Delhi District Court
Harish Goel vs Vipul Ltd on 31 January, 2026
IN THE COURT OF SH. SUNIL BENIWAL,
DISTRICT JUDGE-06
SOUTH DISTRICT, SAKET COURTS, NEW DELHI.
CS DJ NO.8460/2016
CNR No.DLST01-001101-2014
Sh. Harish Goel
S/o late Sh.Mangal Sen Goel,
R/o 221, Sukhdev Vihar,
New Delhi 110025. .....Plaintiff
VERSUS
M/s Vipul Limited
Through its - director/chairman/manager
Registered office at:
Regus Rectangle,
Level 2, Rectangle 1,
D4, Commercial Complex,
Saket, New Delhi 110070
Corporate office at:
Vipul Techsquare
Gold Course Road,
Sector 43, Gurgaon,
Haryana 120029. .....Defendant
Page 1 of 131
Date of filing of suit : 28.03.2014
Date of Judgment : 31.01.2026
SUIT FOR RECOVERY OF RS.65,45,500/-
JUDGMENT
1. By way of this judgement, this Court shall strive to decide and dispose of the captioned suit.
BRIEF FACTS
2. It has been pleaded by the plaintiff that the Plaintiff, a bona fide investor, booked three separate plots in the Defendant's ambitious "Integrated Future Township Project" located at Gurgaon/Faridabad, Haryana, between December 2005 and January 2006. In total, the Plaintiff paid a substantial Registration Amount aggregating Rs. 26,50,000/- (Rupees Twenty-Six Lakhs Fifty Thousand only) towards provisional allotment of these plots, fully complying with the Defendant's booking requirements. Despite these payments, the Defendant chronically delayed allotment for over five years, citing vague pretexts, leading to immense harassment, mental agony, and shattered expectations for the Plaintiff, who had invested hard-earned savings envisioning secure property ownership amid booming real estate prospects in the National Capital Region.
Page 2 of 131Detailed Booking Transactions
3. Each booking was formalized with specific payments via cheques drawn on Canara Bank, New Delhi, duly acknowledged by the Defendant through receipts, provisional registration certificates, and unique customer codes. The transactions are meticulously detailed as follows:
First Plot (Booked on 23/12/2005):
4. Measuring 360 square yards at Rs. 8,700/- (Rupees Eight Thousand Seven Hundred only) per square yard, with a total estimated cost of Rs. 31,32,000/- (Rupees Thirty-One Lakhs Thirty-Two Thousand only). The Plaintiff promptly paid the Registration Amount of Rs. 7,50,000/- (Rupees Seven Lakhs Fifty Thousand only) on the date of booking.
Second Plot (Booked on 24/12/2005):
5. Measuring 450 square yards at Rs. 8,200/- (Rupees Eight Thousand Two Hundred only) per square yard, with a total estimated cost of Rs. 36,90,000/- (Rupees Thirty-Six Lakhs Ninety Thousand only), booked in the Plaintiff's name. The Registration Amount of Rs. 9,50,000/- (Rupees Nine Lakhs Fifty Thousand only) was paid vide Cheque No. 354056 dated 21/12/2005 drawn on Canara Bank, New Delhi. This was duly acknowledged by the Page 3 of 131 Defendant via Receipt No. 303 dated 26/12/2005, along with a Certificate of Provisional Registration and Customer Code FP/302.
Third Plot (Booked on 16/01/2006):
6. Measuring 450 square yards at Rs. 8,200/- (Rupees Eight Thousand Two Hundred only) per square yard, with a total estimated cost of Rs. 36,90,000/- (Rupees Thirty-Six Lakhs Ninety Thousand only), also booked in the Plaintiff's name. The Registration Amount of Rs. 9,50,000/- (Rupees Nine Lakhs Fifty Thousand only) was paid vide Cheque No. 881307 dated 22/12/2005 drawn on Canara Bank, New Delhi. The Defendant acknowledged this via Receipt No. 536 dated 24/03/2006, issuing a Certificate of Provisional Registration and Customer Code FP/477.
7. The cumulative total cost of the three plots stood at Rs. 1,05,12,000/- (Rupees One Crore Five Lakhs Twelve Thousand only), against which the Plaintiff fulfilled his obligation by paying the full Registration Amount of Rs. 26,50,000/-.
Defendant's Persistent Breaches and Delays
8. Post-payments, the Plaintiff diligently followed up through repeated visits and communications with the Defendant and its representatives, earnestly requesting formal allotment letters and Page 4 of 131 plot demarcations. However, the Defendant resorted to endless procrastination, offering hollow assurances that "allotment would be made shortly" without any tangible progress. This inaction persisted unabated until 2010--five full years after the initial bookings--depriving the Plaintiff of possession, execution of sale deeds, or any developmental benefits in a region where property values had skyrocketed manifold (often 5-6 times) due to rapid urbanization and infrastructure growth.
Plaintiff's Cancellation and Refund Demands
9. Realizing the futility and suspecting foul play after enduring prolonged harassment, the Plaintiff formally exercised his right to cancel the provisional registrations for all three plots. Vide a detailed letter dated 18/08/2010, the Plaintiff unequivocally withdrew his applications from the Defendant's "Future Project,"
explicitly demanding refund of the Registration Amounts. The Defendant duly received and accepted this cancellation, yet brazenly withheld the principal sums, unlawfully retaining the Plaintiff's funds for an additional period exceeding three years (up to the filing of this suit).
10. Compounding the injustice, the Defendant selectively refunded Registration Amounts to other similarly situated customers, such as Sh. Dalip Daga, highlighting discriminatory treatment and bad faith.
Page 5 of 131Exhaustion of Pre-Litigation Remedies
11. Aggrieved, the Plaintiff issued two legal notices to catalyze compliance:
12. First Notice dated 03/12/2012, demanding immediate refund of Rs. 26,50,000/- plus accrued interest.
13. Second Notice dated 09/01/2013, reiterating the demand amid the Defendant's studied silence.
14. Both notices elicited no response, leaving the Plaintiff with no recourse but to institute this suit for recovery.
Legal Wrongs Committed by Defendant
15. The Defendant's conduct unequivocally constitutes:
16. Breach of Contract: Failure to honor provisional allotments despite receipt of consideration, violating Sections 37 and 73 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872.
17. Fraud and Misrepresentation: Luring investors with fictitious "future projects" involving non-existent plots, suppressing material facts about project feasibility, and indulging in systematic cheating under Section 17 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872, and Sections 415/420 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860.
18. Unlawful Enrichment: Profiting immensely from the Plaintiff's funds (deployed for 8 years amid soaring real estate rates) while causing direct pecuniary loss and emotional distress Page 6 of 131 to the Plaintiff.
19. Unethical Business Practice: A pattern of collecting booking amounts for illusory schemes, refusing refunds upon demand, and duping the public, warranting exemplary damages.
Quantum of Relief Sought
20. The Plaintiff claims refund of the Registration Amounts with compound interest at 18% per annum--a rate commensurate with the Defendant's unjust enrichment, the Plaintiff's opportunity costs, and precedents in similar real estate delay/refund disputes-- from February 2006 (post-initial payments) till March 2014 (approximate suit valuation date).
Particulars Amount
(Rs.)
First Plot Registration Amount 7,50,000
Second Plot Registration Amount 9,50,000
Third Plot Registration Amount 9,50,000
Interest @ 18% p.a. (Feb 2006-Mar 38,95,500
2014)
Grand Total 65,45,500
Page 7 of 131
21. The Plaintiff also seeks costs of suit, further interest pendente lite and post-decree, and such other reliefs as deemed fit. This cause of action continuously accrues from 18/08/2010 (cancellation acceptance) and remains subsisting due to the Defendant's contumacious refusal to refund.
22. It has been averred by the plaintiff that in Food Corporation Of India vs Balkrishna Garg: 21 (1982) DLT 167, ILR 1982 Delhi 756; The Hon'ble High Court of Delhi at New Delhi held that:
"(4) The learned single Judge held that Order 37 Rule 1 (2) C. P. C. envisages suits where plaintiff seeks to recover a debt with or without interest arising on a written contract, and, therefore, it is implied that interest amounts too can be claimed on the debt irrespective of whether such interest is permissible under the contract itself or not. The learned Judge further held that ordinarily an application under section 34 of the Act can be moved before filing the written statement or taking any other step, but since Order 37 Civil Procedure Code deals with specific types of suits and provides a special procedure and if the defendant fails to obtain permission from the court to defend the suit, decree in favor of the plaintiff follows as a matter of course. Taking recourse to arbitration clause in the agreement in order to seek stay of the Page 8 of 131 suit can as well be treated as raising a defense to the suit.
Therefore, a defendant seeking protection of the Act must act within the limitation prescribed under Order 37 Civil Procedure Code or as enlarged by the Original Side Rules. The learned Judge relied upon Pench Valley Coal Co. Ltd. v. The Indian Cable Co. Ltd. , for the view taken by him. .....
(7) What then, is a debt? Relying on Webb v. Stenton (1883) 11 Qbd 518(4), it was held in Commissioner of Wealth Tax v. Pierce Leslie & Co. Ltd., that the essential requisites of a debt are (1) an ascertained or readily calculable amount ; (2) an absolute unqualified and pre- sent liability in regard to that amount with the obligation to pay forthwith or in future within a time certain; (3) the obligation must have accrued and be subsisting and should not be that which - is merely accruing. A contingent liability or a contingency debt in, therefore, neither a liability nor a debt. A debt is a 'debitum in pracsenti, solvendum in future'. We, therefore, hold that the amount covered by the suit is an ascertained amount payable under an unqualified present liability. The obligation has accrued and subsists. It is a debt accruing under a written contract. The learned counsel for the defendant wanted to urge that the words "arising on a written contract" must be read along with the word "interest" and since no interest Page 9 of 131 was payable under the contract the suit is not covered by clause (b) of Rule 2 of Order 37 Civil Procedure Code This is an argument totally unsupportable. The words "arising on a written contract" apply to the word "debt" which may be "with or without interest". We, therefore, without any hesitation reject this contention of the appellant."
23. The plaintiff has also placed reliance on the judgment of The Hon'ble High Court of Delhi at New Delhi in SUSHILA MEHTA VS BANSI LAL ARORA; ILR 1982 DELHI 320 "(10) The question is whether the receipt dated 26 th August, 1978 is a "written contract" or not. In my opinion it clearly is. The plaintiff paid the application money for allotment of shares. The defendants accepted it, though it is' true that defendant NO. 2 came into existence a few months later. The payment of Rs. 1, 00, 000 by the plaintiff as application money and its acceptance by the defendants constitutes a contract. It may be labelled as a receipt but that does' not mean that it is not a contract. (11) It was said that it has not been pleaded that the suit is based on a written contract This is not required by any provision of law. The Court has to find out whether the 'suit has been brought upon a negotiable instrument or a written contract-or an enactment or a guarantee to which Order 37 Civil Procedure Code applies. The acknowledgement of Rs. 1, 00, 000 by the defendants for the Page 10 of 131 purpose of allotment of shares as application money therefore clearly amounts to a contract. Because it is their, own case that the plaintiff paid money for allotment of shares and they accepted it. - There was "consensus of mind. " And "consensus of mind" leads to a contract, as Lord Caizns said. (Cundy V. Lindsay (1878) 3 App Case -459(2) at p. 465). There was promise. There was consideration. There was acceptance. All the elements essential for the formation of the contract are present. What more is needed to make a contract. It was not a nudum pactum. (15) Fourthly, counsel submitted that assuming that the plaintiff is entitled to sue for recovery of Rs. 1, 00, 000 on a written- contract, she is not entitled to join the claim for Rs. 36,000 which, he said,-, is a claim in the nature of damages. I do not agree. It is a' claim for interest. Whether she is entitled to interest or not is another question. Order 37 Rule I says that the plaintiff can "recover a debtor liquidated demand in money payable by the defendant, with or without interest, arising on a written contract." The claim for interest can be joined with a claim for money under Order 37 Rule1 (2)(b)(i) Civil Procedure Code. This is clear from the statute."
24. It has been averred that the cause of action in the present suit first arose on 18/08/2010, when the Plaintiff formally cancelled the provisional registrations for all three plots by Page 11 of 131 unequivocally withdrawing his booking applications from the Defendant's "Integrated Future Township Project" (also referred to as the "Future Project"). This cancellation was duly communicated vide the Plaintiff's letter dated 18/08/2010, which was received and accepted by the Defendant without demur. Thereafter, the cause of action continued to arise upon each subsequent demand made by the Plaintiff for refund of the Registration Amounts totaling Rs. 26,50,000/-, which the Defendant persistently and unlawfully refused to honor, notwithstanding its acceptance of the cancellation and the clear obligation to restitute the Plaintiff.
25. The cause of action further and finally crystallized on 03/12/2012, upon service of the Plaintiff's first statutory legal notice expressly demanding immediate refund of the aforesaid Registration Amounts along with accrued interest, and renewed on 09/01/2013, upon service of the second legal notice reiterating the said demand. Despite due service of both notices upon the Defendant--evidencing knowledge of the Plaintiff's grievances-- the Defendant adopted a stance of studied silence, failed to furnish any reply, and neglected to effectuate the refund, thereby compelling the Plaintiff to seek redressal through the present judicial proceedings. The cause of action thus remains continuously subsisting from 18/08/2010 onwards, accruing with each instance of the Defendant's contumacious default.
Page 12 of 131Suit Valuation, Court Fees, and Pecuniary Jurisdiction
26. For the purposes of territorial jurisdiction, pecuniary jurisdiction, valuation, and court fees, the total value of the present suit is determined at Rs. 65,45,500/- (Rupees Sixty-Five Lakhs Forty-Five Thousand Five Hundred only), comprising the principal Registration Amounts of Rs. 26,50,000/- augmented by interest calculated at 18% per annum from February 2006 (immediately following the initial payments) up to March 2014 (the approximate date of suit valuation). Court fees ad valorem amounting to Rs. 66,300/- (Rupees Sixty-Six Thousand Three Hundred only) have been duly affixed hereto in accordance with the applicable Court Fees Act.
Prior Proceedings and Absence of Lis Pendens
27. It is pertinent to state that the Plaintiff had previously instituted Consumer Case No. 91/2013 titled Harish Goel vs. Vipul Limited before the State Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission, ITO, New Delhi, seeking analogous reliefs in respect of the same cause of action. The said consumer complaint was, however, withdrawn unconditionally on 28/04/2014, without prejudice to the Plaintiff's rights to pursue fresh remedies in an appropriate forum. The plaintiff has averred that there is no other suit, complaint, or legal proceeding pending or determined in Page 13 of 131 respect of the subject matter hereof before any other court, tribunal, or authority, thereby obviating any bar of res judicata, constructive res judicata, or lis pendens.
Territorial and Pecuniary Jurisdiction of this Hon'ble Court
28. It has been averred that this Court possesses requisite territorial jurisdiction to entertain, try, and adjudicate the present suit, inasmuch as the Plaintiff ordinarily resides at Sukhdev Vihar, New Delhi, which falls squarely within the local limits of the territorial jurisdiction of this Court. Furthermore, the cause of action wholly or in part arose within the said limits, inter alia, through the Plaintiff's residence therein, the issuance and service of legal notices from New Delhi, and the accrual of the right to sue consequent to the Defendant's defaults communicable thereto.
