Allahabad High Court
Smt. Roopam @ Jyoti Sharma And Anr. vs District Magistrate Lucknow And Ors. on 18 May, 2022
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD, LUCKNOW BENCH
A.F.R.
Reserved on:-19.04.2022
Delivered on:-18.05.2022
Court No. - 17
Case :- WRIT - C No. - 21188 of 2021
Petitioner :- Smt. Roopam @ Jyoti Sharma And Anr.
Respondent :- District Magistrate Lucknow And Ors.
Counsel for Petitioner :- Vineet Kumar Chaurasia,Suresh Kumar
Counsel for Respondent :- C.S.C.
Hon'ble Shree Prakash Singh,J.
1. Heard Sri Vineet Kumar Chaurasiya, learned counsel for the petitioners, Sri Shailendra Kumar Singh, learned Chief Standing Counsel-III assisted by Sri Kuldeep Singh and Sri Y.K. Awasthi, learned Standing Counsel for the State and perused the record.
2. By means of the instant writ petition, the petitioners have assailed the judgment and order dated 24.02.2020 passed by Chairman, Appellate Authority/District Magistrate, Lucknow in Appeal No.20231 of 2019, under Section 16 of the U.P. Maintenance and Welfare of Parents and Senior Citizens Act, 2007 (hereinafter referred to as the "Act, 2007") (Re: Indrajeet Sharma Vs. Uma Shankar Sharma), by means of which, the appeal filed by the petitioners have been dismissed by respondent no.1 on the ground of maintainability. He has further assailed the judgment and order dated 6th June, 2019 passed by the Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Tehsil-Sadar, District-Lucknow in Case Crime No.38 of 2018, under Section 5 of U.P. Maintenance and Welfare of Parents and Senior Citizens Act, 2007, whereby the petitioners were directed to evict the premises of Plot No.46, Seemant Nagar, Yashbagh Tum, Kalyanpur, Lucknow.
3. Learned counsel appearing for the petitioners submits that factual matrix of the case is that, the petitioner no.1 was being continuously harassed by the respondent no.3 even for food and lodging, and FIR bearing Case Crime No.0124 of 2016, under Sections 498-A/ 323/504/506 IPC and 3/4 of D.P. Act was lodged by petitioner no.1 against the respondent Nos.3 and 6 and other family members. Since the petitioner no.1 was being tortured for demand of dowry and, as such, under the compelling circumstances, the aforesaid FIR was lodged against the respondent no.1, who is the father-in-law of the petitioner no.1.
4. After the aforesaid FIR, a compromise was done between the petitioner no.1 and opposite party no.3 on 08.11.2016 and it was settled in the compromise that opposite party no.3 along with his family will reside in the house No.82, Sector-N, Aliganj and the petitioner was given a ground floor portion situated at Plot No.46, Seemant Nagar, Yashbagh Tum, Kalyanpur, Lucknow, which is about 600 square ft.
5. Since a compromise was entered in between the petitioner no.1 and respondent no.3, as such, the Investigating Officer, who was investigating the matter in Case Crime No.0124 of 2016, submitted a final report on 12.11.2016 before the Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Court No.11, Lucknow and, later on, it was accepted vide order dated 17th September, 2017.
6. Learned counsel appearing for the petitioners further added that respondent no.3 is a retired Constable from the Police Department and is getting regular pension and has also got other post retiral dues, but despite the above, the opposite party no.3 had intentionally started to torture and harass the petitioners, while violating the terms and conditions mentioned in the compromise deed dated 08.11.2016. The respondent no.3 submitted an application under Section 5 of the Act, 2007 before the Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Tehsil-Sadar for evicting the petitioners from the House No.46 situated at Seemant Nagar, Yashbagh Tum, Lucknow and he did not bother that petitioners are his son and daughter-in-law and even the legal successors of his property, and they have no any other house or place for living.
7. After the aforesaid application instituted before the Opposite Party No.2, the notices were issued for calling explanation/written statement in the case pending before respondent no.2 and it has also been mentioned that prior to the notice, several other notices were issued, though petitioners submitted that the same were not served upon them.
8. Petitioner no.1 had also submitted an application before the District Magistrate, Lucknow on 22nd May, 2019, wherein, it was prayed that case pending before the Sub-Divisional Magistrate may be transferred before any other competent authority, but it was neither heard nor any action has been taken. He further submits that without hearing the side of the petitioners, the Sub-Divisional Magistrate passed the order in Case No.38 of 2018 (Uma Shanker Sharma Vs. Indrajeet Sharma and others) on 6th June, 2019, wherein, they were directed to evict the house of the petitioner no.2, having its No.46 at Seemant Nagar, Yashbagh Tum, Kalyanpur, Lucknow.
