Himachal Pradesh High Court
Pramod Sah vs State Of H.P. & Others on 30 June, 2025
IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA Cr. MMO No. 528 of 2025 .
Reserved on : 19.06.2025 Date of Decision: 30.06.2025.
Pramod Sah ....Petitioner Versus State of H.P. & others ....Respondents Coram Hon'ble Mr Justice Rakesh Kainthla, Judge.
Whether approved for reporting?
For the petitioners : Mr. Jeet Singh Advocate. For respondent/State : Mr. Jitender Sharma, Additional Advocate General.
Rakesh Kainthla, Judge The petitioner has filed the present petition, seeking quashing of the FIR No.03/22, dated 05.01.2022, registered at Police Station Theog, District Shimla for the commission of an offence punishable under Section 420 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC), and the consequential proceedings arising out of the FIR.
_______________ Whether reporters of the local papers may be allowed to see the judgment? yes ::: Downloaded on - 30/06/2025 21:21:11 :::CIS 2( 2025:HHC:20447 )
2. Briefly stated, the facts giving rise to the present petition are that the informant, Pawan Chauhan, made a complaint to the police .
stating that he was running a fruit shop at Parala Fruit Mandi in the name and style of Pawan Fruit Company. Pramod Saah, the petitioner, used to purchase the apple crop from the informant. He purchased the apples worth ₹ 30,16,022/- and absconded without making the payment of the apple crop. He cheated the informant and other persons by not making the payment. The police have registered the FIR and conducted the investigation.
3. Aggrieved by the registration of the FIR, the petitioner has filed the present petition, asserting that the matter has been compromised. A full and final payment of ₹ 85 lacs has been made. The police filed the charge sheet, and the matter is pending before the learned Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Theog, District Shimla. The continuation of the proceedings after the compromise amounts to an abuse of the process of the Court. The allegations in the FIR, even if accepted to be correct, do not make out any case for the commission of an offence punishable under Section 420 of the I.P.C. Hence the present petition.
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4. I have heard Mr. Jeet Singh, learned counsel for the petitioner and Mr. Jitender Sharma, learned Additional Advocate General for .
respondent No.1-State.
5. Mr. Jeet Singh, learned counsel for the petitioner, submitted that the matter has been compromised with the informant and other persons, except one. The allegations in the FIR do not constitute the commission of any cognizable offence, and continuation of the proceedings amounts to an abuse of the process of the Court; therefore, he prayed that the present petition be allowed and the FIR be quashed.
6. Mr. Jitender Sharma, learned Additional Advocate General for respondent No.1-State, submitted that the offence punishable under Section 420 of the IPC is compoundable under Section 320 of the Indian Penal Code. This Court should not exercise its inherent jurisdiction to quash the FIR when an alternative remedy is available to the petitioner.
Hence, he prayed that the present petition be dismissed.
7. Section 320(2) of the Cr.P.C mentions the offence punishable under Section 420 IPC in table-1 as a compoundable offence with the permission of the Court, therefore, the petitioner has an alternative remedy to seek the composition of the offence before the learned Trial Court under Section 320(2) of the Cr.P.C. It was held in Madhu Limaye v.
State of Maharashtra, (1977) 4 SCC 551: 1978 SCC (Cri) 10 that inherent ::: Downloaded on - 30/06/2025 21:21:11 :::CIS 4( 2025:HHC:20447 ) power should not be exercised when an alternative remedy exists. It was observed:
.
At the outset, the following principles may be noticed in relation to the exercise of the inherent power of the High Court, which have been followed ordinarily and generally, almost invariably, barring a few exceptions:
"(1) That the power is not to be resorted to if there is a specific provision in the Code for the redress of the grievance of the aggrieved party;
(2) That it should be exercised very sparingly to prevent abuse of process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice;
(3) That it should not be exercised as against the express bar of law engrafted in any other provision of the Code."
8. It was laid down by the Full Bench of Delhi High Court in Gopal Dass vs State AIR 1978 Del 138, that the power under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. is vested in the Court to make such orders as may be necessary to give effect to any order under the Code, prevent abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice.
