Chattisgarh High Court
Smt. Savitri Devi Yadav vs State Of Chhattisgarh on 24 June, 2024
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2024:CGHC:21260
NAFR
HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR
CRR No. 466 of 2024
Smt. Savitri Devi Yadav W/o Punnilal Yadav, Aged About 42 Years R/o
Village Naraibodh, Ward No. 62, Khalhepara, Gevrabasti, Tahsil Katghora
And District Korba (C.G.)
... Applicant
versus
State Of Chhattisgarh Health And Family Welfare Department, Through
Drug Inspector, Office Of Deputy Director, Food And Drug Administration,
District Korba (C.G.)
... Respondent
(Cause title taken from Case Information System) For Applicant : Mr. Vikas Kumar Pandey, Advocate For Respondent/State : Mr. Jitendra Shrivastava, Govt. Advocate Hon'ble Shri Justice Ravindra Kumar Agrawal Order in Chamber 24/06/2024
1. The present criminal revision under Section 397(1) read with Section 401 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 is filed against the order dated 21.03.2024, passed by learned Special Judge (Drugs 2/8 and Cosmetics Act), Korba, in Special Case (D & C) No. 2 of 2022, whereby the charge under Section 18(c) read with Sections 27b(ii) and 28 of the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940.
2. The facts of the case, as emerges from the document annexed with the revision petition, are that a complaint case has been filed by the respondent/State against the present petitioner and her husband P.L. Yadav (Punni Lal Yadav) before the learned trial Court for the offence under Sections 18(c), 18(A), 18(a)(i) read with Section 27b(ii), 28 and 27d of the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940. The said complaint case was filed on 04.01.2022 and the same was registered on 15.06.2022. Summons were issued to the accused persons and after hearing the parties the charges have been framed against the accused persons on 21.03.2024.
3. It is alleged in the complaint filed by the State that on a complaint being received from the villagers of village Naraibodh, Tahsil Katghora, District Korba, the Chief Medical and Health Officer, Korba has directed the Block Medical Officer, Community Health Centre, Katghora, District Korba to inquire into the matter. On 12.12.2019, the house of the accused P.L. Yadav was searched/inspected. He was found absent from his house and his wife Savitri Devi Yadav (the present petitioner) was found in her house. During the inspection of their house, in a room of first floor of their house, total 93 types of different allopathic medicines, daily patient register was seized. The present petitioner had disclosed that they have no any valid document/license with respect to the storage and sale purchase of the said allopathic medicines and even they have not having any 3/8 invoice of the same. Since, the said allopathic medicines were found storage in absence of any valid document, the said allopathic medicines and the daily patient register was seized from the present petitioner in presence of the witnesses, and the seizure memo was prepared in the Form 16. The seized medicines were sealed on the spot, samples have been taken and the samples of the medicines were sent for its chemical examination to Drugs Testing Laboratory, Kalibadi, Raipur, from where report has been received on 27.02.2020 and according to which the medicines, which was sent for chemical examination, were found substandard. When the notice issued to the petitioner was not replied, again on 28.01.2021, the house of the petitioner was inspected. At that time, her husband P.L. Yadav was found present and he gave in writing that he is not having any valid document/license for storage of the medicines, and therefore considering the prima facie evidence against the petitioner and her husband, the complaint case was filed by the State. After considering the evidence available on record produced by the prosecution, the learned trial Court has framed charge against the petitioner for the offence under Section 18(c) read with Section 27b(ii) and 28 of the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940.
4. Learned counsel for the petitioner would submit that the petitioner is innocent and has nowhere concerned with the offence. The impugned order is passed without any proper application of mind. Merely having in possession of drugs does not constitute the offence under Section 18(c) read with Section 27b(ii) of the Act of 1940. The petitioner has been roped in the offence only on the basis that she 4/8 was found present in the house, when the authorities have inspected her house. There is no specific role of the petitioner made in the complaint that she actively engaged in storage and sale purchase of the said medicines, and therefore the petitioner is liable to be discharged from the alleged offence.
5. On the other hand, learned counsel for the State opposes the submissions made by learned counsel for the petitioner and has submitted that the petitioner was found in possession of huge quantity of medicines of different types. The daily patient register has also been seized from her. The registration of offence has not been challenged by her, but order framing charge has been challenged. There are prima facie sufficient evidence to proceed with the trial of the case. He would also submit that the seizure of the huge quantity of medicines is from the present petitioner and the seizure memo has also been prepared, which is annexed at page 40 of the present petition, which clearly reflects that the petitioner was found in possession of the drugs for which she is having no valid document.
6. In the matter of Bhawna Bai v. Ghanshyam, (2020) 2 SCC 217, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held in para 14 and 15 that :
"14. Chapter XVIII Cr.P.C. deals with "Trial before a Court of Session". As per Section 226 Cr.P.C., the public prosecutor is required to open the case before the Sessions Court by describing the charge brought against the accused and stating by what evidence, he proposes to prove the guilt of the accused. Section 227 Cr.P.C. deals with discharge and it reads as under:-
"227. Discharge.--If, upon consideration of the record of the case and the documents submitted therewith, and after hearing the submissions of the accused and the 5/8 prosecution in this behalf, the Judge considers that there is not sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused, he shall discharge the accused and record his reasons for so doing."
