Karnataka High Court
Sri M H Jagadeesh vs The State By Karnataka Lokayuktha ... on 30 September, 2022
Author: M. Nagaprasanna
Bench: M. Nagaprasanna
1
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU
DATED THIS THE 30TH DAY OF SEPTEMBER, 2022
BEFORE
THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE M. NAGAPRASANNA
WRIT PETITION No.6769 OF 2022 (GM-RES)
BETWEEN:
SRI M.H.JAGADEESH
S/O LATE HONNAGIRIYAPPA,
AGED ABOUT 43 YEARS,
WORKING AS EXECUTIVE ENGINEER,
UTILITY BUILDING, BMRCL (ON DEPUTATION)
DEEPANJALINAGAR, BENGALURU.
... PETITIONER
(BY SRI SATISH K., ADVOCATE FOR
SRI ADITHYA R.CHAKRAGIRI, ADVOCATE)
AND:
1. THE STATE BY KARNATAKA LOKAYUKTHA POLICE
REPRESENTED BY ITS
DEPUTY SUPERINTENDENT OF POLICE,
M.S.BUILDING, BENGALURU - 560 001.
(AMENDED AS PER ORDER DATED 03/09/2022)
2. SRI NATARAJ M.G.,
S/O RUDRAPPA,
AGED ABOUT 49 YEARS,
RESIDING AT NO.348, BAGALUR VILLAGE,
YELAHANKA ROAD, BENGALURU - 562 149.
... RESPONDENTS
(BY SRI B.B.PATIL, ADVOCATE FOR R1)
2
THIS WRIT PETITION IS FILED UNDER ARTICLES 226 AND
227 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA READ WITH SECTION 482 OF
CR.P.C., PRAYING TO CALL FOR RECORDS FROM THE 1ST
RESPONDENT; ISSUE WRIT OR ORDER QUASHING THE IMPUGNED
COMPLAINT DATED 17/06/2021 GIVEN BY THE RESPONDENT NO.2
ANNEXURE-A AND THE IMPUGNED FIRST INFORMATION REPORT
DATED 17/06/2021 IN CRIME NO. 15/2021 REGISTERED BY THE
RESPONDENT NO.1 ANNEXURE-B IN SO FAR AS THE PETITIONER
IS CONCERED.
THIS WRIT PETITION HAVING BEEN HEARD AND RESERVED
FOR ORDERS ON 14.09.2022, COMING ON FOR PRONOUNCEMENT
THIS DAY, THE COURT MADE THE FOLLOWING:-
ORDER
The petitioner in the subject writ petition calls in question registration of crime in crime No.15 of 2021 pursuant to registration of a complaint on 17-06-2021 for offences punishable under Section 7(a) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 ('the Act' for short) and pending before the 23rd Additional City Civil and Sessions Judge, Bengaluru.
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2. Heard Sri K.Satish, learned counsel representing Sri Adithya R.Chakragiri, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner and Sri B.B.Patil, learned counsel for respondent No.1.
3. Brief facts that lead the petitioner to this Court in the subject petition, as borne out from the pleadings, are as follows:-
The petitioner joins service of the Karnataka Power Transmission Corporation Limited ('Corporation' for short) as an Assistant Engineer and later promoted as Assistant Executive Engineer and further placed on independent charge of the post of Executive Engineer with effect from 15.03.2021. On such independent charge being given, the petitioner assumes charge of the post of Executive Engineer (Electrical) at M.T. Division, BRAZ, BESCOM, Race Course Road, Bengaluru to the place of one Smt. Manjula who was transferred by the said order.
