Gujarat High Court
Bhavnagar Municipal Corporation vs Paresh Rasikbhai Dodiya on 16 July, 2021
Author: A. P. Thaker
Bench: A. P. Thaker
C/SCA/8833/2009 JUDGMENT DATED: 16/07/2021
IN THE HIGH COURT OF GUJARAT AT AHMEDABAD
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 8833 of 2009
With
CIVIL APPLICATION (FOR DIRECTION) NO. 1 of 2020
In
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 8833 of 2009
FOR APPROVAL AND SIGNATURE: Sd/-
HONOURABLE DR. JUSTICE A. P. THAKER
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1 Whether Reporters of Local Papers may be allowed No
to see the judgment ?
2 To be referred to the Reporter or not ? Yes
3 Whether their Lordships wish to see the fair copy No
of the judgment ?
4 Whether this case involves a substantial question No
of law as to the interpretation of the Constitution
of India or any order made thereunder ?
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BHAVNAGAR MUNICIPAL CORPORATION
Versus
PARESH RASIKBHAI DODIYA & 1 other(s)
================================================================
Appearance:
MR HS MUNSHAW(495) for the Petitioner(s) No. 1
MR BK OZA(516) for the Respondent(s) No. 1
MR UT MISHRA(3605) for the Respondent(s) No. 1
RULE NOT RECD BACK(63) for the Respondent(s) No. 2
RULE SERVED(64) for the Respondent(s) No. 1
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CORAM:HONOURABLE DR. JUSTICE A. P. THAKER
Date : 16/07/2021
ORAL JUDGMENT
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C/SCA/8833/2009 JUDGMENT DATED: 16/07/2021 [1] The petitioner has filed this petition under Articles 14, 16, 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India for the following prayers:
A. Admit the present Special Civil Application;
B. Allow the present Special Civil Application by way of issuing appropriate writ of mandamus or writ of cerritary or any other writ, direction or order quashing and setting aside the award dated 19.2.09 passed by the Hon'ble Labour Court at Bhavnagar in Reference [LCB] No.10/04 annexed as ANNEXURE-F by way of holding that the same is illegal, unjust, arbitrary, erroneous and contrary to the facts and evidence on record as well as the provisions of the Payment of SECTION 2[oo][bb].
C. Pending the admission, final hearing and disposal of the present Special Civil Application be pleased to stay the implementation, execution and operation of the award dated 19.2.09 passed by the Hon'ble Labour Court at Bhavnagar in Reference [LCB] No.10/04 annexed as ANNEXURE - F in the interest of justice;
D. Call for the record and proceeding of the case bearing Reference [LCB] 10/04 from Hon'ble Labour Court at Bhavnagar by way of passing appropriate orders in the interest of justice;
E. Pass such other and further orders as the nature and circumstances of the case may require, in the interest of justice;
[2] It is main contention of the petitioner that the respondent was provided the work as Swimming Instructor for a period of one month on daily wage basis vide order dated 03.06.1992 on several terms and conditions and accordingly, he reported for duty on 03.06.1992. It is contended by the petitioner that the service of the respondent was purely on temporary, ad hoc and Page 2 of 20 Downloaded on : Mon Jul 19 20:42:33 IST 2021 C/SCA/8833/2009 JUDGMENT DATED: 16/07/2021 daily wage basis and no regular recruitment procedure was followed at that point of time. It is also contended that by order dated 15.07.1992, he was relieved from the service. It is further contended that after almost more than 12 years, the respondent has filed reference in question and asked for relief of reinstatement with continuity of service and full back wages. It is contended that the respondent has filed statement of claim which was resisted by the petitioner by filing detailed written statement. It is contended that the petitioner has also examined its witness and has also submitted written arguments thereof. It is also contended that the Labour Court has not considered the facts that the provision of Section 2(oo)(bb) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter be referred to as the "I.D. Act") was attracted and there was no violation of Section 25F, G and H of the I.D. Act. It is contended that the Labour Court has not considered all there facts in its proper perspective and has erroneously passed the impugned award.
