Calcutta High Court (Appellete Side)
Society Limited And Another vs Kolkata Metropolitan Development ... on 29 January, 2026
Author: Supratim Bhattacharya
Bench: Supratim Bhattacharya
In the High Court at Calcutta
Civil Appellate Jurisdiction
Appellate Side
The Hon'ble Mr. Justice Sabyasachi Bhattacharyya
And
The Hon'ble Mr. Justice Supratim Bhattacharya
M.A.T. No. 1067 of 2025
IA No: CAN 1 of 2025
New Parijat Co-operative Housing
Society Limited and Another
Vs.
Kolkata Metropolitan Development Authority and Others
For the appellants : Mr. Pramit Kumar Ray, Snr. Adv.,
Mr. Sumitava Chakraborty,
Ms. Atmaja Bandyopadhyay,
Mr. Sounak Mandal,
Mr. Sounak Chatterjee, ...Advs.
For the
KMDA/respondent nos.1 to 7 : Mr. Satyajit Talukdar,
Mr. Arindam Chatterjee, ...Advs.
Heard and reserved on : 14.01.2026
Judgment on : 29.01.2026
2
Sabyasachi Bhattacharyya, J.:-
1. The present appeal has been preferred against a judgment dated June
13, 2025 passed by a learned Single Judge of this Court in WPA
No.1432 of 2016, whereby the writ petition filed by the present
appellants was dismissed.
2. At the outset, learned senior counsel appearing for the appellants
raises a preliminary ground for setting aside the impugned judgment,
to the effect that the same was delivered about 18 (eighteen) months
after the date of conclusion of the final hearing of the writ petition.
3. Accordingly, both sides are heard on such preliminary issue, which is
being decided by the present judgment.
4. The relevant facts are that the writ petition was filed in the year 2016.
The arguments of both sides were concluded on December 8, 2023, on
which date the matter was reserved for judgment.
5. However, the judgment was delivered only on June 13, 2025, that is,
after 18 months from the conclusion of the arguments, at a point of
time when the learned Single Judge no longer had the subject-matter
determination to hear the writ petition as per the then roster.
6. Learned senior counsel for the appellants assails the judgment on the
ground that it is not possible for any Judge to remember what was
argued by the parties after more than 18 months, particularly in the
absence of any written notes of submissions having been filed by the
parties. This, it is argued, defies the principle of adversarial system of
3
litigation prevalent in India and is in breach of natural justice, since the
judgment after such long delay would merely by the personal opinion of
the learned Judge on the basis of the pleadings, and not a true
reflection of the arguments actually advanced by the parties during
hearing.
7. Learned senior counsel cites Ram Bali v. State of U.P., reported at
(2004) 10 SCC 598, and D.P. Chadha v. Triyugi Narain Mishra and
others, reported at (2001) 2 SCC 221, in support of the above
contention.
8. Learned senior counsel places reliance on a Division Bench judgment of
the Madras High Court in S. Kasthuri v. Vinoth Foundation, reported at
2024 SCC OnLine Mad 6247, where the judgment was delivered after a
period of about 14 months from conclusion of arguments and was set
aside on such ground alone, following Bhagwandas Fatechand
Daswani and others v. HPA International and others, reported at (2000)
2 SCC 13. In the latter judgment, the Hon‟ble Supreme Court had
observed that long delay in delivery of judgment gives rise to
unnecessary speculations in the minds of the parties to a case and the
affected party may have the apprehension that the arguments raised at
the Bar may not have been reflected or appreciated while dictating the
judgment.
9. Learned senior counsel next contends that justice should not only be
done but also seen to be done. Hence, even a right decision by a wrong
forum is a nullity, in support of which proposition learned senior
4
counsel cites Pandurang and others v. State of Maharashtra, reported at
(1986) 4 SCC 436.
10. Learned senior counsel next cites Anil Rai v. State of Bihar, reported at
(2001) 7 SCC 318, a landmark judgment where the Hon‟ble Supreme
Court laid down guidelines in respect of passing judgments within a
limited period.
11. Ravindra Pratap Shahi v. State of U.P. and others, reported at 2025 SCC
OnLine SC 1813, is also cited by the appellants, where the guidelines in
Anil Rai (supra)1 were further expanded.
12. Learned senior counsel argues that the Hon‟ble Supreme Court, in
none of the cases referred to above, observed that the appellant who
fails to file an application with a prayer for early judgment is a fence-
sitter or that such failure on the part of a litigant clothes the Hon‟ble
Judge passing the judgment after more than 18 months to remember
arguments at the time of writing the judgment.
13. The appellants next rely on Balaji Baliram Mupade and another v. State
of Maharashtra and others, reported at (2021) 12 SCC 603, Indrajeet
Yadav v. Santosh Singh and Another, reported at 2022 SCC OnLine SC
461, Ratilal Jhaverbhai Parmar and others v. State of Gujarat and
others, reported at 2024 SCC OnLine SC 2985, and an unreported
judgment in the matter of K. Madan Mohan Rao v. Bheemrao
Baswanthrao Patil & Ors., in Civil Appeal No. 6972 of 2022. On the
strength of the said reports, it is argued that where the fate of litigation
1
Anil Rai v. State of Bihar, reported at (2001) 7 SCC 318
5
has been pronounced but the judgment follows after a considerable
period, the same has to be set aside on the ground of such delay alone.
14. Learned senior counsel next cites Barku Govind Walve and others v.
State of Maharashtra and others, reported at 2024 (3) Mh.L.J. 86, where
the Bombay High Court refused to set aside the judgment assailed
before it on the ground of delay, observing that the petitioners did not
mention about the delay in delivering the judgment and no specific
ground of delay had been raised. Thus, the said decision of a learned
Single Judge of the Bombay High Court, it is submitted, is
distinguishable on such facts, since in the present case a specific
ground of delay has been taken.
15. Learned senior counsel next deals with Rajan v. State of Haryana,
reported at 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1952, where it was observed that it
would be too much to say that the delay by itself is sufficient to set
aside the impugned judgment. However, learned senior counsel
argues, the Hon‟ble Supreme Court, while passing the said judgment,
relied on Santosh Hazari v. Purushottam Tiwari (Deceased) by LRs.,
reported at (2001) 3 SCC 179 which did not deal with the present issue
of delay at all. Moreover, Rajan (supra)2 did not consider the earlier
judgments of the Hon‟ble Supreme Court itself, which were holding the
2
Rajan v. State of Haryana, reported at 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1952
6
field, namely Bhagwandas Fatechand Daswani (supra)3 and Ratilal
Jhaverbhai Parmar (supra)4.
