Madras High Court
Gopal vs The Commissioner on 17 February, 2022
Author: C.Saravanan
Bench: C.Saravanan
W.P(MD)Nos.3019, 3074 to 3087 of 2022
BEFORE THE MADURAI BENCH OF MADRAS HIGH COURT
DATED : 17.02.2022
CORAM
THE HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE C.SARAVANAN
W.P(MD).Nos.3019, 3074 to 3087 of 2022
and
W.M.P(MD).Nos.2637, 2679, 2683, 2687, 2693,2696,
2680, 2684, 2698, 2691, 2694, 2681, 2682, 2700,
27012695, 2697, 2689, 2692, 2685, 2686, 2688,
2690, 2699, 2702, 2704 and 2705 of 2022
W.P(MD).No.3019 of 2022
Gopal ... Petitioner
Vs.
1.The Commissioner,
Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Department,
Chennai-24.
2.The Joint Commissioner,
Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Department,
Trichy-05.
3.The Assistant Commissioner,
Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Department,
Trichy-05.
4.The Executive Officer,
Arulmighu Thirumutheeswarar Kovil,
Having Office at Nallandavar Temple, Manaparai,
Trichy District. ...Respondents
1/15
https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis
W.P(MD)Nos.3019, 3074 to 3087 of 2022
Prayer: Writ Petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India,
praying this Court to issue a Writ of Certiorarified Mandamus, to call for the
records pertaining to the impugned order of the first respondent in N.Dis.No.
84922/2021 D2 dated 29.12.2021 and quash the same and consequently direct
the first respondent to number the unnumbered revision petition in Revision
Petition S.R.No.84922 of 2021 filed by the petitioner dated 15.12.2021 by
condoning the delay in filing the revision petition and dispose the same on
merits within a time frame that may be fixed by this Court.
For Petitioner : Mr.R.Maheswaran
For R1 to R3 : Mr.P.Subbaraj
Special Government Pleader
For R4 : Mr.AN.Ramanathan
COMMON ORDER
In all these petitions, the second respondent Joint Commissioner had passed an order under Section 78 (4) of the HR&CE Act, 1959. All these petitioners filed an applications before the second respondent Commissioner. However, these petitions were filed beyond the period prescribed under Subsection 7 (2) of Section 21 of the HR&CE Act.
2. The learned counsel for the petitioner submits that under similar circumstances, a learned Single Judge of this Court by order, dated 24.08.2021 in the case of N.Gurunathan Vs Commissioner, HR&CE 2/15 https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis W.P(MD)Nos.3019, 3074 to 3087 of 2022 Department and others in W.P.(MD).Nos.14957 to 14960 of 2021 has exercised the discretion under Article 226 of the Constitution of India and condoned the delay in filing the revision petition to enable the Commissioner to pass orders on merits.
3. The learned counsel for the official respondents 1 to 3 seeks to distinguish the aforesaid order, dated 24.08.2021 of this Court by citing the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Ganeshan Vs Commissioner, HR&CE Department reported in 2019 3 CTC 469. The learned counsel for the respondents would submit that though the Hon’ble Supreme Court was concerned with Section 69 of the HR&CE Act, the Court concluded that the appeal filed by the third respondent therein did not preclude the Commissioner for exercising the suo motu power under Section 69 (2) of the HR&CE Act. The Court however, did not express any opinion with regard to the exercise of suo motu power under Section 69 (2) of the HR&CE Act and it was for the Commissioner to invoke his power under Section 69 (2) of the HR&CE Act with satisfied.
3/15 https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis W.P(MD)Nos.3019, 3074 to 3087 of 2022
4. I have considered the submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner, learned counsel for the official respondents 1 to 3 and the learned counsel for the fourth respondent.
5. The petitioners have exercised the option against the order passed by the second respondent before the Commissioner under Section 21 of the HR&CE Act. However, the applications were filed beyond the period of limitation. Under Section 21 of the HR&CE Act, a limitation of three months is precribed from the date of commuication. Section 21(7) of the HR&CE Act, reads as under:
“21.Powers of Commissioner to call for records and pass orders.
(7) Every application to the Commissioner and for the exercise of this powers under this Section shall be preferred within three months from the date on which the order or proceeding to which the application relates was communicated to the applicant.”
6. Under Section 21 (7) of the HR&CE Act, there is no provision to condone the delay beyond three months filing from the date of which the impugned order or proceedings was communicated to an applicant. In other words, the provision is silent and does not allow condonation of delay. 4/15 https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis W.P(MD)Nos.3019, 3074 to 3087 of 2022
7. Scope of Section 69 (1) of the of the HR&CE Act, was considered by a Division Bench of this Court in Ganesan Vs Commissioner, HR&CE Department 2017 SCC online Mad 15742. The Division Bench of this Court held as under:
70. The reasons for delay is also sufficiently explained by the third respondent in the condone delay application and the leave application filed before the first respondent. Admittedly, the third respondent was not a party to the proceedings under Section 63 of the HR &CE Act by which the appellant was declared as Ambalathaar. None of the villagers were made as parties in the impugned procceding passed under Section 63 of the Act.The third respondent has also stated in his affidavit before the first respondent seeking leave to file the appeal under Section 69(1) of the Act that he came to know about the factum of passing of the impugned order only during the peace committee meeting conducted by the Tahsildar, Thiruppathur dated 06.12.2011. he has filed the appeal in Janurary 2012, within the period of sixty days as per Section 69 (1) of the Act.
