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Gujarat High Court

Sadashiv Bhikhaji Puchpute & 5 vs State Of Gujarat & on 5 May, 2017

Author: J.B.Pardiwala

Bench: J.B.Pardiwala

                   R/CR.MA/32759/2016                                                  ORDER




                     IN THE HIGH COURT OF GUJARAT AT AHMEDABAD

                CRIMINAL MISC.APPLICATION (FOR QUASHING & SET ASIDE
                                   FIR/ORDER) NO. 32759 of 2016

         ==========================================================
                      SADASHIV BHIKHAJI PUCHPUTE & 5....Applicant(s)
                                         Versus
                         STATE OF GUJARAT & 1....Respondent(s)
         ==========================================================
         Appearance:
         MR PRATIK B BAROT, ADVOCATE for the Applicant(s) No. 1 - 6
         MR ANKIT Y BACHANI, ADVOCATE for the Respondent(s) No. 2
         MR HRIDAY BUCH, ADVOCATE for the Respondent(s) No. 2
         MS NISHA THAKORE, APP for the Respondent(s) No. 1
         ==========================================================

             CORAM: HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE J.B.PARDIWALA
          
                                         Date : 05/05/2017 
                                           ORAL ORDER

1. By   this   application   under   Section­482   of   the   Code   of   Criminal  Procedure, 1973, the applicants ­ original accused persons seek to invoke  the   inherent   powers   of   this   Court   praying   for   quashing   of   the  proceedings of the Criminal Case No.1907 of 2016 pending before the  Court of the learned Chief Judicial  Magistrate, Surendranagar, arising  from   the   complaint   filed   under   Section­138   of   the   N.I.   Act   for   the  dishonour of the cheques.

2. It appears from the materials on record that the applicants herein  have been arraigned as an accused in their capacity as the Directors of  the Shree Sai Krupa Sugar & Allied Industries Limited. They are sought to  be   held   vicariously   liable   by   virtue   of   Section­141   of   the   Negotiable  Instrument Act



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HC-NIC                                       Page 1 of 20      Created On Wed Aug 16 06:06:01 IST 2017
                    R/CR.MA/32759/2016                                                  ORDER




3. The principal argument of the learned counsel appearing for the  applicants is that in the complaint, there are no basic averments that at  the time of commission of the offence, the applicants being the Directors  of   the   Company   were   in   day­to­day   affairs   and   management   of   the  company.   According   to   the   learned   counsel,   in   the   absence   of   any  specific   averment   in   this   regard,   supported   by   some   materials,   the  applicants cannot be put on trial for the offence under Section­138 of the  N.I. Act by taking aid of Section­141 of the Act. In such circumstances  referred to above, it is prayed that there being merit in this application,  the   same   be   allowed   and   the   proceedings   be   quashed   so   far   as   the  applicants are concerned.

4. On the other hand, this application has been vehemently opposed  by   Mr.   Buch,   the   learned   counsel   appearing   for   the   complainant.   He  submits   that   the   complaint   gave   a   sufficient   indication   that   the  applicants herein being the Directors of the  Company have played an  important role so far as the transaction is concerned. Mr. Buch invited  my attention to a Page­47, which is resolution passed in the meeting of  the Board of Directors. The resolution reads as under:­ Shri Saikrupa Sugar TRUE COPY OF RESOLUTAION PASSED IN THE MEETING OF THE BOARD   OF DIRECTORS OF ­ THE   COMPANY   HELD   ON   18th  NOVEMBER,   2015   AT   5:00   PM   AT   THE   REGISTERED OFFICE 6 - ANNASAHEN MAGAR COMPLEX, MARKET YARD   PUNE - 411 037.

To delegate the power to the Managing Director and Chairman for signing   the  agreement  with  M/s  Dungarmal  Dhanraj   & Co.238  - 242,  2nd  Floor,   Mega Mall, Near Milan Cinema, Surendranagar (Gujarat).

"Resolved that the Shri Saikrupa Sugar and Alleid Industries Ltd., Hiradgaon   Unit agreed to Receive  advance payment  from Dungarmal  Dhanraj  & Co.,   Page 2 of 20 HC-NIC Page 2 of 20 Created On Wed Aug 16 06:06:01 IST 2017 R/CR.MA/32759/2016 ORDER Mehta Market, Surendranagar, Ahmedabad (Gujarat) for sale of Sugar on   execution of agreement with the buyer i.e.  Dungarmal Dhanraj & Co. 238­ 242,   2nd  Floor   Mega   Mall,   Near   Milan  Cinema,   Surendranagar   (Gujarat   State)"
"Further Resolved that, Shri Rajkumar Sudhamrao Dhamdhere, Managing   Director is hereby Authorized to execute agreement and related documents   with   Dungarmal   Dhanraj   &   Co.   238­242,   2nd  Floor,   Mega   Mall,   Milan   Cinema, Surendranagar (Gujarat State) for the payment to be Advance for   the supply of sugar."

5. According   to   Mr.   Buch,   the   applicants   herein   in   the   meeting  convened on 18/11/2015 delegated the power to the Managing Director  and the Charmian for signing the agreement with the complainant. Mr.  Buch, thereafter, invited my attention to the agreement, which is Page­ 39 and more particularly, Clause­10 thereof, which reads as under:­

10.   Chairman   Mr.   Vikram   Babanrao   Pachpute   and   the   Managing   Director Mr. Rajkumar Sudamrao Dhamdhere of the FIRST PART have   given affidavit cum undertaking that upon failure in performance by   the FIRST PART, they will do the needful to repay the payment and   the losses to the SECOND PART in their personal liability and upon   failure by them to do so the SECOND PART can enforce attachment to   the properties of the FIRST PART alongwith Directors and in such case   FIRST PART can not take any type of objection outside or within the   Court. 

6. In such circumstances referred to above, Mr. Buch prays that there  is no merit in this application, the same is rejected.

7. Having heard the learned counsel appearing for the parties and  having considered the materials on record, the only question that falls  for my consideration is whether the proceedings should be quashed so  far as the applicants are concerned.

