Rajeev Sharma vs Pradeep Kumar on 28 March, 2025

[Cites 46, Cited by 0]

Himachal Pradesh High Court

Rajeev Sharma vs Pradeep Kumar on 28 March, 2025

( 2025:HHC:9529 ) IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA Cr. Revision No.342 of 2024 Reserved on : 17.03.2025 Decided on : 28.03.2025 Rajeev Sharma ...Petitioner Versus Pradeep Kumar ...Respondent Coram The Hon'ble Mr. Justice Virender Singh, Judge. Whether approved for reporting?1 Yes.

For the petitioner : Mr. Ashok Sharma, Senior Advocate with Ms. Anubhuti Sharma, Advocate.

For the respondent : Mr. Vinod Thakur, Advocate.

Virender Singh, Judge PetitionerRajeev Sharma has filed the present revision petition, under Section 397 read with Section 401 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (hereinafter referred to as the 'Cr.PC') against the orders dated 05.02.2024 and 30.03.2024, passed by the Court of learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Hamirpur, District Hamirpur, H.P. (hereinafter referred to as the 'trial Court'), in Case No.51I14 RBT 106I2019, titled as Rajeev Sharma versus Pradeep Kumar.

Whether Reporters of local papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes.

2 ( 2025:HHC:9529 )

2. By way of order dated 05.02.2024, Cr.MA No.264 of 2016, i.e. application, filed by respondent Pradeep Kumar, under Section 45 of the Indian Evidence Act, has been allowed, and Cr.MA No.170 of 2024 i.e. application, filed under Section 311 of Cr.PC, has been dismissed, by the learned trial Court. The order, by way of which, application, under Section 45 of the Indian Evidence Act, has been allowed, is being challenged before this Court.

3. For the sake of convenience, the parties to the present lis are hereinafter referred to, in the same manner, as were, referred to, by the learned trial Court.

4. Brief facts, leading to the filing of the present revision petition, before this Court, may be summed up, as under: 4.1. Complainant Rajeev Sharma, has filed a complaint, under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, (hereinafter referred to as 'the N.I. Act'), regarding cheque No.429788, dated 31.03.2014, amounting to Rs.5,00,000/, drawn on Kangra Central Co 3 ( 2025:HHC:9529 ) operative Bank, Branch Pucca Bharoh168, Hamirpur (hereinafter referred to as 'the cheque in question').

4.2. According to the complainant, the accused owes debt and liability, as such, in order to discharge his legal liability, he has issued the cheque, in question, which, on production, before the banker of the accused, for encashment, was received back, uncashed, with the remarks 'insufficient funds'.

4.3. Thereafter, the requisite legal notice was served and despite service of the notice, when the payment was not made, the complaint was filed before the learned trial Court.

4.4 The learned trial Court, finding a prima facie case, on the basis of the preliminary evidence, passed the summoning order on 26.9.2014. After securing the presence of the accused, the learned trial Court has found sufficient grounds to proceed against the accused for commission of offence, under Section 138 of the N.I. Act.

As such, Notice of Acquisition was put to him vide order dated 03.08.2015, to which, he has not pleaded guilty and claimed trial. Consequently, the complainant was directed 4 ( 2025:HHC:9529 ) to adduce evidence. After closure of the evidence, the case was listed for the statement of accused, under Section 313 of the Cr.PC.

4.5. On 27.07.2016, an application under Section 45 of the Indian Evidence Act was moved by the accused, for expert opinion of handwriting expert regarding signatures of accused on the cheque in question. It has been pleaded that the cheque, in question, be sent to handwriting expert along with signature of the accused.

4.6. According to the accused, the cheque in question, had been lost and in this regard, he had also lodged rapat with Police Station, Hamirpur. According to him, no cheque has ever been issued by the accused in favour of the complainant and the cheque in question does not bear the signature of he accused. Hence, a prayer has been made to allow the application.

4.7. The application has been contested by the complainant by denying the fact that the application is not maintainable, as, the case, at the relevant time, when application, under Section 45 of the Indian Evidence Act, was filed, was listed for recording the statement of 5 ( 2025:HHC:9529 ) accused, under Section 313 Cr.PC and the accused could lead defence evidence, at the appropriate stage.

4.8. The application had further been contested on the ground that the cheque, in question, was returned with the remarks 'insufficient funds' and not on the ground that the signature has not tallied, as such, according to the complainant, no useful purpose would be served by sending the cheque in question to the handwriting expert.

4.9. Learned trial Court, in this case, has allowed the application, on the ground that it was the defence of the accused from the very beginning that the cheque, in question, does not bear his signatures, as such, to corroborate his defence, by getting his signatures compared with the signatures on the cheque, in question, the application was ordered to be allowed.

5. Relevant portion of the order dated 5.2.2024, passed by the learned trial Court, while allowing the application, under Section 45 of the Indian Evidence Act and dismissing the application under Section 311 Cr.PC, moved by the accused, is reproduced, as under : " xxx xxx xxx 6 ( 2025:HHC:9529 ) Thus, from very beginning defence of the accused is that cheque Ext.P.1 involved in the present case does not contain his signatures. In these circumstances accused should be allowed to corroborate his defence by getting his signatures compared with the signatures on the cheque. Thus, present application under Section 45 of Indian Evidence Act is thus allowed. Application after due completion be tagged with main case file for record.

xxx xxx xxx Now to come up for presence of accused before this Court for giving specimen signatures as well as informing the court name of expert who will compare the signatures for 12.02.2024."

6. On 29.02.2024, the learned trial Court has passed the following orders: At this stage, learned counsel for the parties stated that there are chances of compromise in the present case. Let the present case be referred to National Lok Adalat for 09.03.2024. It is hereby clarified that if the compromise is not effected the case shall be taken up for effecting hearing i.e on 22.03.2024 for providing signatures of the accused as well as informing the court name of expert who will compare the signatures. No separate notices will be issued to the parties."

7. Thereafter, on 30.03.2024, the following order, came to be passed by the learned trial Court: "Compromise failed. The learned counsel for the accused stated that Dr. Jassy Anand, private expert be appointed to compare the signature of the accused. The learned counsel for the complainant has objected to appointment of aforementioned person, alleging that he is not a government official The aforementioned objection is discarded as there is no provision in Indian Evidence Act that signature can only be compared by the government expert. Further the complainant will always has an opportunity to cross examine the expert regarding his opinion.Now the accused is directed to file the name and address of the expert by way of affidavit along with his 7 ( 2025:HHC:9529 ) consent and fee instruction for comparing the signatures in the present case for 18.4.2024."

