State Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission
Prachi Mathur vs M/S Tdi Infrastructure Ltd. on 5 October, 2020
IN THE STATE COMMISSION: DELHI
(Constituted under section 9 of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986)
Date of Hearing: 05.10.2020
Date of Decision: 08.10.2020
Review Application No.6/2020
IN THE MATTER OF
MS. PRACHI MATHUR
D/o Mr. I.R. Mathur
502, Jhelam Arorvansh
CGHS Limited Plot No. 8
Sector-5, Dwarka
New Delhi-110075 ....Complainant
VERSUS
M/S TDI INFRASTRUCTURE LIMITED
Registered office at
10, Shaheed Bhagat Singh Marg
New Delhi-110001
Corporate office:-
Upper ground floor, Vandana building
11, Tolstoy Marg, Connaught place
New Delhi-110001 ....Opposite Party
HON'BLE SH. ANIL SRIVASTAVA, MEMBER
1. Whether reporters of local newspaper be allowed to see the judgment? Yes
2. To be referred to the reporter or not? Yes
Present: Mr. Jitender Vashisht, Counsel for the complainant
PER: ANIL SRIVASTAVA, MEMBER
(RA-6/2020) PRACHI MATHUR VERSUS TDI INFRASTRUCTURE PVT. LTD. PAGE 1 OF 7
ORDER
1. The Consumer Complaint case (C-1415/2016) was filed under section 17 of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 and was taken up for final arguments via video conferencing on 04.09.2020. The case was finally disposed of by a judgment dated 14.09.2020, wherein this Commission directed the OPs to refund the deposited amount with compensation in the form of simple interest at the rate of 7% from the date of deposit of the amount till its realization.
2. The complainant has now approached this Commission in a review application under Section 50 of the Consumer Protection Act, 2019 filed on 29.09.2020 against the judgment dated 14.09.2020.
3. The short question which needs to be adjudicated by this Commission is whether the present application for review of the judgment dated 14.09.2020passed under the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 can be entertained by this Commission.
4. It must be noted that the proceedings of the present case took place as per the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 and the judgment was pronounced on 14.09.2020. As per the Consumer Protection Act, 1986, this Commission does not have the power to review cases. This position of law was settled in the case of Rajeev Hitendra Pathak and Ors. v. Achyut Kashinath Karekar and Anr. reported in (2011) 9 SCC 541 wherein the Apex Court held:
"36. On careful analysis of the provisions of the Act, it is abundantly clear that the Tribunals are creatures of the Statute and derive their power from the express provisions of the Statute. The District Forums and the State Commissions have not been given any power to set aside ex parte orders and power of review and the powers which have not been expressly given by the Statute cannot be exercised.
37. The legislature chose to give the National Commission power to review its ex parte orders. Before amendment, against dismissal of any case by the Commission, the consumer had to rush to this Court. The amendment in Section 22 and (RA-6/2020) PRACHI MATHUR VERSUS TDI INFRASTRUCTURE PVT. LTD. PAGE 2 OF 7 introduction of Section 22-A were done for the convenience of the consumers. We have carefully ascertained the legislative intention and interpreted the law accordingly.
38. In our considered opinion, the decision in Jyotsana's case laid down the correct law and the view taken in the later decision of this Court in New India Assurance Co. Ltd. is untenable and cannot be sustained.
39. In view of the legal position, in Civil Appeal No.4307 of 2007, the findings of the National Commission are set aside as far as it has held that the State Commission can review its own orders. After the amendment in Section 22 and introduction of Section 22A in the Act in the year 2002 by which the power of review or recall has vested with the National Commission only. However, we agree with the findings of the National Commission holding that the Complaint No.473 of 1999 be restored to its original number for hearing in accordance with law."
5. From the perusal of the aforesaid judgment, it is clear, that the Consumer Protection Act, 1986, did not vest the State Commission with the power to review its own orders.
6. On the contrary, the new Consumer Protection Act, 2019 has empowered this Commission to review its own orders under Section 50.
7. To put an end to the present controversy, we have to see whether the present case has to be adjudicated in accordance with the provisions of repealed Act i.e. Consumer Protection Act, 1986 or as per the new Act (Consumer Protection Act, 2019).
8. The new Act came into effect on 20.07.2020, i.e. almost four years after the present case was instituted.
9. In fact, the new Consumer Protection Act, 2019 is prospective in nature and parties whose rights and obligations were settled as per the old Act, cannot make use of the provisions of the new Act. The repeal of a law shall not affect the previous operation of any enactment i.e. the proceedings under Consumer Protection Act, 1986 shall continue for cases which had been filed prior to the implementation of Consumer (RA-6/2020) PRACHI MATHUR VERSUS TDI INFRASTRUCTURE PVT. LTD. PAGE 3 OF 7 Protection Act, 2019 on 20.07.2020. The same can be gauged through the repeal and saving section (Section 107) of the Consumer Protection Act, 2019 which has been reproduced below:
107. (1) The Consumer Protection Act, 1986 is hereby repealed.
(2) Notwithstanding such repeal, anything done or any action taken or purported to have been done or taken under the Act hereby repealed shall, in so far as it is not inconsistent with the provisions of this Act, be deemed to have been done or taken under the corresponding provisions of this Act.
