Jharkhand High Court
Smt. Sita Devi Aged About 60 Years W/O ... vs Coal India Limited on 23 February, 2024
Author: Anubha Rawat Choudhary
Bench: Anubha Rawat Choudhary
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI
W.P. (S) No. 7146 of 2023
Smt. Sita Devi aged about 60 years W/o Late Kishan Yadav [Ex.
Driver, Cat-VI] Resident of Qrt. No.-1/28.CMPDIL, RI-V
Colony P.O. and P.S. Jayant, Dist. Sidhi Madhya Pradesh
... ... Petitioner
Versus
1. Coal India Limited, through its Director [P & IR] having its
registered office at Coal Bhawan Premises No. 4, MAR, Plot No.
AF-III, Action Area 1 A New Town, Rajarhat, PO-Colootola PS-
Rajarhat Kolkata-700156
2. Central Mine Planning and Design Institute Ltd.. having its
registered office at Gondwana Place, Kanke Road Ranchi through
its chairman CUM Managing Director, Gondwana Place, Kanke
Road, P.O.-Ranchi University PS-Gondwana Place Ranchi-834008
Jharkhand
3. Regional Director Regional Institute VI Central Mine Planning and
Design Institute Ltd. (LMPDIL) RE-VI, Jayant HRS, PO and PS :
Jayant, Dist. Sidhi, Madhya Pradesh
4. Regional Director [P&IR] Central Mine Planning and Design
Institute Ltd., having its registered office at Gondwana Place,
Kanke Road, Ranchi, Gondwana Place, Kanke Road, PO-Ranchi
University. PS-Gondwana Place Ranchi, Jharkhand
5. Manager [P&A] Central Mine Planning and Design Institute Ltd..
having its registered office al Gondwana Place, Kanke Road,
Ranchi, Gondwana Place, Kanke Road, PO-Ranchi University, PS-
Gondwana Place Ranchi, Jharkhand
6. Personnel Manager | HQ] Central Mine Planning and Design
Institute Ltd., having its registered office at Gondwana Place,
Kanke, Road, Ranchi, Gondwana Place, Kanke Road, P.O. Ranchi
University P.S. Gondwana Place Ranchi, Jharkhand
... ... Respondents
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CORAM :HON'BLE MRS. JUSTICE ANUBHA RAWAT CHOUDHARY
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For the Petitioner : Mr. Amitabh, Advocate
For the Respondents : Mr. Rajesh Lala, Advocate
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04/23.02.2024 Learned counsel for the parties are present.
2. This writ petition has been filed for the following reliefs: -
"For issuance of an appropriate writ directing the respondents to determine the age on the basis of age range guideline as set by the Age Assessment Committee vide office order No. 6014 dated 29.07.1996 as communicated by the Director [P & IR] to all the Regional Director at Subsidiary companies of CIL."
3. Learned counsel for the respondents has submitted that the petitioner has sought correction in the date of birth which was 2 recorded as back as in the year 1996 and she filed a petition only on 18.10.2022 for such purpose at fag end of her service carrier and such request of the petitioner has been rejected by Annexure-3 dated 08.12.2022 by indicating that the age recorded in her service record is final. Learned counsel submits that the order as contained in Annexure-3 dated 08.12.2022 is not under challenge. Otherwise also the petitioner seeking to challenge her age recorded in service book at fag end is not entitled to any relief.
4. Learned counsel for the respondents has relied upon a judgment passed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court reported in Civil Appeal No. 1009 of 2020 (Bharata Coking Coal Limited versus Shyam Kishore Singh) reported in (2020) 3 SCC 411 and has referred to paragraph nos. 8,9,10 and 11.
5. To which, the learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that there are three distinguishing features in this case. Firstly, no opportunity to correct the date of birth was ever granted to the petitioner; secondly the writ petition was filed on 15.12.2023 and the petitioner has attained the age of superannuation on 31.12.2023 and thirdly at the time of appointment, the age of the petitioner was assessed by the medical board and the age was not determined as per the circular of the respondents.