8. The present revision petition has been filed, challenging the orders dated 05.02.2024 and 30.03.2024, on the ground that the learned trial Court fell in error by allowing the application, under Section 45 of the Indian Evidence Act, as, the Court is not supposed to collect evidence on behalf of the parties.

9. Highlighting the fact that no suggestion was even put to the complainantpetitioner qua forging of the cheque in question. It has been contended that it is for the parties to prove their case by leading evidence.

10. On the basis of the above facts, Shri Ashok Sharma, learned Senior Advocate assisted by Ms. Anubhuti Sharma, Advocate has argued that the procedure, which had been adopted by the learned trial Court, while passing the orders impugned herein, is not known to the law.

11. It has also been argued by the learned Senior Counsel that in the application, nothing has been mentioned by the accused, as to which are his admitted signatures and with which signatures, he wants to get the signatures over the cheque in question compared.

8 ( 2025:HHC:9529 )

12. Per contra, it has been argued by Shri Vinod Thakur, learned counsel for the accused that the accused has every right to prove and probabilize his defence, by leading cogent evidence, and that is why the accused had moved the application for comparing his signatures with the signatures, on the cheque, in question. As such, a prayer has been made to dismiss the petition.

13. In addition to this, learned counsel appearing for the accused has raised the objection, with regard to maintainability of the petition, by arguing that the orders impugned herein, fall within the definition of interlocutory orders.

14. So far as the objection raised by the learned counsel for the accused qua the maintainability of the present petition, before this Court, is concerned, the learned trial Court, in the present case, has allowed the application filed under Section 45 of the Evidence Act, by virtue of which, a prayer has been made to compare the signatures over the cheque, in question, with the signatures of the accused.

9 ( 2025:HHC:9529 )

15. The petitioner is before this Court, by way of the present petition, filed under Section 397, read with Section 401 Cr.PC. The provisions of Section 397 Cr.PC, are reproduced, as under: Section 397 - Calling for records to exercise powers of revision (1) The High Court or any Sessions Judge may call for and examine the record of any proceeding before any inferior Criminal Court situate within its or his local jurisdiction for the purpose of satisfying itself or himself as to the correctness, legality or propriety of any finding. Sentence or order, recorded or passed, and as to the regularity of any proceedings of such inferior Court, and may, when calling for such record, direct that the execution of any sentence or order be suspended, and if the accused is in confinement, that he be released on bail or on his own bond pending the examination of the record.

Explanation-All Magistrates, whether Executive or Judicial, and whether exercising original or appellate jurisdiction, shall be deemed to be inferior to the Sessions Judge for the purposes of this SubSection and of section

398. The powers of revision conferred by SubSection (1) shall not be exercised in relation to any interlocutory order passed in any appeal, inquiry, trial or other proceeding.

If an application under this section has been made by any person either to the High Court or to the Sessions Judge, no further application by the same person shall be entertained by the other of them.

10 ( 2025:HHC:9529 )

16. The term 'interlocutory order' has no where been defined in the Cr.PC (now BNSS). The Hon'ble Supreme Court in a case Mohanlal Manganlal versus State of Gujarat, AIR 1968 Supreme Court 733, has elaborately discussed the terms 'final order' and 'interlocutory order'. Relevant paragraphs 4, 5, 7 and 15 of the judgment, are reproduced, as under:

4. The question as to whether a judgment or an order is final or not has been the subject matter of a number of decisions; yet no single general test for finality has so far been laid down. The reason probably is that a judgment or order may be final for one purpose and interlocutory for another or final as to part and interlocutory as to part. The meaning of the two words "final" and .'interlocutory" has, therefore, to be considered separately in relation to the particular purpose for which it is required. However, generally speaking. a judgment or order which determines the principal matter in question is termed final. It may be final although it directs enquiries or is made on an interlocutory application or reserves liberty to apply. (1) In some of the English decisions where this question arose, one or the other of the following four tests was applied.

1. Was the order made upon an application such that a decision in favour of either party would determine the main dispute ?

2. Was it made upon an application upon which the main dispute could have been decided?

3. Does the order as made determine the dispute?

11 ( 2025:HHC:9529 )

4. If the order in question is reversed, would the action have to go on?

5. The first test was applied in Salaman v. Warner(2) and Stan dard Discount Co. v. La Grange(3). But the reasoning in the latter case was disapproved in A.G. v. Great Eastern Rail Co.(4). In Shutrook v. Tufnell(5) the order did not decide the matter in the litigation but referred it back to the arbitrator, though on the application on which it was made, a final determination might have been made. The order was held to be final. This was approved in Bozson v. Altrincham Urban Council( 6) by Lord Halsbury who declined to follow the dictum in Salaman v. Warner(2) and Lord Alverstone stated the test as follows : "Does the judgment or order as made finally dispose of the rights of the parties? This test, however, does not seem to have been applied in A. G. v. Great Eastern Urban Council(6) where an order made on an application for summary judgment under R.S.C. Ord. 14 refusing unconditional leave to defend was held not to be an interlocutory order for purposes of appeal though made on an interlocutory application. An interlocutory order, though not conclusive of the main dispute may be conclusive as to the subordinate matter with which it deals.

7. But these were cases where the impugned orders were passed in appeals or revisions and. since an appeal or a revision is continuation of the original suit or proceeding the test applied was whether the order disposed of the original suit or proceeding. If it did not, and the suit or proceeding was a live one, vet to be tried. the order was held not to be final. Different tests have been applied. however to orders made in proceedings independent of the original or the main proceedings. Thus in Premchand Sastramdasv. The State of Bihar an order of the High Court dismissing an application to direct 12 ( 2025:HHC:9529 ) the Board of Revenue to state a case to the High Court under the Bihar Salestax Act, 1944, was held not to be a final order on two grounds : (1) that the order was made under a jurisdiction which was consultative and standing by itself, it did not bind or affect the rights of the parties though the ultimate order which would be passed by the Board would be based on the opinion expressed by the High Court, and (2) that on a construction of Art. 31 of the Letters Patent of the High Court of Patna an appeal would lie to the Privy Council only in cases of orders passed by the High Court in its appellate or original jurisdiction and not the advisory jurisdiction conferred by the Act. It is clear that though the proceeding in which the High Court passed the impugned order may be said to be an independent proceeding, one of the tests applied was that it did not determine the rights of the parties as the controversy as to the liability of the assessee still remained to be determined by the Board. The decision in State of Uttar Pradesh v. Sujan Singh(1) does not help because the proceeding in which the impugned order was passed was assumed to be an interlocutory one arising from and during the course of the trial itself. The question was whether the order rejecting the State's claim of privilege from producing a certain document was a final order within the meaning of Art. 134(1)