9. After the aforesaid order passed by the Sub-Divisional Magistrate under Section 5 of the Act, 2007, the petitioners approached the District Magistrate, Lucknow while instituting a Case No.20231 of 2019 (Indrajeet Sharma Vs. Uma Shanker Sharma) under Section 16 of the Act, 2007. The aforesaid appeal was filed against the order dated 6th June, 2019 passed by the Sub-Divisional Magistrate and order of eviction was passed thereof.
10. Learned District Magistrate, who is the Appellate Authority as per Section 16 of the Act, 2007, has passed the order in an arbitrary and erroneous manner on 24th February, 2020 on the ground of maintainability. As per his verdict, the petitioners had no right to file an appeal under Section 16 of the Act, 2007.
11. Being aggrieved with the order aforesaid, petitioners filed a writ petition bearing No.19104 of 2021 (Misc. Single); Rupam Sharma @ Jyoti Sharma and another Vs. District Magistrate, Lucknow, before this Court and the same was dismissed on 2nd September, 2021 on the ground of maintainability. He submits that, in fact, the aforesaid writ was filed in hurriedly manner and the order dated 24.02.2020 passed by the Appellate Authority i.e. District Magistrate was not appended/challenged in the aforesaid writ petition and, as such, the Hon'ble Court, while passing the order on 2nd September, 2021, dismissed the writ petition and accorded liberty to the petitioners to file a fresh petition.
12. Learned counsel appearing for the petitioners has argued that, in fact, the compromise was entered in between the petitioner no.1 and respondent no.3 on 08.11.2016 and in pursuance of the same, petitioners were residing on the ground floor of Plot No.46 at Seemant Nagar, Yashbagh Tum, Kalyanpur, Lucknow. Further, since a final report was submitted by the Investigating Officer only on the premise of a compromise entered in between the petitioner No.1 and the respondent no.3 and as soon as the final report was submitted, the respondent no.3 has again started harassing and torturing the petitioners for no reasons.
13. Learned counsel for the petitioners further argued that since the petitioners themselves is getting the pension regularly and has also got the service benefits and as such, they are able to maintain themselves and, thus, the aforesaid proceedings before the Sub-Divisional Magistrate and the Appellate Authority/District Magistrate is nothing, but an eyewash. He further added that, in fact, the conduct and behaviour of the respondent no.3 is unbridlled and unguided and he is without any reason torturing the petitioners by way of instituting the aforesaid proceedings.
14. Learned counsel for the petitioners has also added that due to aforesaid action of the respondent no.3, petitioners are compelled to live in the little parental house, and respondent no.3 has become merciless as the petitioner no.1 was pregnant and also in the high-time of Covid-19 Pandemic, the petitioners were forcefully evicted/thrown out from their house. He also added that order dated 6th June, 2019 has been passed without paying heed on the contention of the petitioners and further the same is also in violation of the intent of the Section 5 of the Act, 2007. The orders dated 6th June, 2019 and 24th February, 2020 are highly illegal, unconstitutional and arbitrary. The orders are without reason and are against the intent of the legislature. He submits that if this Hon'ble Court will not quash the orders passed by the respondent Nos.1 and 2, they shall suffer irreparable loss and injury, which could not be compensated by any means.
15. Finally, learned counsel for the petitioners has also drawn attention that the order dated 24th February, 2020 has been passed against the settled proposition of law as plea of the petitioners has been rejected on the ground that right to appeal against any order passed on the Application Under Section 5 of the Act, 2007 is available to the Senior Citizens and the Parents only which is overt and evident from the bare perusal of Section 16 of the Act, 2007. The provision of Section 16 of the Act, 2007 is being extracted as follows:-
Section 16 (Appeals).
"(1) Any senior citizen or a parent, as the case may be, aggrieved by an order of a Tribunal may, within sixty days from the date of the order, prefer an appeal to the Appellate Tribunal:
Provided that on appeal, the children or relative who is required to pay any amount in terms of such maintenance order shall continue to pay to such parent the amount so ordered, in the manner directed by the Appellate Tribunal:
Provided further that the Appellate Tribunal may, entertain the appeal after the expiry of the said period of sixty days, if it is satisfied that the appellant was prevented by sufficient cause from preferring the appeal in time.