16. Although Indrajeet Yadav (supra)5 and Balaji Baliram Mupade (supra)6
were mentioned in Rajan (supra)2, those were not considered in Rajan
(supra)2.
17. Furthermore, although Ravindra Pratap Shahi (supra)7 and K. Madan
Mohan Rao (supra)8 were discussed, since those judgments cannot be
reconciled with the observation in the later judgment of Rajan (supra)2,
the latter is per incuriam. In support of such submission, learned senior
counsel cites Shah Faesal and others v. Union of India and another,
reported at (2020) 4 SCC 1.
18. Learned senior counsel for the appellants further submits that, as held
in Chintels (India) Ltd. v. Bhayana Builders (P) Ltd., reported at (2021) 4
SCC 602, it is well-settled that judgments like Rajan (supra)2 are not to
be construed like Euclid‟s theorem.
19. Hence, the appellants pray that the appeal be allowed and the
impugned judgment be set aside on the ground of prolonged delay in
passing the judgment alone.
3
Bhagwandas Fatechand Daswani and others v. HPA International and others,
reported at (2000) 2 SCC 13
4
Ratilal Jhaverbhai Parmar and others v. State of Gujarat and others, reported at
2024 SCC OnLine SC 2985
5
Indrajeet Yadav v. Santosh Singh and Another, reported at 2022 SCC OnLine SC
461
6
Balaji Baliram Mupade and another v. State of Maharashtra and others, reported
at (2021) 12 SCC 603
7
Ravindra Pratap Shahi v. State of U.P. and others, reported at 2025 SCC OnLine SC
1813
8
K. Madan Mohan Rao v. Bheemrao Baswanthrao Patil & Ors., in Civil Appeal No.
6972 of 2022
7
20. Learned counsel for the respondent/KMDA controverts the contentions
of the appellants and argues that the factual situation in the present
case is completely different from the cited judgments of the appellants.
In most of the said reports, although the Hon‟ble Supreme Court
deprecated the practice of delay in passing judgments, the impugned
judgments were neither set aside nor declared to be a nullity.
21. Furthermore, it is contended that in Indrajeet Yadav (supra)9 and Balaji
Baliram Mupade (supra)10, the Hon‟ble Supreme Court was considering
cases where the operative portions of the orders, being the final orders,
were pronounced earlier and the reasoned judgments were delivered
much later. The predicament appreciated by the Hon‟ble Supreme
Court in the said cases was that without the benefit of reasoning, it
would be difficult to implement the bare order, and the aggrieved party
would also be unable to avail of the legal remedy of approaching the
higher court, where reasons can be scrutinized. Such prejudice factor
is absent in the present case, it is contended, since the entire judgment
was passed as a whole by the learned Single Judge, albeit late.
22. Also, in Anil Rai (supra)11, the Hon‟ble Supreme Court framed certain
guidelines and/or mandates which still hold the field. However, in the
latest judgment of Rajan (supra)12, the Hon‟ble Supreme Court
considered Anil Rai (supra)11, but did not hold that the judgment
9
Indrajeet Yadav v. Santosh Singh and Another, reported at 2022 SCC OnLine SC
461
10
Balaji Baliram Mupade and another v. State of Maharashtra and others, reported
at (2021) 12 SCC 603
11
Anil Rai v. State of Bihar, reported at (2001) 7 SCC 318
12
Rajan v. State of Haryana, reported at 2025 SCC OnLine SC 195
8
impugned would be liable to the set aside on the sole ground of delay in
pronouncement of the same.
23. In Barku Govind Walve (supra)13, the Bombay High Court held that
mere delay in delivery of decision cannot be a sole ground for setting
aside the order impugned, which is otherwise found to be validly
passed.
24. Moreover, in the present case, since the appellants admittedly did not
take any steps as per the guidelines laid down in Anil Rai (supra)11 by
approaching either the concerned Judge or the Hon‟ble the Chief
Justice, they are not entitled to contend in appeal for the first time that
the impugned judgment is bad on the ground of delay, after having lost
the case and without attempting to resort to the remedies available to
them as per the guidelines laid down in Anil Rai (supra)11. Rather, the
appellants are attempting to circumvent a lawful judicial verdict by
taking a technical objection as to delay in passing the judgment.
25. Learned counsel for the respondent/KMDA contends that in the
unreported judgment of the Hon‟ble Supreme Court in Pila Pahan @
Peela Pahan & Ors. v. The State of Jharkhand & Ors., passed in Writ
Petition(s) (Criminal) No(s).169/2025, further administrative directions
were only given to the High Courts in line with the guidelines framed in
Anil Rai (supra)14; however, no judicial order was passed setting aside
13
Barku Govind Walve and others v. State of Maharashtra and others, reported at
2024 (3) Mh. L. J. 86
14
Anil Rai v. State of Bihar, reported at (2001) 7 SCC 318
9
any verdict on the ground of delay, nor was any such directive issued in
that regard.
26. Learned counsel for the respondent/KMDA next submits that
Bhagwandas Fatechand Daswani (supra)15 cannot come to the aid of
the appellants in any manner, since the factual matrix of the said case
arose prior to Anil Rai (supra)14 and was duly considered by the Apex
Court in Anil Rai (supra)14, where, to ease out such a situation, the
Apex Court was pleased to frame certain guidelines/mandates.
27. Upon hearing learned counsel for the parties, the short preliminary
issue which arises for consideration before this Court is whether, in the
facts and circumstances of the present case, the impugned judgment
should be set aside on the sole ground of the delay of about eighteen
months after conclusion of arguments in passing the judgment.
28. Anil Rai (supra)14 is the landmark judgment holding the field where, for
the first time, the Hon‟ble Supreme Court formulated specific guidelines
to deal with the nagging malaise of prolonged delay in passing
judgments afflicting High Courts in India.
