Orissa High Court
M/S. Jindal Stainless Steel Limited @ vs M/S. Newton Engineering And .... ... on 22 January, 2026
Author: Sanjeeb K Panigrahi
Bench: Sanjeeb K Panigrahi
Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed
Signed by: BHABAGRAHI JHANKAR
Reason: Authentication
Location: ORISSA HIGH COURT, CUTTACK
Date: 05-Feb-2026 10:42:43
IN THE HIGH COURT OF ORISSA AT CUTTACK
W.P.(C) No.24869 of 2025
(In the matter of a Petition under Articles 226 and 227 of the
Constitution of India, 1950).
M/s. Jindal Stainless Steel Limited @ .... Petitioner(s)
M/s. Jindal Stainless Ltd., New
Delhi
-versus-
M/s. Newton Engineering and .... Opposite Party (s)
Chemicals Ltd., Gujarat
Advocates appeared in the case through Hybrid Mode:
For Petitioner(s) : Mr. Amit Pattnaik, Adv.
For Opposite Party (s) : Mr. Durga Prasad Nanda, Sr. Adv.
along with associates
CORAM:
DR. JUSTICE SANJEEB KPANIGRAHI
DATE OF HEARING:09.12.2025
DATE OF JUDGMENT:-22.01.2026
Dr. Sanjeeb K Panigrahi, J.
1. The present Writ Petition has been instituted by M/s Jindal Stainless Steel Limited @ M/s Jindal Stainless Limited, calling into question a chain of arbitral and post-arbitral proceedings culminating in the dismissal of an appeal under Section 37 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. The challenge is directed against the judgment dated 26.07.2025 passed Page 1 Signature Not Verified Digitally Signed Signed by: BHABAGRAHI JHANKAR Reason: Authentication Location: ORISSA HIGH COURT, CUTTACK Date: 05-Feb-2026 10:42:43 by the learned District Judge, Khurda, Bhubaneswar in Arb. Appeal No.16 of 2024, whereby the appeal preferred by the petitioner was dismissed, affirming both the arbitral award dated 31.01.2021 and the order dated 06.08.2024 passed by the learned Senior Civil Judge (Commercial Court), Bhubaneswar.
I. FACTUAL MATRIX OF THE CASE:
2. The factual backdrop dates back to August, 2005, when the petitioner floated a tender for the supply, fabrication, erection, testing and commissioning of an L.P. piping system and storage tanks for the 2×125 MW CPP Project at Duburi, Odisha. The opposite party participated in the tender process and was selected as the lowest bidder. A letter of intent was issued on 12.12.2005, followed by a purchase order dated 29.8.2006. The work contract stipulated specific milestones, requiring commissioning of the first unit within eight months and the second unit within eleven months from the date of the letter of intent.
3. It is the admitted position that the opposite party did not complete the work within the stipulated time, despite extensions having been granted up to 30.9.2007. On 15.3.2008, the opposite party abandoned the work, compelling the petitioner to engage a third-party contractor, namely M/s Shakti Engineering, on 17.4.2008 for execution of the remaining work. These events are not in dispute between the parties.
4. On 21.8.2008, the opposite party issued a letter demanding release of the final bill, which has been consistently described as the "first demand." The said demand was followed by a notice dated 7.1.2009 seeking payment against the final bills submitted on 21.8.2008.
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5. Thereafter, on 25.4.2012, the opposite party once again issued a demand notice seeking release of outstanding dues.
6. The petitioner, by its letter dated 27.7.2012, denied the claim of the opposite party on the ground that it was barred by limitation. Subsequently, a legal notice dated 13.2.2013 was issued by the opposite party.
7. On 18.4.2013, the opposite party invoked arbitration by issuing a letter of reference under Section 21 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, invoking Clause 11 of the purchase order.
8. Arbitration Proceeding No.1 of 2013 culminated in an award dated 31.1.2021. By a majority view, the Arbitral Tribunal held that the claims were not barred by limitation and allowed the claims, including an additional claim inserted during the arbitral proceedings. A dissenting opinion, however, held that the claims were time-barred, having arisen from the first demand dated 21.8.2008.
9. Aggrieved, the petitioner filed an application under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act before the learned Senior Civil Judge (Commercial Court), Bhubaneswar, registered as Arb.(P) No.23 of 2021. By order dated 6.8.2024, the Commercial Court dismissed the application. The petitioner thereafter preferred an appeal under Section 13 of the Commercial Courts Act, 2015 read with Section 37 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, which came to be dismissed on 26.7.2025. The present writ petition was filed on 8.9.2025 challenging the said appellate order.
10.Now that the broad facts leading up to the instant Petition have been laid down, this Court shall endeavour to fully summarise the contentions of Page 3 Signature Not Verified Digitally Signed Signed by: BHABAGRAHI JHANKAR Reason: Authentication Location: ORISSA HIGH COURT, CUTTACK Date: 05-Feb-2026 10:42:43 the Parties and the broad grounds that have been urged to seeking the exercise of this Court's writ jurisdiction.
II. SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF PETITIONER:
11.The petitioner assails the impugned judgments and the arbitral award primarily on the ground that the substantive claims entertained and allowed by the Arbitral Tribunal were hopelessly barred by limitation and, therefore, fell outside the jurisdiction of the Tribunal. It is contended that limitation is not a mere procedural defence but a jurisdictional issue going to the very root of the matter, and any adjudication of a dead or stale claim amounts to a patent illegality warranting judicial interference.