[3] Heard Mr.H. S. Munshaw, learned counsel for the petitioner and Mr.U. T. Mishra, learned counsel for the respondent, at length, through video conferencing.Page 3 of 20 Downloaded on : Mon Jul 19 20:42:33 IST 2021
C/SCA/8833/2009 JUDGMENT DATED: 16/07/2021 [4] Mr.H. S. Munshaw, learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted the same facts which are narrated in the memo of petition. He has submitted that when there was contractual appointment, the provision of Section 2(oo)(bb) of the I.D. Act would applicable and, therefore, there was no question of granting of any reinstatement with back wages and continuity of service to the workman. He has submitted that it was time bound service and, therefore also, the respondent has no right under the provisions of the I.D. Act. He has also referred to the appointment order and relieve order and statement of demand of the workman as well as written statement filed by the petitioner before the Labour Court and has submitted that there was no any breach of Section 25F, G and H of the I.D. Act. While referring to the deposition of the witnesses of the petitioner as well as of the workman, he has submitted that the workman has admitted in his cross-examination that he was appointed only for a period of one month and there was contractual appointment.
While referring to the impugned award, he has submitted that there is no any reference as to the submissions made by the learned advocate for the petitioner and there was also no Page 4 of 20 Downloaded on : Mon Jul 19 20:42:33 IST 2021 C/SCA/8833/2009 JUDGMENT DATED: 16/07/2021 reference regarding the provision of Section 2(oo)(bb) of the I.D. Act. He has submitted that the Labour Court has committed serious error of facts and law on the point that one lady instructor has been appointed and has granted relief to the workman. According to him, the lady instructor Alpaben was taken in service much after almost seven years after relieving the workman and, therefore, the case of Alpaben cannot be considered as breach of Section 25G and H of the I.D. Act. He has submitted that since, the appointment of the workman was contractual appointment, he is not entitled to get reinstatement or any back wages. He has submitted that almost 30 years has passed and, therefore also, there is no question of any reinstatement. He has submitted that the workman has not explained the delay occurred in filing the reference. He has prayed to allow the present petition and to quash and set aside the impugned award.
[4] Mr.H. S. Munshaw, learned counsel for the petitioner has relied upon the following decisions:
(a) Gangadhar Pillai Vs. Siemens Ltd., (2007) 1 SCC 533;Page 5 of 20 Downloaded on : Mon Jul 19 20:42:33 IST 2021
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(b) Haryana State Agricultural Marketing Board Vs. Subhash Chand and another, (2006) 2 SCC 794;
(c) U.P. State Road Transport Corporation Vs. Babu Ram, (2006) 5 SCC 433;
(d) U.P. State Road Transport Corporation Vs. Ram Singh and another, (2008) 17 SCC 627;
(e) GEB - Substituted as Gujarat State Electricity Corporation Vs. Harishkumar N. Bosamiya dated 10.01.2014 rendered in Special Civil Application No. 8192 of 2005;
[5] Per contra, Mr.U. T. Mishra, learned counsel for the respondent has submitted that the present petition is filed under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India and, therefore, it is incumbent on the part of the petitioner to show that what are the patent error or jurisdictional error committed by the Labour Court in passing the impugned award. He has submitted that the employer has failed to show both these points. According to him, Section 2(oo) of the I.D. Act is applicable to the facts of the present case and not Section 2(oo)(bb) as suggested by the learned counsel for the petitioner. He has submitted that there Page 6 of 20 Downloaded on : Mon Jul 19 20:42:33 IST 2021 C/SCA/8833/2009 JUDGMENT DATED: 16/07/2021 was no reason for termination of the service of the workman in the year 1992. He has submitted that no reason has been assigned to the workman for termination of his service. He has submitted that the date of appointment was 03.06.1992 and that too, only for one month and therefore his service ought to have been ended on 03.07.1992. But, thereafter, the service of the workman was continued and order of termination was passed on 14.07.1992. While referring to the pleadings before the Labour Court and the evidence of the employer and employee, he has submitted that there is no cross-examination of the workman regarding his version that the employer has appointed other person in his place. He has submitted that as per the evidence produced on record, the work taken from the workman was of a permanent in nature. He has submitted that the post of Swimming Instructor is still vacant. He has submitted that the workman has already approached the concerned authority immediately and, therefore, there was no delay on the part of the workman in preferring the reference. He has submitted that since other lady instructor has been appointed and the workman has not called for the same work, there is clear breach of Section 25H of the I.D. Act. According to him, this aspect has been Page 7 of 20 Downloaded on : Mon Jul 19 20:42:33 IST 2021 C/SCA/8833/2009 JUDGMENT DATED: 16/07/2021 properly considered by the Labour Court and, therefore, the award being just, proper and reasonable one and it does not require interference by this Court. While relying upon the following decision, he has submitted that the award passed by the Labour Court is not erroneous one either on facts and/or law and, therefore, the same deserves to be confirmed.
