Karnataka High Court
Baburao Ganpatro Tirmalle vs Bhimappa Venkappa Kandakur on 6 March, 1996
Equivalent citations: ILR1996KAR1565, 1996(2)KARLJ32
ORDERING EVICTION INCORPORATING REMEDIAL MEASURES ORDER Mohan Kumar, J.
1. This is a proceeding initiated by the landlord under Section 21(1)(j) of the Karnataka Rent Control Act. The application was filed on 22.6.1981. The premises is a non-residential building. The landlord wanted to demolish the premises and put up a new structure and he offered to give the tenant the ground floor of an equal extent occupied by him after reconstruction. The tenant disputed the genuineness of the claim made by the landlord. He also pleaded that the landlord is in the habit of evicting the tenant, demolishing the structures and not putting up any other building in the same premises. He cited an earlier proceeding initiated by the landlord as H.R.C. No. 30/69 under Section 21(1)(h) & (j) claiming for possession of the premises for self-occupation after demolition and reconstruction. He alleged that the landlord had taken possession of the premises in June, 1978, but he never demolished the structure nor did he put up any construction. This, according to him, is an instance to show that the allegation of the landlord for possession is wanting in bona fides.
2. The Trial Court considered the question. It held that the need alleged by the landlord is bona fide and reasonable and that the eviction can be granted under Section 21(1)(j). The eviction was ordered accordingly. The matter was taken in revision by the tenant before the District Court under Section 50 of the Rent Control Act. The District Judge after considering the respective case, allowed the revision and dismissed the application. In coming to the said conclusion, the District Judge was persuaded by the circumstances that in an earlier proceedings initiated by the landlord, he had taken possession of the premises, but had not put up any construction and, therefore, the present attempt might be a mere ruse to evict the tenant. It, therefore, held that the claim is neither bona fide nor reasonable and hence no eviction can be granted under Section 21(1)(j) of the Rent Control Act. It did not accept the contention of the landlord that the earlier proceeding was for eviction invoking Section 21(1)(h) as well and hence the landlord need not necessarily demolish the premises and reconstruct the same; he can as well occupy the premises as it is. It also noticed that the landlord has not produced the estimate of the new building nor that the licence obtained for the new construction to be made. It also held that there is no proof regarding the financial capacity of the landlord to construct a new building. On these circumstances, the learned District Judge held that the claim made under Section 21(1)(j) cannot be sustained. Accordingly, he dismissed the application. Aggrieved by the order, the landlord has come up in Revision.
3. Section 21 (1)(j) provides that when a landlord reasonably and bona fide requires the premises for the immediate purpose of demolishing the same and such demolition is to be made for the purpose of erecting a new building in place of the premises sought to be demolished, then he is entitled to evict the tenant. In this behalf the condition to be satisfied by the landlord is that the requirement should be a reasonable and bona fide need. Then again the landlord should also show that he requires the premises for immediate demolition and for reconstruction. If these elements are satisfied, then the landlord earns a right to evict the tenant. One may notice that the right of eviction conferred on a landlord under Section 21 (1)(j) is not unbridled but controlled by Sections 26, 27 and 28. It is fairly clear from the Sections that a tenant who has been dispossessed in exercise of the right of landlord under Section 21(1)(j) is entitled for re-entry of the premises after it is reconstructed as contemplated by the statute. It also gives certain rights to the tenants to claim restoration in the event the landlord fails to restore possession. In this background, one has to view the provision in a beneficial manner both to the landlord as well as to the tenant. In doing so, we have to keep in mind that Section 21(1)(j) of the Act is not intended for any capricious or whimsical eviction of tenants on the pretext of demolition of structure and reconstruction. Perhaps, it may be reasonable to assume that the landlord has a duty to satisfy the immediate requirements contemplated by the Proviso. He has to show to the Court that there exists an approved plan that the building is required for the immediate purpose of demolition and which is required for the purpose of erecting a new building. In , Panchamal Naraya Shanoy v. Basthi Venkatesha Shenoy, His Lordship Justice Vaidialingam, speaking for the Bench, stated thus in relation to Section 21(1)(j) of the instant Act:
"11. The proviso to Section 21(1) enumerates the various circumstances under which a landlord may seek to recover possession of the property from his tenant. The requirement contemplated under Clause (j) of the proviso to Sub-section (1) is that of the landlord and it does not have any reference to the condition of the building as such. What is necessary under that clause is that the landlord must satisfy the Court that he reasonably and bona fide requires the premises for the immediate purpose of demolishing it and the demolition is for the purpose of erecting a new building in the place of the old one. No doubt, as to whether the landlord's requirement is reasonable and bona fide has to be judged by the surrounding circumstances, which will include his means for reconstruction of the building, and other steps taken by him in that regard.
