Madhya Pradesh High Court
M/S Trident Multiventures A ... vs The State Of Madhya Pradesh on 28 July, 2025
Author: Vishal Mishra
Bench: Vishal Mishra
NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2025:MPHC-JBP:37931
2025:MPHC 1
IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH
AT JABALPUR
BEFORE
HON'BLE SHRI JUSTICE VISHAL MISHRA
ON THE 28th OF JULY, 20255
WRIT PETITION No. 20860 of 2025
M/S TRIDENT MULTIVENTURES A PARTNERSHIP
CONCERN AND OTHERS
Versus
THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH AND OTHERS
Appearance:
Shri Anil Khare - Senior Advocate with Shri Sankalp
Kochar & Shri Yagyavalk Shukla - Advocates for petitioners
petitioners.
Shri Prashant Singh - Advocate General with Shri Sumit
Raghuvanshi - Government Advocate for respondent/State.
Shri Akshay Khandelwal and Shri Pankaj Dubey -
Advocatess for respondent No.2.
ORDER
The present petition has been filed being aggrieved by regi registration of an FIR vide Crime No.98 of 2025 registered at Police Station Economic Offences Wing, Bhopal under Sections 420, 467,468, 471 and 120 120-B of the Indian Penal Code and Sections 66 C & 66 D of the Information Technology Act, 2000 on 09.06.2025 stating stating it to be an abuse of process of law.
2. It is the case of the petitioners petitioner that the petitioner No.1 is a partnership firm and subsequent purchaser of the property in question. They are aggrieved by institution of a manifestly false and vexatious crimina criminal proceedings registered ered at Crime No.98 of 2025 at Police Police Station Economic Signature Not Verified Signed by: SUSHEEL KUMAR JHARIYA Signing time: 18-08-2025 18:17:28 NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2025:MPHC-JBP:37931 2025:MPHC 2 Offences Wing, Bhopal under Sections 420, 467,468, 471 and 120 120-B of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 and Sections 66 C & 66 D of the Information Technology Act, 2000. It is argued that initiation of criminal proceedings and registration of an FIR is a manifest abuse of process of law. The nature of dispute clearly falls within the domain of civil law and is devoid of the essential ingredients necessary to constitute the offences alleged under the Indian Penal Code and the Information Technology Act.
3. It is argued that the immovable property forming the subject matter of the impugned criminal proceedings was originally held by one Shri Sitaram taram and after his demise the complainant/the respondent respondent No. 2 herein, namely Shri Chinta Singh Maran inherited the property by way succession.
The legitimacy and legal sustainability of the claim made by respondent No.2 was a subject matter of Civil Suit No. 690 of 2023 before Civil Court Court, Bhopal. The Civil Suit was finally dismissed for non non-prosecution vide judgment and decree dated 12.03.2025. After demise of the original owner, the said parcel of land was alienated by one Shri S.L. Noman, who purported to act in the capacity of Power of Attorney holder holder of the deceased. In exercise of such power of attorney, Shri Noman executed sale deeds in favour of certain third-party third party purchasers, including one Mohammad Ayan and one Mohammad Shakil, thereby transferring title of the property in question. The validity validity and enforceability of the said sale transactions became the subject of judicial scrutiny in Civil Suit No.RCS /121 /121-A / 2007. The Signature Not Verified Signed by: SUSHEEL KUMAR JHARIYA Signing time: 18-08-2025 18:17:28 NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2025:MPHC-JBP:37931 2025:MPHC 3 learned trial rial Court, upon appreciation of the pleadings and evidence, upheld the sale deeds and recognized recognize the transferees' rights and dismissed the suit vide judgment and decree dated 27.02.2016.
27.02.20 6. Against which, First Appeal No.471 of 2016, was preferred, which was decided vide judgment and decree dated 13.04.2023 reversing the findings of the trial Court and set aside the sale deeds in question. In pursuance to which, the sale deeds executed in favour of third-party third party was set aside and revenue records are accordingly rectified and the property in question was mutated in favour of the respondent No.2/Shri No.2 Shri Chinta Singh Maran recogn recognizing him as the recorded bhumiswami and owner of the subject land.
4. The respondent No. 2 proceeded to execute a registered sale deed on 12.06.2023, bearing Registration Document No. MP059712023A11971398 thereby conveying the said parcel of land to M/s Trident Multiventures Private Limited. The said conveyance was effected for a lawful and valuable consideration amounting to Rs.2,86,16,000/ Rs.2,86,16,000/-
(Rupees Two Crore Eighty-Six Eighty Six Lakh Sixteen Thousand only), which was paid partly through Real Time Gross Settlement Settlement (RTGS) transactions and partly via multiple account payee cheques. The respondent No.2 and the petitioner etitioner No.1 firm had arrived at a clear and mutually accepted understanding that in view of pending disputes concerning title to the subject land, the full sale consideration would be withheld until final adjudication of ownership. Therefore, the post-dated post dated cheques were issued in good faith by Signature Not Verified Signed by: SUSHEEL KUMAR JHARIYA Signing time: 18-08-2025 18:17:28 NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2025:MPHC-JBP:37931 2025:MPHC 4 the petitioner No.1 in favour of respondent No.2 to be encashed only upon the conclusive vesting of title and mutation mutation of the Petitioner No.1 in revenue records.
5. After execution and registration of the aforementioned sale deed dated 12.06.2023, 12.06.2023 a Review Petition No.556 of 2023 seeking recall of the judgment dated 13/04/2023 was filed. The said Review eview Petition was allowed by this Court on 02/05/2024 resulting in restoration of the original first appeal. The order passed in the Review Petition was challenged by the respondent No. 2 by way of a Special Leave Petition (Civil) No. 24441 of 2024 before the Hon'ble Ho Supreme Court and the Hon'ble Supreme Court after preliminary hearing has issued an interim order dated 30/09/2024 thereby staying the operation and effect of the order dated 02/05/2024 passed in the Review Petition as well as all consequential proce proceedings emanating therefrom m.
6. One Praveen Patel surfaced the claiming rights over the same parcel of land on the strength of an alleged unregistered agreement to sell purportedly executed in his favour by the respondent No. 2, for which Shri Praveen Patel el instituted a civil suit seeking specific performance of agreement to sell impleading the respondent No. 2 as the primary defendant.
This aspect was not disclosed by the respondent No.2 to the petitioner. The conduct of the respondent No.2 subject to execution execution of registered sale deed in favour of the petitioner No.1 reveals a clear pattern of collusion and mala Signature Not Verified Signed by: SUSHEEL KUMAR JHARIYA Signing time: 18-08-2025 18:17:28 NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2025:MPHC-JBP:37931 2025:MPHC 5 fides. Intention of the respondent No.2 further became apparent when despite interim protection granted by the Hon'ble Supreme Court, he preferred an application seeking withdrawal of the Special Leave Petition (C) No. 24441 of 2024, which he himself had instituted, which clearly aimed at dislodging the proceedings pending before the Apex Court and reverting the matter to this Court C or trial court for de novo adjudication with Praveen Patel as a contesting party therein. In view of the application filed by the respondent No.2 before the Hon'ble Supreme Court vide order dated 07.03.2025, the SLP (C) was dismissed as withdrawn. Another SLP (C) No.8570 of 2025 wherein there was a stay in favour of the petitioner No.1, is still pending consideration.
7. The respondent No.2 thereafter instituted a civil suit seeking declaration that the registered sale-deed sale deed dated 12.06.2023 executed in favour itioner No.1 firm be declared as void ab initio of the petitioner initio. This act of the respondent No.2 confirms the calculated efforts on his part to unsettle a transaction that he had willingly and lawfully executed and which had already vested valuable rights in favour of the petitioners. Thereafter, the respondent No. 2 on his own showing levying allegation against the petitioners had got registered an FIR wherein he admits that he voluntarily refunded a sum of Rs.1,35,00,000/-
Rs.1,35,00,000/ (Rupees One Crore Thirty Five Lakhs) to the petitioners tioners with the intent of securing cancellation of the sale deed and not as a result of any fraudulent inducement or misrepresentation, but as an Signature Not Verified Signed by: SUSHEEL KUMAR JHARIYA Signing time: 18-08-2025 18:17:28 NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2025:MPHC-JBP:37931 2025:MPHC 6 act of his own volition. The said contentions are in paragraph 15 of the civil suit filed by the respondent No.2 No.2 seeking cancellation of registration sale deed dated 12.06.2023. It is further argued that the respondent No.2 is still in possession of Rs.80.00 Lakhs which are paid to him in view of agreement to sell entered into between the parties. Now the registration registration of an FIR against the petitioners is per se illegal and sheer abuse of process of law.