12.According to the petitioner, the admitted and undisputed factual position clearly establishes that the first demand for payment of the final bill was raised by the opposite party on 21.8.2008. The petitioner submits that this fact is not only borne out from contemporaneous correspondence but has also been expressly pleaded by the opposite party itself in the statement of claim before the Arbitral Tribunal. On this basis, it is urged that the cause of action crystallised on 21.8.2008 and the right to apply accrued on the same date.
13.The petitioner contends that, applying Article 137 of the Limitation Act, 1963, the limitation period for invoking arbitration was three years from the date on which the cause of action arose. Consequently, the arbitration ought to have been invoked on or before 20.8.2011. However, the opposite party invoked arbitration only on 18.4.2013, nearly five years Page 4 Signature Not Verified Digitally Signed Signed by: BHABAGRAHI JHANKAR Reason: Authentication Location: ORISSA HIGH COURT, CUTTACK Date: 05-Feb-2026 10:42:43 after the first demand, rendering the entire reference ex facie barred by limitation.
14.The petitioner strongly criticises the reasoning adopted by the majority of the Arbitral Tribunal, which, while acknowledging the applicability of the Limitation Act and Article 137, chose to compute limitation from the date of invocation of arbitration under Section 21 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, rather than from the date on which the substantive claim first arose. It is contended that Section 21 only determines the commencement of arbitral proceedings and cannot be construed to resurrect claims that were already barred on the date of invocation.
15.The petitioner further submits that the minority opinion of the Arbitral Tribunal correctly appreciated the law and facts by holding that the claims were barred by limitation, yet this well-reasoned dissent was disregarded without justification. According to the petitioner, the majority award demonstrates perversity on the face of the record, as it ignores admitted documents, pleadings, and settled legal principles governing limitation.
16.It is also contended that the learned Commercial Court and the learned District Judge, while exercising jurisdiction under Sections 34 and 37 respectively, failed to examine limitation as a jurisdictional error and instead treated it as a matter of factual appreciation beyond the scope of interference. The petitioner submits that this approach is legally flawed, as an award allowing time-barred claims is in conflict with the fundamental policy of Indian law and suffers from patent illegality.
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17.On the issue of maintainability, the petitioner asserts that the present writ petition under Article 227 of the Constitution is maintainable notwithstanding the dismissal of the appeal under Section 37. It is argued that where courts below have affirmed an award that is ex facie without jurisdiction due to limitation, the High Court's supervisory jurisdiction can and ought to be invoked to prevent perpetuation of manifest injustice.
III. SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE OPPOSITE PARTY:
18.Per contra, the Opposite Party, has stoutly opposed the Writ Petition and contended that the challenge mounted by the petitioner is misconceived, both on facts and in law. At the outset, it is urged that the present writ petition is an impermissible attempt to reopen concurrent findings of fact recorded by the Arbitral Tribunal, the Commercial Court under Section 34, and the learned District Judge while exercising appellate jurisdiction under Section 37 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. According to the opposite party, such an exercise is wholly alien to the limited supervisory jurisdiction of this Court under Article 227 of the Constitution.
19.On the issue of limitation, the opposite party submits that the petitioner has selectively relied upon the correspondence dated 21.8.2008 to artificially truncate the cause of action. It is contended that mere submission of a final bill or raising of a demand does not ipso facto give rise to a dispute or crystallise a cause of action. The opposite party asserts that the cause of action arose only when the petitioner failed to release Page 6 Signature Not Verified Digitally Signed Signed by: BHABAGRAHI JHANKAR Reason: Authentication Location: ORISSA HIGH COURT, CUTTACK Date: 05-Feb-2026 10:42:43 payment despite repeated requests and, in any event, upon the petitioner's express denial of the claim by letter dated 27.7.2012.
20.The opposite party further contends that the arbitral proceedings were validly commenced in terms of Section 21 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act on 18.4.2013, and that such commencement was well within the permissible period of limitation reckoned from the date when the dispute actually arose. It is argued that until the petitioner unequivocally repudiated the claim, there was no occasion for the opposite party to invoke arbitration, and therefore the invocation cannot be characterised as belated or time-barred.
21.Strong reliance is placed on the majority findings of the Arbitral Tribunal, which, after framing specific issues on limitation, examined the pleadings, documentary evidence, and conduct of the parties in detail. The opposite party submits that the Tribunal correctly appreciated that the dispute matured over a period of time and that limitation could not be mechanically computed from the date of the first bill. The minority view, it is urged, represents only a possible alternative interpretation and cannot be elevated to the status of binding or determinative reasoning.
22.Addressing the scope of judicial review, the opposite party argues that both the Commercial Court and the learned District Judge have correctly applied the settled principles governing Sections 34 and 37 of the Act. It is submitted that limitation, in the present case, involved mixed questions of fact and law, and the findings rendered thereon do not disclose any perversity, patent illegality, or jurisdictional error Page 7 Signature Not Verified Digitally Signed Signed by: BHABAGRAHI JHANKAR Reason: Authentication Location: ORISSA HIGH COURT, CUTTACK Date: 05-Feb-2026 10:42:43 warranting interference. Mere disagreement with the conclusions of the Tribunal cannot be a ground for setting aside an award.