8. In the complaint, the following has been averred :­ (1) That   M/s.   Dungarmal   Dhanraj   &   Co.   is   a   proprietorship   Page 3 of 20 HC-NIC Page 3 of 20 Created On Wed Aug 16 06:06:01 IST 2017 R/CR.MA/32759/2016 ORDER concern having its registered office at the address cited above and is  represented   by   its   proprietor   Mr.   Lalit   Dhanraj   Kella,   present   complainant­company  is engaged  in the business  of wholesale  sugar   trading and supply to the bulk consumers and accused no.1 is Limited   Company, Accused No.2 is a Chairman of said Company, and accused   No.3 Managing Director of the Company and accused No.4 to 9 are   Directors   of   the   Company.   Accused   are   engaged   in   the   business   of   processing sugarcane into Sugar and sale of Sugar. It is stated that the   factory of accused is situated at Po. Hiradgaon, Tal. Shrigonda, Dist.   Ahmednagar   -   413701   (Maharashtra).   In   view   of   the   nature   of   business   engaged   by   accused,   the   accused   had   approached   present   complainant­company for sale of 2500MT of Sugar S/30 in 50Kg. PP   Bag of the coming production year 2015­16 at the rate of Rs.2000/­   per quintal as specified as per agreement dated 04­12­2015 which is   entered into for the quantity of 2500 MT between parties, i.e. accused   and present complainant­company At. Surendranagar. As per the said   agreement, the delivery of goods was to commence w.e.f. February -   2016   and   it   was   accordingly   agreed   by   accused   and   hence,   it   was   responsibility of accused to make delivery of goods as per the terms   mentioned in agreement.

(2) An agreement has been executed between the parties and as per   the conditions No.3, it is agreed that even if delivery of single bag is   given short to present complainant­company, it will be considered as   the failure of performance by accused. In such circumstances, it will be   personal   liability   of   all   accused   and   the   Company   Chairman,   Managing Directors as well as Directors and Additional Director can   also be liable for the same.

It   is   stated   that   accused   have   not   supplied   goods   at   all   to   present   complainant­company as per the terms of the agreement, and accused   have failed to comply terms of agreement.

(3) The said agreement also contains details relating to the cheques   given by accused to present complainant­company in Condition No.3.   The said condition clearly mentions that if single beg is given short by   accused, it will be considered as failure of performance. Since accused   have failed to company with the said agreement, present complainant­ company had informed the accused often and often time by letters and   E­mail about failure  of performance  on accused  part, but thereafter   accused   had   not   taken   care   to   give   reply   to   present   complainant­ company and accused had failed to comply with the same and hence,   present complainant­company was left with no option but to deposit   the said cheques for encashment on 27/6/2016.

(4) It   is   stated   that   as   per   the   terms   of   agreement   present   complainant­ company had paid in advance sum of Rs.5,00,00,000/­   Page 4 of 20 HC-NIC Page 4 of 20 Created On Wed Aug 16 06:06:01 IST 2017 R/CR.MA/32759/2016 ORDER (Rupees Five Crore Only) through Bank. However, accused have not   supplied the goods as per agreement and accused have failed to comply   the terms of agreement and therefore all accused are liable to pay total   sum   of   Rs.10,00,00,000/­   (Rupees   Ten   Crores   Only)   and   present   complainant­company   is   entitled   to   encahs   the   cheques   given   by   accused   and   hence   present   complainant­company   had   deposited   Cheque No.186317 of Rs.5,00,00,000/­ (Rupees Five Crore Only) and   Cheque   No.186318   of   Rs.5,00,00,000/­   (Rupees   Five   Crore   Only)   issued by you of Bank of India which have been dishonoured. There is   legal dues of present complainant­ company and accused are bound to   pay such amount however accused have failed to do so accused were   very well aware that present complainant­company are entitled to get   Rs.10   Crore   from   accused   and   accused   were   also   well   aware   that   present   complainant­company   may   deposit   the   cheques   issued   by   accused for satisfaction  of dues. However  accused have  intentionally   not kept sufficient fund in Bank account and accused have committed   criminal breach of trust and  all accused  are liable  to be prosecuted   under the Provisions of Negotiable Instrument Act.

(5) Accordingly,   present   complainant­company   deposited   cheques   bearing   Nos.186317   and   186318,   Rs.5,00,00,000/­   (Rupees   Five   Crore  Only)  each,  and  Rs.10,00,00,000/­  (Rupees  Ten  Crore  Only)   intoto, drawn on the Bank of India, Shrigonda Branch, Ahmednagar   (Maharashtra) issued by accused and duly signed by Chairman and   Managing  Director  in favour  of present  complainant­company,  with   his Bank,  viz., Dena Bank and the said Bank has as per its Return   Memo   dated   :   27/06/2016   returned   the   aforesaid   cheques   as   dishonoured  and   unpaid   with   return  memo   endorsement   as  "Funds   Insufficient." thus, the cheques issued by accused in favour of present   complainant­company   have   been   dishonoured   and   bounced,   which   amounts   to   the   offence   under   the   Provisions   of   the   Negotiable   Instrument Act.

(6) Further the agreement in question is executed by the Chairman   and   Managing   Director   of   accused   company   on   the   basis   of   the   resolution passed by all the Directors and personal guarantee was also   given by the Managing Directors of the Company and they have been   served with legal notices for being part of the criminal conspiracy as   well as for failure in fulfilling their commitment.

(7) It is stated that the complainant­company sent the legal notice   to   accused,   through   registered   posts   as   well   as   by   way   of   courier   service and also sent by email of accused email address. It is stated   that the legal notice sent to the accused duly serve as the notice by the   way of register post has been serve on Dt.13/07/2016.  It is further   stated  that   accused  had  not  paid   any  amount  of  cheques   and  they   have not comply with the notice and therefore present complainant­ Page 5 of 20 HC-NIC Page 5 of 20 Created On Wed Aug 16 06:06:01 IST 2017 R/CR.MA/32759/2016 ORDER company has constrain to file present complain against the accused.