This power cannot be exercised when a specific remedy is available under the other provisions of the Code. It was observed:-
"8. In order to determine the question under consideration, as to consider what is the scope of the inherent powers of the High Court becomes relevant. The inherent powers of the High Court inhere in it because of its being at the apex of the judicial set-up in a State. The inherent powers of the High Court, preserved by section 482 of the Code, are to be exercised in making orders as may be necessary to give effect to any order ::: Downloaded on - 30/06/2025 21:21:11 :::CIS 5( 2025:HHC:20447 ) under the Code, or to prevent abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. Section 482 envisages that nothing in the Code shall be deemed to limit or .
affect the inherent powers of the High Court exercised by it with the object of achieving the above said three results. It is for this reason that section 482 does not prescribe the contours of the inherent powers of the High Court, which are wide enough to be exercised in suitable cases to afford relief to an aggrieved party. While exercising inherent powers, it has to be borne in mind that this power cannot be exercised in regard to matters specifically covered by the other provisions of the Code. (See R.P. Kapur v. State of Punjab, AIR 1960 S.C. 866) (1). This principle of law had been reiterated succinctly by the Supreme Court recently in Palanippa Gounder v. The State of Tamil Nadu, (1977) 2 SCC 634: AIR 1977 S.C. 1323 (2) therein examining the scope of section 482 it was observed that a provision which saves the inherent powers of a Court cannot override any express provision in the statute which saves that power. Putting it in another form, the Court observed that if there is an express provision in a statute governing a particular subject there is no scope for invoking or exercising the inherent powers of the Court because the Court ought to apply the provisions of the statute which are made advisedly to govern the particular subject matter." (Emphasis supplied)
9. It was held in Arun Shankar Shukla v. State of U.P., (1999) 6 SCC 146: 1999 SCC (Cri) 1076: 1999 SCC OnLine SC 647 that power under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. is extraordinary and should not be exercised when a specific remedy has been provided under the Code. It was observed:
"2. It appears that, unfortunately, the High Court, by exercising its inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code (for short "the Code"), has prevented the flow of justice on the alleged contention of the convicted accused ::: Downloaded on - 30/06/2025 21:21:11 :::CIS 6( 2025:HHC:20447 ) that it was polluted by the so-called misconduct of the judicial officer. It is true that under Section 482 of the Code, the High Court has inherent powers to make such orders as may be .
necessary to give effect to any order under the Code or to prevent the abuse of process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. But the expressions "abuse of the process of law" or "to secure the ends of justice" do not confer unlimited jurisdiction on the High Court, and the alleged abuse of the process of law or the ends of justice could only be secured in accordance with law, including procedural law and not otherwise. Further, inherent powers are in the nature of extraordinary powers to be used sparingly for achieving the object mentioned in Section 482 of the Code in cases where there is no express provision empowering the High Court to achieve the said object. It is well-nigh settled that inherent power is not to be invoked in respect of any matter covered by specific provisions of the Code or if its exercise would infringe any specific provision of the Code. In the present case, the High Court overlooked the procedural law which empowered the convicted accused to prefer a statutory appeal against conviction of the offence. The High Court has intervened at an uncalled-for stage and soft-pedalled the course of justice at a very crucial stage of the trial.
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9. In our view, the order passed by the High Court entertaining the petition of the convicted accused under Section 482 of the Code is, on the face of it, illegal, erroneous, and to say the least, unfortunate. It was known to the High Court that the trial court passed proceedings to the effect that a final judgment and order convicting the accused were pronounced by the trial court. It was also recorded by the trial court that, as the accused were absent, the Court had issued non-bailable warrants. In such a situation, instead of directing the accused to remain present before the Court for resorting to the steps contemplated by the law for passing the sentence, the High Court has stayed further proceedings, including the operation of the non-bailable warrants issued by the trial court. It is disquieting that the High Court has overlooked the important legal aspect that the accused has a right of appeal against the order of conviction purported to ::: Downloaded on - 30/06/2025 21:21:11 :::CIS 7( 2025:HHC:20447 ) have been passed by the trial court. In such circumstances, the High Court ought not to have entertained a petition under Section 482 of the Code and stonewalled the very efficacious alternative remedy of .
appeal as provided in the Code. Merely because the accused made certain allegations against the trial judge, the substantive law cannot be bypassed.
10. It was held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Hamida v.
Rashid, (2008) 1 SCC 474, that the inherent power under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. is to be exercised sparingly and should not be exercised when an alternative remedy is available. It was observed:
"7. It is a well-established principle that inherent power conferred on the High Courts under Section 482 CrPC has to be exercised sparingly with circumspection and in rare cases, and that too to correct patent illegalities or when some miscarriage of justice is done. The content and scope of power under Section 482 CrPC were examined in considerable detail in Madhu Limaye v. State of Maharashtra [(1977) 4 SCC 551: 1978 SCC (Cri) 10: AIR 1978 SC 47], and it was held as under : (SCC p. 555, para
8) The following principles may be stated in relation to the exercise of the inherent power of the High Court:
(1) that the power is not to be resorted to if there is a specific provision in the Code for the redress of the grievance of the aggrieved party;
(2) that it should be exercised very sparingly to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice;
(3) that it should not be exercised as against the express bar of law engrafted in any other provision of the Code.