23.On maintainability, the opposite party submits that the writ petition is barred by the doctrine of arbitral finality. It is argued that once an appeal under Section 37 has been dismissed by a competent appellate court, thisCourt ought to exercise extreme restraint and should not sit in appeal over such orders under the guise of supervisory jurisdiction. The opposite party relies upon the principle that writ jurisdiction cannot be invoked as a substitute for a second appeal, which is expressly barred under the statutory scheme.
IV. ISSUES FOR CONSIDERATION:
24.Having heard the parties and perused the materials available on record, this court has identified the following singular issue that has to be determined which have emerged contentiously during the course of the hearing and is germane to decide the lis at hand;
A. WHETHER A WRIT PETITION UNDER ARTICLE 227 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA IS MAINTAINABLE AGAINST AN ORDER PASSED UNDER SECTION 37 OF THE ARBITRATION AND CONCILIATION ACT, 1996, AND IF SO, WHETHER THE FACTS OF THE PRESENT CASE WARRANT EXERCISE OF THIS COURT'S SUPERVISORY JURISDICTION TO ENTERTAIN AND INTERFERE WITH THE SAME?
25.In the backdrop of the rival submissions and the undisputed procedural history, the principal questions of law that arise for consideration before this Court are twofold. First, whether a writ petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India is maintainable against an order passed by the Page 8 Signature Not Verified Digitally Signed Signed by: BHABAGRAHI JHANKAR Reason: Authentication Location: ORISSA HIGH COURT, CUTTACK Date: 05-Feb-2026 10:42:43 Learned District Judge in exercise of appellate jurisdiction under Section 37 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, after the arbitral award has already been tested under Section 34 and affirmed in appeal. Second, assuming such a petition to be maintainable in law, whether the facts of the present case disclose circumstances so exceptional as to warrant interference by this Court in exercise of its supervisory jurisdiction.
26.The first limb of the inquiry requires this Court to examine the extent to which the constitutional power of superintendence survives within the tightly structured framework of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, which consciously restricts judicial intervention and accords finality to appellate orders passed under Section 37. The question is not merely one of technical maintainability, but of reconciling the constitutional mandate under Article 227 with the legislative intent underlying Sections 5 and 37 of the Act.
27.The petitioner, in support of the maintainability of the present writ petition, submits that the constitutional jurisdiction of this Court under Article 227 is neither curtailed nor ousted by the statutory framework of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. It is argued that Section 5 of the Act, despite containing a non obstante clause, cannot override the supervisory power conferred upon the High Court by the Constitution. The petitioner contends that this position stands conclusively settled by a long line of decisions of the Hon'ble Supreme Court, which recognise that while judicial interference in arbitral matters is to be minimal, constitutional remedies remain available in cases of jurisdictional error or manifest illegality.
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28.Elaborating further, the petitioner submits that the present case squarely falls within the narrow exception carved out by the Hon'ble Supreme Court for interference under Article 227 even after disposal of an appeal under Section 37. According to the petitioner, the arbitral award and the orders affirming it suffer from a patent lack of jurisdiction, inasmuch as the Arbitral Tribunal entertained and adjudicated claims that were ex facie barred by limitation. It is urged that limitation is not a mere defence but a threshold bar affecting the very authority of the Tribunal to adjudicate the dispute. Consequently, when courts below fail to correct such a jurisdictional defect, the High Court's supervisory jurisdiction is not only maintainable but necessary to prevent perpetuation of an illegality.
29.The petitioner further submits that the writ petition is not an attempt to secure a second appeal on merits, but a challenge confined to a pure question of jurisdiction. It is argued that the petitioner does not seek reappreciation of evidence or substitution of factual findings, but only urges that the adjudicatory process itself stood vitiated by entertaining dead claims. In this context, reliance is placed on judicial precedents holding that where an order is patently without jurisdiction or contrary to the fundamental policy of Indian law, the bar against second appeals cannot preclude constitutional scrutiny.
30.Per contra, the opposite party vehemently disputes the maintainability of the writ petition. It is contended that the statutory scheme of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act consciously restricts judicial intervention and provides for only one level of appeal under Section 37, Page 10 Signature Not Verified Digitally Signed Signed by: BHABAGRAHI JHANKAR Reason: Authentication Location: ORISSA HIGH COURT, CUTTACK Date: 05-Feb-2026 10:42:43 with an express bar on any further appeal. According to the opposite party, permitting writ petitions against Section 37 orders as a matter of course would defeat the legislative intent of finality and expedition in arbitral proceedings and open the floodgates to prolonged litigation.
31.The opposite party further submits that Article 227 cannot be invoked to circumvent the statutory bar on second appeals or to convert the High Court into a court of further appeal over arbitral awards. It is argued that even if maintainability is conceded in theory, the High Court must exercise extreme restraint and interfere only in cases of exceptional rarity, such as where the impugned order is patently lacking in inherent jurisdiction or is vitiated by bad faith. According to the opposite party, the present case does not meet this high threshold.
32.In essence, while the petitioner treats maintainability as flowing from the existence of a jurisdictional defect in the award, the opposite party urges that maintainability must be assessed in light of arbitral finality and judicial discipline. According to the opposite party, the present writ petition is a thinly veiled attempt to reargue limitation under the guise of constitutional supervision and ought not to be entertained.