It is stated that the aforesaid cheque  dishonor  due to the reason of   "funds insufficient". It is stated that the accused party were well aware   that there is dues and the present complainant­company may deposit   above mentioned cheques for the said dues, however the accused with   malafide intention did not maintain sufficient balance and therefore   the  abovementioned  cheques  have  been  dishonored.  It is also stated   that present complainant­company was inform by his bank and had   informed that the cheques were dishonored due to the reason "funds   insufficient".   That   the   said   intimation   was   received   on   dtd.27/06/2016. It is stated that the complainant herein had sent the   notice   to   the   accused   within   prescribed   time   by   the   law.   It   is   also   stated that proper opportunity for payment of cheque has been given   to the  accused,  however  they  have  failed  to make  payment  and  till   date   no   such   amount   has   been   paid   by   the   accused   to   the   present   complainant­company.

(8) The   cause   of   action   has   arisen   when   the   cheques   were   dishonored and the accused had failed to make payment of aforesaid   cheque amount   within the stipulated period. It is submitted that all   the   transactions   took   place   at   the   complainant­company,   and   the   cheques were presented by the complainant­company with Dena Bank,   Surendranagar, within the jurisdiction of this Hon'ble Court. So, this   Hon'ble   Court   has   jurisdiction   to   entertain,   try   and   dispose   of   the   complaint.

(9) The   complainant,   therefore,   prays   to   this   Hon'ble   Court   to   register the complaint against the present accused and issue summons   and warrants against the present accused and proceed against all the   accused. It is humbly prayed that the accused may be convicted for the   offence   punishable   under   section   138   read   with   section   141   of   the   Negotiable Instrument Act. And be pleased to imposed heavy fine and   the cheques amount Rs.10,00,00,000/­ (Rupees Ten Crore Only) may   be ordered to be paid to the complainant. 

9. In a very recent pronouncement of the Supreme Court in the case  of Standard Chartered Bank (supra), His Lordship Dipak Mishra, J. has  very succinctly explained and discussed the issue in question after an  exhaustive review of all earlier decisions of the Supreme Court on the  point. I may quote the relevant observations made in paras 9 to 34 as  under:

Page 6 of 20
HC-NIC Page 6 of 20 Created On Wed Aug 16 06:06:01 IST 2017 R/CR.MA/32759/2016 ORDER "9.   To   appreciate   the   controversy   in   proper   perspective,   it   is   appropriate to refer to Sections 138 and 141 of the Act. Section 138   reads as follows:­ "138.   Dishonour   of   cheque   for   insufficiency,   etc.,   of   funds   in   the   account.Where   any   cheque   drawn   by   a   person   on   an   account   maintained   by   him   with   a   banker   for   payment   of   any   amount   of   money to another person from out of that account for the discharge, in   whole or in part, of any debt or other liability, is returned by the bank   unpaid, either because of the amount of money standing to the credit   of that account is insufficient to honour the cheque or that it exceeds   the   amount   arranged   to   be   paid   from   bank,   such   person   shall   be   deemed to have committed an offence and shall, without prejudice to   any other provision of this Act, be punished with imprisonment for a   term  which  may be extended  to two years,  or with fine  which  may   extend to twice the amount of the cheque, or with both:
Provided that nothing contained in this section shall apply unless
(a) the cheque has been presented to the bank within a period of six   months from the date on which it is drawn or within the period of its   validity, whichever is earlier;
(b) the payee or the holder in due course of the cheque, as the case   may   be,   makes   a   demand   for   the   payment   of   the   said   amount   of   money   by   giving   a   notice   in   writing,   to   the   drawer   of   the   cheque,   within thirty days of the receipt of information by him from the bank   regarding the return of the cheque as unpaid; and
(c) the drawer of such cheque fails to make the payment of the said   amount of money to the payee or as the case may be, to the holder in   due course of the cheque, within fifteen days of the receipt of the said   notice.

Explanation.For   the   purposes   of   this   section,   debt   or   other   liability   means a legally enforceable debt or other liability.

10 On a studied scrutiny of the aforesaid provision, it is quite limpid   that to constitute the criminal liability the complainant is required to   show that a cheque was issued; that it was presented in the bank in   question;   that   on   due   presentation,   it   was   dishonoured;   that,   as   enshrined in the provision, requisite notice was served on the person   who was sought to be made liable for criminal liability; and that in  spite  of service  of notice,  the person  who  has been arraigned  as an   accused   did   not   comply   with   the   notice   by   making   payment   or   fulfilling   other   obligations   within   the  prescribed   period,  that   is,   15   days from the date of receipt of notice.

11. Section 141 of the Act deals with offences by companies. It reads   as follows:­

141. Offences  by companies.(1) If the person committing  an offence   under Section 138 is a company, every person who, at the time the   offence was committed, was in charge of, and was responsible to the   company for the conduct of the business of the company, as well as the   Page 7 of 20 HC-NIC Page 7 of 20 Created On Wed Aug 16 06:06:01 IST 2017 R/CR.MA/32759/2016 ORDER company, shall be deemed to be guilty of the offence and shall be liable   to   be   proceeded   against   and   punished   accordingly:   Provided   that   nothing contained in this sub­section shall render any person liable to   9 punishment if he proves that the offence was committed without his   knowledge,  or that he had exercised all due diligence to prevent the   commission of such offence:

Provided further that where a person is nominated as a Director of a   company   by   virtue   of   his   holding   any   office   or   employment   in   the   Central Government or State Government or a financial corporation   owned   or   controlled   by   the   Central   Government   or   the   State   Government, as the case may be, he shall not be liable for prosecution   under this Chapter.
(2) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub­section (1), where any   offence   under   this  Act   has   been  committed  by  a company   and  it  is   proved   that   the   offence   has   been   committed   with   the   consent   or   connivance  of, or is attributable  to, any neglect on the part of, any   Director,   Manager,   Secretary   or   other   officer   of   the   company,   such   Director, Manager, Secretary or other officer shall also be deemed to be   guilty of that offence and shall be liable to be proceeded against and   punished accordingly.

Explanation.For the purposes of this section (a) company means any   body corporate and includes a firm or other association of individuals;   and

(b) director, in relation to a firm, means a partner in the firm.

12 On a perusal of the aforesaid provision, it is clear as crystal that if   the person who commits an offence under Section 138 of the Act is a   company,   the   company   as   well   as   other   person   in   charge   of   or   responsible   to   the   company   for   the   conduct   of   the   business   of   the   company  at the   time  of  commission  of  the  offence  is   deemed  to   be   guilty  of the  offence.  Thus,  it creates  a constructive  liability  on  the   persons responsible for the conduct of the business of the company.