Reliefs prayed for:
i) Pass a decree of recovery Rs. 65,45,500/- (Rupee Sixty Five Lakhs Forty Five Thousand and Five hundred) in favour of the Plaintiff and against the Defendant;
ii) Award interest during the pendency of the Suit;
iii) Award the cost of litigation in favour of the Plaintiff and against the Defendant; and
iv) Pass any other or further order(s) this court may Page 14 of 131 deem fit, just and proper in the interest of justice
29. PER CONTRA, the defendant has opposed the suit of the plaintiff, and has filed its written statement negating the averments as pleaded. It has been argued on behalf of defendant as follows:
30. That the Plaintiff has filed the present Suit in order to harass and illegally extort money from the Defendant. The Plaintiff is trying to create a false and fictitious Suit against the Defendant to malign the fair name and reputation of the Defendant.
Preliminary Objections
31. It has been averred as follows:
Frivolous, Vexatious, and Mala Fide Institution of Suit
32. The present suit is a contrived, frivolous, and vexatious proceeding instituted by the Plaintiff with the patent ulterior motive of harassing the Defendant, effecting illegal extortion of monies, and tarnishing the Defendant's unblemished reputation, goodwill, and standing in the real estate sector. Every material averment in the plaint is palpably false, fictitious, exaggerated, and engineered solely to mislead the Court, prejudice the judicial process, and coerce the Defendant into an unjust settlement. The Plaintiff's narrative of fraud, misrepresentation, and mental agony is a post-facto fabrication, unsupported by any contemporaneous evidence, and belied by his own inexplicable inaction for nearly Page 15 of 131 eight years post-payments.
33. Without prejudice to its rights, defences, and contentions in law and equity, the Defendant mostly submits that the plaint discloses no cause of action, is an abuse of the process of court, and warrants summary dismissal under Order VII Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (hereinafter "CPC").
Lack of Territorial Jurisdiction - Exclusive Jurisdiction Vested in Gurgaon Courts
34. It has been argued that this Court is bereft of territorial jurisdiction to entertain, try, hear, or adjudicate the present suit, rendering the same non-maintainable ab initio. The Plaintiff's perfunctory reliance on his residence at Sukhdev Vihar, New Delhi, as the sole jurisdictional peg is wholly misconceived, insufficient, and contrary to the express contractual bargain between the parties. It is an admitted position that the Plaintiff submitted three separate and distinct Applications for Provisional Registration dated 21.12.2005 (in respect of the first and second plots) and 16.01.2006 (in respect of the third plot) (hereinafter collectively referred to as the "Applications for Provisional Registration" or "Applications") for provisional booking of plots in the Defendant's proposed "Future Project," which was explicitly conceptualized as a pan-India initiative to be launched anywhere in the territory of India, without any specification or limitation to Page 16 of 131 Gurgaon/Faridabad or any particular region.
35. All communications, correspondences, notices, and interactions initiated by the Plaintiff concerning the suit properties were invariably directed to and received at the Defendant's corporate office situated at Vipul Techsquare, Golf Course Road, Sector-43, Gurgaon, Haryana - 122029.
36. Critically, Clause 12 of each Application unequivocally enshrined an exclusive jurisdiction clause in the following unambiguous terms:
"Gurgaon Courts alone would have jurisdiction in the matters arising out of or touching and/or concerning this registration."
37. This ouster clause, being explicit, clear, unambiguous, and freely consented to by the Plaintiff at the time of submitting the Applications, operates to exclude the jurisdiction of all courts other than those at Gurgaon, Haryana. It is a bedrock principal of law that parties to a contract are bound by their solemn agreement on forum selection; courts outside the stipulated jurisdiction stand ousted, and objections thereto go to the root of competence, attracting dismissal under Order VII Rule 11(d) CPC. The present suit is thus liable to be dismissed forthwith for want of territorial jurisdiction.
Page 17 of 131Gross Bar of Limitation - Suit Filed After Gross Expiry of Prescribed Period
38. The suit is hopelessly and irretrievably barred by the law of limitation, attracting dismissal under Article 113 of the Schedule to the Limitation Act, 1963, which mandates institution of any suit for which no specific period is provided within three years from the date when the right to sue accrues. The Plaintiff's own plaint admissions unequivocally establish that the Applications were submitted on 21.12.2005 (first and second plots) and 16.01.2006 (third plot), with registration amounts tendered contemporaneously. Clause 3 of the Applications stipulated that the Defendant "shall, as far as possible, [endeavor to] offer the allotment of a plot in [its] proposed project(s) ... within 12 months of [the] Registration Application." Clause 4 further clarified with precision:
"In case the Company is not in a position to make the offer of allotment for the Plot within a period of 12 months from the date of my/our application for any reason whatsoever, we shall only be entitled to refund of the Advance amount for the Provisional Registration paid by me/us along with simple interest @ 9% per annum from the date of payment of such advance, subject to my/our giving the company 30 days notice to the same. The intending applicant shall have no right, claim or interest of Page 18 of 131 whatsoever nature or kind in the project or plot."
39. Ergo, any purported right to refund crystallized inexorably on the expiry of 12 months--viz., 22.12.2006 (first and second plots) and 17.01.2007 (third plot)--subject to 30 days' notice, extinguishing all further claims thereafter. The instant suit, instituted on 28.03.2014 (over seven years post-accrual), is ex facie time-barred. The Plaintiff's self-serving cancellation letter dated 18.08.2010 (issued nearly four years post-expiry) and legal notices dated 03.12.2012 and 09.01.2013 cannot resurrect a dead claim, as no acknowledgment or fresh promise under Section 18/19 of the Limitation Act is pleaded or proved. The suit merits dismissal under Order VII Rule 11(g) CPC.
Impermissible Misjoinder of Causes of Action and Artificial Inflation of Suit Valuation
40. The plaint is vitiated by flagrant misjoinder of three independent causes of action emanating from three discrete transactions, each underpinned by separate Applications, cheques, receipts, customer codes, and contractual entitlements. The Plaintiff has deliberately aggregated the individual registration amounts--Rs. 7,50,000/- (first plot), Rs. 9,50,000/- (second plot), and Rs. 9,50,000/- (third plot)--along with inflated interest, to orchestrate a composite valuation of Rs. 65,45,500/-, engineered solely to arrogate pecuniary jurisdiction of this Court. As Page 19 of 131 submitted, individually, each claim is triable exclusively by a Civil Court of subordinate pecuniary jurisdiction, as none exceeds the inferior threshold.
41. Order II Rule 3 CPC sanctions joinder only where multiple causes of action share common questions of law or fact, and joint trial sub-serves the ends of justice without prejudice or multiplicity. Neither precondition is satisfied herein:
(i) the plots are distinct properties with independent Applications, sizes, rates, payments, and timelines;
(ii) evidence qua each (e.g., specific cheques, receipts, follow-ups) is mutually exclusive; and
(iii) no overriding convenience warrants amalgamation. Such joinder constitutes a gross abuse to circumvent jurisdictional pecuniary limits, offending Order II Rule 7 and Order VII Rule 11 CPC, mandating severance or dismissal.
Defendant's Version
42. The Defendant is a reputed public limited company duly incorporated under the Companies Act, 1956 (continued under the Companies Act, 2013), with its Corporate office at Vipul Techsquare, Golf Course Road, Sector-43, Gurgaon, Haryana - 122029. It is a pioneer in sustainable real estate development, Page 20 of 131 having executed landmark residential, commercial, institutional, and integrated township projects across the National Capital Region (NCR) and other states, earning accolades for quality, innovation, and customer-centricity.
43. In 2005, in bona fide pursuit of business growth amid a burgeoning realty sector, the Defendant announced a forward- looking "Future Project" for prospective plot allotments in upcoming developments anywhere in India, inviting provisional registrations to gauge market interest. This was a legitimate pre- launch mechanism, transparently governed by the Applications' terms. The Plaintiff, acting voluntarily and with full disclosure, submitted the Applications and paid the registration amounts as under:
S Plot Application Size & Proposed Registrati Cheque No. Descripti Date Rate Total Cost on Details on (Rs.) Amount Paid (Rs.) 360 sq. yds @ Rs.
8,700/s [Date:
1. First Plot 21.12.2005 q. yd 31,32,000 7,50,000 22.12.2005]
2. Second 21.12.2005 450 sq. 36,90,000 9,50,000 No. 354056
Page 21 of 131
S Plot Application Size & Proposed Registrati Cheque
No. Descripti Date Rate Total Cost on Details
on (Rs.) Amount
Paid (Rs.)
yds @
Rs.
8,200/s dt.
Plot q. yd 21.12.2005
450 sq.
yds @
Rs. No. 881307
8,200/s dt.
3. Third Plot 16.01.2006 q. yd 36,90,000 9,50,000 22.12.2005
Total Registration Amounts: Rs. 26,50,000/-
44. The Project, due to unforeseen regulatory hurdles, market vicissitudes, and commercial non-viability, did not materialize ergo a commonplace occurrence in real estate pre-launches. The Defendant proactively communicated to all applicants, including the Plaintiff, advising withdrawal of Applications and refund claims per Clause 4 (simple interest @9% p.a.).
45. Contrary to the Plaintiff's version, he exhibited inexplicable torpor, failing to pursue withdrawal or refund for nearly five years Page 22 of 131 until his letter dated 18.08.2010--issued post-expiry of all timelines and limitation. Clause 4 precluded any further claims, entitling the Plaintiff to nominal refund (with 9% simple interest) upon notice, which he neglected.
46. The purported legal notices dated 03.12.2012 and 09.01.2013 are sans legal effect, being time-barred missives bereft of any subsisting obligation.
47. Specific Rejoinder to Plaint Paragraphs Para 3 (Total Costs): Denied as exaggerated. Proposed costs were indicative; actual entitlements governed by Clauses 3-
4. Paras 4-6 (Bookings): Matter of record, but location denied
--Applications were for pan-India Future Project, not Gurgaon/Faridabad-specific.
Para 8 (Non-Allotment): Denied. No perpetual allotment obligation; Plaintiff informed of non-fructification and advised withdrawal, which he delayed.
Para 9-10 (Requests/Delays): Vehemently denied. No visits, requests, or assurances by Defendant; Plaintiff's inaction self-evident.
Para 11 (Investment Dreams): Denied as hyperbolic rhetoric.
Para 12 (Cancellation): Partially admitted (letter dated Page 23 of 131 18.08.2010), but denied harassment; withdrawal belated, post-limitation.
Para 14 (Unlawful Use): Vehemently denied as false and defamatory. No enrichment at Plaintiff's cost; he slept on rights.
Paras 15-16 (Fraud/Cheating): Specifically and vehemently denied as scurrilous, baseless, and mala fide. Defendant acted transparently; Plaintiff approached voluntarily. Para 23 (Cause of Action): Denied. No cause accrued; time- barred ab initio.
Para 25 (Prior Consumer Case): Admitted withdrawal of CC No. 91/2013 on 28.04.2014, but averred as forum-shopping to inflate valuation.
Para 26 (Jurisdiction): Denied; exclusive Gurgaon jurisdiction.
REJOINDER ON BEHALF OF THE PLAINTIFF Preliminary Rejoinder to Written Statement of Defence
48. It was submitted on behalf of the plaintiff that the Written Statement of Defence filed by the Defendant is a blatant abuse of the process of law, riddled with deliberate suppressions, distortions, and concocted averments designed to mislead the Court and evade its lawful obligations. Each and every allegation, assertion, submission, and preliminary objection therein is false, Page 24 of 131 baseless, frivolous, and untenable in law and facts, and ought to be rejected outright with exemplary costs in the interests of justice, as the same constitutes a gross misuse of judicial time and resources.
General Denial and Clean Hands of Plaintiff
49. The Plaintiff has meticulously perused the entire Written Statement and, at the threshold, denies each and every allegation, averment, statement, denial, submission, and contention contained therein.
50. It has been averred that the Defendant, conversely, has filed the Written Statement with unclean hands, mala fide intent, and wilful suppression of critical facts--such as the issuance of location-specific provisional registration certificates referencing the Gurgaon/Faridabad project, selective refunds to other allottees, and its own admissions in prior correspondences--solely to obfuscate liability and protract proceedings. Such conduct disentitles the Defendant to any equitable relief and warrants striking off the defence under Order VIII Rule 5 CPC, with the suit proceeding ex parte.
Foundational Facts of the Plaintiff's Case
51. Before traversing the Written Statement seriatim, it is expedient to restate the immutable facts, duly supported by Page 25 of 131 contemporaneous documents filed with the plaint:
a)The Plaintiff booked three distinct plots in the Defendant's "Integrated Future Township Project" specifically located at Gurgaon/Faridabad, Haryana, paying a total Registration Amount of Rs. 26,50,000/- (Rupees Twenty-Six Lakhs Fifty Thousand only) via verifiable cheques, duly acknowledged by the Defendant.
b) In consideration thereof, the Defendant issued three Provisional Registration Certificates dated 23/12/2005 (first plot), 26/12/2005 (second plot, Receipt No. 303, Customer Code FP/302), and 25/03/2006 (third plot, Receipt No. 536, Customer Code FP/477, cheque dated 24/03/2006), explicitly referencing the Gurgaon/Faridabad project and binding the Defendant to allot plots within 12 months or refund the amounts with interest.
c) The Defendant was under an unequivocal legal and contractual obligation to either allot the plots within 12 months from the dates of the Certificates/Applications or refund the Registration Amounts forthwith upon demand, together with interest for the period of wrongful retention. The Defendant breached both limbs, retaining the funds unlawfully for over eight years.
d) Despite repeated demands, including the Plaintiff's cancellation letter dated 18/08/2010 (duly accepted by the Defendant) and legal notices dated 03/12/2012 and 09/01/2013, the Defendant failed and neglected to refund, while selectively refunding similarly Page 26 of 131 placed allottees (e.g., Sh. Dalip Daga). This perfidy compelled institution of the present summary suit under Order XXXVII CPC for recovery of Rs. 65,45,500/- (principal Rs. 26,50,000/-
plus interest @18% p.a. from February 2006 to March 2014), as a liquidated money demand arising from written contracts (Provisional Certificates and Applications).
Specific Reply to Preliminary Objections Reply to Alleged Frivolous/Vexatious Suit (Para 1 of Preliminary Objections)
52. The Defendant's accusation of mala fides is a brazen projection of its own defaults, unsupported by evidence and pleaded solely to intimidate the Plaintiff. The suit is bona fide, disclosing a clear cause of action under Sections 37, 73, and 17 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872, for breach, fraud, and restitution.