1. The oral order dated 21.04.2010 rendered by the Coordinate Bench (Coram: Hon'ble Mr.Justice H. K. Rathod) in Bhavnagar Municipal Corporation Vs. Dharmendra B. Vegad in Special Civil Application No.11156 of 2009.
[6] Mr.Mishra, learned counsel for the respondent has prayed to dismiss the present petition and confirmed the impugned award passed by the Labour Court.
[7] In rejoinder, Mr.Munshaw, learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that merely there was a relieve order passed on 14.07.1992 i.e. after 11 days of 03.07.1992, it does not give any right to the workman to be reinstated. He has submitted that till Page 8 of 20 Downloaded on : Mon Jul 19 20:42:33 IST 2021 C/SCA/8833/2009 JUDGMENT DATED: 16/07/2021 the workman was relieved on 14.07.1992, his appointment was contractual appointment and, therefore, no right is accrued in his favour. According to him, since there is delay of almost 12 years in preferring the reference, the burden lies upon the workman to explain such delay. He has prayed to allow the present petition. [8] In the case of Haryana State Agricultural Marketing Board (supra), the Apex Court has observed in paras-10 and 19 as under:-
10. In Municipal Council, Samrala v. Raj Kumar, (2006) 3 SCC 81, wherein, in the offer of appointment it was specifically averred that "his services will be availed till it is considered as fit and proper and necessary. After that his services will be dispensed with", which was accepted by the employee by affirming an affidavit to the effect that he would not have any objection, if the Municipal Corporation dispensed with his services and thereby acknowledged its right to that effect, this Court held :
"Clause (oo)(bb) of Section 2 contain an exception. It is in two parts. The first part contemplates termination of service of the workman as a result of the non-renewal of the contract of employment or on its expiry; whereas the second part postulates termination of such contract of employment in terms of stipulation contained in that behalf....."
(See also Punjab SEB v. Darbar Singh, (2006) 1 SCC 121 and Kishore Chandra Samal v. Orissa State Cashew Development Corpn. Ltd., (2006) 1 SCC 253)
19. In view of the aforementioned definitions of the expressions "status" and "privilege" it must be held that such "status" and "privilege" must emanate from a Page 9 of 20 Downloaded on : Mon Jul 19 20:42:33 IST 2021 C/SCA/8833/2009 JUDGMENT DATED: 16/07/2021 statute. If legal right has been derived by the respondent herein to continue in service in terms of the provisions of the Act under which he is governed, then only, would the question of depriving him of any status or privilege arise. Furthermore, it is not a case where the respondent had worked for years. He has only worked, on his own showing, for 356 days whereas according to the appellant he has worked only for 208 days. Therefore, Fifth Schedule of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 has no application in the instant case. In view of the above, the dispensing with of the engagement of the respondent cannot be said to be unwarranted in law.
[9] In the case of Gangadhar Pillar (supra), the Apex Court has observed in paras-28 and 30 as under :-
28. It is not the law that on completion of 240 days of continuous service in a year, the employee concerned becomes entitled to for regularization of his services and/ or permanent status. The concept of 240 days in a year was introduced in the industrial law for a definite purpose. Inder the Industrial Disputes Act, the concept of 240 days was introduced so as to fasten a statutory liabilities upon the employer to pay compensation to be computed in the manner specified in Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 before he is retrenched from services and not for any other purpose. In the event a violation of the said provision takes place, termination of services of the employee may be found to be illegal, but only on that account, his services cannot be directed to be regularized.
Direction to reinstate the workman would mean that he gets back the same status.
30. In M. P. Housing Board v. Manoj Shrivastava, (2006) 2 SCC 702, this Court held : (SCC p. 709, para 17) "17. It is now well settled that only because a person had been working for more than 240 days, he does not derive any legal right to be regularised in service. (See Madhyamik Shiksha Parishad, U. P. v. Anil Kumar Mishra, (2005) 5 SCC 122; Executive Engineer, ZP Engg. Divn. v. Digambara Rao, (2004) 8 SCC 262, Dhampur Sugar Mills Ltd. v. Bhola Singh, (2005) 2 SCC 470, Manager, Reserve Bank of India v. S. Mani, (2005) 5 SCC 100 and State of U. P. Neeraj Awasthi, Page 10 of 20 Downloaded on : Mon Jul 19 20:42:33 IST 2021 C/SCA/8833/2009 JUDGMENT DATED: 16/07/2021 (2006) 1 SCC 667."