13.   At   one   point   of   time,   an   issue   had   arisen   before   this   Court,   whether a complaint could be held to be maintainable without making   the company a party. The said controversy has been put to rest by a   three­Judge Bench decision in Aneeta Hada v. Godfather Travels and   Tours   Private   Limited6   wherein   it   has   been   held   that   when   the   company can be prosecuted, then only the persons mentioned in the   other categories could be vicariously liable for the offence subject to the   averments in the petition and proof thereof. It has been further held   therein that there cannot be any vicarious liability unless there is a   prosecution against the company. In the case at hand, the company   has been arrayed as the accused No. 1 along with the Chairman and   other Directors.

14 Now, we must go back in time to appreciate what has been stated   in S.M.S. Pharma I (supra), wherein a three­Judge Bench answered a   reference on three issues. The answers on two issues which are relevant   Page 8 of 20 HC-NIC Page 8 of 20 Created On Wed Aug 16 06:06:01 IST 2017 R/CR.MA/32759/2016 ORDER for the present purpose are as follows:­

(a) ..........

(b) Whether a director of a company would be deemed to be in charge   of, and responsible to, the company for conduct of the business of the   company and, therefore, deemed to be guilty of the offence unless he   proves to the contrary.

(c) Even if it is held that specific averments are necessary, whether in   the absence of such averments the signatory of the cheque and or the   managing directors or joint managing director who admittedly would   be   in   charge   of   the   company   and   responsible   to   the   company   for   conduct of its business could be proceeded against.

15 The three­Judge Bench referred to Section 138 and 141 of the Act,   Sections 203 and 204 of CrPC and observed that a complaint must   contain material to enable  the Magistrate  to make  up his mind  for   issuing   process   and   if   this   were   not   the   requirement,   consequences   would  be far­reaching.  If a Magistrate  has to issue  process  in every   case,   the   burden   of   work   before   the   Magistrate   as   well   as   the   harassment   caused   to   the   respondents   to   whom   process   has   to   be   issued would be tremendous. It has been observed therein that Section   204 of the CrPC commences with the words if in the opinion of the   Magistrate taking cognizance of an offence there is sufficient ground   for   proceeding   and   that   apart,   the   words   sufficient   ground   for   proceeding   again   suggest   that   ground   should   be   made   out   in   the   complaint   for   proceeding   against   the   respondent.   The   three­Judge   Bench has ruled that it is settled law that at the time of issuing of the   process, the Magistrate is required to see only the allegations in the   complaint   and   where   the   allegations   in   the   complaint   or   the   chargesheet   do   not   constitute   an   offence   against   a   person,   the   complaint is liable to be dismissed.

16 After so stating, the Court adverted to the complaint filed under   Section 138 of the Act and opined that the complaint should make out   a   case   for   issue   of   process.   As   far   as   the   officers   responsible   for   conducting   the   affairs   of   the   company   are   concerned,   the   Court   referred   to   various   provisions   of   the   Companies   Act,   1956   and   analysed Section 141 of the Act to lay down as follows:­ "What   is   required   is   that   the   persons   who   are   sought   to   be   made   criminally liable under Section 141 should be, at the time the offence   was committed, in charge of and responsible to the company for the   conduct of the business of the company. Every person connected with   the company shall not fall within the ambit of the provision. It is only   those persons who were in charge of and responsible for the conduct of   business of the company at the time of commission of an offence, who   will be liable for criminal action. It follows from this that if a director   of a company who was not in charge of and was not responsible for   the conduct of the business of the company at the relevant time, will   Page 9 of 20 HC-NIC Page 9 of 20 Created On Wed Aug 16 06:06:01 IST 2017 R/CR.MA/32759/2016 ORDER not  be liable under  the  provision.  The  liability  arises  from  being  in   charge of and responsible for the conduct of business of the company at   the relevant time when the offence was committed and not on the basis   of merely holding a designation or office in a company. Conversely, a   person  not  holding  any office  or   designation  in a  company  may  be   liable if he satisfies the main requirement of being in charge of and   responsible for the conduct of business of a company at the relevant   time.   Liability   depends   on   the   role   one   plays   in   the   affairs   of   a   company   and   not   on   designation   or   status.   If   being   a   director   or   manager or secretary was enough to cast criminal liability, the section   would have said so. Instead of every person the section would have said   every director, manager or secretary in a company is liable&, etc. The   legislature is aware that it is a case of criminal liability which means   serious consequences so far as the person sought to be made liable is   concerned.  Therefore,  only persons  who can be said to be connected   with   the   commission   of   a   crime   at   the   relevant   time   have   been   subjected to action."

17   After   so   stating,   the   Court   placed   reliance   on  sub­Section   2   of   Section 141 of the Act for getting support of the aforesaid reasoning as   the   said   sub­Section   envisages   direct   involvement   of   any   Director,   Manager, Secretary or other officer of a company in the commission of   an   offence.  The   Court   proceeded   to   observe   that   the   said   provision   operates   when   in   a   trial   it   is   proved   that   the   offence   has   been   committed with the consent or connivance or is attributable to neglect   on the part of any of the holders of the offices in a company. It has   also   been   observed   that   provision   has   been   made   for   directors,   managers, secretaries and other officers of a company to cover them in   cases  of their  proved  involvement.  It is because  a person  who  is in   charge of and responsible for conduct of business of a company would   naturally know why a cheque in question was issued and why it got   dishonoured and simultaneously it means no other person connected   with   a   company   is   made   liable   under   Section   141   of   the   Act.   The   liability   arises,   as   the   three­Judge   Bench   opined,   on   account   of   conduct, act or omission on the part of an officer and not merely on   account of holding office or position in a company and, therefore, in  order  to bring  a case  within  Section  141  of the  Act,  the  complaint   must disclose the necessary facts which makes a person liable. In the   said case, the Court  has referred  to the decisions  in  Secunderabad   Health Care Ltd. v. Secunderabad Hospitals (P) Ltd.  [1999 (96)   Comp  Case  106],  V. Sudheer Reddy v. State of A.P.[2000  (107)   Comp Case 107], R. Kanan v. Kotak Mahindra Finance Ltd. [2003   (115)   Comp   Case   321],  Lok   Housing   ad   Constructions   Ltd.   v.  Raghupati Leasing and Finance Ltd [2003 (115) Comp Case 957],   Sunil Kumar Chhaparia v. Dakka Eshwaraiah [2002 (108) Comp   Case   687],  State   of   Haryana   v.   Brij   Lal   Mittal  [1998   (5)   SCC   343],  K.P.G. Nair v. Jindal Menthol India Ltd.  [2001  (10) SCC   218],  Katta Sujatha  v. Fertilizers & Chemicals Travancore Ltd.  [2002 (7) SCC 655] and eventually expressed thus:­ Page 10 of 20 HC-NIC Page 10 of 20 Created On Wed Aug 16 06:06:01 IST 2017 R/CR.MA/32759/2016 ORDER "A   liability   under   Section   141   of   the   Act   is   sought   to   be   fastened   vicariously   on   a   person   connected   with   a   company,   the   principal   accused being  the company  itself. It is a departure  from the rule in   criminal law against vicarious liability. A clear case should be spelled   out in the complaint against the person sought to be made liable.