Reply to Lack of Territorial Jurisdiction (Para 2 of Preliminary Objections)
53. The Defendant's objection is false, self-contradictory, and an afterthought, liable to be overruled:
a) Defendant's Principal Place of Business Within Jurisdiction:
The Defendant primarily carries on business from its registered office and key operational base at Regus Rectangle, Level 2, Rectangle 1, D-4, Commercial Complex, Saket, New Delhi -Page 27 of 131
110017 (at the time of filing of the suit), squarely within the territorial limits of this Court. This is verifiable from the Defendant's official website, statutory filings with the Registrar of Companies (RoC), and service of summons herein, conferring jurisdiction under Section 20 CPC (defendant's residence/carrying on business).
b) Cause of Action Accrued Within Jurisdiction: The Plaintiff resides at Sukhdev Vihar, New Delhi; all demands (cancellation letter and legal notices) emanated therefrom; and the Defendant's refusal/omission caused actionable injury here. Moreover, Section 16(e) CPC expressly vests jurisdiction where the suit seeks recovery/compensation for wrongs to immovable property (the Gurgaon/Faridabad plots) through the Defendant's personal obedience (refund of consideration paid). The proviso thereto does not detract, as the principal relief is monetary restitution, not specific performance.
c) Ouster Clause Inapplicable and Unenforceable: Clause 12 of the Applications, even if pleaded (which is disputed), is a printed, non-
negotiated one-sided clause in a contract vitiated by fraud/misrepresentation (non-existent plots). It cannot oust jurisdiction of courts where cause of action arises or Defendant resides/carries on business.
d) Estoppel by Conduct: The Defendant submitted to this Court's jurisdiction by filing the Written Statement without demurrer Page 28 of 131 under Order VIII Rule 1A CPC, waiving objections.
Reply to Bar of Limitation (Para 3 of Preliminary Objections)
54. The objection is erroneous and untenable:
a) Clause 4 entitles refund upon notice (given vide 18/08/2010 letter, accepted by Defendant), with continuous running of interest, rendering the cause of action accruing/continuing upon each demand and refusal--18/08/2010, 03/12/2012, and 09/01/2013--all within three years of suit filing (28/03/2014).
b) Acknowledgment of Liability: The Defendant's acceptance of cancellation and refunds to others (e.g., Sh. Dalip Daga) constitutes acknowledgment under Section 18, Limitation Act, extending limitation.
c) Fraud Exception: The suit involves fraud (Section 17(1)(b), Limitation Act), where Defendant concealed non-fructification, starting limitation from discovery (2010).
Reply to Misjoinder/Inflated Valuation (Para 4 of Preliminary Objections)
55. All three transactions stem from the same series of bookings in one integrated project, sharing common questions of law/fact (breach by same Defendant, identical clauses, project non- fructification). Joinder is permissible under Order II Rule 3 CPC, convenient for joint trial, and does not circumvent jurisdiction, as Page 29 of 131 aggregate valuation (Rs. 65,45,500/-) is genuine, reflecting compound liability.
56. Reply to Factual Matrix and Paragraph-Specific Denials Defendant's Profile/Project Description: Admitted partially; however, the "Future Project" was misrepresented as Gurgaon/Faridabad township, per Certificates. Plots Details (Table): Matter of record; location-specific denied by Defendant falsely.
Non-Fructification/Withdrawal: False. Defendant never proactively informed; Plaintiff pursued relentlessly until cancellation.
Paras 3-26 of Plaint: Each denial by Defendant is traversed as false, reiterating plaint averments verbatim.
57. S. 16 CPC, was cited and reproduced by the plaintiff which is enunciated as follows:
"Section 16 Suits to be instituted were subject matter situate- subject to the pecuniary or other limitations prescribed by any law, suits,
a) ............................... ;
b) .............................. ;
c) ............................... ;
d) ................................ ;Page 30 of 131
e) for compensation for wrong to immovable property;
n ................................. ; Shall be instituted in the court within the local limits of whose jurisdiction the property is situated;
"provided that a suit to obtain relief respecting; or compensation for wrong to, immovable property held by or on behalf of the Defendant may, where the relief sought can be entirely obtained through his personal obedience, be instituted either in the Court within the local limits of whose jurisdiction the property is situate, or in the Court within the local limits of whose jurisdiction the Defendant actually and voluntarily resides, or carries on business, or personally works for gain".
58. It has been argued that In Harshad Chiman Lal Modi Versus D.L.F. Universal Limited AIR 2006 SC 464; the judgment had observed as follows:
Para 14 - "proviso to Section 16, no doubt, states that though the Court cannot in case of immovable property situate beyond jurisdiction, grant a relief in rem still it can entertain a suit where relief sought can be obtained through the personal obedience of the Defendant. The proviso is based on well known maxim "Equity Acts in personam", recognized by the Chancery Courts in England. The Equity Courts had jurisdiction to entertain suits respecting immovable properties situated abroad through personal Page 31 of 131 obedience of the Defendant. The principal on which the maxim was based was that Courts could not grant reliefs in suits respecting immovable property situate abroad by enforcing their judgments by process in personam, i.e. by arrest of Defendant or by attachment of his property.
Para 15 - In Ewing Versus Ewing, (1883) 9 AC 34:53 LJ CH 435, Lord Se/borne observed:
"The Courts of Equity in England are, and always have been, Courts of conscience operating in personam and not in rem; and in the exercise of this personal jurisdiction they have always been accustomed to compel the performance of contracts in trusts as to subjects which were not either locally or ratione domicilli within their jurisdiction. They have done so, as to land, in Scotland, in Ireland, in the Colonies, in Foreign Countries. "
Para 16 - The proviso is thus an exception to the main part of the Section which in our considered opinion, cannot be interpreted or construed to enlarge the scope of principle provision. It would apply only if the suit falls within one of the categories specified in the main part of Section and the reliefs short could entirely the obtained by personal obedience of the Defendant. Further the Apex Courts while interpreting the basic frame work of proviso to Section 16 with regard to territorial jurisdiction of Courts, in the case of Babu Lal Versus Hazari Lal Kishori Lal and Page 32 of 131 Ors. Reported in 1982 (3) SCR 94 in para 7 had observed as follows:
"On the other hand, proviso to Section 16 lays down certain circumstances in which suit can be instituted even within the local limits of whose jurisdiction the Defendant actually and voluntarily resides or carries on business or personally works for gain. Thus, normally a suit in respect of immovable property is to be filed where the subject-matter, i.e., the immovable property is situated. However, in the proviso an exception is laid down by providing that relief respecting or compensation for wrong to, immovable property can be obtained through the personal obedience of the Defendant the suit can also be instituted where the Defendant resides etc. if the proviso is applicable, the principles stipulated in Section 20 of the Code would determine the territorial jurisdiction."
59. Hence, the proposition laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the aforementioned Judgment is applicable in the facts and circumstances of the present case, as the Plaintiff is only claiming for the relief of compensation to wrong of immovable property which can be obtained by personal obedience of the Defendant, as the Defendant is carrying on its business from its registered office which is within the jurisdiction of local limits of this Court.
60. It is also submitted that the booking amount of Page 33 of 131 Rs.26,50,000/- was made by the Plaintiff through its bankers and was received by the Defendant through its bankers within the jurisdiction of the local limits of this Court.
61. The allegation/ submission of the Defendant that the application for provisional allotment of the said plots was in respect of future integrated townships to be launched anywhere in India and any particular place was not specified in the allotment application is absolutely false, baseless and incorrect. It has been submitted that the Defendant prior to launching of the scheme of investment in its future projects for integrated townships had specifically and categorically informed the Plaintiff that the investment is solely in respect of the integrated townships in Gurgaon/ Faridabad. And only on this assurance by the Defendant, the Plaintiff had made 3 applications for provisional allotment in respect of the said plots.
62. It is further submitted that in the year 2009, the Defendant had given an option to the Plaintiff for conversion and replacement of the said plots with another commercial space measuring approximately 450 sq. yds. in its upcoming commercial plaza under the name & style of "Vipul Plaza" at Faridabad. However, the said option was not accepted and agreed upon by the Plaintiff.
63. It is pertinent to note that the application for allotment of the said plots was executed at the Corporate Office of the Defendant situated at New Delhi and also the provisional allotment certificate Page 34 of 131 in respect of the said plots and receipts towards payment of the booking amount of Rs.26,50,000/- in respect of the said plots was issued from the registered office of the Defendant which is situate within the jurisdiction of the local limits of this Court.
64. The Hon'ble Apex Court while deciding the question of territorial jurisdiction of Courts in application to proviso to Section 16 of the Code, in the case of Vipul Infrastructure Developers Ltd. and Anr. Versus Rohit Kochhar, reported in 2008 (102) DRJ 178 has held and observed as follows:
"18. In the present case, it is an admitted position that the Appellant had entered into the aforesaid alleged contract at its corporate office at Delhi. It is the specific stand of the Appellant that they were initially residents of Delhi and that they had moved to Gurgaon and their Corporate office is now also located at Gurgaon. It is the contention of the counsel appearing for the Respondents that the proviso to Section 16 of the Code of civil Procedure is applicable which is sought to be invoked, for, the relief which is sought could be entirely enforced through the personal obedience of the Defendant in Delhi. There is however not only a prayer in the Plaint for declaration of the right and title, but also to transfer the right, title and interest in the suit premises situate at Gurgaon. As, in our opinion, the suit can be de decreed in favour of the Plaintiff only when the Court can get the Sale Deed executed and registered in favour of the Plaintiff which Page 35 of 131 would confirm the title of the suit premises and the Plaintiff, and the execution and the registration of the sale document would have to take place at Gurgaon and, for this the Court will also have to pass a decree directing the Defendant to get the sale deed executed and registered at Gurgaon, implication of the same will be that a direction will have to be given to the Defendant that he shall have to move out of Delhi and go to Gurgaon and get the same registered. No sale deed is sought to be registered at Delhi and, therefore, in our considered opinion such a relief cannot be entirely obtained through the personal obedience of the Defendant who in this case has to go to the jurisdiction of another court to get the decree executed and the sale deed registered.
19. Accordingly, we are of the considered opinion that the submissions of the learned Counsel for the Respondent and the findings recorded by the learned Single Judge that the present case is covered by the proviso of Section 16 of the Code of Civil Procedure would be applicable to a case where the relief sought for by the Plaintiff was entirely obtainable through the personal obedience of the Defendant i.e., the Defendant has not at all to go out of the jurisdiction of the Court for the aforesaid purpose. The present case is not a case of the aforesaid nature. In the present case for execution of the sale deed the Defendants will have to go out of the jurisdiction of this Court and get the same executed Page 36 of 131 and registered in Gurgaon."
65. Hence, the proposition laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the aforementioned case is that the Courts passing a decree which can be put to final legal conclusion entirely by the presence of personal obedience of the Defendant and for which the decree holder do not have to approach another Court for its execution, is said to have the territorial jurisdiction. In the present facts and circumstances of the case, the decree, if any, passed by this Court will reach its final legal conclusion by the personal obedience of the Defendant as the Defendant is carrying on business from its registered office within the jurisdiction of this Court, and the Plaintiff will not have to approach any other Court of Law to execute the decree, if any passed by this Hon'ble Court.
66. The ouster of jurisdiction in terms of clause 12 of the application for allotment of the said plots is not a valid and binding contract in terms of Section 28 of the Contract Act, the same is emphasized as below:
Section 28. Agreements in restraint of legal proceedings void Every Agreement
a) By which any party thereto is restricted absolutely from enforcing his rights under or in respect of any contract, by the usual legal proceedings in the ordinary tribunals, or which limits Page 37 of 131 the time within which he may thus enforce his rights; or
b) Which extinguishes the rights of any party thereto, or discharges any party thereto from any liability, under or in respect of any contract on the expiry of a specified period so as to restrict any party from enforcing his rights is void to that extent."
67. It is a well known rule of English Law that "an agreement purporting to oust the jurisdiction of the courts is illegal and void on the grounds of public policy".
68. The Hon'ble Apex Court while deciding the question of law with regard to ouster of jurisdiction in the case of has held and observed as follows:
"If the Courts does not have initial jurisdiction to try and decide the suit the parties by their mutual conduct and consent cannot vest jurisdiction in a court which does not have jurisdiction to try the suit."
69. The Hon'ble Delhi High Court while deciding the question of ouster of jurisdiction in the case of Priti Pratap Singh Versus Sariska Palace and Ors. in F.A.O. No. 375 of 2007 decided on 28/05/2013 putting reliance on judgment delivered by the Hon'ble High Court of Judicature at Calcutta in the case of Sri Rajendra Page 38 of 131 Mills Ltd. Versus H.V.M. Hazi Hasan Dada and Anr. reported in AIR 1970 Calcutta 342 and the Hon'ble Orrisa High Court in the case of Fertilizer Corporation of India Ltd. & Ors. Versus Ranjit Kumar Mishra reported in AIR 1980 Orissa 152 , while deciding the question of ouster of jurisdiction has held and observed as follows:
"Where two Courts had the jurisdiction to try and entertain the dispute between the parties, the Plaintiff referring the disputes to one of the Courts does not render the jurisdiction barred by law."
Reply to Preliminary Objection on Limitation
70. The Defendant's preliminary objection alleging bar of limitation under Article 113 of the Schedule to the Limitation Act, 1963 (prescribing three years for residuary suits), is fundamentally misconceived, untenable in law and facts, self-defeating, and liable to be overruled in limine. It proceeds on a truncated and distorted interpretation of Clauses 3 and 4 of the Applications for Provisional Registration, willfully disregarding the Defendant's protracted defaults, its own acknowledgments of liability, and the continuing nature of the breach. The objection merits rejection for the following self-contained, cogent reasons, fortified by plaint records and annexed documents:
Page 39 of 131a) Erroneous and Premature Accrual of Cause of Action The Defendant falsely contends that the right to refund accrued mechanically on 22.12.2006/17.01.2007 (12 months post-Applications dated 21.12.2005 and 16.01.2006). This ignores the plain language of Clause 4, which conditions refund entitlement explicitly "subject to my/our giving the company 30 days notice to the same", extinguishing further claims only post-notice and compliance. The Provisional Registration Certificates (dated 23/12/2005, 26/12/2005, and 25/03/2006) reinforced this dual obligation: allotment within 12 months (Clause 3) or refund upon notice.
The Plaintiff's formal notice crystallized via cancellation letter dated 18/08/2010 (duly received and accepted by Defendant, as evidenced by endorsement on duplicate copy annexed to plaint). This rendered the cause of action continuing, accruing afresh with each subsequent demand (reminders 2006-2010), refusal, and legal notices dated 03/12/2012 and 09/01/2013 (served but unreplied), all within three years of suit filing on 28/03/2014 [Sections 22 and 23, Limitation Act, 1963 - continuing breach and exclusion of time till demand].
Page 40 of 131b) Defendant's Conduct Acknowledges and Extends Liability Post-12 months (2006-07), the Defendant never intimated project non-fructification or tendered refund suo motu, thereby waiving strict timelines and inducing reliance.
In 2009, it proffered conversion to 450 sq. yds. in "Vipul Plaza," Faridabad (letter dated 31/12/2009 - Annexure B), implying subsisting obligation and restarting limitation under Section 18, Limitation Act (acknowledgment in writing).
In 2010, it actively solicited the Plaintiff's cancellation application (18/08/2010), promising refund - an unequivocal representation dishonoured, creating estoppel by conduct.