[10] Having considered the submissions canvassed by learned advocates for both the sides and the various decisions relied upon by both the sides coupled with the impugned award, it clearly appears that there is no dispute that the workman was appointed on 03.06.1992 for a period of one month and there was terms and conditions attached with the appointment order. It is also an admitted fact that the workman was relieved vide order dated 14.07.1992. It is also an admitted fact that the workman has filed the reference in the year 2004. The main grievance put forward by the workman is that when he was relieved from the service, no notice was issued to him or no notice pay or retrenchment allowance was paid to him. It is his grievance that without following due process of law, his service came to be terminated and, therefore, the employer may be directed to reinstate him with continuity of service and full back wages. It also appears from the record that the petitioner has also resisted the claim and has taken the stand that there was contractual appointment and, therefore, the provisions of the I.D. Act relating to the issuance of the notice or notice pay or Page 11 of 20 Downloaded on : Mon Jul 19 20:42:33 IST 2021 C/SCA/8833/2009 JUDGMENT DATED: 16/07/2021 retrenchment allowance is not applicable. There is also a stand taken by the employer that this being a contractual appointment, Section 2(oo)(bb) of the I.D. Act is applicable. [11] It also appears from the record that the workman has examined himself and the witness of the respondent has also been examined. It appears from the evidence of the workman which includes chief-examination as well as cross-examination, that he has categorically admitted that his service was contractual one and he was appointed only for one month and he was relieved from the service as per the terms and conditions. He has also admitted that there is different Swimming Pool for ladies and gents. It is his admission that the lady instructor was appointed in the year 1999. Thus, from his evidence, it is clear that when he was relieved from the service, none was appointed in his place. It is pertinent to note that learned counsel for the respondent has submitted that the post which was held by the workman is still vacant. Thus, there is no question of any breach of Section 25G or H of the I.D. Act.
[12] As there is legal issue raised by the petitioner herein Page 12 of 20 Downloaded on : Mon Jul 19 20:42:33 IST 2021 C/SCA/8833/2009 JUDGMENT DATED: 16/07/2021 regarding applicability of Section 2(oo)(bb) of the I.D. Act, whereas, the workman is relying upon Section 2(oo) of the I.D. Act, it is worthwhile to refer to Section 2(oo) which includes (bb) of the I.D. Act which reads as under:-
"[oo] "retrenchment" means the termination by the employer of the service of a workman for any reason whatsoever, otherwise than as a punishment inflicted by way of disciplinary action, but does not include -
(a) voluntary retirement of the workman; or
(b) retirement of the workman on reaching the age of
superannuation if the contract of employment between the employer and the workman concerned contains a stipulation in that behalf; or [bb] termination of the service of the workman as a result of the non-renewal of the contract of employment between the employer and the workman concerned on its expiry or of such contract being terminated under a stipulation in that behalf contained therein; or]
(c) termination of the service of a workman on the ground of continued ill-health;]"
[13] On analysis of the aforesaid provisions, it is crystal clear that the retrenchment will not include voluntary retirement of the workman; or retirement of the workman on reaching the age of superannuation or termination of the service of the workman as a result of the non-renewal of the contract of the employment between the employer and the workman concerned on its expiry or of such contract being terminated under a stipulation in that behalf contained therein or termination of the service of a Page 13 of 20 Downloaded on : Mon Jul 19 20:42:33 IST 2021 C/SCA/8833/2009 JUDGMENT DATED: 16/07/2021 workman on the ground of continued ill-health. Thus, when there is contractual appointment and service of the workman is terminated as per the stipulation of the contract, then, it will not amount to retrenchment. In such case, since there is no retrenchment, the employer need not to follow the procedure envisaged under Section 25 of the I.D. Act. Now, admittedly in this case, the appointment of the workman herein was contractual appointment. Therefore, the employer need not to follow the procedure of I.D. Act.
