Madhya Pradesh High Court
Padmabai vs State Of Madhya Pradesh on 29 October, 1986
Equivalent citations: 1987CRILJ1573
JUDGMENT M. D. Bhatt, J.
1. This is the appeal of the accused Mst. Padmabai who on her conviction under Section 306 of the I.P.C. for abetting the suicide of her daughter-in-law Puja alias Sunita, has been sentenced to three years' R.I.
2. The appellant-accused Padmabai, her husband Ishwardas and son Raju alias Rajendrakumar had been put up for trial under Section 306 of the I.P.C. in the trial Court The trial had abetted against Ishwardas since he had died during the course of trial. Raju the husband of the deceased, for want of evidence was acquitted by the trial Court, and it is only the deceased's mother-in-law viz. the present appellant-accused who has been convicted and sentenced to the extent as stated at the outset.
3. Mst. Sunita, now deceased, was married to Raju on 11-5-1980 at Ujjain, where both of them along with their parents did live together. Out of the lawful wed-lock, a daughter was born in September, 1981. It was on 27-4-1982 at the house of the in-laws that Mst. Sunita, at the time when no other members of the family of the in-laws were present in the house, had died instantaneously consequent to 100% burns over her body. Report of the incident was lodged by the deceased Mst. Sunita's brother P. W. 3 Girish Kumar (Ex. P-7).
4. According to the prosecution, it was settled before the marriage that Rs. 15,000/-in cash and Rs. 5000 in kind would be paid to the bridegrooms' parents by way of dowry; and this settlement had been duly honoured amicably and without rancour. But the in-laws of Mst. Sunita, more particularly, the appellant-accused made demand of further dowry of Rs. 10,000/- and somehow Rs. 1600/-were again, paid. The demand for Rs. 10,000/-still persisted; and on this account, Mst. Sunita was subjected to abuses, humiliation and ill-treatment. As regards this humiliation and ill-treatment, Mst. Sunita was stated to have written three letters (Exs. P-4 to P-6) to her sisters Anita and Soni, near about the time of Holi i.e. about a month and half before Mst. Sunita's death.
5. The appellant-accused and Ors., on being prosecuted after due investigation, abjured the guilt. It was at first contended that the death of Mst. Sunita was just accidental since the stove with which she was working at the relevant time had got burst. It w'as, next contended that deceased Mst. Sunita's husband Raju and his parents had been falsely implicated, solely for the reason, that the deceased's parents wanted their son-in-law Raju to live separately from his parents after the marriage. One witness was examined in defence and the documents Exs. D-4 to D-6, one written by the deceased to her husband and the other two, written by the deceased's father to her father in-law were produced and proved, in an attempt to show the cordial relations between the husband and wife and the absence of any ill-treatment and humiliation, meted out to Smt. Sunitabai at the hands of her in-laws more particularly the appellant mother-in-law.
6. The trial Court, in the first place, held that Mst. Sunita had died consequent to suicide and not by any accident. The letters Exs. P-4 to P-6 were held admissible as being within the ambit of Section 32(1) of the Evidence Act. In the light of the contents of these letters and the oral testimonies of the deceased's father P. W. 5 Hiranand, brother P. W. 3 Girishkumar and brother in-law P. W. 9 Harish Chandwani and of some others, it was held that the appellant-accused and her deceased's husband Ishwardas had persistently abused, harassed and humiliated their daughter-in-law Mst. Sunita to such an extent that being disgusted with the torture meted out to her, she had come to have such mental stress which had forced her to commit suicide. Such conduct on the part of the appellant-accused was held to be covered under the definition of "abetment under Section 107 of the I.P.C and accordingly, the appellant-accused was convicted and sentenced under Section 306 of the I.P.C. for abetment of the suicide. Hence, now, the present appeal.
7. Shri J.P. Gupta and Shri Jaisingh, both learned Counsel for the appellant-accused, have, in the first place, urged that Mst. Sunita's death was accidental and not suicidal, inasmuch as there was the evidence of the presence of the stove at the relevant place where Mst. Sunita was found lying dead, with 100% burns over her body. In this connection, it is also argued that the medical evidence on record, as it is, does not clinchingly exclude the possibility of accidental death. As regards the admissibility of the particular letters Exs. P-4 to P-6, they are urged to be inadmissible in evidence on the touch-stone of the test of proximity which is unavoidably necessary for attracting the application of Section 32(1) of the Evidence Act. (Sharad v. State of Maharashtra has been cited in support. As regards the alleged abuses, harassment and humiliation, it is urged that there is no cogent evidence on record; and even these letters Exs. P-4 to P-6, if admitted, do not point out to such a state of affairs contributing to Mst. Sumita's death by Suicide. As regards the demand of dowry of the further amount of Rs. 10,000/- the prosecution evidence in this regard is urged to be suspect, and as such unreliable, in the absence of material evidence of Naresh and other witnesses.