(3) The mention of particular matters in sub- section (2) shall not be held to prejudice or affect the general application of section 6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 with regard to the effect of repeal.
10. We may also take the assistance of Section 6 (b) of the General Clauses Act, 1897 to further this view. Section 6 (b) of the General Clauses Act, 1897 has been reproduced below:
"6 Effect of repeal.: Where this Act, or any 1 [Central Act] or Regulation made after the commencement of this Act, repeals any enactment hitherto made or hereafter to be made, then, unless a different intention appears, the repeal shall not
(a) revive anything not in force or existing at the time at which the repeal takes effect; or
(b) affect the previous operation of any enactment so repealed or anything duly done or suffered thereunder"
11. Moreover, unless the legislature explicitly provides that the amendment is retrospective in nature, it will be considered prospective. The aforesaid view has been taken by the Apex (RA-6/2020) PRACHI MATHUR VERSUS TDI INFRASTRUCTURE PVT. LTD. PAGE 4 OF 7 Court in the case of CIT v. Vatika Township (P) Ltd. reported in (2015) 1 SCC 1 wherein this Court discussed the proviso to Section 113 of the Income Tax Act, 1961 and held that it was prospective and not retrospective. While deciding the case, the Constitution Bench laid down certain general principles which have been reproduced as under:
"28. Of the various rules guiding how a legislation has to be interpreted, one established rule is that unless a contrary intention appears, a legislation is presumed not to be intended to have a retrospective operation. The idea behind the rule is that a current law should govern current activities. Law passed today cannot apply to the events of the past. If we do something today, we do it keeping in view the law of today and in force and not tomorrow's backward adjustment of it. Our belief in the nature of the law is founded on the bedrock that every human being is entitled to arrange his affairs by relying on the existing law and should not find that his plans have been retrospectively upset. This principle of law is known as lexprospicit non respicit: law looks forward not backward. As was observed in Phillips v. Eyre [Phillips v. Eyre, (1870) LR 6 QB 1] , a retrospective legislation is contrary to the general principle that legislation by which the conduct of mankind is to be regulated when introduced for the first time to deal with future acts ought not to change the character of past transactions carried on upon the faith of the then existing law.
29. The obvious basis of the principle against retrospectivity is the principle of "fairness", which must be the basis of every legal rule as was observed in L'Office Cherifien des Phosphates v. Yamashita-Shinnihon Steamship Co. Ltd. [L'Office Cherifien des Phosphates v. Yamashita- Shinnihon Steamship Co. Ltd., (1994) 1 AC 486 :
(1994) 2 WLR 39 : (1994) 1 All ER 20 (HL)] Thus, legislations which modified accrued rights or which impose obligations or impose new duties or attach a new disability have to be treated as prospective unless the legislative intent is clearly to give the enactment a retrospective effect;
(RA-6/2020) PRACHI MATHUR VERSUS TDI INFRASTRUCTURE PVT. LTD. PAGE 5 OF 7 unless the legislation is for purpose of supplying an obvious omission in a former legislation or to explain a former legislation. We need not note the cornucopia of case law available on the subject because aforesaid legal position clearly emerges from the various decisions and this legal position was conceded by the counsel for the parties. In any case, we shall refer to few judgments containing this dicta, a little later." (emphasis in original)
26. The Designated Court has held that the amendment would operate retrospectively and would apply to the pending cases in which investigation was not complete on the date on which the Amendment Act came into force and the challan had not till then been filed in the court. From the law settled by this Court in various cases the illustrative though not exhaustive principles which emerge with regard to the ambit and scope of an Amending Act and its retrospective operation may be culled out as follows:
(i) A statute which affects substantive rights is presumed to be prospective in operation unless made retrospective, either expressly or by necessary intendment, whereas a statute which merely affects procedure, unless such a construction is textually impossible, is presumed to be retrospective in its application, should not be given an extended meaning and should be strictly confined to its clearly defined limits.
(ii) Law relating to forum and limitation is procedural in nature, whereas law relating to right of action and right of appeal even though remedial is substantive in nature.
(iii) Every litigant has a vested right in substantive law but no such right exists in procedural law.
(iv) A procedural statute should not generally speaking be applied retrospectively where the result would be to create new disabilities or (RA-6/2020) PRACHI MATHUR VERSUS TDI INFRASTRUCTURE PVT. LTD. PAGE 6 OF 7 obligations or to impose new duties in respect of transactions already accomplished.
(v) A statute which not only changes the procedure but also creates new rights and liabilities shall be construed to be prospective in operation, unless otherwise provided, either expressly or by necessary implication."
12. Taking into account the aforesaid discussion, we can conclude that the Consumer Protection Act, 2019 is prospective in nature. Thus, the cases pending in accordance with the 1986 Act will continue to be proceeded under the old Act.
13. Resultantly, the proceedings in C-1415/2016 shall be governed in accordance with the Consumer Protection Act, 1986. This Commission does not have the power to review its own Judgment pronounced as per the provisions of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986.
14. The application for review being not maintainable stands dismissed.
(ANIL SRIVASTAVA) MEMBER PRONOUNCED ON 08.10.2020 sl (RA-6/2020) PRACHI MATHUR VERSUS TDI INFRASTRUCTURE PVT. LTD. PAGE 7 OF 7