Chattisgarh High Court
State Of Chhattisgarh vs Dinesh Soni on 10 March, 2026
1
Digitally signed
RAGHVENDRA by
2026:CGHC:11359-DB
JAT RAGHVENDRA
JAT
NAFR
HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR
ACQA No. 102 of 2012
• State Of Chhattisgarh, through the District Magistrate District
Korba, C.G. ... Appellant(s)
versus
1. Dinesh Soni S/o Netalal Soni Aged About 24 Years R/o.
Bhadarapara, Balco Nagar, Korba (C.G.).
2. Ashok Choudhari S/o Chhotelal Choudhari Aged About 28 Years
R/o. Shanti Nagar, Balco Nagar, Korba (C.G.).
3. Vijay Kumar S/o Dhaniram Manjhawar Aged About 25 Years R/o.
Padimar, Bhadarapara, Balco Nagar, Korba (C.G.).
4. Dilip Baghel S/o S/o. Bahoran Baghel Aged About 24 Years R/o.
Bhadarapara, Balco Nagar, Korba (C.G.).
5. Raju Uike S/o Shiv Prasad Pradhan Aged About 23 Years R/o.
Sector 2, B, 308, Balco Nagar, Korba (C.G.).
6. Montu Khalkho S/o S/o. Anad Pal Aged About 23 Years R/o. Sada
Colony, Balco Nagar, Police Station Kotwali, District - Korba
(C.G.)
... Respondent(s)
2
For Appellant(s) : Mr. Kanwaljeet Singh Saini, Dy. G.A.
For Respondent(s) No. 6 : Ms. Aditi Joshi, Advocate.
DB: Hon'ble Shri Justice Sanjay S. Agrawal and
Hon'ble Shri Justice Amitendra Kishore Prasad
Judgment on Board
Per Amitendra Kishore Prasad, J.
10/03/2026
1. This acquittal appeal has been preferred by the appellant/State against the judgment dated 3.1.2011 passed by the learned 2 nd Additional Sessions Judge, F.T.C, District-Korba, (C.G.), in S.T. No. 87/2010 by which respondents herein has been acquitted of the charges punishable under Sections 395 and 412 of IPC.
2. Brief facts of the case, is that, the complainant, Saman Singh, lodged a report at Police Station Balco on 12.02.2010 at about 21:00 hours stating that he is a resident of Village Risdi and earns his livelihood by doing labour work. He reported that on 12.01.2010, while he was returning to his house at Risdi on his motorcycle bearing registration No. CG-12-A-5631 along with his companion Ramnarayan, at about 7:00 PM, when they reached near Risdi Nala, three persons riding a motorcycle intercepted them on the road. The said persons threatened them by stating that they would beat them and thereafter assaulted and intimidated them, demanding that the motorcycle be handed over to them. Out of fear and under coercion, the complainant was compelled to give them the motorcycle bearing registration No. CG-12-A-5631, after which the three persons fled away from the 3 spot along with the motorcycle. The incident was witnessed by Ramnarayan Kanwar and Jai Singh, who were present at the time of occurrence, and the complainant stated that he would be able to identify the assailants if they were produced before him. On the basis of the said report, Assistant Sub-Inspector Dilip Dhirhe registered an offence under Sections 384/34 of the Indian Penal Code. During the course of investigation, on 20.02.2010 the memorandum statement of accused Dinesh Soni was recorded by Assistant Sub-Inspector Dilip Dhirhe in the presence of witnesses Jai Singh and Moti Lal. On 13.02.2010, the motorcycle was seized from the complainant Saman Singh in the presence of witnesses Ramnarayan and Jai Singh. Thereafter, on 14.02.2010, the memorandum statement of accused Dilip Baghel was recorded by Sub-Inspector Dilip Baghel in the presence of witnesses Jai Singh and Ramnarayan, and on the same date Sub-Inspector Divakar Upadhyay conducted the seizure proceedings of motorcycle bearing registration No. CG-12-A-5631 in the presence of the said witnesses. Subsequently, on 30.04.2010, an identification parade was conducted by the Additional Tehsildar, Sonit Meria, wherein the complainant Saman Singh identified accused Dinesh, Ashok and U.K. Raju. Further, on 14.02.2010, the accused persons namely Dinesh Soni, Ashok Choudhary, Vijay Kumar, Dilip Baghel, Raju and Bhodu were arrested by Assistant Sub-Inspector Dilip Dhirhe. On 28.04.2010, a proclamation of absconding was prepared against accused Suresh Yadav by Sub-Inspector Dilip 4 Dhirhe in the presence of witnesses Shravan Ratre and Jagannath Prasad. The statements of Ramnarayan, Jai Singh, Ramkumar Lahare and the complainant Saman Singh were recorded under Section 161 of the Code of Criminal