Jharkhand High Court
M/S. Svizera Healthcare vs Bssr Union on 25 April, 2024
Author: Anubha Rawat Choudhary
Bench: Anubha Rawat Choudhary
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI
W.P.(L) No. 914 of 2023
1. M/s. Svizera Healthcare, through its Managing Director, having its
Office at Plot No. 29/33, Ancillary Industrial Estate, Deonar,
Govandi, P.O. & P.S. -Govandi, Mumbai - 400643.
2. The Managing Director, M/s. Svizera Healthcare, Plot No. 29/33,
Ancillary Industrial Estate, Deonar, Govandi, P.O. & P.S. -
Govandi, Mumbai - 400643.
3. The President Sales, M/s. Svizera Healthcare, Plot No. 29/33,
Ancillary Industrial Estate, Deonar, Govandi, P.O. & P.S. -
Govandi, Mumbai - 400643.
4. The General Manager (HR and Administration), M/s. Svizera
Healthcare, Plot No. 29/33, Ancillary Industrial Estate, Deonar,
Govandi, P.O. & P.S. -Govandi, Mumbai - 400643.
5. The Deputy General Manager (Sales), Inspira Division, M/s.
Svizera Healthcare, Plot No. 29/33, Ancillary Industrial Estate,
Deonar, Govandi, P.O. & P.S. -Govandi, Mumbai 400643.
6. The Regional Sales Manager, Inspira Division, M/s. Svizera
Healthcare, having its office at Shree Balajee Pharmaceuticals, 2nd
Floor, Surya Prabha Mansion, New Dak Bunglow Road, P.O. &
P.S. Patna, District - Patna, Bihar- 800001.
7. The District Sales Manager, Inspira Division, M/s. Svizera
Healthcare, having its office at Pharma Link, Sheoganj,
Kishoreganj, P.O. G.P.O., P.S. Kotwali, District - Ranchi,
Jharkhand-834001. ... ... Petitioners
Versus
BSSR Union, represented through its Joint General Secretary,
Anirban Bose, (Member, Working Committee, FMRAI), son of Sri
A.K. Bose, having its office at Opposite Hotel Chinar,
Vishwakarma Mandir Lane, Main Road, P.O. - G.P.O., P.S -
Kotwali, District - Ranchi ... ... Respondent
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CORAM :HON'BLE MRS. JUSTICE ANUBHA RAWAT CHOUDHARY
---
For the Petitioners : Mr. Rajesh Kumar, Advocate
For the Respondent : None
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07/25.04.2024
Lastly heard on 12.03.2004
Heard the learned counsel for the petitioners.
2. In spite of service of notice, no one has entered appearance on behalf of the respondent union.
3. This writ petition has been filed challenging the award dated 15.02.2022 passed by the learned Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Ranchi in Ref. Case No. 10/2013 (Annexure-3) whereby the letter dated 23.03.2013 issued by the petitioner company discharging Mr. Santan Kumar, the concerned workman has been set aside and the writ petitioner company has been directed to reinstate Mr. Santan Kumar with 50% of total back wages.
4. As per the impugned award, the case was instituted by the respondent union (hereinafter referred to as "the Union") by filing a petition under Section 2-A of the Industrial Dispute Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as the I.D. Act) on behalf of a sale promotion employee-Medical Sales Representative, Ranchi, namely, Santan Kumar, with a prayer to set aside the letter dated 23.03.2013 whereby, said Santan Kumar, was discharged from service of the petitioner company by way of punishment. A prayer was also made to reinstate him with full back wages and other benefits.
5. The following issues were framed by the learned Labour Court for consideration:
(i) Whether instant case is maintainable in its present form?
(ii) Whether petitioner is entitled or authorized to file instant case on behalf of employee Mr. Santan Kumar?
(iii) Whether employee Mr. Santan Kumar is workman within the meaning of section 2(s) of Industrial Dispute Act.
(iv) Whether this Court has got jurisdiction to try and proceed with the instant case?
(v) Whether termination order of workman Mr. Santan Kumar is bad in law and whether termination order has been passed keeping in mind settled principle of natural justice?
(vi) Whether concerned workman is entitled for reinstatement in service with full back wages?
(vii) Whether domestic enquiry conducted against workman was in accordance with settled law and in compliance with principle of natural justice?"
(viii) Whether workman is entitled for any other relief?
Arguments of the petitioner company
6. Arguments of the petitioner was recorded in order dated 12.03.2024. It has been submitted that the petitioner is aggrieved by 2 the decision on issue nos. (ii), (iii), (iv) and (vi). The core issue is whether Santan Kumar who was working as a Medical Sales Representative is covered under the definition of workman, as defined under Section 2 (s) of the Industrial Dispute Act, and for this the definition of 'workman' as defined under the Industrial Disputes Act has been placed and reference has been made to clause 4 thereof to submit that Santan Kumar was having a salary of more than Rs.10,000 and therefore, he was not covered within the definition of 'workman'. Reliance has been placed on the judgment passed by the Hon'ble Patna High Court in LPA No. 1430 of 2009 (Nalin Sinha Vs. The State of Bihar and others), decided on 19.01.2011 [ Annexure - 4] and a judgment passed by this Court reported in 2004 (3) JCR 231 (Jhr) (M/s Indian Drugs and Pharmaceuticals Ltd. Vs. State of Jharkhand) [annexure-5]. It has been submitted that the impugned judgment is ex-facie perverse as the union had no authority to represent the workman, as the said union was not a recognized union by the petitioner. The workman has not performed his duties as per the instructions issued to him from time to time and without prejudice to the aforesaid submission, grant of 50% back wages is not justified and the order of discharge has been wrongly set aside. As per the appointment letter, the jurisdiction in connection with the dispute could have been raised only in Mumbai, and therefore, the dispute raised in Jharkhand could not be entertained by the learned Labour Court, Ranchi.
Case of the Respondent Union before the learned Labour Court.