29. It would be profitable to quote two paragraphs of the said judgment in
the context, which are as follows:
"9. It is true, that for the High Courts, no period for pronouncement of
judgment is contemplated either under the Civil Procedure Code or
the Criminal Procedure Code, but as the pronouncement of the
judgment is a part of the justice dispensation system, it has to be
without delay. In a country like ours where people consider the
Judges only second to God, efforts be made to strengthen that
15
Bhagwandas Fatechand Daswani and others v. HPA International and others,
reported at (2000) 2 SCC 13
10
belief of the common man. Delay in disposal of the cases facilitates
the people to raise eyebrows, sometimes genuinely which, if not
checked, may shake the confidence of the people in the judicial
system. A time has come when the judiciary itself has to assert for
preserving its stature, respect and regards for the attainment of
the rule of law. For the fault of a few, the glorious and glittering
name of the judiciary cannot be permitted to be made ugly. It is the
policy and purpose of law, to have speedy justice for which efforts
are required to be made to come up to the expectation of the society
of ensuring speedy, untainted and unpolluted justice.
10. Under the prevalent circumstances in some of the High Courts, I
feel it appropriate to provide some guidelines regarding the
pronouncement of judgments which, I am sure, shall be followed
by all concerned, being the mandate of this Court. Such guidelines,
as for the present, are as under:
(i) The Chief Justices of the High Courts may issue appropriate
directions to the Registry that in a case where the judgment is
reserved and is pronounced later, a column be added in the
judgment where, on the first page, after the cause-title, date of
reserving the judgment and date of pronouncing it be
separately mentioned by the Court Officer concerned.
(ii) That Chief Justices of the High Courts, on their administrative
side, should direct the Court Officers/Readers of the various
Benches in the High Courts to furnish every month the list of
cases in the matters where the judgments reserved are not
pronounced within the period of that month.
(iii) On noticing that after conclusion of the arguments the
judgment is not pronounced within a period of two months, the
Chief Justice concerned shall draw the attention of the Bench
concerned to the pending matter. The Chief Justice may also
see the desirability of circulating the statement of such cases
in which the judgments have not been pronounced within a
period of six weeks from the date of conclusion of the
arguments amongst the Judges of the High Court for their
information. Such communication be conveyed as confidential
and in a sealed cover.
(iv) Where a judgment is not pronounced within three months from
the date of reserving it, any of the parties in the case is
permitted to file an application in the High Court with a prayer
for early judgment. Such application, as and when filed, shall
be listed before the Bench concerned within two days
excluding the intervening holidays.
11
(v) If the judgment, for any reason, is not pronounced within a
period of six months, any of the parties of the said lis shall be
entitled to move an application before the Chief Justice of the
High Court with a prayer to withdraw the said case and to
make it over to any other Bench for fresh arguments. It is open
to the Chief Justice to grant the said prayer or to pass any
other order as he deems fit in the circumstances."
30. Notably, none of the guidelines above contemplate setting aside the
judgment-in-question outright on the sole ground of delay but, in the
ultimate analysis, merely leave it to the discretion of the Chief Justice
of the concerned High Court to pass appropriate orders.
31. Taking a cue from the aforementioned decision, in Pila Pahan @ Peela
Pahan (supra)16, certain administrative timelines were issued by the
Hon‟ble Supreme Court on the premise of a brief compilation report
prepared by the learned Amicus Curiae appointed by the Apex Court,
based on the information received from different High Courts. Further
directions were issued, asking the Amicus Curiae to prepare a format
which should be uniformly applied to all High Courts. In the meantime,
the Hon‟ble Supreme Court passed certain practice directions by
modifying the existing practices of the High Courts to ensure that the
date when the judgment is reserved, that when it is pronounced and
the date when it is uploaded on the website are clearly mentioned in
the uploaded/certified copies of the judgment, as well as other
consequential directions.
16
Pila Pahan @ Peela Pahan & Ors. v. The State of Jharkhand & Ors., in Writ
Petition(s) (Criminal) No(s).169/2025
12
32. However, the said judgment, although highlighting the malady of
prolonged delay in passing judgments after conclusion of arguments, is
not a binding judicial precedent on the issue at hand, as to whether to
set aside a judgment altogether on the sole ground of the same being
passed after a huge delay.
33. The appellants argue that the learned Single Judge in the present case,
having much exceeded the timeline as framed in Anil Rai (supra)17, lost
jurisdiction to pass the judgment, on which ground itself the same
should be set aside. In support of such contention, learned senior
counsel for the appellants cites Pandurang (supra)18.
34. However, the ratio of the said judgment is not applicable to the present
case in view of the factual premises of the two being completely
different. In the cited report, the Hon‟ble Supreme Court was
considering a case whether a learned Single Judge had decided a
matter which was required to be adjudicated by a Division Bench of the
self-same High Court. In such context, the Hon‟ble Supreme Court
held that what can be done only by at least two learned Judges, cannot
be done by one learned Judge and even if the decision is right on
merits, it is by a forum which is lacking in competence with regard to
the subject-matter. In such backdrop, the Hon‟ble Supreme Court
observed that even a „right‟ decision by a „wrong‟ forum is no decision
and was held to be non-existent in the eye of law; hence, a nullity.
17
Anil Rai v. State of Bihar, reported at (2001) 7 SCC 318
18
Pandurang and others v. State of Maharashtra, reported at (1986) 4 SCC 436
13
35. The said judgment was based on the premise of the well-settled legal
principle that a Larger Bench judgment is binding on a Bench of lesser
strength, which is a cardinal rule of precedents. The doctrine of coram
non judice was applied by the Hon‟ble Supreme Court in such context.
36. On the other hand, it is nobody‟s case in the present instance that the
learned Writ Court did not have subject-matter jurisdiction when the
writ application was heard. Even if, when the matter was decided
finally, the learned Single Judge was entrusted with the determination
to hear other types of matters as per the roster, after reserving the
matter for delivery of judgment, there was no scope of further "hearing".
The roster of any High Court is prepared under the directions of the
Hon‟ble the Chief Justice of such Court for the purpose of fixing the
subject-matter determination of individual Benches to hear particular
types of matters. Even in case of part-heard matters, administrative
directions at the behest of the Hon‟ble the Chief Justice may vary from
time to time according to the administrative exigencies and the need of
the hour. Whereas, at some points of time, there are standing orders
that upon change of determination, the „part-heard‟ marking is
automatically cancelled and the Judge having the determination then
would re-hear the matter, at other times, it is enumerated in the
standing administrative orders of the court that Judges carry their
„part-heard‟ matters with them irrespective of the change of
determination. However, in a concluded hearing, no such principle
applies at all.
