Orissa High Court
Commissioner-Cum-Secretary vs Syed Mubarak on 30 January, 2026
Author: Sanjeeb K Panigrahi
Bench: Sanjeeb K Panigrahi
Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed
Signed by: BHABAGRAHI JHANKAR
Reason: Authentication
Location: ORISSA HIGH COURT, CUTTACK
Date: 09-Feb-2026 19:48:34
IN THE HIGH COURT OF ORISSA AT CUTTACK
ARBA No.12 & 13 of 2014
(In the matters of Appeals under Section 37 of the Arbitration and
Conciliation Act, 1996)
(In ARBA No.12 of 2014)
Commissioner-cum-Secretary, .... Appellant (s)
Department of Water Resources,
Government of Odisha & Ors.
-versus-
Syed Mubarak .... Respondent (s)
Advocates appeared in the case through Hybrid Mode:
For Appellant (s) : Mr. Debasish Nayak, AGA
For Respondent (s) : Ms. Pami Rath, Sr. Adv.
Along with associate.
(In ARBA No.13 of 2014)
State of Odisha & Ors. .... Appellant (s)
-versus-
Syed Mubarak .... Respondent (s)
Advocates appeared in the case through Hybrid Mode:
For Appellant (s) : Mr. Debasish Nayak, AGA
For Respondent (s) : Ms. Pami Rath, Sr. Adv.
Along with associate.
Page 1
Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed
Signed by: BHABAGRAHI JHANKAR
Reason: Authentication
Location: ORISSA HIGH COURT, CUTTACK
Date: 09-Feb-2026 19:48:34
CORAM:
DR. JUSTICE SANJEEB K PANIGRAHI
DATE OF HEARING:-22.12.2025
DATE OF JUDGMENT:-30.01.2026
Dr. Sanjeeb K Panigrahi, J.
1. The present Appeals have been preferred seeking setting aside of judgment dated 23.9.2013, passed by the Ld. District Judge, Ganjam in ARBP No. 1 of 2005 and judgment dated 16.9.2013 passed by the Ld. District Judge, Ganjam in ARBP No.3 of 2005 whereby, the Ld. District Judge has dismissed both the appeals.
2. Since both appeals arise out of arbitral awards relating to contracts executed by the same parties under the Baghua Irrigation Project and involve common questions concerning the scope of interference under Sections 34 and 37 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, they are taken up together and are being disposed of by this common judgment..
I. FACTUAL MATRIX OF THE CASE:
3. In ARBA 12 of 2014 a. In this appeal, the dispute arises out of Agreement No.1 NCB/2001-2002 executed on 27.7.2001 between the Department of Water Resources, Government of Odisha and the respondent, a Super Class Contractor, for excavation and construction of structures of minors and sub-minors off-taking from Baghua Right Branch Canal from RD 13.15 km to 23.425 km and Baghua Right Distributary from RD 23.425 km to about 30.375 km, described as Package No.9. The contract price was Rs.2,17,96,172/-
Page 2 Signature Not Verified Digitally Signed Signed by: BHABAGRAHI JHANKAR Reason: Authentication Location: ORISSA HIGH COURT, CUTTACK Date: 09-Feb-2026 19:48:34 . The date of commencement was 27.7.2001 and the stipulated date of completion was 26.7.2002.
b. According to the respondent, during execution of the work, large portions of the site were not made available. It is stated that initially only about 3.806 km of the site was available, out of which portions were private land, scattered patches, and reserve forest land. It is further stated that additional stretches were later made available but remained fragmented and obstructed by legal and physical constraints, and that objections were raised by private landowners in certain portions. The respondent claims that manpower and machinery had been mobilised but remained idle due to non-availability of continuous workable site. c. The departmental authorities, on the other hand, treated the delay as attributable to the contractor and proceeded to foreclose the contract. Communications regarding foreclosure and imposition of penalty were issued around 30.10.2003 and 1.11.2003. A proposal for closure of the contract with penalty was approved by the Government and communicated to the Chief Engineer on 4.12.2003. The bank guarantee furnished by the contractor was encashed and final bills were not released according to the respondent.
d. Disputes having arisen, correspondence was exchanged regarding appointment of arbitrator. By letter dated 6.2.2004, the Chief Engineer and Basin Manager appointed Sri Naba Krushna Mohapatra as sole arbitrator. The arbitral proceedings were Page 3 Signature Not Verified Digitally Signed Signed by: BHABAGRAHI JHANKAR Reason: Authentication Location: ORISSA HIGH COURT, CUTTACK Date: 09-Feb-2026 19:48:34 conducted, during which the claimant filed statement of claims and the respondents filed counter statement, followed by rejoinder.
e. The claimant raised multiple claims including claim towards final bill and deductions, claim towards idle man and machinery, claim towards payment on account of revised minimum wages, claim for refund of encashed bank guarantee, claim towards utilisation of mobilisation advance, and claim for interest on blocked amounts and future interest.
f. The sole arbitrator passed the award on 6.12.2004, allowing the claims towards final bill, idle establishment, revised minimum wages, refund of bank guarantee, mobilisation advance, and interest on blocked amount, and also awarded future interest at the rate of 12% per annum from the date of award.
g. Aggrieved by the award, the State filed an application under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 before the Ld. District Judge, Ganjam, Berhampur on 2.3.2005, registered as Arbitration Petition No.01 of 2005, seeking setting aside of the arbitral award.
h. After hearing the parties, the Ld. District Judge, Ganjam, Berhampur, by judgment dated 23.9.2013, dismissed the application under Section 34 and upheld the arbitral award. i. Challenging the said judgment dated 23.9.2013, the appellants filed the present appeal under Section 37 of the Arbitration and Page 4 Signature Not Verified Digitally Signed Signed by: BHABAGRAHI JHANKAR Reason: Authentication Location: ORISSA HIGH COURT, CUTTACK Date: 09-Feb-2026 19:48:34 Conciliation Act, 1996 before this Court in the year 2014, which was registered as ARBA No.12 of 2014.