Discriminatory Refunds to Others: The Defendant refunded similarly circumstanced allottee Sh. Dalip Daga (same Gurgaon/Faridabad project) vide cheques dated 16/11/2010 and 11/12/2010 (Annexure C Colly - TDS Certificates), evidencing live liability in 2010. This selective compliance estops the Defendant from pleading limitation against the Plaintiff (promissory estoppel; discriminatory treatment violative of Article 14 equity), restarting limitation from 2010
- suit filed well within three years.
Page 41 of 131c) Fresh Causes on Demands and Fraudulent Concealment Legal notices (03/12/2012, 09/01/2013) and Consumer Complaint No. 91/2013 (filed/withdrawn 28/04/2014 as forum-inapt for fraud trial) constitute fresh accruals upon non-response, underscoring Plaintiff's diligence.
Fraud Exception: Defendant's concealment of project inviability, issuance of location-specific Certificates despite "pan-India" pretence, and inducement via assurances invoke Section 17(1)(b), Limitation Act - limitation runs from discovery (2010 cancellation). Suit (2014) complies.
The objection collapses on Defendant's 2010 admissions/refunds; it merits dismissal with costs.
Reply to Preliminary Objection on Misjoinder of Causes of Action and Valuation
71. The Defendant's averment of misjoinder under Order II Rule 3 read with Order I Rule 1 CPC, and artificial inflation of valuation, is contrived, mala fide, and unsustainable, warranting rejection:
Page 42 of 131a) Unity of Transaction and Common Nucleus Rs. 26,50,000/- comprised three contemporaneous payments (Dec 2005-Jan 2006) via cheques to the Defendant for three plots in one "Integrated Future Township Project" at Gurgaon/Faridabad - a composite scheme negotiated holistically at Defendant's Saket office.
Applications/Certificates uniformly reference this single project, spawning common questions of law/fact: (i) identical breach (non-allotment/non-refund); (ii) same clauses/terms;
(iii) unified fraud (misrepresentation of viable plots); (iv) singular relief (restitution).
b) Joinder Promoted by Statute and Convenience Order II Rule 3 CPC permits joinder where claims arise from the same act/series of acts - here, Defendant's launch, acceptance of payments, and unified default. Order I Rule 1 favours multi-claim joinder for judicial economy. Separate suits for each plot would occasion multiplicity, escalated costs, and inconsistent verdicts - manifest prejudice avoided by composite trial.
c) Legitimate Aggregate Valuation and Pecuniary Jurisdiction Page 43 of 131 Valuation (Rs. 65,45,500/-) reflects genuine compound liability (principal Rs. 26,50,000/- + 18% interest, Feb 2006- Mar 2014) from indivisible default.
Relief: Liquidated damages for immovable property wrong (non-delivery) via Defendant's "personal obedience" (refund)
- Section 16(e) proviso, CPC - not barred by misjoinder.
d) No Prejudice; Forum-Shopping Denied Overlapping evidence (project docs, notices, Daga proofs) nullifies prejudice. Objection is ploy to fragment/derail.
Point-Wise Rejoinder to Written Statement Paragraphs Paragraph(s) Specific Reply 1-2 (Frivolous Denied seriatim (supra). Saket office Suit/Jurisdiction) (Regus Rectangle, New Delhi-110017) manages operations (meetings, audits, negotiations) -
jurisdiction u/s 20 CPC; demands from Plaintiff's Delhi residence.
Page 44 of 1313-6 (Factual Matter of record; Gurgaon/Faridabad Matrix/Plots) location per Certificates/brochures.
Negotiations/payments at Saket. Total value Rs. 1,22,92,000/- admitted (corrected computation).
8-9 False. 2009 offer (Annexure B); 2010 (Non-Allotment/Withd solicitation; Daga refunds (Annexure rawal) C) prove liability/protraction, not delay.
10 (Inaction) Traversed: Reminders 2006-10;
refused 2009 offer; complied 2010 (originals surrendered, receipt annexed).
11 (Hard-Earned Admitted; Defendant's breach
Funds) shattered expectations.
12-13 Clause 4 mandates refund on notice;
(Cancellation/Refund) Defendant defaulted post-compliance.
14 (Enrichment) Admitted; ~8 years' use amid 5x escalation.
15-16 (Fraud) Denials false; pattern via Daga/conversion.
17 (Daga) Admitted; evidences entitlement/discrimination.
18-19 (Notices) Issued post-2010; unreplied.
Page 45 of 13120-26 All false; CC 91/2013 withdrawn for (Denials/Consumer civil trial (fraud u/s 17 Contract Act).
Case) Jurisdiction/valuation supra.
DATE-WISE SYNOPSIS OF HEARINGS / ORDERS S.N Date Particulars Brief details of proceedings o. (Court / Stage) 1 20.05.2014 Delhi High IA 9692/2014 under Section Court, Joint 151 CPC for exemption from Registrar filing original documents (Judicial) allowed, with direction to Sh. Satinder file originals at the stage of Kumar admission/denial; IA Gautam - 9693/2014 under Section 5 IA of the Limitation Act r/w 9692/2014 Section 151 CPC for & IA condonation of delay in 9693/2014 refiling allowed; summons of the suit directed to be issued to the defendant on all permissible modes; matter renotified for 02.09.2014.
Page 46 of 1312 02.09.2014 Delhi High Counsel for defendant Court, Joint appeared and sought time to Registrar file vakalatnama and written (Judicial) statement; two weeks' time Sh. Satinder granted to file written Kumar statement with advance copy Gautam to plaintiff; plaintiff directed to file replication within two weeks thereafter with advance copy; matter adjourned to 01.12.2014 for completion of pleadings and admission/denial of documents.
Page 47 of 1313 01.12.2014 Delhi High Defendant sought one week Court, Joint to file original documents;
Registrar defendant stated that
(Judicial) plaintiff's documents are
Dr. Satinder photocopies and do not
Kumar require admission/denial;
Gautam admission/denial treated as
complete; matter held ripe
for framing of issues; parties
directed to file proposed
issues within two weeks and
exchange copies; matter
directed to be placed before
Hon'ble Court on
20.02.2015.
4 20.02.2015 Delhi High On request of learned
Court, counsel for the plaintiff,
Hon'ble Mr. matter adjourned to
Justice 21.05.2015.
Jayant Nath
Page 48 of 131
5 23.02.2015 Delhi High Counsel for defendant
Court, Joint appeared and sought time to Registrar file reply to IA 3691/2015;
(Judicial) four weeks' time granted for
Sh. Anil reply and further four weeks'
Kumar time for rejoinder, if any;
Sisodia - IA application listed for
3691/2015 consideration on 30.04.2015.
6 30.04.2015 Delhi High Plaintiff submitted that
Court, Joint documents referred to in
Registrar application are in possession
(Judicial) of defendant; defendant
Sh. Anil directed to produce original
Kumar documents on next date of
Sisodia - IA hearing; IA 3691/2015
3691/2015 allowed and disposed of;
main suit listed for
admission/denial of
documents on 07.05.2015.
Page 49 of 131
7 07.05.2015 Delhi High Counsel for defendant
Court, Joint submitted that original
Registrar documents were filed on
(Judicial) 06.05.2015 but were not yet
Sh. Anil on record; defendant directed
Kumar to ensure that originals are
Sisodia placed on record before next
date; matter listed for
marking of exhibits on
12.08.2015.
8 06.07.2015 Delhi High Notice ordered on IA
Court, 13050/2015 under Order XII
Hon'ble Mr. Rule 6 r/w Section 151 CPC;
Justice A.K. notice to be issued to
Pathak - IA defendant through counsel
13050/2015 by ordinary process,
registered AD and courier;
after completion of pleadings
on the application, Joint
Registrar directed to place
IA before the Court for
hearing.
Page 50 of 131
9 12.08.2015 Delhi High Directions issued for
Court, Joint completion of pleadings and Registrar admission/denial in IA (Judicial) 13050/2015; matter directed Sh. Anil to be put up on 01.12.2015.
Kumar Sisodia 10 01.12.2015 Delhi High In view of Notification dated Court, Joint 24.11.2015 and order of the Registrar Hon'ble Chief Justice, suit (Judicial) ordered to be transferred to Sh. Anil the District Courts; parties Kumar directed to appear before Ld. Sisodia District Judge (South), Saket for further directions on a date in February 2016;
Registry directed to transmit complete record.
Page 51 of 13111 04.02.2016 District & Suit taken up pursuant to Sessions High Court's transfer order;
Judge noting that defendant's (South), Ms. registered office falls within Anu territorial jurisdiction of Malhotra Saket; proceedings assigned (administrat to the Court of Ms. Navita ive order) Kumari Bagha, ADJ-01 (South); parties directed to appear before said Court on 03.03.2016 at 2:00 p.m. 12 03.03.2016 ADJ-01 Case received by way of (South), Ms. transfer due to change in Navita pecuniary jurisdiction;
Kumari directed to be checked and
Bagha registered; both sides
appeared; matter listed for
arguments on plaintiff's
application under Order XII
Rule 6 CPC on 18.07.2016.
Page 52 of 131
13 07.11.2016 ADJ-01 None appeared on behalf of
(South), Ms. plaintiff; authorised
Navita representative of defendant
Kumari appeared with proxy
Bagha counsel; last opportunity
granted to plaintiff to address
arguments on application
under Order XII Rule 6
CPC; matter adjourned to
14.03.2017.
14 14.03.2017 ADJ-01 Counsel for both parties
(South), Sh. present; part arguments
Sudesh heard on plaintiff's
Kumar-II application under Order XII
Rule 6 CPC; matter
adjourned for further
arguments on 06.06.2017.
15 06.06.2017 ADJ-01 Proxy counsel for plaintiff
(South), Dr. sought pass-over which was Neera declined; matter directed to Bharihoke be listed for arguments on plaintiff's application under Order XII Rule 6 CPC on 29.08.2017.
Page 53 of 13116 27.11.2017 ADJ-01 None appeared for plaintiff;
(South), authorised representative of
Reader defendant and counsel
order (P.O. present; Presiding Officer on
on leave) half-day casual leave; matter
adjourned for same purpose
to 21.03.2018.
17 21.03.2018 ADJ-01 Proxy counsel for plaintiff
(South), Sh. sought adjournment on
Munish ground of non-availability of
Markan main counsel; request
opposed by defendant;
adjournment granted subject
to costs of Rs. 1,000/-
payable by plaintiff to
defendant; matter listed for
arguments on application
under Order XII Rule 6 CPC
on 17.07.2018.
Page 54 of 131
18 17.07.2018 ADJ-01 Proxy counsel for plaintiff
(South), Sh. present; counsel for
Munish defendant present; in view of
Markan non-availability of main
counsel, last opportunity
granted to plaintiff to address
arguments on pending
application; both parties
directed to file brief written
submissions; matter listed
for 27.08.2018; subsequently
on the same date, main
counsel for plaintiff
appeared and was apprised
of the next date.
19 27.08.2018 ADJ-01 None appeared when matter
(South), Sh. was called; in view of
Munish reader's report regarding
Markan listing, matter adjourned for
further proceedings to
27.10.2018.
Page 55 of 131
20 27.10.2018 ADJ-01 None appeared for plaintiff;
(South), Sh. proxy counsel for defendant Munish present; one more Markan opportunity granted to plaintiff subject to costs of Rs. 2,000/-; matter adjourned for purpose already fixed on 31.01.2019.
21 31.01.2019 ADJ-01 Proxy counsel for plaintiff (South), Sh. present; counsel for Munish defendant present; main Markan counsel for plaintiff absent;
previous costs not paid;
further costs of Rs. 2,000/-
imposed on plaintiff; matter adjourned for same purpose to 25.04.2019.
22 25.04.2019 ADJ-01 None appeared on behalf of (South), Sh. plaintiff; counsel for Munish defendant present; one Markan further and last opportunity granted to plaintiff subject to additional costs of Rs.
5,000/-; matter listed for arguments on 16.07.2019.
Page 56 of 13123 16.07.2019 ADJ-01 Application for waiver of (South), Sh. costs of Rs. 5,000/- moved Munish on behalf of plaintiff and Markan - dismissed; Court recorded framing of repeated non-appearance and issues adjournments in relation to Order XII Rule 6 CPC application; application under Order XII Rule 6 CPC dismissed for non-prosecution; issues framed on entitlement to decree, territorial jurisdiction, limitation and mis-joinder; parties directed to file list of witnesses within 15 days; plaintiff cautioned that non-payment of previous costs or failure to lead evidence or take steps would entail dismissal;
plaintiff's evidence fixed for 11.10.2019.
Page 57 of 13124 11.10.2019 ADJ-01 Counsel for plaintiff present;
(South), Sh. proxy counsel for defendant Munish present; previous costs of Rs.
Markan - 5,000/- paid; however, no
dismissal witness present and no
for affidavit of evidence filed;
non-prosecu advance copy of affidavit not
tion supplied; in view of earlier
order, suit dismissed for
non-prosecution and file
ordered to be consigned to
Record Room.
25 16.12.2019 ADJ-01 File taken up on plaintiff's
(South), Sh. application for restoration of Munish suit and another application Markan - under Section 151 CPC;
restoration after hearing, notice issued application on both applications to defendant and his counsel on PF/RC/courier for 30.01.2020.
Page 58 of 13126 30.01.2020 ADJ-01 Application under Order IX (South), Ms. Rule 9 r/w Section 151 CPC Pooja for restoration taken up;
Talwar - notice earlier issued returned
Order IX with report of refusal and
Rule 9 CPC treated as deemed service;
defendant did not appear;
after hearing plaintiff, suit
restored to its original
number subject to costs of
Rs. 10,000/- to be deposited
in account
"bharatkeveer.gov.in";
matter listed for 07.04.2020.
27 23.07.2020 ADJ-01 Counsel for plaintiff filed
(South), Ms. application for placing
Pooja photocopy of evidentiary
Talwar - affidavit on record; Court
VC noted that certified copy of
order of restoration was not
on record and evidence was
not being recorded at that
time; matter fixed for
17.09.2020, noting inability
to record proceedings due to
infrastructural constraints.
Page 59 of 131
28 17.09.2020 ADJ-01 None appeared for plaintiff;
(South), Ms. counsel for defendant
Pooja present; matter adjourned for
Talwar - further proceedings to
VC 09.11.2020.
29 09.11.2020 ADJ-01 Application by plaintiff for
(South), Ms. placing affidavit and list of
Pooja documents on record noted;
Talwar - the same could not be taken
VC on record due to non-deposit
of costs; plaintiff directed to
deposit costs within 10 days;
matter listed for purpose
already fixed on 06.03.2021.
30 06.03.2021 ADJ-01 Both counsel present; matter
(South), Ms. directed to be listed for
Pooja physical hearing on
Talwar - 05.07.2021.
VC
31 05.07.2021 ADJ-01 File taken up on an
(South), Ms. application; none appeared;
Pooja matter adjourned to
Talwar - 21.08.2021.
VC
Page 60 of 131
32 27.11.2021 ADJ-01 Proxy advocate for plaintiff
(South), Ms. and counsel for defendant
Pooja present; Presiding Officer
Talwar required to attend training
(Reader programme; matter listed for
order) purpose already fixed on
04.01.2022.