7. The case of the union was that it was registered under the Trade Unions Act, 1926 and was affiliated to Federation of Medical and Sales Representative Association of India; Santan Kumar was a Sales Promotion Employee as defined under Section 2(d) of Sales Promotion Employees (Conditions of Service) Act, 1976 (hereinafter referred to as the Act of 1976) and was a member of the union. He joined the service of the petitioners (herein after referred to as the company) on 08.04.2005 as a Medical Sales Representative and was posted at Aligarh, Uttar Pradesh; on transfer from Aligarh, he joined at 3 Ranchi on 18.08.2008; from January 2012 the company stopped crediting the salary and other expenses into his bank account and started issuing demand drafts and upon request for payment directly in his account, the company directed him to reach Mumbai head office on 21.05.2012 for discussion on sales. Due to non-availability of train reservation, he requested to fix a meeting on another date. Thereafter, the company transferred him to Chennai. Upon intervention of the union the company revoked the order of transfer vide letter dated 17.05.2012.
8. However, the company issued show-cause letter on 27.08.2012 and Santan Kumar replied vide letter dated 07.09.2012 and denied the allegation. Thereafter, the company issued letter dated 25.09.2012 regarding non-adherence of work norms cum chargesheet stating that domestic enquiry will be initiated against him. The union advised Santan Kumar not to respond in the domestic enquiry who sent a letter dated 01.11.2012 to the company stating that the company had not followed section 2 (d) and 18 (1) of the Industrial Disputes Act when charge sheet / show cause was issued therefore, it was illegal, unlawful, arbitrary and unacceptable.
9. Consequently, a complaint was filed in the office of Deputy Labour Commissioner cum Conciliation Officer, Ranchi on 13.02.2013 and learned Assistant Labour Commissioner, Ranchi who sent a letter to the Company on 18.02.2013 to appear with related documents for conciliation. During the pendency of the proceeding before the Deputy Labour Commissioner, the company discharged Santan Kumar by way of punishment passed unilaterally in a domestic enquiry by discharge letter dated 23.03.2013 and it was alleged that the discharge was in violation of section 33 of the I.D. Act.
10. The union raised dispute regarding termination of Santan Kumar from service before the Assistant Labour Commissioner, Ranchi by filing a petition dated 02.04.2013 and a show cause letter dated 05.04.2013 was issued to the company but no response was received. After several dates, the Assistant Labour Commissioner, Ranchi passed an order dated 02.07.2013 mentioning that the 4 conciliation proceeding had failed and advised the union to go to competent court to file a case against the company in connection with the termination of services of Santan Kumar and consequently, the union filed the Reference Case under section 2-A of the I.D. Act, which was numbered as Reference Case No.10 of 2013.
11. Notice was issued to the company by the learned Labour Court who filed a written statement before the learned Labour Court, Ranchi.
Case of the petitioner company before the learned Labour Court.
12. The company filed its reply by taking a stand that-
(a) the proceeding was not maintainable as no reference was formulated under section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act;
(b) the company had not recognized any trade union for its employees and hence the union had no jurisdiction to maintain the reference case on behalf of the employee namely Santan Kumar;
(c) the letter of termination indicated that on the date of termination Santan Kumar was drawing a salary of Rs.11,253/- i.e. in excess of Rs.10,000/- hence was not a workman as defined under section 2 (s) (iv) of the Industrial Dispute Act;
(d) discharge of Santan Kumar was on account of proven misconduct and hence the reference was not maintainable;
(e) in the appointment letter of Santan Kumar, it was mentioned in clear terms that his appointment was subject to jurisdiction in Mumbai only therefore, the learned Labour Court, Ranchi had no jurisdiction;
(f) the Assistant Labour Commissioner, Ranchi did not issue any direction to the union to file a reference case and the said authority had no competence to issue any such direction;
(g) the company has its own elected internal welfare committee members representing the medical representatives who are entitled for negotiations, bargaining, settlement etc. with medical sales representative working with the company and the company had signed two bilateral settlements with 5 representatives of medical sales representative between the year 2004 to 2009. Present matter also has been discussed and addressed to the internal welfare committee members and in compliance with the course of action initiated against Mr. Santan Kumar, the company had appointed an officer for participation in the conciliation proceeding. A domestic enquiry was conducted and the independent conducting officer submitted report holding Santan Kumar guilty of charges level against him.
(h) It was alleged that Santan Kumar had not discharged his duties and responsibilities and indulged in irregular reporting, casual attitude and poor sales performance and he was questioned on many occasions and advised to improve upon his performance but his performance deteriorated and had become an unproductive and redundant to continue the business further in the headquarter. His services were transferred from Aligarh to Ranchi by citing reasons and numerous documents were referred in support of the contention.
(i) Further, the performance of Santan Kumar at Ranchi headquarter was also poor and he did not show any improvement. Numerous documents were referred in support of the contention.
(j) It was the case of the company that a domestic enquiry was conducted and a report was submitted holding Santan Kumar guilty of charges levelled against him and though Santan Kumar was working at Ranchi but his service conditions were controlled and regulated from Mumbai as per terms and conditions accepted by him so the jurisdiction for any dispute arising out of the employment was subject matter of Mumbai jurisdiction and consequently the court at Ranchi had no jurisdiction.
13. A rejoinder was filed to the written statement of the company and the contents of the written statement was denied.
614. On behalf of the union, two witnesses were examined; P.W. 1 was Anirban Bose and P.W. 2 was Santan Kumar and a large number of documents were exhibited.
15. On behalf of the company, two witnesses were examined namely Jai Prakash Mishra - Sales Manager and Shankar Kumar Jha - Regional Sales Manager at Patna and a large number of documents were exhibited.
16. Upon perusal of the arguments raised by the union as recorded in paragraph no.12 of the impugned award, following points were raised:
(a) In the judgment passed by Hon'ble Supreme Court reported in (1994) 5 SCC 737 (H R Adyanthaya and others Vs. Sandoz (India) Ltd. & Others), it has been held that on and from 06.03.1976, the provisions of the I.D. Act became applicable to the medical representative depending upon their wages upto 06.05.1987 and without the limitation on their wages thereafter, and upon the capacity in which they were employed or engaged.
(b) Santan Kumar was never employed in administrative or supervisory capacity; hence he was covered within the definition of sales promotion employee of section 2 (d) of the Act of 1976 read with the I.D. Act and therefore, the provision of the I.D. Act was applicable in case of termination, suspension, discharge or dismissal of his service.