15. Considering the scope of Sections 227 and 228 Cr.P.C., in Amit Kapoor v. Ramesh Chander (2012) 9 SCC 460, the Supreme Court held as under:-
"17. Framing of a charge is an exercise of jurisdiction by the trial court in terms of Section 228 of the Code, unless the accused is discharged under Section 227 of the Code. Under both these provisions, the court is required to consider the "record of the case" and documents submitted therewith and, after hearing the parties, may either discharge the accused or where it appears to the court and in its opinion there is ground for presuming that the accused has committed an offence, it shall frame the charge. Once the facts and ingredients of the section exists, then the court would be right in presuming that there is ground to proceed against the accused and frame the charge accordingly. This presumption is not a presumption of law as such. The satisfaction of the court in relation to the existence of constituents of an offence and the facts leading to that offence is a sine qua non for exercise of such jurisdiction. It may even be weaker than a prima facie case. There is a fine distinction between the language of Sections 227 and 228 of the Code. Section 227 is the expression of a definite opinion and judgment of the Court while Section 228 is tentative. Thus, to say that at the stage of framing of charge, the Court should form an opinion that the accused is certainly guilty of committing an offence, is an approach which is impermissible in terms of Section 228 of the Code.
* * *
19. At the initial stage of framing of a charge, the court is concerned not with proof but with a strong suspicion that the accused has committed an offence, which, if put to trial, could prove him guilty. All that the court has to see is that the material on record and the facts would be 6/8 compatible with the innocence of the accused or not. The final test of guilt is not to be applied at that stage. We may refer to the well-settled law laid down by this Court in State of Bihar v. Ramesh Singh (1977) 4 SCC 39: (SCC pp. 41-42, para 4) "4. Under Section 226 of the Code while opening the case for the prosecution the Prosecutor has got to describe the charge against the accused and state by what evidence he proposes to prove the guilt of the accused. Thereafter comes at the initial stage the duty of the court to consider the record of the case and the documents submitted therewith and to hear the submissions of the accused and the prosecution in that behalf. The Judge has to pass thereafter an order either under Section 227 or Section 228 of the Code. If 'the Judge considers that there is no sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused, he shall discharge the accused and record his reasons for so doing', as enjoined by Section 227. If, on the other hand, 'the Judge is of opinion that there is ground for presuming that the accused has committed an offence which -- ... (b) is exclusively triable by the court, he shall frame in writing a charge against the accused', as provided in Section 228. Reading the two provisions together in juxtaposition, as they have got to be, it would be clear that at the beginning and the initial stage of the trial the truth, veracity and effect of the evidence which the Prosecutor proposes to adduce are not to be meticulously judged. Nor is any weight to be attached to the probable defence of the accused. It is not obligatory for the Judge at that stage of the trial to consider in any detail and weigh in a sensitive balance whether the facts, if proved, would be incompatible with the innocence of the accused or not. The standard of test and judgment which is to be finally applied before recording a finding regarding the guilt or otherwise of the accused is not exactly to be applied at the stage of deciding the matter under Section 227 or Section 228 of the Code. At that stage the court is not to see whether there is sufficient ground for conviction of the accused or 7/8 whether the trial is sure to end in his conviction. Strong suspicion against the accused, if the matter remains in the region of suspicion, cannot take the place of proof of his guilt at the conclusion of the trial. But at the initial stage if there is a strong suspicion which leads the court to think that there is ground for presuming that the accused has committed an offence then it is not open to the court to say that there is no sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. The presumption of the guilt of the accused which is to be drawn at the initial stage is not in the sense of the law governing the trial of criminal cases in France where the accused is presumed to be guilty unless the contrary is proved. But it is only for the purpose of deciding prima facie whether the court should proceed with the trial or not. If the evidence which the Prosecutor proposes to adduce to prove the guilt of the accused even if fully accepted before it is challenged in cross-examination or rebutted by the defence evidence, if any, cannot show that the accused committed the offence, then there will be no sufficient ground for proceeding with the trial. An exhaustive list of the circumstances to indicate as to what will lead to one conclusion or the other is neither possible nor advisable. We may just illustrate the difference of the law by one more example. If the scales of pan as to the guilt or innocence of the accused are something like even at the conclusion of the trial, then, on the theory of benefit of doubt the case is to end in his acquittal. But if, on the other hand, it is so at the initial stage of making an order under Section 227 or Section 228, then in such a situation ordinarily and generally the order which will have to be made will be one under Section 228 and not under Section 227."
7. Whether or not, the petitioner was engaged in sale purchase of the said medicines or storage of the same is the subject matter of trial. At this stage, it cannot be said that the allegation levelled against the 8/8 present petitioner is false and frivolous. The huge quantity of allopathy medicine of different kind have been seized from the present petitioner, therefore, it cannot be said that there is no evidence against her to proceed with the trial, I do not find any sufficient ground to interfere in the order impugned by the present petition and therefore the same is liable to be and is hereby Digitally signed by dismissed.
VEDPRAKASH VEDPRAKASH DEWANGAN DEWANGAN Date:
2024.08.27 18:35:40 Sd/-
+0530 (Ravindra Kumar Agrawal) Judge ved