14
37. Law recognizes generally that once a hearing is concluded, it is only the
Judge before whom the same was heard who shall pass the final
judgment, in the event the said learned Judge is still available in the
same court at the time of passing of such judgment. In fact, law
recognizes the hiatus between conclusion of arguments and passing of
judgment as a mere limbo, the matter being concluded for all practical
purposes with the conclusion of the hearing. A reflection of such
principle is found in Rule 6 of Order XXII of the Code of Civil Procedure,
which provides that notwithstanding anything contrary to the Rules
foregoing the same, whether the cause of action survives or not, there
shall be no abatement by reason of the death of either party between
the conclusion of the hearing and the pronouncing of the judgment, but
judgment may in such case be pronounced notwithstanding the death
and shall have the same force and effect as if it had been pronounced
before the death took place. It is to be noted that this provision is
utterly counter-intuitive and goes against the grain of the settled legal
position that a judgment in the name of a deceased person is a nullity.
38. Thus, the Code goes to such an extent that even if a judgment is
passed in the name of a deceased person, a legal fiction would be
created to deem that the person was alive for all practical purposes,
once hearing is concluded.
39. Hence, mere alteration of determination or passage of time cannot
denude a Bench of subject-matter jurisdiction to pass final judgment,
by going to the extent of declaring it coram non judice, if it had such
15
determination in the first place at the hearing stage. Thus, such
contention of the appellants cannot be accepted.
40. The reliance of the appellants on Ram Bali (supra)19 and D.P. Chadha
(supra)20 are also misplaced. In the said judgments, the Hon‟ble
Supreme Court recognized the principle that if the happenings which
transpired at the time of hearing are perceived by a party to have been
erroneously recorded in a judgment, it is incumbent upon such party,
while the matter is still fresh in the minds of the Judges who have
made the recording, to seek necessary rectification, which is the only
way to have the record corrected; it is not open to the appellant to
contend before the appellate court to the contrary. The said principle is
premised on the notion that regarding what transpired at the hearing,
the recording of the judgment of the court is conclusive and no one can
contradict such statement on affidavit or by other evidence.
41. The challenge in the present case, however, is not in respect of the
"factual happenings" which transpired before the concerned Judge on
the relevant date or during the hearings, but regarding the legality of
the judgment itself in view of the delay between the conclusion of
arguments and the passing of the judgment. If the grievance of the
appellants were limited to erroneous recording of events which
transpired before the learned Single Judge during hearing of the
matter, even then it would be the self-same Bench which would be the
19
Ram Bali v. State of U.P., reported at (2004) 10 SCC 598
20
D.P. Chadha v. Triyugi Narain Mishra and others, reported at (2001) 2 SCC 221
16
appropriate forum for the appellants to approach for rectification of the
records. An appeal under such circumstances would be illusory, since
the appellate court would not be in a position to know the facts or
events which actually took place before the concerned court.
42. Thus, the ratio laid down in Ram Bali (supra)21 and D.P. Chadha
(supra)22 does not come to the aid of the appellants; rather, it would be
self-defeating for the appellants to rely on the same.
43. We observe so because, even as per the guidelines laid down by the
Hon‟ble Supreme Court as discussed above, it was open to the
appellants to move before the concerned Bench, alternatively, the
Hon‟ble the Chief Justice of this Court, seeking an early judgment or
re-assignment of the matter to some other Bench, if necessary, at the
relevant juncture, when the matter was still fresh in the mind of the
concerned Judge.
44. Instead of exhibiting some sense of urgency by doing so, the appellants
waited for the prolonged period of more than eighteen months and
suddenly woke up from slumber only after the judgment went against
them. Although not going to the extent of labelling the appellants
"fence-sitters", we must observe this much that it does not lie in the
mouth of the appellants to cite the last-mentioned two judgments,
when they themselves did not take recourse to the remedy provided in
21
Ram Bali v. State of U.P., reported at (2004) 10 SCC 598
22
D.P. Chadha v. Triyugi Narain Mishra and others, reported at (2001) 2 SCC 221
17
Anil Rai (supra)23 by approaching the concerned Bench or the Hon‟ble
the Chief Justice when the arguments were still fresh in the mind of the
learned Judge but sat tight over the matter while it became stale,
taking up the ground of delay only when an unfavourable order was
handed out to them by the writ court.
45. We are conscious of the fact that the appellants cannot be blamed for
the delay in delivery of the judgment, which was entirely the doing of
the concerned Judge. Yet, a question mark arises as to the bona fides
of the appellants in setting up the ground only in appeal, after their
writ petition was dismissed, without having lifted a finger to seek early
judgment throughout the period when the arguments were just out of
the oven.
46. We would be failing in our duty if we do not record the apparently
reasonable apprehension expressed by learned senior counsel for the
appellants that if they moved an application for early judgment before
the concerned learned Single Judge or the Hon‟ble the Chief Justice
before the judgment was passed, leading to a request to the said
learned Judge to expedite disposal, such move of the appellants might
have prejudiced the concerned Judge against the appellants.
47. However, such apprehension is baseless and cannot be sustained,
since the entire system of judicial hierarchy is based on the faith and
trust that judges are supposed to be above such petty considerations
and are fair, unless proved otherwise. Apart from the aspect of delay,
23
Anil Rai v. State of Bihar, reported at (2001) 7 SCC 318
18
there is no allegation of bias against the concerned Judge in the
present case. Hence, when binding precedents of the Hon‟ble Supreme
Court provide such recourse, there cannot be any conceivable basis of
apprehending any prejudice in the mind of the concerned Judge just
because an innocuous prayer is made to pass judgment early due to
the inconvenience being suffered by the parties due to the delay.
48. Even otherwise, in the event the appellants succeed on such threshold
ground alone, the appellate court has no other option to remand the
matter on merits. The same prejudice, even if we lend credibility to it,
might very well afflict the mind of the learned Single Judge taking up
the matter upon remand, since by the same logic, it could very well be
in the back of the mind of the Bench hearing it on remand that similar
allegations may be made by the appellants against it if they lose, which
might create a bias/reverse bias (depending on the psyche of the
concerned Judge) clouding its decision.