(c). The criminal proceedings, said the Court, were the proceedings against the respondents for an offence under s. 6(1) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947. They were still pending before the Special Judge. In the course of those proceedings the respondents applied for the production of the document by the Union Government and that was allowed by the Court. The order, therefore , was an interlocutory order pending the said proceedings. It did not purport to decide the rights of the parties i.e. the State of Uttar Pradesh and the respondents, the accused. It only enabled the accused to have the said document proved and exhibited in the case 13 ( 2025:HHC:9529 ) and therefore was a procedural step for adducing evidence. The court also said that assuming that the order decided some right of the Union Government, that Government was neither a party to the criminal proceedings nor a party either before the High Court or this Court. This decision was clearly on the footing that the respondents' application for production of the document in which the Union Government, not a party to the trial, claimed privilege was an interlocutory and not an independent proceeding. The question is what would be the position if (a) the application was an independent proceeding, and (b) if it affected the right of the Union Government.

xxx xxx xxx 15 In a civil proceeding, an order is final if it finally decides the rights of the parties, see Ramchand Manjilal v. Goverdhandas Vishindas Ratanchand. If it does not finally decide the rights of the parties the order is interlocutory, though it conclusively determines some subordinate matter and disposes of the proceeding in which the subordinate matter is in controversy. For this reason, even an order setting aside an award is interlocutory, fee Croasdell and Cammell Laird & Co., Limited v. In re, (1906) 2 KB 569. A similar test has been applied for determining whether an order ill a criminal proceeding is final, see S. Kuppuswami Rao v. The King(:'). For the purposes of this appeal, we do not propose to examine all the decisions cited at the bar and to formulate a fresh test on the subject. Whatever test is applied, an order directing the filing of a complaint and deciding that there is a prima facie case for an enquiry into an offence is not a final order. It is merely a preliminary step in the prosecution and therefore an interlocutory order. As the order is not final, the High Court was not competent to give a certificate under Art. 1 34 (1)

14 ( 2025:HHC:9529 )

17. The Hon'ble Federal Court of India, in S. Kuppuswami Rao versus The King, MANU/FE/0001/ 1947, has also interpreted the term 'final order'.

Paragraphs 6 to 9 of the judgment, are reproduced, as under:

6. The question then is what is the meaning of "judgment, decree or final order of a High Court" in this section? The expression "final order" has been judicially interpreted and its meaning is now well settled. In Salaman v. Warner1 , Lord Esher, M.R. discussed the meaning of the expression, "final order" in these terms:

If their decision, whichever way it is given, will, if it stands, finally dispose of the matter in dispute, I "think that for the purposes of these rules it is final. On the other hand, if their decision, if given in one way, will finally dispose of the matter in dispute, but, if given in the other, will allow the action to go on, then I think it is not final, but interlocutory.

Fry, L.J. remarked as follows:

I conceive that an order is 'final' only where it is made upon an application or other proceeding which must, whether such application or other proceeding fail or succeed, determine the action. Conversely I think that an order is 'interlocutory' where it cannot be affirmed that in either event the action will be determined.

Lopes, L.J. said as follows:

I think that a judgment or order would be final within the meaning of the rules, when, whichever way it went, it would finally determine the rights of the parties. 15 ( 2025:HHC:9529 ) In Bozson v. The Altrincham Urban Lord Alverstone, C.J. held that the real test for determining the question was:

Does the judgment or order, as made, finally dispose of the rights of the parties?

7. In Ramchand Manjimal v. Goverdhandas Vishandas Ratanchand3 , the question was in respect of a stay granted under Section 19, Arbitration Act, IX of 1899. The trial Judge granted a stay, but on appeal the Court of the Judicial Commissioner of Sind reversed the order The Judicial Commissioner granted a certificate under Section 109, Civil Procedure Code on the footing that the order passed by him was a final order. On appeal the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council pointed out that the order in question was not a final order and the preliminary objection against the sustenance of the appeal was upheld. Viscount Cave, in delivering the judgment of the Board, observed as follows:

The question as to what is a final order was considered by the Court of Appeal in the case of Salaman v. Warner, (1891) 1 QB. 734(Suupra), Bozson v. The Altrincham Urban, District Council No. (J) (1903) 1 K.B. 547(Supra) and Issacs v. Salbestien, The effect of these and other judgments is that an order is final if it finally disposes of the rights of the parties. The orders now under appeal do not finally dispose of those rights, but leave them to be determined by the Courts in the ordinary way.

These observations show that the Judicial Committee considered that the words used in the abovementioned three English decisions gave the same meaning to the expression " final order", and adopted the definition as given by Lord Esher M.R. in 16 ( 2025:HHC:9529 ) Salaman's case (1891) 1 Q.B. 734. The Judicial Committee further held that when the effect of the order was to leave the rights to be determined by the Court in the ordinary way, the order was not a final order.

8. In Abdul Rahman v. D.K. Cassim & Sons5 , Sir George Lowndes, in delivering the judgment of the Judicial Committee, stated that the test of finality was whether the order finally disposed of the rights of the parties. Referring to Ramchand Manjimal's case A.I.R. (7) 1920 P.C. 86 he observed as follows:

Lord Cave in delivering the judgment of the Board laid down, as the result of an examination of certain cases decided in the English Courts, that the test of finality is whether the order 'finally disposes of the rights of the parties', and he held that the order then under appeal did not finally dispose of those rights, but left them 'to be determined by the Courts in the ordinary way'. It should be noted that the Appellate Court in India was of opinion that the order it had made 'went to the root of the suit, namely the jurisdiction of the Court to entertain it', and it was for this reason that the order was thought to be final and the certificate granted. But this was not sufficient. The finality must be a finality in relation to the suit. If, after the order, the suit is still a live suit in which the rights of the parties have still to be determined, no appeal lies against it under Section 109(a) of the Code.

Sir George Lowndes further added:

In their Lordships' opinion it is impossible to distinguish the present case from that upon which Lord Cave pronounced. The effect of the order from which it is here sought to appeal was not to dispose finally of the 17 ( 2025:HHC:9529 ) rights of the parties. It no doubt decided an important, and even a vital, issue in the case, but it left the suit alive, and provided for its trial in the ordinary way.

