Patna High Court
Awadh Narain Singh vs Jwala Prasad Singh And Ors. on 10 January, 1956
Equivalent citations: AIR1956PAT321, 1956CRILJ1087, AIR 1956 PATNA 321
JUDGMENT Ramaswami, J.
1. In this case the petitioner Awadh Narain Singli has obtained a rule from this Court calling upon th'e opposite party to show cause why they should not be punished for contempt of Court under Section 4, Contempt of Courts Act (Act 32 of 1952). Cause has been shown by Mr. Ugrah Singh on behalf of opposite parties 1 to 5, 8, 9 and 12 to 15. Notices had been served upon the other opposite parties, but opposite party 6 has not appeared in spite of service of notice. Opposite parties 7, 10, 11 and 13 have appeared, but they are not represented by any counsel. They merely made an oral statement to Court that they are poor men and opposite parties 7 and 16 prayed that they might be excused.
2. The material facts are important. On 15-6-1954, the petitioner filed a complaint in the Court of the Sub-divisional Magistrate of Banka in which he alleged that three persons, namely Dheku Mandal and his sons, Musan Mandal and Babu Lal Mandal had forcibly plucked mangoes from an orchard belonging to Sm. Baidehi Devi. The petitioner said that Dheku Mandal and his sons committed theft of mangoes worth Rs. 40/- and when the petitioner protested, they threatened him with assault. The petitioner further alleged that he was the molazim of Sm. Baide,hi Devi and looked after her properties.
After the complaint petition was filed, the Sub-divisional Magistrate issued summons under Section 379, Penal Code, against Babu Lal Mandal, Musan Mandal and Dheku Mandal. On 2-7-1954, the accused persons applied to the Sub-divisional Magis-tiate for transfer of the case to the Gram Pan-chayet of Chatmadih Dharampur, But the petition was rejected by the Sub-divisional Magistrate and on 9-7-1954, the case was transferred to Mr. B. S. P. Sinha, Magistrate 2nd class, for being disposed of.
On 14-7-1954, Babu Lal Mandal, opposite party 3, sent an application to the Chief Minister alleging that the case filed by Awadh Narain Singh was false and that the case was instituted in collusion with the second officer. It was further alleged by Babu Lal Mandal that Sitaram Singh was a wealthy man and the prosecution witnesses were all relations of Sitaram Singh and were all interested witnesses. . A copy of this petition was cent by Babu Lal Mandal to the Minister in charge of local self-Government.
Other copies were also sent by Babu Lal Mandal to the Collector of Bhagalpur, to the Director of Gram Panchayet, to the District Gram Pan-chayet Officer, Bhagalpur, to the Subdivisional Officer, Banka, and to the Mukhia of Chatmadih Dharampur Gram Panchayet. The petition of Babu Lal Mandal is annesure A to the application. It is signed by opposite party 2, Chandra Mohan Singh, and by 95 other persons.
3. On 30-7-1954, opposite party 1, Jwala Pra-sad Singh, who is the Mukhia of Chatmadih Dharampur Gram Panchayet, sent a letter to the Sub-divisional Officer of Banka with respect to the criminal case. A copy of this letter is annexure B to the application. . In this letter, opposite party 1 stated that there was no occurrence at all as alleged by Awadh Narain Singh in his petition of complaint.
Opposite party 1 further said that Sitaram Singh v/as a rich person and he had instituted a case falsely in order to put pressure upon. Dheku Mandal to give up his claim to the mango trees, Opposite party 1 further said that about 25 days before the alleged date of occurrence all the mangoes had been taken away by various purchasers. Opposite party 1 added that "the entire public of the area are dissatisfied with the false case which has been instituted". Thereafter, the accused persons filed a petition before the Sub-divisional Magistrate for transfer of the case from the file of Mr. B. S. P. Sinha, On 30-8-1954, the petition of transfer was rejected.
Thereafter on 19-10-1954, the petitioner again made an application before the Sub-divisional Magistrate of Banka praying that proceedings may be started against opposite parties 1 and 2 for contempt of Court. The application was rejected by the Sub-divisional Magistrate on 26-9-1955 on the ground that "the opposite parties were inexperienced and raw villagers" and "if they had understood the implications of their writing, they would not have done what is alleged to have been done by them."