Section 141 of the Act contains the requirements for making a person   liable under  the said provision. That the respondent falls within the   parameters of Section 141 has to be spelled out.

A complaint has to be examined by the Magistrate in the first instance   on   the   basis   of   averments   contained   therein.   If   the   Magistrate   is   satisfied that there are averments which bring the case within Section   141,   he   would   issue   the   process.   We   have   seen   that   merely   being   described  as a director  in  a company  is not  sufficient  to satisfy  the   requirement of Section 141. Even a non­director can be liable under   Section  141 of the  Act.  The  averments  in the complaint  would also   serve the purpose that the person sought to be made liable would know   what is the case which is alleged against him.

This will enable him to meet the case at the trial."

18  On  the  basis  of the  aforesaid  analysis,  the  Court  in this regard   concluded that:­ "It is necessary to specifically aver in a complaint under Section 141   that at the time the offence was committed, the person accused was in   charge of, and responsible for the conduct of business of the company.   This averment is an essential requirement of Section 141 and has to be   made   in   a   complaint.   Without   this   averment   being   made   in   a   complaint,   the   requirements   of   Section   141   cannot   be   said   to   be   satisfied."

19 After the three­Judge Bench answered the reference, the matter was   placed   before   a   two­Judge   Bench.   The   two­Judge   Bench,   hearing   S.M.S. Pharmaceuticals Ltd. v. Neeta Bhalla and another  [2007   (4) SCC 70] (hereinafter referred to as SMS Pharma II), reproduced a   passage   from  Sabitha   Ramamurthy   v.   R.B.S.   Channabasavaradhya  [2006   (10)   SCC   581]   which   reads   as   follows:­ "7. A bare  perusal  of the  complaint  petitions  demonstrates  that  the   statutory   requirements   contained   in   Section   141   of   the   Negotiable   Instruments Act had not been complied with. It may be true that it is   not   necessary   for   the   complainant   to   specifically   reproduce   the   wordings of the section but what is required is a clear statement of fact   so as to enable the court to arrive at a prima facie opinion that the   accused  are  vicariously  liable.  Section  141  raises  a legal  fiction.   By   reason of the said provision, a person although is not personally liable   for commission of such an offence would be vicariously liable therefor.  



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Such vicarious liability can be inferred so far as a company registered   or incorporated under the Companies Act, 1956 is concerned only if   the   requisite   statements,   which   are   required   to   be   averred   in   the   complaint   petition,   are   made   so   as   to   make   the   accused   therein   vicariously liable for the offence committed by the company. Before a   person   can   be   made   vicariously   liable,   strict   compliance   with   the   statutory requirements would be insisted."

20   Thereafter  the  Court   referred   to  the   authority   in  Saroj  Kumar   Poddar v. State (NCT of Delhi) and another [2007 (3) SCC 693]   and noted the observations which we think it apt to reproduce:­ "14.   Apart   from   the   Company   and   the   appellant,   as   noticed   hereinbefore, the Managing Director and all other Directors were also   made accused.

The appellant did not issue any cheque. He, as noticed hereinbefore,   had  resigned  from  the directorship  of the  Company.  It may  be  true   that as to exactly on what date the said resignation was accepted by   the Company is not known, but, even otherwise, there is no averment   in   the   complaint   petitions   as   to   how   and   in   what   manner   the   appellant   was   responsible   for   the   conduct   of   the   business   of   the   Company or otherwise responsible to it in regard to its functioning. He   had not issued any cheque. How he is responsible for dishonour of the   cheque has not been stated. The allegations made in para 3, thus, in   our opinion do not satisfy the requirements of Section 141 of the Act."

21. The said observations were clarified by stating that:­ "26.   A   faint   suggestion   was   made   that   this   Court   in   Saroj   Kumar   Poddar (supra) has laid down the law that the complaint petition not   only   must   contain   averments   satisfying   the   requirements   of   Section   141 of the Act but must also show as to how and in what manner the   appellant   was   responsible   for   the   conduct   of   the   business   of   the   company or otherwise responsible to it in regard to its functioning. A   plain reading of the said judgment would show that no such general   law was laid down therein. The observations were made in the context   of the said case as it was dealing with a contention that although no   direct  averment  was  made  as against  the appellant  of the said case   fulfilling  the  requirements  of Section  141 of the  Act  but  there  were   other   averments   which   would   show   that   the   appellant   therein   was   liable therefor."

22 The said clarification was reiterated in Everest Advertising (P) Ltd.   v. State, Govt. of NCT of Delhi and others18.

23  In the  said  case,  taking   note  of the  assertions  in the  complaint   which were really vague, the Court declined to interfere with the order   passed by the High Court which had opined that the complainant did   not disclose commission of offence against the accused persons.