Procedure on 13.02.2010 by Assistant Sub-Inspector Dilip Dhirhe. Upon completion of the investigation, a charge-sheet under Sections 395 and 412 of the Indian Penal Code was prepared against the accused persons and was filed on 11.05.2010 before the Court of Smt. Saroj Nand Das, who thereafter committed the case to the Court of the learned Sessions Judge on 20.08.2010. The case was subsequently received by this Court on transfer on the said date, and thereafter charges under Sections 395 and 412 of the Indian Penal Code were framed against the accused persons on 22.10.2010, which were duly read over and explained to them; however, the accused persons denied the charges and pleaded not guilty, thereby necessitating the trial.
3. So as to hold the accused/respondents guilty, the prosecution has examined as many as 9 witnesses and exhibited 20 documents. The statement of the accused persons/respondents was also recorded under Section 313 of the Cr.P.C. in which they denied the charges levelled against them and pleaded innocence and false implication in the case.
4. After appreciating the oral as well as documentary evidence, the learned trial Court found that the prosecution has failed to prove 5 its case beyond reasonable doubt and by the impugned judgment dated 3.1.2011, acquitted the accused persons/respondents from the aforesaid charges. Hence, this appeal.
5. Learned counsel for the appellant/State submits that the learned trial Court has committed a serious error of law in acquitting the accused persons/respondents. It is contended that the trial Court has failed to properly appreciate and consider the material evidence available on record and has consequently passed the impugned judgment of acquittal in a palpably illegal and erroneous manner. Learned counsel further submits that the complainant, Saman Singh (PW-1), who is also the victim in the present case, has categorically deposed regarding the commission of the offence and has clearly supported the prosecution case in his testimony. Despite such clear and cogent evidence, and further despite the fact that the accused persons were subjected to Test Identification Parade vide Ex. P/2, the trial Court has erroneously acquitted the respondents/accused persons. It is also submitted that the trial Court has unjustifiably disbelieved the statements of Ramnarayan (PW-7) and Jai Singh (PW-9), who have also categorically narrated the incident and have supported the prosecution version in their evidence, thereby rendering the impugned judgment unsustainable in the eyes of law. However, the acquittal recorded by the trial Court is based on improper appreciation of evidence, as the material evidence produced by 6 the prosecution has been overlooked, resulting in an erroneous judgment. Hence, it is prayed that the present appeal be allowed.
6. On the other hand, learned counsel for respondent No. 6 submits that the FIR was initially lodged against three unknown persons and, thereafter, during the course of investigation, the concerned police authorities filed the charge-sheet against the accused persons/respondents for the commission of the offence of robbery without there being any cogent or reliable material evidence against them. It is further submitted that the allegations made by the complainant, Saman Singh (PW-1), do not corroborate with the statements of Ramnarayan (PW-7) and Jai Singh (PW-9), and there exist material omissions and contradictions in their testimonies. Learned counsel also contends that the alleged memorandum and seizure have not been duly proved in accordance with law and the prosecution has failed to establish the same through reliable evidence. It is further argued that the FIR itself was lodged after an inordinate and unexplained delay of about 20 days, which casts serious doubt on the prosecution case. Moreover, the Test Identification Parade was neither conducted properly nor proved by the witnesses during trial. In view of these significant infirmities and inconsistencies in the prosecution evidence, it is submitted that the learned trial Court has rightly acquitted the accused persons/respondents and the impugned judgment of acquittal does not call for any interference by this Court.