4. In these circumstances, counsel for the petitioner submitted that all the opposite parties are guilty of contempt of Court and they ought to be punished under Section 4, Contempt of Courts Act (Act 32 of 1952). It was pointed out that opposite party 1 has written the letter, annexure B, to the Sub-divisional Magistrate with regard to the merits of a criminal case which was sub judice before the Magistrate, Mr. R. S. P. Sinha.
Opposite party 1 alleged that the criminal case filed by Awadh Narain Singh was false and as a matter of fact there was no occurrence as alleged in the petition of complaint. It was further alleged by opposite party 1 that "the entire public of the area are dissatisfied with the false case" and "about 25 days before the alleged date of occurrence all the mangoes had been taken away by various purchasers". In the petition submitted by Babu Lal Mandal, opposite party 3, also it was alleged that the case filed by Awadh Narain Singh was false and that "as a matter of fact Sitaram Singh had instituted the case in collusion with the second officer".
This petition is signed by all the opposite parties except opposite party 1. There are 81 more signatories to this petition. The petitioner has not prayed for issue of notice against them. It is clear on a perusal of both the petitions, annexures A and B, that all the opposite parties are guilty of a conduct which was likely to pervert the true course of justice.
In order to establish criminal contempt it is not necessary that there should be intention on the part of the opposite party to interfere with the course of justice. It is not even necessary that the mind of the trial Court should be affected. It is sufficient if the publication tends to prejudice the public or the Court for or against a party before the case is finally heard. The question of intention is immaterial so long as the words used in the publication tend to interfere with the course of justice or prejudice the public or the Court in the trial of the case.
There is authority for the proposition that "contempt of Court" may include conduct which though not directly influencing the judge's mind may affect the conduct of the parties to the proceeding and which is likely to affect the course of true justice. That was the view taken by Maugham L.J. in Re William Thomas Shipping Co. (1930) 2 Ch 368 (A). At page 376 the Lord Justice says:
"If it were so confined, I doubt whether there would be any limit to what a litigant, or some other person, might say pending the hearing of an action in the Chancery Division, unless, indeed, it could be shown that possible witnesses in the case were being interfered with. I think that to publish injurious misrepresentations directed against a party to the action, especially when they are holding up that party to hatred or contempt, is liable to affect the course of justice because it may, in the case of a plaintiff, cause him to discontinue the action from fear of public dislike, or it may cause the defendant to come to a compromise which he otherwise would not come to, for a like reason".
There is an earlier English case in Read and Hug-gonson's case (1742) 2 Atk, 469 (B) in which Lord Hardwicke said :
"Nothing is more incumbent upon Courts of justice, than to preserve their proceedings from being misrepresented; nor is there anything of more pernicious consequence, than to prejudice the minds of the public against persons concerned as parties in causes, before the cause is finally heard".
In defining a little later three kinds of contempt, Lord Hardwicke said :
"There may be ..... a contempt of this Court in abusing parties who are concerned in causes here ..... There cannot be anything of greater consequence than to keep the streams of justice clear and pure, that parties may proceed with safety both to themselves and their characters".
5. In this context, I would refer to a passage at page 91 of Oswald on Contempt, 3rd Edn. The passage is to the following effect :
"All publications which offend against the dignity of the Court, or are calculated to prejudice the course of justice, will constitute contempts. Offences of this nature are of three kinds namely, those which (1) scandalise the Court; or (2) abuse the parties concerned in causes there; or (3) prejudice mankind against persons before the cause is heard. Under the first head all libels on the integrity of the Court, its Judges, officers, or proceedings; under the second and third heads anything which tends to excite prejudice against the parties, or their litigation, while it is pending.
For example, attacks on or abuse of a party, his witnesses or solicitor, constitute contempts, though a mere libel on a party, not amounting to an interference with the course of justice, does not, the party being left to his remedy by action. Theatrical exhibitions referring to a pending case constitute a contempt, and under certain circums- tances the exhibition of a model of a prisoner awaiting his trial might do so. Generally, comments on a cause, written and published, spoken or threatened, while it is pending, and prejudicing, or calculated to prejudice, any party, and particularly paragraphs in newspapers having that effect, are contempts."
6. It is manifest in the present case that there has been a serious attempt on the part of the opposite parties to excite prejudice against the petitioner while the criminal case was pending. There has been an attempt to mobilise public opinion and to approach higher authorities in an extra judicial manner for the purpose of influencing the fate of the criminal case. There has been also deliberate attempt on the part of all the opposite parties, except opposite party 1, to scandalise the trying Magistrate, Mr. R. S. P. Sinha, alleging that he was in collusion with the complainant Awadh Narain Singh.