(2) On receipt of an appeal, the Appellate Tribunal shall, cause a notice to be served upon the respondent.
(3) The Appellate Tribunal may call for the record of proceedings from the Tribunal against whose order the appeal is preferred.
(4) The Appellate Tribunal may, after examining the appeal and the records called for either allow or reject the appeal.
(5) The Appellate Tribunal shall, adjudicate and decide upon the appeal filed against the order of the Tribunal and the order of the Appellate Tribunal shall be final:
Provided that no appeal shall be rejected unless an opportunity has been given to both the parties of being heard in person or through a duly authorised representative.
(6) The Appellate Tribunal shall make an endeavour to pronounce its order in writing within one month of the receipt of an appeal.
(7) A copy of every order made under sub-section (5) shall be sent to both the parties free of cost."
16. While corroborating his arguments, he has placed reliance on the case reported in 2019 (8) ADJ 731 (D.B.) (Akhilesh Kumar and another Vs. State of U.P. and others) and has referred para 7 of the aforesaid judgment, which is extracted as under:-
7. However, learned standing counsel has referred to a decision in Paramjit Kumar Saroya : Amanpreet v. Union of India, (2014 AIR (P&H) 121 wherein the Division Bench of the Punjab and Haryana High Court has held that a purposive interpretation should be given to Section 16(1) of the Act, 2007 and the only interpretation is that the right of appeal is conferred on both sides. The Court was of the view that it may be a case of an accidental omission and not of conscious exclusion and in order to give a complete and effective meaning to the statutory provision, the Court should read the words into it and the ultimate conclusion being that an appeal from both sides is envisaged under section 16(1) of the Act, 2007. Paragraph Nos. 19, 20, 23 and 27 of the said judgment reads as under:
"19. The petitioners assailed the provisions of sub section (1) of Section 16 of the said Act on the ground that there cannot be a right to appeal only to one of the affected parties, as anomalous situation would be created against the same order with which both the parties may be aggrieved.
17. In a similar controversy the Madras High Court in Balamurugan v. Rukmani (C.R.P.(PD)(MD) No. 437 of 2015 & M.P.(MD) Nos. 1 & 2 of 2015 decided on 29 April 2015) in agreement with the view taken in Paramjit Kumar Saroya (AIR 2014 Punjab and Haryana 121) has held that an appeal under section 16 of the Act, 2007 would be maintainable on the behest of both the parties, i.e. at the instance of the aggrieved party for the reason that where the Tribunal decides a case in favour of the senior citizens or parents, the children or dependent or relatives against whom the order is passed and against whom it can be enforced under section 11 of the Act, 2007 would be the aggrieved person and have a right to file an appeal.
18. He further placed reliance on the case reported in AIR 2014 Punjab and Haryana 121 (Paramjeet Kumar Saroya Vs. Union of India and another) and judgment rendered in case of Carew and Co. Ltd. v. Union of India: (SCC 1.802, para 21), wherein, it has been held the "The law is not "a brooding omnipotence in the sky" but a pragmatic instrument of social order. It is an operational art controlling economic life, and interpretative effort must be imbued with the statutory purpose. No doubt, grammar is a good guide to meaning but a bad master to dictate. Notwithstanding the traditional view that grammatical construction is the golden rule, Justice Frankfurter used words of practical wisdom when he observed#: (US p. 138):
"There is no surer way to misread a document than to read it literally."
19. We are thus of the view that Section 16(1) of the said Act is valid, but must be read to provide for the right of appeal to any of the affected parties.
20. He has further submitted that in our old customary laws, there was traditional principle of law of interpretation, which later on evolved and took the form of new law of interpretation. Quoting the aforesaid, he has referred the case of Gujarat Urja Vikas Nigam Ltd. v. Essar Power Ltd., (2008) 4 SCC 755. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in aid of interpreting a statute pressed into service the traditional Mimansa system. These principles are the traditional principles of interpretation laid down by Jaimini and are stated to have been used regularly by great jurists who authored the Mitakshara and Dayabhaga laws. The principles were created for religious purpose, but they are stated to be so rational and logical that they began to be used in law, grammar, logic, philosophy and, thus, became of universal application. The three ways of dealing with the conflicts under the Mimansa system have been crystallized as under:--
"(1) Where two texts which are apparently conflicting are capable of being reconciled, then by the principle of harmonious construction (which is called the samanjasya principle in Mimansa) they should be reconciled.