(c) The union was a registered trade union and Santan Kumar was a workman and a member of the said union and hence under section 36 (1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, union could represent the workman for any proceeding under the I.D. Act. Subsection 2 of section 2-A provide that all the provision of Act of 1947 (including provision of section 36 of the Act) shall apply in relation to adjudication of reference filed under section 2-A, and therefore, the 7 reference which was filed by the union on behalf of its member Santan Kumar was legal and maintainable.
(d) The company had transferred Santan Kumar from Ranchi to Chennai and in an arbitrary manner when he raised dispute and the union had persuaded the matter before the Deputy Labour Commissioner, Ranchi, then the company had revoked the transfer of Santan Kumar but in revenge issued show cause notice and initiated domestic enquiry on false and fabricated charges and discharged him from service.
The company had denied the request of Santan Kumar to conduct enquiry at Ranchi and appointed inquiry officer at Bombay and therefore Santan Kumar had not received fair opportunity of hearing and the company discharged Santan Kumar during the pendency of the conciliation proceeding. Therefore, the entire action of the company was illegal arbitrary, malafide and based on unfair labour practice.
(e) The union had brought the matter before the conciliation officer but the company did not participate and upon direction/advice of the conciliation officer the reference was filed before the labour court on exercising provision of section 2-A of the I.D. Act, and the letter of discharge dated 23.03.2013 was fit to be set aside.
(f) In support of the case, the union had referred to a number of judicial pronouncements as mentioned in paragraph no.12 of the award.
17. On the other hand, the company argued as follows: -
(a) Sales promotion employees were not workman as held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of H R Adyanthaya (supra).
(b) Santan Kumar was not a workman and the learned Labour Court had no jurisdiction on the subject matter.
(c) Santan Kumar was not workman and hence no reference under section 2-A of the ID Act was maintainable.8
(d) Under section 2-A of the I.D. Act an individual workman can file reference after expiry of 45 days from the date of application to the conciliation officer, hence no case could be filed by the union and therefore, the reference case filed by the union was not maintainable. Union could represent its members in the reference made under section 10 of the I.D. Act and not under section 2-A of the Act. Therefore, the reference case was bad in law and fit to be dismissed.
(e) The learned Labour Court had no territorial jurisdiction upon the matter and reference was fit to be dismissed.
(f) The union was not recognized by the company, hence was not entitled to represent Santan Kumar.
(g) The work performance of Santan Kumar was not satisfactory, and in spite of repeated letters, reminders, directions, etc., he did not improve himself and was found guilty of the charges leveled against him in the domestic inquiry and was consequently discharged from service. He was given sufficient opportunity, but he did not appear in the inquiry and therefore his discharge is justified. A prayer was made to dismiss the reference.
(h) A number of judgments were relied upon by the company, as has been recorded in paragraph no. 13 of the impugned award.
18. The issue no.(iii) dealing with the point as to whether Santan Kumar was a workman was reframed as follows:
"Whether a medical sales representative is workman within the meaning of Section 2(s) of ID Act? or whether discharge of Mr. Santan Kumar is covered under the industrial dispute? and present case is maintainable in the ID Act?"
19. It is important to note that the learned labour court clearly recorded in paragraph 15 of the award that it was an admitted fact between both the parties that at the time of discharge from service, Santan Kumar was posted as Medical Sales Representative and his work was neither managerial nor supervisory. This aspect of the matter is not in dispute even before this Court. It is the case of the 9 petitioner company that the letter of termination indicated that on the date of termination, Santan Kumar was drawing a salary of Rs.11,253/- i.e. in excess of Rs.10,000/- hence was not a workman as defined under section 2 (s) (iv) of the I.D. Act.
20. The learned labour court after detailed discussions and, inter alia, considering the judgements relied upon by the petitioner as mentioned above, decided the issue no.(iii) in favour of the union vide paragraphs 24 and 25 of the award, which are quoted as under:
"24. Therefore, in the light of above decisions, it can be concluded, that the Sale Promotion employees will not fall under the definition of workman under 2 (s) of the I.D. Act, but, on and from 6-3-1976, the provisions of Industrial Dispute Act are applicable to Sale Promotion employees depending upon their wages up to 6-5-1987 and without the limitation on their wages thereafter and upon the capacity in which they were employed or engaged.
25. In the present case, Mr. Santan Kumar, at the time of discharge from service i.e. in the year 2013, was a Medical sales representatives and he was not engaged in Administrative, Managerial and Supervisory Capacity. Therefore, in case of Santan Kumar, provisions of I.D. Act are applicable, and present case under Section 2-A of the I. D. Act, 1947 is maintainable. Accordingly, this issue is decided affirmative and in favour of the petitioner."
21. In the aforesaid paragraphs, the learned labour court also referred to section 2-A of the I.D. Act, which is a different issue and will be considered later in this judgement.
22. It is not in dispute that Santan Kumar, is governed by the Act, namely "The Sales Promotion Employees (Conditions of Service) Act, 1976 as it stood after amendment with effect from 06.05.1987. Section 2 and 6 are quoted as under:
2. Definitions. --In this Act, unless the context otherwise requires, --
(a) "establishment" means an establishment engaged in pharmaceutical industry or in any notified industry;
b) "notified industry" means an industry declared as such under section 3;
(c) ........................
[(d) "sales promotion employees" means any person by whatever name called (including an apprentice) employed or engaged in any establishment for hire or reward to do any work relating to promotion of sales or business, or both, but does not include any such person--
(i) who, being employed or engaged in a supervisory capacity, draws wages exceeding sixteen hundred rupees per mensem; or
(ii) who is employed or engaged mainly in a managerial or administrative capacity.
10Explanation.--For the purposes of this clause, the wages per mensem of a person shall be deemed to be the amount equal to thirty times his total wages (whether or not including, or comprising only of, commission) in respect of the continuous period of his service falling within the period of twelve months immediately preceding the date with reference to which the calculation is to be made, divided by the number of days comprising that period of service;]
(e) all words and expressions used but not defined in this Act and defined in the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (14 of 1947), shall have the meanings respectively assigned to them in that Act.
6. Application of certain Acts to sales promotion employees. -- (1) The provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923 .................. [(2) The provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (14 of 1947), as in force for the time being, shall apply to, or in relation to, sales promotion employees as they apply to, or in relation to, workmen within the meaning of that Act and for the purposes of any proceeding under that Act in relation to an industrial dispute, a sales promotion employee shall be deemed to include a sales promotion employee who has been dismissed, discharged or retrenched in connection with, or as a consequence of, that dispute or whose dismissal, discharge or retrenchment had led to that dispute.] (3) The provisions of the Minimum Wages ..................... (4) ........................