On behalf of opposite party 1 Mr. Ugrah Singh put forward the contention that it was the duty of the Mukhia to make a report about encroachment of gairmazrua am land to the Sub-divisional Magistrate. It was argued, therefore, that by writing the letter annexure B, to the Sub-divisional Magistrate, the Mukhia, namely opposite party 1, had not committed any contempt of Court. I do not think there is any substance in this argument.
Counsel for opposite party 1 has not been able to show that the Sub-divisional Magistrate has any statutory authority with regard to removal of encroachment on gairmazrua am land, Counsel, however, referred to Section 14(g), Bihar Panchayat Raj Act. Section 14 (g) states that "the Gram Panchayat shall undertake the control and administration of, and be responsible for the reporting and removal of encroachments on public streets, public places and property vested in it".
There is nothing in this section to indicate that there is any statutory duty upon the Mukhia to make a report to the Sub-divisional Magistrate for encroachment on public property. Moreover, the letter, annexure B, cannot be said to be a mere report about encroachment on public land. On the contrary, the Mukhia asserts in the letter that the criminal case had been instituted by Sitaram Singh merely to put pressure upon Dheku Mandal that the criminal case was false and that there was no occurrence as alleged by Awadh Narain Singh in the complaint petition.
It is manifest that the letter, annexture B, is not a bona fide report made by opposite party 1 with regard to encroachment on gairmazrua am land but it was a deliberate attempt made by him to prejudice the trial of the criminal case and to convince the Sub-divisional Magistrate that the criminal case was falsely instituted and that Sitaram had brought the criminal case in order to put pressure upon Dheku Mandal to give up his claim to the Mango trees.
It is manifest, that there was a deliberate attempt on the part of opposite party 1 to distract and to interfere with the proper course of administration of justice. I am satisfied, therefore, that opposite party 1 is .guilty of contempt of Court.
7. As regards the other opposite parties, except opposite party 3, it was submitted by Mr. Ugrah Singh that they merely signed the petition, annexture A, without knowing the contents thereof. It was contended that these opposite parties did not intend to say anything about the criminal case but they had thought that a question regarding gairmazrua land was only involved. I am afraid it is not possible to accept this argument. No counter-affidavit has been filed by these opposite parties to show that they signed the petition without reading its contents.
In any event, it is quite improbable that all these opposite parties should have signed the petition without understanding the contents thereof Paragraph 9 of annexure A is to the following effect:
"The general public is also annoyed with this false case. The signatures of the members of the public are also submitted herewith. An urgent enquiry may be made into the matter. It is hoped you will consider the above facts soon and take proper steps."
After this paragraph Babulal Mandal has signed the petition and then 95 members of the public have signed including opposite parties 2 and 4 to 16. It is a highly far fetched argument that these opposite parties have signed the petition, annexure A, without knowing the contents thereof. The argument of Mr. Ugrah Singh on this point must, therefore, be rejected. It was also contended by learned counsel that as a matter of law the opposite parties could not be convicted of criminal contempt in view of the fact that the Sub-divisional Magistrate has held that no proceeding should be taken.
I do not think that the argument of learned counsel is valid. The Sub-divisional Magistrates has no jurisdiction under the contempt of Courts Act (Act 32 of 1952) to try an offence for contempt or to punish offenders for contempt of Court. If the Sub-divisional Magistrate considered that there was a prima facie case, it was his duty to report to the High Court for taking action under Sections 3 and 4 of Act 32 of 1952.
The order of the Sub-divisional Magistrate in this case is, therefore, not tantamount to that of an acquittal or discharge of the opposite parties on the charge of contempt. I am not, therefore, prepared to hold that there is and legal bar for proceeding against the opposite parties for contempt of Court or to punish them for that offence.
8. Lastly, Mr. Ugrahsingh submitted that his clients would tender unqualified apology and prayed that no punishment might be imposed upon any of the opposite parties. But I do not think that this is a proper case in which we should accept the kind of apology tendered by learned counsel. When asked to show cause by the Sub-divisional Magistrate, opposite parties 1 and 2 did not tender any apology. On the contrary, they attempted to justify their conduct and in their petition they said, among other matters, as follows :
"That whatever statement has been made in the report of this petitioner had been made after full enquiry and on personal knowledge of the petitioner and the petitioner did so with full knowledge that he would go to the witness box to support his statement on oath if and when called to do so."