8. The said decision was reversed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Ganesan Vs Tamil Nadu Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowment Board, 2019 (7) SCC 108. The Hon'ble Supreme Court framed the following questions of law:-
“(1) Whether the Commissioner while hearing the appeal unde Section 69 of the 1959 Act, is a Court?5/15
https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis W.P(MD)Nos.3019, 3074 to 3087 of 2022 (2) Whethe applicability of Section 29 (2) of the Limitation Act is with regard to different limitation prescribed for any suit, appeal or application to be filed only in a Court or Section 29 (2) can be pressed in service with regard to filing of a suit, appeal or application before the statutory authorities and tribunals provided in special or local laws?
(3) Whether the Commissioner while hearing the appeal under Section 69 of the 1959 Act is entitled to condone a delay in filing an appeal applying the provisions of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963?
(4) Whether the statutory scheme of the 1959 Act indicates that Section 5 of the Limitation Act is applicable to proceedings before its authorities?”
9. The Hon'ble Supreme Court held as under and summarised the law as under:-
“59. The ratio which can be culled from the abovenoted judgments, especially judgments of three- Judge Benches, as noted above, is as follows:
59.1. The suits, appeals and applications referred to in the Limitation Act, 1963 are suits, appeals and applications which are to be filed in a Court.
59.2. The suits, appeals and applications referred to in the Limitation Act are not the suits, appeals and applications which are to be filed before a statutory authority like Commissioner under the 1959 Act.
59.3. Operation of Section 29 (2) of the Limitation Act is confined to the suits, appeals and applications referred to in a special or local law to be filed in Court and before statutory authorities like Commissioner under 6/15 https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis W.P(MD)Nos.3019, 3074 to 3087 of 2022 the 1959 Act.
59.4. However, special or local law vide statutory scheme can make applicable any provision of the Limitation Act or exclude applicability of any provision of the Limitation Act which can be decided only after looking into the scheme of particular, special or local law.”
10. The Hon'ble Supreme Court ultimately held as follows:
“67. The learned counsel for the respondent has referred to two Rules framed under Section 116 of the 1959 Act, namely, the Application and Appeal Rules dated 30.08.1961 and the Holding of Inquiries Rules dated 30.08.1961. The Application and Appeal Rules provide for procedures and details of filing application, affidavits, memorandum of appeal, application for revision, etc. The said Rules, in no manner, support the contention of the learned counsel for the respondent that Section 5 of the Limitation Act is applicable. Similarly, the Holding of Inquiries Rules provide for procedure of holding of inquiries, issue of notice, etc. The above Rules also do not throw any light on the applicability of Section 5 of the Limitation Act.
68. The above provision clearly indicates that provision for only computation of limitation has been made applicable to the proceedings under the 1959 Act.
Section 115 cannot be read in a manner as to providing applicability of Section 5. There is no other provision in the scheme from which it can be inferred that the 1959 Act intended applicability of Section 5 of the Limitation Act to proceedings of appeal before the Commissioner. We, thus, conclude that Section 5 of the Limitation Act is not applicable as per the Scheme of the 1959 Act.” Thus, under Section 69 of the HR&CE Act also, there is no power 7/15 https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis W.P(MD)Nos.3019, 3074 to 3087 of 2022 given to the Commissioner to entertain any application beyond the period of limitation prescribed therein.
11. It has been held application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act is not applicable to proceedings under Section 69 of the Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Act, 1959. Therefore, the question that arises for consideration is whether despite absence of a specific provision to condone the delay under Section 21 of the Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Act, 1959, whether the Court can condone the delay and direct the second respondent to entertain the application to pass appropriate orders on merits. The petitioners are tenants who are in possession and occupation of the temple property. They are in arrears of rent to the fourth respondent temple and therefore facing eviction proceedings.
12. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in Union of India Vs. Popular Construction Company reported in 2001 (8) SCC 470, dealt with the situation where a period was prescribed for condoning the delay after the limitation had expired under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in Paragraphs 7, 12 and 16 held as 8/15 https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis W.P(MD)Nos.3019, 3074 to 3087 of 2022 under:-
''7. There is no dispute that the 1996 Act is a ''special law'' and that Section 34 provides for a period of limitation different from that prescribed under the Limitation Act. The question then is — is such exclusion expressed in Section 34 of the 1996 Act? The relevant extract of Section 34 reads:
''34. Application for setting aside arbitral award.- (1)-(2) *** (3) An application for setting aside may not be made after three months have elapsed from the date on which the party making that application had received the arbitral award or, if a request had been made under Section 33, from the date on which that request had been disposed of by the Arbitral Tribunal:
Provided that if the court is satisfied that the applicant was prevented by sufficient cause from making the application within the said period of three months it may entertain the application within a further period of thirty days, but not thereafter.''