4. In ARBA 13 of 2014 i. In this appeal, the respondent was awarded the work under Agreement No. NCB-1 of 2002-2003, Package No. 8A, of Baghua Irrigation Division No. 1, Matajhari, Ganjam, for excavation of minors and allied works, for a contract price of Rs. 1,00,88,605/-. The stipulated date of commencement was 5.6.2002 and the stipulated date of completion was 4.2.2003. Extension of time was granted up to 4.8.2003. The work was completed within the extended period and detailed final measurements were recorded by about 3.8.2003.
ii. The respondent submitted running account bills during execution of work. The 4th R/A bill and the 5th R/A bill along with the final bill aggregated to Rs. 69,52,145/-. After statutory deductions, the net payable amount was assessed at Rs. 63,51,867/-. The Executive Engineer prepared the 4th R/A bill around 1.7.2003, but payment was not released on the ground that higher authorities had issued instructions not to make payment. The appellants stated that amounts were proposed to be adjusted towards alleged excess payments and dues relating to other packages executed by the respondent in different divisions.
iii. On 15.3.2003, the respondent addressed a letter to the Chief Engineer requesting that no recovery be made from bills of other Page 5 Signature Not Verified Digitally Signed Signed by: BHABAGRAHI JHANKAR Reason: Authentication Location: ORISSA HIGH COURT, CUTTACK Date: 09-Feb-2026 19:48:34 works. On 30.8.2003, the respondent filed an application under Section 9 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 before the Ld. District Judge, Ganjam-Gajapati, Berhampur, seeking protection against recovery, by which time an amount of about Rs. 22,26,546/- had already been recovered. Vide order dated 30.8.2003, the Ld. District Judge directed that no further recovery be made from other bills of the respondent till the dispute was decided in arbitration. Despite this, the remaining amount from the 4th R/A bill and the final bill was not released. iv. The respondent accordingly issued a request on 10.1.2004 for appointment of a sole arbitrator. On 6.2.2004, the Chief Engineer appointed a sole arbitrator, namely a retired Chief Engineer Sri N.C. Rout, in terms of the dispute resolution clause. Both parties participated in the arbitral proceedings, filed statements of claim and counter statements, produced documents, and addressed arguments. The hearing concluded with the consent of both sides.
v. Before the arbitrator, the respondent raised multiple claims. Claim No. 1 related to non-payment of the 4th R/A bill, 5th R/A bill and final bill, with net payable assessed at Rs. 63,51,867/-. Claim No. 2 related to reimbursement of additional expenditure incurred due to enhancement of minimum wages from Rs. 40/- to Rs. 50/- with effect from 01.01.2002, based on Government of Odisha notifications and departmental formula for labour component. Claim No. 3 related to release of performance Page 6 Signature Not Verified Digitally Signed Signed by: BHABAGRAHI JHANKAR Reason: Authentication Location: ORISSA HIGH COURT, CUTTACK Date: 09-Feb-2026 19:48:34 security amounting to Rs. 5,04,430/- after expiry of defect liability period. Claim No. 4 related to refund of retention money of Rs. 1,62,177/- deducted from earlier R/A bills. Claim No. 5 related to interest on delayed payment of bills in terms of Clause 43 of the General Conditions of Contract.
vi. By award dated 5.3.2005, the learned arbitrator allowed Claim No. 1 for Rs. 63,51,867/-, Claim No. 2 for Rs. 7,01,169.56, directed release of performance security of Rs. 5,04,430/- under Claim No. 3 with interest, allowed refund of retention money of Rs. 1,62,177/- under Claim No. 4 with interest of Rs. 18,109/-, and allowed interest on delayed payment of principal amount under Claim No. 5 quantified at Rs. 11,43,336/-. The total monetary award aggregated to Rs. 88,81,089.56, along with direction for release of the bank guarantee towards performance security. vii. The appellants filed an application under Section 34 of the Act on 20.6.2005 before the Ld. District Judge, challenging the award on the grounds including alleged improper constitution of the tribunal, deletion of price escalation clause, adjustment of dues from other contracts, and alleged non-compliance with contractual dispute procedure. By judgment dated 16.9.2013, the Ld. District Judge dismissed the Section 34 application and upheld the arbitral award. The present appeal under Section 37 arises from the said judgment dated 16.09.2013 of the Ld. District Judge.
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5. This Court shall now endeavour to summarise the contentions of the Parties and the broad grounds that have been raised. II. APPELLANTS' SUBMISSIONS:
6. In ARBA No. 12 of 2014, the appellants mainly contend that the learned arbitrator travelled beyond the terms of the contract and granted claims which were expressly barred thereunder. It is urged that the escalation clause having been consciously deleted from the agreement, no amount could have been awarded towards increase in labour cost or wages, nor could any compensation be granted on account of alleged idle labour and machinery. It is further contended that the delay in execution of the work was attributable solely to the contractor's own defaults and not to any failure on the part of the department in providing the site. According to the appellants, sufficient site was made available and the departmental authorities were ready to proceed, but the contractor failed to mobilise resources and execute the work within the stipulated period, which eminently justified the foreclosure of the contract and encashment of the bank guarantee strictly in terms of the agreement.
7. The appellants further assail the evidentiary basis of the claims allowed by the arbitrator, particularly in respect of idle establishment, mobilisation advance and alleged blocked amounts, contending that no strict proof of actual loss or expenditure was produced and that the findings are based on assumptions rather than cogent material. The direction for refund of the bank guarantee and Page 8 Signature Not Verified Digitally Signed Signed by: BHABAGRAHI JHANKAR Reason: Authentication Location: ORISSA HIGH COURT, CUTTACK Date: 09-Feb-2026 19:48:34 grant of interest are also stated to be unsupported by the contract and excessive in nature. It is additionally urged that the disputes were not referred to arbitration within the time prescribed after the Engineer's decision and that the arbitral reference itself was not maintainable. Objection is also taken to the manner of appointment of the sole arbitrator, alleging non-compliance with the contractual procedure, thereby vitiating the entire arbitral proceedings.
8. In ARBA No. 13, the appellants primarily contend that the arbitral tribunal itself was not constituted in accordance with the contract. It is their case that under the General Conditions of Contract, the dispute was first required to be adjudicated by the named Adjudicator and only thereafter could the matter proceed to arbitration, and that in the event of failure to appoint an arbitrator by mutual agreement, the appointing authority was an external body and not the Chief Engineer. According to the appellants, the named Adjudicator had not refused to act, and the respondent had declined to accept him on the ground of alleged bias, which did not justify bypassing the contractual procedure. Consequently, the appointment of the sole arbitrator by the Chief Engineer on 6.2.2004 is asserted to be contrary to the contract, rendering the arbitral proceedings void ab initio.