33.The legal position is now firmly settled that an Arbitral Tribunal is a species of tribunal over which the High Court exercises writ and supervisory jurisdiction. An arbitral tribunal, though constituted by consent of parties and not forming part of the regular judicial hierarchy, nonetheless performs adjudicatory functions of a judicial nature. It determines disputes between parties, applies legal principles, follows rules of procedure consistent with natural justice, and renders decisions Page 11 Signature Not Verified Digitally Signed Signed by: BHABAGRAHI JHANKAR Reason: Authentication Location: ORISSA HIGH COURT, CUTTACK Date: 05-Feb-2026 10:42:43 that have binding force, subject to statutory remedies. Consequently, orders passed by an arbitral tribunal are not immune from constitutional scrutiny. In appropriate and exceptional cases, such orders may be challenged by invoking the writ or supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court. This foundational principle has been authoritatively recognised by the Hon'ble Supreme Court, which has repeatedly clarified that the character of an arbitral tribunal as a private adjudicatory body does not place it beyond the reach of constitutional oversight where jurisdictional or fundamental legal infirmities are alleged.
34.In Union of India v. R. Gandhi, President Madras Bar Association1, the Hon'ble Supreme Court undertook a detailed examination of what constitutes "Courts" and "Tribunals" under the constitutional scheme. The Court explained that courts are institutions established by the State for the administration of justice and exercise the judicial power of the State. Tribunals, on the other hand, are alternative adjudicatory mechanisms created to decide specific categories of disputes. Importantly, the Court expressly recognised arbitral tribunals as "private tribunals," while distinguishing them from statutory and constitutional tribunals. The Court observed that tribunals, including arbitral tribunals, exercise adjudicatory functions even though they are not conventional courts. This classification is significant because it places arbitral tribunals within the broader constitutional framework governing tribunals, thereby subjecting them to supervisory jurisdiction. The emphasis was 1 (2010) 11 SCC 1 Page 12 Signature Not Verified Digitally Signed Signed by: BHABAGRAHI JHANKAR Reason: Authentication Location: ORISSA HIGH COURT, CUTTACK Date: 05-Feb-2026 10:42:43 not on the source of their creation, but on the nature of the functions they discharge, namely, adjudication of disputes affecting legal rights.
35.Similar observations were made by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in SREI Infrastructure Finance Limited2, where arbitration was characterised as a quasi-judicial process. The Court noted that the power and functions of arbitral tribunals are statutorily regulated under the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. The tribunals decide disputes between parties, follow procedural norms aligned with natural justice, and render determinations that attain finality subject to remedies provided under the Act. The Hon'ble Supreme Court thus acknowledged that arbitration, while distinct from court litigation, is not a purely private or informal mechanism. Rather, it is a structured adjudicatory process recognised and governed by statute. This recognition reinforces the conclusion that arbitral tribunals, despite their private origin, operate within a legal framework that attracts constitutional supervision where circumstances so warrant.
36.From the above decisions, it clearly follows that arbitral tribunals are private tribunals, distinct from statutory or constitutional tribunals, yet amenable to the supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court. Accordingly, a petition under Article 227 of the Constitution challenging an order of an arbitral tribunal is, in principle, maintainable. However, this recognition of maintainability does not imply that such jurisdiction is to be exercised freely or routinely. The availability of supervisory jurisdiction merely establishes the outer boundary of constitutional power. The manner and 2 (2018) 11 SCC. 470 Page 13 Signature Not Verified Digitally Signed Signed by: BHABAGRAHI JHANKAR Reason: Authentication Location: ORISSA HIGH COURT, CUTTACK Date: 05-Feb-2026 10:42:43 frequency of its exercise are governed by well-established principles of restraint, particularly in the context of arbitration, which is designed to operate with minimal judicial intervention and maximum finality.
37.At this stage, it is necessary to notice certain key provisions of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, which decisively shape the scope of judicial interference. Section 5 contains a non obstante clause that expressly limits judicial intervention in matters governed by Part I of the Act, except where such intervention is specifically provided. Section 37 further reinforces this legislative intent by conferring a narrow and exhaustive right of appeal against specified orders, and by expressly barring a second appeal. Together, these provisions underscore a deliberate statutory policy of restricting court involvement. The Act does not envisage multiple layers of scrutiny or prolonged judicial supervision. Instead, it carefully balances party autonomy with limited judicial oversight, allowing intervention only at defined stages and on defined grounds.
38.The legislative policy of expedition is further evident from the timelines introduced by the Arbitration and Conciliation (Amendment) Act, 2016. Section 29-A mandates that arbitral awards be made within a prescribed period, while Section 34(6) requires challenges to awards to be decided expeditiously. These provisions reflect Parliament's clear intent that arbitration should result in timely resolution of disputes. The Hon'ble Supreme Court, in Union of India v. Varindera Constructions Ltd.3, extended this emphasis on expedition even to appeals under Section 37. 3 (2020) 2 SCC 111 Page 14 Signature Not Verified Digitally Signed Signed by: BHABAGRAHI JHANKAR Reason: Authentication Location: ORISSA HIGH COURT, CUTTACK Date: 05-Feb-2026 10:42:43 The consistent judicial and legislative message is that arbitration must culminate in finality within a reasonable time, and that judicial processes should not be allowed to frustrate this objective.