(2) The second situation is a conflict where it is impossible to reconcile the two conflicting texts despite all efforts. In this situation the Vikalpa principle applies, which says that whichever law is more in consonance with reason and justice should be preferred. However, conflict should not be readily assumed and every effort should be made to reconcile conflicting texts. It is only when all efforts of reconciliation fail that the Vikalpa principle is to be resorted to.
(3) There is a third situation of a conflict Sharma Amodh and this is where there are two conflicting 2014.05.31 11 : 40 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document chandigarh CWP-12340-2010 (O&M) irreconcilable texts but one overrides the other because of its greater force. This is called a Badha in the Mimansa system (similar to the doctrine of ultra vires)." It is in the aforesaid context that the Hon'ble Supreme Court observed as under:--
"52. No doubt ordinarily the literal rule of interpretation should be followed, and hence the Court should neither add nor delete words in a statute. However, in exceptional cases this can be done where not doing so would deprive certain existing words in a statute of all meaning, or some part of the statute may become absurd."
21. He further placed reliance on the case reported in (2008) 4 SCC 755 (Gujarat Urja Vkas Nigam Ltd. Vs. Essar Power Ltd.) and has referred paras 52 and 53 of the aforesaid judgment, which are extracted as under:-
52. No doubt ordinarily the literal rule of interpretation should be followed, and hence the Court should neither add nor delete words in a statute. However, in exceptional cases this can be done where not doing so would deprive certain existing words in a statute of all meaning, or some part of the statute may become absurd.
53. In the chapter on `Exceptional Construction' in his book on `Interpretation of Statutes' Maxwell writes : "Where the language of a statute, in its ordinary meaning and grammatical construction leads to a manifest contradiction of the apparent purpose of the enactment, or to some inconvenience or absurdity, hardship or injustice, presumably not intended, a construction may be put upon it which modifies the meaning of the words, and even the structure of the sentence. This may be done by departing from the rules of grammar, by giving an unusual meaning to particular words, by altering their collocation, by rejecting them altogether, or by interpolating other words, under the influence, no doubt, of an irresistible conviction that the legislature could not possibly have intended what the words signify, and that the modifications thus made are mere corrections of careless language and really give the true meaning."
22. He further placed reliance on the case reported in 1991 (2) SCC 87 (Surjeet Singh Kalra Vs. Union of INdia and another) and has referred para 19 of the aforesaid judgment, which is extracted as under:-
19. True it is not permissible to read words in a statute which are not there, but "where the alternative lies between either supplying by implication words which appear to have been accidentally omitted, or adopting a construction which deprives certain existing words of all meanings, it is permissible to supply the words". Having regard to the context in which a provision appears and, the object of the statute in which the said provision is enacted, the court should construe it in a harmonious way to make it meaningful. An attempt must always be made so to reconcile the relevant provisions as to advance the remedy intended by the statute. [378E-G] Craies Statute Law, 7th Edition, P. 109; Hameedia Hardware Stores V. B. Mohan Lal Sowcar, [1988] 2 SCC 513 at 524-25, and Sirajul Haq Khan & Ors. v. The Sunni Central Board of Waqf,
23. Learned counsel for the petitioner further placed reliance on the case of Hameedia Hardware Stores v. B. Mohan Lal Sowcar, (1988) 2 SCC 513 where it was observed that the court construing a provision should not easily read into words which have not been expressly enacted but having regard to the context in which a provision appears and the object of the statute in which the said provision is enacted. The court should construe it in a harmonious way to make it meaningful. An attempt must always be made so as to reconcile the relevant provisions to advance the remedy intended by the statute.
24. He further placed reliance on the case reported in 1988 (2) SCC 513 (Hamedia Hardware Stores Vs. B. Mohal Lal Sowcar), wherein, it has been held by the Apex Court that object of an statute is a primary goal and, as such, making it meaningful, a harmonious interpretation could be done.
25. He further placed reliance on the case reported in S.C.R (Supreme Court Reports) (Sirjul Haq Khan & Others Vs. The Sunni Central Board of Waqf, U.P. and others). The relevant parts of the aforesaid order read as under:-
It is well settled that in construing the provisions of a statute courts should be slow to adopt a construction which tends to make any part of the statute meaningless or ineffective; an attempt must always be made so to reconcile the relevant provisions as to advance the remedy intended by the statute.