8. I have scrutinized the trial Courts judgment and the evidence on record in the light of arguments, pressed coming to the question whether Mst. Sunita's death was suicidal or homicidal, medical evidence of P.W. 6 Dr. Sule in the light of the post-mortem report (Ex. P-l 1) is found to be, far from being conclusive, inasmuch as, this Autopsy Surgeon is found unable to opine with certainty, as to whether or not, the death of Mst. Sunita by 100% burns was suicidal, homicidal or accidental (para 10 of P. W. 6). In P. W. 3 Girish Kumar's FIR (Ex. P-7), he is found to state on the strength of what he had learnt from the members of the family of the deceased's in-laws that Mst. Sunita, while preparing to boil the milk for her child on the stove, had got accidentally burnt due to the bursting of the stove. Such mention, being hearsay is not of much relevance unless there is other proof regarding the cause of death being by accident, or unless, there is some material to probabilise such fact.
9. P.W. 10 Police sub-Inspector B.P. Dubey who had rushed to the place of the incident is found to have prepared the seizure-memo regarding the articles seized by him from the place where the dead body of Mst Sunita was lying. It is nowhere mentioned in the seizure-memo (Ex. P-12) that any stove or any kettle containing milk were found at the place. He has totally denied the defence suggestion in this regard during the course of his cross-examination. However, P. W. 7 Hariram, who is one of the attesting-witnesses of the seizure memo Ex. P-12, has deposed contrary to the recitals of Ex. P-12, that he had seen one stove in that room and the Sub-Inspector Dubey had not seized it, even though he himself had asked him to do so. No doubt, this witness has not been declared hostile but even then his oral testimony in the matter of presence of the stove at the place does not inspire any credence, particularly when he is found to have signed the seizure- memo without noting his protest that the Sub-Inspector had not seized the stove even though he himself had protested about this. There is nothing for the Sub-Inspector to tell lies and not to seize the stove, if at all it was there. Mere presence of the stove, even if it had been on the spot would have made no difference, if the story as urged by defence that Sunita was preparing at the relevant time to boil the milk for her daughter were correct, then, in that case, there should have been some kettle vessel or container with milk therein, which could indicate that Mst. Sunita, at the relevant time, was preparing to boil milk for her child. I find myself in agreement with the trial Court that there was no stove at the place, and that the death of Mst. Sunita was not an accidental one, but was the clear case of suicide.
10. Non-examination of one Ramnarayan Nai and one boy Mahesh, who according to the investigation by the Police Sub-Inspector P.W. 10 Dubey, were the first persons to reach the particular room after breaking the front door is obviously of no material consequence, inasmuch as, their evidence, even if adduced, could not have thrown any positive light regarding the cause of Mst. Sunita's death by accident or by suicide. Prosecution had adduced evidence, what (sic) if considered to be necessary. The accused persons, if they were really certain about the cause of death, could well have examined Ramnarayan Nai and Mahesh, to probabilise the death as an accidental one. Nothing prevented them from doing so. Anyway, as it is, from the evidence on record, there is no scope for doubt that Mst. Sunita herself had committed suicide.
11. Coming to the question of admissibility or otherwise of the three letters Exs. P-4 to P-6 within the purview of Section 32(1) of the Evidence Act, it may be observed, in the light of the tenor of these three documents, although these letters do not bear any date, that they are found to be written near about the time of the Holi of the year 1982, about a month or so before Mst. Sunita's death. These letters are apparently found to be proximate in time. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court, in their recent decisions in ; Sharad v. State of Maharashtra relying on the leading decision on the question in the case of Narayana Swami v. Emperor AIR 1939 PC 47 : 40 Cri LJ 364 and the Locus-Classicus of their own earlier decision in ; Hanumant v. State of M.P. and considering the interpretation of Section 32(1) Ibid as made in ; Ratan Gond v. State of Bihar have, after their review of these authorities and Ors., formulated certain propositions as per the clear language of Section 32 ibid, widening the sphere of Section 32, to avoid injustice. These propositions are stated in para 21 of this reported decision. The proposition laid down is that Section 32 is an exception to the rule of hearsay, making admissible the statement of person who dies whether the death is a homicide or a suicide, provided the statement relates to the cause of death, or exhibits circumstances leading to the death.