49. Thus, the above line of reasoning, if taken to its logical conclusion, is
absurd and would create an ever-expanding paranoia of suspicion,
hitting at the very root of judicial integrity without any credible or
reasonable basis. Such an excuse, without anything else, cannot justify
the long delay on the part of the appellants to wait till they lost the
case, to urge the point first before the appellate court without giving a
chance to the concerned Bench to rectify its defect by seeking an early
decision before it.
19
50. Moving on further, heavy reliance has been placed by the appellants on
Indrajeet Yadav (supra)24 and Balaji Baliram Mupade (supra)25 as well
as K. Madan Mohan Rao (supra)26 and Ratilal Jhaverbhai Parmar
(supra)27. In all the above cases, the Judge concerned had passed the
operative portion of the verdict in open court, by oral orders; however,
the reasons therefor were supplied much later.
51. In such context, the Hon‟ble Supreme Court held in Balaji Baliram
Mupade (supra)24 that the counsel extended through various judicial
pronouncements appeared to have been ignored, more importantly
where oral orders were pronounced. In case of such orders, it was
held, it was expected that they were either dictated in the court or at
least must have followed immediately thereafter, to facilitate any
aggrieved party to seek redressal from the higher court. The delay in
delivery of judgment was held, in terms of the ratio of Anil Rai (supra)28,
to be in violation of Article 21 of the Constitution of India.
52. The Hon‟ble Supreme Court also observed that the hiatus period of 9
(nine) months between the date of the operative portion of the order and
the reasons disclosed was more than even the maximum period for
pronouncement of reserved judgment as per Anil Rai (supra)27 and on
24
Indrajeet Yadav v. Santosh Singh and Another, reported at 2022 SCC OnLine SC
461
25
Balaji Baliram Mupade and another v. State of Maharashtra and others, reported
at (2021) 12 SCC 603
26
K. Madan Mohan Rao v. Bheemrao Baswanthrao Patil & Ors., in Civil Appeal No.
6972 of 2022
27
Ratilal Jhaverbhai Parmar and others v. State of Gujarat and others, reported at
2024 SCC OnLine SC 2985
28
Anil Rai v. State of Bihar, reported at (2001) 7 SCC 318
20
such ground, set aside the same. However, the expression "maximum
time period for even pronouncement of reserved judgment" has to be
read in the context of the actual principles laid down in Anil Rai
(supra)27, since the expression was used only in such context in Balaji
Baliram Mupade (supra)29. Looked at from such perspective, non-
adherence to the said maximum period would only entitle the aggrieved
party/parties to move the concerned Bench or the Chief Justice of the
High Court for appropriate directions before the judgment was
pronounced, but would not per se render the judgment a nullity. Thus,
in the report under discussion, the maximum time period was used
merely as an additional justification to set aside the impugned
judgment, the primary ground being the aggrieved party being
remediless for the inordinately long period of 9 (nine) months, when the
right to appeal accrued as the fate of the matter was disclosed by
dictating the ordering portion, but no appeal could be preferred as the
body of the judgment, containing reasons did not come forth.
53. In Indrajeet Yadav (supra)30, under similar circumstances, the Hon‟ble
Supreme Court set aside the impugned judgment, as the arguments of
the appeals therein were concluded by the High Court on March 30,
2019 and the High Court allowed the said appeals on the very day by
pronouncing the operative portion of the order, but a reasoned
29
Balaji Baliram Mupade and another v. State of Maharashtra and others, reported
at (2021) 12 SCC 603
30
Indrajeet Yadav v. Santosh Singh and Another, reported at 2022 SCC OnLine SC
461
21
judgment and order was pronounced after approximately 5 (five)
months.
54. Again, in K. Madan Mohan Rao (supra)31, the Supreme Court relied on
its earlier judgements, including Anil Rai (supra)32, governing the field.
However, it was also not a case where a complete final judgment,
including the reasons therefor, had been pronounced by the High
Court. In the said case, an election petition was taken up for
consideration after a considerable delay and after a prolonged hearing,
ultimately the order was pronounced on June 15, 2022, purportedly
allowing the application and rejecting the election petition. Yet, the
reasoned order allowing the said application was not available even on
the date when the challenge against the decision was decided finally by
the Hon‟ble Supreme Court on September 26, 2022, which prompted
the Apex Court to hold that a party to the litigation cannot be expected
to wait indefinitely for availability of the reasons for the order of the
court, particularly when it is a time-sensitive matter like an election
petition. In such circumstances, the entire matter was directed to be
placed before the Hon‟ble the Chief Justice of the concerned High Court
for issuing appropriate assignment orders.
31
K. Madan Mohan Rao v. Bheemrao Baswanthrao Patil & Ors., in Civil Appeal No.
6972 of 2022
32
Anil Rai v. State of Bihar, reported at (2001) 7 SCC 318
22
55. In Ratilal Jhaverbhai Parmar (supra)33, the Hon‟ble Supreme Court
recorded its concern that in recent times, the said court had suo motu
initiated proceedings, having noticed "attitudinal and thought patterns"
of learned Judges of various High Courts across the country which
tended to lower the image of the judiciary in general and the High
Courts in particular. It was recorded that while some of the proceedings
were still pending, one such proceeding had been disposed of recently
emphasising the need for learned Judges to exercise restraint while
expressing one's views in open court. Yet again (the Supreme Court
went on observing), a fortnight back, the Hon‟ble Supreme Court had
set aside a judgment of a High Court on the ground that it had been
signed by the learned Judge after demitting office.
56. Such issues were flagged by the Hon‟ble Supreme Court in Ratilal
Jhaverbhai Parmar (supra)33 as indicating distressing trends. In the
facts of the case before the Hon‟ble Apex Court, an application under
Article 227 of the Constitution of India was being heard by the High
Court and hearing was concluded on March 1, 2023. Only on April 30,
2024, about more than a year thereafter, the appellant‟s counsel
received from the IT Cell of the High Court a soft copy of the reasoned
order dated March 1, 2023 containing the reason for dismissal of the
petition. The Apex Court took note of the fact that at the beginning of
the said order "ORAL ORDER" was printed in bold font, which was
33
Ratilal Jhaverbhai Parmar and others v. State of Gujarat and others, reported at 2024 SCC OnLine SC 2985 23 supposed to be an order which had been dictated in open court. However, the appellant had made the serious allegation that the learned Judge had passed a reasoned order more than a year after March 1, 2023 and had ante-dated the reasoning portion of the same to project that the reasoned order was passed on March 1, 2023 itself. In the context of such allegation, the Hon‟ble Supreme Court expressed displeasure and made certain observations regarding the manner in which the High Courts ought to ensure that the outcome of proceedings should be visibly just.