39.Against this statutory backdrop, the scope of interference under Articles 226 and 227 assumes critical importance. While arbitral tribunals are undoubtedly subject to writ jurisdiction, the extent of such interference is extremely limited. In Deep Industries Ltd. v. ONGC Ltd.4, the Supreme Court cautioned that routine invocation of Article 227 against orders passed under Section 37 would derail the arbitral process and defeat the purpose of the Act. The Court clarified that although Article 227 is a constitutional provision and remains untouched by Section 5, interference must be confined to exceptional cases where the impugned order is patently lacking in inherent jurisdiction. This principle has been consistently reaffirmed, including in Surender Kumar Singhal v. Arun Kumar Bhalotia5 where the Hon'ble Delhi High Court summarised the governing standards and emphasised that supervisory jurisdiction is not appellate jurisdiction. It exists to correct glaring jurisdictional errors, not to re-examine merits or factual findings. These principles guide this Court in examining the present case.
40.Both parties, in support of their respective positions on maintainability, have drawn attention to what they describe as a dichotomy in judicial approach of this Court concerning writ petitions against orders passed under Section 37 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act. 4 (2020) 15 SCC 706 5 2021 SCC OnLine Del 3708 Page 15 Signature Not Verified Digitally Signed Signed by: BHABAGRAHI JHANKAR Reason: Authentication Location: ORISSA HIGH COURT, CUTTACK Date: 05-Feb-2026 10:42:43
41.In this Court's view, the apparent dichotomy between the two judgments i.e. judgment dated 8.4.2022 in W.P.(C) Nos. 3523, 5491, 5494 of 2022 and 28644, 30554 of 2021 vis-à-vis judgment dated 24.7.2025 in W.P.(C) No. 5028 of 2025 concerning the maintainability of a writ petition against an order passed under Section 37 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 does not stem from any direct inconsistency in legal principle. Rather, it arises from the fundamentally different juridical questions that each court was called upon to decide.
42.Although both judgments operate within the same statutory and constitutional framework, they engage with distinct stages of arbitral adjudication and address different categories of alleged illegality. One judgment interrogates the very authority of the forum that entertained the arbitration-related proceedings, while the other presupposes jurisdictional competence and examines the permissible limits of constitutional supervision after the statutory remedies have been exhausted. This difference in starting points significantly shapes the courts' approach to writ maintainability. Consequently, what appears at first glance to be conflicting reasoning is, in substance, a reflection of differing factual matrices and doctrinal lenses. The divergence lies not in the law governing writ jurisdiction itself, but in the nature of the defect alleged and the institutional role of the High Court at each stage of the arbitral process.
43.The 2022 judgment situates maintainability at a threshold level by focusing squarely on jurisdictional competence under the Arbitration and Conciliation Act. It treats Section 2(1)(e), which defines the "Court" for Page 16 Signature Not Verified Digitally Signed Signed by: BHABAGRAHI JHANKAR Reason: Authentication Location: ORISSA HIGH COURT, CUTTACK Date: 05-Feb-2026 10:42:43 domestic arbitrations, as a foundational provision that cannot be diluted by subsequent procedural or forum-allocation statutes. Where arbitration applications under Sections 9, 14, 34, or appeals under Section 37 are entertained by a forum that does not qualify as the "principal civil court of original jurisdiction," the defect is characterised as jurisdictional rather than procedural. In such circumstances, the court reasons that the order suffers from inherent lack of authority, rendering it void ab initio. This approach conceptualises jurisdiction as anterior to adjudication and immune from considerations of efficiency, convenience, or legislative policy favouring commercial courts. The writ jurisdiction is therefore invoked not to correct an error within jurisdiction, but to arrest the exercise of power by a forum that never lawfully possessed it.
44.In this framework, the writ petition is not perceived as an appellate or revisional device. Instead, it functions as a constitutional instrument to invalidate proceedings conducted by a court acting coram non judice. The 2022 judgment thus places significant emphasis on the distinction between illegality and lack of jurisdiction. While errors of law or fact may be corrected through statutory appeals, an assumption of jurisdiction contrary to the express mandate of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act is treated as a structural infirmity. The High Court's intervention is justified on the ground that constitutional courts cannot permit adjudicatory power to be exercised by a forum expressly excluded by statute. Importantly, the court does not view the existence of alternative remedies or the bar on second appeals under Section 37 as determinative, because those provisions presuppose a valid exercise of jurisdiction in the first Page 17 Signature Not Verified Digitally Signed Signed by: BHABAGRAHI JHANKAR Reason: Authentication Location: ORISSA HIGH COURT, CUTTACK Date: 05-Feb-2026 10:42:43 place. Where jurisdiction itself is absent, such statutory limitations are considered inapplicable.
45.The judgment also places considerable reliance on Section 42 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, which embodies the principle of "forum finality" once a competent court is approached. By reading Sections 2(1)(e) and 42 together, the court reinforces the idea that arbitral supervision must remain anchored to a legally defined forum. Any legislative attempt, whether through notifications or the Commercial Courts Act, to confer arbitral jurisdiction on a court of a lower grade is viewed as impermissible unless the parent statute is amended. From this perspective, writ jurisdiction is not merely discretionary but necessary to preserve legislative supremacy and constitutional discipline. The court's reasoning is thus rooted in structural constitutionalism, prioritising legality of power over considerations of speed or efficiency in dispute resolution.