8. In State v. Navjot Sandhu [(2003) 6 SCC 641: 2003 SCC (Cri) 1545], after a review of a large number of earlier decisions, it was held as under : (SCC p. 657, para 29) ::: Downloaded on - 30/06/2025 21:21:11 :::CIS 8( 2025:HHC:20447 ) "29. ... The inherent power is to be used only in cases where there is an abuse of the process of the court or where interference is absolutely necessary for securing the ends of .
justice. The inherent power must be exercised very sparingly, as cases which require interference would be few and far between. The most common case where inherent jurisdiction is generally exercised is where criminal proceedings are required to be quashed because they are initiated illegally, vexatiously or without jurisdiction. Most of the cases set out hereinabove fall in this category. It must be remembered that the inherent power is not to be resorted to if there is a specific provision in the Code or any other enactment for redress of the grievance of the aggrieved party. This power should not be exercised against an express bar of law engrafted in any other provision of the Criminal Procedure Code. This power cannot be exercised as against an express bar in some other enactment."
9. In Arun Shankar Shukla v. State of U.P. [(1999) 6 SCC 146: 1999 SCC (Cri) 1076] the High Court had entertained a petition under Section 482 CrPC after an order of conviction had been passed by the Sessions Judge and before the sentence had been awarded and further proceedings in the case had been stayed. In appeal, this Court set aside the order of the High Court after reiterating the principle that it is well settled that inherent power is not to be invoked in respect of any matter covered by specific provisions of the Code or if its exercise would infringe any specific provision of the Code. It was further observed that the High Court overlooked the procedural law which empowered the convicted accused to prefer a statutory appeal against conviction of the offence and intervened at an uncalled for stage and soft-pedalled the course of justice at a very crucial stage of the trial. The order of the High Court was accordingly set aside on the ground that a petition under Section 482 CrPC could not have been entertained as the accused had an alternative remedy of an appeal as provided in the Code. It is not necessary to burden this judgment with other decisions of this Court, as the consistent view throughout has been that a petition under Section 482 CrPC cannot be entertained if there is any other ::: Downloaded on - 30/06/2025 21:21:11 :::CIS 9( 2025:HHC:20447 ) specific provision in the Code of Criminal Procedure for redress of the grievance of the aggrieved party.
10. In the case in hand, the respondents-accused could apply for .
bail afresh after the offence had been converted into one under Section 304 IPC. They deliberately did not do so and filed a petition under Section 482 CrPC in order to circumvent the procedure whereunder they would have been required to surrender, as the bail application could be entertained and heard only if the accused were in custody. It is important to note that no order adverse to the respondents-accused had been passed by any court, nor was there any miscarriage of justice or any illegality. In such circumstances, the High Court committed a manifest error of law in entertaining a petition under Section 482 CrPC and issuing a direction to the subordinate court to accept the sureties and bail bonds for the offence under Section 304 IPC. The effect of the order passed by the High Court is that the accused after getting bail in an offence under Sections 324, 352 and 506 IPC on the very day on which they were taken into custody, got an order of bail in their favour even after the injured had succumbed to his injuries and the case had been converted into one under Section 304 IPC without any court examining the case on merits, as it stood after conversion of the offence. The procedure laid down for the grant of bail under Section 439 CrPC, though available to the respondents-accused, having not been availed of, the exercise of power by the High Court under Section 482 CrPC is clearly illegal and the impugned order passed by it has to be set aside." (Emphasis supplied)
11. Similarly, it was held in B.S. Joshi vs. State of Haryana 2003 (4) SCC 675, that the High Court can quash the F.I.R. in non-
compoundable offences based on compromise suggesting that the power under Section 482 Cr.P.C. is not to be exercised in respect offences, which are compoundable under Section 320 of Cr.P.C. except in exceptional cases.
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12. Therefore, it is impermissible to quash the FIR in exercise of inherent jurisdiction when an alternative remedy is available.
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13. It was submitted that the allegations in the FIR do not constitute the commission of any cognizable offence and the continuation of the proceedings amounts to an abuse of the process of the Court; hence, the FIR be quashed. The law relating to quashing of FIR was explained by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in B.N. John v. State of U.P., 2025 SCC OnLine SC 7 as under: -
"7. As far as the quashing of criminal cases is concerned, it is now more or less well settled as regards the principles to be applied by the court. In this regard, one may refer to the decision of this Court in State of Haryana v. Ch. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335, wherein this Court has summarised some of the principles under which FIR/complaints/criminal cases could be quashed in the following words:
"102. In the backdrop of the interpretation of the various relevant provisions of the Code under Chapter XIV and of the principles of law enunciated by this Court in a series of decisions relating to the exercise of the extraordinary power under Article 226 or the inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code which we have extracted and reproduced above, we give the following categories of cases by way of illustration wherein such power could be exercised either to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice, though it may not be possible to lay down any precise, clearly defined and sufficiently channelised and inflexible guidelines or ::: Downloaded on - 30/06/2025 21:21:11 :::CIS 11( 2025:HHC:20447 ) rigid formulae and to give an exhaustive list of myriad kinds of cases wherein such power should be exercised.