(5) ............................
(6) ................................
[(7) Notwithstanding anything contained in the foregoing sub- sections--
(a) in the application of any Act referred to in any of the said sub- sections to sales promotion employees, the wages of a sales promotion employee for the purposes of such Act, shall be deemed to be his wages as computed in accordance with the provisions of this Act;
(b) where an Act referred to in any of the said sub-sections provides for a ceiling limit as to wages so as to exclude from the purview of the application of such Act persons whose wages exceed such ceiling limit, such Act shall not apply to any sales promotion employee whose wages as computed in accordance with the provisions of this Act exceed such ceiling limit.]"
23. On a plain reading of Sales Promotion Employees Act as it stood with effect from 06.05.1987, all Sales Promotion Employees who do not work in supervisory/managerial/administrative capacity are covered under the Industrial Disputes Act; for Sales Promotion Employees who work in supervisory capacity the Sales Promotion Employees Act is applicable only if the wages are more than the amount mentioned in the Sales Promotion Employees Act itself; Sales Promotion Employees working under managerial/administrative capacity are totally excluded from the purview of Industrial Disputes 11 Act. As Santan Kumar was not working in supervisory/ managerial/administrative capacity, therefore, he was duly covered by applicability of Industrial Disputes Act in terms of section 6 of Sales Promotion Employees Act read with the definition of Sales Promotion Employees as defined in the Sales Promotion Employees Act itself. This Court is of the considered view that the definition of workman as defined under Industrial Disputes Act has no bearing on Sales Promotion Employees who are governed by Industrial Disputes Act by virtue of section 2 and 6 of Sales Promotion Employees Act.
24. The aforesaid provisions of the Sales Promotion Employees Act as it stood in the year 1976 and its amendment vide Act 48 of 1986 with effect from 06.05.1987 and also the provisions of Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 as it was amended from time to time were subject matter of consideration in the judgement passed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case reported in (1994) 5 SCC 737 (supra). All the matters involved in the said judgment were relating to the period prior to 06.05.1987. Paragraph 28, 29 and 35 of the aforesaid judgement are quoted as under:
"28. The SPE Act was amended by the Amending Act 48 of 1986 which came into force w.e.f. 6-5-1987. By the said amendment, among others, the definition of sales promotion employee was expanded so as to include all sales promotion employees without a ceiling on their wages except those employed or engaged in a supervisory capacity drawing wages exceeding Rs 1600 per mensem and those employed or engaged mainly in managerial or administrative capacity.
29. Section 6 of that Act made the Workmen Compensation Act, 1923Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, (the ID Act), Minimum Wages Act, 1948, Maternity Benefit Act, 1961, Payment of Bonus Act, 1965 and Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972, applicable forthwith to the medical representatives. Sub-section (2) of the said section while making the provisions of the ID Act, as in force for the time being, applicable to the medical representatives stated as follows: "(2) The provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (14 of 1947), as in force for the time being, shall apply to, or in relation to, sales promotion employees as they apply to, or in relation to, workmen within the meaning of the Act and for the purposes of any proceeding under that Act in relation to an industrial dispute, a sales promotion employee shall be deemed to include a sales promotion employee who has been dismissed, discharged or retrenched in connection with, or as a consequence of, that dispute or whose dismissal, discharge or retrenchment had led to that dispute."12
In other words, on and from 6-3-1976 the provisions of the ID Act became applicable to the medical representatives depending upon their wages up to 6-5-1987 and without the limitation on their wages thereafter and upon the capacity in which they were employed or engaged.
35. Hence, SLP (C) No. 15641 of 1983, WP No. 5259 of 1980 together with CA No. 235 of 1983 and CA No. 242 of 1990 will have to be dismissed since in these cases the medical representatives were not governed either by the ID Act or the SPE Act at the relevant time. In SLP (C) No. 15641 of 1983 and in WP No. 5259 of 1980 connected with CA No. 235 of 1983, the terminations of the services of the employees complained of were effected on 26-4-1976 and 9-12-1977 respectively. It is not the case of the employees involved in these cases that the wages of the employees concerned were less than Rs 750 per mensem (excluding commission) or Rs 9000 per annum (including commission). Hence the SPE Act which came into force on 6-3-1976 also did not apply to them. In CA No. 242 of 1990 the dispute with regard to the bonus for the year 1977-78 to 1979-80 arose on 28-1- 1981. It is again not the case of the appellant-employee that his wages were less than the said amounts and the SPE Act applied to him on that account."
25. This Court has gone through the said judgement and finds that the ratio of the judgement has been rightly summarized by the learned labour court in paragraph 16 of the impugned award which is quoted as under:
16. In case of H.R. Adyanthaya Vs. Sandoz (India) Ltd. (1994) 5 Supreme Court Cases 737, the question for consideration before Hon'ble Supreme Court was arose, whether the 'medical representatives' are workman under section 2 (s) of the Industrial Disputes Act? The Bench of Hon'ble Five Judges, has considered the above question at the great length and held that 'medical representatives' are not workman under section 2 (s) of the Industrial Disputes Act as their works are not manual, skilled, unskilled, clerical, technical or operational. Further, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has discussed the relevant provisions of Sales Promotion Employees (Condition of Service) Act, 1976 and observed that after amendment in SPE Act by the amending Act of 48 of 1986 which came into force w.e.f. 06.05.1987 the definition of Sales Promotion Employee has expanded so as to include of all sales promotion employees without a ceiling on their wages except those employed or engaged in a supervisory capacity drawing wages exceeding Rs.1600/- per mensem and those employed or engaged mainly in managerial or administrative capacity.
