Allahabad High Court
Munni Lal vs State Of U.P. on 6 May, 2026
Author: Manish Mathur
Bench: Manish Mathur
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD, LUCKNOW BENCH
Neutral Citation No. - 2026:AHC-LKO:32482
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD
LUCKNOW
CRIMINAL APPEAL No. - 1078 of 2010
Munni Lal
.....Appellant(s)
Versus
State of U.P.
.....Respondent(s)
Counsel for Appellant(s)
:
Atul Verma
Counsel for Respondent(s)
:
Govt. Advocate
Court No. - 12
HON'BLE MANISH MATHUR, J.
1. Heard Mr. Atul Verma learned counsel for appellants assisted by Mr. Hari Krishna Verma and Mr. Mohd. Agha Haider Rizvi and learned AGA for respondent-State.
2. This Criminal Appeal has been filed by the appellants under Section 374(2) Cr.P.C. to set aside order dated 6th April, 2010 passed by Additional Sessions Judge, Court No.14, Lucknow in Session Trial No. 911 of 2004 (State of U.P. versus Munni Lal and others) arising out of Case Crime No. 36 of 2004, under Sections 498A, 306 I.P.C., P.S. Thakurganj, District Lucknow. Further, a prayer has been made to enlarge the appellant on bail in the said case crime.
3. As per prosecution version, it has been stated that the informant's daughter, Surajwati was married to Manoj Kumar, son of the appellant two years prior to the date of incident. Allegation levelled is that there was continuous demand of dowry due to which the daughter was harassed mentally and physically. It is stated that in the dowry demand, a motorcycle and a sum of Rs.50,000/- were being demanded. It is further stated that due information being given by his daughter with regard to such harassment, the informant went to her in-laws' place on 4th February 2004 but was chased away while being insulted and subsequently on 6th February 2004, he was informed that his daughter had passed away. The FIR therefore was lodged under Sections 498-A, 304-B and 506 of IPC read with Sections 3/4 of Dowry Prohibition Act and charges were also framed under the aforesaid sections.
4. Learned counsel for appellants submits that subsequently the appellant was acquitted in the aforesaid sections while conviction was recorded only with regard to Sections 498-A and 306 IPC.
5. Learned counsel has adverted to the judgment to submit that aspect of dowry demand and harassment for non-payment thereof has clearly been indicated in the judgment as an improvement in the prosecution version since no such averment was made in the FIR and statement under Section 161 of the Cr.P.C. The aspect of any settlement having been arrived at and the non-fulfilment of which has been alleged was also also indicated as an improvement. Reliance has been placed on judgment rendered by Supreme Court in the case of Yudhishthir versus State of Madhya Pradesh, 1971 SCC Criminal page 684.
6. Learned counsel has also adverted to judgment to indicate that trial court has recorded a finding that since it was only the husband of deceased who could have benefitted from the demand of dowry pertaining to motorcycle and the husband having already passed away, such demand for dowry was held not to be attributable to the appellants.
7. It is further submitted that the examining doctor as PW-6 has clearly indicated the aspects of the state of deceased and the opinion of the doctor that death had occasioned due to hanging as a result of suicide. It is submitted that the police who were also examined and even as per the inquest report clearly indicates that the body was found hanging inside a locked room and was retrieved by the police only after breaking down the door. It is on these aspects that trial court acquitted the appellant with regard to Section 304-B read with Section 3/4 of Dowry Prohibition Act.
8. Learned counsel has submitted that trial court has erred in recording a conviction under Section 498-A read with Section 306 IPC in view of the fact that the ingredients of the aforesaid sections were clearly inapplicable in the present facts and circumstances since the trial court itself has in the earlier part of judgment found that there was no cruelty or harassment upon the deceased prior to her suicide. It is therefore submitted that not only the provisions of Section 498-A read with Section 306 of IPC were inapplicable but even the presumption under Section 113-A of the Evidence Act was incorrectly drawn adversely to the appellants.
9. Learned counsel has also adverted to the aspect that cruelty has been found established on the ground that the deceased on the day of death had not taken any food and an adverse inference has been drawn against the appellant only on the ground that they did not indicate any efforts on their part in finding out the reason why deceased had not taken food or insisted for her taking some food.
10. It is therefore submitted that such a presumption is clearly unrelatable to terms of section 498-A read with section 306 IPC along with presumption to be drawn under section 113-A of the Evidence Act.