8. Learned counsel appearing for the petitioners has further pointed out that there is a material suppression and concealment and selective disclosure of facts by the respondent No.2 with the deliberate intent to mislead the Investigating Agency as well as this Hon'ble Court. The respondent No. 2 consciously failed to bring to the notice of the Economic Offence Wings pendency of various civil proceedings, including Civil Suit Nos. 268/2025, 402A/2023 and 690/2023, the First Appeal No.471/2016, the Review Petition No.556/2023, as well as a Special Leave Petition (Civil) No.24441/2024 before the Hon'ble Supreme Court. It is deliberate attempt on the part of the respondent respondent No.2 in not disclosing the pendency of the aforesaid civil proceedings with respect to property in question, coupled with the fact that he himself had withdrawn his SLP wherein an interim protection was granted by the Hon'ble Supreme Court to him and thereafter he had preferred a Civil Suit for cancellation of the sale-
sale-deed between him and the petitioners, coupled with the fact that he is still in possession of the amount of Rs.80.00 Lakhs in pursuance to the sale-deed sale deed executed with the Signature Not Verified Signed by: SUSHEEL KUMAR JHARIYA Signing time: 18-08-2025 18:17:28 NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2025:MPHC-JBP:37931 2025:MPHC 7 petitioners. Counsel unsel appearing for the petitioners has further argued that the complainant has never made any complaint to the police authorities. It is surprising that for the first time, after fighting series of civil litigation, he has made complaint directly to the Economic Economic Offence Wings authorities without even disclosing the factum of civil litigations. It is argued that the Economic Offence Wings authority should not normally take any action with respect to private dispute between the parties and cognizance should not be taken.
Therefore, the entire criminal proceedings which have been initiated against the petitioners are abuse of process of law and the respondent No.2 is trying to give a colour to the civil dispute and every attempt is made to convert it into a criminal iminal litigation. In support of his arguments, learned counsel appearing for the petitioners has relied upon judgments passed by the Hon'ble Supreme Courts in the cases of Dahiben vs. Arvindbhai Kalyanji Bhanushali: (2020) 7 SCC 366; Naresh Kumar vs. State State of Karnataka: SLP (Crl.) No.1570/2021; Paramjeet Singh Batra vs. State of Uttarakhand:
(2013) 11 SCC 673; Mithlesh Kumar Jha vs. State of Karnataka: SLP (Crl.) No.9871/2019; A.M. Mohan vs. State represented by SHO & Anr.: SLP (Crl) No.9598/2022; Usha Chakraborty Chakraborty vs. State of W.B.:(2023) 15 SCC 135;
Rekha Sharad Ushir vs. Saptashrungi Mahila Nagari Sahkari Patsanstha Ltd.: 2025 SCC OnLine SC 64 and Mohmood Ali vs. State of U.P.:(2023) 15 SCC 488.
9. Per contra, learned counsel appearing for the respondents have Signature Not Verified Signed by: SUSHEEL KUMAR JHARIYA Signing time: 18-08-2025 18:17:28 NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2025:MPHC-JBP:37931 2025:MPHC 8 heavily opposed the contentions made by the petitioners. Learned Advocate General appearing for the respondent No.1 has raised an issue with respect to scope of interference under Article 226 of of the Constitution of India at investigation stage, for which, he has relied upon a judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of State of Haryana vs. Bhajan Lal Lal, reported in 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335 as well as in the case of State of Maharashtra vs. Arun run Gulab Gawali reported in (2010) 9 SCC 701 and has argued that in exercise of powers under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India or under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C./Section Cr.P.C./Section 528 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita (BNSS), (BNSS) the High Court should not interfere for quashment of an FIR pending investigation.
investigation. If the FIR discloses serious allegations which are backed by documentary and digital evidence and if the case is at the preliminary investigation stage, normally, the FIR should not be quashed.
ashed. Another argument before this Court is raised regarding the nature of offence being a class of economic crime committed by the petitioner by calculated misuse of digital banking infrastructure by preparation of forged documents, identity theft and fr fraudulent misrepresentation of land ownership to usurp valuable immovable property and its sale consideration. It is argued that the economic offence constitutes a class part involving deep rooted conspiracies and serious threat to financial health relying upon the judgment passed in the case of Y.S. Jagan Mohan Reddy vs. CBI reported in (2013) 7 SCC 439 as well as in the case of State of Signature Not Verified Signed by: SUSHEEL KUMAR JHARIYA Signing time: 18-08-2025 18:17:28 NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2025:MPHC-JBP:37931 2025:MPHC 9 Gujarat vs. Mohanlal Jitamalji Porwal reported in (1987) 2 SCC 364.
10. It is further argued that if the criminality com committed by the petitioners discloses multiples offences coupled with the fact that the FIR clearly discloses the commission of offence by the petitioners, the FIR should not be quashed. It is argued that the petitioner No.2 used his own and his employee's mobile obile numbers and created a fraudulent email ID to open a bogus ICICI Bank account in the name of complainant Chinta Singh Maran, which was in violation of Sections Section 66C & 66D of the IT Act, 2000 and also attracts the provisions of Sections 467, 468 & 471 of of the Indian Penal Code.
It is further contended that despite of showing a sale consideration of Rs.2.86 crores, an amount of Rs.1.36 Rs.1.3 crores was fraudulently diverted to a third party namely Shri Nitin Karosiya to settle unrelated liabilities. The cheques amounting to Rs.66.00 Lakhs were either stopped or left unsigned, further establishing dishonest inducement at inception stage. Using an OTP linked to the petitioner's employees mobile numbers, number , funds were transferred from the complainant's account, unknown to him, in violation of Section 66 of the IT Act and Section 420 of the Indian Penal Code. He has placed before this Court several documents to show that the investigation is at the primary stage and several documents showing the transactions creation of an bank account, generation of OTP to the petitioner's mobile number, which creates a serious suspicion regarding the manner in which the entire fraud has been committed with the respondent No.2. It is argued that it is a settled Signature Not Verified Signed by: SUSHEEL KUMAR JHARIYA Signing time: 18-08-2025 18:17:28 NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2025:MPHC-JBP:37931 2025:MPHC 10 proposition of law that in case a complaint discloses a commission of cognizable offence, then in terms of the judgment passed by the Constitutional Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Lalita Kumari vs. Government of U.P. and others reported in (2014) 2 SCC 1 as well as considering the relevant provisions of Indian Penal Code/ Code/Bhartiya Nyay Sanhita,, the police authorities are duty bound to register an FIR against the petitioners. The petitioners are not cooperating in the investigation. He has further relied upon a judgment passed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of M/S Neeharika, Infrastructure ture Pvt. vs the State Of Maharashtra reported in AIR 2021 SC 1918 wherein certain guidelines have been framed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court. He has prayed for dismissal of the writ petition.
11. Learned counsel appearing for the respondent No.2 has argued the matter in detailed virtually adopting the arguments made by the learned Advocate General. He has relied upon certain judgments passed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court to substantiate his arguments. It is argued that in the light of various pronouncements of the Hon'ble Supreme Court, when a complaint is pending investigation with the police authorities, the Court should normally not interfere in the pending investigation and should not quash the entire criminal proceedings.
12. Heard learned counsel for the the parties and perused the record.
13. From the perusal of the records, it is not disputed that an FIR Signature Not Verified Signed by: SUSHEEL KUMAR JHARIYA Signing time: 18-08-2025 18:17:28 NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2025:MPHC-JBP:37931 2025:MPHC 11 has been registered against the petitioners vide Crime No.98 of 2025 registered at Police Station Economic Offences Wing, Bhopal under Sections 420, 467,468, 467 471 and 120-B B of the Indian Penal Code and Sections 66 C & 66 D of the Information Technology Act, 2000. The records further indicates that a sale deed was executed in favour of the petitioners by the respondent No.2 on 12.06.2023 bearing registratio registration No. MP059712023A11971398 conveying the parcel of land to the petitioner No.1 for a lawful sale consideration of Rs.2,86,16,000/-.
Rs.2,86,16,000/
14. For the sake of convenience, the important dates and events pointed out in the chart are reproduced below:
S.No. Date Event
1. 27/02/2016 Subsequent to the demise of the original owner of the land in question, the subject parcel of land was alienated by one Shri S.L. Noman Noman, who purported to act in the capacity of Power of Attorney holder of the deceased. In exercise of such claimed authority, Shri Noman executed sale deeds in favour of certain third third-party purchasers, including one Mohammad Ayan and one Mohammad Shakil, ther thereby transferring title of the property in question. The validity and enforceability of the said sale transactions became the subject of judicial scrutiny in the course of civil proceedings bearing RCS/121-A/2007.