It has been held that, on and from 06.03.1976 the provisions of the I D Act become applicable to the Medical Representatives depending upon their wages up to 06.05.1987 and without the limitation on their wages thereafter, and upon the capacity in which they were employed or engaged. Further, Their Lordships of Hon'ble Supreme Court analysed the provisions of '1947 Act', the Maharashtra Act and '1976 Act' and held that complaint made by the Medical Representative is not maintainable under the Maharashtra Act. The case of H.R. Adyanthaya 13 & Ors. v. Sandoz (India) Ltd. & Ors. [(1994) 5 SCC 737 (Supra) has been followed in Rhone-Poulenc (India) Ltd Vs State of U.P. & Ors. on 26 September, 2000, wherein Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that, "the acceptance of the contention of Mr. Reddy that respondent no.3 in view of Sandoz case is not a 'workman' within the meaning of the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act, however, does not help the appellant in substance as in the present case we propose to adopt the same course as was adopted in Sandoz case by treating the complaint to be a industrial dispute under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 in exercise of the powers of this Court under Article 142 of the Constitution. More than 12 years have passed since the reference was made to the Industrial Court and in the facts and circumstances of the case, we think it appropriate to adopt the course as was adopted in Sandoz case. Thus, we treat the reference in question to be one under Section 10 (1)
(d) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947."
26. Thereafter, the learned Labour Court considered numerous judgements all of which referred to the judgement passed in the case reported in (1994) 5 SCC 737 (supra) including the judgements relied upon by the petitioner during the course of hearing, that is, the judgment passed by the Hon'ble Patna High Court in LPA No. 1430 of 2009 (Nalin Sinha Vs. The State of Bihar and others), decided on 19- 01-2011 (Annexure - 4), judgment passed by this Court reported in 2004 (3) JCR 231 (Jhr) (M/s Indian Drugs and Pharmaceuticals Ltd. Vs. State of Jharkhand) (Annexure - 5). The learned Labour Court also considered and heavily relied upon the subsequent judgement passed by this Court in WP(L) No. 2000 of 2009 decided on 26.11.2009 against which L.P.A. No. 59 of 2010 (S. H. Pharmaceuticals Ltd. vs. State of Jharkhand & Another) was dismissed and Special Leave Petition No 9771 of 2011 has also been dismissed. The learned Labour Court also considered the subsequent judgement passed Hon'ble Patna High Court in Deepak Kumar vs. State of Bihar & Others decided on 09.03.2016 which has distinguished the judgement passed in LPA No. 1430 of 2009 (supra).
27. In W.P. (L) No. 2000 of 2009 (S. H. Pharmaceuticals Ltd. vs. State of Jharkhand & Another) (supra), the award passed by the learned Labour Court, Deoghar was challenged by the Pharmaceutical Company and reliance was also placed by the writ petitioner - management on the provisions of Sales Promotion Employees Act and a reference was made to the judgment passed by the Hon'ble 14 Supreme Court in the case of H.R. Adyanthaya & Others Vs. Sandoz (India) Ltd. & Another reported in (1994) 5 SCC 737 (supra) and it was argued that the Industrial Disputes Act would not apply. The said argument was rejected by holding that the argument of the writ petitioner-management does not take into account that the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court was in respect of a date prior to 1987 amendment of the Act of 1976 and with the aforesaid observation the writ petition was dismissed.
28. The order dated 26.11.2009 passed in W.P. (L) No. 2000 of 2009 (supra) is quoted as under: -
"I have heard learned counsel for the petitioner and learned counsel for the State.
The petitioner is the Management, which has challenged the impugned award of the Labour Court, Deoghar directing reinstatement of the dismissed employee of the petitioner with full back wages.
I have gone through the impugned award of the Labour Court, Deoghar and I do not find any good ground to disagree with the reasoning therein.
Learned counsel for the petitioner has challenged the decision of the Labour Court closing the evidence of the petitioner, and submits that because of such closure the petitioner was deprived of the opportunity of producing the alternative witness, in place of original witness of the petitioner who had failed to turn-up. However, it has not been shown as to what crucial evidence was expected of the witness intended to be produced by the petitioner and for which dates were given by the Labour Court several times to the Management.
In absence of showing any crucial issue on which the intended witness was expected to depose, the argument becomes merely technical in nature. From the record, I find that opportunities were given to the petitioner-Management to produce their witness, which the petitioner failed to avail.
It has next been argued from the petitioner's side that the Labour Court has granted full back wages to the workman merely upon a bald statement on his part that he was not gainfully employed elsewhere after the termination of his service. Even in the present writ petition, there is not even a whisper on the part of the petitioner-Management naming any other place or establishment where the workman was actually employed during this period. Therefore, this submission is also without substance. If some alternative establishment had been mentioned in the pleadings of the writ petition, perhaps a counter affidavit may have been called from the workman asking for specific admission or denial but as the writ petition stands, this argument also becomes merely technical in nature.
Reliance has been placed upon the provisions of the Sales Promotion Employees (Conditions of service) Act, 1976 and a decision of the Supreme Court in the case of H.R. Adyanthaya & Others Vrs. Sandoz (India) Ltd. & Another reported in (1994) 5 SCC 737, it has been argued that in view of the aforesaid Act, the Industrial Disputes Act would not apply.15
The argument does not take into account that the decision of the Supreme Court is in respect of a date prior to the 1987 amendment of the said 1976 Act.
In the circumstances, it is not a fit case which would call for any interference with the impugned award of the Labour Court, in exercise of the discretionary jurisdiction of this Court under 226 of the Constitution of India.
This writ petition is dismissed."
29. The aforesaid judgment of the writ court was challenged in L.P.A. No. 59 of 2010 (supra) and the appeal was dismissed vide order dated 01.12.2010 after notice by recording that the award passed by the Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Deoghar was rightly confirmed by the Single Judge and there was nothing to reconsider the same. The order was challenged before the Hon'ble Supreme Court in SLP (C) No. CC 9771/2011 (supra) which was also dismissed vide order dated 07.07.2011. The learned Labour Court held that Santan Kumar, was governed by Sales Promotion Employees Act and was also governed by Industrial Disputes Act by referring to the judgement passed in the Constitutional Bench judgement reported in (1994) 5 SCC 737 (supra) and also judgment dated 26.11.2009 passed by this Court in W.P. (L) No. 2000 of 2009 (supra) which has been affirmed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court.