9. When arguments, were heard today, Mr. Ugrah Singh said that he would file an affidavit on behalf of all the opposite parties, except opposite parties 3, 7, 10, 11 and 16. One of the affidavits on behalf of Jawala Prasad Singh has been duly verified, but two other affidavits filed on behalf of the other opposite parties have not been sworn. But counsel for the petitioner objected that these affidavits had been sworn at a very late stage and should no be accepted.
It is obvious from the order-sheet of this case that opposite parties 1 to 5 appeared on 15-12-1955, and the other opposite parties appeared on 6-1-1956. It is, therefore, clear that the petitions which the opposite parties are putting in today are much belated and counsel for the petitioner complained that copies of the affidavits had not been served on him.
We, therefore, intimated to counsel for the petitioner that these affidavits cannot be accepted at this late stage. But we have perused the affidavit of opposite party and also the unsworn affidavits of the other opposite parties. It is apparent to us that the apology which is offered is not unconditional or unqualified apology. In para 13 of the affidavit, opposite party 1 states that he is not guilty of contempt of Court and in para 15 he states as follows :
"That without prejudice to the submission that your Lordships be pleased to hold that the petitioner is not guilty of contempt of Court, the petitioner hereby tenders his unqualified apology for having stated anything, which might tend to be contempt of Court".
There is a similar statement made in the other two affidavits which have not been sworn.
10. It is true that Section 4, Contempt of Courts Act authorises the High Court to discharge the accused or to remit the punishment if apology is made to the satisfaction of the High Court. In the present case, however, I am not satisfied that the apology is genuine or that it indicates real contrition on the part of the accused persons.
The offence of contempt committed in this case is a very serious matter, for there has been a deliberate attempt on the part of the opposite parties to excite public opinion in the locality against the Magistrate who is trying the case. There was also deliberate attempt to pervert the course of justice by making a memorial to the Chief Minister and other administrative authorities and the manifest intention of the opposite parties was to make an attempt to exercise extra judicial pressure upon the trying Magistrate.
The High Court cannot tolerate this kind of conduct and it is essential that the authority of all Courts of justice must be protected if the administration of justice in the state is to be kept pure and unsullied. I, therefore, take a serious view of the contempt committed by the opposite parties in the special circumstances of this case. I also think that the apology tendered by the opposite parties is not genuine because it was tendered at a very late stage and it was in fact tendered as an alternative ground to the justification of the contempt.
It has been pointed out by Vivian Bose J. in Sub-Judge, First Class, Hoshangabad, v. Jawahar Lal Ramchand 1940 Nag 407 (AIR V 37) (C) that an apology is not a weapon of defence forged to purge the guilty of their offences; nor was it an additional insult to be hurled at the heads of those who had been wronged.
It was also pointed out by the learned Judge that before tender of an apology could be of any avail, it should be tendered at the earliest possible stage, not the latest, and even if wisdom dawns only at the appellate stage, the apology should be tendered unreservedly and unconditionally before the arguments begin and before the person tendering the apology discovers that he has a weak case. These observations of the learned Judge are very apposite in the present case. I hold, therefore, that the apology tendered in this case is not genuine or unreserved and it cannot be accepted as mitigation of the offence committed by the opposite parties.
11. As regards, the sentence I was at first inclined to think that a sentence of imprisonment should be appropriate because of the seriousness of the offence, but in view, however, of the fact that the opposite parties are villagers, who are raw and illiterate, I think that a sentence of fine would be sufficient.
12. For the reasons I have expressed, I convict all the opposite parties under Section 4, Contempt of Courts Act (Act 32 of 1952). Opposite party 1 is the Mukhia of the Gram Panchayat; opposite party 2 is a Surpunch of another Gram Panchayat, and opposite parties 3 and 4 are themselves accused in the criminal case before the Magistrate of Banka. I would impose of fine of Rs. 200/- on each of the opposite parties 1 to 4, and a fine of Rs. 100/- on each of the opposite parties 5 to 16. In default of payment of fine, I direct that the opposite parties should undergo simple imprisonment for six weeks each.
Imam, J.
13. I agree.