9. In Hori Ram Singh v. The Grown6 , it was contended that Section 205, was limited to appeals in civil cases only. The Court rejected that contention. Sulaiman J., after rejecting the contention, further considered the meaning of the words "

judgment, decree and final order" in Section 205(1), Constitution Act. The words "final order" were used in Section 109, Civil Procedure Code That section prescribes conditions under which an appeal lies to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council from a decree or final order passed on appeal by a High Court. It was noticed that the words "final order" were used in contrast with interlocutory order. The learned Judge took the view that in cases in which the decision of the point in dispute either way did not result in finally disposing of the matter before the Court, the decision did not amount to a final order. In that case, as noted in the judgment of Varadachariar J. no objection was taken on behalf of the Crown to the maintainability of the appeal and the majority of the Judges therefore dealt with the case on the assumption that an appeal was competent."

18. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in Madhu Limaye versus The State of Maharashtra, (1977) 4 Supreme Court Cases 551, has again explained the meaning of 'interlocutory order'. Paragraphs 10 and 14 of the judgment, are reproduced, as under: 18 ( 2025:HHC:9529 ) "10. As pointed out in Amar Nath's case (supra) the purpose of putting a bar on the power of revision in relation to any interlocutory order passed in an appeal, inquiry, trial or other proceeding is to bring about expeditious disposal of the cases finally, More often than not, the revisional power of the High Court was resorted to in relation to interlocutory orders delaying the final disposal of the proceedings. The Legislature in its wisdom decided to check this delay by introducing subsection (2), in section

397. On the one hand, a bar has been put in the way of the High Court (as also of the Sessions Judge) for exercise of the revisional power in relation to any interlocutory order, on the other, the power has been conferred in almost the same terms as it was in the 1898 Code. On a plain reading of section 482, however, it would follow that nothing in the Code, which would include subsection (2) of section 397 also, "shall be deemed to limit or affect the inherent powers of the High Court". But, if we were to say that the said bar is not to operate in the exercise of the inherent power at all, it will be setting at naught one of the limitations imposed upon the exercise of the revisional powers. In such a situation, what isthe harmonious way out ? In our opinion, a happy solution of this problem would be to say that the bar provided in sub section (2) of section 397 operates only in exercise of the revisional power of the High Court, meaning thereby that the High Court will have no power of revision in relation to any interlocutory order. Then in accordance with one of the other principles enunciated above, the inherent power will come into play, there being no other provision in the Code for the redress of the grievance of the aggrieved party. But then, if the order assailed is purely of an interlocutory character which could be corrected in exercise of the revisional power of the High Court under the 1898 Code. the High Court will refuse to exercise its inherent power. But in case the impugned order clearly brings about a situation which is 19 ( 2025:HHC:9529 ) an abuse of the process of the Court or for the purpose of securing the ends of justice interference by the High Court is absolutely necessary, then nothing contained in section 397(2) can limit or affect the exercise of the inherent power by the High Court. But such cases would be few and far between. The High Court must exercise the inherent power very sparingly. One such case would be the desirability of the quashing of, a criminal proceeding initiated illegally, vexatiously or as being without jurisdiction. Take for example a case where a prosecution is launched under the Prevention of Corruption Act without a sanction. then the trial of the accused will be without jurisdiction and even after his acquittal a second trial after proper sanction will not be barred on the doctrine of Autrefois Acquit. Even assuming, although we shall presently show that it is not so, that in such a case an order of the Court taking cognizance or issuing processes is an interlocutory order. does it stand to reason to say that inherent power of the High Court cannot be exercised for stopping the criminal proceeding as early as possible, instead of harassing the accused upto the end ? The answer is obvious that the bar will not operate to prevent the abuse of the process of the Court and/or to secure, the ends of justice. The label of the petition filed by an aggrieved party is immaterial. The High Court can examine the matter in an appropriate case under its inherent powers. The present case undoubtedly falls for exercise of the power of the High Court in accordance with section 482 of the 1973 Code. even assuming. although not accepting, that invoking the revisional power of the High Court is impermissible.

xxx xxx xxx

14. In passing, for the sake of explaining ourselves, we may refer to what has been said by Kania C. J. in Kuppuswami's case at page 187 by quoting a few words from Sir George 20 ( 2025:HHC:9529 ) Lowndes in the case of Abdul Rahman V. D. K. Cassim and Sons(3). The learned law Lord said with reference to the order under consideration in that case : "The effect of the order from which it is here sought to appeal was not to dispose finally of the rights of the parties. It no doubt decided an important, and even a vital, issue in the case, but it left the suit alive, and provided for its trial in the ordinary way. Many a time a question (1) [187677] 2 A.C. 743. (3) [1933] 60 Indian Appeals, 76. (2) [1957] S.C.R. 930. arose in India as to what is the exact meaning of the phrase "case decided"

occurring in Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Some High Courts had taken the view that it meant the final order passed on final determination of the action. Many others had however, opined that even interlocutory orders were covered by the said term. This Court struck a mean and it did not approve of either of the two extreme lines. In Baldevdas v. Filmistan Distributors (India) Pvt. Ltd.(1) it has been pointed out :

"A case may be said to be decided, if the Court adjudicates for the purposes of the suit some right or obligation of the parties in controversy :"

We may give a clear example of an order in a civil case which may not be a final order within the meaning of Article 133 (1) of the Constitution, yet it will not be purely or simply of an interlocutory character. Suppose for example, a defendant raises the plea of jurisdiction of a particular Court to try the suit or the bar of limitation and succeeds, then the action is determined finally in that Court. But if the point is decided against him the suit proceeds. Of course, in a given case the point raised may be such that it is interwoven and interconnected with the other issues in the case, and that it may not be possible to decide it under Order 14 Rule 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure as I preliminary point of law. But, if it is a pure point 21 ( 2025:HHC:9529 ) of law and is decided one way or the other, then the order deciding such a point may not be interlocutory, albeitmay not be final either. Surely, it will be a case decided, as pointed out by this Court in some decisions, within the meaning of section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. We think it would be just and proper to apply the same kind to test for finding out the real meaning of the expression 'interlocutory order' occurring in section 397(2)."