30. It has been clearly held in the judgement passed in the case reported in (1994) 5 SCC 737 (supra) that on and from 06.03.1976 the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act became applicable to the medical representatives depending upon their wages up to 06.05.1987 and for the period beyond 06.05.1987 it was made applicable to all medical representatives without any limitation on their wages and upon the capacity in which they were employed or engaged. Meaning thereby, those who were engaged in supervisory capacity having pay exceeding Rs.1600 per mensem and all those who were engaged in managerial or administrative capacity were kept out of the purview of the Industrial Disputes Act. Thus, the argument of the petitioner company by referring to the salary of Santan Kumar being more than Rs.10,000/- on the date of his termination by referring to definition of workman as defined under section 2 (s) (iv) of the Industrial Disputes Act has no bearing in this case as Santan Kumar was admittedly not 16 working in supervisory, managerial or administrative capacity and in view of the ratio of the judgement passed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in (1994) 5 SCC 737 (supra), the salary of medical representatives will have no bearing after amendment made in Sales Promotion Employees Act with effect from 06.05.1987 when the employee is not working in supervisory, managerial or administrative capacity. The plea that medical representatives will not be governed by the Industrial Disputes Act has been rejected by this Court in the judgement passed in order dated 26.11.2009 passed by this Court in W.P. (L) No. 2000 of 2009 (supra) upheld up to Hon'ble Supreme Court in SLP (C) No. CC 9771/2011(supra) vide order dated 07.07.2011, there is no scope for taking any contrary view. This Court finds that the learned Labour Court has passed a well-reasoned judgement on this point vide paragraphs 16, 24 and 25 as quoted above. It has been held that it could be concluded that sales promotion employee would not fall under the definition of workman under section 2 (s) of the I.D. Act, but, on and from 06.03.1976, the provision of the I.D. Act was applicable to sales promotion employee depending upon their wages up to 06.05.1987 and without the limitation of their wages thereafter and upon the capacity in which they were employed or engaged. A finding was further recorded in paragraph no.25 that in the year 2013 Santan Kumar was working as medical sales representative and was not engaged in administrative, managerial or supervisory capacity and therefore the provision of Industrial Disputes Act was applicable and the case was maintainable under section 2-A of the I.D. Act.
31. In view of the aforesaid findings, this Court is of the considered view that the findings of the learned labour court with regards to issue no. (iii) does not call for any interference under writ jurisdiction.
32. So far as issue no.(iv) is concerned, the same has been considered from paragraph no.33 onwards and the learned labour court decided the said issue against the company by recording that the dispute arose at Ranchi and the cause of action was within the territorial jurisdiction of the learned labour court. The learned labour 17 court, while deciding the aforesaid issue, relied upon various judgments and recorded that it has been held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court that if a part of cause of action arose in the territory of the State when the State government had the jurisdiction to make reference, the case would be maintainable in such state and observed that similar principle was laid down by Hon'ble Patna High Court and Hon'ble Orissa High Court in the aforesaid judgments. This Court finds no illegality and perversity in the said judgement and mere mention in the letter of appointment that the courts at Mumbai will have exclusive jurisdiction will not take away the jurisdiction of the court in the State of Jharkhand when admittedly Santan Kumar was posted in Jharkhand and part of cause of action arose within the State of Jharkhand.
33. The next point for consideration is whether the case as filed before the learned labour court under section 2-A of Industrial Disputes Act, by the union was maintainable.
34. No reference was made by the government to the learned labour court in terms of Section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act or in terms of section 2-A (2) of Industrial Disputes Act. The Assistant Labour Commissioner-cum-Conciliation Officer, Ranchi, in letter dated 02.07.2013 stated that the conciliation had failed due to non- participation of the petitioner company with regards to the industrial dispute earlier raised by the union on behalf of Santan Kumar vide letter dated 13.02.2013 (Exhibit-10). Such industrial dispute vide letter dated 13.02.2013 (Exhibit-10) was apparently raised prior to discharge of Santan Kumar. The petitioner company was not participating in the conciliation proceedings and issued discharge letter dated 23.03.2013 by way of punishment as a result of disciplinary proceedings. The Assistant Labour Commissioner-cum-Conciliation Officer, Ranchi, vide letter dated 02/07/2013 mentioned that conciliation proceedings had failed and that the petitioner company was not interested in conciliation and referred to the amendment made to the Industrial Disputes Act in the year 2010 by which section 2-A was introduced and advised that the amended provision of Industrial Disputes Act can be invoked to raise the dispute regarding discharge in competent court.
18No dispute was raised before the Assistant Labour Commissioner- cum-Conciliation Officer, Ranchi pursuant to order of discharge of Santan Kumar and straight away case was filed before the Labour Court under section 2A by referring to the letter dated 02.07.2013.
35. The union filed the case under section 2-A pursuant to the advice given by Assistant Labour Commissioner-cum-Conciliation Officer, Ranchi, vide aforesaid letter dated 02.07.2013 and it was contended that the case was filed as per the advice of Assistant Labour Commissioner-cum-Conciliation Officer, Ranchi. The cause title of the case as it reflects from the impugned award itself indicates that the case was filed by the union and not by Santan Kumar and in order to defend its action an argument was raised that the union was representing Santan Kumar and section 36 of the Industrial Disputes Act was relied to contend that a workman can be represented by union which was accepted by the learned labour court.
36. The learned labour court had framed issue no.(i) "whether instant case is maintainable in the present form" but did not decide the said issue separately. Issue nos.(i), (vi), and (viii) have been disposed of vide paragraph no. 62 by mentioning that in view of findings of issue nos. (ii), (iii), (iv), (v) & (vii), the present reference is maintainable. Thus, the issue no. (i) and (ii) are corelated and issue no.
(i) was considered while deciding the issue no.(ii) in paragraphs nos. 26 to 32 of the impugned award. The learned court also recorded that the union was registered under the Trade Union Act and Santan Kumar was its member and the union had a right to represent Santan Kumar. Paragraph nos.28 to 32 of the award are quoted as follows:
"28. Thus, there is no denial of opposite parties that BSSR is registered union and further there is no denial that Mr. Santan Kumar is the member of the said union. Again, on the basis of oral as well as documentary evidences (Ext.14, 14/1, 15 & 16}, it is proved that petitioner union is a registered trade union and Mr. Santan Kumar is its member.
29.Under Section 36 (1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, a workmen who is a party to dispute shall be entitled to be represented in a proceeding under this Act by - (a) any member of the executive or other office-bearer of a registered trade union of which he is a member, (b) any member of the executive or other office-bearer of a federation of trade unions to which the trade union referred to in 19 clause (a) is affiliated, (c) where the worker is not a member of any trade union, by any member of the executive or other office bearer of any trade union connected with, or by any workman employed in the industry in which the worker is employed and authorized in such manner as may be prescribed.