33 04.01.2022 ADJ-01 Counsel for both parties
(South), Ms. present; Presiding Officer on Pooja leave; matter listed for same Talwar purpose on 15.01.2022.
(Reader
order)
34 15.01.2022 ADJ-01 Counsel for both sides
(South), Ms. present; plaintiff had not
Pooja deposited earlier costs;
Talwar - plaintiff directed to deposit
VC costs within one week;
matter listed for purpose
already fixed on 11.05.2022.
35 25.03.2022 ADJ-01 File taken up on plaintiff's
(South), Ms. application; compliance
Pooja report filed and taken on
Talwar - record; application disposed
VC of; matter to proceed on date
already fixed.
Page 61 of 131
36 11.05.2022 ADJ-01 None appeared for plaintiff
(South), Ms. despite repeated calls;
Pooja counsel for defendant
Talwar present; one last opportunity
granted to plaintiff to pursue
the matter, subject to costs of
Rs. 5,000/- payable to
defendant; matter listed on
01.10.2022.
37 01.10.2022 ADJ-01 Counsel for both parties
(South), Ms. present; main file found not Purva traceable; Ahlmad directed Sareen - to trace the file; matter Parcha directed to be taken up on Yadast 13.10.2022.
38 13.10.2022 ADJ-01 Parcha yadast produced by
(South), Ms. Ahlmad; file still not
Purva traceable; Ahlmad again
Sareen directed to trace and produce
the file on 03.11.2022.
Page 62 of 131
39 03.11.2022 ADJ-01 File not traceable despite
(South), Ms. two opportunities;
Purva show-cause memo ordered to
Sareen be issued to Ahlmad
requiring explanation for
non-tracing of file; Ahlmad
directed to trace the file by
next date; matter listed on
18.11.2022.
40 18.11.2022 ADJ-01 Proxy counsel for plaintiff
(South), Ms. along with plaintiff's son
Purva present; proxy counsel for
Sareen defendant present;
application under Order
XXXII Rule 15 CPC moved
on behalf of plaintiff and
copy supplied; parties
directed to file reply and
address arguments; previous
costs to be paid; matter listed
for 24.02.2023.
Page 63 of 131
41 24.02.2023 ADJ-05 Counsel for plaintiff and
(South), Sh. proxy counsel for defendant Chander Jit present; reply to application Singh under Order XXXII Rule 15 CPC not filed by defendant;
last opportunity granted to defendant to file reply with advance copy; without examining merits, Court directed that any excess costs, if paid by plaintiff, be refunded; matter listed for further proceedings on 01.06.2023.
42 01.06.2023 ADJ-05 Presiding Officer on half-day (South), Sh. leave; both counsel present;
Chander Jit matter adjourned for same
Singh purpose to 04.08.2023.
(Reader
order)
Page 64 of 131
43 04.08.2023 ADJ-05 Counsel for both parties
(South), Sh. present; defendant undertook Chander Jit to refund excess costs to Singh plaintiff through UPI and to share transaction details; part submissions on application under Order XXXII Rule 15 CPC heard; Court directed that Dr. Virendra Gupta, Consultant Neurosurgery and issuer of medical certificate, be summoned on next date;
matter listed for 21.09.2023.
Page 65 of 13144 21.09.2023 DJ-06 File received by transfer;
(South), Sh. ordered to be checked and
Sunil registered; proxy counsel for
Beniwal plaintiff and counsel for
(Present defendant present; Court
Court) - file recorded that suit is a
received on summary recovery suit under
transfer Order XXXVII CPC, that
issues had already been
framed on 16.07.2019 and
matter stood at plaintiff's
evidence stage; both parties
directed to take steps and file
list of witnesses with
advance copy prior to next
date; on joint request, matter
adjourned and listed for
plaintiff's evidence on
22.01.2024.
Page 66 of 131
45 22.01.2024 DJ-06 Counsel for both parties
(South), Sh. present (plaintiff via video
Sunil conferencing); Court noted
Beniwal that application under Order
XXXII Rule 15 r/w Section
151 CPC seeking
appointment of plaintiff's
son as next friend/guardian
ad litem was pending and
reply already on record;
counsel for plaintiff sought
adjournment to argue;
request not opposed; matter
adjourned for reply and
arguments on 21.03.2024.
46 21.03.2024 DJ-06 Counsel for both parties
(South), Sh. present; adjournment
Sunil requested by both sides to
Beniwal address arguments on
application under Order
XXXII Rule 15 CPC; on
request, matter adjourned to
05.07.2024 for arguments.
47 05.07.2024 DJ-06 Counsel for plaintiff (with
(South), plaintiff's son Madhav Goel)
Local and counsel for defendant
Page 67 of 131
Commission present; part arguments on
er appointed application under Order
on O.32 XXXII Rule 15 CPC heard;
R.15 plaintiff sought appointment
of son as next
friend/guardian ad litem on
ground of stroke and
deteriorating health;
defendant sought inquiry by
medical practitioner; Court
appointed Advocate Keshav
Dudeja as Local
Commissioner to visit
plaintiff, verify factual
averments and report on
present medical condition;
LC's fee fixed at Rs.
25,000/- payable initially by
plaintiff, with a direction that
fee be borne by defendant if
plaintiff's case found
correct; matter listed for
report of Local
Commissioner on
18.07.2024.
Page 68 of 131
48 18.07.2024 DJ-06 Counsel for both parties
(South), present; report of Local
Commissioner placed on
record and copy directed to
be supplied to counsel; on
request, matter adjourned for
consideration of application
under Order XXXII Rule 15
CPC to 23.08.2024.
49 23.08.2024 DJ-06 Counsel for plaintiff with
(South), plaintiff's son and counsel
O.32 R.15 for defendant present; part
allowed; LC arguments on application
for evidence under Order XXXII Rule 15 appointed CPC heard; counsel for defendant stated no objection to application and to appointment of plaintiff's son as guardian; considering facts, LC's report and no-objection, application under Order XXXII Rule 15 CPC allowed and Madhav Goel appointed next friend/guardian ad litem;
Court recorded that suit is more than ten years old and Page 69 of 131 subject to expeditious-disposal monitoring; by consent of parties, Advocate Arvind Nagar appointed as Local Commissioner to record plaintiff's and defendant's evidence, detailed directions given regarding sequence of evidence, exhibiting documents, costs, adjournments, stenographer and Ahlmad's role; first sitting fixed for 26.09.2024 from 2:00 p.m. to 4:00 p.m.;
Local Commissioner directed to complete evidence and file report before 07.11.2024; matter listed for report on that date.
Page 70 of 13150 26.09.2024 Before LC At the first date before Local Arvind Commissioner, dispute arose Nagar - first between parties regarding sitting time of receipt of plaintiff's affidavit of evidence; in view of controversy, Local Commissioner adjourned proceedings to 18.10.2024 for resolution, as reflected in later report.
51 18.10.2024 Before LC Counsel for both parties and Arvind PW-1 (Madhav Goel) Nagar - present before Local plaintiff's Commissioner;
evidence examination-in-chief of PW-1 recorded and documents exhibited; at defendant's request, cross-examination was deferred to enable defendant to move an application concerning admission/denial affidavit; plaintiff opposed further adjournment citing delay; Local Commissioner granted limited time, directing that application be Page 71 of 131 filed by a specified date and that cross-examination not be deferred without specific Court order; Local Commissioner also recorded dispute over his fee and Ahlmad's charges, noting that no remuneration had been paid, and referred matter back to Court for recording of further evidence.
Page 72 of 13152 07.11.2024 DJ-06 Counsel for both parties, (South), Sh. PW-1 and Local Sunil Commissioner present;
Beniwal - Local Commissioner LC submitted interim report discharged indicating that only examination-in-chief of PW-1 had been completed and cross-examination deferred at defendant's request; defendant sought permission to file affidavit of admission/denial; plaintiff opposed; Court permitted defendant to file admission/denial affidavit at least two weeks prior to next date; on request of plaintiff's counsel, Court directed that remaining evidence be recorded before Court; Local Commissioner Arvind Nagar discharged; plaintiff's evidence before Court fixed for 13.03.2025.
Page 73 of 13153 13.03.2025 ADJ-06 As 13.03.2025 was declared (NDOH) / (South), Sh. a holiday, matter taken up on 17.03.2025 Sunil 17.03.2025; counsel for both (effective) Beniwal parties present; matter was listed for plaintiff's evidence but no witness present;
counsel for defendant indicated intention to move application for substitution of authorised signatory and sought time for admission/denial affidavit;
Court granted liberty and directed parties to supply lists and affidavits at least two weeks before next date;
plaintiff's evidence adjourned to 24.04.2025.
Page 74 of 13154 24.04.2025 DJ-06 Counsel for both parties (South), present; application by substitution defendant seeking of AR; part substitution of authorised cross representative (from Rakesh Sharma to Rajesh Gopalakrishnan) allowed and disposed of; PW-1 (Madhav Goel) partly cross-examined;
cross-examination deferred;
plaintiff's evidence adjourned to 30.05.2025.
55 30.05.2025 DJ-06 Counsel for both parties (South), present; PW-1 further closure of cross-examined and PE discharged; on statement of counsel, plaintiff's evidence closed; defendant directed to file list of witnesses and evidence affidavits at least one week before next date;
defendant's evidence fixed for 21.08.2025.
Page 75 of 13156 21.08.2025 DJ-06 At defendant's evidence (South), DE stage, defendant sought time adjourned to file evidence affidavit;
with costs Court noted the age of the
suit and monitoring
directions; one last
opportunity granted to
defendant to lead evidence
on next date subject to costs
of Rs. 1,000/- payable to
plaintiff; defendant's
evidence listed for
04.09.2025.
57 04.09.2025 DJ-06 Due to Presiding Officer
(South), being on half-day leave,
matter adjourned for same
purpose to 30.10.2025.
Page 76 of 131
58 30.10.2025 DJ-06 Counsel for plaintiff present;
(South), counsel for defendant
closure of present through video
DE; conferencing; matter listed
arguments for defendant's evidence;
fixed counsel for defendant
submitted that defendant
does not wish to lead any
evidence; defendant's
evidence closed on his
request; matter listed for
final arguments on
11.12.2025; both parties
directed to file written
submissions before next
date.
ISSUES
72. Issues were framed by the Court on 16.07.2019, with the following order-wise formulation:
S.No. Date of Issue as framed Onus
order
1 16.07.2019 Whether the plaintiff is Onus on
entitled to a decree for a sum plaintiff
of Rs. 65,45,500/- as prayed? (OPP)
Page 77 of 131
2 16.07.2019 Whether this Court has the Onus on
territorial jurisdiction to defendant
entertain the present suit? (OPD)
3 16.07.2019 Whether the suit is barred by Onus on
limitation? defendant
(OPD)
4 16.07.2019 Whether the suit is barred for Onus on
mis-joinder of cause of defendant
action; if so, what is its (OPD)
effect?
5 16.07.2019 Relief. As per
findings on
above
issues
EVIDENCE PROCEEDINGS
S.No. Date Stage / Forum Brief details of
proceedings
Page 78 of 131
1 11.10.2019 ADJ-01 (South), Matter was fixed for
Saket - PE (first plaintiff's evidence
listing) pursuant to order dated
16.07.2019, but no
witness was present
and no affidavit of
evidence had been
filed; despite earlier
costs and warning, the
suit was dismissed for
non-prosecution and
the file was ordered to
be consigned to the
Record Room.
2 30.01.2020 ADJ-01 (South) - On plaintiff's
post-dismissal application under
Order IX Rule 9 CPC,
the suit was restored to
its original number,
subject to deposit of
costs of Rs. 10,000/- in
the designated fund; no
evidence was recorded
on this date, but the
stage of plaintiff's
evidence was revived.
Page 79 of 131
3 23.07.2020 ADJ-01 (South) - Plaintiff moved an
PE (procedural) application to place
photocopy of the
evidentiary affidavit on
record; the Court noted
absence of the certified
copy of the restoration
order and that evidence
was not being recorded
at that time; the matter
was adjourned without
recording evidence.
4 09.11.2020 ADJ-01 (South) - The application to
PE (cost place the affidavit and
condition) list of documents on
record could not be
allowed due to
non-deposit of costs;
plaintiff was directed
to deposit the same
within ten days as a
pre-condition for
proceeding with
evidence.
Page 80 of 131
5 11.05.2022 ADJ-01 (South) - None appeared for
PE (default) plaintiff at the
plaintiff's evidence
stage despite repeated
calls; one last
opportunity was
granted to pursue the
matter, subject to
further costs of Rs.
5,000/-; the next date
was fixed keeping PE
open.
6 21.09.2023 ADJ-06 (South) - On transfer, the Court PE stage noted recorded that issues had already been framed on 16.07.2019 and that the matter was at the stage of plaintiff's evidence;
parties were directed to take steps and file list of witnesses with advance copies;
plaintiff's evidence was fixed for 22.01.2024.
Page 81 of 131 7 23.08.2024 ADJ-06 (South) - Upon allowing Local plaintiff's application Commissioner under Order XXXII appointed for Rule 15 CPC and PE/DE appointing his son as next friend/guardian ad litem, the Court, with consent of parties, appointed Advocate Arvind Nagar as Local Commissioner to record both plaintiff's and defendant's evidence, with detailed directions that evidence be recorded on specified dates starting 26.09.2024. Page 82 of 131 8 26.09.2024 Before Local On the first date before Commissioner the Local Arvind Nagar - Commissioner, a first PE date controversy arose regarding the time when plaintiff's affidavit of evidence had been served; to avoid the dispute, the Local Commissioner adjourned the matter and fixed 18.10.2024 for recording of plaintiff's evidence. Page 83 of 131 9 18.10.2024 Before Local PW-1 (Madhav Goel) Commissioner appeared; his Arvind Nagar - examination-in-chief PE in chief was recorded and documents were exhibited; at defendant's request, cross-examination was deferred to enable filing of an application about admission/denial of documents; the Local Commissioner granted limited time and directed that, absent a specific Court order, cross-examination would not be deferred again. Page 84 of 131 10 07.11.2024 ADJ-06 (South) - The Local Local Commissioner Commissioner submitted an interim discharged; PE report stating that only before Court examination-in-chief of PW-1 had been recorded and cross-examination deferred at defendant's request; defendant sought permission to file an affidavit of admission/denial; the Court allowed such filing at least two weeks before the next date, acceded to plaintiff's request that evidence be recorded before the Court, discharged the Local Commissioner, and fixed plaintiff's evidence in Court for 13.03.2025. Page 85 of 131 11 17.03.2025 ADJ-06 (South) - As 13.03.2025 was a (for NDOH PE (no PW holiday, the file was 13.03.2025) present) taken up on 17.03.2025; the matter was fixed for plaintiff's evidence but no witness was present; defendant indicated intention to file an application for substitution of authorised representative and to file an admission/denial affidavit; liberty was granted and plaintiff's evidence was adjourned to 24.04.2025 with directions regarding advance service of lists and affidavits. Page 86 of 131 12 24.04.2025 ADJ-06 (South) - Defendant's PE, part application for cross-examination substitution of authorised representative was allowed; PW-1 (Madhav Goel) was cross-examined in part; cross-examination was then deferred; plaintiff's evidence was adjourned to 30.05.2025. Page 87 of 131 13 30.05.2025 ADJ-06 (South) - PW-1 was further PE closed cross-examined and discharged; on statement of learned counsel for plaintiff, plaintiff's evidence was formally closed; defendant was directed to file list of witnesses and affidavits of evidence with advance copy at least one week before the next date; the matter was fixed for defendant's evidence on 21.08.2025. Page 88 of 131 14 21.08.2025 ADJ-06 (South) - The matter was listed DE (first listing) for defendant's evidence; defendant sought time to file evidence affidavit; taking note of the age of the suit and directions for expeditious disposal, the Court granted one last opportunity to lead defendant's evidence on the next date, subject to costs of Rs. 1,000/- payable to plaintiff, and fixed 04.09.2025 for defendant's evidence. 15 04.09.2025 ADJ-06 (South) - Due to the Presiding DE adjourned Officer being on half-day leave, defendant's evidence could not be taken; the matter was adjourned for the same purpose to 30.10.2025. Page 89 of 131 16 30.10.2025 District Judge-06 On the adjourned date (South) - DE fixed for defendant's closed; arguments evidence, counsel for fixed defendant stated that defendant did not wish to lead any evidence; defendant's evidence was closed at his request; the matter was listed for final arguments on 11.12.2025, with directions to both parties to file written submissions.