7
7. We have heard learned counsel for the parties, considered their rival submissions made herein-above and went through the records with utmost circumspection.
8. The Supreme Court has considered the scope of interference in cases of acquittal in several matters and has passed several guidelines for considering the appeals arising out of acquittal of accused persons in the matter of Jafarudheen and others vs. State of Kerala1 has considered the scope of interference in Appeal against acquittal, which reads as under:-
"25. While dealing with an appeal against acquittal by invoking Section 378 CrPC, the appellate court has to consider whether the trial court's view can be terms as a possible one, particularly when evidence on record has been analysed. The reason is that an order of acquittal adds up to the presumption of innocence in favour of the accused. Thus, the appellate court has to be relatively slow in reversing the order of the trial court rendering acquittal. Therefore, the presumption in favour of the accused does not get weakened but only strengthened. Such a double presumption that enures in favour of the accused has to be disturbed only by thorough scrutiny on the accepted legal parameters."
9. In the matter of Kali Ram vs State of H.P. 2, the Supreme Court has held in para 25 which reads as under:-
1 (2022) 8 SCC 440 2 (1973) 2 SCC 808 8 "25.Another golden thread which runs through the web of the administration of justice in criminal cases is that if two views are possible on the evidence adduced in the case, one pointing to the guilt of the accused and the other to his innocence, the view which is favorable to the accused should be adopted.
This principle has a special relevance in cases where the guilt of the accused is sought to be established by circumstantial evidence."
10. The Hon'ble Apex Court vide its judgment dated 12.02.2024 (Criminal Appeal No 1162 of 2011) passed in Mallappa and Ors. Versus State of Karnataka has held in para 36 as under:-
"36. Our criminal jurisprudence is essentially based on the promise that no innocent shall be condemned as guilty. All the safeguards and the jurisprudential values of criminal law, are intended to prevent any failure of justice. The principles which come into play while deciding an appeal from acquittal could be summarized as:-
(i) Appreciation of evidence is the core element of a criminal trial and such appreciation must be comprehensive--
inclusive of all evidence, oral and
documentary;
(ii) Partial or selective appreciation of
evidence may result in a miscarriage of justice and is in itself a ground of challenge;
(iii) If the Court, after appreciation of evidence, finds that two views are possible, 9 the one in favour of the accused shall ordinarily be followed;
(iv) If the view of the Trial Court is a legally plausible view, mere possibility of a contrary view shall not justify the reversal of acquittal;
(v) If the appellate Court is inclined to reverse the acquittal in appeal on a re-appreciation of evidence, it must specifically address all the reasons given by the Trial Court for acquittal and must cover all the facts;
(vi) In a case of reversal from acquittal to conviction, the appellate Court must demonstrate an illegality, perversity or error of law or fact in the decision of the Trial Court.
11. Further, the Supreme Court in the matter of Surendra Singh and another v. State of Uttarakhand 3, whereby in Para-11 & 12, it has been held that the High Court should interfere in the order of acquittal, if the same suffers from perversity and is based on misreading of material evidence etc. and observed as under:
"11. Recently, in the case of Babu Sahebagouda Rudragoudar and others v. State of Karnataka, (2024) 8 SCC 149, a Bench of this Court to which one of us was a Member (B.R. Gavai, J.) had an occasion to consider the legal position with regard to the scope of interference in an appeal against acquittal. It was observed thus:
"38. First of all, we would like to reiterate the principles laid down by this Court governing the 3 2025 5 SCC 433 10 scope of interference by the High Court in an appeal filed by the State for challenging acquittal of the accused recorded by the trial court.