30.In present case, it is proved fact that petitioner union is registered trade union, affiliated to the Federation of Medical and Sales Representative Association of India (FMRAI) and Mr. Santan Kumar is its member. Therefore, member of the executive or other office-bearer of petitioner union can represent to Mr. Santan Kumar in any of the proceeding under the ID Act including the proceeding of Section 2A of the Act where discharge, dismissal, retrenchment and otherwise termination of the services of an individual workman in an industrial dispute and reference can be filed in the court directly after the expiry of 45 days from the date of making application to the Conciliation Officer and all provisions of ID Act is applicable in relation to adjudication of such disputes.
31. I further find that, before filing of the present case, the petitioner union had filed a complaint in the office of Deputy Labour Commissioner cum Conciliation Officer, Ranchi on 13.02.2013 and had raised industrial dispute vide letter dated 13.02.2013 (Exhibit-10). The petitioner has brought and filed copy of letter issued by ALC, Ranchi to M/s Svizera Healthcare (Opposite Party) dated 18.02.2013 as Exhibit-10/1, which proves that Conciliation Proceeding was initiated and the opposite parties were directed to appear on 05.03.2013 in the Conciliation Proceeding. The said conciliation proceeding was pending but in the mean time the opposite parties has discharged services of Mr. Santan Kumar on 23.03.2013 by way of punishment vide Exhibit- 11. The opposite parties/management has not participated in the conciliation proceeding and the conciliation was failed and then Assistant Deputy Labour Commissioner -cum- Conciliation Officer, Ranchi, vide letter dated 02/07/2013 (Ext.13) has advice to petitioner union to file case before the competent court. Thereafter, the petitioner union has filed present case in this court on 22/08/2013.
32. In view of above facts and circumstance, when it is proved that petitioner union is a registered trade union and Mr. Santan Kumar is its member then, in view of section 36 (1) of the Act, petitioner union is entitled or authorized to file instant case on behalf of employee Mr. Santan Kumar as the petitioner union had raised industrial dispute on 13.02.2000 and upon failure of the conciliation proceeding upon advise of the Conciliation Officer, present reference under Section 2A of the Act has been filed. Accordingly, this issue is decided affirmative and in favour of the petitioner union."
37. The case was held to be maintainable having been filed by the union under section 2-A of Industrial Disputes Act on two grounds, firstly, the union is entitled or authorized to represent Santan Kumar and secondly, that the case has been filed on 22.08.2013 by the union upon failure of the conciliation proceeding and upon advice of the 20 Conciliation Officer vide letter dated 02.07.2013 (Ext.13) has advice to petitioner union to file case before the competent court. This Court finds that the aforesaid findings are self-contradictory, on the one hand it has been held that the case was filed by the union in representative capacity and on the other hand it has been held that the case was filed by the union itself upon advice of the Conciliation Officer vide letter dated 02.07.2013.
38. In this respect two points are required to be examined, firstly, the directions contained in letter dated 02.07.2013 and secondly, can it be construed or permitted in law to give complete go by to the procedure of raising dispute under section 2-A in terms of section 2-A (2).
39. After recording that the conciliation with respect to the dispute raised vide letter dated 13.02.2013 had failed and that the petitioner company had discharged Santan Kumar in the midst of the conciliation proceedings, the Assistant Labour Commissioner -cum- Conciliation Officer, Ranchi, recorded that the petitioner company is not interested in conciliation and advised accordingly vide letter dated 02.07.2013 [Exhibit 13-Annexure 2 to the Writ Petition] to the Writ Petition in the following words:-
izca/ku ds bl d`R; ls Li'V gS fd dksbZ le>kSrk djuk ugha pkgrs gS] vr% vkS|ksfxd fookn ¼la"kks/ku½ vf/kfu;e] 2010 uEcj vkWQ 24@2010] fnukad 18-08-2010 ds vkyksd esa ijke"kZ fn;k tkrk gS fd ;fn mfpr le>s rks viuh lsok lekfIr laca/kh fookn dks l{ke U;k;ky; esa nk;j dj ldrs gSA
40. The sequence of events indicate that the industrial dispute was raised on 13.02.2013 alleging that the petitioner company was threatening Santan Kumar that he would be dismissed from service, but in the midst of the conciliation proceedings, pursuant to such complaint, the service of the Santan Kumar was dismissed, and consequently the Assistant Labour Court Commissioner cum Conciliation Officer dropped the conciliation proceedings and observed that the petitioner company is not interested in any settlement, and if so found proper disputes can be raised before the competent court in connection with the discharge of Santan Kumar.21
41. On the face of the aforesaid letter dated 02.07.2013, there was no advice to the union to file case under section 2-A of the I.D. Act;
the letter only refers to the amendment by which section 2-A came into force and advised that the matter relating to discharge from service (i.e discharge of Santan Kumar) can be raised by filing case before competent court if found proper. The learned labour court has misread and misunderstood the letter dated 02.07.2013 to hold that the case filed by the union under section 2-A was maintainable.
42. By no stretch of imagination, the said letter can be construed to have directed the union to straight away file case under section 2-A nor such a direction could have been issued dehors the procedure prescribed under section 2-A(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act.
43. Section 2-A of Industrial Dispute Act reads as under:
"[2-A. Dismissal, etc., of an individual workman to be deemed to be an industrial dispute.-- [(1)]Where any employer discharges, dismisses, retrenches, or otherwise terminates the services of an individual workman, any dispute or difference between that workman and his employer connected with, or arising out of, such discharge, dismissal, retrenchment or termination shall be deemed to be an industrial dispute notwithstanding that no other workman nor any union of workmen is a party to the dispute.] 3 [(2)Notwithstanding anything contained in section l0, any such workman as is specified in sub-section (1)may, make an application direct to the Labour Court or Tribunal for adjudication of the dispute referred to therein after the expiry of forty-five days from the date he has made the application to the Conciliation Officer of the appropriate Government for conciliation of the dispute, and in receipt of such application the Labour Court or Tribunal shall have powers and jurisdiction to adjudicate upon the dispute, as if it were a dispute referred to it by the appropriate Government in accordance with the provisions of this Act and all the provisions of this Act shall apply in relation to such adjudication as they apply in relation to an industrial dispute referred to it by the appropriate Government.