11. Learned counsel has placed reliance on the following judgements:-
State of Himanchal Pradesh versus Madan Gopal, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 191; Mangat Ram versus State of Haryana, 2014 SCC OnLine SC 259; Gurcharan Singh versus State of Punjab, 2016 SCC OnLine SC1415 and Rajbabu and another versus State of Madhya Pradesh, 2008 SCC OnLine SC1129
12. Learned AGA has refuted submissions advanced by learned counsel for the appellant with submission that the trial court in its judgment has clearly adverted to the statements of prosecution witnesses particularly that of PW1, informant which indicates the aspect of deceased being harassed due to dowry demand. He has also adverted to the statements of PW1 to indicate that just two days prior to the date of demise of the daughter of the informant, the informant had gone to her in-laws' place requiring them to permit the deceased accompanying him back to his house in view of harassment from which he was informed by the deceased herself but as per statement, he was humiliated and chased away. It is therefore submitted that the incident of humiliation not only of deceased but of her father as well was proximate to the suicide and would therefore come within scope of section 498-A IPC read with section 306 IPC and therefore the presumption under Section 113-A of the Evidence Act has been rightly drawn against the appellant.
13. It is further submitted that provisions of section 498-A IPC clearly indicate the aspect of either harassment or cruelty on the part of appellant which was duly established by the prosecution by examination of informant as PW1. It is however admitted that conviction has been recorded under sections 498-A and 306 IPC while acquitting the appellant under section 304-B IPC read with section 3/4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act.
14. Upon consideration of submissions advanced by learned counsel for parties and perusal of the material on record, it is evident that although a charge sheet has been filed against the appellant under sections 498-A, 304-B and 506 of Indian Penal Code (IPC) read with section 3/4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act but conviction has been recorded only under section 498-A and section 306 IPC. In such circumstances, the provision of aforesaid sections as well as that of section 113-A of the Evidence Act would require contemplation. The aforesaid sections are as follows:-
498-A IPC " 498A. Husband or relative of husband of a woman subjecting her to cruelty. Whoever, being the husband or the relative of the husband of a woman, subjects such woman to cruelty shall be punished with imprisonment for a term which may extend to three years and shall also be liable to fine.
Explanation. For the purpose of this section, "cruelty" means-
(a) any wilful conduct which is of such a nature as is likely to drive the woman to commit suicide or to cause grave injury or danger to life, limb or health (whether mental or physical) of the woman; or
(b) harassment of the woman where such harassment is with a view to coercing her or any person related to her to meet any unlawful demand for any property or valuable security or is on account of failure by her or any person related to her to meet such demand."
306 IPC "306. Abetment of suicide. If any person commits suicide, whoever abets the commission of such suicide, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to ten years, and shall also be liable to fine."
113-A of Evidence Act "[113-A. Presumption as to abetment of suicide by a married woman-When the question is whether the commission of suicide by a woman had been abetted by her husband or any relative of her husband and it is shown that she had committed suicide within a period of seven years from the date of her marriage and that her husband or such relative of her husband had subjected her to cruelty, the court may presume, having regard to all the other circumstances of the case, that such suicide had been abetted by her husband or by such relative of her husband.
Explanation. For the purposes of this section, "cruelty" shall have the same meaning as in Section 498-A of the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860).]"
15. The provisions of Section 498-A IPC therefore indicate the aspect that the husband or relative of the husband of a woman who subjects such woman to cruelty is required to be punished. The explanation clause defines the aspect of cruelty as any willful conduct which is of such a nature as is likely to drive the woman to commit suicide or to cause grave injury or danger to life, limb, or health of the woman.
16. Similarly in the case of Section 306 IPC, the aspect of abetment of suicide comes into play that if any person abets the commission of a suicide due to which a person does in fact commit suicide, he shall be punished with imprisonment. This is aspect is required to be seen in conjunction with Section 107 IPC which indicates abetment of a thing and describes a person abeting the doing of thing as a person who instigates any other person to do that thing or engages with one or more other person or persons in conspiracy of doing of that thing, intentionally adds by any act or illegal omission, the doing of that thing.
Explanation 2 thereof indicates that whoever, either prior to or at the time of commission of the act, does anything in order to facilitate the commission of that act and thereby facilitates the commission thereof, is said to add the doing of that act and therefore in terms thereof would come within the definition of an abettor as defined under Section 108 IPC.
17. It would also be convenient to refer to provisions of Section 113-A of the Evidence Act pertaining to presumption as abetment of suicide by a married woman and indicates that in case any such question arises whether the commission of suicide by a woman had been abetted by her husband or any relative of the husband and suicide has been committed within a period of seven years from the date of marriage with the husband or such relative of the husband subjecting her to cruelty, the court may presume that such suicide has been abetted by husband or such relative of the husband. Explanation thereto indicates that cruelty would have same meaning as defined under Section 498-A IPC.