A/2007. The learned Trial Signature Not Verified Signed by: SUSHEEL KUMAR JHARIYA Signing time: 18-08-2025 18:17:28 NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2025:MPHC-JBP:37931 2025:MPHC 12 Court dismissed the suit filed by the Respondent No. 2.
2. 13/04/2023 In appeal, this Hon'ble Court, while exercising its appellate jurisdiction in First Appeal No. 471/ 2016, was pleased to reverse the findings of the Trial Court. Vide detailed judgment and decree dated 13.04.2023, 23, the Hon'ble Court set aside the sale deeds in question, thereby rendering the transactions legally ineffective and void ab initio and placed the Respondent No. 2 as the owner of the said land parcel.
3. 12/06/2023 Respondent No. 2 proceeded to execute a registered sale deed dated 12.06.2023, bearing Registration Document No. MP059712023A11971398, thereby conveying the said parcel of land to the Petitioner No.1. The said conveyance was effected for a lawful and valuable consideration amounting to ₹2,86,16,000/- (Rupees Two Crore Eighty Eighty-Six Lakh Sixteen Thousand only), which was paid partly through RTGS transactions and partly via multiple post-dated dated account payee cheques.
4. 2023 Quite unexpectedly and subsequent to the execution and registration of the sale deed in favour of the Petitioner No. 1 firm, an individual by the name of Praveen Patel surfaced, claiming rights over the same parcel of land on the strength of an alleged unregistered agreement to sell purportedly Signature Not Verified Signed by: SUSHEEL KUMAR JHARIYA Signing time: 18-08-2025 18:17:28 NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2025:MPHC-JBP:37931 2025:MPHC 13 executed in his favour by Responde Respondent No. 2.
Relying upon the said unregistered and disputed document, Shri Praveen Patel proceeded to institute a civil suit seeking specific performance of the purported agreement to sell, impleading Respondent No. 2 as the primary defendant. This suit was ultimately dismissed by the Trial Court on the instance of Respondent No.2 Application.
5. 02/05/2024 Subsequent to the execution and registration of the aforementioned sale deed dated 12/06/2023, the opposite parties instituted Review Petition No. 556 / 2023, seeking recall of the judgment dated 13/04/2023. The said review petition was allowed by the Hon'ble High Court on 02/05/2024, thereby resulting in the restoration of the original appeal proceedings.
6. 30/09/2024 Hon'ble Supreme Court stays operati operation of 02.05.2024 order in SLP (C) No. 24441/2024 preferred by the Respondent No. 2.
7. 05/03/2025 The mala fide intent and duplicitous conduct of Respondent No. 2 stood fully exposed when, on 05.03.2025, he instituted a civil suit seeking a declaration that at the registered sale deed dated 12.06.2023, executed in favour of Petitioner No. 1 firm, be declared void ab initio. The Respondent No. 2 admitted on affidavit of having refunded Rs. 1.35 Crores back to Petitioner No. 1 and retaining amount of Rs. 81 Signature Not Verified Signed by: SUSHEEL KUMAR JHARIYA Signing time: 18-08-2025 18:17:28 NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2025:MPHC-JBP:37931 2025:MPHC 14 lacs.
8. 07/03/2025 Respondent No. 2, with the apparent intent of frustrating the interim protection granted by the Hon'ble Supreme Court, moved an application seeking withdrawal of the S.L.P. (C) No. 24441 of 2024, which he himself had earlier instituted. Such an act, coming at a critical juncture, was clearly aimed at dislodging the proceedings pending before the Apеx Court and reverting the matter to the high court / trial court for de novo adjudication.
9. SLP (C) No. 8570/2025 filed by Petitioner No. 1, stay continued by Hon'ble Supreme Court. Order dated 07/03/2025 modified vide Order dated 28/03/2025.
10. In a stark volte-face, face, Respondent No. 2, who had previously remained silent on the alleged agreement with Praveen Patel, later supported Patel's claim during review proceedings and expressly stated that he had no objection to the restoration of the dismissed civil suit, despite never having disclosed such agreement at the time of executing the registered sale deed in favour of the Petitioners. Tria Trial Court allowed the review filed by Praveen Patel vide its judgement in MJC 514/2024.
11. 09/06/2025 Impugned FIR was lodged.
Signature Not Verified Signed by: SUSHEEL KUMAR JHARIYA Signing time: 18-08-2025 18:17:28NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2025:MPHC-JBP:37931 2025:MPHC 15
15. From the perusal of the aforesaid tabulation, it is apparently clear that series of litigations have taken place between the parties with respect to property in question. Three civil suits are still pending consideration; one SLP filed by the petitioner is pending consideration before the Hon'ble Supreme Court being SLP 8570 of 2025 wherein an interim relief has been granted by the Hon'ble Supreme Court on 07.03.2025 which was modified vide order dated 28.03.2025. There was no complaint with respect to any fraud being committed by the petitioners in any of the civil proceedings initiated by the respondent No.2 nor there is any verbatim in the complaint made to the Economic Offence Wings disclosing the factum of civil proceedings between the parties. None of the documents placed before this Court points point out that the Enonomic Offence Wings were apprised by the respondent No.2 regarding pendency of the civil proceedings as well as the fact that the civil proceedings which have already been decided between the parties parties with the respect to property in question. It is further not disputed that an amount of Rs.80.00 Lakhs is retained by the respondent No.2 in pursuance to the registered sale deed executed on 12.06.2023, for which, he has filed another civil suit bein being RCS No.A/268 of 2025 after withdrawing the SLP.
16. From the perusal of the plaint filed by the respondent No.2, it is seen that he has clearly mentioned in para 15 that an amount of Rs.1.3 Rs.1.35 crores rores has been returned back to the petitioners in pursuance to the Signature Not Verified Signed by: SUSHEEL KUMAR JHARIYA Signing time: 18-08-2025 18:17:28 NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2025:MPHC-JBP:37931 2025:MPHC 16 settlement entered into between the parties. The relevant extract of para 15 are as under:-
" यह क वादी एक ामीण पृ भूिम का सीधा-साधा अ प िशि त ि है, उसे ितवादीगण के दुभावनापूण आशय का एहसास नह आ और वह ितवादीगण के कहे अनुसार सौदे को िनर त कराने हेतु सहमत हो गया, िजसके चलते ितवादीगण ारा उसके खाते म 1,35,00,000/ 1,35,00,000/- पये (एक करोड़ पतीस लाख पये) के चेक डाले तथा उस रािश क वापसी हेतु वादी से उसके आईसीआईसीआई बक के चेक ा कर 1,35,00,000/- पये (एक करोड़ पतीस लाख पये) का भुगतान वापस ा कर िलया, शेष 80,00,000/ 80,00,000/- पये (अ सी लाख पये ) म से वादी के नुकसान क ितपू त के प ात बचने वाली रािश िव य प िनर तीकरण दनांक को देना तय ई, अथात िजस दनांक को ितवादीगण ारा य प िनर त कया जावेगा उस दनांक को उ रािश उ ह दया जाना तय आ था। वादी तथा ितवादीगण के म य वाद त भूिम का िव य सं वहार िनर त हो गया था, इस बात का माण यह भी है क ितवादीगण ारा दये गये 3 (तीन) चेको का भुगतान भी टाप पेमट के मा यम से ितवादीगण ारा कवा दया गया था, जो इस वादप के साथ संल कये जा रहे है ।"
The contention made in para 15 of the plaint filed by the respondent No.2 clearly discloses the fact that the parties entered into a compromise and agreed to cancellation of sale deed and in pursuance to the same, an amount of Rs.1.35 crores has been returned back to the petitioners and remaining amount of Rs.80.00 Lakhs will be paid to the petitioner after cancellation of the sale deed. The contention made in the plaint regarding regarding admission with respect to return of the amount is an admission on the part of the respondent No.2 being the complainant.
17. The respondent No.2 has made a complaint to the Economic Offence Wings regarding commission of offence, for which, an FIR has been registered. For registration of an FIR under Sections 420, 460, 468, 471 Signature Not Verified Signed by: SUSHEEL KUMAR JHARIYA Signing time: 18-08-2025 18:17:28 NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2025:MPHC-JBP:37931 2025:MPHC 17 B of the Indian Penal Code, the mens rea is required to be seen. & 120-B There is no element of mens rea,, fraudulent, inducement of criminal conspiracy available in the present case. The complainant has never disputed this fact in the entire litigations filed by him before various Courts that cheating has been committed by the petitioners with him and he has not being paid any amount. It is for the first time, a complaint has been made disclosing commission of a crime by the petitioners. There is no explanation tendered by the respondent No.2 that as to why in the complaint made to the Economic Offence Wings, Wings, he has not disclosed the factum of series of ccivil litigations between him and the petitioners as well as other with respect to same property in question. There is a prolonged and un-explained un explained silence of the respondent No.2 for nearly more than two years, which again questions the credibility of his allegations.
a The FIR allegedly refers to an incident occurring between 06.06.2023 and 08.09.2023, for which, a complaint was lodged on 09.06.2025. The respondent No.2 in paras 6 to 9 has expressly admitted the institution of a civil suit seeking cancellatio cancellation of the sale deed after having voluntarily refunded the substantial amount to the petitioner petitioners.