12. As regards the test of proximity regarding the circumstantial evidence, be it in the form of the statement or the letters written, the material propositions propounded in AIR 1984 SC 1622 : 1984 Cri LJ 1738 (supra) being relevant for purposes of the present case are reproduced hereunder for proper appreciation :
The test of proximity cannot be too literally construed and practically reduced to a cut-and-dried formula of universal application so as to be confined in a strait-jacket. Distance of time would depend or vary with the circumstances of each case. For instance, where death is a logical culmination of a continuous drama of the story, the statement regarding each step directly connected with the end of the drama would be admissible because the entire statement would have to be read as an organic whole and not torn from the contest. Sometimes statements relevant to or furnishing an immediate motive may also be admissible as being a part of the transaction of death. It is manifest that all these statements come to light only after the death of the deceased who speaks from death. For instance, where the death takes place within a very short time of the marriage or the distance of time is not spread over more than 3-4 months the statement may be admissible under Section 32.
(At p. 1630 of AIR) : At p. 1747 of Cri LJ) Where the main evidence consists of statements and letters written by the deceased which are directly connected with or related to her death and which reveal a tell-tale story, the said statement would clearly fall within the four corners of Section 32 and, therefore, admissible. The distance of time alone in such cases would not make the statement irrelevant.
(At p. 1631 of AIR) : (At p. 1748 of Cri LJ) In the light of the tests above, these letters Exs. P-4 to P-6, clearly proved to be written by the deceased Mst. Sunita to her two sisters, are obviously found to come within the purview of Section 32(1) of the Evidence Act inasmuch as, just within a reasonable time, quite close in proximity prior to the suicide, the deceased had written and addressed these letters to her two sisters. The trial Court is therefore found to be right in admitting these documents in evidence.
13. Now, coming to the merits of the case on the material question' whether the appellant-accused the mother-in-law of Mst. Sunita, now deceased, had abetted the commission of suicide by Mst. Sunita, it may, at first, be observed that, considering the definition of "abetment of a thing" as given in Section 107 of the I.P.C. the scope of the offence under Section 306 ibid for abetment of suicide is quite within a narrow compass. It would be evident on plain reading of Section 306 read with Section 107 of the I.P.C, that, in order to make out the offence of abetment of suicide, the necessary proof required is that the culprit has either instigated the victim to commit suicide or has engaged himself in conspiracy with others, for the commission of suicide or has intentionally aided, by any act or illegal omission in the commission of suicide. Instigation for suicide may well take the form of wilful misrepresentation or wilful concealment of any material facts, directly or otherwise, leading to the avowed or intended result i.e. suicide. Likewise, any act done, prior to or at the time of commission of suicide, in order to facilitate suicide which may then, however, actually take place, is also covered within the ambit of 'intentional adding' as mentioned in Section 107 ibid. However, it may be well to remember that the act done to facilitate the commission of suicide should be closely proximate in time to the time of the incident. The acts done at a distant time with no close nearness or proximity to the time of a suicide will obviously have to be ruled out, as acts facilitating and accelerating the commission of suicide. There has to be element of positive complicity on the part of the abettor at the point of time just prior to the actual commission of the offence or within such short space of time prior to suicide that there may be found a reasonable and rational nexus between the act done by the abettor and the resultant death. It is of the essence of the crime order of abetment of suicide that the abettor should be proved to have substantially assisted in the commission of the offence of suicide. Instigation, incitement, provocation, encouragement, insinuation, solicitation which words connote different meanings, are, no doubt, some of the acts, which may constitute as 'abetment' for commission of suicide. But all such acts or any of them have to be positive and potent in the nature, of such a degree, that the direct result of such acts may be none other, but the commission of suicide.
14. Stray domestic quarrels, perfunctory abuses by mother-in-law, to her daughter-in-law in the Indian society, crude and uncultured behaviour by the In-laws or the husband towards his wife being mundane matters of normal occurrence in the traditional joint Hindu families, will not go to form and constitute 'abetment' unless these acts of conduct singally or cumulatively, are found to be of such formidable and compelling nature as may lead to the commission of suicide or may facilitate in a singular and prime manner, the commission of the same.