19. Similar view has also been taken by the Hon'ble Supreme Court, in V.C. Shukla versus State through CBI, AIR 1980 Supreme Court 962. Relevant paragraphs 5 to 7, and 30 to 33, of the judgment, are reproduced, as under:

5. It will be important to note that the word 'interlocutory order' used in this subsection relates to various stages of the trial? namely, appeal, inquiry, trial or any other proceeding. The object seems to be to cut down the delays in stages through which a criminal case passes before it culminates in an acquittal, discharge or conviction. So far as the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 is concerned, it has got a wide and diverse area of jurisdiction inasmuch as it regulates the procedure of trial not only of the large number of offences contained in the Indian Penal Code but also in other Acts and statutes which apply the Code of Criminal Procedure or which are statutes in pari material the Code. Having regard, therefore, to the very large ambit and range of the Code, the expression 'interlocutory order' would have to the given a broad meaning so as to achieve the object of the Act without disturbing or interfering with the fairness of the trial. Fortunately, however, there 22 ( 2025:HHC:9529 ) are a few decisions which have interpreted the expression 'interlocutory order' as appearing in s. 397(2) of the Code. Before we come to the decisions, certain features may be noticed here. In the first place, the concept of appeal against interlocutory order seems to be by and large foreign to the scheme of the Code or for that matter the scheme of the Code of Criminal Procedure right from 1872 uptodate. Appeal has been provided only against final orders and not against interlocutory orders. Instead of appeal, the Code of 1898 as also the Code of 1872 contained powers of revision which vested in the High Court to revise any order passed by a criminal court. In the previous Codes, the term 'interlocutory' was not used. Therefore, the revisional jurisdiction was wide enough to embrace within its scope any order whether interlocutory. intermediate or final. Secondly, by virtue of scores of decisions of the various High Courts in India and the Privy Council, it was well settled that the revisional jurisdiction possessed by the Sessions Judge and the High Court could be exercised only to example the legality or propriety of the order impugned and more particularly the Courts; were to interfere only if there was an error of law or procedure. Previous to the Code, the powers of revision enjoyed by the Sessions Judge or the District Magistrate for the Chief Judicial Magistrate through various amendments were rather limited whereas the power of High Court was wide and unlimited. Apart from the revisional power the High Court under the Code of 1898 possessed an inherent power to pass order ex debito justitiae in order to prevent abuse of the process of the court. This was a special power which was to be exercised by the High Court to meet a particular contingency not expressly provided for in the Code of Criminal Procedure. Even in the present Code, the inherent power of the court has been fully retained under sec. 482 which runs thus: 23 ( 2025:HHC:9529 ) "482. Nothing in this Code shall be deemed to limit or affect the inherent powers of the High Court to make such orders as may be necessary to give effect to any order under this Code, or to prevent abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice."

6. One of the questions that arose was as to whether an interlocutory order which could be revised by the Sessions Judge, can be further revised under s. 482 of the Code by the High Court because s. 3.97(3) 1 permitted the power o, revision to be exercised only by the High Court or the Sessions Judge but not by both of them. The limitation contained in s. 397(3) runs as follows: "(3) If an application under this section has been made by any person either to the High Court or to the Sessions Judge, no further application by the same person shall be entertained by the other of them."

Subsection (3), however, does not limit at all the inherent power of the High Court contained in s. 482, as mentioned above. It merely curbs the revisional power given to the High Court or the Sessions Judge under s. 397(1) of the Code. We need not dilate on this aspect because we are not called upon to consider the interpretation of S. 397(3) of the Code, although in one of the cases cited before us this aspect has been gone into and that is why we have indicated the same. Mr. Mridul contended that as the Special Courts Act has fully applied the procedure of the Code to the trial of the offences by the Special Judge, the expression 'interlocutory order' has been used exactly in the same sense as in s. 397(2). In other words, the contention was that s. 11 of the Act is modelled on s. 397(2) of the Code by telescoping subsection (2) of the said section into s. 11(1) of the Act. In support of his contention reliance was placed in the case of Amar Nath & Ors. v. State of Haryana & Ors.(1) and particularly to the following observations made by this Court: 24 ( 2025:HHC:9529 ) "It seems to us that the term 'interlocutory order' in s. 397(2) of the 1973 Code has been used in a restricted sense and not in any broad or artistic sense. It merely denotes orders of a purely interim or temporary nature which do not decide or touch the important rights or the liabilities of the parties. Any order which substantially affects the right of the accused, or decides certain rights of the parties cannot be said to be an interlocutory order so as to bar a revision to the High Court against that order, because that would be against the very object which formed the basis for insertion of this particular provision in s. 397 of the 1973 Code. Thus, for instance, orders summoning witnesses, adjourning cases, passing orders for bail, calling for reports and such other steps in aid of the pending proceeding, may not doubt amount to interlocutory orders against which no revision would lie under s. 397(2) of the 1973 Code. But orders which are matters of moment and which affect or adjudicate the rights of the accused or a particular aspect of the trial cannot be said to be interlocutoryorders so as to be outside the purview of the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court."