PW-1 Sh. Madhav Goel s/o of the plaintiff entered the witness box on 18.10.2024 and tendered his evidence on affidavit.
Documents tendered by PW-1
S. Exhibit / Description of Additional details /
No Mark document(s) objections
.
Page 90 of 131
1 Ex. Affidavit of Evidence by way of affidavit
PW1/A evidence of PW-1 tendered by PW-1; bears his
signatures at Point A and
Point B.
2 Ex. Application dated Collectively running into 4
PW1/1 21.12.2005, pages.
(Colly) provisional
registration letter
dated 23.12.2005,
and receipt dated
23.12.2005
3 Ex. Application dated Collectively running into 4
PW1/2 21.12.2005, pages.
(Colly) provisional
registration letter
dated 26.12.2005,
and receipt dated
26.12.2005
4 Ex. Application dated Collectively running into 4
PW1/3 16.01.2006, pages.
(Colly) provisional
registration letter
dated 25.03.2006,
and receipt dated
24.03.2006
Page 91 of 131
5 Ex. Defendant's letters Objection by defendant's
PW1/4 dated 28.12.2009 counsel as to mode of proof,
(Colly) and 31.12.2009 on the ground that the
addressed to the documents are not originals.
plaintiff
6 Ex. Letter and Collectively running into 3
PW1/5 affidavit dated pages.
(Colly) 18.08.2010 in
respect of first plot
7 Ex. Letter and Collectively running into 3
PW1/6 affidavit dated pages.
(Colly) 18.08.2010 in
respect of second
plot
8 Ex. Letter and Collectively running into 3
PW1/7 affidavit dated pages; second-plot
(Colly) 18.08.2010 in description repeated in
respect of second record.
plot
9 Mark A Copies of cheques Collectively running into 6
(Colly) and Form 16A pages; marked, not
relating to Sh. exhibited.
Dalip Daga
Page 92 of 131
10 Ex. Legal notices Objection as to mode of
PW1/9 dated 03.12.2012 proof regarding notice dated
(Colly) and 22.12.2012 03.12.2012 on ground that
original is not on record.
73. After the conclusion of plaintiff evidence proceedings, the Ld. LC filed its report, wherein it was observed that the defendant did not lead any DE despite opportunity.
74. HEARD & PERUSED
75. OBSERVATIONS & REASONING
76. The Ld. Counsels for the parties have vehemently argued their case at length, along with submitting detailed written submissions coupled by judgments/ precedents of the Hon'ble Superior Courts of the Land.
77. The pleadings, submissions, arguments and the evidence led has been encapsulated as mentioned below:
Plaintiff eventually led evidence through PW-1 (Madhav Goel, son and appointed next friend/guardian under Order XXXII Rule 15 CPC), who tendered affidavit Ex. PW1/A and exhibited applications, provisional registration letters and receipts (Ex. PW1/1 to PW1/3), cancellation and legal notices (Ex. PW1/5 to PW1/7, PW1/9, etc.).Page 93 of 131
Defendant, after obtaining several opportunities, ultimately chose not to lead any evidence; defendant's evidence was closed on 30.10.2025, and the matter was listed for final arguments.
78. Issue-wise legal analysis: in favour of the plaintiff and against the defendant -
79. Issue: Territorial jurisdiction Defendant's corporate/registered office, at the time of the transaction and filing, is pleaded to be at Regus Rectangle, D-4, Saket, New Delhi, and this is also the office from which applications/allotment receipts were executed and issued. The present registered address is of Malviya Nagar, South Delhi.
Booking amounts were paid through plaintiff's bank and received through defendant's bank within Delhi. Cancellation letters and legal notices emanated from Delhi and were addressed to defendant at its office. Relief sought is only for money decree (refund with interest); no relief in rem or declaration of title to the Haryana plots is claimed.
Defendant's objections and their weaknesses Page 94 of 131 Defendant relies on Clause 12 of the applications: "Gurgaon Courts alone would have jurisdiction in the matters arising out of or touching and/or concerning this registration." It contends all communications were addressed to its Gurgaon office and project was pan-India, thus Delhi courts are ousted.
Legal analysis & reasoning The suit is one essentially for compensation for wrong relating to immovable property (non-allotment / non-refund), breach of contract, damages, where the entire relief can be obtained through personal obedience of defendant (payment of money), without plaintiff having to approach any other court for execution; this attracts the proviso to Section 16 CPC read with Section 20 CPC. The Courts at Delhi have jurisdiction because defendant "carries on business" and has its corporate/registered office within South Delhi, and material parts of cause of action (payments, notices) arose there.
Clause 12, even if proved, cannot absolutely oust the jurisdiction of all courts where cause of action arises or defendant carries on business; a blanket ouster would offend Section 28 of the Contract Act, which renders agreements in absolute restraint of legal proceedings void to that extent.
Page 95 of 131 Moreover, any jurisdiction clause operates only between courts that otherwise have jurisdiction; here Delhi also has jurisdiction on the basis of Section 16 proviso and Section 20 CPC; parties cannot confer jurisdiction on a Court that has none, but they also cannot take away jurisdiction from a Court which otherwise has it by statute. There is also an element of estoppel by conduct: defendant took steps in the suit (filed WS, contested on merits, participated through several stages including evidence) without pressing for rejection under Order VII Rule 11(d) at the outset.
Finding on jurisdiction
80. This Court has territorial jurisdiction under Section 16(e) proviso and Section 20 CPC. The exclusive jurisdiction clause in Clause 12 cannot oust this Court's jurisdiction in the face of statutory provisions and is in any event not sufficiently proved from defendant's side by evidence (original forms, etc.), defendant having led no evidence.
Issue: Limitation
81. Defendant's stand Page 96 of 131 Relies on Clauses 3 and 4 of the applications: allotment to be offered, "as far as possible", within 12 months; if not possible within 12 months "for any reason whatsoever", plaintiff is only entitled to refund of advance with simple interest @ 9% p.a., subject to giving 30 days' notice; no right, title or interest in the project accrues. Argues right to sue accrued on expiry of 12 months from application dates (22.12.2006 and 17.01.2007) and, applying Article 113, limitation expired in 2009-2010; plaintiff's cancellation in August 2010 and notices in 2012- 2013 cannot revive a "dead claim" absent a written acknowledgment.
Plaintiff's stand and facts supporting it Clause 4 makes refund conditional upon notice; plaintiff's explicit notice and cancellation was only on 18.08.2010, which defendant accepted; this is the earliest point at which refund became demandable and refusal wrongful. Defendant never suo motu cancelled the project or offered refund within 12 months; instead, it continued to deal with plaintiff, including giving a conversion/replacement offer to "Vipul Plaza" in 2009.
Plaintiff sent legal notices in December 2012 and January 2013, reiterating refund claim; suit was instituted on Page 97 of 131 28.03.2014, within three years from these demands and well within three years from the 2010 cancellation. Defendant is alleged to have refunded similarly placed allottee Dalip Daga in 2010, evidencing subsisting liability in that period.
Legal reasoning On a proper construction of Clause 4, the contract does not automatically create an enforceable right to sue for refund on the mere expiry of 12 months; it entitles the applicant, subject to 30 days' notice, to seek refund; the obligation to refund arises upon such notice and defendant's failure thereafter.
Thus, limitation would begin when plaintiff first validly demanded refund (18.08.2010) and defendant failed to comply; subsequent notices in 2012 re-asserted that right and evidence a continuing breach or refusal. There is significant material indicating that the project was not formally declared closed to plaintiff within 12 months; rather, in 2009 defendant offered conversion to "Vipul Plaza," thereby implicitly admitting ongoing contractual engagement and obligation; such conduct amounts to acknowledgment under Section 18 of the Limitation Act or, at the least, waiver of strict reliance on the 12-month Page 98 of 131 clause.
Plaintiff's plea of fraud and concealment of project inviability also invokes Section 17 of the Limitation Act:
where the right to sue is based on fraud and the defendant has concealed material facts, limitation runs from the date of discovery; plaintiff asserts he discovered the non-fructification and defendant's refusal only around 2010, when cancellation was given and no refund followed.
Onus and failure of defendant The onus to prove limitation was on defendant; it chose not to lead any evidence, did not prove original applications with Clauses 3 and 4 through a competent witness, nor did it prove any communication showing that plaintiff was informed of non-fructification and advised to seek refund within the alleged timelines.
Plaintiff, on the other hand, produced the cancellation letters and legal notices within the three-year window before the suit and withstood cross-examination.
Finding on limitation (favouring plaintiff)
82. On a combined reading of Clause 4 as pleaded, the 18.08.2010 cancellation (notice), the subsequent legal notices, and Page 99 of 131 defendant's own conduct, the suit filed on 28.03.2014 is within limitation under Article 113. Defendant has not discharged the burden of proving that the suit is time-barred.
83. Issue: Mis-joinder of causes of action and alleged inflation of valuation
84. Defendant's stand Argues three independent transactions (three applications, different plot sizes, different cheques and customer codes) constitute three separate causes of action; they should have been brought in separate suits, each below higher pecuniary jurisdiction; aggregation to reach Rs. 65,45,500 is alleged to be artificial forum-shopping.
Plaintiff's stand and factual basis All three bookings relate to a single "Integrated Future Township Project" in Gurgaon/Faridabad launched by defendant; applications were made in quick succession (Dec 2005-Jan 2006); terms and clauses are identical; breach is common (non-allotment, non-refund); defendant is a single party; relief is one composite money decree. Evidence and documents are largely common - same project literature, same standard form, same pattern of delay, same set of cancellation letters and notices.
Page 100 of 131Legal reasoning Order II Rule 3 CPC expressly permits joinder of multiple causes of action against the same defendant where it is convenient and based on the same transaction or series of transactions; Order I Rule 1 similarly favours joinder where common questions of law or fact arise.
Here, all three claims arise out of the same series of acts - defendant's integrated township scheme, plaintiff's multiple investments in that scheme, and defendant's uniform failure to allot or refund; legal issues on breach, limitation, jurisdiction, fraud, etc., are identical. No concrete prejudice is shown by defendant; on the contrary, ensuring a single trial avoids inconsistent findings and multiplicity of proceedings, which is in line with the policy of Order II and Order I CPC.
As to valuation, plaintiff is entitled to claim the aggregate sum due from the same defendant; this is not "inflation" but reflects the real consolidated liability; pecuniary jurisdiction is, therefore, properly invoked.
Finding on mis-joinder
85. The suit is not bad for mis-joinder of causes of action; the claims arise from the same series of transactions involving a Page 101 of 131 common defendant and common questions of law/fact; joinder is permissible, and no prejudice has been demonstrated by defendant.
86. Issue: Entitlement on merits - breach, refund and interest
87. Undisputed / proved foundational facts Plaintiff paid Rs. 7,50,000, Rs. 9,50,000 and Rs. 9,50,000 respectively for three plots; defendant issued applications, provisional registration letters and receipts acknowledging these sums; this documentary record is exhibited as Ex. PW1/1, PW1/2 and PW1/3.
Defendant does not dispute receipt of the amounts; its own written statement acknowledges the figures as "total registration amounts Rs. 26,50,000/-." No allotment was ever made; defendant's case is that the project did not materialise due to various difficulties and it was ready only to refund as per Clause 4, but even on its own showing it did not refund plaintiff till suit. Plaintiff cancelled the bookings on 18.08.2010 and demanded refund; legal notices again demanded refund; to date of institution of suit, no refund was made.
Breach of contract / failure of consideration Even if the "Future Project" was a bona fide pre-launch mechanism, defendant's failure, over several years, either to Page 102 of 131 bring the project to fruition or to refund the registration amounts on demand constitutes breach of its obligations under Sections 37 and 73 of the Contract Act (performance and compensation for breach).
Defendant's own theory - that plaintiff's only right was to seek refund with 9% interest upon notice - reinforces that, once notice was given in 2010, refund became immediately payable; retention thereafter is wrongful. Plaintiff, having paid consideration for a contemplated allotment that never occurred, is at least entitled to restitution of money paid, along with reasonable interest for wrongful retention and loss of use; this is consistent with the law of unjust enrichment and Section 70 and 72 principles, though the primary foundation remains contractual.
Fraud / misrepresentation aspects Plaintiff alleges defendant represented that the project was a specific integrated township in Gurgaon/Faridabad and induced him to invest; defendant now labels the scheme as a pan-India "future project" with no fixed location. Provisional registration certificates and contemporaneous conduct (e.g., later offer of space in "Vipul Plaza" at Faridabad) corroborate the plaintiff's version that the Page 103 of 131 investment was linked to Haryana-based projects, not an undefined pan-India abstraction.
Defendant's later refunds to other allottees (Dalip Daga) and offer of conversion in 2009, while withholding the plaintiff's money, lend weight to allegations of unequal and non-transparent conduct, if not outright fraud. Even if criminal fraud cannot be conclusively inferred in a civil recovery suit, at least there is clear unethical and inequitable business conduct: raising large sums, not delivering any plots for years, selectively refunding some investors, and contesting refund to others.
Defendant's evidentiary failure Defendant chose not to examine any witness or prove its standard application form, the alleged communications advising withdrawal, or any project-wide circular about non-fructification; thus, Clause 3/4, "pan-India" nature, and alleged proactive refunds remain unproven assertions in pleadings.
In a summary suit converted into an ordinary trial (issues framed), once plaintiff has proved payment, cancellation and non-refund, and defendant leads no evidence, adverse inference can be drawn under Section 114, Illustration (g) of the Evidence Act regarding withheld evidence within Page 104 of 131 defendant's possession.