6. In the judgment passed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court reported in the case of Bharat Coking Coal Ltd. v. Shyam Kishore Singh (2020) 3 SCC 411, it has been held that the dispute regarding date of birth cannot be entertained at the fag end of service. Paragraph 8, 9, 10 and 11 are quoted as under: -
"8. In the above background it is to be noticed as to whether the consideration as made by the High Court is justified. The learned counsel for the respondent with specific reference to para 10 in the order [Shyam Kishore Singh v. Bharat Coking Coal Ltd., 2017 SCC OnLine Jhar 3061] of the learned Single Judge referred to the aspect wherein the learned Single Judge has taken note of the representation made by the respondent in the year 2009 and the verification that was secured by the appellants from the Bihar School Examination Board. Though such reference is made, in our opinion, the same was not appropriate in the present facts when three decades had elapsed from the date of employment. The position is well established that if a particular date of birth is entered in the service register, a change sought cannot be entertained at the fag end of service after accepting the same to be correct during entire 3 service. In the instant facts the position is that the respondent entered service on 1-3-1982. The date of birth entered as 4-3-1950 has remained on record from the said date. The requirement to submit the nomination form indicating the particulars of the family and the nominee was complied with and it was submitted by the respondent on 25-5-1998. In the said nomination form the date of birth of the employee was required to be mentioned, wherein the respondent in his own handwriting has indicated the date of birth as 4-3-1950. Apart from that fact, the learned Additional Solicitor General would also point out that since there was a change in the method of maintaining the service register, all the employees were provided an opportunity to verify and seek for change in the service record in the year 1987. At that stage also the respondent did not seek for any change. Therefore, in that circumstance, when the opportunity available at the first instance in 1987 had not been availed and thereafter on 25-5-1998 when the respondent himself in the Provident Fund nomination form had indicated the date of birth as 4-3-1950 which corresponds to the date of birth entered in the service register as on the date of commencement of the employment, merely because a verification was made from the Bihar School Examination Board and even if it was confirmed that the date of birth was 20-1-1955 such change at that stage was not permissible.
9. This Court has consistently held that the request for change of the date of birth in the service records at the fag end of service is not sustainable. The learned Additional Solicitor General has in that regard relied on the decision in State of Maharashtra v. Gorakhnath Sitaram Kamble [State of Maharashtra v. Gorakhnath Sitaram Kamble, (2010) 14 SCC 423 : (2011) 2 SCC (L&S) 582] wherein a series of the earlier decisions of this Court were taken note and was held as hereunder : (SCC pp. 428-29, paras 16-17 & 19) "16. The learned counsel for the appellant has placed reliance on the judgment of this Court in U.P. Madhyamik Shiksha Parishad v. Raj Kumar Agnihotri [U.P. Madhyamik Shiksha Parishad v. Raj Kumar Agnihotri, (2005) 11 SCC 465 : 2006 SCC (L&S) 96] . In this case, this Court has considered a number of judgments of this Court and observed that the grievance as to the date of birth in the service record should not be permitted at the fag end of the service career.
17. In another judgment in State of Uttaranchal v. Pitamber Dutt Semwal [State of Uttaranchal v. Pitamber Dutt Semwal, (2005) 11 SCC 477 : 2006 SCC (L&S) 106] relief was denied to the government employee on the ground that he sought correction in the service record after nearly 30 years of service. While setting aside the judgment [Pitamber Dutt Semwal v. State of U.P., 1999 SCC OnLine All 1610 : 2000 All LJ 2341] of the High Court, this Court observed that the High Court ought not to have interfered with the decision after almost three decades.
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19. These decisions lead to a different dimension of the case that correction at the fag end would be at the cost of a large number 4 of employees, therefore, any correction at the fag end must be discouraged by the Court. The relevant portion of the judgment in Home Deptt. v. R. Kirubakaran [Home Deptt. v. R. Kirubakaran, 1994 Supp (1) SCC 155 : 1994 SCC (L&S) 449] reads as under : (SCC pp. 158-59, para 7)
"7. An application for correction of the date of birth [by a public servant cannot be entertained at the fag end of his service]. It need not be pointed out that any such direction for correction of the date of birth of the public servant concerned has a chain reaction, inasmuch as others waiting for years, below him for their respective promotions are affected in this process. Some are likely to suffer irreparable injury, inasmuch as, because of the correction of the date of birth, the officer concerned, continues in office, in some cases for years, within which time many officers who are below him in seniority waiting for their promotion, may lose their promotions forever. ... According to us, this is an important aspect, which cannot be lost sight of by the court or the tribunal while examining the grievance of a public servant in respect of correction of his date of birth. As such, unless a clear case, on the basis of materials which can be held to be conclusive in nature, is made out by the respondent, the court or the tribunal should not issue a direction, on the basis of materials which make such claim only plausible. Before any such direction is issued, the court or the tribunal must be fully satisfied that there has been real injustice to the person concerned and his claim for correction of date of birth has been made in accordance with the procedure prescribed, and within the time fixed by any rule or order. ... the onus is on the applicant, to prove the wrong recording of his date of birth, in his service book.'"