46.By contrast, the 2025 judgment operates in an entirely different analytical space. It begins with the assumption that the forum which decided the Section 37 appeal was competent and that the arbitral adjudicatory structure functioned within the contours prescribed by law. The court is therefore not concerned with forum usurpation or jurisdictional illegitimacy, but with the scope of constitutional intervention after the statutory process has run its course. In this context, the maintainability of a writ petition is acknowledged in principle, owing to the constitutional nature of Articles 226 and 227. However, the court draws a sharp distinction between maintainability and justiciability, emphasising that Page 18 Signature Not Verified Digitally Signed Signed by: BHABAGRAHI JHANKAR Reason: Authentication Location: ORISSA HIGH COURT, CUTTACK Date: 05-Feb-2026 10:42:43 the latter is severely circumscribed by the legislative policy of minimal judicial interference in arbitration.
47.The 2025 judgment situates itself firmly within the post-amendment arbitral jurisprudence that prioritises finality, efficiency, and party autonomy. It underscores that Section 37 provides a narrowly tailored appellate remedy and expressly bars a second appeal, reflecting Parliament's intent to limit judicial scrutiny. Against this backdrop, routine invocation of writ jurisdiction is viewed as undermining the statutory scheme. While acknowledging that constitutional powers cannot be ousted by statute, the court stresses the doctrine of self- restraint and institutional deference. Writ intervention is confined to cases of patent lack of inherent jurisdiction, manifest perversity, or bad faith of an exceptional order. Mere errors of law, misapplication of public policy, or erroneous appreciation of evidence are deemed insufficient to warrant interference.
48.The emphasis in the 2025 judgment is therefore on supervisory restraint rather than corrective intervention. The High Court positions itself as a constitutional sentinel, not an appellate authority in disguise. It cautions that liberal exercise of writ jurisdiction against Section 37 orders would effectively create a prohibited second appeal, eroding the finality intended by the Arbitration and Conciliation Act. This approach reflects a conscious balancing of constitutional authority with statutory purpose. The court recognises that while arbitral tribunals and courts exercising jurisdiction under the Act are amenable to constitutional supervision, such supervision must be exercised sparingly to avoid derailing the Page 19 Signature Not Verified Digitally Signed Signed by: BHABAGRAHI JHANKAR Reason: Authentication Location: ORISSA HIGH COURT, CUTTACK Date: 05-Feb-2026 10:42:43 arbitral process. The guiding principle is that intervention must be the exception, not the rule.
49.When viewed together, the two judgments reveal not a contradiction but a calibrated judicial response to different categories of challenges. The 2022 judgment addresses a scenario where the legitimacy of the adjudicatory forum itself is in question. In such cases, concerns of arbitral finality or efficiency cannot override the necessity of lawful authority. Conversely, the 2025 judgment deals with challenges arising after a competent forum has exercised its jurisdiction, where the primary concern shifts to preserving the integrity and efficiency of the arbitral framework. The distinction is thus between absence of jurisdiction and erroneous exercise of jurisdiction. Each invokes a different constitutional reflex.
50.This distinction is critical for understanding writ maintainability in arbitration matters. Where the challenge strikes at the root of jurisdiction, the High Court is justified in intervening to prevent an unconstitutional assumption of power. However, where jurisdiction is undisputed and the grievance relates to adjudicatory outcomes, the High Court's role is significantly constrained. The constitutional power remains, but its exercise is tempered by statutory policy and judicial discipline. The two judgments, therefore, operate in harmony, each articulating the appropriate limits of writ intervention at different stages of the arbitral lifecycle.
51.Ultimately, the perceived dichotomy dissolves when the judgments are read contextually and purposively. One protects the rule of law by Page 20 Signature Not Verified Digitally Signed Signed by: BHABAGRAHI JHANKAR Reason: Authentication Location: ORISSA HIGH COURT, CUTTACK Date: 05-Feb-2026 10:42:43 ensuring that only legally competent forums adjudicate arbitration matters. The other protects the arbitral process by insulating it from excessive judicial interference after lawful adjudication. Together, they reflect a nuanced and layered approach to constitutional supervision in arbitration, balancing legality, finality, and efficiency without compromising the foundational principles of either constitutional law or arbitration jurisprudence.
52.Applying the aforesaid principles to the facts of the present case, this Court is of the considered view that although the writ petition is maintainable in principle, whether a case is made out for interference in exercise of supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution remains to be seen.
53. The challenge raised by the petitioner centres almost entirely on the issue of limitation, contending that the claims entertained by the Arbitral Tribunal were ex facie time-barred. It is pertinent in this regard to outline the settled legal position regarding the limitation governing the initiation or commencement of arbitration proceedings under the A&C Act. The Hon'ble Supreme Court, recently, in Arif Azim Co. Ltd. v. Aptech Ltd.6 provided a detailed exposition on this issue, clarifying the distinction between the limitation period for invoking arbitration and the limitation for raising substantive claims. The relevant portion of the judgment is reproduced below for ready reference:
"(a) When does the right to apply under Section 11(6) accrue?6
(2024) 5 SCC 313 Page 21 Signature Not Verified Digitally Signed Signed by: BHABAGRAHI JHANKAR Reason: Authentication Location: ORISSA HIGH COURT, CUTTACK Date: 05-Feb-2026 10:42:43
53. It has been held in a catena of decisions of this Court that the limitation period for making an application seeking appointment of arbitrator must not be conflated or confused with the limitation period for raising the substantive claims which are sought to be referred to an Arbitral Tribunal. The limitation period for filing an application seeking appointment of arbitrator commences only after a valid notice invoking arbitration has been issued by one of the parties to the other party and there has been either a failure or refusal on the part of the other party to make an appointment as per the appointment procedure agreed upon between the parties.