18. In view of the aforesaid provision, therefore for the purposes of applicability of Section 498-A IPC, it is essential for prosecution to prove that the relative of the husband, as in the present case, has subjected the woman to cruelty, which is a willful conduct of such a nature as is likely to drive the woman to commit suicide.
19. Similarly in terms of Section 107 IPC, for a person to be brought within the scope of Section 306 IPC, it is essential for the prosecution to prove that the person has instigated any other person for doing a thing or has intentionally aided by any act or illegal omission, doing of that thing. Any person facilitating the commission of such an act either prior to or at the time of commission of such act would also be said to have aided the doing of that act.
20. Upon applicability of aforesaid factors in the present facts and circumstances, it would be conducive to refer to the impugned judgment in which testimony of PW1, the informant, with regard to dowry demand and harassment on that account has been disbelieved as an improvement. The aspect of any settlement on that score has also been found by the trial court to be an improvement in the prosecution version and it has also been held that as per the alleged dowry demand, the appellants could not be held to be liable since they could not be established as beneficiaries of such demand.
21. The trial court has thereafter held that the aspect of dowry demand was not established by the prosecution or that the suicide has a result of dowry demand.
22. While referring to testimony of examining doctor as PW7, the trial court has held that death has occasioned as a result of suicide particularly looking to the state of a corpse and on the basis of testimony of police personnel. It has also been held that there is no evidence on record whereby it can be said that the death has occasioned due to any dowry demand proximate to the death. It is on that basis that the appellants have been acquitted under section 304 B IPC read with section 3/4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act.
23. It is also established from the impugned judgment that appellants have been brought within purview of abettors under section 108 IPC only on the aspect that they failed to express any concern with regard to the deceased having not eaten for that entire day on the date of her death or made any efforts to induce her to eat food.
24. In the considered opinion of this court, once the trial court itself has held that no dowry demand could be established by the prosecution, the aspect of applicability of any cruelty as envisaged under Section 498-A IPC automatically failed and therefore since cruelty inflicted upon such a woman being an essential ingredient of Section 498-A IPC, could not be established, this court finds the trial court having committed an error in convicting the appellants under the aforesaid provision of Section 498-A IPC.
25. The proposition of Section 306 IPC has been adjudicated upon by Supreme Court in the case of Madan Gopal (supra) in the following manner:-
" 7. Having heard learned counsel for the parties and after a perusal of the material on record, we are of the considered opinion that apart from a bald allegation that the respondent made a demand for Rs. 50,000/- as dowry and that he would often beat up the deceased after consuming liquor, there is no worthwhile evidence to even remotely suggest that the respondent has abetted her suicide. In Jayedeepsinh Pravinsinh Chavda v. State of Gujarat 2024 SCC OnLine SC 3679, it has been held by this Court that mere harassment, by itself would not be sufficient to prove that the accused is guilty of abetment of suicide under Section 306 of IPC, in the absence of a clear intention or mens rea to abet the suicide. Further, in order to prove the guilt of an accused for the offence under Section 306 of IPC, the prosecution is bound to establish that an 'active or direct' action was taken by the accused that has led the deceased to take the extreme step of ending her life. A similar view has been taken by this Court in its earlier decisions in Ramesh Kumar v. State of Chhattisgarh (2001) 9 SCC 618; Ude Singh v. State of Haryana (2019) 17 SCC 301 & Kashibai v. State of Karnataka 2023 INSC 722 Therefore, the law on this point is fairly well settled that without an overt and positive act by the accused which either instigates or aids the commission of suicide, conviction under Section 306 of IPC cannot be sustained.
8. We shall now proceed to consider whether the Trial Court was justified in applying the presumption under Section 113-A of the Evidence Act, so as to presume that the respondent-husband had abetted the suicide. At the outset, we must take note of the fact that while Section 113-A of the Evidence Act contains the words "may presume", the words "shall presume" is used in Section 113-B2 of the Evidence Act. The marked difference in the language of these two provisions is a clear indication of the legislative intent that the presumption under Section 113-A is not mandatory and is not to be applied mechanically, merely on account of the fact that suicide occurred within seven years of marriage [See Mangat Ram v. State of Haryana (2014) 12 SCC 595].