[14] On perusal of the impugned award, it transpires that the Labour Court has misread the evidence on record to the fact that the version of the workman, in his chief-examination, that in his place, other lady workman has been appointed is not challenged in cross-examination and has accepted the version of the workman that another person is appointed in his place. But, the Labour Court has not read the entire evidence including the cross-examination of the workman. The workman in his cross- examination admitted that the other workman was appointed in later point of time and there is different post for lady instructor and for gents instructor. Thus, this fact clearly destroyed the case of the workman that at the time of termination of his Page 14 of 20 Downloaded on : Mon Jul 19 20:42:33 IST 2021 C/SCA/8833/2009 JUDGMENT DATED: 16/07/2021 service, immediately, other person was appointed. [15] It is also pertinent to note that the workman was relieved from the service on 15.07.1992. Whereas, he has approached the Labour Court by way of filing aforesaid reference after more than 12 years without assigning any cogent reason for delay. At this juncture, it is worthwhile to referred to the decision of the Apex Court in the Case of U. P. State Road Transport Corporation Vs. Ram Singh and another (supra) wherein there was delay of 13 years in raising dispute. In para-7, the Apex Court has observed that "this Court has in several decisions held that while delay cannot itself be sufficient reason to reject an industrial dispute, nevertheless the delay cannot be unreasonable. It was further observed in the aforesaid decision that the mere fact that the respondent was making repeated representations would not justify his raising the issue before the Labour Court after 13 years.
[16] In another decision in the case of U. P. State Road Transport Corporation Vs. Babu Ram (supra), it was observed that no formula of universal application can be laid down for determination of the question of delay and it would Page 15 of 20 Downloaded on : Mon Jul 19 20:42:33 IST 2021 C/SCA/8833/2009 JUDGMENT DATED: 16/07/2021 depend on facts of each individual case. Further, it was observed that it is for the workman concerned to show that he has raised the dispute within a reasonable time, and/or that he was not responsible for delayed decision. It was also observed that the delay cannot be condoned merely on surmises and conjectures. In para-9, the Apex Court has referred to its own earlier decision, in the case of S. M. Nilajkar Vs. Telecom District Manager, (2003) 4 SCC 27,which reads as under:-
9. In S.M. Nilajkar and Ors. v. Telecom District Manager, Karnataka (2003 (4) SCC 27), the position was reiterated as follows: (at para 17) "17. It was submitted on behalf of the respondent that on account of delay in raising the dispute by the appellants the High Court was justified in denying relief to the appellants. We cannot agree. It is true, as held in Shalimar Works Ltd. v.
Workmen, AIR 1959 SC 1217 that merely because the Industrial Disputes Act does not provide for a limitation for raising the dispute it does not mean that the dispute can be raised at any time and without regard to the delay and reasons therefor. There is no limitation prescribed for reference of disputes to an Industrial Tribunal; even so it is only reasonable that the disputes should be referred as soon as possible after they have arisen and after conciliation proceedings have failed particularly so when disputes relate to discharge of workmen wholesale. A delay of 4 years in raising the dispute after even re-employment of the most of the old workmen was held to be fatal in Shalimar Works Limited v. Workmen, AIR 1959 SC 1217). In Nedungadi Bank Ltd. v. K.P. Madhavankutty, AIR 2000 SC 839, a delay of 7 years was held to be fatal and disentitled to workmen to any relief. In Ratan Chandra Sammanta and others v. Union of India, 1993 AIR SCW 2214, it was held that a casual labourer retrenched by the employer deprives himself of remedy available in law by delay itself; lapse of time results in losing the remedy and the right as well. The delay would certainly be fatal if it has resulted in material evidence relevant to Page 16 of 20 Downloaded on : Mon Jul 19 20:42:33 IST 2021 C/SCA/8833/2009 JUDGMENT DATED: 16/07/2021 adjudication being lost and rendered not available. However, we do not think that the delay in the case at hand has been so culpable as to disentitle the appellants for any relief. Although the High Court has opined that there was a delay of 7 to 9 years in raising the dispute before the Tribunal but we find the High Court factually not correct. The employment of the appellants was terminated sometime in 1985-86 or 1986-87. Pursuant to the judgment in Daily Rated Casual Employees Labourer v. Union of India, AIR 1987 SC 2342, the Department was formulating a scheme to accommodate casual labourers and the appellants were justified in awaiting the outcome thereof. On 16-1-1990 they were refused to be accommodated in the scheme. On 28-12-1990 they initiated the proceedings under the Industrial Disputes Act followed by conciliation proceedings and then the dispute was referred to the Industrial Tribunal-cum-Labour Court. We do not think that the appellants deserve to be non suited on the ground of delay."