4. On 17-06-2021 a complaint is made by the 2nd respondent before the 1st respondent against the petitioner alleging that he owns a shop by name M/s Rajashyamala Electricals and undertakes electrical works in respect of new connections and is, therefore, a contractor who undertakes such works. One Sri S.M.Nagaraju had 4 entrusted work of getting new electric connection 80 KW to Lulu Warehouse godown to the 2nd respondent. Therefore the contract was between S.M.Nagaraju and the complainant. The work entrusted by S.M.Nagaraju pertained to installation, wiring/ channeling, its diagram and erection of electrical equipments in the premises of godown. The said S.M.Nagaraju who claims to be the owner of Lulu Warehouse godown makes an online application for a new connection to the Vidhyanagar Sub-Division on 19.02.2021. The 2nd respondent/Contractor appears to have contacted one Jithendra, Assistant Executive Engineer to secure such electrical connection. It is the allegation in the complaint that every person involved in the said grant of electrical connection was paid in closed envelops without mentioned any work pending at any date. It is later alleged in the complaint that the complainant telephonically contacted the petitioner who in turn had assured that he would do his job. The complaint further alleges that since the work was not completed till 15.06.2021, the complainant visited the office to verify the status of the work and at that point in time, the petitioner had demanded and accepted illegal gratification. 5
5. Based on the said complaint before the Anti Corruption Bureau, the 1st respondent registers a crime in Crime No.15 of 2021. Later they prepare a pre-trap panchanama lay a trap on the petitioner on 17-06-2021. During the trap the bait amount was recovered, not from the hands of the petitioner, but from a file that was kept on the table of the petitioner. It was the specific statement of the petitioner that unknown persons keep walking into his chamber and one of whom might have kept the bait money in the file. The petitioner was unaware of the said amount and the file pertaining to the allegation was not the one that was pending before him seeking his approval. The prime allegation is that the petitioner had demanded Rs.5,000/- as illegal gratification for the work that had to be done. The complaint also narrates against several other employees to whom the complainant claims to have paid certain amounts by handing over in envelops. When and for what work the amount was paid is not forthcoming in the complaint. The case on hand concerns demand of Rs.5,000/- by the petitioner and its acceptance. Registration of crime is what drives the petitioner to this Court in the subject petition. 6
6. Learned counsel Sri K.Satish representing Sri Adithya R.Chakragiri, learned counsel for petitioner would contend that there is neither demand nor acceptance in the case at hand, as the file of the complainant that had come up before him had already been cleared long before the allegation comes about. Therefore, there was no work pending before him for making demand or accepting any illegal gratification. If demand and acceptance is not proved, the learned counsel would submit that the entire proceedings are vitiated. He would also contend that such contractors who seek to settle personal scores would come up with such complaints, after them getting disgruntled. Therefore, it is a mala fide action is what the learned counsel would seek to lay emphasis on.
7. On the other hand, the learned counsel Sri B.B.Patil representing the 1st respondent would contend with vehemence that the petitioner has demanded the amount as could be gathered from the conversation between the petitioner and the complainant on 17-06-2021 which has been recorded for 4.49 minutes. It is his case that the petitioner has demanded the amount. Whether the 7 amount not being found in the hands of the petitioner or recovery made from the hands of the petitioner is a matter for trial and, therefore, the proceedings should not be interjected at this juncture, as there are statements of panch witnesses which would prove the pre-trap panchanama as also trap proceedings. Call records are also placed to demonstrate that the complainant and the 2nd respondent were in conversation and would submit that the matter be dismissed.
8. I have given my anxious consideration to the submissions made by the respective learned counsel and perused the material on record.
9. Before embarking upon consideration of the case on its merits, I deem it appropriate to notice the judgments of the Apex Court which have dealt with Section 7(a) of the Act holding that to prove allegations under the provisions of the Act demand and acceptance is sine qua non. The Apex Court in the case of P.SATYANARAYANA MURTHY v. DISTRICT INSPECTOR OF 8 POLICE, STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH AND ANOTHER1 has held as follows:
"23. The proof of demand of illegal gratification, thus, is the gravamen of the offence under Sections 7 and 13(1)(d)(i) and (ii) of the Act and in absence thereof, unmistakably the charge therefor, would fail. Mere acceptance of any amount allegedly by way of illegal gratification or recovery thereof, dehors the proof of demand, ipso facto, would thus not be sufficient to bring home the charge under these two sections of the Act. As a corollary, failure of the prosecution to prove the demand for illegal gratification would be fatal and mere recovery of the amount from the person accused of the offence under Section 7 or 13 of the Act would not entail his conviction thereunder."
