Kerala High Court
Divisional Forest Officer vs N.C. Balakrishnan on 8 January, 1986
Equivalent citations: 1987CRILJ346
ORDER K. Sukumaran, J.
1. The Divisional Forest Officer, Kozhikode, ordered Under Section 61A of the Kerala Forest Act, confiscation of a jeep for illegal transportation of 336 Kgs of sandalwood. Though a contention was urged that the sandalwood was not a forest produce, t was negatived by the Court below. Yet the penalty of confiscation was set aside by the appellate Court. Two reasons were given in support of that decision : (1) Except in the present instance, the jeep had not been found engaged in the transportation of any contraband article, and (2) The Jeep was in the custody of the Forest Department for about four years after its seizure.
2. The order of the appellate Court is challenged in this revision petition.
3. The order of the Court below is not sustainable having regard to the statutory schemes and the established facts. Preservation of the forests in the State is a felt necessity. The Directive Principles contained in Part IV of the Constitution require the State to make endeavours for such preservation of forests. Under Article 51A it is a Fundamental Duty of every citizen to safeguard the forest wealth. An assault on the forest wealth of the country has therefore necessarily to be viewed with all seriousness. The provisions of the Forest Act some of them drastic no doubt have been conceived of for achieving the above laudatory object. Having regard to the area in which the officials have to work, and the fact that those who loot the forest are invariably well organised groups, stringent provisions have been made for the prevention of forest offences. Special provisions have been made for the detection of the offences. In proportion to the oppressive extent of organised exploitation against the forest, deterrent punishment is provided when the offence is established. This is as it should be. Those involved in the crime and found guilty on the basis of materials and evidence, do not deserve any sympathetic consideration, having regard to the gravity of the crime. Imposition of a nominal fine, would only encourage those who speculate in the smuggling of forest produce. Courts have necessarily to be aware Of these larger considerations when dealing with the forest offences. The approach the Court should adopt towards those found guilty of such abhorrent social crimes had been discussed in Tharu v. State 1985 Ker LT 310, with reference to the decision of the Supreme Court, Pyarali K. Tejani v. Mahadeo Ramachandra Dange and Prem Ballab v. State (Delhi Administration) of the Punjab High Court in Joginder Singh v. State of Punjab 1980 Cri LJ 1218 : AIR 1981 NOC 21 (FB) and of this Court in Mathai John v. State of Kerala 1978 KerLT 154 : 1978 Cri LJ 742 and Ammini v. State of Kerala 1981 Ker LT SN 28, Case No. 50 : 1981 Cri LJ 1170 (The Supreme Court declined special leave sought for against the above judgment vide S.L.P.Nos. 947 & 963 of 1985).
4. The fact that the petitioner was convicted for the first time would not necessarily mean that he had not engaged in such activities on anterior occasions. As observed by the Punjab High Court in 1980 Cri LJ 1218 : AIR 1981 NOC 21 (Punj & Har) (FB), supra:
It perhaps indicates only the fortuitous circumstance that he may have been caught for the first time. The first reason for waiving the penalty of is therefore totally confiscation unsustainable.
5. The fact that the jeep continued in the custody of the Forest Officials after seizure, does not have any relevant or rational nexus with the question of confiscation. The jeep was confiscated on 23-1-1977. It was open to the owner of the jeep to seek appropriate orders for having its custody pending adjudication before the D.F.O. The proceedings before the officer culminated by order dt. 26-11-1977. The appeal was filed on 11-1-1978. It would have been open to the owner to move the appellate Court for appropriate order regarding the custody of the jeep if he so desired. That too had riot been done. Such being the circumstances, the person who is admittedly guilty of a Torest offence cannot project the pendency of the appeal as a ground for upsetting the proper decision taken by the D.F.O. in relation to such an offence. It has to be noted that the quantity of sandalwood transported in the jeep was a substantial one. This factor would be indicative of the offence being the culmination of an organised activity in that behalf. That being so, the confiscation of the vehicle by the statutory authority was perfectly justified. The appellate Court erred in interfering with that order, without adequate or sustainable reasons. The order of the appellate Court is therefore liable to be and is hereby set aside. The revision petition/is accordingly allowed with costs.