9. Recently, in Ram Pyarey v. State of Uttar Pradesh 2025 INSC 71, this Court while discussing the difference between the two provisions, has also observed that 'cogent evidence' regarding cruelty and harassment or evidence pointing towards the specific act of abetment in the form either instigating or aiding the suicide would be a 'condition precedent' for applying the presumption under Section 113A of Evidence Act. This is what the Court observed:
"13. It is relevant to note that under Section 113B, the Court shall presume dowry death unlike Section 113A where the provision says that Court may presume abetment of suicide. This is the vital difference between the two provisions which raises presumption as regards abetment of suicide. When the Courts below want to apply Section 113A of the Evidence Act, the condition precedent is that there has to be first some cogent evidence as regards cruelty & harassment. In the absence of any cogent evidence as regards harassment or abetment in any form like aiding or instigating, the court cannot straightway invoke Section 113A and presume that the accused abetted the commission of suicide."
26. Similarly in the case of Mangat Ram (supra), the Supreme Court has adverted to the provisions of Section 306 IPC read with section 107 IPC and the presumption required under section 113-A of the Evidence Act and has held as follows:-
" 28. We have already indicated that the trial court has found that no offence under Section 304-B IPC has been made out against the accused, but it convicted the accused under Section 306 IPC, even though no charge had been framed on that section against the accused. The scope and ambit of Section 306 IPC has not been properly appreciated by the courts below. Section 306 IPC reads as under:
"306.Abetment of suicide.?If any person commits suicide, whoever abets the commission of such suicide, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to ten years, and shall also be liable to fine."
Abetment of suicide is confined to the case of persons who aid or abet the commission of the suicide. In the matter of an offence under Section 306 IPC, abetment must attract the definition thereof in Section 107 IPC. Abetment is constituted by instigating a person to commit an offence or engaging in a conspiracy to commit, aid or intentional aiding a person to commit it. It would be evident from a plain reading of Section 306 read with Section 107 IPC that, in order to make out the offence of abetment or suicide, necessary proof required is that the culprit is either instigating the victim to commit suicide or has engaged himself in a conspiracy with others for the commission of suicide, or has intentionally aided by an act or illegal omission in the commission of suicide."
"30. We are of the view that the mere fact that if a married woman commits suicide within a period of seven years of her marriage, the presumption under Section 113-A of the Evidence Act would not automatically apply. The legislative mandate is that where a woman commits suicide within seven years of her marriage and it is shown that her husband or any relative of her husband has subjected her to cruelty, the presumption as defined under Section 498-A IPC, may attract, having regard to all other circumstances of the case, that such suicide has been abetted by her husband or by such relative of her husband. The term "the Court may presume, having regard to all the other circumstances of the case, that such suicide had been abetted by her husband" would indicate that the presumption is discretionary. So far as the present case is concerned, we have already indicated that the prosecution has not succeeded in showing that there was a dowry demand, nor would the reasoning adopted by the courts below would be sufficient enough to draw a presumption so as to fall under Section 113-A of the Evidence Act."
27. Similarly in the case of Gurcharan Singh (supra), it has been held as follows:-
" 27. The pith and purport of Section 306 IPC has since been enunciated by this Court in Randhir Singh v. State of Punjab [Randhir Singh v. State of Punjab, (2004) 13 SCC 129 : 2005 SCC (Cri) 56] , and the relevant excerpts therefrom are set out hereunder : (SCC p. 134, paras 12-13) "12. Abetment involves a mental process of instigating a person or intentionally aiding that person in doing of a thing. In cases of conspiracy also it would involve that mental process of entering into conspiracy for the doing of that thing. More active role which can be described as instigating or aiding the doing of a thing is required before a person can be said to be abetting the commission of offence under Section 306 IPC.
13. In State of W.B. v. Orilal Jaiswal [State of W.B. v. Orilal Jaiswal, (1994) 1 SCC 73 : 1994 SCC (Cri) 107] , this Court has observed that the courts should be extremely careful in assessing the facts and circumstances of each case and the evidence adduced in the trial for the purpose of finding whether the cruelty meted out to the victim had in fact induced her to end the life by committing suicide. If it transpires to the court that a victim committing suicide was hypersensitive to ordinary petulance, discord and differences in domestic life quite common to the society to which the victim belonged and such petulance, discord and differences were not expected to induce a similarly circumstanced individual in a given society to commit suicide, the conscience of the court should not be satisfied for basing a finding that the accused charged of abetting the offence of suicide should be found guilty.