12. In considering the reasonable and bona fide requirement of the landlord under this clause, the desire of the landlord to put the property to a more profitable use after demolition and reconstruction is also a factor that may be taken into account in favour of the landlord. In our opinion, it is not necessary that the landlord should go further and establish under this clause that the condition of the building is such that it requires immediate demolition. That the condition of the property may be such which requires immediate demolition is emphasized in Clause (k) of the proviso. When such a specific provision has been made in Clause (k), the condition of the building cannot come into the picture nor could it have been dealt with again in Clause (j). So the requirement under Clause (j) is that of the landlord and cannot have any reference to the building."
Hence, according to the above Decision, the condition of the building is irrelevant while examining the claim under the said Proviso. But in this regard we may notice the following observation of the Supreme Court in , Neta Ram and Ors. v. Jiwah Lal and Ors. :
"(8) Reading these provisions as a whole, it is obvious that if the landlord's need be genuine and he satisfies the Controller, he can obtain possession of the building or the land, as the case may be. If, however, he does not re-erect the building and puts it to any other use or lets it out to another tenant, the former tenant can apply to be put back in possession. Clause (b) clearly shows both affirmatively and negatively that the landlord must satisfy the Controller about his claim, before he can obtain an order in his favour. The Controller has to be satisfied about the genuineness of the claim. To reach this conclusion, obviously the Controller must be satisfied about the reality of the claim made by the landlord, and this can only be established by looking at all the surrounding circumstances, such as the condition of the building, its situation, the possibility of its being put to a more profitable use after construction, the means of the landlord and so on. It is not enough that the landlord comes forward, and says that he entertains a particular intention, however strongly, said to be entertained by him. The clause speaks not of the bona fides of the landlord, but says, on the other hand, that the claim of the landlord that he requires the building for reconstruction and re-erection must be bona fide, that is to say, honest in the circumstances. It is impossible, therefore, to hold that the investigation by the Controller should be confined only to the existence of an intention in the mind of the landlord to reconstruct. This intention must be honestly held in relation to the surrounding circumstances. In our opinion, the interpretation placed by the Punjab High Court (in the decision of Gosain, J) puts too narrow a construction, and leaves very little for the Controller to decide. It is well-known that Rent Restriction Acts were passed in view of the shortage of houses and the high rents which were being demanded by landlords. The very purpose of the Rent Restriction Acts would be defeated if the landlords were to come forward and to get tenants turned out, on the bare plea that they want to reconstruct the houses, without first establishing that the plea is bona fide with regard to all the circumstances, viz., that the houses need reconstruction or that they have the means to reconstruct them etc....."