57. However, none of the said factual coordinates are applicable to the present case before us.
58. There is a marked distinction between a case where the judgment itself is passed as a whole long after the same was reserved on conclusion of arguments, and one where the ordering portion of the judgment is actually expressed or passed in open court and/or uploaded immediately upon hearing but the reasons follow much thereafter, on occasions after several months.
59. In the latter case, the toll taken by the credibility of the Judiciary at large is much higher since, by definition, an order has to be preceded by its reasons and by no stretch of imagination can the reasons follow the conclusion. It would be the putting the proverbial cart before the horse if a conclusion is arrived at and then reasons are supplied in retrospect. It is understandable that upon exercising a mental line of reasoning (which, if articulated by passing the entire judgment 24 immediately in open court, would consume precious judicial time), the concerned Judged expresses the conclusion of such reasoning by dictating the ordering portion in open court and dictates the whole judgment, including proper ratio in chambers. However, in such event the reasoning has to follow the ordering portion at the earliest - if not on the very next working day, at the earliest thereafter - in order to lend sanctity to the same. If the reasoning comes forth several days, weeks or months thereafter, the ordering portion would precariously resemble a wager or a draw of lots and might create the apprehension in the mind of the litigant that the reasons were reverse constructed later to justify the knee-jerk conclusion passed contemporaneously with the hearing in open court.
60. A still higher premise of vitiating such an order would be that on the very date of passing of the operative portion of the order, the right to prefer an appeal accrues; but no such appeal can be preferred unless the reasons of the order are actually uploaded, since it is such reasons or lack of it which are to be considered by the Appellate Court where such order is intended to be assailed. Thus, the aggrieved party lacks a forum to challenge the order, although bound by it, which directly contravenes the ubi jus ibi remedium principle. The problem becomes far more aggravated when the time-lag between the ordering portion and the reasons is inordinate. In such circumstances, it is of course understandable as to why the order itself ought to be set aside as a 25 whole, in view of the same lacking a modicum of validity and/or sanctity befitting a judicial verdict.
61. As opposed thereto, the ground of challenge to a judgment which is delivered entirely after a prolonged period, subsequent to closure of arguments, is somewhat different. In such cases, it cannot be said that the final conclusion of the Judge was already disclosed by order passed/expressed in open court but the reasons followed thereafter. The judgment, in its entirety in such cases, is delivered long after conclusion of arguments.
62. The first premise of challenge to the same is, obviously, that it is humanly not possible for Judges to recollect arguments made before them months before (more than 18 months in the instant case). This, in turn, would hit at the roots of the adversarial system followed in the Indian judicial structure. It is a valid contention that, under normal circumstances, a Judge (who is, after all, a human being) is not expected to remember the specific arguments advanced 18 months prior to the passing of the final judgment without external aids, such as written notes of arguments (which were not filed in the present case).
63. In such a case, there is every possibility that the judgment finally delivered by the Judge is her/his own opinion on the basis of the materials on record, unaided by the arguments of counsel appearing for the respective parties, which were actually advanced during hearing. Apart from defeating the adversarial system, such a judgment would also run the risk of being based entirely on the written material on the 26 basis of the documents and pleadings on record. From a pragmatic viewpoint, it is common experience in courts that during hearing, counsel supplement, or sometimes even supplant, defects in pleadings and lend their own interpretation to the materials on record and may even urge pure questions of law which have not been pleaded or waive grounds during arguments. Unless seen through the prism of counsel, such nuanced and multi-layered texture of the contentions of parties and the plurality of interpretations on the self-same materials is lost and the written materials acquire the monochrome of solely the Judge‟s viewpoint, denuded of the benefits of varied perspectives.
64. That apart, of course, the right of access to justice and equal treatment before the law, enshrined in Article 21 as a part of the right to life and Article 14 of the Constitution respectively, goes for a toss in case there is an inordinate delay between the conclusion of arguments and the verdict.
65. Taking into consideration such possible grounds of challenge in the event the entire judgment is delivered inordinately late, the question which now falls for consideration is what ought to be the fate of such a judgment in a challenge to the same.
66. In Rajan (supra)34, a two-Judge Bench of the Hon‟ble Supreme Court took into consideration several earlier judgments of the said Court, 34 Rajan v. State of Haryana, reported at 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1952 27 including that passed in Ravindra Pratap Shahi (supra)35, where the directions passed in Anil Rai (supra)36 were reiterated, further directing the Registrar General of each High Court to furnish to the Chief Justice of the said High Court a list of cases where the judgment reserved is not pronounced within the remaining period of that month and the Court keeps on repeating the same for three months. The Hon‟ble Supreme Court, in Rajan (supra)37 also took into consideration the denigration by the Hon‟ble Supreme Court of the practice of passing orders without furnishing reasons for the same at the relevant time. K. Madan Mohan Rao (supra)38, as well as several other judgments in the field were also considered by the Hon‟ble Division Bench of the Supreme Court in Rajan (supra)37.
67. However, it was concluded by the Hon‟ble Supreme Court that it would be too much for the said court to say that the delay by itself is sufficient to set aside the impugned judgment. In the same breath, it was added that it would all depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case. Thus, the Hon‟ble Supreme Court, in Rajan (supra)37, did not set down as an invariable principle that on the sole ground of delay in passing judgment, the same can be set aside. As per the ratio laid 35 Ravindra Pratap Shahi v. State of U.P. and others, reported at 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1813 36 Anil Rai v. State of Bihar, reported at (2001) 7 SCC 318 37 Rajan v. State of Haryana, reported at 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1952 38 K. Madan Mohan Rao v. Bheemrao Baswanthrao Patil & Ors., in Civil Appeal No. 6972 of 2022 28 down in Rajan (supra)39, thus, although there is no bar to setting aside a judgment on the ground of delay, a call in that regard should be taken on the facts and circumstances of each case and delay, per se, could not be a sole criterion for setting aside such a judgment.