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(b) When does the cause of action arise?
79. We are not impressed with the submission canvassed on behalf of the respondent that the cause of action for raising the claims arose on 1-11-2017 and thus the limitation period for invoking arbitration should commence from the said date. The petitioner has alleged that the respondent received the payment for the course from ICCR on 3-10-2017.
However, the perusal of the communication exchanged between the parties indicates that it is only on 28-3-2018 that the right of the petitioner to bring a claim against the respondent could be said to have been crystallised. The position of law is settled that mere failure to pay may not give rise to a cause of action. However, once the applicant has asserted its claim and the respondent has either denied such claim or failed to reply to it, the cause of action will arise after such denial or failure.
80. In B & T AG [B & T AG v. Union of India, (2024) 5 SCC 358] three principles of law came to be enunciated by this Court regarding the manner in which the point in time when the cause of action arose may be determined. First, that the right to receive the payment ordinarily begins upon completion of the work. Secondly, a dispute arises only when there is a claim by one side and its denial/repudiation by the other and thirdly, the accrual of cause of action Page 22 Signature Not Verified Digitally Signed Signed by: BHABAGRAHI JHANKAR Reason: Authentication Location: ORISSA HIGH COURT, CUTTACK Date: 05-Feb-2026 10:42:43 cannot be indefinitely postponed by repeatedly writing letters or sending reminders. It was further emphasised by this Court that it was important to find out the "breaking point" at which any reasonable party would have abandoned the efforts at arriving at a settlement and contemplated referral of the dispute to arbitration. Such breaking point would then become the date on which the cause of action could be said to have commenced.
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(c) When is arbitration deemed to have commenced?
88. Section 21 of the 1996 Act provides that the arbitral proceedings in relation to a dispute commence when a notice invoking arbitration is sent by the claimant to the other party:
"21. Commencement of arbitral proceedings.--Unless otherwise agreed by the parties, the arbitral proceedings in respect of a particular dispute commence on the date on which a request for that dispute to be referred to arbitration is received by the respondent."
89. In Milkfood Ltd. v. GMC Ice Cream (P) Ltd. [Milkfood Ltd. v. GMC Ice Cream (P) Ltd., (2004) 7 SCC 288] , it was observed thus : (SCC pp. 301-302 & 307, paras 26-27, 29 &
49) "26. The commencement of an arbitration proceeding for the purpose of applicability of the provisions of the Indian Limitation Act is of great significance. Even Section 43(1) of the 1996 Act provides that the Limitation Act, 1963 shall apply to the arbitration as it applies to proceedings in court. Sub-section (2) thereof provides that for the purpose of the said section and the Limitation Act, 1963, an arbitration shall be deemed to have commenced on the date referred to in Section 21.
27. Article 21 of the Model Law which was modelled on Article 3 of the Uncitral Arbitration Rules had been adopted for the purpose of drafting Section 21 of the 1996 Act. Section 3 of the 1996 Act provides for as to when a request can be said to have been received by the respondent. Thus, Page 23 Signature Not Verified Digitally Signed Signed by: BHABAGRAHI JHANKAR Reason: Authentication Location: ORISSA HIGH COURT, CUTTACK Date: 05-Feb-2026 10:42:43 whether for the purpose of applying the provisions of Chapter II of the 1940 Act or for the purpose of Section 21 of the 1996 Act, what is necessary is to issue/serve a request/notice to the respondent indicating that the claimant seeks arbitration of the dispute.
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29. For the purpose of the Limitation Act an arbitration is deemed to have commenced when one party to the arbitration agreement serves on the other a notice requiring the appointment of an arbitrator. This indeed is relatable to the other purposes also, as, for example, see Section 29(2) of the (English) Arbitration Act, 1950.
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49. Section 21 of the 1996 Act, as noticed hereinbefore, provides as to when the arbitral proceedings would be deemed to have commenced. Section 21 although may be construed to be laying down a provision for the purpose of the said Act but the same must be given its full effect having regard to the fact that the repeal and saving clause is also contained therein. Section 21 of the Act must, therefore, be construed having regard to Section 85(2)(a) of the 1996 Act. Once it is so construed, indisputably the service of notice and/or issuance of request for appointment of an arbitrator in terms of the arbitration agreement must be held to be determinative of the commencement of the arbitral proceeding."