In that case, one of us (Fazal Ali, J.) was a party to the decision and spoke for the Court. It is no doubt true that this Court held that an order summoning an accused was not an interlocutory order but being a matter of moment it decided an important aspect of the trial and was, therefore, in a sense a final order which could be revised by the Sessions Judge or the High Court under s. 397 of the Code. The observations made by this Court, however, have to be read in the light of the peculiar facts of the said case. What had happened in that case was that an FIR was lodged at police station Butana, District Karnal, mentioning a number of accused persons as having participated in the occurrence. The police, after holding investigations, submitted a chargesheet against 25 ( 2025:HHC:9529 ) the other accused persons except the appellants before the Supreme Court against whom a final report under s. 173 of the Code was given by the police. Th, report was placed before a Judicial Magistrate, First Class who, after perusing the same, accepted the report and released the appellants. Thereafter the complainant filed a revision before the Additional Sessions Judge against the order of the Judicial Magistrate releasing the appellants but the revision petition was dismissed by the Judge. Thereafter the informant filed a regular complaint before the Judicial Magistrate against all the accused including the appellants. The learned Magistrate after having examined the complaint found that no case against the appellant was established. A further revision was taken up before the Sessions Judge who accepted the revision and directed further inquiry, on receipt of which the Magistrate issued summons to the appellants straightaway. Against this order the appellants went up in revision to the High Court which dismissed the petition in limine, obviously on the ground that the order passed by the Magistrate was an interlocutory one. That is how the matter came up by special leave before this Court. It would thus had been that before the stage of trial of the case reached the appellants had been released by the Magistrate who accepted the final report that no case was made against them. Even a complaint which was in the nature of a protest petition against the final report filed before the Magistrate was also dismissed. When the Magistrate issued summons in pursuance of an order of further inquiry by the Sessions Judge cognizance was taken against the appellants who were ordered to be put on trial because the order summoning the appellants virtually amounted to asking the accused to face the trial. It was in the background of these circumstances that this Court held that such an order being a matter of moment affecting important rights of the parties, 26 ( 2025:HHC:9529 ) could not be said to be purely an interlocutory order. We have no doubt that the decision of this Court, referred to above, was absolutely correct. In fact this part of the decision was endorsed by a later decision of this Court in the case of Madhu Limaye v. The State of Maharashtra The Court observed thus "In Amar Nath's case, as in this, the order of the Trial Court issuing process against the accused was challenged and the High Court was asked to quash the criminal proceeding either in exercise of its inherent power under section 482 of the 1973 Code corresponding to section 561A of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 3898herein after called the 1898 Code or the old Code, or under Section 397(1) of the new Code corresponding to section 435 of the old Code. Two points were decided in Amar Nath's case in the following terms: (1) "While we fully agree with the view taken by the learned Judge that where a revision to the High Court against the order of the Subordinate Judge is expressly barred under subs. (2) of s. 397 of the 1973 Code the inherent powers contained in s. 482 would not be available to defeat the bar contained in s. 397(2)." (2) The impugned order of the Magistrate, however was not an interlocutory order. ............ But we are going to reaffirm the decision of the Court on the second point." G A Division Bench consisting of three Judges held that an order framing a charge was not an interlocutory order and, therefore, a revision against such an order was competent before the Sessions Judge or the High Court. In dwelling on the various shades and aspects of an interlocutory order, Untwalia J. who spoke for the Court, referred to previous decisions of the Court regarding the scope and ambit of a final order in order to highlight the nature and signification of the term 'interlocutory order'. Before analysing the decision, it may be 27 ( 2025:HHC:9529 ) necessary to state the facts on the basis of which the aforesaid decision was rendered. The prosecution case was that in a press conference held at New Delhi on September '7, 1974, the appellant before the Supreme Court is said to have made certain statements and handed over a press handout containing allegedly some defamatory statements regarding Shri A. R. Antulay, the then Law Minister of the Government of Maharashtra. The State Government decided to prosecute the appellant for an offence under s. 500 of the Indian Penal Code after obtaining the necessary sanction under s. 199(4) (a) of the Code. Armed with the sanction, the Public Prosecutor filed a complaint in the court of the Sessions Judge, Greater Bombay. The Sessions Judge took cognizance of the complaint and issued process against the appellant. At the time when the appellant was being heard in the Sessions Court, the allegation against him was resisted on three grounds (1) that the court of Sessions had no jurisdiction to take cognizance of the offence without a formal commitment of the case to it; (2) that the sanction given was bad inasmuch as it was not given by the appointing authority; and (3) that the sanctioning authority had not applied i s E; mind to the facts of the case and accorded sanction in a casual manner. The Sessions Judge rejected all these contentions and framed charges against the appellant under s. 500, I.P.C. Thereafter, the appellant moved the High Court in revision against the order framing the charges. Before the High Court, a preliminary objection as to the maintainability of the revision application was taken. Before proceeding further, it may be observed that the objections taken by the appellant in the aforesaid case related to the root of the jurisdiction of the Sessions Judge 28 ( 2025:HHC:9529 ) and if accepted, would have rendered the entire proceedings void ab initio. The case before this Court was not one based on allegations of fact on which cognizance was taken by a trial court and afterhaving found that a prima facie case was made out a charge was framed against the accused. Even so, the ratio decidendi in the aforesaid case was, in our opinion absolutely correct and we are entirely in agreement with the learned Judges constituting the Bench that the order of the Sessions Judge framing charges, in the circumstances of the case, was not merely an interlocutory order but partook of the nature of a final order or, at any rate, an intermediate order so as to be taken out of the bar contained in s. 397(2) of the Code In that case, Untwalia J., speaking for the Court observed as follows: "It is to be noticed that the test laid down therein was that if the objection of the accused succeeded, the proceeding could have ended but not vice versa. The order can be said to be a final order only if, in either event, the action will be determined. In our opinion, if this strict test were to be applied in interpreting the words 'interlocutory order' occurring in section 397(2), then the order taking cognizance of all offence by a Court, whether it is so done illegally or without jurisdiction, will not be a final order and hence will be an interlocutory one....... But in our judgment such an interpretation and the universal application of the principle that what is not a final order must be an interlocutory order is neither warranted nor justified. If it were so it will render almost nugatory the revisional power of the Sessions Court or the High Court conferred on it by section 397(10) .......................... On the one hand, the legislature kept intact the revisional power of the High Court and, on the other, it put a bar on the exercise of that power in relation to any interlocutory order. In such a situation it appears to us that the real intention 29 ( 2025:HHC:9529 ) of the legislature was not to equate the expression "interlocutory order" as invariably being converse of the words ''final order". There may be all order passed during the course of a Proceeding which may not he final in the sense noticed in Kuppuswami's case (Supra), but, yet it may not be an interlocutory orderpure or simple. Some kinds of orders may fall in between the two. By a rule of harmonious construction, we think that the bar in subsection (2) of Section 397 is not meant to be attracted to such kinds of intermediate orders. They may not be final orders for the purposes of Article 131 of the Constitution, yet it would not be correct to characterise the as merely interlocutory orders within the meaning of section 397 (2).

xxx xxx xxx Yet for the reasons already alluded to, we feel no difficulty in coming to the conclusion, after due consideration, that all order rejecting, the plea of the accused on a point which when accepted, will conclude the particular proceeding, will surely be not an interlocutory order within the meaning of section 397(2)."