[17] Considering both these decisions coupled with the facts of the present case, it is crystal clear that there is no reasonable or cogent reasons assigned by the workman for filing the alleged reference after almost 12 years. Since, there is no explanation worth the name, the delay cannot be condoned in the present case.
[18] In the case of Bhavnagar Municipal Corporation (supra), the Coordinate Bench of this Court (Coram: Hon'ble Mr.Justice H. K. Rathod) has observed in paras 11, 12 and 13 as under:-
11. Therefore, contention raised by learned advocate Mr. Munshaw is right that after a period of twelve years delay, Page 17 of 20 Downloaded on : Mon Jul 19 20:42:33 IST 2021 C/SCA/8833/2009 JUDGMENT DATED: 16/07/2021 without any justification, reference should not have to be entertained merely because of section 25 H of I. D. Act, 1947 is violated. Apart from that when section 25 H is violated then workman is entitled relief of reinstatement as re-employment but continuity of service which has been granted, can not be granted in favour of respondent workman. The question of back wages also does not arise, which has been granted in favour of workman because it is not a case in respect to breach of section 25 F of I. D. Act.
Considering entire facts and circumstances of case and keeping in mind law, this being a case of having special facts and circumstance, it justified reinstatement only. The direction which has been given by Labour Court with continuity of service with 10% back wages and consequential benefits are clear error committed by Labour Court which required interference by this Court, therefore, same is required to be modified as under.
12. Apparently, Labour Court has committed gross error in granting relief when breach of section 25 H is found from record, it was not case of breach of section 25 F of I. D. Act. Therefore, award passed by Labour Court in reference no. 294/2005 dated 25/5/2005 is required to be modified. Instead of reinstatement with continuity of service with 10% back wages with consequential benefit, it is to be modified to the effect that now respondent workman is entitled reinstatement in original post and only entitle continuity of service from date of award.
13. Therefore, it is directed to petitioner Corporation to reinstate respondent workman immediately while giving continuity of service from date of award. The aforesaid award has been modified to that effect only. The decision of this Court may not be treated as precedent in other cases. Accordingly, Rule is made absolute to aforesaid extent. Ad interim relief, if any, stand vacated. No order as to costs.
[19] Thus, considering the special circumstances, it appears that the order has been passed in favour of the workman though there was a delay of more than 12 years.
[20] Having considered the facts and circumstances of the Page 18 of 20 Downloaded on : Mon Jul 19 20:42:33 IST 2021 C/SCA/8833/2009 JUDGMENT DATED: 16/07/2021 present case, it is apparent on record that the delay is not explained. Further, the appointment of the workman was purely on contractual basis with terms and conditions mentioned in the appointment order itself. Merely because, the workman has worked for 12 days more, it does not give any right to the workman to reinstatement as well as continuity of service and back wages. The working of the workman of extra 12 days does not accrue any right since, initially, the appointment of the workman was purely on contractual basis with the specific terms and conditions. The workman fully knew that his service is liable to be terminated and he would be relieved from the service after expiry of contractual period. Thus, in the present case, there is no retrenchment within the meaning of Section 2(oo) of the I.D. Act, but, it is end of service due to contractual appointment and, therefore, Section 2(oo)(bb) of the I.D. Act would be applicable. On perusal of the impugned award, it clearly transpires that the Labour Court has not considered all these aspects and has misread the entire oral as well as documentary evidence on record. Therefore, this Court is of the considered opinion that the impugned award needs to be interfered with and it is liable to be quashed and set aside.
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C/SCA/8833/2009 JUDGMENT DATED: 16/07/2021 [21] In view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances of the case, the petition is allowed. The impugned award dated 19.02.2009 passed by the Labour Court, Bhavnagar, in Reference (L.C.B) Case No.10 of 2004 is hereby quashed and set aside. The original reference stands dismissed. Record and proceedings be sent back to the concerned Trial Court forthwith. [22] Rule is made absolute to the aforesaid extent. No order as to costs.
[23] In view of the disposal of the main petition, the civil application does not survive and hence, the same is disposed of.
Sd/-
(DR. A. P. THAKER, J) V.R. PANCHAL Page 20 of 20 Downloaded on : Mon Jul 19 20:42:33 IST 2021