26. On the other hand, countering the aforesaid, Sri Shailendra Kumar Singh learned Chief Standing Counsel-III has very vehemently opposed the contention as has been made by the petitioners in preceding paragraphs. He denied the factual matrix of the case as averred by the petitioners. He submits that overtly there is no mention of the parties to the appeal other than the senior citizen as well as parents as Section 16(1) of the Act, 2007 is evident and, therefore, nothing can be added against the intent of the legislature.
27. Learned Chief Standing Counsel for the State submits that, in fact, it is settled proposition of law that while interpreting the statutes or Acts, there can be iron on the fabric, but cannot change the texture. He submits that, in fact, in the given situation/instant matter, the legislature did not put the word in appeal, which could reveal that the right to appeal is extended to the children, relatives or any other person aggrieved by the order passed under Section 5 of the Act, 2007. He submits that, in fact, had there been any intention of the legislature to accord the right of appeal to such a person other than the senior citizen as well as the parents, there would have been the specific wordings in the appeal itself and, as such, the interpretation of the statute cannot be done by putting a word which has cautiously not been added in the provisions. Adding such a word in Section 16(1) of the Act, 2007 would amount to make a legislation by the Court which was not warranted as to the intent of the legislature.
28. Strengthening his arguments, he has placed reliance on a judgment in Appeal (Civil) No. 2298 of 2001 (Gurudevdatta Vksss Maryadit and others Vs. State of Maharashtra and others), wherein, while passing the order, the Apex Court has specifically held that when the expression/ words of legislative provision are capable to construct the purpose of the provision, a court cannot ignore it and further cannot substitute a different construction as the same would affect the object of the legislation. The relevant paragraph of the aforesaid judgment is quoted hereinunder:-
"Moreover, as the extrinsic material reveals, s.40(3) was intended to be remedial. As far as practicable, s.40(1) and (3) should be construed to promote the objects of the Act. Nevertheless, as I pointed out in Kingston v. Keprose Pty Ltd. [1987 (11) NSWLR 404 at 423], in applying a purposive construction, the function of the court remains one of construction and not legislation. When the express words of a legislative provision are reasonably capable of only one construction and neither the purpose of the provision nor any other provision in the legislation throws doubt on that construction, a court cannot ignore it and substitute a different construction because it furthers the objects of the legislation."
29. Learned counsel has further placed reliance on a case bearing Appeal (Civil) No. 5077 of 1998 (Nasiruddin and others Vs. Sita Ram Agarwal) and has referred the relevant paragraph of the aforesaid judgment, which is extracted as follows:-
The court's jurisdiction to interpret a statute can be invoked when the same is ambiguous. It is well known that in a given case the Court can iron out the fabric but it cannot change the texture of the fabric. It cannot enlarge the scope of legislation or intention when the language of provision is plain and unambiguous. It cannot add or subtract words to a statute or read something into it which is not there. It cannot re-write or recast legislation. It is also necessary to determine that there exists a presumption that the legislature has not used any superfluous words. It is well-settled that the real intention of the legislation must be gathered from the language used. It may be true that use of the expression 'shall or may' is not decisive for arriving at a finding as to whether statute is directory or mandatory. But the intention of the legislature must be found out from the scheme of the Act. It is also equally well-settled that when negative words are used the courts will presume that the intention of the legislature was that the provisions are mandatory in character.
30. Referring the aforesaid judgments, he submits that, in fact, it is settled proposition of law that the 'words', which should have been, but was not provided in the statute cannot be settled by Courts as, by doing so, the same would be otherwise adopting the method of legislation and not a construction.
31. Having heard learned counsel for the parties and going through the record, it emerges that right to appeal under the Act, 2007 is only attributed to the senior citizen and the parents though, as per the provisions of Section 5 of Act, 2007, the order may be passed against the children, relatives or any other person also. Section 5(2)(8) is reiterated as under:-
"(2) The Tribunal may, during the pendency of the proceeding regarding monthly allowance for the maintenance under this section, order such children or relative to make a monthly allowance for the interim maintenance of such senior citizen including parent and to pay the same to such senior citizen including parent as the Tribunal may from time to time direct."
"(8) If, children or relative so ordered fail, without sufficient cause to comply with the order, any such Tribunal may, for every breach of the order, issue a warrant for levying the amount due in the manner provided for levying fines, and may sentence such person for the whole, or any part of each month's allowance for the maintenance and expenses of proceeding, as the case be, remaining unpaid after the execution of the warrant, to imprisonment for a term which may extend to one month or until payment if sooner made whichever is earlier: Provided that no warrant shall be issued for the recovery of any amount due under this section unless application be made to the Tribunal to levy such amount within a period of three months from the date on which it became due."