(Emphasis ours)

7. Reading the observations made by this Court in the aforesaid case as a whole we are unable to agree with the argument of Mr. Mridul that this Court in any way disapproved the tests of a final order or interlocutory order accepted by the Federal Court in case of S. Kuppu swami Rao v. The King This Court took care to explain that in a situation with which the Judges were dealing in that particular case, it would 'not be proper to treat the order framing charges as an interlocutory order pure and simple. Even thought the order may be intermediate it could not be said to be final so as to bar the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court under s. 397(3) of the Code. We find ourselves in complete agreement with the 30 ( 2025:HHC:9529 ) exposition of the law by the learned Judges who decided the said case. We will deal with a broader and a wider aspect of the matter in a later part of our judgment when we deal with the scope and ambit of the Act. We might reiterate here even at the risk of repetition that the term 'interlocutory order' used in the Code of Criminal Procedure has to be given a very liberal construction in favour of the accused in order to ensure complete fairness of the trial because the bar contained in s. 397(3) OF the Code would apply to a variety of cases coming up before the courts not only being offences under the Penal Code but under numerous Acts. If, therefore, the right of revision was to be barred, the pro vision containing the bar must be confined within the four corners of the spirit and the letter of the law. In other words, the revisional power of the High Court or the Sessions Judge could be attracted if the order was not purely interlocutory but intermediate or quasi final. The same, however, in our opinion, could not be said of the Special Courts Act which was meant to cover only specified number of crimes and criminals and the objective attained was quickest despatch and speediest disposal. Mr. Mridul further relied on a decision of this Court in the case of State of Karnataka v. L. Muniswamy & ors. and particularly on the following observations made by Chandrachud, J. as he then was:

"On the other hand, the decisions cited by learned counsel for the respondents in Vadilal Panchal v. D. D. Ghadigaonkar and Century Spinning, & Manufacturing Co. v. State of Maharashtra a show that it is wrong to say that at the stage of framing charges the court cannot apply its judicial mind to the consideration whether or no. there is any ground for presuming the commission of the offence by the accused. As observed in the latter case, the order framing a charge affects a person's liberty substantially and therefore it is the . A duty of

31 ( 2025:HHC:9529 ) the court to consider judicially whether the material warrants the framing of the charge. It cannot blindly accept the decision of the prosecution that the accused be asked to face a trial."

Great stress was laid by the learned counsel for the appellant on the fact that the Court had observed that the stage of framing of charges was a very important matter because it affected a person's liberty substantially and, therefore, the Court should consider judicially whether the materials warrant framing of the charge. There can be absolutely no doubt regarding the correctness of the observations made by Chandrachud J. This decision, however, is no authority for holding that an order framing a charge is not an interlocutory order. In the aforesaid case, this Court was called upon to exercise its jurisdiction under s. 482 of the Code, that is to say, the inherent powers of the Court was invoked to quash the proceedings in order to prevent abuse of the process of the Court. The term 'interlocutory order' 7 appearing in s. 397 (2) of the Code did not arise for interpretation in that case. In these circumstances, therefore, we do not think that this case can be of any assistance to the appellant. Reference was also made to a decision of this Court in the case of Parmeshwari Devi v. State & Anr. This case also depends on different facts and relates to the circumstances under which a summons could be issued under s. 94(1) of the Code of 1898. In passing, however, this Court observed: "The Code does not define an interlocutory order, but it obviously is an intermediate order, made during the preliminary stages of an enquiry or trial. The purpose of subsection (2) of section 397 is to keep such an order outside the purview of the power of revision so that the enquiry or trial may proceed without delay. This is not likely to prejudice the aggrieved party for 32 ( 2025:HHC:9529 ) it can always challenge it in due course if the final order goes against it. But it does 'not follow that if the order is directed against a person who is not a party to the enquiry or trial, and he will have no opportunity to challenge it after a final order is made affecting the parties concerned, he cannot apply for its revision even if it is directed against him and adversely affects his rights."

Although this Court said that the Code does not define an interlocutory order, it does not include an intermediate order made during the preliminary stages, of an inquiry or trial. This Court laid greater stress on the fact that an order which was directed against a person who was not a party to the inquiry or trial and had, therefore, no opportunity to place his point of view could not be bound by any order passed against him. This appears to be the ratio of that case. Reliance was also placed on a decision of this Court in the case of Century Spinning & Manufacturing Co. Ltd. v. The State of Maharashtra in order to urge that the stag, of framing of charges is a matter of moment and an order framing a charge could not be termed as an interlocutory order. In the first place, the judgment of the aforesaid case was rendered before the Code of 1973 was passed and, therefore, the interpretation of interlocutory order as contained in s. 397 (2) of the Code could not have arisen for consideration. Secondly, the decision was given on the scope and ambit of s. 251A of the Code of 1898 AS amended by the Act of 1958. Dealing with the scope of sub sections (2) and (3) of s. 251A of the Code of 1898, this Court observed as follows:(1) "The argument that the Court at the stage of framing the charges has not to apply its judicial mind for considering whether or not there is a ground for presuming the commission of the of offence by the accused is not supportable either on the, plain language of the section or on its judicial interpretation or on any 33 ( 2025:HHC:9529 ) other recognised principal of law. The order framing the charges does substantially affect the person's liberty and it is not possible to countenance the view that the Court must automatically frame the charge merely because the prosecuting authorities, by relying on the documents referred to in Section 173, consider it proper to institute the case. The responsibility of framing the charges is that of the Court and it has to judicially consider the question of doing so. Without fully adverting to the mate rial on the record it must not blindly adopt the decision of the prosecution."

30. This case was followed in the case of Mohammad Amin Brothers Ltd. & Ors. v. Dominion of India & Ors. where it was held that so far as this Court is concerned the principles laid down in Kuppuswamis case (supra) settled the law. In this connection, in the aforesaid case, Mukherjea, J., speaking for the Court observed as follows:

"The expression "final order" has been used in contradistinction to what is known as "interlocutory order" and the essential test to distinguish the one from the other has been discussed and formulated in several cases decided by the Judicial Committee. All the relevant authorities A BEARING on the question have been reviewed by this Court in their recent pronouncement in S. Kuppuswami Rao v. The King, and the law on point, so far as this court is concerned, seems to be well settled. In full agreement with the decisions of the Judicial (committee in Ram Chand Manjimal v. Goverdhandas Vishindas and Abdul Rahman v. D. K. Cassim and Sons, and the authorities of the English Courts upon which These pronouncements were based, it has been held by this court that the test for determining the finality of an order is, whether the judgment or order finally disposed of the rights of the parties." C Thus, the Federal Court in its 34 ( 2025:HHC:9529 ) decision seems to have accepted two principles, namely, (1) that a final order has to be. interpreted in contradistinction to an interlocutory order: and (2) that the test for determining the finality of an order is whether the judgment or order finally disposed of the rights of the parties.

31. These principles apply to civil as also to criminal cases as pointed out by Kania C.J. in the case of S. Kuppuswami Rao v. The King (supra?. We find ourselves in complete agreement with the view taken by Mukherjea J. which is based on English cases as also the view taken by the Judicial Committee and the Federal Court.