39. This Court in Rajesh Prasad v. State of Bihar [Rajesh Prasad v. State of Bihar, (2022) 3 SCC 471 : (2022) 2 SCC (Cri) 31] encapsulated the legal position covering the field after considering various earlier judgments and held as below : (SCC pp. 482-
83, para 29) 6 (2024) 8 SCC 149 "29. After referring to a catena of judgments, this Court culled out the following general principles regarding the powers of the appellate court while dealing with an appeal against an order of acquittal in the following words : (Chandrappa case [Chandrappa v. State of Karnataka (2007) 4 SCC 415 : (2007) 2 SCC (Cri) 325], SCC p. 432, para 42
42. From the above decisions, in our considered view, the following general principles regarding powers of the appellate court while dealing with an appeal against an order of acquittal emerge:
(1) An appellate court has full power to review, reappreciate and reconsider the evidence upon which the order of acquittal is founded.
(2) The Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 puts no limitation, restriction or condition on exercise of such power and an appellate court on the evidence before it may reach its own conclusion, both on questions of fact and of law.11
(3) Various expressions, such as, "substantial and compelling reasons", "good and sufficient grounds", "very strong circumstances", "distorted conclusions", "glaring mistakes", etc. are not intended to curtail extensive powers of an appellate court in an appeal against acquittal. Such phraseologies are more in the nature of "flourishes of language"
to emphasise the reluctance of an appellate court to interfere with acquittal than to curtail the power of the court to review the evidence and to come to its own conclusion. (4) An appellate court, however, must bear in mind that in case of acquittal, there is double presumption in favour of the accused. Firstly, the presumption of innocence is available to him under the fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence that every person shall be presumed to be innocent unless he is proved guilty by a competent court of law.
Secondly, the accused having secured his acquittal, the presumption of his innocence is further reinforced, reaffirmed and strengthened by the trial court.
(5) If two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the appellate court should not disturb the finding of acquittal recorded by the trial court.' "
40. Further, in H.D. Sundara v. State of Karnataka [H.D. Sundara v. State of Karnataka, (2023) 9 SCC 581: (2023) 3 SCC (Cri) 748], this Court summarised the principles 12 governing the exercise of appellate jurisdiction while dealing with an appeal against acquittal under Section 378CrPC as follows :(SCC p. 584, para 8) "8. ... 8.1. The acquittal of the accused further strengthens the presumption of innocence;
8.2. The appellate court, while hearing an appeal against acquittal, is entitled to reappreciate the oral and documentary evidence;
8.3. The appellate court, while deciding an appeal against acquittal, after reappreciating the evidence, is required to consider whether the view taken by the trial court is a possible view which could have been taken on the basis of the evidence on record;
8.4. If the view taken is a possible view, the appellate court cannot overturn the order of acquittal on the ground that another view was also possible; and 8.5. The appellate court can interfere with the order of acquittal only if it comes to a finding that the only conclusion which can be recorded on the basis of the evidence on record was that the guilt of the accused was proved beyond a reasonable doubt and no other conclusion was possible."
41. Thus, it is beyond the pale of doubt that the scope of interference by an appellate court for reversing the judgment of acquittal recorded by the trial court in favour of the accused has to be exercised within the four corners of the following principles:
41.1. That the judgment of acquittal suffers 13 from patent perversity;
41.2. That the same is based on a misreading/omission to consider material evidence on record; and 41.3. That no two reasonable views are possible and only the view consistent with the guilt of the accused is possible from the evidence available on record."
12. It could thus be seen that it is a settled legal position that the interference with the finding of acquittal recorded by the learned trial judge would be warranted by the High Court only if the judgment of acquittal suffers from patent perversity; that the same is based on a misreading/omission to consider material evidence on record; and that no two reasonable views are possible and only the view consistent with the guilt of the accused is possible from the evidence available on record."
12. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the matter of Tulasareddi @ Mudakappa and another vs. The State of Karnataka & others, 2026 SCC Online SC 89, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed as under:-
"27. In the case of Babu Sahebagouda Rudragoudar v. State of Karnataka, 2024 (8) SCC 149 this Court held in paragraphs 39 to 42 as under:
39. This Court in Rajesh Prasad v. State of Bihar [Rajesh Prasad v. State of Bihar, (2022) 3 SCC 471 : (2022) 2 SCC (Cri) 31] encapsulated the legal position covering the field after considering 14 various earlier judgments and held as below: (SCC pp.482-83, para 29) "29. After referring to a catena of judgments, this Court culled out the following general principles regarding the powers of the appellate court while dealing with an appeal against an order of acquittal in the following words: (Chandrappacase [Chandrappa v. State of Karnataka, (2007) 4 SCC 415 : (2007) 2 SCC (Cri) 325], SCC p. 432, para
42) '42. From the above decisions, in our considered view, the following general principles regarding powers of the appellate court while dealing with an appeal against an order of acquittal emerge:
(1) An appellate court has full power to review, reappreciate and reconsider the evidence upon which the order of acquittal is founded.