9. On merits, the appellants further contend that the arbitrator erred in allowing Claim No. 1 relating to payment of the 4th R/A bill and final bill, despite substantial amounts being allegedly recoverable from the respondent under other contracts executed in different Page 9 Signature Not Verified Digitally Signed Signed by: BHABAGRAHI JHANKAR Reason: Authentication Location: ORISSA HIGH COURT, CUTTACK Date: 09-Feb-2026 19:48:34 divisions. It is argued that excess payments, unpaid mobilisation advances and penalties in other packages entitled the department to withhold payment under the present contract by way of adjustment in order to safeguard public revenue, and that the arbitrator failed to take these liabilities into account. With regard to Claim No. 2 relating to minimum wages, it is contended that the contract did not contain any escalation clause and that such clause had in fact been consciously deleted; therefore, the respondent, having accepted the contract rates without protest during execution, could not subsequently seek reimbursement on account of wage revision. As regards Claims No. 3, 4 and 5, it is urged that retention of performance security and retention money was justified in view of outstanding dues in other contracts and that award of interest and direction to release the bank guarantee were beyond the arbitrator's jurisdiction and contrary to the contractual terms. The appellants also contend that the award is against public policy, as it results in payment to a contractor who was otherwise allegedly liable to make good losses to the State.
10.On the aforesaid premises, the appellants submit that the learned District Judge failed to exercise jurisdiction vested under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 by not examining whether the arbitral tribunal was constituted in accordance with the agreement, whether the arbitrator had exceeded the terms of the contract, and whether the award dealt with claims expressly barred by contractual stipulations. It is contended that patent illegality is Page 10 Signature Not Verified Digitally Signed Signed by: BHABAGRAHI JHANKAR Reason: Authentication Location: ORISSA HIGH COURT, CUTTACK Date: 09-Feb-2026 19:48:34 apparent on the face of the award, both in assumption of jurisdiction and in grant of claims contrary to the contract and without evidentiary foundation, which warranted interference. The appellants therefore assert that the refusal to set aside the award suffers from material irregularity and non-consideration of vital grounds available under Section 34(2) and Section 34(2A), thereby justifying appellate interference with the impugned judgment. III. RESPONDENT'S SUBMISSIONS:
11.Per contra, the counsel for the respondent contends in ARBA No. 12, the respondent supports the arbitral award and the judgment of the learned District Judge, Ganjam, Berhampur, contending that the entire delay in execution and eventual foreclosure of the contract occurred solely due to failure of the department to provide continuous and lawful working site. It is stated that only small and scattered portions of the site were initially made available and that substantial stretches comprised private land and forest land where execution could not legally proceed, despite mobilisation of manpower and machinery by the contractor. Repeated requests for handing over proper site and for supply of drawings are stated to have been made, but no effective steps were taken by the department. According to the respondent, the contractor remained ready and willing to execute the work but was prevented by circumstances wholly beyond his control, and therefore termination of the contract and encashment of the bank guarantee were unjustified and arbitrary.
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12.With regard to the claims allowed by the arbitrator, the respondent submits that documentary and oral evidence was adduced showing mobilisation of labour and machinery and the expenses incurred during the subsistence of the contract, which were duly assessed by the arbitrator while granting compensation. It is further contended that payment of revised minimum wages is a statutory obligation and cannot be avoided by deletion of a general escalation clause, and therefore the amount awarded under that head was legally payable. The respondent further submits that the objections now sought to be raised were either not urged before the arbitrator or were already considered and rejected by the learned District Judge while exercising jurisdiction under Section 34, and that the present appeal is in substance an attempt to seek reappreciation of evidence, which is impermissible in proceedings under Section 37. It is also contended that the arbitrator was appointed and participated in by both parties without objection and that the award does not suffer from any jurisdictional infirmity or patent illegality.
13.In ARBA No. 13, the respondent contends that the arbitral tribunal was constituted strictly in accordance with the contractual stipulations and with the consent of both parties. It is submitted that since the value of the contract was below the prescribed monetary threshold, the dispute was referable to a sole arbitrator, and upon the respondent's request dated 10.1.2004, the Chief Engineer appointed the sole arbitrator on 6.2.2004 in terms of the applicable procedure. The respondent emphasises that the appellants participated in the Page 12 Signature Not Verified Digitally Signed Signed by: BHABAGRAHI JHANKAR Reason: Authentication Location: ORISSA HIGH COURT, CUTTACK Date: 09-Feb-2026 19:48:34 arbitral proceedings without demur, filed counter statements, produced documents and argued the matter on merits, and therefore any objection to jurisdiction or procedure stands waived and cannot be permitted to be raised after suffering an adverse award.
14.On the issue of non-payment of the 4th R/A bill and final bill, the respondent submits that there is no clause in the contract authorising the department to withhold amounts payable under one contract for the purpose of recovering alleged dues under other, independent contracts executed in different divisions. It is argued that each contract constitutes a separate legal relationship and cross- adjustment is impermissible in the absence of express contractual authority. The respondent further relies upon the order dated 30.8.2003 passed by the learned District Judge in proceedings under Section 9 restraining further recovery from other bills, yet the appellants continued to withhold payment, demonstrating that the action was arbitrary and unsupported by law.
15.With respect to the claim towards minimum wages, the respondent submits that payment of revised minimum wages was a statutory mandate under the Minimum Wages Act, 1948 and also flowed from contractual clauses requiring compliance with labour laws. It is contended that deletion of a general price-escalation clause cannot override statutory obligations, and once the respondent was legally bound to pay enhanced wages, the corresponding financial burden could not be thrust upon him alone. It is further submitted that the arbitrator applied the departmental formula and relied upon Page 13 Signature Not Verified Digitally Signed Signed by: BHABAGRAHI JHANKAR Reason: Authentication Location: ORISSA HIGH COURT, CUTTACK Date: 09-Feb-2026 19:48:34 measurement book entries and other contemporaneous records, and therefore the computation is purely factual and beyond the scope of interference in appeal.
16.As regards performance security, retention money and interest, the respondent submits that the defect liability period had long expired, the work had been accepted, and there was no contractual justification for continued retention of security amounts. It is argued that retention was being used merely as leverage for extraneous disputes arising out of other contracts, which is impermissible. The respondent further submits that interest was awarded in accordance with contractual provisions governing delayed payments and that once wrongful withholding of admitted dues was established, grant of interest was a natural and lawful consequence.