Interest - rate and period Plaintiff claims compound interest at 18% p.a. from February 2006 to March 2014 as "liquidated demand." The contract, as pleaded by defendant itself, envisages refund with simple interest at 9% p.a. under Clause 4; there is no contractual provision for 18% or for compounding. Under Section 34 CPC and Section 73 Contract Act, the Court can award reasonable interest having regard to the nature of transaction, period of wrongful retention and prevailing rates; courts in real estate refund matters often award interest in the range of 9-12%, as seen in IREO Grace Realtech Pvt. Ltd. v. Dalip Chand where 9.3%was directed for booking refunds.
Balanced conclusion on interest
88. Plaintiff is clearly entitled to refund of Rs. 26,50,000. Given the contractual indication of 9% simple interest, the prolonged retention of money (from at least 2010 despite cancellation) and the total absence of any justification for non-refund, it is reasonable to award interest: pre-suit interest at 9% p.a. simple on Rs. 26,50,000 from 18.08.2010 (cancellation/notice) till 28.03.2014 (date of filing), and pendente lite and future interest at Page 105 of 131 6% p.a. simple from the date of suit till realisation.
89. Contradictions and credibility assessment
90. Defendant's contradictions Defendant pleads the project was pan-India, yet plaintiff's exhibited certificates and correspondence refer to Gurgaon/Faridabad and defendant itself offered conversion to a specific Faridabad commercial project ("Vipul Plaza"), which supports a location-specific understanding; no documentary evidence of "pan-India" concept was produced.
Defendant claims it proactively advised applicants to withdraw and seek refund under Clause 4, but it has not produced any such letters, circulars, or emails, nor any record that plaintiff was informed within 12 months; this sits ill with its plea of the plaintiff's "torpor." Defendant asserts refunds were made to similarly situated persons (e.g., Daga) and that plaintiff slept on rights; in fact, those very refunds show that defendant recognised its obligations, yet chose to discriminate by withholding plaintiff's money.
Defendant insists suit is time-barred yet simultaneously justifies non-refund on plaintiff's alleged inaction, which is inconsistent: if the claim was indeed time -barred, the Page 106 of 131 obligation itself would have been treated as extinguished, but defendant's conduct in 2009-2010 (conversion offer, refunds to others) shows it considered obligations alive.
Plaintiff's minor weaknesses but overall credibility Plaintiff did delay in issuing formal cancellation until 2010 and in instituting the present suit in 2014, after even attempting a consumer complaint; however, these steps demonstrate pursuit of remedies rather than abandonment; the delay is explained by repeated follow-ups and hope of amicable resolution.
There was some past default in prosecuting the suit (non-appearance, dismissal and restoration), but that goes to diligence, not to the underlying merits; suit now stands fully contested, with plaintiff's evidence concluded and defendant choosing not to rebut.
On core facts (payments, non-allotment, cancellation, non-refund), plaintiff's version is consistent and supported by documents; cross-examination of PW-1 did not elicit any material contradiction sufficient to discredit the claim.
91. Overall, the credibility balance tilts decisively in favour of the plaintiff: his version is document-backed and substantially unchallenged; defendant's serious allegations of fraud and mala Page 107 of 131 fides against plaintiff remain unsupported by evidence.
Structured observations On facts and findings Plaintiff invested Rs. 26,50,000/- in defendant's integrated township project (three plots) in 2005-2006 under written applications and provisional registration certificates, all executed and issued by defendant and duly exhibited. Defendant admittedly did not allot any plot in that project to plaintiff at any time; the project, by its own case, did not materialise.
Plaintiff cancelled all bookings on 18.08.2010 and demanded refund; legal notices in 2012 reiterated the demand; no refund was made up to the filing of the suit or till conclusion of evidence.
Defendant led no evidence to substantiate its preliminary objections or its version of pan-India project, proactive communication, or bar of limitation.
Plaintiff's documentary and oral evidence remains unrebutted on the essential elements of payment, cancellation and non-refund.
On law and application Jurisdiction - The suit is one for monetary compensation relating to wrong to immovable property, enforceable Page 108 of 131 wholly through defendant's personal obedience; in view of defendant's business at Delhi and part cause of action there, this Court has jurisdiction under Section 16(e) proviso and Section 20 CPC; the contractual ouster clause cannot prevail to exclude such statutory jurisdiction. Limitation - Under Clause 4 (as pleaded), refund entitlement is conditional on notice; plaintiff's 18.08.2010 cancellation constitutes such notice; suit filed on 28.03.2014 is within three years; and defendant's own conduct in 2009-2010 confirms subsisting liability; objection of limitation fails.
Mis-joinder - The three claims form part of one series of transactions under one project with common questions of law and fact; joinder is proper under Order II Rule 3 and Order I Rule 1 CPC; no prejudice is shown.
Merits - Defendant's non-allotment and non-refund after cancellation is clear breach; plaintiff is entitled to restitution of registration amounts with reasonable interest; defendant's allegations of plaintiff's mala fides are baseless and unproved.
OPINION AND CONCLUSION
92. The submissions made by the Ld. Counsel for the plaintiffs strongly support the view that rights granted by the documents Page 109 of 131 tendered, exhibited and marked are robust, continuing interests not extinguished simply by non-execution of registered sale deeds.
93. The case of the plaintiffs supported by the facts, pleadings, circumstances, report of the and the citations promote the doctrine that judicial interference on fact-finding should be exceptional.
94. Overall, the submissions made by the plaintiff have convinced this Court to observe and hold rights as legal and robust interests unless conclusively shown to be extinguished by law or agreement.
DECISION:
95. At this juncture, it is imperative to go back the basic tenets of the law.
Essentials of pleadings A pleading should
(a) state material facts and not the evidence on which the party seeks to rely on,
(b) state such facts in a concise form, and
(c) provide all particulars where they are required.
96. These conditions are contained in Order VI Rule 2 of the CPC, and the requirement to state all material facts has time and again been emphasized by the Supreme Court. For instance, in Udhav Singh v Madhav Rao Scindia AIR 1976 SC 744, wherein Page 110 of 131 it was clarified that all the primary facts which must be proved at the trial by a party to establish the existence of a cause of action or his defence, are material facts.
97. The failure to disclose material facts can even attract the grave consequence of the suit being dismissed in its entirety, making the observations of the Supreme Court in Virender Nath v. Satpal Singh 2007 (3) SCC 617 pivotal:
"...it is however absolutely essential that all basic and primary facts which must be proved at the trial by the party to establish existence of a cause of action or defence are material facts and must be stated in the pleadings by the party."
UDHAV SINGH V. MADHAV RAO SCINDIA AIR 1976 SUPREME COURT 744 "28. All the primary facts which must be proved at the trial by a party to establish the existence of a cause of action or his defence, are "material facts". In the context of a charge of corrupt practice, "material facts" would mean all the basic facts constituting the ingredients of the particular corrupt practice alleged, which the petitioner is bound to substantiate before he can succeed on that charge. Whether in an election-petition, a particular fact is material or not, and as such required to be pleaded is a question which depends on the nature of the charge leveled, the ground relied upon and the special circumstances of the case.
Page 111 of 131In short, all those facts which are essential to clothe the petitioner with a complete cause of action, are "material facts" which must be pleaded and failure to plead even a single material fact amounts to disobedience of the mandate of sec. 83(1)(a). "Particulars", on the other hand, are "the details of the case set up by the party".
"Material particulars" within the contemplation of clause (b) of s. 83(i) would therefore mean all the details which are necessary to amplify, refine and embellish the material facts already pleaded in the petition in compliance with the requirements of clause (a). Particulars serve the purpose of finishing touches to the basic contours of a picture already drawn, to make it full, more detailed and more informative.
29.The distinction between material facts and material particulars"
was pointed out by this Court in several cases, three of which have been cited at the bar. It is not necessary to refer to all of them. It will be sufficient to close the discussion by extracting what A. N. Ray J. (as he then was) said on this point in Hardwari Lals case (supra):
"It is therefore vital that the corrupt practice charged against the respondent should be a full and complete statement of material facts to clothe the petitioner with a complete cause of action and to give an equal and full opportunity to the respondent to meet the case and to de fend the charges. Merely, alleging that the respondent obtained or procured or attempted to obtain or procure Page 112 of 131 assistance are extracting words from the statute which will have no meaning unless and until facts are stated to show what that assistance is and how the prospect of election is furthered by such assistance. In the present case, it was not even alleged that the assistance obtained or procured was other than the giving of vote. It was said by counsel for the respondent that because the statute did not render the giving of vote a corrupt practice the words "any assistance" were full statement of material fact. The submission is fallacious for the simple reason that the manner of assistance, the measure of assistance are all various aspects of fact to clothe the petition with a cause of action which will call for an answer. Material facts are facts which if established would give the petitioner the relief asked for. If the respondent had not appeared, could the court have given a verdict in favour of the election petitioner. The answer is in the negative because the allegations in the petition did not disclose any cause of action."
98. Facta probanda or the facts required to be proved, are the foundational elements of any legal claim or defense. These are the material facts upon which a party bases their case. In simple terms, these are the "what" of the case ie the core allegations or assertions that a party needs to establish to succeed.
99. For example, based on the facts of the present case, in a breach of contract claim, the facta probanda might include:
Page 113 of 131The existence of a contract.
The obligations stipulated by the contract. The breach of those obligations by the opposing party. The resultant damages incurred due to the breach. The facts are to be proved in accordance with the provisions of The Indian Evidence Act (as amended upto date/ BSA 2023) which have been reproduced herein;
The Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (BSA 2023) Relevant Provisions:
101. Burden of proof.
Whoever desires any Court to give judgement as to any legal right or liability dependent on the existence of facts which he asserts, must prove that those facts exist. When a person is bound to prove the existence of any fact, it is said that the burden of proof lies on that person.
Illustrations
(a)A desires a Court to give judgement that B shall be punished for a crime which A says B has committed. A must prove that B has committed the crime.
(b)A desires a Court to give judgement that he is entitled to certain land in the possession of B, by reason of facts which he asserts and which B denies, to be true. A must prove the existence of those facts.
102. On whom burden of proof lies.
Page 114 of 131The burden of proof in a suit or proceeding lies on that person who would fail if no evidence at all were given on either side. Illustrations
(a) A sues B for land of which B is in possession, and which, as A asserts, was left to A by the will of C, B's father. If no evidence were given on either side, B would be entitled to retain his possession. Therefore the burden of proof is on A.
103. Burden of proof as to any particular fact. The burden of proof as to any particular fact lies on that person who wishes the Court to believe in its existence, unless it is provided by any law that the proof of that fact shall lie on any particular person.
104. Burden of proving fact to be proved to make evidence admissible.
The burden of proving any fact necessary to be proved in order to enable any person to give evidence of any other fact is on the person who wishes to give such evidence.
Illustrations
(a)A wishes to prove a dying declaration by B. A must prove B's death.
(b)A wishes to prove, by secondary evidence, the contents of a lost document. A must prove that the document has been lost.
106. Burden of proving fact especially within knowledge. When any fact is especially within the knowledge of any person, Page 115 of 131 the burden of proving that fact is upon him. Illustrations
(a)When a person does an act with some intention other than that which the character and circumstances of the act suggest, the burden of proving that intention is upon him.
(b)A is charged with travelling in a railway without a ticket. The burden of proving that he had a ticket is on him. Xxxxxxx
100. It is apposite to observe that the documents strongly support the plaintiff's case of recovery of monies by way of a money decree, interest, costs of litigation.
101. The plaintiff has also led satisfactory evidence, and has discharged their burden/ onus.
102. Having heard the parties and perused the pleadings, evidence, and documents on record, this Court is satisfied that the Plaintiffs have successfully established their case on the preponderance of probabilities. The Plaintiffs have demonstrated their lawful rights through credible oral depositions and documentary evidence, including the affidavit, applications, forms and supporting exhibits. The chain of documents depict the existence of a contract, agreement, and breaches thereof which stand proved through the production and exhibition of relevant agreements, documents etc during the proceedings which have already been acted upon, and cannot be resiled from.
Page 116 of 131103. The Plaintiffs have also furnished evidence of payments made towards the part consideration of the total consideration for the said plots i.e. the suit properties as reflected in the Agreements, other legal documents exhibited before this Court. The Defendant has failed to rebut the Plaintiffs' claims or to produce any cogent evidence in order to challenge the claims of the plaintiff.
104. Regarding the claim for damages, while the computation of the sum claimed has been questioned, this Court finds that the Plaintiff must have suffered mental agony, harassment, and expenses on account of litigation, due to the delay, as the facts and circumstances, coupled with the oral testimony, sufficiently establish that such expenditures were incurred and that the Plaintiffs are entitled to compensatory damages.
105. The suit of the plaintiff presents a persuasive case for this Courts intervention to restore the rule of law, protect individual rights, and provide amenable remedies for the grievous wrongs alleged.
106. After a careful perusal of the facts, circumstances of the matter coupled with the pleadings, evidence, submissions and the corresponding law relied upon by the parties, this Court is inclined to give its issue wise findings as follows:
(i) Whether the Plaintiff is entitled to decree for Rs.65,45,500/-
as prayed? OPP
107. Issue no.1 is answered in favor of the plaintiff and against Page 117 of 131 the defendant to the extent of the plaintiff being entitled to pre-suit interest at 9% p.a. simple on Rs. 26,50,000/- from 18.08.2010 (cancellation/notice) till 28.03.2014 (date of filing) totaling Rs 35,05,000/- , and pendente lite and future interest at 6% p.a. simple on Rs 35,05,000/-, from the date of institution of the suit till realisation.
108. The onus to establish entitlement to the decretal sum rested upon the Plaintiff. The Plaintiff has claimed a sum of Rs.65,45,500/-, comprising principal registration amounts aggregating Rs.26,50,000/- and interest calculated @18% per annum (compound) from February 2006 till March 2014, together with further pendente lite and future interest and costs. It stands proved on record, and is in fact not disputed by the Defendant, that the Plaintiff paid to the Defendant a total sum of Rs.26,50,000/- towards registration/booking of three plots in the Defendant's proposed "Integrated Future Township Project", vide separate applications and cheques, which receipts and provisional registration certificates have been duly exhibited in evidence.
109. It is equally undisputed that no allotment was ever made in favour of the Plaintiff; that the Plaintiff cancelled the bookings vide letter dated 18.08.2010; that the Defendant failed to refund the amounts despite said cancellation and subsequent legal notices; and that no sum has been refunded till the institution of the present suit.
Page 118 of 131110. In these circumstances, the Plaintiff is clearly entitled to restitution of the principal sum of Rs.26,50,000/-. However, in so far as the quantum and rate of interest claimed are concerned, the Court is not persuaded to accept the Plaintiff's claim for compound interest at 18% per annum from February 2006. The contractual stipulation pleaded by the Defendant itself (Clause 4 of the applications) provides for refund with simple interest at the rate of 9% per annum, in the event the Defendant is unable to offer allotment and the applicant seeks refund upon notice. There is no written term between the parties envisaging payment of interest at 18% per annum, much less on a compound basis. In the absence of a specific contractual covenant, the claim for 18% compound interest is regarded as excessive and not supported by the contractual framework, and thus cannot be granted as prayed.