32. The view taken in Kuppuswami's case (supra) was endorsed by this Court in the case of Mohan Lal Magarl Lal Thacker v. State of Gujarat where it was held that generally speaking a judgment order which determines the principal matter in question is termed final. The English decisions as also the Federal Court decisions were referred to in this case and after considering the decisions, this court observed as follows :

"The meaning of the two words "final" and "interlocutory" has, therefore, to be considered separately in relation to the particular purpose for which it is required. However, generally speaking, a judgment or order which determines the principal matter in question is termed final....An interlocutory order, though not conclusive of the main dispute may be conclusive as to the subordinate matter with WHICH it deals ....If the decision on an issue puts an end to the suit, the order is undoubtedly a final one but if the suit is still left alive and has yet to be tried in the ordinary way, no finality could attach to the order.. This test was adopted in S. Kuppuswami Rao v. The King where the court also held that the words "judgment" and 'order' have the same meaning 35 ( 2025:HHC:9529 ) whether the proceeding is a civil or a criminal proceeding. In Mohammad Amin Brothers Ltd. v. Dominion of India the Federal Court following its earlier decision adopted against the test, viz., whether the judgment or order finally disposed of the rights of the parties."

33. There is yet another aspect of the matter which has to be concerned so far as this decision is considered, to which we shall advert when we deal with the last plank of the argument of the learned counsel for the appellant. Suffice it to say at the moment that the case referred to also fully endorses the view taken by the Federal Court and the English decisions, viz., that an order is not a final but all interlocutory one if it does not determine or decide the rights of parties once for all. Thus, on a consideration of the authorities, mentioned above, the. following proposition emerge: (1) that an order which does not determine the rights of the parties but only one aspect of the suit or the trial is an interlocutory order; (2) that the concept of interlocutory order has to be ex plained. in contradistinction to a final order. In other words, if an order is not a final order, it would be an interlocutory order; (3) that one of the tests generally accepted by the English Courts and the Federal Court is to see if the order is decided in one way, it may terminate the proceedings but if decided in another way, then the proceedings would continue; because, in our opinion, the term 'interlocutory order' in the Criminal Procedure Code has been used in a much wider sense so as to include even intermediate or quasi final orders;

(4) that an order passed by the Special Court discharging the accused would undoubtedly be a final order inasmuch as it finally decides the rights of the parties and puts an end to the controversy and thereby terminates the entire 36 ( 2025:HHC:9529 ) proceedings before the court so that nothing is left to be done by the court thereafter; (5) that even if the Act does not permit an appeal against an interlocutory order the accused is not left without any remedy because in suitable cases, the accused can always move this Court in its jurisdiction under Art. 136 of the Constitution even against an order framing charges against the accused. Thus, it cannot be said that by not allowing an appeal against an order. framing charges, the Act works serious injustice to the accused."

20. In view of the above, this Court of the view that the order by virtue of which, the application under Section 45 of the Evidence Act has been decided, does not fall within the definition of 'interlocutory order' as the important aspect of the case has finally been decided by permitting the accused to get his signatures over the cheque in question compared with his signatures.

21. By no stretch of imagination, the order, by virtue of which, the application has been allowed, can be said to be an interlocutory order. Rather, it can be said to be intermediatory order as the said order has decided the rights of the parties and also affects the rival contentions of the parties. The orders impugned herein are although not conclusive of main dispute between the parties, but, 37 ( 2025:HHC:9529 ) conclusive of the matter subordinate to the main order. As such, the same cannot be said to be the interlocutory order.

22. In view of the above, this Court, now proceed to discuss the other objections, as raised, by the learned counsel for the parties.

23. The proper course for the accused is to get the signatures, over the cheque, in question, compared with his admitted signatures, however, he has made a request simply to send the signatures for comparison to the handwriting expert and to call for the report as to whether the cheque in question, has been signed by the accused or not.

24. The prayer clause in the application is reproduced as under: "It is, therefore, prayed that the cheque in question be sent to the hand writing expert and expert opinion whether the cheque has been signed by the accused or not be called. The signature of the accused may kindly be taken in the Court and be sent to the hand writing expert along with cheque in question for the expert opinion in the interest of justice"

38 ( 2025:HHC:9529 )

25. By no stretch of imagination, it can be said that such prayer can be accepted. Even otherwise, the learned trial Court has also fallen into error, by fixing the case for the presence of the accused for giving specimen signatures, as well as, informing the Court, name of the expert, who will compare the signatures, as, such procedure is unknown to law.

26. While holding so, the view of this Court is being guided by the decision of this Court in Ajitsinh Chehuji Rathod versus State of Gujarat and Another, (2024) 4 Supreme Court Cases 453. Relevant paragraphs 14 to 16 of the judgment, are reproduced, as under: "14. Certified copy of a document issued by a Bank is itself admissible under the Bankers' Books Evidence Act, 1891 without any formal proof thereof. Hence, in an appropriate case, the certified copy of the specimen signature maintained by the Bank can be procured with a request to the Court to compare the same with the signature appearing on the cheque by exercising powers under Section 73 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872.

15. Thus, we are of the view that if at all, the appellant was desirous of proving that the signatures as appearing on the cheque issued from his account were not genuine, then he could have procured a certified copy of his specimen signatures from the Bank and a request could have been made to summon the concerned Bank official in defence for giving evidence regarding the 39 ( 2025:HHC:9529 ) genuineness or otherwise of the signature on the cheque.

16. However, despite having opportunity, the accused appellant did not put any question to the bank official examined in defence for establishing his plea of purported mismatch of signature on the cheque in question and hence, we are of the firm opinion that the appellate Court was not required to come to the aid and assistance of the appellant for collecting defence evidence at his behest. The presumptions under the NI Act albeit rebuttable operate in favour of the complainant. Hence, it is for the accused to rebut such presumptions by leading appropriate defence evidence and the Court cannot be expected to assist the accused to collect evidence on his behalf."

27. In view of the discussion made above, the order dated 05.02.2024, passed by the trial Court does not survive in the judicial scrutiny by this Court. As such, the revision petition is allowed and the order dated 05.02.2024 passed in Case No.51I14 RBT 106I2019, titled as Rajeev Sharma versus Pradeep Kumar, and the orders subsequent thereto, are set aside.

28. Parties, through their learned counsel, are directed to appear before the learned trial Court on 10th April, 2025.

Send down the record forthwith.



                                         ( Virender Singh )
March 28, 2025 (ps)                            Judge

Unlock Advanced Research with PRISMAI

Himachal Pradesh High Court