32. Question arises that whether there can be an iota of intent of any legislature to leave an aggrieved person remediless, which is wholly against the principle of natural justice and procedure established by law.
33. The interpretation of a statutory enactment is not a mechanical task. It is also not based on mathematical formula. While interpreting an statute, the intent of the legislature is to be discovered. The words used/imbibed in the statute are the foremost reliable source of the meaning and intent of any writing. In fact, the finest guide of the meaning of the 'words' in the matured jurisprudence does not lie only in the dictionary, but the purpose and object of the statute has an impact over there.
34. Though, it is a well settled proposition of law that if the language is plain and unambigous, the same cannot be enlarged or added by way of interpretation of statute. The words in a statute neither can be substracted nor can be added, but even then the intent of legislature is the supreme goal to be achieved/interpreted.
35. So far as the parliamentary debates while enactment of Act, 2007 is concerned, there has been no debate qua Section 16(1) of the Act, 2007. The Section 5(2)(8) specifically enlarges certain obligations/liabilities over the children, relative or any other person and, as such, on the other word, they can be said to be a person aggrieved. There can be no such intent of the legislature so as to exclude the right of appeal to such persons upon whom the liability has been fastened. If Section 5(2) as well as Section 5(8) and Section 16(1) are read with each other, it emerges that as per the aforesaid Section 16(1) right of filing an appeal always remain available to the person other than senior citizen and parents also.
36. In view of the aforesaid discussions, there seems to be an accidental omission while enactment of the statute namely Act, 2007, where under Section 16(1), the right to appeal has only been given to the parents and the senior citizens not to the children, relative or other person. In any legislature of the world, there can be no such discussion or intent to exclude a person, who is aggrieved under the same Act, to file an appeal or to extend any remedy therein. So far as the rule of casus omissus is concerned, it is also a vice-versa as if there is a clear necessity of any provision and that has been omitted, then that is out of purview of the doctrine of casus omissus.
37. Objective of any statute is always to provide more effective provisions so that there could remain no ambiguity. The provisions for the maintenance are for welfare of the parents and the senior citizen and was promulgated for better care of them but, there is another side of the story. Because the maintenance has to be given by some person or institute or a juristic person and if such a maintenance is been granted, some person must be affected and thus, the non mentioning of the words in Section 16(1) is not a casus omissus, but it seems an accidental omission.
38. The rule of purposive interpretation also indicates and establishes that the law is such a thing which has to be applied as a pragmatic instrument for social order. The interpretative effort must be inherent with the statutory purpose.
39. There is a well settled principle that the judge can iron the fabrics but cannot change the texture of statute. There is another aspect of this rule that if texture is itself defective due to accidental omission, then that becomes inefficacious and ineffective, and thus, the role of the courts comes into picture. Many times, in case of accidental omission, the Court by way of applying the rule of purposive interpretation has improved the texture, though, did not change the same.
40. Further, it is also important that there is no provision in the Act denying the right of appeal to the other parties. From perusal of the other provisions of the Act and various sub sections discussed aforesaid indicates that the right to appeal to other parties has accidentally been omitted. Only exception to this course of action is the initial words of sub section (1) of Section 16 of the said Act which need to be supplanted to give a meaning to the intent of the statutes.
41. The identical issue was also dealt with by the Punjab and Haryana High Court in case of Paramjeet Kumar Saroya (supra) as well as in case of Balamurugan (supra) by the Madras High Court and it has been held that if the right to appeal is not been accorded to the children, relatives or any other person then the purpose of the Act, 2007 would be frustrated and rather this would be a denial of right to appeal to the person aggrieved.
42. Thus, this Court is also in agreement with the aforesaid orders and find that the right to appeal to any affected parties is available so far as the purpose of the Act, 2007 is concerned.
43. Therefore, this writ petition is hereby partly allowed. The order dated 24.02.2020 passed by respondent no.1 is set aside. The liberty is granted to the petitioners to file an appeal before the Appellate Court under Section 16 of the Act, 2007 afresh, within a period of 15 days from the date of this order and if such an appeal is filed, the Appellate Authority shall take decision on appeal within a further period of four months after calling objections and affording an opportunity of hearing to the parties concerned.
44. No order as to costs.
Order Date :- 18.05.2022 Ashutosh/Ujjawal