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24 Be it noted, the observations made in Saroj Kumar Poddar (supra)   and   clarification   given   in   SMS   Pharma   II   (supra)   and   Everest   Advertising (P) Ltd. (supra) were taken note of in K.K. Ahuja v. V.K.   Vora   and   Anr   2009   (10)   SCC   48].   In   the   said   case,   the   Court   explaining the position under Section 141 of the Act has stated thus:­ "The position under Section 141 of the Act can be summarised thus:

(i)   If   the   accused   is   the   Managing   Director   or   a   Joint   Managing   Director, it is not necessary to make an averment in the complaint that   he is in charge of, and is responsible to the company, for the conduct of   the business of the company. It is sufficient if an averment is made that   the accused was the Managing Director or Joint Managing Director at   the  relevant  time.  This   is because  the  prefix  Managing  to the  word   Director makes it clear that they were in charge of and are responsible   to the company, for the conduct of the business of the company.
(ii) In the case of a Director or an officer of the company who signed   the   cheque   on   behalf   of   the   company,   there   is   no   need   to   make   a   specific averment that he was in charge of and was responsible to the   company, for the conduct of the business of the company or make any   specific allegation about consent, connivance or negligence.

The very fact that the dishonoured cheque was signed by him on behalf   of the company, would give rise to responsibility under sub­section (2)   of Section 141.

(iii)   In  the  case  of  a   Director,   secretary   or  manager   [as   defined   in   Section 2(24) of the Companies Act] or a person referred to in clauses  

(e) and  (f) of Section  5  of the  Companies  Act,  an averment  in the   complaint   that   he   was   in   charge   of,   and   was   responsible   to   the   company, for the conduct of the business of the company is necessary   to bring the case under Section 141(1) of the Act. No further averment   would be necessary in the complaint, though some particulars will be   desirable.   They   can   also   be   made   liable   under   Section   141(2)   by   making   necessary   averments   relating   to   consent   and   connivance   or   negligence,   in   the   complaint,   to   bring   the   matter   under   that   sub­ section.

(iv)   Other   officers   of   a  company   cannot   be   made   liable   under  sub­ section (1) of Section 141. Other officers of a company can be made   liable only under  sub­section (2) of Section 141,  by averring  in the   complaint their position and duties in the company and their role in   regard to the issue and dishonour  of the cheque,  disclosing  consent,   connivance or negligence."

25   In   Harmeet   Singh   Paintal   (supra),   a   two­Judge   Bench   did   not   agree with the stand of the appellant, emphasized on the averments   and   found   that   in   the   complaint   petition   there   were   no   specific   averments   and,   accordingly,   dismissed   the   appeal   filed   by   the   Page 13 of 20 HC-NIC Page 13 of 20 Created On Wed Aug 16 06:06:01 IST 2017 R/CR.MA/32759/2016 ORDER appellant­Corporation therein. The Court in paragraphs 17 and 18 of   the judgment reproduced the part of the complaint. We have carefully   perused  the said averments  in the claim petition  and  we are of the   opinion that there cannot be any shadow of doubt that the assertions   made therein did not meet the requirements of Section 141 of the Act.

26   In   A.K.   Singhania   (supra),   after   referring   to   the   previous   judgments, the Court found that it was difficult to infer that there was   any   averment   that   the   two   accused   persons   who   had   come   to   this   Court, were in charge and responsible for the conduct of the business   of the Company at the time the offence was committed. The allegation   in   the   complaints   in   sum   and   substance   was   that   business   and   financial  affairs  of the  Company  used  to be decided,  organized  and   administered by accused persons along with other Directors.

27 In Gunmala Sales Pvt. Ltd. (supra) the Court was concerned with   Directors who issued the cheques. This authority, as we notice, has to   be   appositely   understood.   The   two­Judge   Bench   referred   to   SMS   Pharma I and other earlier decisions, and came to hold that:­ "30. When a petition is filed for quashing the process, in a given case,   on an overall reading of the complaint, the High Court may find that   the basic averment is sufficient, that it makes out a case against the   Director; that there is nothing to suggest that the substratum of the   allegation   against   the   Director   is   destroyed   rendering   the   basic   averment insufficient and that since offence is made out against him,   his further role can be brought out in the trial. In another case, the   High Court  may quash  the complaint  despite  the  basic averment.  It   may   come   across   some   unimpeachable   evidence   or   acceptable   circumstances which may in its opinion lead to a conclusion that the   Director  could never  have  been in charge  of and responsible  for  the   conduct   of   the   business   of   the   company   at   the   relevant   time   and   therefore making him stand the trial would be an abuse of process of   court as no offence is made out against him.

31 When in view of the basic averment process is issued the complaint   must   proceed   against   the   Directors.   But,   if   any   Director   wants   the   process  to be quashed  by filing  a petition  under  Section  482 of the   Code   on   the   ground   that   only   a   bald   averment   is   made   in   the   complaint and that he is really not concerned with the issuance of the   cheque,  he  must  in order  to persuade  the  High  Court  to quash  the   process   either   furnish   some   sterling   incontrovertible   material   or   acceptable circumstances to substantiate his contention. He must make   out   a   case   that   making   him   stand   the   trial   would   be   an   abuse   of   process of court. He cannot get the complaint quashed merely on the   ground that apart from the basic averment no particulars are given in   the  complaint  about  his role, because  ordinarily  the  basic averment   would be sufficient to send him to trial and it could be argued that his   further role could be brought out in the trial. Quashing of a complaint   Page 14 of 20 HC-NIC Page 14 of 20 Created On Wed Aug 16 06:06:01 IST 2017 R/CR.MA/32759/2016 ORDER is a serious matter. Complaint cannot be quashed for the asking. For   quashing of a complaint it must be shown that no offence is made out   at all against the Director."  [Emphasis supplied] 28 After so stating, the Court proceeded to summarise its conclusions,   appreciated the averments made in the complaint petition and opined   thus:­ ".....Pertinently, in the application filed by the respondents,  no clear   case was made out that at the material time, the Directors were not in   charge of and were not responsible for the conduct of the business of   the   Company   by   referring   to   or   producing   any   incontrovertible   or   unimpeachable   evidence   which   is   beyond   suspicion  or   doubt  or   any   totally   acceptable   circumstances.   It   is   merely   stated   that   Sidharth   Mehta  had resigned from the directorship  of the Company on 30­9­ 2010 but no incontrovertible or unimpeachable evidence was produced   before the High Court as was done in Anita Malhotra [2012 (1) SCC   520] to show that he had, in fact, resigned long before the cheques in   question were issued. Similar is the case with Kanhaiya Lal Mehta and   Anu Mehta. Nothing was produced to substantiate the contention that   they were not in charge of and not responsible for the conduct of the   business of the Company at the relevant time. In the circumstances, we   are of the opinion that the matter deserves to be remitted to the High   Court for fresh hearing. However, we are inclined to confirm the order   passed   by   the   High   Court   quashing   the   process   as   against   Shobha   Mehta. Shobha Mehta is stated to be an old lady who is over 70 years   of age.