Subsequently, while examining the validity of Section 14(1)(b) of the T.N. Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960, which is a similarly worded provision as in Section 21(1)(j), the Supreme Court noticed the above two Decisions and in , Prabhakaran Nair v. State of Tamil Nadu stated as hereunder:
"26. In Metalware and Co. v. Bansilal Sharma , this Court emphasised that the phrase used in Section 14(1)(b) of the Act was "the building was bona fide required by the landlord" for the immediate purpose of demolition and reconstruction and the same clearly referred to the bona fide requirement of the landlord. This Court emphasised that the requirement in terms was not that the building should need immediate demolition and reconstruction. The state or condition of the building and the extent to which it could stand without immediate demolition and reconstruction in future would not be a totally irrelevant factor while determining "the bona tide requirement of the landlord". This Court emphasised that if the Rent Controller had to be satisfied about the bona fide requirement of the landlord which meant genuineness of his claim in that behalf the Rent Controller would have to take into account all the surrounding circumstances including not merely the factors of the landlord being possessed of sufficient means or funds to undertake the project and steps taken by him in that regard but also the existing condition of the building, its age and situation and possibility or otherwise of its being put to a more profitable use after reconstruction. All these facts being relevant must enter the verdict of the Rent Controller on the question of the bonafide requirement of the landlord under Section 14(1)(b)....."
Therefore, in , Their Lordships stated that the condition of the building is a relevant circumstance to ascertain the bona fides of the landlord. There was a departure from the view in . But, the view expressed in has been reiterated in . The Section also affords an indication in this behalf because, the landlord should establish that he requires the building "for the immediate purpose of demolishing". This can be achieved by reference to the condition of the building as well. Hence, though the condition of the building may not be a crucial factor while considering the claim for eviction for reconstruction, the Court nevertheless will have to consider that circumstance as well while assessing whether the need of the landlord is bona fide or reasonable.
4. In this case, we will examine the question with these yardsticks. No doubt, the landlord has not produced the plan nor a current licence, but in this case the landlord initiated proceedings to recover possession from the tenant with intent to reconstruct. It may take quite some time for the culmination of the proceedings and for the landlord to actually get possession of the premises. Therefore, it is not reasonable to expect that the landlord should keep ready everything for such a long time with the approved plan and keep it renewing annually. A plan that he obtains from the local authority may lapse in the meanwhile. So it is sufficient if the landlord establishes that he has got means and that he is in a position to construct the building.
5. The findings of the District Judge in the revisional jurisdiction that the landlord lacks in financial capacity and other means, wherewithal to construct the premises may not also be factually correct. It is in evidence that the landlord is possessed of means sufficient enough to put up a new structure after demolition. One of the circumstances which had weighed with the lower Court to hold that the landlord's petition lacks in bona fide is the fact that he had earlier obtained possession of the premises in H.R.C.No. 30/69 invoking Section 21(1)(h) and (j) and that he had not put up any new building. That by itself may not be set up as a ground to reject the claim of the landlord for eviction if he establishes otherwise that the grounds are there to show that his request is genuine, bona-fide and reasonable. It may not be out of place to advert to the fact that there the eviction was sought really under Section 21(1)(h) though Section 21(1)(j) was also relied on. Section 21(1)(h) contemplates own occupation and Section 21(1)(j) contemplates eviction for reconstruction. The bona fide need had been found to exist and if so perhaps it was open to the landlord not to demolish the premises at all but occupy the same as it is. All that is necessary is that the landlord should occupy the premises. The eviction was to meet his bona fide need and not realty for reconstruction. While Clause (j) envisages the need only for reconstruction of the building, if the landlord pleads need under Section 21(1)(h) and secures eviction, he need not reconstruct the building even if he had alleged that the building is old and requires reconstruction. As stated earlier, he secured eviction on proving his bona fide need and not on the need of the premises to be demolished and reconstructed. The learned Counsel for the landlord was, therefore, correct in saying that the whole approach of the learned District Judge has been vitiated in the sense that he has omitted to advert to the ground on the basis of which his earlier request for eviction was upheld. It is no doubt true that after getting possession of the building in the alleged proceedings wherein he relied on Section 21(1)(j) as well for eviction, he has not demolished the building for reconstruction. But it is of no consequence and no adverse inference can be drawn as the eviction was sought by the landlord under Section 21(1)(h) as well. In such circumstances, it is immaterial whether the landlord had demolished the building and reconstructed the same. The interest of the tenant does not survive in view of the order of eviction under Section 21(1)(h) of the Act. Therefore, the fact that the landlord had not reconstructed the building does not in any way mitigate the claim of bona fide set up by the landlord in these proceedings.