(2) The Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 puts no limitation, restriction 15 or condition on exercise of such power and an appellate court on the evidence before it may reach its own conclusion, both on questions of fact and of law.
(3) Various expressions, such as, "substantial and compelling reasons", "good and sufficient grounds", "very strong circumstances", "distorted conclusions", "glaring mistakes", etc. are not intended to curtail extensive powers of an appellate court in an appeal against acquittal. Such phraseologies are more in the nature of "flourishes of language" to emphasise the reluctance of an appellate court to interfere with acquittal than to curtail the power of the court to review the evidence and to come to its own conclusion.
(4) An appellate court, however, must bear in mind that in case of 16 acquittal, there is double presumption in favour of the accused. Firstly, the presumption of innocence is available to him under the fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence that every person shall be presumed to be innocent unless he is proved guilty by a competent court of law.
Secondly, the accused having secured his acquittal, the presumption of his innocence is further reinforced, reaffirmed and strengthened by the trial court. (5) If two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the appellate court should not disturb the finding of acquittal recorded by the trial court.'
40. Further, in H.D. Sundara v. State of Karnataka [H.D. Sundara v. State of Karnataka, (2023) 9 SCC 581 : (2023) 3 SCC (Cri) 748] this Court summarised the principles governing the exercise of appellate jurisdiction while 17 dealing with an appeal against acquittal under Section 378 CrPC as follows : (SCC p. 584, para 8) "8. ... 8.1. The acquittal of the accused further strengthens the presumption of innocence;
8.2. The appellate court, while hearing an appeal against acquittal, is entitled to reappreciate the oral and documentary evidence;
8.3. The appellate court, while deciding an appeal against acquittal, after reappreciating the evidence, is required to consider whether the view taken by the trial court is a possible view which could have been taken on the basis of the evidence on record;
8.4. If the view taken is a possible view, the appellate court cannot overturn the order of acquittal on the ground that another view was also possible; and 8.5. The appellate court can interfere with the order of acquittal only if it comes to a finding that the only conclusion which can be recorded on the basis of the evidence on record was that the guilt of the accused was proved beyond a reasonable doubt and no other conclusion was possible."
41. Thus, it is beyond the pale of doubt that the scope of interference by an appellate court for reversing the 18 judgment of acquittal recorded by the trial court in favour of the accused has to be exercised within the four corners of the following principles:
41.1. That the judgment of acquittal suffers from patent perversity;
41.2. That the same is based on a misreading/omission to consider material evidence on record; and 41.3. That no two reasonable views are possible and only the view consistent with the guilt of the accu Ramesh v. State of Uttarakhand, 2020 (20) SCC 522 sed is possible from the evidence available on record.
42. The appellate court, in order to interfere with the judgment of acquittal would have to record pertinent findings on the above factors if it is inclined to reverse the judgment of acquittal rendered by the trial court.
28. In the case of Ramesh v. State of Uttarakhand, 2020 (20) SCC 522, this Court has observed and held in para 19 & 20 as under:
"19. In a case like this when the trial court acquitted the accused persons of their charges, the High Court could not have reversed the finding merely on the basis that other view, as recorded by the High Court, appeared to 19 it to be a plausible view. Such an approach by the High Court, against the judgment of the acquittal, is impermissible. In this context, we may usefully refer to Kalyan v. State of U.P. [Kalyan v. State of U.P., (2001) 9 SCC 632 : 2002 SCC (Cri) 780] wherein it was held : (SCC pp. 640-41, paras 15, 18 & 20) "15. ... The view taken by the trial court could have been disturbed only if there were compelling reasons. We do not find any compelling reason noticed [State of U.P. v. Hari Lal, 1998 SCC OnLine All 1216 : 1999 All LJ 142] by the High Court while setting aside the order of acquittal.