17.On the above premises, the respondent submits that the scope of interference under Section 37 is extremely limited and does not permit reappreciation of evidence or substitution of the court's view for that of the arbitrator. It is contended that the learned District Judge has already examined the objections within the parameters of Section 34 and found no patent illegality, jurisdictional error or violation of public policy. The respondent therefore asserts that the present appeals seek a second round of factual adjudication, which is impermissible in appellate proceedings arising out of arbitral awards, and that no ground is made out for interference with either the award or the impugned judgment.
Page 14 Signature Not Verified Digitally Signed Signed by: BHABAGRAHI JHANKAR Reason: Authentication Location: ORISSA HIGH COURT, CUTTACK Date: 09-Feb-2026 19:48:34 IV. ISSUE FOR CONSIDERATION:
18.Having heard the parties and perused the materials available on record, this court here has identified the following issue to be determined:
A. Whether the order of the Ld. District Judge warrants interference keeping in mind the limitations of this court's powers under Section 37 of the A&C Act?
V. ISSUE A: WHETHER THE ORDER OF THE LD. DISTRICT JUDGE WARRANTS INTERFERENCE KEEPING IN MIND THE LIMITATIONS OF THIS COURT'S POWERS UNDER SECTION 37 OF THE A&C ACT?
19.Before going into the merits of the contentions, it is necessary to outline the ambit and scope of Section 37(2)(b) of the 1996 Act. The said section is extracted below:
"37. Appealable orders.--(1)[Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force, an appeal] shall lie from the following orders (and from no others) to the court authorised by law to hear appeals from original decrees of the court passing the order, namely:
∗∗∗ (2) Appeal shall also lie to a court from an order of the Arbitral Tribunal--
(a) accepting the plea referred to in sub-section (2) or sub-section (3) of Section 16; or
(b) granting or refusing to grant an interim measure under Section 17."
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20.The Supreme Court and this Court in catena of judgments have held that the powers of appellate court while exercising jurisdiction under Section 37(2)(b) of the 1996 Act against orders passed by the Arbitral Tribunal is very restricted and narrow and the same should be exercised when the orders seems to be perverse, arbitrary and contrary to law. The judgment of Wander Ltd. v. Antox India (P) Ltd.1 passed by the Apex Court, elaborates the ambit and scope of the appeals. Although the aforesaid judgment is not dealing with the arbitration proceedings but the same deals with the power of appellate court in the Civil Procedure Code, 1908 (CPC). Operative paragraphs of the aforesaid judgment are extracted below:
"13. On a consideration of the matter, we are afraid, the Appellate Bench fell into error on two important propositions. The first is a misdirection in regard to the very scope and nature of the appeals before it and the limitations on the powers of the appellate court to substitute its own discretion in an appeal preferred against a discretionary order. The second pertains to the infirmities in the ratiocination as to the quality of antox's alleged user of the trade mark on which the passing-off action is founded. We shall deal with these two separately.
14. The appeals before the Division Bench were against the exercise of discretion by the Single Judge. In such appeals, the appellate court will not interfere with the exercise of discretion of the court of first instance and substitute its own discretion except where the discretion has been shown to have been exercised arbitrarily, or capriciously or perversely or where the court had ignored 1990 Supp SCC 727 1 Page 16 Signature Not Verified Digitally Signed Signed by: BHABAGRAHI JHANKAR Reason: Authentication Location: ORISSA HIGH COURT, CUTTACK Date: 09-Feb-2026 19:48:34 the settled principles of law regulating grant or refusal of interlocutory injunctions. An appeal against exercise of discretion is said to be an appeal on principle. Appellate court will not reassess the material and seek to reach a conclusion different from the one reached by the court below if the one reached by that court was reasonably possible on the material. The appellate court would normally not be justified in interfering with the exercise of discretion under appeal solely on the ground that if it had considered the matter at the trial stage it would have come to a contrary conclusion. If the discretion has been exercised by the trial court reasonably and in a judicial manner the fact that the appellate court would have taken a different view may not justify interference with the trial court's exercise of discretion. After referring to these principles Gajendragadkar, J. in Printers (Mysore) (P) Ltd. v. Pothan Joseph (SCC OnLine SC para 9) '9. ...These principles are well established, but as has been observed by Viscount Simon in Charles Osenton & Co. v. Johnston "the law as to the reversal by a court of appeal of an order made by a Judge below in the exercise of his discretion is well established and any difficulty that arises is due only to the application of well-settled principles in an individual case."' The appellate judgment does not seem to defer to this principle."
21.The said judgment is consistently followed in adjudicating petitions pertaining to the A&C Act by Courts across the Country in Green Infra Wind Energy Ltd. v. Regen Powertech (P) Ltd.2; Sona Corpn. India (P) Ltd. v. Ingram Micro India (P) Ltd.3; Manish Aggarwal 2018 SCC OnLine Del 8273 2 2020 SCC OnLine Del 300 3 Page 17 Signature Not Verified Digitally Signed Signed by: BHABAGRAHI JHANKAR Reason: Authentication Location: ORISSA HIGH COURT, CUTTACK Date: 09-Feb-2026 19:48:34 v. RCI Industries & Technologies Ltd.4; Tahal Consulting Engineers India (P) Ltd. v. Promax Power Ltd.5 and Handicraft & Handlooms Exports Co. of India v. SMC Comtrade Ltd.6.
22.In Reliance Infrastructure Ltd. v. State of Goa7, the Apex Court noticing its previous decision in MMTC Ltd. v. Vedanta Ltd.8 has noted the limited scope of interference under Section 34 and further narrower scope of appeal under Section 37 of the Act particularly when dealing with the concurrent findings of the arbitrator and that of the Court. Relevant paragraph '14' of MMTC Ltd.(supra) as noted in paragraph '26' in Reliance Infrastructure Ltd.(supra) is to be extracted hereinunder:--
"14. As far as interference with an order made under Section 34, as per Section 37, is concerned, it cannot be disputed that such interference under Section 37 cannot travel beyond the restrictions laid down under Section 34. In other words, the court cannot undertake an independent assessment of the merits of the award, and must only ascertain that the exercise of power by the court under Section34 has not exceeded the scope of the provision. Thus, it is evident that in case an arbitral award has been confirmed by the court under Section 34 and by the court in an appeal under Section 37, this Court must be extremely cautious and slow to disturb such concurrent findings."