6. Now as regards the financial capacity of the landlord is concerned, there are materials to show that he is financially sound and can raise required funds. He has produced the Bank Pass Book to show the Bank balance. He has given evidence to show that he can raise the necessary funds from his friends and that Banks would extend their help to finance the construction. It was also shown that he is a share-holder of a Co-operative Bank and he alleges that by mortgaging the property, the building, etc., to the Bank, he can raise money. We must remember that the proceedings started way back in the year 1980, it is unreasonable to call upon the landlord to keep the money ready for the drawn out period during which the litigation may last. There is no case for the tenant that the landlord lost all his wealth subsequent to the litigation. The tenant has not let in prima facie evidence to indicate that the finance available with the landlord is hardly sufficient to finance the structure. In the absence of any such material, we have to accept the evidence of the landlord and hold that he has got financial sustenance to make reconstruction. If that is the position, then the result would be that the circumstance mentioned in the first part of Section 21(1)(j) exist to entitle the landlord to seek eviction.
7. The next question that would arise for consideration is as to whether the requirement for reconstruction pleaded by the landlord is bona fide or not. Even though the Section does not in express words envisage that in considering the question of bona fide need, the condition of the building need be taken into account, nevertheless its physical condition may be a test - though not a litmus test - to assess the bona fide need of the landlord. After the landlord establishes his financial capacity then in order to seek eviction for demolition of the building, he should show the said requirement to be reasonable and bona fide. The rent control legislation is intended to prevent capricious and whimsical eviction of the tenant it is a benevolent legislation to safeguard the interest of the tenant. It may not be inappropriate to describe the tenant as the favoured child of the legislation. If so, can the Courts then confer a right on the landlord to evict the tenant depending on the money power of the said landlord? I am of the view that conferring such a right by means of interpreting Section 21(1)(j) would not be just and fair. Therefore, in order the landlord establishes his bona fide and reasonable need under Section 21(1)(j), he may have to lead some evidence regarding the condition of the building. Unless he shows that the building is in such a condition that it requires immediate demolition, the Courts need not necessarily encourage the application of the landlord under Section 21(1)(j) and hold that the need is bona fide and reasonable.
8. A perusal of the documents produced in this case shows that the building is very old. According to the landlord, it is more than 60 years old and it is located in an important part of the City. So it is expected that to put the premises for better use, the landlord would have desired to have a new building constructed. One cannot say that there is an irrational or a capricious desire. Justice Krishna Iyer (as he then was) in 1970 Kerala Law Times 257, Kalhani and Ors. v. Madhavi and Ors., described a similar desire of a landlord thus:
"...Knowing the length o1 time taken in rent control litigation in Kerala, - not unusual to find the period between the institution of an application and its ultimate disposal in the revisional court lengthening into several years - if a building perilously close to sinking alone can justify a petition under Section 11(4)(iv) in a State with heavy monsoons, I do not know what purpose would be served by such a course except to endanger the lives of tenants. It is obvious, therefore, that a wider and more realistic meaning must be given to the expression "condition of the building" The social purpose of this provision is to remove the road blocks in the way of progress in building programmes. Old structures in newly developing areas may be like pimples on fair faces. Replacement and renewal of obsolescent and unsightly buildings to make room for larger, modern constructions is a social necessity, provided existing tenants are not thrown into the streets. The "condition of the building" is a larger concept which includes considerations of social surroundings and allied factors. Where the building is very old and incongruous with the social setting and the surroundings of the place, the Court has got to take a more liberal view in applying the provision of law. However, the primary purpose of the statute viz., prevention of unreasonable eviction must also inform the Court when applying this provision. That is precisely why the statute itself provides that the tenant, if evicted on the ground of need to reconstruct, should be put back in the building, when reconstructed. A blend of the social needs of replacement and renewal and the avoidance of unreasonable eviction is achieved by Section 11(4)(iv), in that it provides for eviction when the building is in a physically or socially bad condition. At the same time, the tenant is armed with a right to get back in to possess the premises when rebuilt."