18. Even if another view regarding the occurrence was possible, as taken by the High Court, the same could not be made a basis for setting aside the order of the trial court in view of the settled position of law on the point.
20. Under the circumstances, the appeal is allowed by setting aside the judgment of the High Court convicting the accused persons and sentencing them to various imprisonments including life imprisonment. We uphold the order of acquittal passed by the trial court in favour of the appellants."
20. In another judgment in Basappa v. State of Karnataka 20 [Basappa v. State of Karnataka, (2014) 5 SCC 154 : (2014) 2 SCC (Cri) 497], this Court noticed plethora of judgments where this very principle had been adopted, as can be seen from the following discussion therefrom : (SCC pp. 158-61, paras 11-12, 14 &; 17-18) "11. In Bhim Singh v. State of Haryana [Bhim Singh v. State of Haryana, (2002) 10 SCC 461 : 2003 SCC (Cri) 1469], it has been clarified that interference by the appellate court against an order of acquittal would be justified only if the view taken by the trial court is one which no reasonable person would in the given circumstances, take.
12. In Kallu v. State of M.P. [Kallu v. State of M.P., (2006) 10 SCC 313 : (2006) 3 SCC (Cri) 546], it has been held by this Court that if the view taken by the trial court is a plausible view, the High Court will not be justified in reversing it merely because a different view is possible....
14. In Ganpat v. State of Haryana [Ganpat v. State of Haryana, (2010) 12 SCC 59 :(2011) 1 SCC (Cri) 309], SCC para 15, some of the above principles have been restated. To quote : (SCC p. 62) '15. The following principles have to be kept in mind by the appellate court while dealing with appeals, particularly, against an order of acquittal:
21
(iv) An order of acquittal is to be interfered with only when there are "compelling and substantial reasons" for doing so. If the order is "clearly unreasonable", it is a compelling reason for interference.'
17. ... It is not the stand of the High Court that there had been some miscarriage of justice in the way the trial court has appreciated the evidence. On the contrary, it is the only stand of the High Court that on the available evidence, another view is also reasonably possible in the sense that the appellant-accused could have been convicted. In such circumstances, the High Court was not justified in reversing the acquittal....
18. The appeal is allowed. The impugned judgment [State of Karnataka v. Basappa, 2010 SCC OnLine Kar 5110] is set aside and that of the trial court is restored."
13. From the bare perusal of the record, it appears that, firstly, the FIR was lodged after an inordinate delay of about 20 days from the date of the alleged incident, and no satisfactory or plausible explanation for such delay has been furnished by the prosecution. Secondly, the FIR was initially registered against three unknown persons and, therefore, a Test Identification Parade was conducted during the course of investigation, however, the same does not appear to have been conducted in accordance with the settled principles of law. The Test Identification Parade has not 22 been properly proved and suffers from procedural irregularities, thereby diminishing its evidentiary value. Furthermore, the entire prosecution evidence appears to be shaky and unreliable in nature, containing several inconsistencies and deficiencies. In view of these circumstances, it cannot be said that the learned trial Court committed any error of law or perversity in appreciating the evidence on record while acquitting the accused persons/respondents herein, and therefore the impugned judgment of acquittal does not warrant any interference.
14. This Court finds no illegality in the order impugned acquitting the respondents particularly when there is a settled legal position that if two views are possible, the appellate Court should not interfere with the judgment of acquittal, even otherwise, the prosecution thus has utterly failed in proving its case beyond reasonable doubt and the trial Court has fully justified in recording the finding of acquittal which is based on proper appreciation of evidence available on record.
15. In such facts and evidence, the trial court has, thus, not committed any illegality in acquitting the respondents for the commission of the alleged crime.
16. Accordingly, the appeal filed by the appellant/State is hereby dismissed.
Sd/- Sd/-
(Sanjay S. Agrawal) (Amitendra Kishore Prasad)
Judge Judge
Raghu Jat