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(1) Where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety, do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused.
(2) Where the allegations in the first information report and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate r within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code.
(3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused.
(4) Where the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code.
(5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused.
(6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the ::: Downloaded on - 30/06/2025 21:21:11 :::CIS 12( 2025:HHC:20447 ) proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the .
aggrieved party.
(7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to a private and personal grudge." (emphasis added)
8. Of the aforesaid criteria, clause no. (1), (4) and (6) would be of relevance to us in this case.
In clause (1) it has been mentioned that where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused, then the FIR or the complaint can be quashed.
As per clause (4), where the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non- cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order dated by the Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155 (2) of the CrPC, and in such a situation, the FIR can be quashed.
Similarly, as provided under clause (6), if there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the CrPC or the concerned Act under which the criminal proceedings are instituted, such proceedings can be quashed."
14. This position was reiterated in Ajay Malik v. State of Uttarakhand, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 185, wherein it was observed:
"8. It is well established that a High Court, in exercising its extraordinary powers under Section 482 of the CrPC, may issue orders to prevent the abuse of court processes or to secure the ends of justice. These inherent powers are ::: Downloaded on - 30/06/2025 21:21:11 :::CIS 13( 2025:HHC:20447 ) neither controlled nor limited by any other statutory provision. However, given the broad and profound nature of this authority, the High Court must exercise it .
sparingly. The conditions for invoking such powers are embedded within Section 482 of the CrPC itself, allowing the High Court to act only in cases of clear abuse of process or where intervention is essential to uphold the ends of justice.
9. It is in this backdrop that this Court, over the course of several decades, has laid down the principles and guidelines that High Courts must follow before quashing criminal proceedings at the threshold, thereby pre-empting the Prosecution from building its case before the Trial Court. The grounds for quashing, inter alia, contemplate the following situations : (i) the criminal complaint has been filed with mala fides; (ii) the FIR represents an abuse of the legal process; (iii) no prima facie offence is made out; (iv) the dispute is civil in nature; (v.) the complaint contains vague and omnibus allegations; and (vi) the parties are willing to settle and compound the dispute amicably (State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335).
15. It was held in Madhavrao Jiwajirao Scindia v.
Sambhajirao Chandrojirao Angre, (1988) 1 SCC 692: 1988 SCC (Cri) 234: 1988 SCC OnLine SC 80 that the Court has to determine whether the uncontroverted allegations in the complaint constitute a cognizable offence when the prosecution is at the initial stage. It was observed at page 695
7. The legal position is well settled that when a prosecution at the initial stage is asked to be quashed, the test to be applied by the court is as to whether the uncontroverted allegations as made prima facie establish ::: Downloaded on - 30/06/2025 21:21:11 :::CIS 14( 2025:HHC:20447 ) the offence. It is also for the court to take into consideration any special features which appear in a particular case to consider whether it is expedient and in .
the interest of justice to permit a prosecution to continue.
This is so on the basis that the court cannot be utilised for any oblique purpose and where in the opinion of the court chances of an ultimate conviction are bleak and, therefore, no useful purpose is likely to be served by allowing a criminal prosecution to continue, the court may while taking into consideration the special facts of a case also quash the proceeding even though it may be at a preliminary stage.
16. The parameters for exercising jurisdiction to interfere with the investigations being carried out by the police were considered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Neeharika Infrastructure (P) Ltd. v. State of Maharashtra, (2021) 19 SCC 401:
2021 SCC OnLine SC 315, and it was observed at page 444:
13. From the aforesaid decisions of this Court, right from the decision of the Privy Council in Khwaja Nazir Ahmad [King Emperor v. Khwaja Nazir Ahmad, 1944 SCC OnLine PC 29: (1943-44) 71 IA 203: AIR 1945 PC 18], the following principles of law emerge:
13.1. The police have the statutory right and duty under the relevant provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure contained in Chapter XIV of the Code to investigate into cognizable offences.