(3) The application referred to in sub-section (2) shall be made to the Labour Court or Tribunal before the expiry of three years from the date of discharge, dismissal, retrenchment or otherwise termination of service as specified in sub-
section (1).]"
2244. Prior to introduction of Section 2-A of Industrial Disputes Act, an individual workman at no stage could become a party to the industrial dispute independently of the union or the workman as even an individual dispute became an industrial dispute when being sponsored by the trade union or a considerable number of co-worker of the concerned workman. However, after the enactment of Section 2-A, it is not necessary that the dispute relating to discharge, dismissal, retrenchment, or otherwise termination of service of workman must be sponsored by a trade union or a substantial number of workmen. In other words, even if it is not sponsored by the trade union or substantial number of workmen, such a dispute is deemed to be an industrial dispute. The use of the word "notwithstanding that no other workmen nor any union of workman is a party to the dispute" in Section 2-A (2), it is apparent that the trade union or co-workmen are not precluded from sponsoring an individual dispute for the purpose of converting it into an industrial dispute. Thus, such a dispute can either ipso facto be deemed to be an industrial dispute on a demand made by the workman himself or by espousing the dispute by trade union or body of workman. There is distinction between the two types of disputes. In the former case, the dispute is between the workman concerned and the employer while in the later, the dispute is between the workman as a body and the employer. In other words, the first is an individual dispute deemed to be an industrial dispute by virtue of section 2-A while the later dispute is a collective dispute. In case covered under section 2-A, it is for the workman to file an application before the Conciliation Officer in terms of section 2-A (2) and in absence of such step, even the workman cannot approach the learned Labour court or Industrial Tribunal directly much less the union.
45. Though the petition before the learned labour court was filed under Section 2-A of the Industrial Disputes Act, but the required steps in terms of Section 2-A of the Industrial Dispute Act was not taken. This point was taken by the petitioner company as recorded in paragraph 13 wherein it was argued that under Section 2-A of the Industrial Disputes Act, an individual workman can file reference after 23 expiry of 45 days from the date of application to the conciliation officer, and hence no case by the union was maintainable. This aspect of the matter has not at all been considered by the learned labour court.
46. The law is well settled that the Industrial Tribunal/Labour Court constituted under the Industrial Disputes Act is a creature of statute and it acquires jurisdiction on the basis of reference made there to. Further in case of discharge, dismissal, retrenchment or termination of a workman, the dispute is deemed to be an industrial dispute notwithstanding that no other workman nor any union of workman is a party to the dispute. In order to maintain an application under section 2-A of Industrial Disputes Act, it has been clearly provided under sub- section (2) that notwithstanding anything contained in section 10, any such workman who has been discharged, dismissed, retrenched or terminated may make an application directly to the learned Labour Court or Tribunal for adjudication of the dispute after expiry of 45 days from the date he has made an application to the conciliation officer of the appropriate government for conciliation of the dispute and upon receipt of such application, the learned labour court or tribunal shall have powers and jurisdiction to adjudicate upon the dispute as if it were a dispute referred to it by appropriate government in accordance with the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act and all the provisions of the Act shall apply in relation to such adjudication as they apply in relation to industrial dispute referred to by the government.
47. The provision of section 2-A (2) provides that first an application has to be made before a conciliation officer and if no order is passed within 45 days, then only the cause of action arises for the individual workman to directly approach labour court or tribunal for adjudication of dispute covered under section 2-A (1). This Court is of the considered view that in absence of any application having been filed before the conciliation officer in terms of section 2-A (2), neither Santan Kumar nor the union representing Santan Kumar could have directly filed an application before the labour court under section 2-A 24 of Industrial Disputes Act even if some advice was given by Assistant Labour Commissioner-cum-Conciliation Officer, Ranchi, in letter dated 02.07.2013 as mentioned above. The requirement to file an application before the Conciliation officer by the workman i.e Santan Kumar cannot be waived as the object of the Industrial Disputes Act is firstly to resolve the dispute through conciliation and mediation and only upon failure or upon expiry of 45 days in terms of section 2-A (2) the petition under section 2-A can be directly filed in the labour court/tribunal for adjudication of dispute and consequential reliefs.
48. In the present case, the union claims to have moved the learned Labour Court under section 2-A pursuant to advice given by the Assistant Labour Commissioner-cum-Conciliation Officer in letter dated 02.07.2013. This Court is of the considered view that in order to raise an industrial dispute directly to the court in terms of Section 2-A of the Industrial Disputes Act, the required application was to be filed before the Conciliation Officer and in absence of such application and without expiry of 45 days from the date of such application, the case could not have been filed directly to the learned Labour Court under section 2A of I. D. Act. The letter dated 02.07.2013 issued by the Assistant Labour Commissioner-cum-Conciliation Officer dealing with the complaint letter dated 13.02.2013, was prior to the date of termination, can be construed to have given a complete go-by to the procedure prescribed under Section 2-A (2) of the I.D. Act. The aforesaid objection which was raised by the petitioners in paragraph 13 of the impugned award has not at all been considered by the learned Labour Court while holding that the case filed by the union under Section 2-A was maintainable.
49. The condition precedent to directly file an application before the learned Labour Court under Section 2-A (2) having not been satisfied in the present case, the case could not have been entertained by the learned Labour Court. The process of raising the grievance before the Conciliation Officer is an important and mandatory step which in the present case has not been satisfied. In such 25 circumstances, the labour court has omitted jurisdictional error in directly entertaining the petition under section 2-A of the I.D. Act.
50. Accordingly, the petition filed by the union before the learned Labour Court was not maintainable and the learned labour court has committed jurisdictional error in entertaining the petition filed under section 2-A without compliance of section 2-A (2) as no steps were taken to move the Conciliation Officer in terms of Section 2-A (2) of the Industrial Disputes Act in connection with discharge of Santan Kumar.
51. In view of the aforesaid findings the impugned award cannot be sustained in the eyes of law and is accordingly set-aside.
52. This writ petition is allowed in the aforesaid terms.
53. Pending interlocutory application, if any, is closed.
(Anubha Rawat Choudhary, J.) Saurav/Mukul/AFR 26