(Emphasis supplied) Later, the Apex Court in the case of V.SEJAPPA v. STATE BY POLICE INSPECTOR LOKAYUKTA, CHITRADURGA2 has held as follows:
"21. While dealing with the contention that it is not enough that some currency notes were handed over to the public servant to make it illegal gratification and that the prosecution has a further duty to prove that what was paid was an illegal gratification, reference can be made to the following observation in Mukut Bihari v. State of Rajasthan [Mukut Bihari v. State of Rajasthan, (2012) 11 SCC 642: (2013) 1 SCC (Cri) 1089: (2013) 1 SCC (L&S) 136], wherein it was held as under: (SCC pp. 645-46, para 11) "11. The law on the issue is well settled that demand of illegal gratification is sine qua non for 1 (2015) 10 SCC 152 2 (2016) 12 SCC 150 9 constituting an offence under the 1988 Act. Mere recovery of tainted money is not sufficient to convict the accused, when the substantive evidence in the case is not reliable, unless there is evidence to prove payment of bribe or to show that the money was taken voluntarily as bribe. Mere receipt of amount by the accused is not sufficient to fasten the guilt, in the absence of any evidence with regard to demand and acceptance of the amount as illegal gratification, but the burden rests on the accused to displace the statutory presumption raised under Section 20 of the 1988 Act, by bringing on record evidence, either direct or circumstantial, to establish with reasonable probability, that the money was accepted by him, other than as a motive or reward as referred to in Section 7 of the 1988 Act. While invoking the provisions of Section 20 of the Act, the court is required to consider the explanation offered by the accused, if any, only on the touchstone of preponderance of probability and not on the touchstone of proof beyond all reasonable doubt. However, before the accused is called upon to explain as to how the amount in question was found in his possession, the foundational facts must be established by the prosecution. The complainant is an interested and partisan witness concerned with the success of the trap and his evidence must be tested in the same way as that of any other interested witness and in a proper case the court may look for independent corroboration before convicting the accused person."
... ... ...
25. Absence of proof of demand on 9-12-1997, coupled with PW 2's evidence that the amount was paid by PW 1 to the appellant towards purchase of diesel raises serious doubts about the amount being paid by PW 1 as illegal gratification.
The High Court neither considered the defence plea of alibi nor it held that the decision of the trial court was erroneous or perverse. In our view, evaluation of the evidence made by the trial court while recording an order of acquittal does not suffer from any infirmity or illegality or manifest error and the grounds on which the order of acquittal is based cannot be 10 said to be unreasonable. While so, the High Court was not justified in interfering with the order of acquittal and the impugned judgment [State v. V. Sejappa, 2008 SCC OnLine Kar 620: 2008 Cri LJ 3312] cannot be sustained."
(Emphasis supplied) The Apex Court in the case of N.VIJAYAKUMAR v. STATE OF TAMILNADU3 has held as follows:
"26. It is equally well settled that mere recovery by itself cannot prove the charge of the prosecution against the accused. Reference can be made to the judgments of this Court in C.M. Girish Babu v. CBI [C.M. Girish Babu v. CBI, (2009) 3 SCC 779: (2009) 2 SCC (Cri) 1] and in B. Jayaraj v. State of A.P. [B. Jayaraj v. State of A.P., (2014) 13 SCC 55: (2014) 5 SCC (Cri) 543] In the aforesaid judgments of this Court while considering the case under Sections 7, 13(1)(d)(i) and (ii) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 it is reiterated that to prove the charge, it has to be proved beyond reasonable doubt that the accused voluntarily accepted money knowing it to be bribe. Absence of proof of demand for illegal gratification and mere possession or recovery of currency notes is not sufficient to constitute such offence. In the said judgments it is also held that even the presumption under Section 20 of the Act can be drawn only after demand for and acceptance of illegal gratification is proved. It is also fairly well settled that initial presumption of innocence in the criminal jurisprudence gets doubled by acquittal recorded by the trial court.
27. The relevant paras 7, 8 and 9 of the judgment in B. Jayaraj [B. Jayaraj v. State of A.P., (2014) 13 SCC 55: (2014) 5 SCC (Cri) 543] read as under: (SCC pp. 58-59) "7. Insofar as the offence under Section 7 is concerned, it is a settled position in law that demand of illegal gratification is sine qua non to constitute the said offence and mere recovery of 3 (2021) 3 SCC 687 11 currency notes cannot constitute the offence under Section 7 unless it is proved beyond all reasonable doubt that the accused voluntarily accepted the money knowing it to be a bribe. The above position has been succinctly laid down in several judgments of this Court. By way of illustration, reference may be made to the decision in C.M. Sharma v. State of A.P. [C.M. Sharma v. State of A.P., (2010) 15 SCC 1: (2013) 2 SCC (Cri) 89] and C.M. Girish Babu v. CBI [C.M. Girish Babu v. CBI, (2009) 3 SCC 779: (2009) 2 SCC (Cri) 1] .