He further acknowledges that he has retained an amount of Rs.80.00 Lakhs whereby, fortifying fying the petitioners' contention that the dispute is inherently civil in nature and devoid of element of criminality.
18. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Dahiben (supra) has held as under:
Signature Not Verified Signed by: SUSHEEL KUMAR JHARIYA Signing time: 18-08-2025 18:17:28NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2025:MPHC-JBP:37931 2025:MPHC 18 "29.4. The sale deed records that the 36 cheques covering the entire sale consideration of Rs 1,74,02,000 were "paid" to the pl plaintiffs, during the period between 7-7-2008 7 to 2-7-2009.
29.5 If the case made out in the plaint is to be believed, it would mean that almost 99% of the sale consideration i.e. Rs 1,73,62,000 allegedly remained unpaid throughout. It is, however, inconceiv inconceivable that if the payments had remained unpaid, the plaintiffs would have remained completely silent for a period of over five-and five and-half years, without even issuing a legal notice for payment of the unpaid sale consideration, or instituting any proceeding for for recovery of the amount, till the filing of the present suit in December 2014 29.6. The plaintiffs have made out a case of alleged non non-payment of a part of the sale consideration in the Plaint, and prayed for the relief of cancellation of the sale deed on this ground. 29.7. Section 54 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 provides as under: "54.
"Sale" defined.--"Sale"
defined. "Sale" is a transfer of ownership in exchange for a price paid or promised or part-paid part and part-promised."
promised." The definition of "sale" indicates that there must be a transfer of ownership from one person to another i.e. transfer of all rights and interest in the property, which was possessed by the transferor to the transferee. The transferor cannot retain any part of the interest or right in the property, property, or else it would not be a sale. The definition further indicates that the transfer of ownership has to be made for a "price paid or promised or part-paid part and part-promised".
promised". Price thus constitutes an essential ingredient of the transaction of sale 29.8. In Vidhyadhar v. Manikrao [Vidhyadhar v. Manikrao, (1999) 3 SCC 573] this Court held that the words "price paid or promised or part-paid paid and part-promised"
part promised" indicates that actual payment of the whole of the price at the time of the execution of the sa sale deed is not a sine qua non for completion of the sale. Even if the whole of the price is not paid, but the document is executed, and thereafter registered, the sale would be complete, and the title would pass on to the transferee under the transaction. The non-payment payment of a part of the sale price would not affect the validity of the sale. Once the title in the property has already passed, even if the balance sale consideration is not paid, the sale could not be invalidated on this ground. In order to constitute constitute a "sale", the parties must intend to transfer the ownership of the property, on the agreement to pay the price either in praesenti, or in future. The intention is to be gathered from the recitals of the sale deed, the conduct of the parties, and the evidence on record."
19. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Naresh Kumar Signature Not Verified Signed by: SUSHEEL KUMAR JHARIYA Signing time: 18-08-2025 18:17:28 NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2025:MPHC-JBP:37931 2025:MPHC 19 (surpa) has held as under:
"6) In the case of Paramjeet Batra v. State of Uttarakhand (2013) 11 SCC 673, this Court recognized that although the inherent powers of a High Court ourt under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure should be exercised sparingly, yet the High Court must not hesitate in quashing such criminal proceedings which are essentially of a civil nature. This is what was held: "12. While exercising its jurisdiction isdiction under Section 482 of the Code the High Court has to be cautious. This power is to be used sparingly and only for the purpose of preventing abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure ends of justice. Whether a complaint discloses a ccriminal offence or not depends upon the nature of facts alleged therein.
Whether essential ingredients of criminal offence are present or not has to be judged by the High Court. A complaint disclosing civil transactions may also have a criminal texture. ButBut the High Court must see whether a dispute which is essentially of a civil nature is given a cloak of criminal offence. In such a situation, if a civil remedy is available and is, in fact, adopted as has happened in this case, the High Court should not hesitate hesitate to quash the criminal proceedings to prevent abuse of process of the court." (emphasis supplied) Relying upon the decision in Paramjeet Batra (supra), this Court in Randheer Singh v. State of U.P. (2021) 14 SCC 626, observed that criminal proceedings proceedings cannot be taken recourse to as a weapon of harassment. In Usha Chakraborty & Anr. v. State of West Bengal & Anr. 2023 SCC OnLine SC 90, relying upon Paramjeet Batra (supra) it was again held that where a dispute which is essentially of a civil nature, is given a cloak of a criminal offence, then such disputes can be quashed, by exercising the inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.
7) Essentially, the present dispute between the parties relates to a breach of contract. A mere breach of contract, by one of the parties, would not attract prosecution for criminal offence in every case, as held by this Court in Sarabjit Kaur v. State of Punjab and Anr. (2023) 5 SCC 360. Similarly, dealing with the distinction between the offence of cheating and a mere breach of contractual obligations, this Court, in Vesa Holdings (P) Ltd. v. State of Kerala, (2015) 8 SCC 293, has held that every breach of contract would not give rise to the offence of cheating, and it is required to be shown that tthe accused had fraudulent or dishonest intention at the time of making the promise.
8). In the case at hand, the dispute between the parties was not only essentially of a civil nature but in this case the dispute itself stood settled later as we have already already discussed above. We see no criminal Signature Not Verified Signed by: SUSHEEL KUMAR JHARIYA Signing time: 18-08-2025 18:17:28 NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2025:MPHC-JBP:37931 2025:MPHC 20 element here and consequently the case here is nothing but an abuse of the process. We therefore allow the appeal and set aside the order of the High Court dated 02.12.2020. The criminal 9 proceedings arising out of FIR FIR No.113 of 2017 will hereby stand quashed."
20. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Paramjeet Singh Batra (surpa) has held as under:
"12. While exercising its jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code the High Court has to be cautious. This power is to be used sparingly and only for the purpose of preventing abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure ends of justice. Whether a complaint discloses a criminal offence or not depends upon the nature of facts alleged therein.
Whether essential ingredients of criminal offence are present or not has to be judged by the High Court. A complaint disclosing civil transactions may also have a criminal texture. But the High Court must see whether a dispute which is essentially of a civil natu nature is given a cloak of criminal offence. In such a situation, if a civil remedy is available and is, in fact, adopted as has happened in this case, the High Court should not hesitate to quash the criminal proceedings to prevent abuse of process of the court."
cour
21. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Mithlesh Kumar Jha (supra) has held as under:-
under:
"47. Moreover, this Court has at innumerable instances expressed its disapproval for imparting criminal color to a civil dispute, made merely to take advantage advantage of a relatively quick relief granted in a criminal case in contrast to a civil dispute. Such an exercise is nothing but an abuse of the process of law which must be discouraged in its entirety"
22. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of A.M. Mohan (supra) has held as under:
"10. The Court has also noted the concern with regard to a growing tendency in business circles to convert purely civil disputes into Signature Not Verified Signed by: SUSHEEL KUMAR JHARIYA Signing time: 18-08-2025 18:17:28 NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2025:MPHC-JBP:37931 2025:MPHC 21 criminal cases. The Court observed that this is obviously on account of a prevalent impression that civil law remedies are time consuming and do not adequately protect the interests of lenders/creditors. The Court also recorded that there is an impression that if a person could somehow be entangled in a criminal prosecution, there is a likelihood of of imminent settlement. The Court, relying on the law laid down by it in the case of G. Sagar Suri and Another v. State of U.P. and Others2 held that any effort to settle civil disputes and claims, which do not involve any criminal offence, by applying pres pressure through criminal prosecution (2000) 2 SCC 636 : 2000 INSC 34 should be deprecated and discouraged. The Court also observed that though no one with a legitimate cause or grievance should be prevented from seeking remedies available in criminal law, a complainant omplainant who initiates or persists with a prosecution, being fully aware that the criminal proceedings are unwarranted and his remedy lies only in civil law, should himself be made accountable, at the end of such misconceived criminal proceedings, in acc accordance with law.."
23. In the case of Bhajanlal (supra) it is clearly reiterated that criminal proceedings must not be allowed to continue where the allegation does not discloses prima facie offence, but essentially civil in nature.
24. As far as material suppression on the part of the respondent No.2 is concerned, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Arunima Baruah vs Union of India reported in (2007) 6 SCC 120 has taken note of regarding material suppression of the party in not approaching approaching the Court or authorities with a clean hand and observed as under:
"10. On the one hand, judicial review is a basic feature of the Constitution, on the other, it provides for a discretionary remedy. Access to justice is a human right. (See Dwarka Prasad Prasad Agarwal v.
B.D. Agarwal [(2003) 6 SCC 230] and Bhagubhai Dhanabhai Khalasi v. State of Gujarat [(2007) 4 SCC 241 : (2007) 2 SCC (Cri) 260 : (2007) 5 Scale 357].) A person who has a grievance against a State, a forum must be provided for redressal thereof.
thereof. (See Hatton v.
United Kingdom [15 BHRC 259]. For reference see also Zee Signature Not Verified Signed by: SUSHEEL KUMAR JHARIYA Signing time: 18-08-2025 18:17:28 NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2025:MPHC-JBP:37931 2025:MPHC 22 Telefilms Ltd. v. Union of India [(2005) 4 SCC 649].)
11. The court's jurisdiction to determine the lis between the parties, therefore, may be viewed from the human rights concept of access to justice. The same, however, would not mean that the court will have no jurisdiction to deny equitable relief when the complainant does not approach the court with a pair of clean hands; but to what extent such relief should be denied is the question.
q
12. It is trite law that so as to enable the court to refuse to exercise its discretionary jurisdiction suppression must be of material fact. What would be a material fact, suppression whereof would disentitle the appellant to obtain a discretionary discretionary relief, would depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case. Material fact would mean material for the purpose of determination of the lis, the logical corollary whereof would be that whether the same was material for grant or denial of the relief.
relief. If the fact suppressed is not material for determination of the lis between the parties, the court may not refuse to exercise its discretionary jurisdiction. It is also trite that a person invoking the discretionary jurisdiction of the court cannot be allowed to approach it with a pair of dirty hands. But even if the said dirt is removed and the hands become clean, whether the relief would still be denied is the question."
25. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Dalip Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh and others reported in (2010) 2 SCC 114 has held as under:
"1. For many centuries Indian society cherished two basic values of life i.e. "satya" (truth) and "ahimsa" (non-violence).
(non violence). Mahavir, Gautam Buddha and Mahatma Gandhi guided the people to ingrain these values in their daily life. Truth constituted an integral part of the justice delivery system which was in vogue in the pre pre- Independence era and the people used to feel proud to tell truth in the courts irrespective of the the consequences. However, post post- Independence period has seen drastic changes in our value system. The materialism has overshadowed the old ethos and the quest for personal gain has become so intense that those involved in litigation do not hesitate to take shelter of falsehood, misrepresentation and suppression of facts in the court proceedings.
2. In the last 40 years, a new creed of litigants has cropped up. Those who belong to this creed do not have any respect for truth. They shamelessly resort to falsehood and unethical means for achieving their goals. In order to meet the challenge posed by this new creed of litigants, the courts have, from time to time, evolved Signature Not Verified Signed by: SUSHEEL KUMAR JHARIYA Signing time: 18-08-2025 18:17:28 NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2025:MPHC-JBP:37931 2025:MPHC 23 new rules and it is now well established that a litigant, who attempts to pollute the stream of justice or who touches the pure fountain of justice with tainted hands, is not entitled to any any relief, interim or final.
3. In Hari Narain v. Badri Das [AIR 1963 SC 1558] this Court adverted to the aforesaid rule and revoked the leave granted to the appellant by making the following observations: (AIR p.1558) "It is of utmost importance that in making making material statements and setting forth grounds in applications for special leave made under Article 136 of the Constitution, care must be taken not to make any statements which are inaccurate, untrue or misleading. In dealing with applications for special special leave, the Court naturally takes statements of fact and grounds of fact contained in the petitions at their face value and it would be unfair to betray the confidence of the Court by making statements which are untrue and misleading. Thus, if at the hearing earing of the appeal the Supreme Court is satisfied that the material statements made by the appellant in his application for special leave are inaccurate and misleading, and the respondent is entitled to contend that the appellant may have obtained specia special leave from the Supreme Court on the strength of what he characterises as misrepresentations of facts contained in the petition for special leave, the Supreme Court may come to the conclusion that in such a case special leave granted to the appellant ough ought to be revoked."
4. In Welcom Hotel v. State of A.P. [(1983) 4 SCC 575 : 1983 SCC (Cri) 872 : AIR 1983 SC 1015] the Court held that a party which has misled the Court in passing an order in its favour is not entitled to be heard on the merits of the case.
5. In G. Narayanaswamy Reddy v. Govt. of Karnataka [(1991) 3 SCC 261 : AIR 1991 SC 1726] the Court denied relief to the appellant who had concealed the fact that the award was not made by the Land Acquisition Officer within the time specified in Section 11-AA of the Land Acquisition Act because of the stay order passed by the High Court. While dismissing the special leave petition, the Court observed: (SCC p. 263, para 2) "2. ... Curiously enough, there is no reference in the special leave petitions to any of the stay orders and we came to know about these orders only when the respondents appeared in response to the notice and filed their counter-affidavit.
counter affidavit. In our view, the said interim orders have a direct bearing on the question raised and the non non-disclosure of the same certainly amounts to suppression of material facts. On this ground alone, the special leave petitions are liable to be rejected. It is well settled in law that the relief under Article 136 of the Constitution is discretionary and a petitioner who approaches this Signature Not Verified Signed by: SUSHEEL KUMAR JHARIYA Signing time: 18-08-2025 18:17:28 NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2025:MPHC-JBP:37931 2025:MPHC 24 Court for such relief must come with frank and full disclosure of facts. If he fails to do so and suppresses material facts, his application is liable to be dismissed. We accordingly dismiss the special leave petitions."
6. In S.P. Chengalvaraya Chengalvaraya Naidu v. Jagannath [(1994) 1 SCC 1] the Court held that where a preliminary decree was obtained by withholding an important document from the court, the party concerned deserves to be thrown out at any stage of the litigation. 7. In Prestige Lights Lights Ltd. v. SBI [(2007) 8 SCC 449] it was held that in exercising power under Article 226 of the Constitution of India the High Court is not just a court of law, but is also a court of equity and a person who invokes the High Court's jurisdiction under ArtiArticle 226 of the Constitution is duty-bound duty bound to place all the facts before the Court without any reservation. If there is suppression of material facts or twisted facts have been placed before the High Court then it will be fully justified in refusing to entertain entertain a petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution. This Court referred to the judgment of Scrutton, L.J. in R. v. Kensington Income Tax Commissioners [(1917) 1 KB 486 (CA)] , and observed: (Prestige Lights Ltd. case [(2007) 8 SCC 449] , SCC p. 462, 4 para 35).
In exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution, the High Court will always keep in mind the conduct of the party who is invoking such jurisdiction. If the applicant does not disclose full facts or suppresses relevant materials materials or is otherwise guilty of misleading the court, then the Court may dismiss the action without adjudicating the matter on merits. The rule has been evolved in larger public interest to deter unscrupulous litigants from abusing the process of court by deceiving deceiving it. The very basis of the writ jurisdiction rests in disclosure of true, complete and correct facts. If the material facts are not candidly stated or are suppressed or are distorted, the very functioning of the writ courts would become impossible."
26. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Shri K. Jayaram and others Vs. Bangalore Development Authority and others decided on 08.12.2021 in Civil Appeal No.7550-7553 No.7550 7553 of 2021 has held as under:
"15. In K.D. Sharma v. Steel Authority of India Limited Limited and Others, (2008) 12 SCC 481, it was held thus:-
thus:
"34. The jurisdiction of the Supreme Court under Article 32 and of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution is extraordinary, Signature Not Verified Signed by: SUSHEEL KUMAR JHARIYA Signing time: 18-08-2025 18:17:28 NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2025:MPHC-JBP:37931 2025:MPHC 25 equitable and discretionary. Prerogative writs mentioned therein are issued for doing substantial justice. It is, therefore, of utmost necessity that the petitioner approaching the writ court must come with clean hands, put forward all the facts before the court without concealing or suppressing anything and seek an appropriate appropriate relief. If there is no candid disclosure of relevant and material facts or the petitioner is guilty of misleading the court, his petition may be dismissed at the threshold without considering the merits of the claim.
35. The underlying object has been succinctly stated by Scrutton, L.J., in the leading case of R. v. Kensington Income Tax Commrs.
Commrs.- (1917) 1 KB 486 : 86 LJKB 257 : 116 LT 136 (CA) in the following words: (KB p. 514) "...... it has been for many years the rule of the court, and one which itt is of the greatest importance to maintain, that when an applicant comes to the court to obtain relief on an ex parte statement he should make a full and fair disclosure of all the material facts--
facts--it says facts, not law. He must not misstate the law if he can help it-- --the court is supposed to know the law. But it knows nothing about the facts, and the applicant must state fully and fairly the facts; and the penalty by which the court enforces that obligation is that if it finds out that the facts have not been been fully and fairly stated to it, the court will set aside any action which it has taken on the faith of the imperfect statement." (emphasis supplied)
36. A prerogative remedy is not a matter of course. While While exercising extraordinary power a writ court would certainly bear in mind the conduct of the party who invokes the jurisdiction of the court. If the applicant makes a false statement or suppresses material fact or attempts to mislead the court, the court court may dismiss the action on that ground alone and may refuse to enter into the merits of the case by stating, "We will not listen to your application because of what you have done." The rule has been evolved in the larger public interest to deter unscrupulous unscrupulous litigants from abusing the process of court by deceiving it.
37. In Kensington Income Tax Commrs.(supra), Viscount Reading, C.J. observed: (KB pp. 495-96) 495 96) "... Where an ex parte application has been made to his Court for a rule nisi or other process, if the Court comes to the conclusion that the affidavit in support of the application was not candid and did not fairly state the facts, but stated them in such a way as to mislead the Court as to the true facts, he Court ought, for its own protection and to prevent an abuse of its process, to refuse to proceed any further with the examination of the merits. This is a power inherent in the Court, but one which should only be used in cases which bring conviction to the mind of the Court that it has been deceived.
ed. Before coming to this conclusion a careful examination will Signature Not Verified Signed by: SUSHEEL KUMAR JHARIYA Signing time: 18-08-2025 18:17:28 NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2025:MPHC-JBP:37931 2025:MPHC 26 be made of the facts as they are and as they have been stated in the applicant's affidavit, and everything will be heard that can be urged to influence the view of the Court when it reads the affidavit and knows the true facts. But if the result of this examination and hearing is to leave no doubt that the Court has been deceived, then it will refuse to hear anything further from the applicant in a proceeding which has only been set in motion by by means of a misleading affidavit." (emphasis supplied)
38. The above principles have been accepted in our legal system also. As per settled law, the party who invokes the extra extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court under Article 32 or of a High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution is supposed to be truthful, frank and open. He must disclose all material facts without any reservation even if they are against him. He cannot be allowed to play "hide and seek"
or to "pick and choose" the facts he likes to disclose and to suppress (keep back) or not to disclose (conceal) other facts. The very basis of the writ jurisdiction rests in disclosure of true and complete (correct) facts. If material facts are suppressed or distorted, the very functioning of writ courts and exercise would become impossible. The petitioner must disclose all the facts having a bearing on the relief sought without any qualification. This is because "the court knows law but not facts".
39. If the primary object as highlighted in Kensington Income Tax Commrs. (supra) is kept in mind, an applicant who does not come with candid facts and "clean breast" cannot hold a writ of the court with "soiled hands". Suppression Suppression or concealment of material facts is not an advocacy. It is a jugglery, manipulation, manoeuvring or misrepresentation, which has no place in equitable and prerogative jurisdiction. If the applicant does not disclose all the material facts fairly and truly truly but states them in a distorted manner and misleads the court, the court has inherent power in order to protect itself and to prevent an abuse of its process to discharge the rule nisi and refuse to proceed further with the examination of the case on meri merits. If the court does not reject the petition on that ground, the court would be failing in its duty. In fact, such an applicant requires to be dealt with for contempt of court for abusing the process of the court."
16. It is necessary for us to state here that in order to check multiplicity of proceedings pertaining to the same subject subject-matter and more importantly to stop the menace of soliciting inconsistent orders through different judicial forums by suppressing material facts either by remaining silent or or by making misleading statements in the pleadings in order to escape the liability of making a false statement, we are of the view that the parties have to disclose the details of all legal proceedings and litigations either past or present concerning Signature Not Verified Signed by: SUSHEEL KUMAR JHARIYA Signing time: 18-08-2025 18:17:28 NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2025:MPHC-JBP:37931 2025:MPHC 27 any part of the subjec tmatter of dispute which is within their knowledge. In case, according to the parties to the dispute, no legal proceedings or court litigations was or is pending, they have to mandatorily state so in their pleadings in order to resolve the dispute between the parties in accordance with law."
27. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Bhaskar Laxman Jadhav and others v. Karamveer Kakasaheb Wagh Education Society and others reported in (2013) 11 SCC 531 has held as under:-
under:
"44. It is not for a litigant to decide what fact is material for adjudicating a case and what is not material. It is the obligation of a litigant to disclose all the facts of a case and leave the decision decision-
making to the court. True, there is a mention of the orde order dated 2-5- 2003 in the order dated 24-7-2006 24 2006 passed by the JCC, but that is not enough disclosure. The petitioners have not clearly disclosed the facts and circumstances in which the order dated 22-5-2003 was passed or that it has attained finality.
45. We may only refer to two cases on this subject. In Hari Narain v. Badri Das [AIR 1963 SC 1558] stress was laid on litigants eschewing inaccurate, untrue or misleading statements, otherwise leave granted to an appellant may be revoked. It was observed as follows:
ows: (AIR p. 1560, para 9)"
9. ... It is of utmost importance that in making material statements and setting forth grounds in applications for special leave care must be taken not to make any statements which are inaccurate, untrue or misleading. In dealing with applications for special leave, the Court naturally takes statements of fact and grounds of fact contained in the petitions at their face value and it would be unfair to betray the confidence of the Court by making statements which are untrue and misleading.
eading. That is why we have come to the conclusion that in the present case, special leave granted to the appellant ought to be revoked. Accordingly, special leave is revoked and the appeal is dismissed. The appellant will pay the costs of the respondent."
46. More recently, in Ramjas Foundation v. Union of India [(2010) 14 SCC 38] the case law on the subject was discussed. It was held that if a litigant does not come to the court with clean hands, he is not entitled to be heard and indeed, such a person is not entitled to any relief from any judicial forum. It was said: (SCC p. 51, para 21) "21. The principle that a person who does not come to the court with clean hands is not entitled to be heard on the merits of his grievance Signature Not Verified Signed by: SUSHEEL KUMAR JHARIYA Signing time: 18-08-2025 18:17:28 NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2025:MPHC-JBP:37931 2025:MPHC 28 and, in any case, such person is not entitled to any relief is applicable not only to the petitions filed under Articles 32, 226 and 136 of the Constitution but also to the cases instituted in others courts and judicial forums. The object underlying the principle is that every court is is not only entitled but is duty bound to protect itself from unscrupulous litigants who do not have any respect for truth and who try to pollute the stream of justice by resorting to falsehood or by making misstatement or by suppressing facts which have a bearing on adjudication of the issue(s) arising in the case."
47. A mere reference to the order dated 2-5-2003, 2 2003, en passant, in the order dated 24-7-2006 24 2006 does not serve the requirement of disclosure. It is not for the court to look into every word of the ppleadings, documents and annexures to fish out a fact. It is for the litigant to come upfront and clean with all material facts and then, on the basis of the submissions made by the learned counsel, leave it to the court to determine whether or not a particular particular fact is relevant for arriving at a decision. Unfortunately, the petitioners have not done this and must suffer the consequence thereof."
28. ca e of Thermax Ltd. Vs. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case K.M. Johny reported in (2011) 13 SCC 412 has held that 'criminal process must not be misused as a tool of harassment in commercial disp disputes.
29. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Mahmood Ali (supra) has held under:
"11. At this stage, we would like to observe something important. Whenever an accused comes before the Court invoking either the inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC) or extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution titution to get the FIR or the criminal proceedings quashed essentially on the ground that such proceedings are manifestly frivolous or vexatious or instituted with the ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance, then in such circumstances the court owes a dutyy to look into the FIR with care and a little more closely.
12. We say so because once the complainant decides to proceed against the accused with an ulterior motive for wreaking personal vengeance etc. then he would ensure that the FIR/complaint is very well drafted with all the necessary pleadings. The complainant Signature Not Verified Signed by: SUSHEEL KUMAR JHARIYA Signing time: 18-08-2025 18:17:28 NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2025:MPHC-JBP:37931 2025:MPHC 29 would ensure that the averments made in the FIR/complaint are such that they disclose the necessary ingredients to constitute the alleged offence. Therefore, it will not be just enough for the Court to look into the averments made in the FIR/complaint alone for the purpose of ascertaining whether the necessary ingredients to constitute the alleged offence are disclosed or not.
13. In frivolous or vexatious proceedings, the Court owes a duty to look into many other attending circumstances emerging from the record of the case over and above the averments and, if need be, with due care and circumspection try to read in between the lines. The Court while exercising its jurisdiction under Section 482482CrPC or Article 226 of the Constitution need not restrict itself only to the stage of a case but is empowered to take into account the overall circumstances leading to the initiation registration of the case as well as the materials collected in the course of investigation. Take for instance the case on hand. Multiple FIRs have been registered over a period of time. It is in the background of such circumstances the registration of multiple FIRs assumes importance, thereby attracting the issue of wreaking vengeance vengeance out of private or personal grudge as alleged."
30. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Usha Chakraborty (supra) has held as under:-
under:
"16. We have already extracted the said application filed by the respondent against the appellants in itsits entirety. At the outset, it is to be noted that in the affidavit accompanying the application, the respondent has stated thus: "I have not placed this incident before any court heretofore."
In the application, obviously, it is stated that he is one of th the trustees of Bagla Sundari Memorial Trust at Basunagar Madhyamgram and under the said trust there is a high school by name of Rose Bank Educare and he is the Secretary of the said school. The recital in Para 2 of the application filed by the respondent would would reveal his case that the accused persons kept him in dark and without giving any information by strengthening the said trust deed illegally got the same registered on 12-7-2016 12 2016 and removed him from the said post.
It is in this context that the aforesaid aforesaid statement in the aforesaid affidavit assumes relevance. It is the case of the appellants that in regard to his removal from the post of Secretary of the school, the respondent had instituted Title Suit No. 363 of 2015, praying therein for a declaration that that he is the Secretary of the school and the said Signature Not Verified Signed by: SUSHEEL KUMAR JHARIYA Signing time: 18-08-2025 18:17:28 NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2025:MPHC-JBP:37931 2025:MPHC 30 suit is still pending. Despite the institution of the said suit and its pendency before the First Court of Civil Judge, Junior Division, Barasat the respondent made such a statement in the affidavit. That apart, what is stated in the application is that he is the Secretary of the school, run by the Trust.
17. The materials on record pertaining to the said pleadings instituted in the civil suit, produced in this proceeding would reveal that the respondent waswas in fact ousted from the membership of the trust. In the counter-affidavit counter affidavit filed in this proceeding, the respondent has virtually admitted the pendency of the suit filed against his removal from the post of Secretary and the trusteeship and its pendency. The factum of passing of adverse orders in the interlocutory applications in the said civil suit as also the prima facie finding and conclusion arrived at by the civil court that the respondent stands removed from the post of Secretary and also from the trusteeship usteeship are also not disputed therein. Then, the question is why would the respondent conceal those relevant aspects? The indisputable and undisputed facts (admitted in the counter counter-affidavit by the respondent) would reveal the existence of the civil dispdispute on removal of the respondent from the post of Secretary of the school as also from the trusteeship. Obviously, it can only be taken that since the removal from the office of the Secretary and the trusteeship was the causative incident, he concealed the pendency of the civil suit to cover up the civil nature of the dispute.
18. By non-disclosure non disclosure the respondent has, in troth, concealed the existence of a pending civil suit between him and the appellants herein before a competent civil court which obviousl obviously is the causative incident for the respondent's allegation of perpetration of the aforesaid offences against the appellants. We will deal with it further and also its impact a little later.
21. The factual position thus would reveal that the genesis as al also the purpose of criminal proceedings are nothing but the aforesaid incident and further that the dispute involved is essentially of civil nature. The appellants and the respondents have given a cloak of criminal offence in the issue. In such circumstance when the respondent had already resorted to the available civil remedy and it is pending, going by the decision in Paramjeet Batra [Paramjeet Batra v. State of Uttarakhand, (2013) 11 SCC 673 : (2012) 4 SCC (Cri) 76] , the High Court would have quashed the criminal proceedings to prevent the abuse of the process of the Court but for the concealment.
22. In the aforesaid circumstances, coupled with the fact that in respect of the issue involved, which is of civil nature, the respondent had already approached the jurisdictional civil court by instituting a Signature Not Verified Signed by: SUSHEEL KUMAR JHARIYA Signing time: 18-08-2025 18:17:28 NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2025:MPHC-JBP:37931 2025:MPHC 31 civil suit and it is pending, there can be no doubt with respect to the fact that the attempt on the part of the respondent is to use the criminal proceedings as weapon of harassment against the appellants. The indisputable facts that the respondent has filed the pending title suit in the year 2015, he got no case that he obtained an interim relief against his removal from the office of Secretary of the School Managing Committee as also the trusteeship, that he filed the stated application for an order for investigation only in April 2017 together with absence of a case that despite such removal he got a right to get informed of the affairs of the school and also the trust, would only support the said conclusion.
conclusi
23. For all these reasons, we are of the considered view that this case invites invocation of the power under Section 482CrPC to quash the FIR registered based on the direction of the Magistrate Court in the aforestated application and all further proc proceeding in pursuance thereof. Also, we have no hesitation to hold that permitting continuance of the criminal proceedings against the appellants in the aforesaid circumstances would result in abuse of the process of court and also in miscarriage of justice."
justice."
31. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Rekha Sharad Ushir (supra) has held as under:-
under:
"11. It is settled law that a litigant who, while filing proceedings in the court, suppresses material facts or makes a false statement, cannot seek justice from the court. The facts suppressed must be material and relevant to the controversy, which may ha have a bearing on the decision making. Cases of those litigants who have no regard for the truth and those who indulge in suppressing material facts need to be thrown out of the court. In paragraph 5 of the decision of this Court in the case of S.P. Chengalvaraya Chengalvaraya Naidu v. Jagannath1, it is held thus: "5. The High Court, in our view, fell into patent error. The short question before the High Court was whether in the facts and circumstances of this case, Jagannath obtained the preliminary decree by playing fraud fraud on the court. The High Court, however, went haywire and made observations which are wholly perverse. We do not agree with the High Court that "there is no legal duty cast upon the plaintiff to come to court with a true case and prove it by true evidence".. The principle of "finality of litigation" cannot be pressed to the extent of such an absurdity that it becomes an engine of fraud in the hands of dishonest litigants. The courts of law are meant for imparting justice between the parties. One who comes to the court, Signature Not Verified Signed by: SUSHEEL KUMAR JHARIYA Signing time: 18-08-2025 18:17:28 NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2025:MPHC-JBP:37931 2025:MPHC 32 must come with clean hands. We are constrained to say that more often than not, process of the court is being abused. PropertyProperty- grabbers, taxevaders, bank-loan-dodgers bank dodgers and other unscrupulous persons from all walks of life find the court-process court process a convenient lever to retain the illegal gains indefinitely. We have no hesitation to say that a person, who's case is based on falsehood, has no right to approach the court. He can be summarily thrown out at any stage of the litigation." (emphasis added)
12. Section 138 of the NI Act has three conditions incorporated in clauses (a) to (c) of the proviso. Firstly, the cheque has been presented to the bank within a period of six months from the date on which it is drawn or within the period of its validity, whichever is earlier. Secondly, if a cheque is returned by the bank unpaid, the payee or the holder in due course must make a demand for payment of the amount of money covered by the cheque by issuing a notice in writing within 30 days of receipt of information information from the bank regarding the return of the cheque as unpaid. The third condition is that the drawer of the cheque must fail to make payment of the amount covered by the cheque within 15 days of the receipt of the notice.
13. In the present case, a statutory statutory notice under Section 138 of the NI Act was issued by the advocate for the respondent on 11th November 2016 to the appellant. The notice proceeds on the footing that the respondent, a Co-operative Co operative Credit Society, is providing financial assistance toto its members and is also carrying on banking business. The allegation in the notice served to the appellant is that the appellant was a member of the credit society and had taken an overdraft facility from the respondent in the sum of Rs. 11,97,000/ 11,97,000/-.
Paragraph agraph 1 of the notice specifically relies upon the fact that the appellant has executed necessary documents and that the appellant has agreed and acknowledged to make repayment of the amount advanced with interest. Thereafter, the notice proceeds to descrdescribe how the cheque issued by the appellant in the sum of Rs. 27,27,460/ 27,27,460/-
was returned unpaid.
14. Within a few days of receiving the notice, on 28th November 2016, the appellant replied to the notice through her advocate in which it was mentioned that after after receiving the notice, a written application had been made by the applicant to the respondent calling upon the respondent to provide documents relied upon in the notice. The appellant stated that the said documents had not been provided and that she would reply to the demand notice after receiving the documents. In the reply, she denied the claim of the respondent. On 13th December 2016, the appellant's advocate addressed a letter to the respondent reiterating that though the Signature Not Verified Signed by: SUSHEEL KUMAR JHARIYA Signing time: 18-08-2025 18:17:28 NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2025:MPHC-JBP:37931 2025:MPHC 33 appellant had demanded the documents documents from the respondent, the same had not been provided. Thereafter, the respondent filed a complaint on 15th December 2016 before JMFC, Kalwan. The statement of the respondent-complainant respondent complainant in the form of an affidavit was filed on the same day.
15. It iss pertinent to note that in the counter to the present appeal, the respondent has not denied the receipt of the letters dated 28th November 2016 and 13th December 2016. The complaint and affidavit in support of the complaint only refer to the notice dated 15th November 2016 issued by the advocate for the appellant to the respondent. What is stated in the complaint reads thus: ".............................................................. [D] The notice sent on the first address has been received on 15.11.2016. However, from the second address, envelope envelope has been returned on 15.11.2016 with the postal remark as 'left'." However, the respondent suppressed the letters dated 28th November 2016 and 13th December 2016 in the complaint and its statement on oath. Now, by filing an additional affidavit, it is contended by the respondent that certain documents were supplied to the appellant. A copy of the application dated 29th November 2016, submitted by the appellant to the respondent's manager, is placed on record seeking loan account statements. Accordingly,gly, certain account statements bearing the appellant's signature have been produced. The signatures on the account statements do not bear any date.
16. It is pertinent to note that in the notice under Section 138 of the NI Act, in paragraph 1, the respondent respondent specifically relied upon documents executed by the appellant and the acknowledgment of the loan made by the appellant. By a reply dated 28th November 2016, the appellant informed the respondent that by filing a written application, the appellant had demanded demanded certain documents, which had not been provided. What is pertinent to note is that the respondent does not deny the receipt of the reply dated 28th November 2016. No reply was sent by the respondent pointing out that the documents were supplied. Even in the letter dated 13th December 2016, the appellant made the same grievance regarding the non-supply supply of the documents relied upon in the demand notice. Before filing the complaint, the respondent failed to respond to the said letter.
17. A counter to this appeal was filed by the respondent on 7th August 2024, in which it is not even a case made out that requisite documents, as demanded by the appellant, were handed over to her on 29th November 2016. A case was belatedly made out for tthe first time by filing an additional affidavit on 9th January 2025 that statements of loan account sought by the appellant were furnished to Signature Not Verified Signed by: SUSHEEL KUMAR JHARIYA Signing time: 18-08-2025 18:17:28 NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2025:MPHC-JBP:37931 2025:MPHC 34 her and her signature appears on the statements. As stated earlier, though it is claimed that the appellant's signatures signatures appear on the said documents acknowledging the receipt, no date is mentioned below the signatures. In the additional affidavit, the respondent alleged that by a letter dated 29th November 2016, the appellant had called upon the respondent to provide the loan account statements of the six loan accounts mentioned in the said letter. Therefore, the stand taken in January 2025 that the statement of accounts was supplied on 29th November 2016 is clearly an afterthought.
18. The fact remains that in the complaint, complaint, the respondent has suppressed the reply dated 28th November 2016 and the letter dated 13th December 2016 sent by the appellant's advocate. These two documents have also been suppressed in the statement on oath. The respondent made out a false case case that the appellant did not reply to the demand notice. Moreover, the case that the documents as demanded were supplied is not pleaded in the complaint and statement under Section 200 of CrPC.
19. If these two letters were disclosed in the complaint, the learned Magistrate while recording the statement under Section 200 of CrPC, could have always questioned the respondent on the supply of documents to the appellant. What is important is that in the reply dated 28th November 2016, the appellant had reserved her right to give a reply to the demand notice after receiving the documents. It was the respondent's duty to supply documents to the appellant or her advocate to enable the appellant to properly reply to the demand notice. At least, the inspection of documents documents could have been provided to the appellant. After noticing the fact that notwithstanding service of two letters written by the appellant, relied upon documents were not provided to the appellant, the learned Magistrate could have dismissed the complaint complaint by exercising power under Section 203 of CrPC, as the appellant could not have replied to the statutory notice without looking at the documents relied upon.
20. Thus, this was a case where very material documents in the form of two letters addressed by by the appellant were suppressed in the complaint and the statement on oath under Section 200. In the statement on oath, the respondent-complainant respondent complainant vaguely referred to a 'false notice reply', but a copy of the reply was not produced by the respondent along with the complaint.
21. While filing a complaint under Section 200 of CrPC and recording his statement on oath in support of the complaint, as the complainant suppresses material facts and documents, he cannot be allowed to set criminal law in motion based based on the complaint. Setting criminal law in motion by suppressing material facts and documents is nothing but an abuse of the process of law.Signature Not Verified Signed by: SUSHEEL KUMAR JHARIYA Signing time: 18-08-2025 18:17:28
NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2025:MPHC-JBP:37931 2025:MPHC 35
22. Hence, the High Court ought to have interfered and quashed the complaint. Accordingly, the impugned order of the High Court is set aside. The complaint bearing S.C. No. 648 of 2016 pending in the court of the learned Judicial Magistrate First Class at Kalwan and the order of cognizance dated 2nd March 2017 are hereby quashed and set aside."
32. This Court is aware aware of the fact that pending investigation, normally the Court should not entertain a writ petition seeking quashment of an FIR, however, series of judgments passed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court clearly reflect that abuse of process of law is also not perm permissible. If the aforesaid findings and observations made by the Hon'ble Supreme Court are applied to the facts and circumstances to the present case, it is apparently clear that as series of civil suits are pending consideration, coupled with litigation pending nding before the Hon'ble Supreme Court with respect to the property in question and considering the fact that a fresh civil suit is filed by the respondent No.2 seeking cancellation of the sale deed and also the fact that contentions made in para 15 of the plaint regarding return of the amount Rs.1.35 crores and retaining an amount of Rs.80.00 Lakhs by the respondent no.2, clearly show that initiation of a criminal proceedings are clear abuse of process of law. While exercising jurisdiction under Section 48 482 of Cr.P.C./528 of BNSS BNS or under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, it is incumbent upon the Court to look mere text of the FIR and to examine a broader factual context in terms of civil litigations, litigation , admission admissions on record and conduct of the parties. In the present case the overwhelming record of the Signature Not Verified Signed by: SUSHEEL KUMAR JHARIYA Signing time: 18-08-2025 18:17:28 NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2025:MPHC-JBP:37931 2025:MPHC 36 concurrent civil litigations, admission by the respondent no.2 regarding voluntarily refund of substantial consideration, as well as suppression of material facts before the investigating agency, the conduct conduct of the respondent No.2 is totally unwarranted. It is surprising to see that the complaints were never made to the police authorities, rather the complaint was made to the Economic Offence Wings and the Economic Offence Wings has taken cognizance in the he matter. The aspect that whether the Economic Offence Wings can take cognizance on a complaint made with respect to private dispute between the parties was considered in the case of Prema Devi vs. State of U.P. and others reported in 2014 Supreme (Allahabad Allahabad) 317 wherein it was observed that normally private dispute should not be investigated by the Economic Offence Wings. There should be some mens rea to point out that cheating, fraud and misappropriate of Government money concerning the Government departments have been alleged in the complaint. However, no such averment is made in the present complaint. Then how the Economic Offence Wings have taken cognizance in the matter is also questionable.
However, the fact remains that looking to the series of of litigation pending between the parties, coupled with the fact that there is already an interim relief granted by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in an SLP which is still pending, the Economic Offence Wings could not have proceeded in the matter.
33. The facts of the present case clearly show that the FIR has been Signature Not Verified Signed by: SUSHEEL KUMAR JHARIYA Signing time: 18-08-2025 18:17:28 NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2025:MPHC-JBP:37931 2025:MPHC 37 lodged with an oblique motive to gain favour in a private civil dispute. Thus, in the light of the pronouncements made by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the aforesaid cases, this Court deems it appropriate appropriate to exercise its inherent jurisdiction to quash the FIR in order to prevent miscarriage of justice and uphold the sanctity ity of judicial proceedings.. Accordingly, the criminal case registered vide Crime No.98 of 2025 at Police Station Economic Offences Wing, ng, Bhopal under Sections 420, 467, 468, 471 and 120 120-B of the Indian Penal Code and Sections 66 C & 66 D of the Information Technology Act, 2000 on 09.06.2025 against the petitioners amounting to abuse of process of law, is hereby quashed. The parties are free to contest their civil litigations before the various forums including the Hon'ble Supreme Court.
34. With the aforesaid, the writ petition stands allowed and disposed off. No order as to costs.
(VISHAL MISHRA) JUDGE SJ Signature Not Verified Signed by: SUSHEEL KUMAR JHARIYA Signing time: 18-08-2025 18:17:28