68. The appellants in the instant case argue that the Hon‟ble Supreme Court, in Rajan (supra)39 , took into consideration Santosh Hazari (supra)40 which was rendered in connection with a second appeal and was completely different in its scope of adjudication than the issue at hand. On such ground, it is even argued by the present appellants that the ratio in Rajan (supra)39 ought to be ignored by us by coming to the finding that the ratio laid down therein is per incuriam.
69. However, the Hon‟ble Supreme Court has deprecated time and again the practice of High Courts to deviate from binding precedents laid down by the Apex Court on flimsy grounds. It would also be violative of judicial decorum to hold a ratio laid down by the Hon‟ble Supreme Court to be per incuriam at the drop of a hat.
70. Although there are certain situations where, faced with a dilemma, the High Courts may choose one of several judgments of the Supreme Court, if conflicting on a point of law, by applying the litmus test as to the facts of which of such conflicting judgments most resemble the factual paradigm of the case being decided by the High Court. 39 Rajan v. State of Haryana, reported at 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1952 40 Santosh Hazari v. Purushottam Tiwari (Deceased) by LRs., reported at (2001) 3 SCC 179 29
71. Even otherwise, if a subsequent judgment of the same Bench-strength of the Supreme Court fails to take into consideration a binding precedent of a previous judgment of the Apex Court, the previous judgment may be relied on by the High Courts. However, if a later judgment of the Supreme Court specifically considers earlier judgments and, upon interpreting/explaining those, lays down the law in a particular field, there is little or no scope for the High Courts to deviate from the same.
72. In such context, the reliance of the appellants on Shah Faesal (supra)41 and Indo Swiss Time Limited v. Umrao, reported at 1961 SCC OnLine Punj 38, respectively decisions of the Hon‟ble Supreme Court and a Full Bench decision of the Punjab and Haryana High Court, are futile.
73. In Shah Faesal (supra)41, the Hon‟ble Supreme Court had, inter alia, observed that a decision or judgment can only be per incuriam if it is not possible to reconcile its ratio with that of a previously pronounced judgment of a co-equal or larger Bench or if the decision of a High Court is not in consonance with the views of the Hon‟ble Supreme Court. However, such proposition was adjuncted by the caveat that the per incuriam rule is strictly and rarely applicable, that too, only to the ratio decidendi and not to obiter dicta.
74. Such considerations, however, were in the context of the Supreme Court holding its own earlier judgments per incuriam and not the High 41 Shah Faesal and others v. Union of India and another, reported at (2020) 4 SCC 1 30 Court, subordinate in judicial hierarchy, considering whether a Supreme Court judgment was per incuriam.
75. In the Full Bench judgment of the Punjab and Haryana High Court, it was observed that it is not the last judgment which necessarily needs to be followed, which proposition, as discussed above, is not disputed.
76. However, even applying the tests laid down in the said judgments, we do not find the observation of the Hon‟ble Supreme Court in Rajan (supra)42, to the effect that it would be too much for the court to say that the delay by itself is sufficient to set aside an impugned judgment and it would all depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case, to be irreconcilable to the previous judgments in the field.
77. Rather, on a harmonious construction of the previous judgments of the Supreme Court, as discussed above, it becomes evident that long delay in passing a judgment after conclusion of arguments cannot be the sole ground of setting aside the same, if the entire judgment was passed much later.
78. An exception has been carved out by the Hon‟ble Supreme Court in several instances only in cases where the conclusion or the final decision was expressed or passed in open court and the reasons followed after a long delay. We have already deliberated on the distinction between such a situation and one where the entire judgment is delivered later, and need not dwell upon the same ad nauseam.
42 Rajan v. State of Haryana, reported at 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1952 31
79. Although delay defeats the right of the parties to a litigation to have expeditious justice, which is a part of the right to life under Article 21 of the Constitution of India, a judgment of an otherwise competent court of law cannot and ought not to be set aside on the sole ground of delay at the drop of a hat, without anything more, on the general premise of violation of Article 21 of the Constitution of India, unless otherwise bad in law or without jurisdiction.
80. As opposed to a case where a final decision is taken by delivering only the ordering portion or conclusion of a judgment and the right of the aggrieved party to prefer an appeal accrues immediately, consequentially the limitation period starting to run, without any remedy being available in the absence of the full judgment with reasons, in a case where the entire body of the judgment, including the concluding portion is delivered after a long delay, at least the aggrieved party does not suffer from such predicament.
81. Undoubtedly, the principles and guidelines laid down in Anil Rai (supra)43 is a beacon in the field and has further been followed in several other judgments.
82. Even going by the said guidelines, we find that the Hon‟ble Supreme Court stopped short of holding that a judgment passed after the timeline as stipulated in the said report is automatically rendered a nullity or that the learned Judge passing the judgment loses jurisdiction automatically after a particular period. 43 Anil Rai v. State of Bihar, reported at (2001) 7 SCC 318 32
83. As per the said guidelines, certain safeguards and a system of checks and bounds are put in place to ensure speedy disposal of cases. For example, if the judgment is not pronounced within the period of two months from conclusion of the arguments, the Chief Justice of the concerned High Court may draw the attention of the Bench concerned to the pending matter. The desirability of circulating the statement of such cases in which judgments have not been pronounced within six weeks from the date of conclusion of the arguments among the Judges of the High Courts for their information has also been mooted. The said proposition, however, is supplemented with the rider that such communication is to be confidential and in a sealed cover, thereby protecting the identity of the concerned Judge from public scrutiny and the resultant ignominy, only on the ground of delay in rendering the judgment.
84. The last limit to which the Hon‟ble Supreme Court goes in Anil Rai (supra)44 is that if the judgment is not pronounced within six months, any of the parties would be at liberty to move an application before the Chief Justice of the concerned High Court with a prayer to withdraw the case and make it over to any other Bench for fresh arguments. It would then be open to the Chief Justice to grant the said prayer or to pass any other order as he deems fit in the circumstances.
85. Thus, even in terms of the guidelines laid down in Anil Rai (supra)42, the Judge concerned is not automatically denuded of jurisdiction after the 44 Anil Rai v. State of Bihar, reported at (2001) 7 SCC 318 33 expiry of six months from conclusion of arguments, which is the outer time-limit stipulated therein, but merely gives the liberty to any of the parties to approach the Chief Justice. Even after such approach, the discretion has been vested in the Chief Justice of the High Court to pass appropriate orders, either by withdrawing the matter from the concerned Bench and place it before some other for fresh arguments or, if necessary, any other directions which the Chief Justice may deem fit in the circumstances, which would also perhaps include a request to the concerned Judge himself or herself to pass the final judgment expeditiously.