8. In the present case, the complainant did not support the prosecution case insofar as demand by the accused is concerned. The prosecution has not examined any other witness, present at the time when the money was allegedly handed over to the accused by the complainant, to prove that the same was pursuant to any demand made by the accused. When the complainant himself had disowned what he had stated in the initial complaint (Ext. P-11) before LW 9, and there is no other evidence to prove that the accused had made any demand, the evidence of PW 1 and the contents of Ext. P-11 cannot be relied upon to come to the conclusion that the above material furnishes proof of the demand allegedly made by the accused. We are, therefore, inclined to hold that the learned trial court as well as the High Court was not correct in holding the demand alleged to be made by the accused as proved.
The only other material available is the recovery of the tainted currency notes from the possession of the accused. In fact such possession is admitted by the accused himself. Mere possession and recovery of the currency notes from the accused without proof of demand will not bring home the offence under Section
7. The above also will be conclusive insofar as the offence under Sections 13(1)(d)(i) and (ii) is concerned as in the absence of any proof of demand for illegal gratification, the use of corrupt or illegal means or abuse of position as a public servant to obtain any valuable thing or pecuniary advantage cannot be held to be established.
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9. Insofar as the presumption permissible to be drawn under Section 20 of the Act is concerned, such presumption can only be in respect of the offence under Section 7 and not the offences under Sections 13(1)(d)(i) and (ii) of the Act. In any event, it is only on proof of acceptance of illegal gratification that presumption can be drawn under Section 20 of the Act that such gratification was received for doing or forbearing to do any official act. Proof of acceptance of illegal gratification can follow only if there is proof of demand. As the same is lacking in the present case the primary facts on the basis of which the legal presumption under Section 20 can be drawn are wholly absent."
The abovesaid view taken by this Court fully supports the case of the appellant. In view of the contradictions noticed by us above in the depositions of key witnesses examined on behalf of the prosecution, we are of the view that the demand for and acceptance of bribe amount and cellphone by the appellant, is not proved beyond reasonable doubt. Having regard to such evidence on record the acquittal recorded by the trial court is a "possible view" as such the judgment [State of T.N. v. N. Vijayakumar, 2020 SCC OnLine Mad 7098] of the High Court is fit to be set aside. Before recording conviction under the provisions of the Prevention of Corruption Act, the courts have to take utmost care in scanning the evidence. Once conviction is recorded under the provisions of the Prevention of Corruption Act, it casts a social stigma on the person in the society apart from serious consequences on the service rendered. At the same time it is also to be noted that whether the view taken by the trial court is a possible view or not, there cannot be any definite proposition and each case has to be judged on its own merits, having regard to evidence on record."
(Emphasis supplied) 13 Considering the concept of demand and acceptance, the Apex Court in a later judgment in the case of K.SHANTHAMMA v. STATE OF TELANGANA4 has held as follows:
"10. We have given careful consideration to the submissions. We have perused the depositions of the prosecution witnesses. The offence under Section 7 of the PC Act relating to public servants taking bribe requires a demand of illegal gratification and the acceptance thereof. The proof of demand of bribe by a public servant and its acceptance by him is sine qua non for establishing the offence under Section 7 of the PC Act.
11. In P. Satyanarayana Murthy v. State of A.P. [P. Satyanarayana Murthy v. State of A.P., (2015) 10 SCC 152:
(2016) 1 SCC (Cri) 11], this Court has summarised the well-
settled law on the subject in para 23 which reads thus: (SCC p. 159) "23. The proof of demand of illegal gratification, thus, is the gravamen of the offence under Sections 7 and 13(1)(d)(i) and (ii) of the Act and in absence thereof, unmistakably the charge therefor, would fail. Mere acceptance of any amount allegedly by way of illegal gratification or recovery thereof, dehors the proof of demand, ipso facto, would thus not be sufficient to bring home the charge under these two sections of the Act. As a corollary, failure of the prosecution to prove the demand for illegal gratification would be fatal and mere recovery of the amount from the person accused of the offence under Section 7 or 13 of the Act would not entail his conviction thereunder."