15. Now, coming to the merits of the case, the appellants principal act constituting abetment for suicide is stated to be the persistent demand for additional dowry from the deceased Mst. Sunita's parents and the consequent humiliation inflicted on the deceased-daughter-in-law Mst. Sunita in this regard, leading directly to her suicide. Material witnesses on the prosecution side in the matter of this allegation are deceased's brother P.W. 3 Girish Kumar, her father P.W. 5 Hiranand, her elder's sisters husband P. W. 9 Harish Chandwani and her cousin P.W. 8 Shyamsunder. It may, incidentally, be stated that Shyamsunder has even made the accusation against the appellant-accused for perpetrating physical atrocities on her daughter-in-law viz. Mst. Sunita now deceased. He has deposed that the deceased had told her once, that the appellant-accused had been harassing her, beating her, and even had been denying normal meals to her (para 4 of P. W. 8). This solitary averment is obviously an exaggeration and concoction, inasmuch as, neither the deceased s father nor brother nor the brother-in-law who had been examined in the case earlier to this witness Shyamsunder had made any such accusation.
16. Now. the evidence of the deceased's father, brother and brother-in-law and so also of P.W. 4 Mst. Dayabai who had mediated to bring about the settlement of marriage is found to show that Rs. 15,000/- in cash and Rs. 5,000/- in kind, had already been paid to the appellant-accused and her husband, towards the dowry as per the initial agreement and settlement. Such payment was under mutual arrangement and with free consent of the parties concerned without any element of force or duress. It is the subsequent demand for more amount i.e. the amount of Rs. 10,000/-, which is stated to be the proximate cause, leading to Mst. Sunita's suicide, due to her persistent humiliation, consequent to the non-fulfilment of this additional demand. Evidence, of course, has been adduced in this regard.
17. On close scrutiny of the evidence of these material witnesses, referred to above, the story regarding this additional demand of Rs. 10,000/- is found to be a myth and concoction with no solid and rational foundation. As per the evidence of the deceased s brother P. W. 3 Girish Kumar arid father P.W. 5 Hiranand, the appellant-accused had made this additional demand for the first time to the deceased's another brother Naresh, just after eight days of marriage, when he had gone to the place of the deceased's in-laws, to fetch her sister viz. the deceased Mst. Sunita to see her father Hiranand, who had just then suffered a heart-attack. According to Girish Kumar, the appellant-accused had refused to send her daughter-in-law Mst. Sunita unless the amount of Rs. 10,000/- was paid to her; but as it is, from his own evidence, it is further found that even after not receiving this amount, she had immediately sent her daughter-in-law just after two or three days. His further averment that Mst. Sunita had told him that she was being harassed by her 'in-laws' for nonpayment of additional demand of Rs. 10,000/-obviously appears to be false, inasmuch as, it does not stand to reason that just within eight days of marriage, when the settled dowry of Rs. 20,000/- had already been paid, the appellant-accused could have made the additional demand so immediately. Naresh would have been the best person to vouchsafe regarding the veracity of this allegation for additional demand of dowry, but the prosecution has not cared to examine him; and as such the material evidence in the case is obviously lacking. It is pertinent to note that Girish Kumar, in his FIR (Ex. P-7) which had been lodged just two days after suicide, there was no such mention at all regarding the additional demand of dowry of Rs. 10,000/-by the appellant-accused. There is also no mention in the FIR regarding part payment of Rs. 1800/- or Rs. 1600/- or regarding the demand of fridge in place of an almirah, as deposed to by this witness Girish Kumar in para 25 of his averment.
18. The oral testimony of the deceased's father P.W. 5 Hiranand also shows enough embellishments since the material facts deposed to by him are not found to be stated in his earlier statement (Ex.D-2). The same is true with regard to the oral testimonies of P.W. 8 Shyamsunder and P.W. 9 Harish Chandwani. Mst. Sunita is found to have died about a year and ten months after her marriage. The evidence of her father, brother, cousin and brother-in-law indisputably shows that out of this total period, she had remained at her parents' house for about six or seven months, the remaining period being the one, when she had been living with her husband and 'in-laws'. Radhamal and Daulatram, who are the Panchas of the community and who were stated to have approached the appellant-accused's husband late Ishwardas to amicably settle the issue regarding the additional demand of dowry of Rs. 10,000/- are again not found to have been examined to lend veracity to the prosecution story. On the contrary, Hiranand's own testimony amply shows that when he, in the company of Daulatram and Radhamal, had personally met the appellant-accused's husband Ishwardas at the relevant time when the latter was lying ill on bed, Ishwardas had plainly told Hariram and the Mukhias of the Community not to talk about dowry and had therefore asked Hiranand to send his daughter Mst. Sunita to live with her husband and in-laws. This circumstance, itself belies the prosecution story regarding the demand of additional dowry. Then, there are other circumstances on record which completely expose the prosecution story regarding harassment and humiliation of Mst. Sunita on account of dowry-demand.