10. This Court in fact has also held that even if there is good evidence to establish that the recorded date of birth is erroneous, the correction cannot be claimed as a matter of right. In that regard, in State of M.P. v. Premlal Shrivas [State of M.P. v. Premlal Shrivas, (2011) 9 SCC 664 : (2011) 2 SCC (L&S) 574] it is held as hereunder : (SCC pp. 667 & 669, paras 8 & 12)
"8. It needs to be emphasised that in matters involving correction of date of birth of a government servant, particularly on the eve of his superannuation or at the fag end of his career, the court or the tribunal has to be circumspect, cautious and careful while issuing direction for correction of date of birth, recorded in the service book at the time of entry into any government service. Unless the court or the tribunal is fully satisfied on the basis of the irrefutable proof relating to his date of birth and that such a claim is made in accordance with the procedure prescribed or as per the consistent procedure adopted by the department concerned, as the case may be, and a real injustice has been caused to the person concerned, the court or the tribunal should be loath to issue a direction for correction of the service book. Time and again this Court has expressed the view that if a government servant makes a request for correction of the recorded date of birth after lapse of a long time of his induction into the service, particularly beyond the time fixed by his employer, he cannot claim, as a matter of right, the correction of his date of birth, even if he has good evidence to establish that 5 the recorded date of birth is clearly erroneous. No court or the tribunal can come to the aid of those who sleep over their rights (see Union of India v. Harnam Singh [Union of India v. Harnam Singh, (1993) 2 SCC 162 : 1993 SCC (L&S) 375] ).
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10. Be that as it may, in our opinion, the delay of over two decades in applying for the correction of date of birth is ex facie fatal to the case of the respondent, notwithstanding the fact that there was no specific rule or order, framed or made, prescribing the period within which such application could be filed. It is trite that even in such a situation such an application should be filed which can be held to be reasonable. The application filed by the respondent 25 years after his induction into service, by no standards, can be held to be reasonable, more so when not a feeble attempt was made to explain the said delay. There is also no substance in the plea of the respondent that since Rule 84 of the M.P. Financial Code does not prescribe the time-limit within which an application is to be filed, the appellants were duty- bound to correct the clerical error in recording of his date of birth in the service book."
11. The learned Additional Solicitor General has also relied upon the decision of this Court in Kirloskar Bros. Ltd. v. Laxman [Kirloskar Bros. Ltd. v. Laxman, (2020) 3 SCC 419] dated 25-4-2019 wherein the belated claim was not entertained. Further reliance is also placed on the decision of this Court in Eastern Coalfields Ltd. v. Ram Samugh Yadav [Eastern Coalfields Ltd. v. Ram Samugh Yadav, (2020) 3 SCC 421] dated 27-5-2019 wherein this Court has held as hereunder : (SCC p. 422, paras 6-7) "6. Nothing is on record that in the year 1987 when the opportunity was given to Respondent 1, to raise any issue/dispute regarding the service record more particularly his date of birth in the service record, no such issue/dispute was raised. Only one year prior to his superannuation, Respondent 1 raised the dispute which can be said to be belated dispute and therefore, the learned Single Judge [Ram Samujh Jadav v. Coal India Ltd., WP No. 215 of 2006, order dated 28-8-2007 (Cal)] as well as the employer was justified in refusing to accept such an issue.
7. The Division Bench of the High Court [Ram Samujh Yadav v. Coal India Ltd. APO No. 334 of 2009, order dated 6- 10-2010 (Cal)] has, therefore, committed a grave error in directing the appellant to correct the date of birth of Respondent 1 in the service record after number of years and that too when the issue was raised only one year prior to his superannuation and as observed hereinabove no dispute was raised earlier."
7. After hearing the learned counsel for the parties this Court finds that even as per the case of the petitioner, the petitioner was appointed in June 2001 on temporary post as General Mazdoor Category-I and later on her service was confirmed. At the time of appointment, she had no paper to show her date of birth and accordingly she appeared 6 before the Age Assessment Committee who determined her age in between 30-35 years and it is her case that at that time, the age of the petitioner was fixed at higher side ignoring the guideline of Coal India Limited. It is the case of the petitioner that upon coming to know regarding the wrong entry of date of birth, she immediately contacted the respondent authorities for change of her recorded date of birth from 35 years to 32 ½ years and also submitted a representation to the Ministry of Coal on 21.10.2006 and thereafter she represented on 18.10.2022 for correction of her date of birth which has been rejected vide order dated 08.12.2022.
8. This Court finds that even as per the case of the petitioner, she had full knowledge regarding recording of her date of birth and as per the petitioner herself, she made certain representation on 21.10.2006 though a copy of the same has not been annexed along with the writ petition. This court further finds that thereafter the petitioner did not take any step and ultimately filed a representation on 18.10.2022 before the respondent no. 1 seeking correction of her date of birth which has been rejected vide order dated 08.12.2022. The order dated 08.12.2022 is also not under challenge in the present proceedings.
9. This Court finds that the petitioner has challenge the recorded date of birth almost at the fag end of her service and the present writ petition was filed just 15 days prior to her date of superannuation as per service records.
10. It has been clearly held in the aforesaid judgment passed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court that the request for change of the date of birth in the service records at the fag end of service is not sustainable and even if there is good evidence to establish that the recorded date of birth is erroneous, the correction cannot be claimed as a matter of right.
11. Considering the aforesaid facts and circumstances this Court is not inclined to grant any relief to the petitioner as prayed for in the writ petition.
12. Accordingly, this writ petition is dismissed.
Binit (Anubha Rawat Choudhary, J.)