(emphasis supplied)
12. The prosecution's case is that the appellant had kept pending the return of commercial tax filed by the said Society for the year 1996-97. The appellant had issued a notice dated 14-2-2000 to the said Society calling upon the 4 (2022) 4 SCC 574 14 said Society to produce the record. Accordingly, the necessary books were produced by the said Society. The case made out by PW 1 is that when he repeatedly visited the office of the appellant in February 2020, the demand of Rs 3000 by way of illegal gratification was made by the appellant for passing the assessment order. However, PW 1, in his cross-examination, accepted that the notice dated 26-2-2000 issued by the appellant was received by the said Society on 15-3-2000 in which it was mentioned that after verification of the books of accounts of the said Society, exemption from payment of commercial tax as claimed by the said Society was allowed. PW 1 accepted that it was stated in the said notice that there was no necessity for the said Society to pay any commercial tax for Assessment Year 1996-97.
13. According to the case of PW 1, on 23-3-2000, he visited the appellant's office to request her to issue final assessment order. According to his case, at that time, initially, the appellant reiterated her demand of Rs 3000. But she scaled it down to Rs 2000. Admittedly, on 15-3-2000, the said Society was served with a notice informing the said Society that an exemption has been granted from payment of commercial tax to the said Society. Therefore, the said Society was not liable to pay any tax for the year 1996-97. The issue of the final assessment order was only a procedural formality. Therefore, the prosecution's case about the demand of bribe made on 23-3-2000 by the appellant appears to be highly doubtful.
14. PW 1 described how the trap was laid. In the pre- trap mediator report, it has been recorded that LW 8, Shri R. Hari Kishan, was to accompany PW 1 -- complainant at the time of offering the bribe. PW 7 Shri P.V.S.S.P. Raju deposed that PW 8 Shri U.V.S. Raju, the Deputy Superintendent of Police, ACB, had instructed LW 8 to accompany PW 1 -- complainant inside the chamber of the appellant. PW 8 has accepted this fact by stating in the examination-in-chief that LW 8 was asked to accompany PW 1 and observe what transpires between the appellant and PW 1. PW 8, in his evidence, accepted that only PW 1 entered the chamber of the appellant and LW 8 waited outside the chamber. Even PW 7 admitted in the cross-examination that when PW 1 entered the 15 appellant's chamber, LW 8 remained outside in the corridor. Thus, LW 8 was supposed to be an independent witness accompanying PW 1. In breach of the directions issued to him by PW 8, he did not accompany PW 1 inside the chamber of the appellant, and he waited outside the chamber in the corridor. The prosecution offered no explanation why LW 8 did not accompany PW 1 inside the chamber of the appellant at the time of the trap.
15. Therefore, PW 1 is the only witness to the alleged demand and acceptance. According to PW 1, firstly, the demand was made of Rs 3000 by the appellant on 24-2-2000. Thereafter, continuously for three days, she reiterated the demand when he visited the appellant's office. Lastly, the appellant made the demand on 29-2-2000 and 23-3-2000. On this aspect, he was cross-examined in detail by the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the appellant. His version about the demand and acceptance is relevant which reads thus:
"In the vicinity of office of AO the jeep, in which we went there was stopped and I was asked to go into the office of AO and the trap party took vantage positions. Accordingly, I went inside the office of AO. I wished AO. At that time apart from AO some other person was found in the office room of AO and he was talking to the AO. AO offered me a chair. After discussion with the AO the said other person left the room of AO. I informed AO that I brought the bribe amount as demanded by her and also asked her to issue the final assessment orders. Then I took the said tainted currency notes from my shirt pocket and I was about to give the same to the AO and on which instead of taking the same amount directly by her with her hands she took out a diary from her table drawer, opened the diary and asked me to keep the said amount in the diary. Accordingly, I kept the amount in the said diary. She closed the said diary and again kept the same in her table drawer and locked the drawer and kept the keys in her hand bag which was hanging to her seat. She pressed the calling bell and a lady attender came into the room of AO, then she instructed the lady attender to 16 call ACTO concerned to her along with the society records concerned.
Accordingly, ACTO came to AO along with record. After going through the ledger and cash book, etc. AO signed on the last page of the said ledger and cash book mentioning 26-2-2000 below her signature in the said register though she signed on 27-3-2000 in my presence. AO directed her attender to affix official rubber stamp below her signature in the ledger and cash book and accordingly attender affixed the same. AO also signed on the office note of final assessment orders at that time. Thereafter, I collected the general ledger and cash book from the attender after affixing the said rubber stamp thereon and came out of the office of AO and relayed the pre-arranged signal to the trap party."