A dilapidated and old building requires reconstruction whereby the premises is put to better use to serve the society as a whole. In this case contra evidence has not been let in to the effect that the building does not require reconstruction. In view of these facts, it has to be held that the requirement of the landlord under Section 21 (1)(j) is both bona fide and reasonable.
9. Then we are left with the question as to the relief to be granted. The normal rule would be the eviction of the tenant under Section 21(1)(j) and let the premises be reconstructed and after reconstruction to hand over possession to the tenant for occupation in accordance with Sections 26, 27 and 28 of the Act. But as apprehended by the tenant in this case, contingency may arise in that the landlord may pull down the building, but decline to reconstruct the same. If that is done, the right of the tenant granted under Sections 25, 26 and 27 becomes otiose. In such a situation, the question then would arise is as to whether the Court can step in and give any effective direction to the landlord to safeguard the interest of the tenant, secured under the above Sections.
10. Normally when an eviction is ordered by the Court under Section 21(1)(j) the landlord can be called upon to make a reconstruction within a specified period. The Court can call upon the landlord to give an undertaking in this behalf to the Court. And when such directions are given on the basis of the undertaking or otherwise and if he fails to abide by the undertaking, then penalty could be imposed for violation of the undertaking given to the Court. That relief will not certainly help the tenant who has been evicted from the promises and who has lost the statutory protection conferred on him as a tenant of the holding. It will be little solace to the tenant to be told that for violations of the undertaking given to the Court the landlord has been proceeded against and dealt with accordingly. Probably in certain cases the tenant would have lost his means of livelihood itself because of the eviction order under Section 21(1)(j). In such circumstances the Court is entitled always to mould the relief to be granted in these matters.
11. The question then would be, in what manner can this Court safeguard the interest of the tenant being evicted in enforcement of an order under Section 21(1)(j). No doubt, there is a statutory machinery itself provided in this behalf. But, as the mind of the human is inscrutable, one has to cushion such orders, providing for the unexpected as well. We will examine the question with this in view.
12. Section 26(2) of the K.R.C. Act reads thus:
"(2) If the Court is satisfied that the landlord has not substantially commenced work of demolishing the premises within the period of one month in accordance with his undertaking, the Court shall order the landlord to deliver to the tenant vacant possession of the premises on the terms and conditions on which he occupied it immediately before the eviction. On such order being made, the landlord shall forthwith deliver vacant possession of the premises to the tenant. Such order shall be deemed to be an order within the meaning of Clause (14) of Section 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908."
13. The Section says that if the Court is satisfied that the landlord has not substantially commenced the work of the demolition of the premises within the period of one month in accordance with his undertaking, the Court shall pass an order directing the landlord to deliver to the tenant the vacant possession of the premises on the terms and conditions on which he occupied the premises immediately before the eviction. This provision operates in the event a premises is partly existing which the landlord has not pulled down. The Section does not contemplate the contingency as to what would be the position if the landlord pulls down the building as a whole and he does not put up the construction. In a given case can the Court permit the tenant to put up the super structure in accordance with the terms of the landlord's application? The answer to this query should be, according to me in the positive. In the instant case, the apprehension of the tenant is that the landlord may not put up the construction after demolition of the building. If past action be an indication, perhaps one cannot say that the tenant's apprehension is totally misplaced. It should be seen that in the earlier case the landlord did not put up construction though he alleged that he wanted to reconstruct the building, he did not do so, as according to him, he sought eviction under Section 21(1)(h). We need not analyse that controversy over again, but certainly an apprehensive tenant can draw a parallel from that instance. In these circumstances, the Court can certainly consider whether it should incorporate appropriate direction in the matter of reconstruction and mould the relief to be granted in this proceeding.