(2022) 3 HCC (Del) 289 4 2023 SCC OnLine Del 2069 5 2023 SCC OnLine Del 3981 6 (2024) 1 SCC 479 7 (2019) 4 SCC 163 8 Page 18 Signature Not Verified Digitally Signed Signed by: BHABAGRAHI JHANKAR Reason: Authentication Location: ORISSA HIGH COURT, CUTTACK Date: 09-Feb-2026 19:48:34
23.The same view has been expressed in UHL Power Company Ltd. v. State of Himachal Pradesh9 in paragraph '16' while noticing paragraph '11' in MMTC Ltd.(supra):--
"16. As it is, the jurisdiction conferred on courts under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act is fairly narrow, when it comes to the scope of an appeal under Section 37 of the Arbitration Act, the jurisdiction of an appellate court in examining an order, setting aside or refusing to set aside an award, is all the more circumscribed. In MMTC Ltd. v. Vedanta Ltd. [MMTC Ltd. v. Vedanta Ltd., (2019) 4 SCC 163 : (2019) 2 SCC (Civ) 293], the reasons for vesting such a limited jurisdiction on the High Court in exercise of powers under Section 34 of the ArbitrationAct have been explained in the following words : (SCC pp. 166-67, para
11) "11. As far as Section 34 is concerned, the position is well-settled by now that the Court does not sit in appeal over the arbitral award and may interfere on merits on the limited ground provided under Section 34(2)(b)(ii) i.e. if the award is against the public policy of India. As per the legal position clarified through decisions of this Court prior to the amendments to the 1996 Act in 2015, a violation of Indian public policy, in turn, includes a violation of the fundamental policy of Indian law, a violation of the interest of India, conflict with justice or morality, and the existence of patent illegality in the arbitral award.
Additionally, the concept of the "fundamental policy of Indian law" would cover compliance with statutes and judicial precedents, adopting a judicial approach, compliance with the principles (2022) 4 SCC 116 9 Page 19 Signature Not Verified Digitally Signed Signed by: BHABAGRAHI JHANKAR Reason: Authentication Location: ORISSA HIGH COURT, CUTTACK Date: 09-Feb-2026 19:48:34 of natural justice, and Wednesbury [Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd. v. Wednesbury Corpn., [1948] 1 K.B. 223(CA)] reasonableness. Furthermore, "patent illegality" itself has been held to mean contravention of the substantive law of India, contravention of the 1996 Act, and contravention of the terms of the contract."
24.In Haryana Tourism Ltd. v. Kandhari Beverages Ltd.10 as noted in paragraph '30' in Reliance Infrastructure Ltd.(supra), it was held on the scope of interference under Sections 34 and 37 of the Act' 1996 as under:--
"30. In Haryana Tourism [Haryana Tourism Ltd. v. Kandhari Beverages Ltd., (2022) 3 SCC 237 : (2022) 2 SCC (Civ) 87], this Court yet again pointed out the limited scope of interference under Sections 34 and37 of the Act; and disapproved interference by the High Court under Section 37 of the Act while entering into merits of the claim in the following words : (SCC p. 240, paras 8-9) "8. So far as the impugned judgment and order [Kandhari Beverages Ltd. v. Haryana Tourism Ltd., 2018 SCC OnLine P&H 3233] passed by the High Court quashing and setting aside the award and the order passed by the Additional District Judge under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act are concerned, it is required to be noted that in an appeal under Section 37 of the Arbitration Act, the High Court has entered into the merits of the claim, which is not 2022) 3 SCC 237 10 Page 20 Signature Not Verified Digitally Signed Signed by: BHABAGRAHI JHANKAR Reason: Authentication Location: ORISSA HIGH COURT, CUTTACK Date: 09-Feb-2026 19:48:34 permissible in exercise of powers under Section 37 of the Arbitration Act.
9. As per settled position of law laid down by this Court in a catena of decisions, an award can be set aside only if the award is against the public policy of India. The award can be set aside under Sections 34/37 of the Arbitration Act, if the award is found to be contrary to : (a) fundamental policy of Indian Law; or (b) the interest of India; or
(c) justice or morality; or (d) if it is patently illegal. None of the aforesaid exceptions shall be applicable to the facts of the case on hand. The High Court has entered into the merits of the claim and has decided the appeal under Section 37 of the Arbitration Act as if the High Court was deciding the appeal against the judgment and decree passed by the learned trial court. Thus, the High Court has exercised the jurisdiction not vested in it under Section 37 of the Arbitration Act. The impugned judgment andorder [Kandhari Beverages Ltd. v. Haryana Tourism Ltd., 2018 SCC OnLine P&H 3233] passed by the High Court is hence not sustainable."
25.It was, thus, observed in paragraph '33' of Reliance Infrastructure Ltd.(supra) as under:--
"33. Keeping in view the aforementioned principles enunciated by this Court with regard to the limited scope of interference in an arbitral award by a Court in the exercise of its jurisdiction under Section34 of the Act, which is all the more circumscribed in an appeal under Section 37, we may examine the rival submissions of the parties in relation to the matters dealt with by the High Court."
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26.It is observed in Punjab State Civil Supplies Corpn. Ltd. v. Sanman Rice Mills11 that:
"9. The object of the Act is to provide for a speedy and inexpensive alternative mode of settlement of dispute with the minimum of intervention of the courts. Section 5 of the Act is implicit in this regard and prohibits interference by the judicial authority with the arbitration proceedings except where so provided in Part-I of the Act. The judicial interference, if any, is provided inter- alia only by means of Sections 34 and 37 of the Act respectively.
10. Section 34 of the Act provides for getting an arbitral award set aside by moving an application in accordance with sub-Section (2) andsub-Section (3) of Section 34 of the Act which inter-alia provide for the grounds on which an arbitral award is liable to be set aside. One of the main grounds for interference or setting aside an award is where the arbitral award is in conflict with the public policy of India i.e. if the award is induced or affected by fraud or corruption or is in contravention with the fundamental policy of Indian law or it is in conflict with most basic notions of morality and justice. A plain reading of Section 34 reveals that the scope of interference by the court with the arbitral award under Section 34 is very limited and the court is not supposed to travel beyond the aforesaid scope to find out if the award is good or bad.