19. The deceased Mst. Sunita's three letters (Exs. P-4 to P-6), written to her sisters, no doubt, show the deceased "s unhappiness in the domestic environment of her 'in-laws, but these letters when scrutinized are not found to convincingly, show that this unhappiness was on account of any demand of huge amount of Rs. 10,000/-. Much cannot be made out of these letters to incriminate the in-laws, more particularly the appellant-accused. During the same period when these letters, which are without date, had been written, there are other letters, written by the deceased Mst. Sunita's father to the appellant's husband Ishwardas. These letters which are duly proved and equally admitted, are Exs. D-4 and D-5. These letters make no reference regarding Ishwardas' and his wife's any additional dowry-demand of Rs. 10,000/-on the contrary, these letters show the existence of mutual good relations between the two families without any rancour or illwill amongst them on any count. More important is the letter Ex. D-6, admittedly written by the deceased to her husband. This letter too show nothing else but all love and fondness for her husband, with no iota of material therein, regarding any bickerings or regarding her unhappiness or humiliation at her in-laws' place. The letter, on the contrary, evidences the deceased's eagerness to retrurn to her 'in-law' place, as early as possible. Obviously such cannot be the conduct of any woman who might have been harassed and humiliated at her in-law's place. Had the in-laws' treatment of Sunita been repulsive and abhorring, Mst. Sunita, in her letter Ex. D-6, would not have shown her eagerness to return to her in-laws' place; and would have, on the contrary, shown her reluctance in some form or the other. Thus, this important letter Ex. D-6, by itself, demolishes the prosecution story regarding the deceased's harassment and humiliation.
20. There is further incidental evidence to show the cordial relations between the deceased Mst. Sunita and her mother-in-law viz, the appellant-accused P.W. 2 Girdharilal and P.W. 7 Hariram who live in the same locality where the house of the deceased's in-laws was situate at Ujjain, have, both, stated that they had always seen the deceased and her mother-in-law viz. the appellant-accused, moving about together and having mutual cordial relations without any rancour. There is no reason to doubt the evidence of these witnesses who have been examined on the prosecution side as independent witnesses. Considering the over all evidence of the material prosecution witnesses and the attending circumstances and no less the particular letters respectively produced on both sides, I am clearly of the view that the prosecution story regarding the additional demand of Rs. 10,000/- by the appellant-accused from the deceased's parents is a myth and concoction; and the further story regarding the deceased's humiliation and harassment on account of non-fulfilment of this demand is, likewise, false to the core.
21. No evidence whatsoever on the prosecution side, thus, shows any act on the part of the appellant-accused, so proximate in time as to show that her any act, whatsoever, had a direct nexus or even a remote one, with the fatal and when Mst. Sunita had burnt herself to death. No doubt, she had ended her life by self-immolations; and that too, at the time, when no members of the family of her in-laws were present in the house. One knows not the state of mind of the deceased Mst. Sunita at the time, when she had committed suicide. It could well be that the behaviour of the appellant-accused and her husband may not have been to the expectation of the daughter-in-law viz. Mst. Sunita, now deceased; and therefore, she might have: come to have frustration and pessimism due to her own extreme sensitiveness and sentimentalism. The appellant-accused cannot be blamed for the deceased psychotic and emotional disorders of a weak mind. Anyway, no act on the part of the appellant-accused is found to be such which might have essentially contributed to Mst. Sunita's death. Therefore, the appellant-accused cannot be held to have abetted Mst. Sunita in committing suicide. The appellant-accused consequently, being not found guilty of the offence under Section 306 of the I.P.C., deserves to be acquitted.
22. In the result thus the appeal is allowed. Setting aside the order of conviction and sentence, as passed by the trial Court under Section 306 of the I.P.C., it is ordered instead, that the appellant-accused be and is now acquitted of the said offence. Her bail bonds are discharged.