13.2. Courts would not thwart any investigation into the cognizable offences.
13.3. However, in cases where no cognizable offence or offence of any kind is disclosed in the first information report, the Court will not permit an investigation to go on.::: Downloaded on - 30/06/2025 21:21:11 :::CIS
15( 2025:HHC:20447 ) 13.4. The power of quashing should be exercised sparingly with circumspection, in the "rarest of rare cases". (The rarest of rare cases standard in its application for .
quashing under Section 482CrPC is not to be confused with the norm which has been formulated in the context of the death penalty, as explained previously by this Court.) 13.5. While examining an FIR/complaint, quashing of which is sought, the Court cannot embark upon an enquiry as to the reliability or genuineness or otherwise of the allegations made in the FIR/complaint.
13.6. Criminal proceedings ought not to be scuttled at the initial stage.
13.7. Quashing of a complaint/FIR should be an exception and a rarity rather than an ordinary rule.
13.8. Ordinarily, the courts are barred from usurping the jurisdiction of the police, since the two organs of the State operate in two specific spheres of activity. The inherent power of the court is, however, recognised to secure the ends of justice or prevent the above of the process by Section 482CrPC.
13.9. The functions of the judiciary and the police are complementary, not overlapping.
13.10. Save in exceptional cases where non-interference would result in the miscarriage of justice, the Court and the judicial process should not interfere at the stage of investigation of offences.
13.11. Extraordinary and inherent powers of the Court do not confer an arbitrary jurisdiction on the Court to act according to its whims or caprice.
13.12. The first information report is not an encyclopaedia which must disclose all facts and details relating to the offence reported. Therefore, when the investigation by the police is in progress, the court should not go into the merits of the allegations in the FIR. Police must be permitted to complete the investigation. It would be ::: Downloaded on - 30/06/2025 21:21:11 :::CIS 16( 2025:HHC:20447 ) premature to pronounce the conclusion based on hazy facts that the complaint/FIR does not deserve to be investigated or that it amounts to an abuse of process of .
law. During or after the investigation, if the investigating officer finds that there is no substance in the application made by the complainant, the investigating officer may file an appropriate report/summary before the learned Magistrate, which may be considered by the learned Magistrate in accordance with the known procedure. 13.13. The power under Section 482CrPC is very wide, but the conferment of wide power requires the Court to be cautious. It casts an onerous and more diligent duty on the Court.
13.14. However, at the same time, the Court, if it thinks fit, regard being had to the parameters of quashing and the self-restraint imposed by law, more particularly the parameters laid down by this Court in R.P. Kapur [R.P. Kapur v. State of Punjab, 1960 SCC OnLine SC 21: AIR 1960 SC 866] and Bhajan Lal [State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335: 1992 SCC (Cri) 426], has the jurisdiction to quash the FIR/complaint.
13.15. When a prayer for quashing the FIR is made by the alleged accused, the Court when it exercises the power under Section 482CrPC, only has to consider whether or not the allegations in the FIR disclose the commission of a cognizable offence and is not required to consider on merits whether the allegations make out a cognizable offence or not and the court has to permit the investigating agency/police to investigate the allegations in the FIR.
17. It was held in State of Karnataka v. L. Muniswamy (1977) 2 SCC 699: 1977 SCC (Cri) 404 that the High Court can quash the criminal proceedings if they amount to an abuse of the process of the Court. It was observed at page 703:
::: Downloaded on - 30/06/2025 21:21:11 :::CIS17( 2025:HHC:20447 ) "7. ... In the exercise of this wholesome power, the High Court is entitled to quash a proceeding if it comes to the conclusion that allowing the proceeding to continue .
would be an abuse of the process of the Court or that the ends of justice require that the proceeding ought to be quashed. The saving of the High Court's inherent powers, both in civil and criminal matters, is designed to achieve a salutary public purpose, which is that a court proceeding ought not to be permitted to degenerate into a weapon of harassment or persecution. In a criminal case, the veiled object behind a lame prosecution, the very nature of the material on which the structure of the prosecution rests, and the like would justify the High Court in quashing the proceeding in the interest of justice. The ends of justice are higher than the ends of mere law, though justice has got to be administered according to laws made by the legislature. The compelling necessity for making these observations is that without a proper realisation of the object and purpose of the provision which seeks to save the inherent powers of the High Court to do justice, between the State and its subjects, it would be impossible to appreciate the width and contours of that salient jurisdiction."
18. The term abuse of the process was explained in Chandran Ratnaswami v. K.C. Palanisamy, (2013) 6 SCC 740:
(2014) 1 SCC (Cri) 447: 2013 SCC OnLine SC 450 at page 761:
33. The doctrine of abuse of process of court and the remedy of refusal to allow the trial to proceed is a well-
established and recognised doctrine both by the English courts and courts in India. There are some established principles of law which bar the trial when there appears to be an abuse of the process of the court.
34. Lord Morris in Connelly v. Director of Public Prosecutions [1964 AC 1254 : (1964) 2 WLR 1145 : (1964) 2 All ER 401 (HL)], observed: (AC pp. 1301-02) ::: Downloaded on - 30/06/2025 21:21:11 :::CIS 18( 2025:HHC:20447 ) "There can be no doubt that a court which is endowed with a particular jurisdiction has powers which are necessary to enable it to act effectively within such .
jurisdiction. ... A court must enjoy such powers in order to enforce its rules of practice and to suppress any abuses of its process and to defeat any attempted thwarting of its process.
*** The power (which is inherent in a court's jurisdiction) to prevent abuses of its process and to control its own procedure must in a criminal court include a power to safeguard an accused person from oppression or prejudice."
In his separate pronouncement, Lord Delvin in the same case observed that where particular criminal proceedings constitute an abuse of process, the court is empowered to refuse to allow the indictment to proceed to trial.
35. In Hui Chi-ming v. R. [(1992) 1 AC 34 : (1991) 3 WLR 495 : (1991) 3 All ER 897 (PC)], the Privy Council defined the word "abuse of process" as something so unfair and wrong with the prosecution that the court should not allow a prosecutor to proceed with what is, in all other respects, a perfectly supportable case.
36. In the leading case of R. v. Horseferry Road Magistrates' Court, ex p Bennett [(1994) 1 AC 42 : (1993) 3 WLR 90 : (1993) 3 All ER 138 (HL)], on the application of the abuse of process, the court confirms that an abuse of process justifying the stay of prosecution could arise in the following circumstances:
(i) where it would be impossible to give the accused a fair trial; or
(ii) where it would amount to misuse/manipulation of the process because it offends the court's sense of justice and propriety to be asked to try the accused in the circumstances of the particular case.::: Downloaded on - 30/06/2025 21:21:11 :::CIS
19( 2025:HHC:20447 )
37. In R. v. Derby Crown Court, ex p Brooks [(1984) 80 Cr App R 164 (DC)], Lord Chief Justice Ormrod stated:
"It may be an abuse of process if either (a) the .
prosecution has manipulated or misused the process of the court so as to deprive the defendant of a protection provided by law or to take unfair advantage of a technicality, or (b) on the balance of probability the defendant has been, or will be, prejudiced in the preparation of conduct of his defence by delay on the part of the prosecution which is unjustifiable."
38. Neill, L.J. in R. v. Beckford (Anthony) [(1996) 1 Cr App R 94: 1995 RTR 251 (CA)], observed that:
"The jurisdiction to stay can be exercised in many different circumstances. Nevertheless, two main strands can be detected in the authorities: (a) cases where the court concludes that the defendant cannot receive a fair trial; (b) cases where the court concludes that it would be unfair for the defendant to be tried."
What is unfair and wrong will be for the court to determine on the individual facts of each case.
19. It was held in Mahmood Ali v. State of U.P., (2023) 15 SCC 488: 2023 SCC OnLine SC 950 that where the proceedings are frivolous or vexatious, the Court owes a duty to quash them.
However, the Court cannot appreciate the material while exercising jurisdiction under Section 482 of CrPC. It was observed at page 498:
13. In frivolous or vexatious proceedings, the Court owes a duty to look into many other attending circumstances emerging from the record of the case over and above the averments and, if need be, with due care and circumspection try to read in between the lines. The Court ::: Downloaded on - 30/06/2025 21:21:11 :::CIS 20( 2025:HHC:20447 ) while exercising its jurisdiction under Section 482CrPC or Article 226 of the Constitution need not restrict itself only to the stage of a case but is empowered to take into .
account the overall circumstances leading to the initiation/registration of the case as well as the materials collected in the course of investigation. Take for instance the case on hand. Multiple FIRs have been registered over a period of time. It is in the background of such circumstances the registration of multiple FIRs assumes importance, thereby attracting the issue of wreaking vengeance out of private or personal grudge as alleged.
14. State of A.P. v. Golconda Linga Swamy [State of A.P. v. Golconda Linga Swamy, (2004) 6 SCC 522: 2004 SCC (Cri) 1805], a two-judge Bench of this Court elaborated on the types of materials the High Court can assess to quash an FIR. The Court drew a fine distinction between consideration of materials that were tendered as evidence and appreciation of such evidence. Only such material that manifestly fails to prove the accusation in the FIR can be considered for quashing an FIR. The Court held :
(Golconda Linga Swamy case [State of A.P. v. Golconda Linga Swamy, (2004) 6 SCC 522: 2004 SCC (Cri) 1805], SCC p. 527, paras 5-7) "5. ... Authority of the court exists for the advancement of justice and if any attempt is made to abuse that authority so as to produce injustice, the court has power to prevent such abuse. It would be an abuse of the process of the court to allow any action which would result in injustice and prevent the promotion of justice. In the exercise of the powers court would be justified to quash any proceeding if it finds that initiation or continuance of it amounts to abuse of the process of court or quashing of these proceedings would otherwise serve the ends of justice. When no offence is disclosed by the complaint, the court may examine the question of fact. When a complaint is sought to be quashed, it is permissible to look into the materials to assess what the complainant has alleged and ::: Downloaded on - 30/06/2025 21:21:11 :::CIS 21( 2025:HHC:20447 ) whether any offence is made out even if the allegations are accepted in toto.
6. In R.P. Kapur v. State of Punjab [R.P. Kapur v. State of .
Punjab, 1960 SCC OnLine SC 21: AIR 1960 SC 866], this Court summarised some categories of cases where inherent power can and should be exercised to quash the proceedings : (SCC OnLine SC para 6)
(i) where it manifestly appears that there is a legal bar against the institution or continuance e.g. want of sanction;
(ii) where the allegations in the first information report or complaint taken at its face value and accepted in their entirety do not constitute the offence alleged;
(iii) where the allegations constitute an offence, but there is no legal evidence adduced or the evidence adduced clearly or manifestly fails to prove the charge.
7. In dealing with the last category, it is important to bear in mind the distinction between a case where there is no legal evidence or where there is evidence which is clearly inconsistent with the accusations made, and a case where there is legal evidence which, on appreciation, may or may not support the accusations. When exercising jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code, the High Court would not ordinarily embark upon an enquiry whether the evidence in question is reliable or not or whether on a reasonable appreciation of it, accusation would not be sustained. That is the function of the trial Judge. The judicial process, no doubt should not be an instrument of oppression, or, needless harassment. The court should be circumspect and judicious in exercising discretion and should take all relevant facts and circumstances into consideration before issuing the process, lest it would be an instrument in the hands of a private complainant to unleash vendetta to harass any person needlessly. At the same time, the section is not an instrument handed ::: Downloaded on - 30/06/2025 21:21:11 :::CIS 22( 2025:HHC:20447 ) over to an accused to short-circuit a prosecution and bring about its sudden death."(emphasis supplied)
20. In the present case, a perusal of the FIR shows that the .
petitioner had taken the apple crop from the informant and other persons with a promise to pay the money. The fact that he absconded after taking the apple crop shows that he never intended to honour the promise. It is not a case where a person is unable to pay the amount due to financial difficulties or other reasons, but a case where the petitioner absconded after receiving the apple crop from the informant and other persons. These allegations prima facie show a dishonest intention which led the growers to hand over their apple crop to the petitioner and constitute the commission of a cognizable offence.
21. It was submitted that the dispute between the parties was civil, and the registration of the FIR was impermissible. There can be no dispute with the proposition of law that the civil dispute cannot be turned into criminal proceedings1, however, it does not mean that no civil action can give rise to a criminal action. Professor Glanville Williams explained in his celebrated book Learning the Law (Tenth Edition, Stevens and Sons) that the facts by themselves cannot determine civil or criminal liability. The same set of facts may give 1 G. Sagar Suri v. State of U.P., (2000) 2 SCC 636, A.M. Mohan v. State, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 339, Sachin Garg v. State of U.P., 2024 SCC OnLine SC 82, and Naresh Kumar v. State of Karnataka, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 268.
::: Downloaded on - 30/06/2025 21:21:11 :::CIS23( 2025:HHC:20447 ) rise to criminal or civil liability. The distinction between the two is not the nature of the act but the nature of the proceedings that are taken .
to seek redressal. It was observed:
"The distinction between a crime and a civil wrong, though capable of giving rise to some difficult legal problems, is in essence quite simple. The first thing to understand is that the distinction does not reside in the nature of the wrongful act itself. This can quite simply be proved by pointing out that the same act may be both a crime and a civil wrong. Occasionally, at a bus station, there is someone who makes a living by looking after people's impedimenta while they are shopping. If I entrust my bag to such a person, and he runs off with it, he commits the crime of theft and also two civil wrongs--the tort of conversion and a breach of his contract with me to keep the bag safe. The result is that two sorts of legal proceedings can be taken against him: a prosecution for the crime, and a civil action for the tort and the breach of contract. (Of course, the plaintiff in the latter action will not get damages twice over merely because he has two causes of action; he will get only one set of damages.) To take another illustration, if a railway signalman, to dumb forgetfulness a prey, fails to pull the lever at the right moment, and a fatal accident occurs on the line, his carelessness may be regarded as sufficiently gross to amount to the crime of manslaughter, and it is also the tort of negligence towards the victims of the accident and their dependents and a breach of his contract with the Railway Executive to take due care in his work. It will be noticed that this time, the right of action in tort and the right of action in a contract are vested in different persons. These examples show that the distinction between a crime and civil wrong cannot be stated as depending upon what is done, because what is done may be the same in each case. The true distinction resides, therefore, not in the nature of the wrongful act but in the legal consequences that may follow. If the wrongful act is capable of being followed by what are called criminal proceedings, that means that it is regarded as a crime ::: Downloaded on - 30/06/2025 21:21:11 :::CIS 24( 2025:HHC:20447 ) (otherwise called an offence). If it is capable of being followed by civil proceedings, that means that it is regarded as a civil wrong. If it is capable of being followed by both, it is both a .