(emphasis supplied)
16. Thus, PW 1 did not state that the appellant reiterated her demand at the time of trap. His version is that on his own, he told her that he had brought the amount. What is material is the cross-examination on this aspect. In the cross-examination, PW 1 accepted that his version regarding the demand made by the appellant on various dates was an improvement. The relevant part of the cross-examination of the appellant reads thus:
"I did not state to ACB Inspector in Section 161 CrPC statement that on the evening of 24-2-2000 I met the AO and that she demanded the bribe. I did not mention in Ext. P-3 complaint that continuously for 3 days after 24-2-2000 I met the AO and the AO reiterated her demand. I did not mention in Ext. P-3 complaint that on 29-2-2000 I approached the AO and the AO demanded bribe of Rs 3000 and that unless I pay the said bribe amount she will not issue final assessment orders. I did not state in my Section 164 statement before the Magistrate that 13-3-2000 to 16- 3-2000 I was on leave and from 1-3-2000 to 12-3- 2000, I was engaged in recovering the dues of the society. It is not true to suggest that I did not meet the AO continuously 3 days i.e. on 25-2-2000, 26-2-2000 17 and 27-2-2000 and that 27-2-2000 is Sunday. It is not true to suggest that I did not meet the AO in the evening of 24-2-2000 and that AO did not demand any money from me. I did not state in my Section 161 CrPC statement to Inspector of ACB that before I left the office of DSP on the date of trap I made a phone call enquiring about the availability of AO and the AO was in the office and informed me that she should be available in the office from 6.00 to 7.00 p.m. on that day so also in my Section 164 CrPC. I made such a phone call from the office of the DSP, ACB. I do not remember as to from which phone number I made phone call on that day. I cannot describe office telephone number of the AO. It is not true to suggest that I did not make any such phone call to AO and that she did not give any such reply to me. I did not state to ACB Inspector in my Section 161 CrPC statement or to the Magistrate in my Section 164 CrPC statement that I went inside the office of AO and I wished AO and at that time apart from AO some other person was found in the office room of AO and that he was talking to the AO and that the AO offered me a chair and that after discussion with the AO the said person left the room of AO and then I informed the AO that I brought the bribe amount. I did not state that said aspects to DSP during the post trap proceedings also."
(emphasis supplied)
17. Thus, the version of PW 1 in his examination-in- chief about the demand made by the appellant from time to time is an improvement. As stated earlier, LW 8 did not enter the appellant's chamber at the time of trap. There is no other evidence of the alleged demand. Thus, the evidence of PW 1 about the demand for bribe by the appellant is not at all reliable. Hence, we conclude that the demand made by the appellant has not been conclusively proved.
18. PW 2, Shri B.D.V. Ramakrishna had no personal knowledge about the demand. However, he accepted that on 15-3-2000, the said Society received a communication informing that the said Society need not pay any tax for the year 1996-97. PW 3 Shri L. Madhusudhan was working as 18 Godown Incharge with the said Society. He stated that on 15- 3-2000, when he visited the appellant's office, ACTO served the original notice dated 26-2-2000 in which it was mentioned that the Society was not liable to pay any tax. It is his version that when he met the appellant on the same day, she enquired whether he had brought the demanded amount of Rs 3000. However, PW 3 did not state that the appellant demanded the said amount for granting any favour to the said society.
19. PW 4 Ahmed Moinuddin was ACTO at the relevant time. He deposed that on 27-3-2000, the appellant instructed him to prepare the final assessment order, which was kept ready in the morning. He stated that he was called at 6 p.m. to the chamber of the appellant along with books of the said Society. At that time, PW 1 was sitting there. He stated that the appellant subscribed her signature on a Register of the said Society and put the date as 26-2-2000 below it. He was not a witness to the alleged demand. However, in the cross- examination, he admitted that the appellant had served a memo dated 21-3-2000 to him alleging that he was careless in performing his duties."
On a coalesce reading of all the judgments rendered by the Apex Court on the point in issue, what would unmistakably emerge is, mere demand cannot result in an accusation. Mere acceptance also would not result in such accusation. What would result for a proceeding under Section 7(a) of the Act is that there should be demand and acceptance. Mere recovery of money from the accused would not suffice to prove the guilt. Though these are cases where the Apex Court was considering matters after a full blown trial, the law that runs through the stream of these judgments is that if 19 proceedings have to be initiated against an accused under the provisions of the Act, there should be 'demand and acceptance'.