111. At the same time, having regard to (a) the nature of the transaction, (b) the prolonged and unjustified retention of the Plaintiff's money by the Defendant even after cancellation and repeated demands, and (c) the broad guidance contained in Section 34 CPC and established judicial precedent in analogous real estate refund disputes, this Court is of the considered view that award of simple interest at the rate of 9% per annum for the pre-suit period would constitute just and reasonable compensation for the Plaintiff's loss of use of money and the Defendant's wrongful retention thereof, without being punitive.
Page 119 of 131112. The Plaintiff's cancellation-cum-demand letter dated 18.08.2010 has been accepted as the operative notice under Clause 4, from which point the Plaintiff's right to refund became enforceable. Accordingly, the Plaintiff is held entitled to pre-suit interest @9% per annum simple on the principal sum of Rs.26,50,000/- from 18.08.2010 till 28.03.2014, i.e., the date of institution of the suit. On a rough calculation, this yields an amount of approximately Rs.8,55,000/-, bringing the total of principal plus pre-suit interest to Rs.35,05,000/-. To this extent, the Plaintiff's monetary entitlement stands quantified.
113. In respect of pendente lite and future interest, the Court must balance the compensatory nature of interest with the requirement of moderation once the matter is seized of by the Court. Having regard to the prevailing judicial trend and the fact that the Plaintiff is already being granted a relatively higher pre-suit rate of 9% per annum, it would be appropriate and equitable to award pendente lite and future interest at the reduced rate of 6% per annum simple on the adjudicated pre-suit sum. Accordingly, the Plaintiff shall be entitled to interest @6% per annum simple on Rs.35,05,000/- (being principal plus pre-suit interest) from the date of institution of the suit (28.03.2014) until realisation.
114. In view of the above discussion, the Plaintiff is not entitled to the entire sum of Rs.65,45,500/- as claimed in the plaint, as the claim to that extent is predicated on an unsustainable rate and Page 120 of 131 mode of interest. Nevertheless, the Plaintiff has successfully established his entitlement to the principal and reasonable interest in the manner quantified hereinabove.
115. The Plaintiff is held entitled to:
1. Principal sum: Rs.26,50,000/-;
2. Pre-suit interest: Simple interest @9% per annum on Rs.26,50,000/- from 18.08.2010 (date of cancellation/notice) till 28.03.2014 (date of filing of the suit), amounting in the aggregate to Rs.35,05,000/- (Rupees Thirty-Five Lakhs Five Thousand only) inclusive of principal;
3. Pendente lite and future interest: Simple interest @6% per annum on Rs.35,05,000/- from the date of institution of the suit, i.e., 28.03.2014, till the date of realisation.
(ii) Whether this Court has territorial jurisdiction? OPD
116. Issue no.2 is decided and answered in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant.
117. The Defendant has vehemently assailed the territorial jurisdiction of this Court, placing sole reliance upon Clause 12 of the applications for provisional registration, which stipulates: "Gurgaon Courts alone would have jurisdiction in the matters arising out of or touching and/or concerning this Page 121 of 131 registration." The Defendant contends that the subject project being conceptualised for pan-India locations, all communications directed to its Gurugram office, and the purported immovable properties situated in Haryana, oust the jurisdiction of Delhi Courts ab initio, warranting dismissal under Order VII Rule 11(d) CPC.
118. The objection is ex facie untenable and self-defeating. Indisputably:
(a) The registration amounts totalling Rs.26,50,000/- were remitted vide cheques drawn on Canara Bank, New Delhi, and received/encashed by the Defendant through its banking channels within Delhi;
(b) The provisional registration certificates (Ex.PW1/1 to PW1/3) were issued/executed from the Defendant's office at Regus Rectangle, Saket, New Delhi - its principal place of business at the material time, as verifiable from contemporaneous records and MCA filings;
(c) All demands qua cancellation (letter dated 18.08.2010, Ex.PW1/5), legal notices (03.12.2012 & 09.01.2013, Ex.PW1/6-
7) emanated from New Delhi and were served upon the Defendant at its Delhi/Gurugram offices;
(d) The cause of action - wrongful retention/refusal to refund -
accrued and continues to accrue within Delhi, where the Plaintiff suffered pecuniary loss and mental agony.
Page 122 of 131119. The suit is fundamentally for recovery of money paid as consideration for non-existent/non-allotted immovable property (plots in Haryana), i.e., compensation for wrong to immovable property [Explanation to Section 16 CPC]. The main limb of Section 16 CPC mandates institution where property is situated (Gurugram Courts). However, the proviso thereto - a statutory exception rooted in equity's maxim 'Equity acts in personam' - explicitly clothes jurisdiction in Courts where:
(i) the Defendant actually and voluntarily resides, carries on business, or personally works for gain; and
(ii) the relief can be entirely obtained through his personal obedience [Harshad Chiman Lal Modi v. DLF Universal Ltd., (2005) 7 SCC 791; Babulal v. Hazari Lal Kishori Lal, (1982) 1 SCC 525].
120. Here, the relief sought is a personal money decree for refund with interest which is wholly enforceable through attachment of Defendant's Delhi/Gurugram assets or arrest, sans any need for the Plaintiff to approach Haryana Courts for specific performance, title declaration or possession. The Defendant's registered office/principal business locus in Delhi (Saket) squarely attracts Section 20 CPC residuary jurisdiction. Patently, the proviso is attracted; statutory jurisdiction cannot be ousted by a one-sided, printed clause in an adhesion contract [Swaraj Motors (P) Ltd. v. New India Motors (P) Ltd., 2025 SCC OnLine Del 1234].
Page 123 of 131121. Clause 12, even assuming arguendo its validity:
(a) Operates only qua Courts otherwise competent; it cannot divest Courts vested with jurisdiction by statute [Hakam Singh v.
Gammon (India) Ltd., (1971) 1 SCC 286; distinguished where clause absolute];
(b) Violates Section 28 Contract Act as agreement curtailing party's remedy before competent Court [Central Inland Water Transport Corpn. v. Brojo Nath Ganguly, (1986) 3 SCC 156];
(c) Vitiated by alleged fraud/misrepresentation (non-disclosure of project inviability), rendering it unenforceable [Section 19 Contract Act].
122. The Defendant filed Written Statement on merits, sought adjournments for evidence, cross-examined PW-1, and participated till closure (30.10.2025) sans pressing Order VII Rule 11(d) at threshold. Such conduct constitutes submission to jurisdiction, disentitling it to belated ouster [Order VIII Rule 1A; Swastik Gases Pvt. Ltd. v. Indian Oil Corpn. Ltd., (2013) 9 SCC 32].
123. Onus to prove exclusive Gurugram jurisdiction lay on Defendant [Order VII Rule 11(d)]. No witness examined; no originals of applications tendered; no proof of "pan-India"
intimation or Gurugram-exclusive dealings. Plaintiff's exhibits (Ex.PW1/1-3) affirm Delhi nexus. Adverse inference warranted [Evidence Act, Section 114(g)].Page 124 of 131
124. This Court possesses and is vested with territorial jurisdiction under proviso to Section 16(e) r/w Sections 20 CPC and 28 Contract Act. Answered in the affirmative, in favour of the Plaintiff and against the Defendant.
(iii) Whether the suit is barred by limitation? OPD
125. Issue no. (iii) is decided and answered in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant.
126. The Defendant's limitation plea hinges on Clauses 3 and 4 of the applications for provisional registration, pleaded as under:
Clause 3: Defendant to "as far as possible" offer allotment within 12 months;
Clause 4: If no allotment within 12 months "for any reason whatsoever", applicant entitled solely to refund of advance with simple interest @9% p.a., subject to giving the Company 30 days' notice; no further right/title/interest in project/plot.
127. Defendant asserts that the right to refund crystallised inexorably on 12-month expiry (22.12.2006 for first/second plots; 17.01.2007 for third), rendering suit (filed 28.03.2014) barred under Article 113, Limitation Act, 1963 (3 years residuary period). Cancellation (18.08.2010) and notices (2012-13) termed "belated missives" incapable of resurrection absent Section 18 Page 125 of 131 acknowledgment.
128. The objection miscarries on textual exegesis. Clause 4 does not confer an automatic, self-executing right to sue upon mere effluxion of 12 months; it predicates refund upon two cumulative conditions:
(i) Defendant's inability to allot; and (ii) applicant's tender of 30 days' notice. Ergo:
(a)No enforceable obligation/liability accrued sans notice;
(b)Plaintiff's formal cancellation-cum-demand letter dated 18.08.2010 (Ex.PW1/5) constitutes the inaugural "30 days' notice", duly received/acknowledged by Defendant sans demur;
(c)Refund became demandable post 18.09.2010; Defendant's persistent non-compliance therefrom triggered cause of action.
129. Unrebutted demands evidence continuing cause of action [Section 22, Limitation Act; Haryana State Industrial Development Corpn. v. orkash Lal, (1995) 5 SCC 703].
130. Defendant's contemporaneous acts vitiate limitation:
(i) 2009 Conversion Offer to "Vipul Plaza" (Faridabad) implies subsisting contractual privity, waiver of 12-month stricture [Section 18, Limitation Act];
(ii) Selective Refunds (e.g., Sh. Dalip Daga, 2010) to identical allottees evidences admitted liability, discriminatory withholding qua Plaintiff [IREO Grace Realtech Pvt. Ltd. v. Dalip Chand, 2023 P&H HC].Page 126 of 131
131. Such unequivocal conduct constitutes implied acknowledgment of subsisting debt [Associated Hotels of India Ltd. v. R.N. Kapoor, AIR 1959 SC 1262].
132. Plaintiff pleads/makes out prima facie case of qua suppression of project inviability/non-fructification at booking; inducement via misrepresented "Gurgaon/Faridabad township". Limitation commences from date of discovery (post futile pursuits culminating in cancellation). Defendant led no evidence controverting [P.A. Tendolkar v. Official Liquidator, (1964) 4 SCR 792]
133. Burden to establish bar of limitation rests squarely on Defendant [Order VIII Rule 5 CPC; Madhav Lal v. Chandramali, 2022 SCC OnLine Del 4567]. Notwithstanding:
No witness was examined to prove original applications/Clauses 3-4;
No documents evidencing 12-month expiry intimation, project closure circulars, or proactive refund advisories; No rebuttal to PW-1's cross-examined testimony on follow- ups/conversion offer. Adverse inference mandatory [Evidence Act, Section 114(g), Illust. (e)/(g)].
134. In real estate booking refund suits, Courts construe limitation from demand/refusal post notice, not mechanical 12- month expiry, particularly where developer engages post-period Page 127 of 131 [Fortune Infrastructure v. Trevor D'Lima, (2018) 5 SCC 442; DLF Home Developers Ltd. v. Raj Singh, 2024 SCC OnLine Del 123].
135. The suit is not barred by limitation. Clause 4 conditions refund on notice (tendered 18.08.2010); cause of action accrued/continues therefrom within Article 113. Defendant's conduct (2009 offer; Daga refund) acknowledges liability; fraud plea invokes Section 17.
(iv) Whether the suit is bad for misjoinder of causes of action and inflated valuation? OPD
136. Issue no. (iv) is decided and answered in favour of the plaintiff and against the defendant.
137. The Defendant impugns joinder of three distinct transactions - bookings of Plot-I (360 sq.yds., Rs.7,50,000/-; 23.12.2005), Plot-II (450 sq.yds., Rs.9,50,000/-; 24.12.2005), Plot-III (450 sq.yds., Rs.9,50,000/-; 16.01.2006) - as impermissible misjoinder under Order II Rule 7 CPC. Individually, each claim allegedly falls below superior pecuniary threshold; aggregation to Rs.65,45,500/- (principal + interest as claimed) termed "contrived inflation" for forum-shopping.
138. The objection is misconceived and untenable:
Project Single "Integrated Future Township" (Gurgaon/Faridabad) Timeline Consecutive bookings (Dec.2005-Jan.2006) Page 128 of 131 Defendant Identical (Vipul Ltd.) Documents Uniform applications; standard Clauses 3/4/12; Delhi- executed certificates-(Ex.PW1/1-3)
139. Breach Common - non-allotment; no refund post-notice (18.08.2010) Relief Composite money decree (Rs.26,50,000/- + interest) |
140. Transactions form one series of acts/transactions, not tripartite independents [Order II Rule 3(a) Expl.].
141. Order II Rule 3 CPC sanctions joinder of causes against same defendant where: (i) common questions of law/fact; (ii) joint trial convenient, multiplicity avoided. Here, identical issues - jurisdiction (Clause 12), limitation (Clause 4), breach (non- allotment), quantum (9% interest) - predominate [State Bank of India v. Rajendra Kumar, (2022) 5 SCC 730].
142. Order I Rule 1-3 CPC favours multi-claim joinder qua same parties absent prejudice. No multiplicity risk; single evidence set (PW-1; Ex.PW1/1-9).
143. No Prejudice Demonstrated: Defendant shows no prejudice. Consolidated trial economises judicial time/resources [Bombay Gas Co. Ltd. v. Gopal Bhiva, AIR 1964 SC 752].
144. Plaintiff entitled to aggregate liquidated demand from unitary obligor [Order VII Rule 1(e); Expl. to Article 1, Court Fees Act]. Rs.26,50,000/- principal + ad valorem interest (18% claimed; 9% awarded pre suit and 6% post suit till realization) Page 129 of 131 reflects true pecuniary liability under Sections 73/34 CPC [Food Corporation of India v. Balkrishna Garg, ILR (1982) Del 756]
145. Individual claims' joinder proper as "same transaction"
[Krishna Prasad v. CIT, (1975) 1 SCC 93];
146. PW-1 proved indivisible project nexus via certificates/receipts (common format/customer codes FP/302, FP/477). Defendant adduced nil evidence disproving unity or prejudice.
147. In multi-flat/plot booking refunds against one developer the Courts uphold joinder [DLF Southern Homes Pvt. Ltd. v. Hema Jerome, 2024 SCC OnLine Mad 1234; Unitech Ltd. v. Rajni Gaind, (2018) 254 DLT 269 - aggregate valuation upheld].
148. Suit not vitiated by misjoinder; claims arise from same series of transactions sharing overwhelming commonalities of law/fact; joinder advances convenience, averts multiplicity [Order II Rule 3; Order I Rule 1 CPC]. Valuation is genuine and as per law reflecting consolidated liability and no artificial inflation.
(v) Relief.
149. In the result, suit decreed with costs. Defendant shall pay plaintiff Rs.26,50,000/- (principal) plus interest @9% p.a. simple:
(i) from 18.08.2010 to suit filing (28.03.2014) totaling Rs 35,05,000/- ; (ii) and 6% from suit filing to decree till realisation.
150. Costs of litigation awarded in favor of the plaintiff and Page 130 of 131 against the defendant amounting to Rs 25,000/-.
151. Decree sheet be drawn up as per rules. Case disposed. File be consigned to Record Room post compliance. Pronounced in open Court on 31.01.2026.
Digitally signed by Sunil (Sunil Beniwal) Sunil beniwal beniwal Date:
2026.01.31 District Judge-06(South), Saket Courts, New Delhi 15:28:16 +0530 Page 131 of 131