crime and a civil wrong. Criminal and civil proceedings are (in the normal case) easily distinguishable: the procedure is different, the outcome is different, and the terminology is different."
22. The Hon'ble Supreme Court also held in Randheer Singh v.
State of U.P., (2021) 14 SCC 626: 2021 SCC OnLine SC 942, that a given set of facts may make out a civil wrong as well as the criminal offence and mere availability of civil remedies is no ground to quash the criminal proceedings. It was observed:
"34. The given set of facts may make out a civil wrong as well as a criminal offence. Only because a civil remedy is available may not be a ground to quash criminal proceedings. But as observed above, in this case, no criminal offence has been made out in the FIR read with the chargesheet so far as this appellant is concerned. The other accused, Rajan Kumar, has died."
23. A similar view was taken in V.R. Dalal v. Yougendra Naranji Thakkar, (2008) 15 SCC 625, wherein it was observed: -
"13. It may be true that in the event the court finds that the dispute between the parties is civil in nature, it may not allow the criminal proceedings to go on. But, no law, in our opinion, as such can be laid down as in a given case both civil suit and criminal complaint would be maintainable although the cause of action for both the proceedings is the same."
24. It was laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Puneet Beriwala Vs. State 2025 SCC OnLine SC 983 that simply because a remedy is provided under the civil law cannot lead to an inference that ::: Downloaded on - 30/06/2025 21:21:11 :::CIS 25( 2025:HHC:20447 ) resort cannot be had to the criminal law or that the civil law remedy is the only remedy available to the parties. It was observed:
.
28. It is trite law that the mere institution of civil proceedings is not a ground for quashing the FIR or to hold that the dispute is merely a civil dispute. This Court in various judgments, has held that simply because there is a remedy provided for breach of contract, that does not by itself clothe the Court to conclude that civil remedy is the only remedy, and the initiation of criminal proceedings, in any manner, will be an abuse of the process of the court. This Court is of the view that because the offence was committed during a commercial transaction, it would not be sufficient to hold that the complaint did not warrant a further investigation and, if necessary, a trial.
[See: Syed Aksari Hadi Ali Augustine Imam v. State (Delhi Admin.), (2009) 5 SCC 528, Lee Kun Hee v. State of UP, (2012) 3 SCC 132 and Trisuns Chemicals v. Rajesh Aggarwal, (1999) 8 SCC 686]
25. Therefore, the FIR cannot be quashed because civil remedy is available to the informant for the recovery of the money.
26. It is undisputed that the police have filed the charge-sheet before the learned Trial Court, hence, the learned Trial Court is seized of the matter. It was laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Iqbal v. State of U.P., (2023) 8 SCC 734: 2023 SCC OnLine SC 949 that when the charge sheet has been filed, the learned Trial Court should be left to appreciate the same. It was observed:
"At the same time, we also take notice of the fact that the investigation has been completed and the charge sheet is ready to be filed. Although the allegations levelled in the FIR do not inspire any confidence, particularly in the absence of any ::: Downloaded on - 30/06/2025 21:21:11 :::CIS 26( 2025:HHC:20447 ) specific date, time, etc. of the alleged offences, we are of the view that the appellants should prefer a discharge application before the trial court under Section 227 of the Code of Criminal .
Procedure (CrPC). We say so because even according to the State, the investigation is over and the charge sheet is ready to be filed before the competent court. In such circumstances, the trial court should be allowed to look into the materials which the investigating officer might have collected forming part of the charge sheet. If any such discharge application is filed, the trial court shall look into the materials and take a call whether any discharge case is made out or not."
27. No other point was urged.
28. Consequently, the present petition fails, and the same is dismissed and so also the pending miscellaneous applications, if any.
29. The observation made herein before shall remain confined to the disposal of the petition and will have no bearing whatsoever on the merits of the case.
(Rakesh Kainthla) Judge 30th June, 2025 (veena) ::: Downloaded on - 30/06/2025 21:21:11 :::CIS