14. In this case the tenant has offered to put up the construction at his cost in accordance with the directions and plans submitted by the landlord. This offer of course cannot be accepted straightaway. The premises belongs to the landlord and he is the master of the situation. If he is entitled to construct the building at his own cost and using his own expertise and other materials, the tenant cannot step in and say that he will do it at his own cost.
15. Section 21 (1) states that tenant shall not be evicted except on the grounds mentioned in the Section. Therefore, the said right secured by the tenant under Section 21(1) of the Act cannot be allowed by the Court to be defeated by invoking of Section 21 (1)(j). If it is so, it is the duty of the Court to safeguard the interest of the tenant who has lost the premises by virtue of invoking Section 21 (1)(j). Under Section 108(e) of the T.P. Act, when once the subject matter of the lease-hold is destroyed, the lessee has the option to terminate the lease. The lease will not be terminated if the destruction of the immovable property is by the landlord. It is void only at the instance of the tenant. It means, if the tenancy still subsists and if the "destruction" of the lease-hold property by the landlord is under the protection of a Court order, then the Court has a duty to protect the interest of the tenant as well. If that principle is extended, the Court has all the power to safeguard the right that the tenant has lost. In the said circumstances an eviction under Section 21(1)(j) has to be granted in a given circumstance subject to the condition that the landlord demolishes the structure and puts up the new building within a stipulated time. The Court shall permit the landlord to evict the tenant, subject to the production of the approved plan of the building being reconstructed and also undertaking to do the reconstruction within a stipulated time subject to of course "force majeure" clause. This undertaking should form part of the order of eviction being passed. While doing so, the Court can also apply its mind, if need be regarding the estimate for such construction and incorporate that part also as part of the order. The Court can also enquire whether the assessment is exaggerated or otherwise. The Court may come to a conclusion also in this behalf. If the landlord fails to make the fresh construction as undertaken and as directed by the Court, then the Court has to consider what further relief that has to be granted to safeguard the right of the tenant. It is no use for the tenant if possession of a vacant site is restored to him. The order under Section 26(2) has to be effective and meaningful and in order that the said order may be effective and meaningful, the Court can always consider the relief of granting permission to the tenant to permit him to put up the construction in terms and directions issued at the time of eviction incorporating the undertaking given by the landlord.
16. Now as provided in the order passed under Section 21(1)(j), the landlord has given an undertaking that he shall demolish the structure and put up a new construction within the specified period. If this undertaking is violated by the landlord, as stated earlier, a mere penal action for violation of the undertaking against the landlord does not meet the ends of Justice as far as tenant is concerned. He should be given an effective relief if and when the landlord violates the undertaking. Similar situation arose for consideration of the Supreme Court in 1988 (Supp) SCC 549, Manwar Ali v. State of West Bengal and Ors. Therein the Supreme Court appointed the Official Liquidator to reconstruct the building under the supervision of the Court. The Supreme Court was not confronted with a situation in that case where the landlord had not effected any construction. The building was partly constructed. But nevertheless, the observation therein indicates that the Court can order further construction under the aegis of the Court,
17. As noticed earlier, it is armed with the Court order that the landlord could demolish the lease-hold premises. In such a case the tenant has the option to avoid the lease. He does not do so because the landlord has undertaken to reconstruct the premises. The landlord thus gained an advantage of an order to demolish the building and remove the tenant from the premises. If the landlord abuses the authority given to him under law, he becomes a trespasser ab initio and his remaining in the lease-hold premises is unauthorised. The lease is still current and the lessor cannot exclude the lessee from the premises. When he misuses the authority given by the Court, it is as if he never had the authority to demolish the building. In such a situation, the Court is bound to invoke the principle actus legis nemini facit injuriam and do Justice to the aggrieved. The Court has then to pass appropriate orders permitting the tenant to reconstruct the premises in terms of its earlier order passed and if feasible in accordance with the approved plan and only to the extent it need accommodate the tenant and not beyond that. The expenses incurred in this behalf has to be made good by the landlord. It can also consider providing for any other safeguard to be made in this behalf to safeguard the interest of the aggrieved party.