12. As far as the language of Section 34 of the 1996 Act is concerned, the crucial words are ''but not thereafter'' used in the proviso to sub-section (3). In our opinion, this phrase would amount to an express exclusion within the meaning of Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act, and would therefore bar the application of Section 5 of that Act. Parliament did not need to go further. To hold that the 9/15 https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis W.P(MD)Nos.3019, 3074 to 3087 of 2022 court could entertain an application to set aside the award beyond the extended period under the proviso, would render the phrase ''but not thereafter'' wholly otiose. No principle of interpretation would justify such a result.
16. Furthermore, Section 34(1) itself provides that recourse to a court against an arbitral award may be made only by an application for setting aside such award ''in accordance with'' sub-
section (2) and sub-section (3). Sub-section (2) relates to grounds for setting aside an award and is not relevant for our purposes. But an application filed beyond the period mentioned in Section 34, sub- section (3) would not be an application “in accordance with” that sub-section. Consequently by virtue of Section 34(1), recourse to the court against an arbitral award cannot be made beyond the period prescribed. The importance of the period fixed under Section 34 is emphasised by the provisions of Section 36 which provide that ''where the time for making an application to set aside the arbitral award under Section 34 has expired … the award shall be enforced under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 in the same manner as if it were a decree of the court''.
This is a significant departure from the provisions of the Arbitration Act, 1940. Under the 1940 Act, after the time to set aside the award expired, the court was required to ''proceed to pronounce judgment according to the award, and upon the judgment so pronounced a decree shall follow'' (Section 17). Now the consequence of the time 10/15 https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis W.P(MD)Nos.3019, 3074 to 3087 of 2022 expiring under Section 34 of the 1996 Act is that the award becomes immediately enforceable without any further act of the court. If there were any residual doubt on the interpretation of the language used in Section 34, the scheme of the 1996 Act would resolve the issue in favour of curtailment of the court's powers by the exclusion of the operation of Section 5 of the Limitation Act.''
13. The Court, while dealing with the power of the Court under Section 34 to condone the delay, held that Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 was special law and since specific period for condoning the delay has been prescribed, the question of applying Section 5 of the Limitation Act, did not arise.
14. A reading of sub-clause 7 to Section 21 of the Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Act, 1959, which has been extracted above, indicates that an application has to be filed within a period of three months from the date of communication of the order, which is sought to be revised before the Commissioner. There is no period prescribed for filing such application beyond the period prescribed therein. There is no indication in the scheme of the Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Act, 1959 in Section 21 that principle akin to section 5 of the Limitation Act is expressly excluded. 11/15 https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis W.P(MD)Nos.3019, 3074 to 3087 of 2022 Section 5 of the Limitation Act reads as under:-
''5.Extension of prescribed period in certain cases. —Any appeal or any application, other than an application under any of the provisions of Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, may be admitted after the prescribed period, if the appellant or the applicant satisfies the Court that he had sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal or making the application within such period.
Explanation.— The fact that the appellant or the applicant was misled by any order, practice or judgment of the High Court in ascertaining or computing the prescribed period may be sufficient cause within the meaning of this section.''
15. No prejudice will be caused if the application under Section 21 of the HR&CE Act, filed by the petitioner for revision of the order. If the second respondent is entertained beyond the period of limitation, provided the other condition regarding pre-deposit arrears of rent is made by them before the first respondent Commissioner in terms of Section 34 A of the Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Act, 1959.
16. Considering the same, I am inclined to allow these writ petitions by directing the first respondent to pass appropriate orders on merits and in 12/15 https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis W.P(MD)Nos.3019, 3074 to 3087 of 2022 accordance with law, subject to the respective petitioners complying with the other requirements of the Section 34 A of the Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Act, 1959. The petitioners are therefore directed to deposit the arrears of rent within 45 days from the date of receipt of copy of this order. If such deposit has not been already made and file a proof before the first respondent. On such deposit/filing of proof, the application filed by the respective petitioners shall be numbered and disposed on merits and in accordance with law thereafter.
17. Needless to state that before passing such order, the petitioner shall also be heard in person or through an authorised representative as per the protocol placed on account of the outbreak of Covid-19 pandemic. No costs. Consequently, connected Miscellaneous Petitions are closed.
17.02.2022
Index : Yes / No
Internet : Yes/ No
sn
Note : In view of the present lock down owing to COVID-19 pandemic, a web copy of the order may be utilized for official purposes, but, ensuring that the copy of the order that is presented is the correct copy, shall be the responsibility of the advocate/litigant concerned. 13/15 https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis W.P(MD)Nos.3019, 3074 to 3087 of 2022 To
1.The Commissioner, Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Department, Chennai-24.
2.The Joint Commissioner, Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Department, Trichy-05.
3.The Assistant Commissioner, Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Department, Trichy-05.
4.The Executive Officer, Arulmighu Thirumutheeswarar Kovil, Having Office at Nallandavar Temple, Manaparai, Trichy District.
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sn W.P(MD).Nos.3019, 3074 to 3087 of 2022 17.02.2022 15/15 https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis