Himachal Pradesh High Court
Himachal Road Transport Corporation vs Bimla Kanwar And Ors. on 19 October, 2001
Equivalent citations: I(2002)ACC346, II(2002)ACC754, 2002ACJ346
Author: Arun Kumar Goel
Bench: Arun Kumar Goel
JUDGMENT Arun Kumar Goel, J.
1. Himachal Road Transport Corporation, hereinafter referred to as 'H.R.T.C is aggrieved with the award passed by the learned Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, Shirnla, in MAC No. 99-S/2 of 1995, dated 18.10.96. This claim petition was filed at the instance of the respondents, who are the widow and two minor daughters of late Inder Singh Kanwar.
2. In proceedings initiated under Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, hereinafter referred to as 'the Act', learned Tribunal below awarded a total compensation of Rs. 7,97,700 in favour of respondent Nos. 1 to 3, besides interest at the rate of 12 per cent per annum from the date of filing of claim petition, i.e., 14.11.1995 till the date it was paid or deposited by the H.R.T.C. This total amount is inclusive of the amount, if any, already paid to the respondents under no fault liability. Minor daughters have been allowed a sum of the Rs. 2,50,000 each with interest, as aforesaid and the remaining Rs. 2,97,700 has been allowed in favour of their mother, Bimla Kanwar. Against the award amount of Rs. 7,97,700, all three of them had claimed Rs. 20,00,000 in the petition filed by them under the Act before the Tribunal.
3. In this appeal respondents have filed cross-objections for enhancement of compensation by modifying the award. At the same time, an application for additional evidence was also filed with a prayer to take into account the revision of pay scales which became applicable from 1.1.1996 on the basis of revision of pay scales allowed by the State Government to its employees including those of the State owned Corporation, like H.R.T.C. This application was ordered to be posted along with the main appeal for hearing. Reply has been filed to this application, i.e., CMP No. 598 of 1999 and under the orders of the court affidavit has also been filed on behalf of H.R.T.C.
4. Another fact that needs to be noted here is that as per last pay certificate, Exh. PA the total emoluments being drawn by the deceased on the date of death were Rs. 6,171 p.m.
5. As per affidavit filed on behalf of H.R.T.C, a copy whereof is at page 34 of the appeal file, in case the appellant, had not died in the accident in question, his pay would have been fixed at Rs. 7,880 in the revised pay scale of Rs. 6,400-10,480 and his total emoluments would have been Rs. 13,109 on 31.10.1999.
6. Facts by and large are admitted in this case, however, those need to be noted briefly.
7. Deceased Inder Singh was working as Superintendent (Stores) in the H.R.T.C. Divisional Office at Shimla. His widow Bimla Kanwar is also employed in the H.R.T.C. as a Senior Clerk. On the fateful day, i.e., 23.5.1995 deceased was a bona fide passenger in bus No. HPS 6929 on its way from Sanjauli to Kufri. He was constructing his house there at Kufri.
8. There is evidence of a police case having been registered and copy of FJ.R. is Exh. PC. Deceased being a bona fide passenger in the bus in question at the time of its accident on 23.5.1995 is certified by the Divisional Manager, H.R.T.C. Copy of certificate is Exh. PD. Copy of his death certificate is Exh. PE, of the post-mortem examination Exh. PF and the legal representatives certificate is Exh. PG.
9. Besides these documents, there is Exh. PB, communication circulating seniority list issued by H.R.T.C. on 1.5.1987 together with list Exh. PB-1. Deceased Inder Singh was at Sr. No. 4 and was the youngest of all the four persons mentioned in it.
10. According to respondent Nos. 1 to 3 accident was the result of rash and negligent driving on the part of the driver of the bus which met with accident near Kufri when it rolled down into a nallah. H.R.T.C. was contesting the claim of respondent Nos. 1 to 3. H.R.T.C. pleaded that accident was not the result of rash and negligent driving, but was due to mechanical defect. As such it was not liable for payment of any amount to the petitioners, as claimed. The Tribunal framed the following issues and awarded the amount as noted herein-above:
(1) Whether the deceased Inder Singh Kanwar had died on account of rash and negligent driving of the bus driver of bus No. HPS 6929? OPP (2) If issue No. 1 supra is proved, to what amount of compensation the petitioners are entitled? OPP (3) Relief.
11. After conclusion of the case, the Tribunal passed the award as aforesaid. Reference to evidence of this case is also relevant, which is as under:
PW 1 is Ahmad Ali, Superintendent, Bus Stand, Shimla, who has proved the last pay certificate as also the seniority list circulated vide Exh. PB and the actual provisional seniority list Exh. PB-1. According to him deceased was Senior Auditor (Stores). This category was subsequently designated as the Superintendent (Stores). Kishori Lal at Sr. No. 1 was promoted before Inder Singh Kanwar died and as such he was at Sr. No. 3 for promotion to the post of Assistant Manager. Deceased was 45 years of age at the time of his death and was to retire at the age of 58 years. In cross-examination he stated that it was not possible for him to state as to when the deceased was to be promoted.
PW 2 is Bimla Kanwar. Per her, the deceased was working as Superintendent (Stores). She and her two minor daughters were dependent on the income of deceased being the only heirs. He used to contribute Rs. 3,000 for running kitchen, etc. Thus she claimed compensation of Rs. 20,00,000. In addition to the documents referred to hereinabove tendered by her in her statement, she also produced certificates Exhs. PH and PJ to the effect that both the daughters were studying in Auckland House School, Shimla. House which was being constructed by the deceased could not be completed after his death. She admitted in cross-examination to be working as Senior Clerk in H.R.T.C. and getting about Rs. 5,000 as gross salary. She denied the suggestion on behalf of H.R.T.C. that her husband used to pay her Rs. 1,000 and not Rs. 3,000 per month. This is the entire oral and documentary evidence on behalf of the claimants.
12. On the other hand, no evidence was led on behalf of the respondents either oral or documentary to establish the plea of the accident being not the result of rash and negligent driving and/or its being outcome of mechanical failure. Following statement was made on its behalf on 15.10.1996:
Since the driver of the bus had died and H.R.T.C. has paid the interim relief to the petitioners, no evidence is to be led and as such, the evidence of the respondent (wrongly shown as petitioners in this statement) is deemed to have been closed.
13. At the time of hearing of this appeal, learned Counsel appearing for the H.R.T.C. forcefully urged that the amount awarded is highly excessive, both on the basis of the evidence as well as under the law governing the same. According to him the amount awarded is liable to be reduced substantially and further no benefit can be given to the respondents-claimant Nos. 1 to 3 of either revision of pay scales which were made applicable w.e.f. 1.1.96, in the year 1998, or otherwise. According to him if the amount awarded is upheld, it will result in undue enrichment of the respondents which is not the purpose, much less intention of the provisions of Motor Vehicles Act. According to him it does not have to come as a bounty or windfall. While assessing compensation under Section 168 of the Act, the Tribunal was required to assess compensation which appeared to it to be just. This letter of law according to Mr. Chandel, has been followed more in its breach than compliance.
14. On the other hand, Mr. Gupta, the learned Counsel for the respondents, while controverting all the pleas urged on behalf of the H.R.T.C. prayed for allowing the application for additional evidence and thus enhancing the compensation. According to him this Court is competent to assess the compensation keeping in view the future prospects of the deceased to the next higher post. In the alternative and without conceding his earlier submissions, he submitted that at least in the scale of pay as revised of the post held by the deceased, his clients are entitled to enhancement as claimed in the application coupled with the facts detailed in the affidavit filed by the H.R.T.C. pursuant to the directions of the court.
15. After having gone through the evidence on record both oral and documentary, as also keeping in view the mandate of law declared by the Apex Court as well as High Courts, we feel that the compensation awarded by the learned Tribunal below deserves to be enhanced by allowing the application for additional evidence. It is only thereafter that just compensation can be assessed in the opinion of this Court.
16. At the risk of repetition, it may be observed and it was not disputed that pay scales have been revised in the H.R.T.C. on the pattern of the State Government w.e.f. 1.1.1996. Date of death of Inder Singh is 23.5.1995, i.e., about 774 months before the revised pay scales came into force.
17. So far plea of H.R.T.C. that since driver has died, therefore, there was no other evidence, is concerned, it cannot be accepted. While making this statement, it was forgotten by the H.R.T.C. that while denying the allegations of accident being the result of rash and negligent driving, plea of same being the result of mechanical failure was also set up.
18. This fact could be established by leading evidence from contemporaneous official record relating to the maintenance of the bus in question. No such attempt has been made for the reasons best known to the H.R.T.C. When confronted with this situation, Mr. Chandel was not in a position to give any plausible reason explaining such an omission.
19. Even otherwise when a motor vehicle like the bus in the present case, is properly driven on the highway in a proper manner at a proper speed, keeping in view the nature of road, its topography and other geographical conditions and is also maintained, it ordinarily does not roll down the road causing fatal accident, like the present one. Thus, we feel that the principle of res ipsa loquitur has been rightly invoked by the learned Tribunal below and in the absence of any material, much less cogent and/or reliable plea urged by Mr. Chandel that the accident was not the result of rash and negligent driving has been raised simply to be rejected and it is ordered accordingly.
20. So far the matter relating to quantum of compensation is concerned, plea of Mr. Chandel has remained on paper only and rightly so. H.R.T.C. could not have controverted the last pay slip issued by it in the case of deceased vide Exh. PA. As per this document, deceased Inder Singh was getting a monthly salary of Rs. 6,171. It is contained in this very document that he was contributing a total sum of Rs. 2,801 per month towards the General Provident Fund and Rs. 5 towards B. Fund. In this background Bimla Kanwar respondent No. 1 has rightly stated that deceased had been contributing Rs. 3,000 per month towards kitchen expenses. This was in addition to Rs. 2,801, as aforesaid being contributed towards GPF which is the net loss to the estate of deceased being the direct result of his untimely death in the accident in question.
21. This clearly establishes that the contribution of the deceased to the estate was not Rs. 3,000 per month as was urged by Mr. Chandel to accept the former figure; but was in fact Rs. 5,501 per month. Faced with this situation though he did not give up expressly, but at the same time he was not in a position to further buttress his plea that dependency upon the deceased should be taken at Rs. 3,000 per month, as stated by Bimla Kanwar, PW 2.
22. In view of the aforesaid discussion we have no hesitation in holding that trial court was justified in taking the monthly income at Rs. 6,171 and then by following the now well-known and recognized multiplier method, worked out the dependency of respondent Nos. 1 to 3 at Rs. 4,115 p.m. By applying multiplier of 15 amount thus comes to Rs. 7,40,700 (Rs. 4,115 x 12 x 15).
23. Besides this learned Tribunal below has allowed Rs. 25,000 on account of loss of love and affection, mental shock and agony; similarly a sum of Rs. 30,000 has been allowed to Bimla Kanwar on account of loss of consortium. Thus the total sum awarded is Rs. 7,97,700 with interest, as mentioned hereinabove.
24. Before proceeding further in the matter, we may note that it has been fairly stated by Mr. Gupta that the sum of Rs. 55,000 allowed by the learned Tribunal below cannot be supported in law being exorbitant and on higher side. He further stated that it is in the discretion of this Court to allow this amount awarded under both these heads.
25. Another plea urged on behalf of the H.R.T.C. by Mr. Chandel was that multiplier in this case is extremely on higher side looking to the age and uncertainty of life which Was liable to be reduced to 12. He further pointed out that the multiplier method takes into account all other facts, like chances of future promotion as also the uncertainties of life; may be not because of (Sic.) have been terminated without his attaining age of superannuation, therefore, the amount of compensation needs to be reduced by applying multiplier of 12.
26. This plea on multiplier need not detain us in view of the recent decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Jyoti Kaul v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2000 ACJ 1368 (SC). In this case while assessing compensation in case of death of a person aged 50 years, who had died in the fatal accident, it was urged that he was to superannuate after 8 years, as such High Court had reduced multiplier to 10. Claimants feeling aggrieved by the decision of the High Court of Madhya Pradesh preferred the appeal. What was held by the Supreme Court while allowing the appeal and restoring the multiplier of 15 was in the following terms:
(2) Heard the learned Counsel for the parties. We find interference by the High Court on the above basis only is not based on sound reasoning. Tribunal has taken into consideration overall considerations. We find there are different judgments by this Court giving different multipliers. This would depend on the facts and circumstances of each case. The multiple System is sound in computing compensation is now well settled but what multiplier should be applied would depend on various circumstances. The age of deceased, the age of dependants, not only existing salary when he died, if any, additional sum payable to the deceased depending upon the nature of job in which he was working, his chances of promotion, the life expectancy, etc. Hence multiplier is bound to change to some degree.
(3) In General Manager, Kerala State Road Transport Corporation v. Susamma Thomas 1994 ACJ 1 (SC), this Court observed:
It is necessary to reiterate that the multiplier method is logically sound and well established...It must be borne in mind that the multiplier method is the accepted method of ensuring a 'just' compensation which will make for uniformity and certainty of the award.
(4) It refers to the principle of computing compensation by the English courts under which the multiplier granted never exceeded 16. This is a case in which multiplier of 12 was applied.
(5) In S. Chandra v. Pallavan Trans. Corporation 1995 ACJ 1170 (SC), this Court observed:
...it cannot be disputed that the life expectancy in India even in the year 1979 was not less than 65 years. We, therefore, hold that the appellants were entitled to a multiplier of 20.
(6) Similarly, in the case of Sneha Dutta v. Himachal Road Trans. Corporation 1999 ACJ 1589 (SC), this Court recorded:
...multiplier 12 to be just and proper.
(7) The aforesaid decisions make it clear that the principle of multiplier would depend on the facts and circumstances of each case. Looking to the facts of this case we find that the Tribunal has given good reasons for applying the multiplier of 15. This was in addition of taking into consideration that the predecessors of the deceased all lived for more than 80 years. The High Court reduced the multiplier from 15 to 10 without taking into consideration the circumstances considered by the Tribunal and thus committed the error. We, accordingly, set aside the findings of the High Court only to the extent of the application of multiplier and uphold other findings including reduction of interest. The present appeal, accordingly, succeeds in part. The computation of compensation now shall be made on the basis of multiplier of 15. The difference in enhanced amount which has yet not been paid by the respondent State shall be paid to the claimants within a period of three months from today.
27. In U.P. State Road Trans. Corporation v. Trilok Chandra 1996 ACJ 831 (SC), a three-Judge Bench of the Hon'ble Apex Court while dealing with the matter relating to the multiplier to be applied in a given case observed as under:
(17) The situation has now undergone a change with the enactment of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, as amended by the Amendment Act, 54 of 1994. The most important change introduced by the amendment insofar as it relates to determination of compensation is the insertion of Sections 163-A and 163-B in Chapter XI entitled 'Insurance of Motor Vehicles Against Third Party Risks'. Section 163-A begins with anon obstante clause and provides for payment of compensation, as indicated in the Second Schedule to the legal representatives of the deceased or injured, as the case may be. Now if we turn to the Second Schedule, we find a Table fixing the mode of calculation of compensation for third party fatal accident and injury claims arising out of accidents. The first column gives the age group of the victims of accident, the second column indicates the multiplier and the subsequent horizontal figures indicate the quantum of compensation in thousand payable to the heirs of the deceased victim. According to this Table the multiplier varies from 5 to 18 depending on the age group to which the victim belonged. Thus, under this Schedule the maximum multiplier can be up to 18 and not 16 as was held in Susamma Thomas' case 1994 ACJ 1 (SC).
(18) We must at once point out that the calculation of compensation and the amount worked out in the Schedule suffer from several defects. For example, in item No. 1 for a victim aged 15 years, the multiplier is shown to be 15 years and the multiplicand is shown to be Rs. 3,000. The total should come to Rs. 3,000 x 15 = Rs. 45,000 but the same is worked out at Rs. 60,000. Similarly, in the second item the multiplier is 16 and the annual income is Rs. 9,000; the total should have been Rs. 1,44,000 but is shown to be Rs. 1,71,000. To put it briefly, the Table abounds in such mistakes. Neither the Tribunals nor the courts can go by the ready reckoner. It can only be used as a guide. Besides, the selection of multiplier cannot in all cases be solely dependent on the age of the deceased. For example, if the deceased, a bachelor, dies at the age of 45 and his dependants are his parents, age of the parents would also be relevant in the choice of multiplier. But these mistakes are limited to actual calculations only and not in respect of other items. What we propose to emphasise is that the multiplier cannot exceed 18 years' purchase factor. This is the improvement over the earlier position that ordinarily it should not exceed 16. We thought it necessary to state the correct legal position as the courts and Tribunals are using higher multiplier as in the present case where the Tribunal used the multiplier of 24 which the High Court raised to 34, thereby showing lack of awareness of the background of the multiplier system in Davies' case (supra).
28. In 5. Chandra v. Pallavan Trans. Corporation 1995 ACJ 1170 (SC), in case of a deceased aged 42 years, multiplier of 20 was applied and compensation was enhanced from Rs. 48,680 to Rs. 1,00,000 as per claim together with interest at the rate of 12 per cent per annum.
29. A Division Bench of this Court in Krishna v. Himachal Pradesh Public Works Department 1996 ACJ 1064 (HP), allowed multiplier of 14 in case of deceased Veterinary Assistant Surgeon aged 41 years and allowed the compensation accordingly.
30. In the face of these decisions we find no reason to change the multiplier of 15 as allowed by the Tribunal which is accordingly upheld.
31. Now coming to the CMP No. 598 of 1999 and its effect in the event of the same being allowed.
32. Reference to the provisions of Order 41, Rule 27, Civil Procedure Code, is relevant here. It is as under:
27. Production of additional evidence in appellate court.-(1) The parties to an appeal shall not be entitled to produce additional evidence, whether oral or documentary, in the appellate court. But if,-
(a) the court from whose decree the appeal is preferred has refused to admit evidence which ought to have been admitted, or (aa) the party seeking to produce additional evidence, establishes that notwithstanding the exercise of due diligence, such evidence was not within his knowledge or could not, after the exercise of due diligence, be produced by him at the time when the decree appealed against was passed, or
(b) the appellate court requires any document to be produced or any witness to be examined to enable it to pronounce judgment, or for any other substantial cause, the appellate court may allow such evidence or document to be produced or witness to be examined.
(2) Whenever additional evidence is allowed to be produced by an appellate court, the court shall record the reason for its admission.
33. It may not be out of place to notice here that the revised pay scales were made applicable by the Government of H.P. Finance Department (Pay Revision Section) Notification No. FIN-(PR) B (7) 1/98, dated 20.1.1998, whereby revision of pay scales was allowed. By means of this notification, Himachal Pradesh Civil Services (Revised Pay) Rules, 1998 were framed. According to Rule 1 (ii) of these Rules, those were deemed to have come into force from 1.1.1996. It was not disputed on behalf of H.R.T.C. that revision of pay stands allowed in case of its staff in terms of this notification of the Government of Himachal Pradesh, though claim of respondent-cross-objector Nos. 1 to 3 to be entitled to its benefit was specifically denied.
34. Award in this case is of 18.10.1996. Thus neither it is covered by Sub-clause (a) nor by Sub-clause (aa) of Sub-rule (1) of Rule 27 of Order 41, Civil Procedure Code. In these circumstances we feel that case is squarely covered by Sub-clause (b) of the said sub-rule. Moreover this is a document which we feel will enable this Court to pronounce the judgment as well as for the purposes of doing substantial justice between the parties as also for arriving at the figure of just compensation to which the respondents may be entitled as per provisions of Section 168 of the Act.
35. Another reason to allow the prayer made by the respondents is that this is a notification issued by the Government notifying the revision of pay scales w.e.f. 1.1.96. As already noted in case deceased Tnder Singh was alive, there was nothing that could have stopped him, much less disentitled him the benefit of this revised pay scale, including admissible arrears, like all other Government employees as well as employees of public sector undertakings, like this H.R.T.C. This fact can be judicially noticed by this Court.
36. Present trend in assessing compensation; by looking to the chances of future promotions and other prospects together with uncertainty of life, is a further ground to allow the application filed by the respondents for additional evidence, though Mr. M.S. Chandel submitted that compensation awarded, if not reduced, is already excessive and exorbitant, therefore, this application needs to be rejected.
37. We may also observe that H.R.T.C. like a model employer being limb of the welfare State has given the true and correct picture of the emoluments the deceased would have derived on his existing post, i.e., Superintendent (Stores) on the revision of his pay scales, being Rs. 13,101 w.e.f. 31.10.1999. In the reply filed by the H.R.T.C. to this application, they have not disputed that deceased was to get the benefit of revision of pay scales. The only thing urged was that no benefit can be derived by the respondents from such revision of pay scales. Matter regarding taking into account circumstances referred to in the preceding paras, had been engaging attention of the Supreme Court of India. Such decisions, we feel, will enable us to deal with matter effectively. As such those are being referred to hereinafter.
38. In Manjushri Raha v. B.L. Gupta 1977 ACJ 134 (SC), deceased Sayendra Nath Raha was 37 years of age at the time of death and was drawing salary of Rs. 620 p.m. According to the Apex Court, courts below had not taken into account the salary which he would have earned while reaching maximum of his grade and on such date he would have reached the maximum grade of Rs. 900 at the age of 46 years, i.e., full 9 years before his superannuation. Taking into account this fact, said Raha would have drawn Rs. 1,89,402 which was rounded off to Rs. 1,88,000, after deducting 50 per cent towards his day-to-day expenses, payment of income tax and other charges the actual income lost to the family was held to be Rs. 94,000. The Claims Tribunal had allowed Rs. 60,000 and it was enhanced to Rs. 1,00,000.
39. In General Manager, Kerala State Road Trans. Corporation v. Susamma Thomas 1994 ACJ 1 (SC), this aspect of the matter was considered. In this case deceased who was 39 years of age had income of Rs. 1,032. After taking into account the prospects and advancement in his future career, on the basis of evidence on record, Apex Court estimated higher income of Rs. 2,000 per month and dependency at Rs. 17,000 per year, after applying multiplier of 12, fixed the amount at Rs. 2,04,000 and added a sum of Rs. 15,000 on account of loss of consortium, loss to the estate; and finally Rs. 2,25,000 was thus fixed as compensation and on this sum interest was also allowed.
40. In Kela Devi v. Ram Chand 1986 ACJ 818 (Delhi), appeal of the claimants was allowed by Delhi High Court and compensation enhanced. High Court had enhanced the compensation of Rs. 9,780 in case of a deceased aged 29 years drawing Rs. 145 per month as a class IV Central Government employee. Though compensation of Rs. 50,000 had been claimed, but after consideration of revision of pay scales as per report of the pay commission it was enhanced to Rs. 1,25,000 after application under Order 41, Rule 27, Civil Procedure Code (as in the present case) having been allowed. While ordering enhancement of compensation it was observed that claimants had not anticipated the revision of pay scales. This is exactly the situation in the appeal under consideration by us.
41. This decision of Delhi High Court was affirmed by the Supreme Court of India in New India Assurance Co. Ltd. v. Kala Devi 1996 ACJ 16 (SC) and it was held as under:
This appeal has been directed against the judgment dated 17.2.1986 passed by the High Court of Delhi enhancing the amount of compensation awarded by the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal. In an accident which took place on 11.4.67 at 8 a.m., one Ram Singh, aged about 29 years, was hit by the bus belonging to New Transporters, 3, Queen's Road, Delhi, driven by its driver Ram Chand, as a result of which Ram Singh died on the spot. His wife and two minor sons made a claim for compensation for his death in the accident. The Tribunal awarded a sum of Rs. 9,780 as compensation for the death. The claimants preferred an appeal before the High Court of Delhi. An application was made in the High Court that the compensation be enhanced in view of the revision of the pay scales of the post held by the deceased, by the Third Pay Commission. The High Court, taking into account the revision of pay scales by the Third Pay Commission, had awarded a sum of Rs. 1,25,000 as compensation. The contention of learned Counsel for the appellant is that the High Court had allowed the application of the claimants for the enhancement of compensation on the basis of Third Pay Commission Report and without affording an opportunity of being heard to the appellant. But it may be noted that the appellant had filed an appeal against the order allowing the application of the claimants for enhancement of the claim on the basis of the report of the Third Pay Commission and the said appeal was dismissed by the High Court. Having regard to the revised pay scale of the post held by the deceased, his age and longevity of life as well as all other facts and circumstances of the case, we do not find any justification to interfere with the quantum of compensation awarded by the High Court. The appeal is, therefore, dismissed. There shall, however, be no order as to costs.
42. In Sarla Dixit v. Balwant Yadav 1996 ACJ 581 (SC), in the case of death of a Captain aged 27 years, where claimants were his widow, daughter and mother and mother having also died during the pendency of the claim petition, Tribunal assessed the compensation of Rs. 1,70,238 and reduced it by Rs. 42,569 due to contributory negligence of the deceased. Appellate court reversed the finding on contributory negligence, assessed the compensation at Rs. 96,090 and after deductions awarded Rs. 54,000. Supreme Court after taking into consideration future prospects of the deceased in military service and keeping in view imponderables while discharging military duties assessed the gross monthly income at Rs. 2,200 and dependency at Rs. 1,500 p.m. By applying multiplier of 15 as well as Rs. 15,000 on account of loss of consortium and loss to the estate awarded compensation of Rs. 2,85,000. It was also observed that "all contingencies of the future need not necessarily be baneful.
(Emphasis supplied)
43. In this case it was further held as under:
Applying these principles to the facts of the case before this Court in the aforesaid case it was observed that the deceased in that case was of 39 years of age. His income was Rs. 1,032 per month. He was more or less on a stable job and considering the prospects of advancement in future career the proper higher estimate of monthly income of Rs. 2,000 as gross income to be taken as average gross future income of the deceased and deducting at least 1/3rd therefrom by way of personal living expenses had he survived, loss of dependency could be capitalised by adopting the multiplicand of Rs. 1,400 per month or Rs. 17,000 per year and that figure could be capitalised by adopting multiplier of 12 which was appropriate to the age of deceased being 39 and to that amount was added the conventional figure of Rs. 15,000 by way of loss of consortium and loss to estate. Adopting the same scientific yardstick as laid down in the aforesaid judgment, the computation of compensation in the present case can almost be subjected to a well settled mathematical formula. Deceased in the present case, as seen above, was earning a gross salary of Rs. 1,543 per month. Rounding it up to figure of Rs. 1,500 and keeping in view all the future prospects which the deceased had in stable military service in the light of his brilliant academic record and performance in the military service spread over 7 years and also keeping in view the other imponderables like accidental death while discharging military duties and the hazards of military service, it will not be unreasonable to predicate that his gross monthly income would have shot up to at least double than what he was earning at the time of his death, i.e., up to Rs. 3,000 per month had he survived in life and had successfully completed his future military career till the time of superannuation. The average gross future monthly income could be arrived at by adding the actual gross income at the time of death, namely, Rs. 1,500 per month to the maximum which he would have otherwise got had he not died a premature death, i.e., Rs. 3,000 per month and dividing that figure by two. Thus, the average gross monthly income spread over his entire future career, had it been available, would work out to Rs. 4,500 divided by 2, i.e., Rs. 2,200. Rs. 2,200 per month would have been the gross monthly average income available to the family of the deceased had he survived as a breadwinner. From that gross monthly income at least 1/3rd will have to be deducted by way of his personal expenses and other liabilities like the payment of income tax, etc. That would roughly work out to Rs. 730 p.m. but even taking a higher figure of Rs. 750 p.m. and deducting the same by way of average personal expenses of the deceased from the average gross earning of Rs. 2,200 p.m. balance of Rs. 1,450 which can be rounded off to Rs. 1,500 p.m. would have been the average amount available to the family of the deceased, i.e., his dependants, namely, appellants herein. It is this figure which would be the datum figure per month which on annual basis would have worked out to Rs. 18,000. Rs. 18,000, therefore, would be the proper multiplicand which would be available for capitalisation for computing the future economic loss suffered by the appellants on account of untimely death of the breadwinner. As the age of the deceased was 27 years and a few months at the time of his death the proper multiplier in the light of the aforesaid decision of this Court in General Manager, Kerala State Road Transport Corporation v. Susamma Thomas 1994 ACJ 1 (SC), would be 15. Rs. 18,000 multiplied by 15 will come to Rs. 2,70,000. To this figure will have to be added the conventional figure of Rs. 15,000 by way of loss of estate and consortium, etc. That will lead to a total figure of Rs. 2,85,000. This is the amount which the appellants would be entitled to get by way of compensation from respondent Nos. 1 and 2 subject to our decision on point No. 2.
44. Again in Donat Louis Machado v. L. Ravindra 1999 ACJ 1400 (SC), while considering the case of a bachelor Journalist, aged 31 years, who was earning Rs. 2,500 p.m., claimants being his parents and sister, was allowed Rs. 52,800 by the Tribunal. It was enhanced to Rs. 1,27,000. After taking into account his future prospects, Supreme Court assessed the income of the deceased at the end of his career at Rs. 7,500 per month and giving an average amount of Rs. 3,750 per month assessed compensation of Rs. 6,75,000 by applying the multiplier of 15. Thus allowed Rs. 2,00,000 to the claimants in the following terms:
(3) We have heard learned Counsel for the appellants-claimants as well as the learned Counsel for the insurance company, who is the real contesting party at this stage and who has to bear the burden of the total amount of compensation made payable to the claimants. We may note certain salient features of the case which are not in dispute. The deceased was earning Rs. 2,500 per month in his vocation as a journalist at the relevant time. He was aged 31 years when his life was cut short because of the unfortunate accident. Learned counsel for the claimants contended that he was also earning extra income, but as there is no clear evidence, we will proceed on the basis that he was earning Rs. 2,500 per month at least. As he died at a comparatively younger age of 31 years, he had a very lucrative career before him for a number of years had he survived. Therefore, we can easily visualise that his total earnings would have gone up by at least Rs. 5,000 per month by the time he would have rested on his oars and given up his work as a journalist after exhausting his full earning career. Consequently, the total amount would work out at Rs. 7,500 per month during the whole span of future career and taking an average at 50 per cent, his future monthly income during the rest of the life could have worked out at Rs. 3,750. On that basis, 12 months' earning would have been Rs. 45,000 and adopting a multiplier of 15 looking to the young age of the deceased the total economical gain to his estate would work out at Rs. 6,75,000 at least. But taking a conservative figure of Rs. 6,00,000 it can easily be visualised that the claimants who are the parents and unmarried sister and who are dependent on him would have got at least 1/3rd amount as he would have spent the rest of 2/3rd amount of his earnings on his own family which he would have raised and on himself. This would come to a figure of Rs. 2,00,000. This can easily be treated to be the appropriate compensation payable to the claimants on account of economical loss suffered by them as a result of the unfortunate accident to their breadwinner. The High Court has granted the compensation of Rs. 1,27,000 so that the remaining amount which can be assessed as payable by the respondents would be Rs. 73,000 more.
(4) We, therefore, allow this appeal partly by directing the respondents to pay an additional amount of Rs. 73,000 jointly and severally with 9 per cent interest on the additional amount of Rs. 73,000 from the date of filing the claim petition till payment of this additional amount. Respondent No. 3 insurance company will, therefore, have to pay the additional amount of Rs. 73,000 with 9 per cent interest as aforesaid to the claimants. This amount shall be deposited in the Tribunal by respondent No. 3 insurance company towards the full and final satisfaction of the appellants' claim within a period of eight weeks from today. The appellants will be entitled to withdraw the same from the Tribunal on giving due identification of the claimants concerned. There shall be no order as to costs in the facts and circumstances of the case.
In this case compensation was reduced to less than 1/3rd because the deceased was to rear and maintain his family after his marriage and the claimants being his parents and sister.
45. In Sneha Dutta v. Himachal Road Trans, Corporation 1999 ACJ 1589 (SC), after taking into account the lucrative future career of deceased, aged 39 years, who was working as Liaison Officer and Tour Agent, Foreign Tourist, Apex Court allowed compensation of Rs. 3,00,000 as against Rs. 1,00,000 awarded by the Tribunal and which was enhanced to Rs. 2,11,200 in appeal. In this behalf what was observed was as under:
(3) In our view, the appropriate award of compensation to the heirs of the deceased who died in a motor accident would work out at least to Rs. 4,00,000 in all instead of Rs. 2,75,000 as awarded by the High Court by reducing the figure of Rs. 5,60,000 as awarded by the trial court. The reason is obvious. The appellants' breadwinner who died because of the unfortunate accident, was drawing a salary of Rs. 4,000 per month as held by the Claims Tribunal. Even deducting an amount of Rs. 1,500, Rs. 2,500 would have been the economic benefit available to the heirs of the deceased and even if the deceased had survived the rest of earning career, he would have made available to his dependants at least Rs. 5,000 per month. Adding Rs. 5,000 to Rs. 2,500 the total would work out to Rs. 7,500. Reducing it to half over the years the average economic loss to the dependants would work out to Rs. 3,500 per month and even deducting Rs. 500 therefrom as the personal expenses of the deceased, Rs. 3,000 would have been available to the appellants per month and multiplying by 12 the annual economic benefit would work out at Rs. 36,000 and considering the remaining earning years of the deceased had he survived the multiplier of 12 would yield at least Rs. 4,00,000 as total compensation, if not more. Considering all these aspects of the matter, therefore, the appellants shall be entitled to an additional sum of Rs. 1,25,000. Now remains the question of interest. As the application was filed as early as on 7.4.1992 and as this claim is being allowed at this belated stage, in our view, having considered all the facts and circumstances of the case and not as a precedent we deem it fit to award an additional sum of Rs. 50,000 by way of interest. Thus, in all Rs. 1,75,000 additionally shall be awarded to the appellants. The additional amount available to appellants would be deposited by the respondent No. 1 before the trial court within six weeks from today. The appellants shall be entitled to withdraw the said amount towards full and final satisfaction of their claim in the matter on due identification. Out of the awarded amount of Rs. 1,75,000 keeping in view the apportionment of the compensation as directed by the High Court amongst the claimants, we direct that an additional amount of Rs. 1,25,000 will be available to the widow and the balance of Rs. 50,000 to the aged parents of the deceased. Interest, if any, accruing on this amount will also be proportionately paid to the appellants. It is made clear that if Rs. 1,75,000 which are additionally awarded to appellants, are not deposited within the aforesaid stipulated period, then on expiry of that period, it will start earning interest at the rate of 12 per cent per annum till the actual deposit is made. The appeal is allowed accordingly. No costs.
46. Reference was also made to a Division Bench judgment of this Court in H.P. Road Trans. Corporation v. Jai Ram 1980 ACJ 1 (HP), on behalf of Mr. Chandel, who urged that by selecting a suitable multiplier the possibility of deceased earning more emoluments in future is also taken care of. in the face of decisions of the Supreme Court, referred to hereinabove, we feel that this decision does not in any manner advance the case of H.R.T.C.
47. In Malliga v. Thiruvalluvar Trans. Corporation , 2001 ACJ 343 (SC), deceased was an Assistant Engineer who died in motor accident. He was offered a job by a foreign firm on a monthly remuneration of Rs. 36,000 through communication dated 14.1.1987. Vide communication of April, he was required to join around June or July. Tribunal worked out the figure of Rs. 36,00,000 as compensation, but considering the amount to be too excessive, it was fixed at Rs. 7,50,000 plus 12 per cent interest per annum. High Court in appeal had reduced the amount to Rs. 2,00,000. While allowing the appeal of the claimant, award passed by the Tribunal was restored and compensation as awarded by the Tribunal below with 12 per cent interest from the date of application was upheld.
48. Examining the case in the light of the revision of pay scales, as well as on the basis of the decisions of the Apex Court referred to hereinabove, we feel that while maintaining the multiplier of 15 ordered by the Tribunal below revision of pay scales which became effective from 1.1.1996, those need to be taken note of in the case of petitioner. Though it is the case of respondent Nos. 1 to 3 that deceased Inder Singh was to be promoted as an Assistant Manager, but when? PW 1 was unable to tell. In these circumstances even while ignoring the chance of future promotions, we feel that taking mean of what the deceased would have got on revision of pay scale and what he was getting at the time of his death would be reasonable amount so as to arrive at his gross income at the time of his retirement. It comes to Rs. 19,272 per month or say Rs. 19,000 per month. Its mean works out to Rs. 9,500 per month.
49. As already noted, multiplier method is by now well recognised by all courts including the Supreme Court of India while assessing the amount of compensation and we feel that it provides a good guide for assessing the compensation in the cases arising out of motor accidents. Thus allowing two units to the deceased, dependence when rounded off works out to Rs. 5,700 per month or say Rs. 68,400 per annum. When multiplied by 15, the amount works out to Rs. 10,26,000. To this amount when an amount of Rs. 14,000 is added as conventional compensation on account of loss of consortium, etc., the total amount payable to respondent Nos. 1 to 3 works out to Rs. 10,40,000.
50. It was urged on behalf of claimants that they are entitled to interest at the rate of 12 per cent per annum on this amount from the date of filing of claim petition, i.e., 14.11.1995, till the date of its deposit/payment. This position is again contested by Mr. Chandel, who stated that interest should not be allowed at a rate more than prevailing bank rate as of date. He placed reliance on a recent decision of Supreme Court in Kaushnuma Begum v. New India Assurance Co. Ltd., 2001 ACJ 428 (SC). Para 23 of this judgment was in the following terms:
(23) Now, we have to fix up the rate of interest. Section 171 of the MV Act empowers the Tribunal to direct that 'in addition to the amount of compensation simple interest shall also be paid at such rate and from such date not earlier than the date of making the claim as may be specified in this behalf. Earlier, 12 per cent was found to be the reasonable rate of simple interest. With a change in economy and the policy of Reserve Bank of India the interest rate has been lowered. The nationalised banks are now granting interest at the rate of 9 per cent on fixed deposits for one year. We, therefore, direct that the compensation amount fixed hereinbefore shall bear interest at the rate of 9 per cent per annum from the date of the claim made by the appellants. The amount of Rs. 50,000 paid by the insurance company under Section 140 shall be deducted from the principal amount as on the date of its payment and interest shall be recalculated on the balance amount of the principal sum from such date.
No other point is urged.
51. In view of the aforesaid discussion while partly allowing the appeal of the H.R.T.C. as also partly allowing the cross-objections, it is held that respondent Nos. 1 to 3 are entitled to a total compensation of Rs. 10,40,000 together with interest at the rate of 12 per cent per annum on this amount w.e.f. 14.11.1995 up to 31.3.2001 and thereafter at the rate of 9 per cent per annum in the light of the decision in the case of Kaushnuma Begum, 2001 ACJ 428 (SC). The amount of compensation is inclusive of the sum, if any deposited/paid to respondent Nos. 1 to 3 under no fault liability. Similarly, the amount, if any already deposited, shall carry interest up to the date of deposit. We further order that this amount shall be apportioned as under amongst respondent Nos. 1 to 3- Cross-objectors:
Respondent No. 1, Bimla Kanwar; Rs. 3,14,000 Respondent No. 2, Priti Kanwar (minor); and Rs. 3,63,000 Respondent No. 3 Priyanka Kanwar (minor) Rs. 3,63,000 with proportionate interest as above. No costs.