18. The above are cases where the tenant is financially in a position to make the reconstruction or he is willing to undertake the reconstruction. There may be cases where the tenant cannot do so for paucity of funds or for other reasons. In such cases, the Court should pass appropriate orders to absorb the hardship sustained by the tenant by the wrongful act of the landlord. As stated earlier, on failure to reconstruct the premises, the whole act of landlord becomes tortious. This would entitle the tenant to claim damages he had to suffer as a result thereof from the tortfeasor. If so the landlord is bound to make good the damage sustained by the tenant by the illegal act. The quantum of damage can be quantified as the enhanced rent the tenant had to pay to the alternate premises taken by him to rehabilitate himself after the demolition of his tenanted premises. The landlord should be called upon to make good the amount to the tenant reckoned from the day he ought to have completed the reconstruction, this being the reasonable scale of damages the tenant has suffered. The Court can also award any other expenditure incurred by the tenant in this behalf, which incurring is permissible under law.
19. Therefore, in a case of eviction under Section 21(1)(j), the Court has prima facie to satisfy as to whether the landlord has the required financial stability to start the reconstruction. He should satisfy that the need alleged is bonafide and reasonable and that the building requires immediate demolition. This has to be decided taking into account the various factors discussed above. To obviate any difficulty that may arise due to the landlord avoiding the undertaking given by him to the Court and putting the tenant in further difficulties, the Court itself shall incorporate such remedial measures including permitting the tenant to reconstruct the premises on the same basis of the approved plan produced by the landlord. The Court can also direct that the construction be carried out under the supervision of the Court by appointing a Commissioner or authorising the Official Liquidator in this behalf to do so as has been done in 1988 (Supp) SCC 549.
20. To repeat, this power of the Court can be traced to the analogous rights of the parties that submits under Section 108(e) of the T.P.Act. It may be noted that under general law as codified in the T.P. Act, the tenant is entitled to treat the lease as subsisting in the event the landlord of his own accord destroys the tenament. His remaining in possession of the premises in question would be legal and the landlord is not entitled to prevent his retaining possession. But in a case under Section 21(1)(j), such entry and demolition of the tenament has taken place under the authority of law. The authority of law conferred on the landlord permitted him to enter into the leasehold property, pull down the building only on his undertaking to reconstruct the same. If he abuses this permission, namely, fails to honour his undertaking, his remaining in possession of the premises after demolishing the building is tantamount to remaining there without the authority of law. It is as if he had no permission at all to enter the property and pull down the building. If that be so, the principle as noted above that the act of Court shall not injure any one should be applied and the Court be empowered to give all directions as is in law a party is entitled to so that the parties will be restored to the position prior to the permission being granted under Section 21(1)(j) of the Karnataka Rent Control Act. This can be achieved only if permission demolished by the landlord. If that be so, in a case of eviction under Section 21(1)(j), the Court has ample power and is bound as well to issue such appropriate directions to meet the ends of Justice which will enable the tenant to reconstruct the building as well.
21. In the result, the Revision Petition is allowed. There will be an order of eviction under Section 21(1)(j) of the K.R.C. Act as prayed for. The tenant is given time till 30.6.1996 to vacate the premises. The landlord shall reconstruct the building within 12 months after getting vacant possession. The landlord shall file an affidavit before the Court below undertaking to complete the reconstruction of the building within 12 months from the date on which the tenant surrendered and gave vacant possession of the building. In default to reconstruct the same within the stipulated or such reasonable extended period, the tenant is free to move the Court below for permission to reconstruct the building by himself or through the Court. The Court may pass appropriate orders if an application is made in this behalf, keeping in view of what is stated above in this behalf. The H.R.R.P is disposed of as above. No costs.