11. Section 37 of the Act provides for a forum of appeal inter-alia against the order setting aside or refusing to set aside an arbitral award under Section 34 of the Act. The scope of appeal is naturally akin to andlimited to the grounds enumerated under Section 34 of the Act.11
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12. It is pertinent to note that an arbitral award is not liable to be interfered with only on the ground that the award is illegal or is erroneous in law that too upon reappraisal of the evidence adduced before the arbitral trial. Even an award which may not be reasonable or is non-speaking to some extent cannot ordinarily be interfered with by the courts. It is also well settled that even if two views are possible there is no scope for the court to reappraise the evidence and to take the different view other than that has been taken by the arbitrator. The view taken by the arbitrator is normally acceptable and ought to be allowed to prevail.
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14. It is equally settled law that the appellate power under Section 37of the Act is not akin to the normal appellate jurisdiction vested in the civil courts for the reason that the scope of interference of the courts with arbitral proceedings or award is very limited, confined to the ambit of Section 34 of the Act only and even that power cannot be exercised in a casual and a cavalier manner.
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16. It is seen that the scope of interference in an appeal under Section37 of the Act is restricted and subject to the same grounds on which an award can be challenged under Section 34 of the Act. In other words, the powers under Section 37 vested in the court of appeal are not beyond the scope of interference provided under Section 34 of the Act."
Here, the Supreme Court has once again reiterated that even an award which may not be reasonable or is nonspeaking to some extent cannot ordinarily be interfered with by the courts. It is also well settled that even if two views are possible there is no scope for Page 23 Signature Not Verified Digitally Signed Signed by: BHABAGRAHI JHANKAR Reason: Authentication Location: ORISSA HIGH COURT, CUTTACK Date: 09-Feb-2026 19:48:34 the court to reappraise the evidence and to take the different view other than that has been taken by the arbitrator. The view taken by the arbitrator is normally acceptable and ought to be allowed to prevail.
27.In Konkan Railway Corpn. Ltd. v. Chenab Bridge Project12 referring to MMTC Limited (supra) it has been held that:
"19....The scope of jurisdiction under Section 34 and Section 37 of the Act is not akin to normal appellate jurisdiction. It is well-settled that courts ought not to interfere with the arbitral award in a casual and cavalier manner. The mere possibility of an alternative view on facts or interpretation of the contract does not entitle courts to reverse the findings of the arbitral tribunal..."
28.In Dyna Technology Private Limited v. Crompton Greaves Limited13, the Apex Court observed as under:
"24. There is no dispute that Section 34 of the Arbitration Act limits a challenge to an award only on the grounds provided therein or as interpreted by various courts. We need to be cognizant of the fact that arbitral awards should not be interfered with in a casual and cavalier manner, unless the court comes to a conclusion that the perversity of the award goes to the root of the matter without there being a possibility of alternative interpretation which may sustain the arbitral award. Section 34 is different in its approach and cannot be equated with a normal appellate jurisdiction. The mandate under Section 34 is to respect the finality of the (2023) 9 SCC 85 12 13 (2019) 20 SCC 1 Page 24 Signature Not Verified Digitally Signed Signed by: BHABAGRAHI JHANKAR Reason: Authentication Location: ORISSA HIGH COURT, CUTTACK Date: 09-Feb-2026 19:48:34 arbitral award and the party autonomy to get their dispute adjudicated by an alternative forum as provided under the law. If the courts were to interfere with the arbitral award in the usual course on factual aspects, then the commercial wisdom behind opting for alternate dispute resolution would stand frustrated.
25. Moreover, umpteen number of judgments of this Court have categorically held that the courts should not interfere with an award merely because an alternative view on facts and interpretation of contract exists. The courts need to be cautious and should defer to the view taken by the Arbitral Tribunal even if the reasoning provided in the award is implied unless such award portrays perversity unpardonable under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act."
29.Judicial scrutiny of arbitral awards is stringently limited under Indian law. Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, provides the exclusive grounds upon which an arbitral award can be challenged. Courts, therefore, are not empowered to interfere merely because another interpretation or outcome may seem more reasonable. The jurisdiction under Section 34 is confined to procedural and legal infirmities such as lack of jurisdiction, violation of natural justice, or patent illegality. Consequently, appellate jurisdiction under Section 37 is even narrower in its scope. Its purpose is to evaluate whether the court adjudicating under Section 34 has remained within the permissible statutory boundaries. The appeal court cannot re-evaluate evidence or reconsider the factual matrix afresh. The statutory framework thus reflects an overarching legislative intent to insulate arbitral decisions from excessive judicial Page 25 Signature Not Verified Digitally Signed Signed by: BHABAGRAHI JHANKAR Reason: Authentication Location: ORISSA HIGH COURT, CUTTACK Date: 09-Feb-2026 19:48:34 intervention. The entire architecture of Sections 34 and 37 reinforces the finality and autonomy of arbitral proceedings. Arbitration is designed to offer an efficient, expert-led, and expedited alternative to litigation. Courts must therefore resist the temptation to intervene unless the decision by the court under Section 34 itself amounts to a significant transgression of legal boundaries.
30.Judicial restraint under Section 37 also reflects respect for institutional competence of arbitral tribunals in resolving technical and commercial disputes. Courts are cautious not to intrude into operational or industry-specific assessments unless such assessments are manifestly disconnected from evidence or contractual terms. Arbitration is valued precisely because it permits specialized adjudication, and appellate courts must avoid substituting judicial perceptions for commercial judgment, unless the latter is demonstrably arbitrary or legally unsound.
31.The balance, therefore, lies between two competing imperatives:
preserving arbitral autonomy and ensuring legal accountability.
Excessive deference risks validating legally flawed awards, while excessive interference undermines arbitration as an effective dispute resolution mechanism. Section 37 embodies this balance by allowing interference only when legal thresholds are crossed. Courts must carefully calibrate intervention to correct illegality without re-
opening factual controversy, thereby preserving both rule of law and arbitral efficiency.
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32.Now this Court shall endeavour to answer the main question framed herein bearing in mind that this Court is not sitting as a court of first appeal over the arbitral award, nor can it re-appreciate evidence or substitute its own view merely because another view is possible.
33.The principal issue for consideration before this Court is whether the arbitral award suffers from such illegality, perversity or jurisdictional defect as would justify interference in an appeal under Section 37 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, particularly when the award has already been upheld by the Ld. District Judge, Ganjam, Berhampur under Section 34.
34.In ARBA 12 of 2014, the first objection raised by the appellants relates to non-availability of site and delay in execution of work. The arbitrator has recorded detailed findings that only fragmented portions of the site were initially handed over and that even subsequent availability remained discontinuous and legally obstructed due to private ownership and forest restrictions. The arbitrator has referred to departmental correspondence, progress reports and site conditions while arriving at the conclusion that workable site was not made available in reasonable measure. These findings are not based on conjecture but on documents placed on record. The Ld. District Judge has also examined this aspect and has found that the arbitrator's conclusion is supported by evidence. This Court does not find that such findings are so unreasonable or unsupported as to warrant interference.
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35.The appellants have argued that the contractor was himself responsible for delay and that departmental action in foreclosing the contract and encashing the bank guarantee was justified. However, the arbitrator has found that stoppage of work and termination were not preceded by adequate handover of site and that the contractor could not be blamed for non-execution in such circumstances. Whether termination was justified or not was a matter squarely within the arbitral domain, and once the arbitrator has examined facts and contractual clauses to reach a conclusion, this Court cannot re-adjudicate that question in appeal.
36.The next issue relates to claims towards idle labour, machinery and mobilisation advance. These claims are founded on the assertion that manpower and equipment were mobilised in anticipation of work but remained idle due to site constraints. The arbitrator has examined statements of deployment, duration of idling, and supporting materials and thereafter quantified compensation. This is essentially an assessment of factual loss arising out of breach. This Court finds no material to suggest that the arbitrator ignored vital evidence or relied on no evidence. The appellants' grievance is primarily about the sufficiency and correctness of proof, which cannot be revisited under Section 37.
37.The appellants have also challenged the award of revised minimum wages, stating that deletion of escalation clause barred such claim. This Court finds that the arbitrator has treated the issue as one of statutory compliance rather than contractual escalation. Payment of Page 28 Signature Not Verified Digitally Signed Signed by: BHABAGRAHI JHANKAR Reason: Authentication Location: ORISSA HIGH COURT, CUTTACK Date: 09-Feb-2026 19:48:34 minimum wages flows from law and not merely from contract. A contractual clause cannot override statutory wage obligations. The arbitrator has relied on legal principles and relevant precedents while allowing this claim. This approach does not disclose any legal infirmity.
38.The challenge to refund of bank guarantee is also linked to the finding regarding wrongful termination. Once the arbitrator found that failure to execute work was not attributable to the contractor, invocation of the bank guarantee lost its contractual basis. The arbitrator has therefore directed refund of the encashed amount. This follows logically from the factual findings and does not amount to grant beyond jurisdiction.
39.With regard to interest on blocked amounts and future interest, the arbitrator has exercised discretion after considering that money was withheld without justification. Interest is compensatory in nature and intended to offset deprivation of use of money. The rate awarded cannot be said to be shockingly high or prohibited under law. This Court finds no reason to interfere with such discretionary relief.
40.Another set of objections raised by the appellants pertains to limitation and appointment of arbitrator. It is seen that these objections were not pressed before the arbitrator by invoking Section 16 of the Act. The parties participated in the proceedings without raising jurisdictional challenge at the appropriate stage. The Act clearly provides that objections to jurisdiction must be raised before Page 29 Signature Not Verified Digitally Signed Signed by: BHABAGRAHI JHANKAR Reason: Authentication Location: ORISSA HIGH COURT, CUTTACK Date: 09-Feb-2026 19:48:34 the Tribunal at the earliest opportunity, failing which such objections are deemed to be waived. Raising such grounds for the first time in appellate proceedings is not permissible.
41.It is also relevant that many of the grounds now urged were not part of the Section 34 application in substance or were not pursued seriously before the Ld. District Judge. An appeal under Section 37 cannot be used to enlarge the scope of challenge beyond what was available under Section 34, nor can it serve as a forum for introducing fresh objections or reshaping the case.
42.Therefore, the judgment of the Ld. District Judge dated 23.9.2013 shows that the scope of Section 34 was correctly appreciated and that each head of claim was examined with reference to the arbitral findings and contractual provisions. This Court does not find that the Ld. District Judge ignored any material issue or applied incorrect legal principles.
43.In ARBA 13 of 2014, at the outset, this Court notes that the execution of work by the respondent is not in dispute. The contract, the period of execution, the grant of extension up to 4.8.2003, the completion of work within the extended period, and the recording of final measurements by early August, 2003, all stand admitted. There is also no dispute that the 4th R/A bill and the final bill were prepared, that the gross amount stood at about Rs. 69.86 lakhs, and that after statutory deductions the net payable was Rs. 63,51,867/-. Thus, the foundational fact that money became due and payable to the respondent under the very contract in question is not contested.
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44.The only justification offered by the appellants for non-payment is that the respondent had alleged dues or excess payments in respect of other contracts executed under different packages and divisions, and therefore the amount payable under the present contract was retained for adjustment. This Court finds that the arbitrator has dealt with this issue in a detailed and reasoned manner. The General Conditions of Contract were examined, particularly Clause 43.1, which mandates payment within 28 days of preparation of the bill and provides for interest in case of delay. Significantly, no clause was shown which authorises the employer to withhold payments under one contract to recover alleged dues under another, independent contract. Contracts are separate legal engagements. Rights and liabilities under one cannot be mechanically transplanted into another in the absence of express contractual authority. Permitting such adjustment would amount to rewriting the contract by judicial fiat, which neither the arbitrator nor this Court is empowered to do.
45.This Court also finds force in the arbitrator's observation that even if the alleged amount to be recovered from other packages was about Rs. 34.25 lakhs, the entire sum of about Rs. 70 lakhs was withheld. Such blanket withholding, despite completion of work and certification of measurements, cannot be justified on any rational contractual basis. The arbitrator's conclusion that this amounted to financial harassment is not an emotional or rhetorical remark, but a factual inference drawn from prolonged deprivation of payment for completed work.
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46.Further, the record shows that the respondent had approached the Ld. District Judge under Section 9 on 30.8.2003, and an order was passed restraining further recovery from other bills till arbitration was decided. The appellants were parties to that proceeding. Yet, payment of the bills under the present contract was still not released, on the plea of instructions from higher authorities. This Court is constrained to observe that once a judicial order is in force, administrative instructions cannot override it. Continued non- payment despite such order only reinforces the finding that the respondent was deprived of money lawfully due, without legal justification.