10. On the bedrock of the principles laid down by the Apex Court in the aforesaid judgments, the case at hand will have to be considered. The afore-narrated facts about the complaint being a matter of record are not reiterated. The timeline of the issue in the case at hand requires to be noticed. An application was made by Sri.S.M.Nagaraju for a new electrical connection claiming to be the owner of Lulu Warehouse on 19-02-2021. The application was approved on 22-02-2021 and the field inspection was carried out on the same day; estimation was given on the same day; power sanction was also approved on the same day; and drawing electrical lines by the electrical inspector was also approved on the same day. Therefore, entire application was considered and closed within three days of its submission. The petitioner had not yet assumed charge of the post of Executive Engineer in that Division, as on that date. On 09-03-2021 power sanction was approved and on 12-03-2021 the electrical inspector also completed the drawings and its approval. On 15-03-3021 work order in favour of the 20 complainant had already been issued. The petitioner takes charge of the post of Executive Engineer on 18-03-2021 after all these proceedings were over. On 11-06-2021 electricity and power was approved and provided to the godown and on 15-06-2021 the meter reading on the software which was the job charter of the petitioner was approved. After all these approvals when nothing remained, there was a complaint by the contractor, a beneficiary of the entire proceedings afore-narrated right from the date when the petitioner was not even in the post, till the petitioner comes to the post.
11. Getting disgruntled or generating some grief the complainant, who is the contractor for whom all works had already been done registers a complaint on 17-06-2021. No consumer or any other aggrieved person complained to the contractor of any pending work and there was no letter of authorization for the contractor to follow up the issue by anybody.
12. On registration of the aforesaid complaint by the contractor, the 1st respondent, the then Anti Corruption Bureau registers the crime in Crime No.15 of 2021, undertakes pre-trap 21 panchanama and conducts a raid on the office of the petitioner and what is found is bait money of Rs.5,000/- which was not recovered from the hands of the petitioner, but was found in some file which is not even the file relating to the complainant. Therefore, in the considered view of this Court, there is neither demand nor acceptance of any money in the case at hand, as there is no document produced to demonstrate that the work of the complainant was still pending as on 17-06-2021.
13. The conversation between the petitioner and the 2nd respondent which is taken as the foundation for making such allegation also does not indicate that it is a tacit demand made for this particular work as the conversation itself happens on 17-06- 2021 and not any day earlier, by which date the application had already been concluded. A document is placed by the respondent to demonstrate that the work had not been completed. The job of the petitioner was to make material inventory as he was holding the post of Executive Engineer. The material inventory was already done on 11-06-2021. Later, the job of the Assistant Executive Engineer was to test the meter. Meter testing was done on 15-06- 22 2021. After entire job was done, service connection, which was not even the job of the petitioner, was given on 29-06-2021. The entire timeline is from the date of submission of the application on 19-02-2021 up to the service connection. The job of the petitioner has ended on 11-06-2021. If that be so, there was nothing for the complainant to allege that the petitioner had demanded bribe for a work that had already been done.
14. Apart from glaring facts, even if it is construed to be a demand, there is no acceptance. Even if it is construed to be an acceptance there is no demand. There is no recovery of bait money from the petitioner, but from some file on the table of the petitioner. This is what the Apex Court in the aforesaid judgments held that it cannot amount to demand and acceptance. In the teeth of the aforesaid judgments of the Apex Court, if the facts as narrated hereinabove are considered, permitting further proceedings on the strength of the issue now brought before the Court would become an abuse of the process of law. In cases where it is alleged of demand and acceptance of illegal gratification and the matter is considered for trial, there should be foundation 23 laid in the complaint. Mere statement made that amount was recovered from the petitioner cannot mean that further proceedings should be permitted to continue for the respondents to prove that what was recovered was illegal gratification. There is no material prima facie even for permitting further proceedings against the petitioner.
15. For the aforesaid reasons, I pass the following:
ORDER
(i) The Writ Petition is allowed.
(ii) The FIR in Crime No.15 of 2021 registered before the Karnataka Anti-Corruption Bureau, Police Station, Bengaluru City and pending before the 23rd Additional City Civil and Sessions Judge, Bengaluru City, stands quashed.
Sd/-
JUDGE bkp CT:MJ