Considering this fact and on an overall reading of the complaint in the   peculiar facts and circumstances of the case, we feel that making her   stand the trial would be an abuse of process of court. It is however,   necessary for the High Court to consider the cases of other Directors in   light of the decisions considered by us and the conclusions drawn by us   in this judgment."

29 We have referred to the aforesaid decision in extenso, as we are of   the convinced opinion that the analysis made therein would squarely   apply to the case  at hand  and  it shall  be clear  when  we reproduce   certain passages from the complaint.

30   Prior   to   that,   we   may   profitably   refer   to   a   two­Judge   Bench   decision in Tamil Nadu News Print & Papers Ltd. v. D. Karunakar   and Others 2015 (8) Scale 733].  In the said case, the Court has   referred   to   the   decision   rendered   in   S.M.S.   Pharma   I   (supra)   and,   thereafter, taken note of the averments made in the complaint. Be it   noted, in the said case it had been averred in the complaint petition   that the accused Nos. 2 to 9 were Directors and were in day to day   management  of the accused company and in that context the Court   has opined as follows:­ Page 15 of 20 HC-NIC Page 15 of 20 Created On Wed Aug 16 06:06:01 IST 2017 R/CR.MA/32759/2016 ORDER "Upon perusal of the complaint, we find that an averment has been   made to the effect that Accused Nos.3 to 10 were in fact, in­charge of   the day­to­day business of Accused No.1­company."

31   We   have   referred   to   these   decisions   as   they   explicitly   state   the   development  of  law  and  also lay  down  the  duty  of  the  High  Court   while   exercising   the   power   of   quashing   regard   being   had   to   the   averments   made   in   the   complaint   petition   to   attract   the   vicarious   liability of the persons responsible under Section 141 of the Act.

32 Now, is the time to scan the complaint. Mr. Divan, learned senior   counsel appearing for the appellant­bank, has drawn our attention to   paragraphs   2,   4   and   10   of   the   complaint   petition.   They   read   as   follows:­ "2. I further say that I know the accused above named. The accused   No.1   is   a   Company   incorporated   under   the   Companies   Act,   1956   having   its   registered   address   as   mentioned   in   the   cause   title.   The   accused Nos.2 to 7 are the Chairman,  Managing  Director,  Executive   Director   and   whole   time   Director   and   authorized   signatories   of   accused   No.1   respectively.   As   such   being   the   Chairman,   Managing   Director, Executive Director and Whole Time Director were and are the   persons responsible and in charge of day to day business of the accused   No.1 viz.when the offence  was committed. The accused Nos.6 and 7   being   signatories   of   the   cheque   are   aware   of   the   transaction   and   therefore the accused Nos.2 to 7 are liable to be prosecuted jointly or   severally for having consented and/or connived in the commission of   present office in their capacity as the Chairman, Managing Director,   Executive Director, Whole Time Director and authorized signatories of  accused No.1, further the offence is attributable to accused Nos.2 to 7   on account of their neglect to ensure and make adequate arrangements   to Honour the cheque issued by accused No.1 and further on account   of the  neglect  of  accused   Nos.1  to 7 to comply  with  the  requisition   made   in   the   Demand   Notice   issue   under   the   provisions   of   Section   138(c) of the Negotiable Instruments Act within the stipulated period.   The accused are therefore liable to be proceeded.

xxxxx xxxxx

4.   I   say   that   the   Accused   No.   1   through   Accused   Nos.   2   and   3   approached the Complainant Bank at its Branch situated at Mumbai   for a Short Term Loan facility for a sum of Rs. 200 Crore to meet the   expenditure  of Four  ORV  vessels  being  built at ABG  Shipyard.  After   verifying   the   documents   submitted   the   Complainant   Bank   vide   its   sanction letter dated 28th  April 2012 sanctioned the said Facility for   the   purpose   mentioned   therein.   The   said   terms   and   conditions   mentioned   in   the   sanction   letter   dated   28th  April   2012   were   duly   accepted by the Accused No. 1 by signing the same. Accused No.1 also   agreed to pay interest at the negotiated rate by the Complainant bank.  



                                              Page 16 of 20

HC-NIC                                      Page 16 of 20     Created On Wed Aug 16 06:06:01 IST 2017
                   R/CR.MA/32759/2016                                                       ORDER



Hereto annexed the marked as Exhibit B is a copy of the said sanction   letter dated 28th April 2012.

xxxxx xxxxx

10. I say that the accused Nos.1 to 7 were aware that the aforesaid   cheque would be dishonoured for being Account  Blocked and all the   accused,  in active  connivance  mischievously  and intentionally  issued   the aforesaid cheques in favour of the complainant Bank.

33 The aforesaid averments, as we find, clearly meet the requisite test.   It is apt to mention here that there are seven accused persons. Accused   No.1  is   the  Company,  accused  Nos.2  and  3  are  the  Chairman  and   Managing   Director   respectively   and   accused   Nos.6   and   7   were   signatory   to   the   cheques.   As   far   as   the   accused   Nos.4   and   5   were   concerned,  they were  whole­time  Directors  and  the assertion  is that   they were in charge of day to day business of the Company and all of   them   had   with   active   connivance,   mischievously   and   intentionally   issued the cheques in question.

34 Thus, considering the totality of assertions made in the complaint   and   also   taking   note   of   the   averments   put   forth   relating   to   the   respondent Nos. 2 and 3 herein that they are whole­time Director and   Executive Director and they were in charge of day to day affairs of the   Company, we are of the considered opinion that the High Court has   fallen into grave error by coming to the conclusion that there are no   specific averments in the complaint for issuance of summons against   the   said   accused   persons.   We   unhesitatingly   hold   so   as   the   asseverations   made   in   the   complaint   meet   the   test   laid   down   in   Gunmala Sales Pvt. Ltd. (supra).