90. Similarly, in BSNL [BSNL v. Nortel Networks (India) (P) Ltd., (2021) 5 SCC 738] , it was held by this Court thus : (SCC p. 766, para 51) "51. The period of limitation for issuing notice of arbitration would not get extended by mere exchange of letters, [S.S. Rathore v. State of M.P., (1989) 4 SCC 582 :
1990 SCC (L&S) 50; Union of India v. Har Dayal, (2010) 1 SCC 394; CLP (India) (P) Ltd. v. Gujarat Urja Vikas Nigam Ltd., (2020) 5 SCC 185] or mere settlement discussions, where a final bill is rejected by making Page 24 Signature Not Verified Digitally Signed Signed by: BHABAGRAHI JHANKAR Reason: Authentication Location: ORISSA HIGH COURT, CUTTACK Date: 05-Feb-2026 10:42:43 deductions or otherwise. Sections 5 to 20 of the Limitation Act do not exclude the time taken on account of settlement discussions. Section 9 of the Limitation Act makes it clear that:'where once the time has begun to run, no subsequent disability or inability to institute a suit or make an application stops it'. There must be a clear notice invoking arbitration setting out the "particular dispute" [ Section 21 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996.] (including claims/amounts) which must be received by the other party within a period of 3 years from the rejection of a final bill, failing which, the time bar would prevail.""
(emphasis supplied is ours)
54. It is evident from the record that the question of limitation was squarely raised before the Ld. Arbitral Tribunal. The Ld. Tribunal framed a specific issue on limitation, examined the pleadings, correspondence exchanged between the parties, and the conduct of both sides over a period of time. The majority of the Tribunal, upon appreciation of the material placed before it, returned a reasoned finding that the claims were not barred by limitation. This finding was not arrived at mechanically or by ignoring relevant material, but by adopting one of the possible views on when the cause of action arose and when the dispute crystallised between the parties.
55. The petitioner's principal grievance is that limitation ought to have been computed from the date of the first demand raised by the opposite party. However, the Tribunal took the view that the dispute matured over time and that mere submission of a bill or raising of a demand did not, by itself, conclusively trigger limitation. Whether limitation commenced from the first demand, from subsequent correspondence, or from the Page 25 Signature Not Verified Digitally Signed Signed by: BHABAGRAHI JHANKAR Reason: Authentication Location: ORISSA HIGH COURT, CUTTACK Date: 05-Feb-2026 10:42:43 express denial of the claim, was a matter requiring factual and legal assessment. The Tribunal undertook this exercise and recorded its conclusions. The fact that the petitioner disagrees with this conclusion does not render the finding perverse or without jurisdiction.
56. Significantly, the finding on limitation was thereafter examined by the learned Commercial Court while exercising jurisdiction under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act. The Commercial Court considered the challenge on limitation and found no ground to hold that the award suffered from patent illegality or was in conflict with the fundamental policy of Indian law. The court expressly declined to substitute its own view for that of the Arbitral Tribunal, in line with the settled limits of Section 34 jurisdiction.
57. The appellate court under Section 37 also revisited the issue and affirmed the view taken by the Commercial Court. The dismissal of the appeal was based on the finding that the arbitral determination on limitation was a plausible and reasoned view, and that no error of the nature contemplated under Section 34 had been demonstrated. Thus, there are concurrent findings on limitation by the Arbitral Tribunal, the Commercial Court, and the appellate court, all operating within their respective jurisdictions.
58. In such circumstances, this Court cannot, in exercise of Article 227, re- evaluate the factual foundation or re-balance the legal reasoning on limitation. Supervisory jurisdiction is not intended to correct every alleged error of law, much less to substitute one possible interpretation of limitation for another. The petitioner's contention essentially invites this Page 26 Signature Not Verified Digitally Signed Signed by: BHABAGRAHI JHANKAR Reason: Authentication Location: ORISSA HIGH COURT, CUTTACK Date: 05-Feb-2026 10:42:43 Court to reassess when limitation commenced, which would amount to sitting in appeal over concurrent findings--an exercise expressly discouraged in arbitration matters.
59. It must be emphasised that limitation, in the present case, was treated as a mixed question of fact and law. The Tribunal's conclusion was based on its assessment of correspondence, conduct, and the timing of dispute crystallisation. No material has been shown to suggest that the Tribunal ignored vital evidence, relied on extraneous considerations, or adopted a view that no reasonable tribunal could have taken. Absent such perversity, mere disagreement with the outcome cannot justify constitutional interference.
60. This Court is also mindful that permitting writ interference on such grounds would undermine the statutory finality accorded to arbitral awards and appellate orders under Section 37. If every party dissatisfied with a finding on limitation were permitted to invoke Article 227, the bar on second appeals would be rendered illusory, and the arbitral process would be indefinitely prolonged.
V. CONCLUSION:
61.Accordingly, while the Writ Petition is maintainable in theory, the present case does not disclose any exceptional circumstance, patent lack of jurisdiction, or manifest injustice in relation to the findings on limitation. The petitioner's challenge reflects a difference of opinion on the merits of the limitation issue, which is insufficient to warrant Page 27 Signature Not Verified Digitally Signed Signed by: BHABAGRAHI JHANKAR Reason: Authentication Location: ORISSA HIGH COURT, CUTTACK Date: 05-Feb-2026 10:42:43 interference under Article 227. The supervisory jurisdiction of this Court, therefore, ought not to be exercised in the present case.
62.Accordingly, the present Writ Petition is dismissed. Pending applications, if any, also stand disposed of in aforesaid terms.
63.No order as to costs. Ordered accordingly.
64. Interim order, if any, passed earlier stands vacated.
(Dr. Sanjeeb K Panigrahi) Judge Orissa High Court, Cuttack, Dated the 22nd Jan, 2026/ Page 28