86. In the latest guidelines in Pila Pahan @ Peela Pahan (supra)45, the Hon‟ble Supreme Court has further fine-tuned the said guidelines and passed directions for the Amicus Curiae to prepare a uniform format for all High Courts, in a bid to ensure that the justice-delivery system is fast-tracked and easier access to justice is facilitated.
87. However, in cases where a final judgment in its entirety, including the reasons and the conclusion, is delivered after a particular period, none of the judgments of the Hon‟ble Supreme Court has laid down the precedent that such judgment should be set aside on such count alone.
88. A question has been raised before this Court by learned senior counsel appearing for the appellants as to whether this Court, irrespective of there being no specific precedent of the Hon‟ble Supreme Court, should 45 Pila Paghan @ Peela Pahan & Ors. v. The State of Jharkhand & Ors., in Writ Petition(s) (Criminal) No(s).169/2025 34 independently lay down the law by setting aside the implement judgment on the ground of 18 months‟ delay.
89. Although affirmative action is welcome where required, at the same time, in-built safeguards are to be adhered to before being overly proactive, particularly when checks and bounds are already existing in the system by dint of the guidelines passed in Anil Rai (supra)46 , which are being regularly honed and fine-tuned by successive directions of the Hon‟ble Supreme Court in recent times to ensure that transparency is increasingly brought about in the justice-delivery system and expeditious disposal of matters is ensured.
90. Upon a thorough consideration of the judgments holding the field and on a recce of the pros and cons, we find the following factors worth considering to arrive at a conclusion as to whether the impugned judgment should be set aside on the sole ground of delay of eighteen months in delivering the same, in the absence of anything else:
(i) Even if this Court holds that the impugned judgment ought to be set aside on the sole ground of inordinate delay in passing the same after conclusion of arguments, a question would arise, in the absence of any Constitutional or statutory outer time-limit for delivery of judgments, as to what would be the exact "inordinate"
period after which it can be said that the concerned Judge loses jurisdiction or the judgment is invalidated; whatever time-limit is 46 Anil Rai v. State of Bihar, reported at (2001) 7 SCC 318 35 fixed for such purpose would be based on an entirely arbitrary cut-off date, imposed as per our individual perception.
(ii) In all cases where there is a huge delay in passing judgments, it cannot be automatically inferred that the concerned Judge did not have the benefits of the arguments of both parties if written notes of arguments were filed by the parties at the time of arguments. Even if no written notes of arguments are filed, it cannot automatically be construed that the Judge does not have any tools of recollection while passing the judgments after such delay. During the course of arguments, it is often that Judges take hand-written rough notes of arguments or jot down important pointers or psychological cues which, coupled with the pleadings and copies of the cited judgments available on record, provide a sufficient data-base for the Judge to recollect as to what arguments were broadly made before the court at the time of hearing. Moreover, mental capacities vary from person to person, some having phenomenal memory while others are average or worse in recollection (at least the author can speak for himself), thus making it impossible to fix any particular universal standard period to fit all Judges, beyond which it can be said beyond doubt that the Judge concerned cannot have any recollection of the arguments advanced.
36
(iii) Thirdly, even the Hon‟ble Supreme Court, in Anil Rai (supra)47 and subsequent contemporary judgments following the guidelines laid down therein, have stopped short of holding that a Judge loses jurisdiction after the outer limit of six months and/or that judgments passed after six months are automatically invalidated. As per the directions of the Hon‟ble Supreme Court, at best a party can apply to the Chief Justice of the concerned High Court for necessary directions or removing the matter from the concerned Bench and re-allocating the same for fresh hearing before a different Bench. However, apart from obvious cases where the decision is expressed in open court but the reasons follow much thereafter, even the Hon‟ble Supreme Court has not set aside any judgment merely on the ground of delay.
91. The above factors deter us, despite fully empathising with and appreciating the agony of the litigants who suffer from huge delays in passing judgments, from going to the extent of setting aside the impugned judgment solely on the ground of delay, without anything more to cast aspersions on the particular learned Judge and/or any other circumstances leading to such conclusion.
92. The impugned judgment of the writ court reflects clearly and lucidly the arguments advanced by the respective parties as well as the judgments cited before the said court. We also find that the learned Single Judge adverted to the merits of the case at length and came to their 47 Anil Rai v. State of Bihar, reported at (2001) 7 SCC 318 37 conclusion accordingly. Thus, although we do not comment on the merits of the appeal otherwise at this juncture, as we are deciding only a preliminary issue on the ground of delay in delivering the judgment, we find that there is no other indicator in the judgment than the delay to show that the learned Single Judge was completely oblivious of the arguments advanced by the parties and/or the judgments cited before the said court or that the court failed to touch upon the merits of the case comprehensively. Both sides‟ respective arguments are narrated quite elaborately in the judgment, indicating either that the narrative portion was dictated earlier or that the learned Single Judge had their own notes and/or the memory of the concerned learned Single Judge was sufficiently refreshed by pointers and cues in the pleadings and, may be rough notes taken during arguments.
93. Hence, the argument, that the adversarial system of justice delivery was defeated merely by the delay in delivering the impugned judgment, cannot be accepted in the present case.
94. In view of the above, this Court is of the opinion that although we are somewhat disappointed at the long delay of more than 18 months from the conclusion of the arguments to the delivery of the impugned judgment, we are unable to set aside the same solely on the ground of such delay.
95. Accordingly, the preliminary challenge raised by the appellants against the judgment to that effect is hereby turned down on contest. Such issue is, thus decided against the appellants.
38
96. However, we make it abundantly clear that all other contentions of the respective parties are kept open for being argued on merits at the final hearing of the appeal. The observations made above are restricted to the adjudication of the preliminary challenge on the ground of delay in delivery of the impugned judgment and shall not be deemed to be conclusive or binding on the parties in any manner at any further stage of the appeal or elsewhere.
97. The connected application, bearing CAN 1 of 2025, be posted for hearing under the heading "Application" in the Monthly List of February, 2026.
(Sabyasachi Bhattacharyya, J.) I agree.
(Supratim Bhattacharya, J.)