10. In   complaint,   there   are   specific   averments   as   regards   the   role  played by the applicants herein so far as the work contract, which was  assigned to the complainant is concerned. It is not as if the applicants  herein are a complete alien to the company. Indisputably, they are one  of the Directors of the company. On three places in the complaint, I find  reference of the applicants in one way or the other. 

11. In case of offence by company for the dishonour of cheque, the  culpability of the Directors has to be decided with reference to Section  141 of the Act. The same reads as follows:

Page 17 of 20
HC-NIC Page 17 of 20 Created On Wed Aug 16 06:06:01 IST 2017 R/CR.MA/32759/2016 ORDER "141. Offences by companies.­ (1) If the person committing an offence   under section 138 is a company, every person who, at the time the   offence was committed, was in­charge of, and was responsible to the   company for the conduct of the business of the company, as well as the   company, shall be deemed to be guilty of the offence and shall be liable   to be proceeded against and punished accordingly:
Provided that nothing contained in this sub­section shall render any   person   liable   to   punishment   if   he   proves   that   the   offence   was   committed  without  his knowledge,  or  that  he  had  exercised  all due   diligence to prevent the commission of such offence:
Provided further that where a person is nominated as a Director of a   company   by   virtue   of   his   holding   any   office   or   employment   in   the   Central Government or State Government or a financial corporation   owned   or   controlled   by   the   Central   Government   or   the   State   Government, as the case may be, he shall not be liable for prosecution   under this Chapter.
(2) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub­section (1), where any   offence  under  this  Act  has been  committed  by a company  and  it is   proved   that   the   offence   has   been   committed   with   the   consent   or   connivance  of, or is attributable to, any neglect on the part of, any   director,   manager,   secretary   or   other   officer   of   the   company,   such   director, manager, secretary or other officer shall also be deemed to be   guilty of that offence and shall be liable to be proceeded against and   punished accordingly.
Explanation.­ For the purposes of this section,­
(a) "company" means any body corporate and includes a firm or other   association of individuals; and
(b) "director", in relation to a firm, means a partner in the firm."

12. From a plain reading of the aforesaid provision, it is evident that  every person who at the time the offence was committed is in charge of  and   responsible   to   the  Company  shall   be   deemed   to   be   guilty   of   the  offence   under   Section­138   of   the   Act.   In   the   face   of   it,   will   it   be  necessary to specifically state in the complaint that the person accused  was in­charge of and responsible for the conduct of the business of the  Company? In my opinion, in the case of offence by Company, to bring its  Directors   within   the   mischief   of   Section   138   of   the   Act,   it   shall   be  necessary to allege that they were in­charge of and responsible to the  Page 18 of 20 HC-NIC Page 18 of 20 Created On Wed Aug 16 06:06:01 IST 2017 R/CR.MA/32759/2016 ORDER conduct of the business of the Company. It is necessary ingredient which  would be sufficient to proceed against such Directors. However, I may  add that as no particular form is prescribed, it may not be necessary to  reproduce exact the words of the section. If reading of the complaint  shows  and substance  of accusation discloses the  necessary averments,  that would be sufficient to proceed against such of the Directors and no  particular form is necessary. However, it may not be necessary to allege  and prove that, in fact, such of the Directors have any specific role in  respect of the transaction leading to the issuance of cheque. Section 141  of the Act makes the Directors in­ charge and responsible to Company  "for the conduct of the business of the Company" within the mischief of  Section 138 of the Act and not particular business for which the cheque  was issued. One should not read more than what has been mandated in  Section 141 of the Act.  [See: A.K. Singhani vs. GSFC , 2014 Cri. L.J.  340]. 

13. In  Mannalal   Chmaria   and   another   vs.   State   of   West   Bengal  [2014 Cri. L.J. 2160], the Supreme Court, on the very same issue, made  certain observations which are important for the purpose of deciding this  application:

9.   The   law   on   the   subject   is   now   very   well­settled   by   a   series   of   decisions rendered by this Court and it is not necessary to repeat the   views expressed time and again. Suffice it to say, that the law has once    again   been   stated   in  A. K. Singhania     v. Gujarat  State  Fertilizer     Company Ltd. [AIR 2014 SC 71 : 2013 AIR SCW 6195]    to the    effect that it is necessary for a complainant to state in the complaint   that   the   person   accused   was   in­charge   of   and   responsible   for   the   conduct of the business of the company. Although, no particular form   for   making   such   an   allegation   is   prescribed,   and   it   may   not   be   necessary to reproduce the language of Section 138 of the Negotiable   Instruments  Act, 1881,  but a reading of the complaint should show   that the substance of the accusation discloses that the accused person    was in­charge of and responsible for the conduct of the business of  the      company   at   the   relevant   time.   From   the   averment   made   in   the   Page 19 of 20 HC-NIC Page 19 of 20 Created On Wed Aug 16 06:06:01 IST 2017 R/CR.MA/32759/2016 ORDER complaint, which is reproduced above, it can safely be said that there   is no specific or even a general allegation made against the appellants. 

14. Thus, although in the complaint in question, there is no specific  averment in so many words that the accused herein at the time of the  commission   of   the   offence,   was   in­charge   of   and   responsible   for   the  conduct   of   the   business   of   the   company,   yet   reading   the   other  averments, it can safely be said that the accused had played some role  indicating his involvement in the day­to­day affairs and management of  the company. The substance of the accusations discloses prima facie that  the applicant herein was in­charge of and responsible for the conduct of  the business of the company at the relevant point of time. If that be so,  then the observations of the Supreme Court as contained in para 31 of  Gunmala Sales Private Ltd (supra) would come into play. 

15. In   view   of   the   above,   this   application   is   fails   and   is   hereby  rejected.   Rule   is   discharged.   Ad­interim   order   earlier   granted   stands  vacated.

(J.B.PARDIWALA, J.)  aruna Page 20 of 20 HC-NIC Page 20 of 20 Created On Wed Aug 16 06:06:01 IST 2017