47.On Claim No. 2 relating to minimum wages, this Court finds that the arbitrator approached the issue correctly in law and in fact. Payment of minimum wages under the Minimum Wages Act, 1948 is not optional, nor is it dependent on contractual clauses. It is a statutory mandate. The contract itself required compliance with labour laws. The wage revision notification enhancing wages from Rs. 40/- to Rs. 50/- came into effect on 1.1.2002, prior to commencement of work on 5.6.2002. The respondent, therefore, had no choice but to pay the enhanced wages. The deletion of a general price escalation clause cannot nullify a statutory obligation, nor can it absolve the employer of financial consequences flowing from compliance with mandatory labour laws.
48.The arbitrator did not award any notional or speculative amount. He applied the Works Department formula for calculation of increased Page 32 Signature Not Verified Digitally Signed Signed by: BHABAGRAHI JHANKAR Reason: Authentication Location: ORISSA HIGH COURT, CUTTACK Date: 09-Feb-2026 19:48:34 labour cost, identified the labour components for different categories of work based on measurement book entries, and then computed the additional amount payable. This is a factual and technical exercise, well within the domain of the arbitral tribunal. This Court does not find any perversity or patent illegality in this computation. The award on this head is rooted in statutory obligation, contractual stipulations regarding labour law compliance, and departmental methodology for calculation.
49.With respect to Claim No. 3 concerning performance security, the factual position is that the defect liability period had expired and the work stood accepted. Performance security is meant to secure performance during execution and defect liability. It is not meant to be retained indefinitely as leverage for unrelated claims. The arbitrator directed release of the bank guarantee amount and awarded interest for delayed release. This Court finds that such direction flows directly from the contract and from basic principles of fairness in commercial dealings. Retention beyond contractual period without cause is not defensible.
50.On Claim No. 4 regarding retention money, the contract itself provides that part of the retention is to be released on completion and the balance after expiry of defect liability period. Both stages had admittedly passed. The arbitrator relied on measurement book deductions to ascertain the amount retained and ordered refund with interest. This again is a straight application of contractual terms to admitted facts. No perversity or illegality is shown.
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51.On Claim No. 5 relating to interest on delayed payment of the principal amount, Clause 43 of the GCC expressly provides for interest on delayed payments. Once the principal amount was found to be wrongfully withheld, interest necessarily follows. The arbitrator quantified interest based on contractual rate and period of delay. Award of interest in such circumstances cannot be characterised as punitive or contrary to law. It is compensatory in nature.
52.The appellants have also raised objections regarding the constitution of the tribunal and alleged violation of dispute resolution procedure. This Court finds that the arbitrator has recorded a clear factual finding that Clause 25.3(f) applied, that the respondent requested appointment of sole arbitrator, and that the Chief Engineer appointed the arbitrator on 6.2.2004. The appellants participated in the proceedings fully, filed pleadings, produced documents, and argued on merits. No objection under Section 16 was raised before the tribunal. No application under Sections 12 to 15 was pursued. In such circumstances, Section 4 of the Act squarely applies, and any objection to procedure or composition stands waived. A party cannot approbate and reprobate, participate in proceedings, and after suffering an adverse award, question the very forum it had accepted.
53.The plea that disputes were not raised within 28 days of the Engineer's decision is also devoid of merit. Limitation in arbitration is governed by the Limitation Act by virtue of Section 43. Contractual clauses cannot curtail statutory limitation periods. Moreover, such Page 34 Signature Not Verified Digitally Signed Signed by: BHABAGRAHI JHANKAR Reason: Authentication Location: ORISSA HIGH COURT, CUTTACK Date: 09-Feb-2026 19:48:34 objections are jurisdictional in nature and ought to have been raised before the tribunal at the threshold. Raising them for the first time in Section 34 or Section 37 proceedings is impermissible.
54.This Court also notes that the Section 34 application did not plead precise grounds falling within Section 34(2) with necessary particulars. What was placed before the Ld. District Judge was largely a repetition of defences taken before the arbitrator. The Ld. District Judge rightly declined to re-appreciate evidence or revisit contractual interpretation. The judgment dated 16.09.2013 reflects correct appreciation of the limited scope of interference.
55.In sum, this Court finds that the arbitral award impugned in ARBA 13 of 2014 is based on contractual clauses, statutory mandates, admitted facts, and reasoned appreciation of evidence. It does not suffer from perversity. It does not violate public policy. It does not disclose patent illegality on the face of the award. The conclusions reached by the arbitrator are plausible, coherent, and legally sustainable. Even if another view were theoretically possible, that by itself is no ground for interference under Section 37.
56.Overall, this Court finds that the arbitral awards are reasoned awards based on contractual interpretation and factual appreciation, and the supervisory court under Section 34 has already found no ground for interference. The present appeal essentially seeks a rehearing on facts and merits, which is not permissible within the narrow confines of Section 37 jurisdiction.
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57.Accordingly, this Court finds no illegality, perversity or jurisdictional error in the arbitral awards dated 6.12.2004 or 5.3.2005 respectively and in the judgments dated 23.9.2013 or 16.9.2013 passed by the Ld. District Judge, Ganjam, Berhampur, warranting interference by this Court.
VI. CONCLUSION:
58.In this backdrop, this Court finds that the appellants' challenge essentially seeks reappreciation of evidence and substitution of factual conclusions, which is impermissible in appellate jurisdiction under Section 37. The arbitral awards and the judgments of the Ld. District Judge reflect due consideration of the contractual framework and evidentiary materials, and no ground is made out to hold that the award is in conflict with law or public policy. Consequently, the challenge does not merit acceptance.
59.In view of the foregoing discussion and findings, this Court holds that the appeals are devoid of merit and, accordingly, ARBA No.12 of 2014 and ARBA No.13 of 2014 are dismissed. The judgments dated 23.9.2013 and 16.9.2013 passed by the Ld. District Judge, Ganjam, Berhampur in Arbitration Petition No.01 of 2005 and Arbitration Petition No.03 of 2005 are hereby affirmed, and the same stand upheld.
60.Any interim orders, if any, passed during pendency of the aforesaid appeals shall stand vacated. Pending interlocutory applications, if any, shall also stand disposed of.
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61.There shall be no order as to costs.
(Dr.Sanjeeb K Panigrahi) Judge Orissa High Court, Cuttack, Dated the 30th Jan., 2026/ Page 37