-11-1995, after limitation itself was removed from the statute was maintainable. This Court held that there could be no resort to Article 137 of the Limitation Act, 1963 even though no period of limitation was prescribed. Accordingly, the Court held that the claim petition could not be rejected at the threshold on the ground of limitation, after the deletion of sub-section (3) of Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 which had provided a period of six months. This view was taken having regard to the purpose of the statute. We, however, find that the judgment relied on has no application to the present case. It is a settled law where the statute does not provide for a period of limitation, the provisions of the statute must be invoked within a reasonable time.
10. In Advanced Law Lexicon by P. Ramanatha Aiyar, 3rd Edn., "reasonable time" is explained as follows:
"That is a reasonable time that preserves to each party the rights 26 and advantages he possesses and protects each party from losses that he ought not to suffer."
Thus, time must be reckoned reasonably, not only in order to preserve rights and advantages a party possesses, but equally to protect each party from the losses he ought not to suffer. Thus, whether an action has been taken within a reasonable time, must also be viewed from the point of view of the party who might suffer losses.
11. In the instant case, we find that the High Court had observed as follows:
"The auction-sale took place in 1942, the application for restoration of the lands was first made in 1975 and the appeal from it was dismissed for default in 1983. In the meanwhile, the disputed lands changed hands twice and were in the possession of the appellant-writ petitioners from 1962 and 1986. Such a long-settled position could only be upset for some very compelling reasons and on making out an extremely strong case 27 for restoration of the appeal. There is nothing on record to suggest anything remotely like that. Secondly, the action of the Additional Collector in restoring the appeal even without any notice to the appellant- writ petitioners was clearly illegal and in contravention of Sections 4 and 5 of the Act."
The High Court was clearly right in the view it had taken.
12. It is argued on behalf of the appellants that power of the Additional Collector for restoration of lands could have been exercised suo motu and since no limitation was prescribed for exercise of such power, the delay in this case may be overlooked. This submission presupposes that where the power can be exercised suo motu, such exercise may be undertaken at any time. The submission is directly contrary to a decision of this Court in Collector v. D. Narsing Rao [Collector v. D. Narsing Rao, (2015) 3 SCC 695 : (2015) 2 SCC (Civ) 396] where this Court affirmed the view [Collector v. D. Narasing Rao, 2010 SCC 28 OnLine AP 406 : (2010) 6 ALD 748] of the Andhra Pradesh High Court. Para '17' of the judgment reads as follows: (D. Narsing Rao case [Collector v. D. Narsing Rao, (2015) 3 SCC 695 : (2015) 2 SCC (Civ) 396] , SCC p. 706, para 17) "17. ... that the suo motu revision undertaken after a long lapse of time, even in the absence of any period of limitation was arbitrary and opposed to the concept of rule of law."
Thus, we have no hesitation in rejecting this contention.
13. In our view, where no period of limitation is prescribed, the action must be taken, whether suo motu or on the application of the parties, within a reasonable time. Undoubtedly, what is reasonable time would depend on the circumstances of each case and the purpose of the statute. In the case before us, we are clear that the action is grossly delayed and taken beyond reasonable time, particularly, in view of the fact that the land was transferred several times 29 during this period, obviously, in the faith that it is not encumbered by any rights.
14. We are of the view that merely because the legislation is beneficial and no limitation is prescribed, the rights acquired by persons cannot be ignored lightly and proceedings cannot be initiated after unreasonable delay as observed by this Court in Situ Sahu v. State of Jharkhand [Situ Sahu v. State of Jharkhand, (2004) 8 SCC 340] .
25. Though the grant was made in the year 1961 and all along the revenue records, the name of the grantee-Sri Ganganna was entered from the year 1977 to 2016, when the revenue entries were computerised, the name of the grantee was left out in the revenue records and therefore, he was constrained to make a representation. The proceedings were initiated in the year 2016 after a lapse of more than five decades i.e., 55 years and the grantee was allotted to enjoy the property which was granted to him. For genuine reason, the 30 Government should not have litigated the proceedings and unnecessarily has harassed the grantee. Therefore, the Government has to pay the litigation expenses to the grantee and the grantee is entitled to the writ of mandamus as sought for in Writ Petition No.621/2020.
26. Though this Court was inclined to impose heavy costs on the Government on the ground that the State Government should not have encouraged this type of false litigation/writ petition, but in view of pursuation made by the learned Additional Advocate General along with the learned Government Advocate, this Court resisted to impose any cost on the Government to put quietest to the litigation between the parties to the lis.
27. In view of the aforesaid reasons, writ petition No. 30653/2019 filed by the State Government against the impugned order dated 25.10.2017 passed by the Special Deputy Commissioner, Bengaluru South Taluk, is devoid of merits and accordingly, it is dismissed. 31
28. Writ Petition No.621/2020 filed by the Grantee is allowed and a writ of mandamus is issued directing the respondents to consider the representation of the petitioner - Sri Ganganna dated 17.1.2019 on the basis of the grant and confirmed by the Special Deputy Commissioner and now affirmed by this Court. The respondents-Revenue Authorities are hereby directed to consider the said representation as per Annexure-T and conduct the Phodi and Durasth of one acre of land in Sy.No.13 of Honnaganahatti Village, Tavarekere Hobli, Bengaluru South Taluk and pass appropriate orders strictly in accordance with law within a period of twelve weeks from the date of receipt of a copy of this order.
29. All the original records summoned and promptly produced by the jurisdictional Tahsildar and the learned Additional Advocate General is appreciated. After perusal of the original records, this Court has come to the definite conclusion that the grant is genuine 32 and has dismissed the writ petition filed by the State Government. The original records are returned to the jurisdictional Tahsildar, who is present in person in the Open Court in presence of the learned Additional Advocate General and in galaxy of the learned Advocates.
Ordered accordingly.
Sd/-
Judge Nsu/-