(emphasis supplied) "
"28. Significantly, this Court underlined by referring to its earlier pronouncement in Orilal Jaiswal [State of W.B. v. Orilal Jaiswal, (1994) 1 SCC 73 : 1994 SCC (Cri) 107] that courts have to be extremely careful in assessing the facts and circumstances of each case to ascertain as to whether cruelty had been meted out to the victim and that the same had induced the person to end his/her life by committing suicide, with the caveat that if the victim committing suicide appears to be hypersensitive to ordinary petulance, discord and differences in domestic life, quite common to the society to which he or she belonged and such factors were not expected to induce a similarly circumstanced individual to resort to such step, the accused charged with abetment could not be held guilty. The above view was reiterated in Amalendu Pal v. State of W.B. [Amalendu Pal v. State of W.B., (2010) 1 SCC 707 : (2010) 1 SCC (Cri) 896]
29. That the intention of the legislature is that in order to convict a person under Section 306 IPC, there has to be a clear mens rea to commit an offence and that there ought to be an active or direct act leading the deceased to commit suicide, being left with no option, had been propounded by this Court in S.S. Chheena v. Vijay Kumar Mahajan [S.S. Chheena v. Vijay Kumar Mahajan, (2010) 12 SCC 190 : (2011) 2 SCC (Cri) 465] .
30. In Pinakin Mahipatray Rawal v. State of Gujarat [Pinakin Mahipatray Rawal v. State of Gujarat, (2013) 10 SCC 48 : (2013) 4 SCC (Civ) 616 : (2013) 3 SCC (Cri) 801] , this Court, with reference to Section 113-A of the Evidence Act, 1872, while observing that the criminal law amendment bringing forth this provision was necessitated to meet the social challenge of saving the married woman from being ill-treated or forced to commit suicide by the husband or his relatives demanding dowry, it was underlined that the burden of proving the preconditions permitting the presumption as ingrained therein, squarely and singularly lay on the prosecution. That the prosecution as well has to establish beyond reasonable doubt that the deceased had committed suicide on being abetted by the person charged under Section 306 IPC, was emphasised."
28. The proposition with regard to section 113-A of the Evidence Act has also been enunciated upon in the case of Rajbabu and another (supra) in the following manner:-
" 19. Under Section 113-A of the Evidence Act, the prosecution has first to establish that the woman concerned committed suicide within a period of seven years from the date of her marriage and that her husband or any relative of her husband had subjected her to cruelty. Section 113-A gives a discretion to the court to raise such a presumption, having regard to all the other circumstances of the case, which means that where the allegation is of cruelty it must consider the nature of cruelty to which the woman was subjected, having regard to the meaning of the word "cruelty" in Section 498-A IPC.
20. The mere fact that a woman committed suicide within seven years of her marriage and that she had been subjected to cruelty by her husband or any relative of her husband, does not automatically give rise to the presumption that the suicide had been abetted by her husband or any relative of her husband. The court is required to look into all the other circumstances of the case. One of the circumstances which has to be considered by the court is whether the alleged cruelty was of such nature as was likely to drive the woman to commit suicide or to cause grave injury or danger to life, limb or health of the woman. The law has been succinctly stated in Ramesh Kumar v. State of Chhattisgarh [(2001) 9 SCC 618 : 2002 SCC (Cri) 1088] wherein this Court observed : (SCC pp. 626-27, para 12) "12. This provision was introduced by the Criminal Law (Second) Amendment Act, 1983 with effect from 26-12-1983 to meet a social demand to resolve difficulty of proof where helpless married women were eliminated by being forced to commit suicide by the husband or in-laws and incriminating evidence was usually available within the four corners of the matrimonial home and hence was not available to anyone outside the occupants of the house. However, still it cannot be lost sight of that the presumption is intended to operate against the accused in the field of criminal law. Before the presumption may be raised, the foundation thereof must exist. A bare reading of Section 113-A shows that to attract applicability of Section 113-A, it must be shown that (i) the woman has committed suicide, (ii) such suicide has been committed within a period of seven years from the date of her marriage, (iii) the husband or his relatives, who are charged had subjected her to cruelty. On existence and availability of the abovesaid circumstances, the court may presume that such suicide had been abetted by her husband or by such relatives of her husband. Parliament has chosen to sound a note of caution. Firstly, the presumption is not mandatory; it is only permissive as the employment of expression 'may presume' suggests. Secondly, the existence and availability of the abovesaid three circumstances shall not, like a formula, enable the presumption being drawn; before the presumption may be drawn the court shall have to have regard to 'all the other circumstances of the case'. A consideration of all the other circumstances of the case may strengthen the presumption or may dictate the conscience of the court to abstain from drawing the presumption. The expression?'the other circumstances of the case' used in Section 113-A suggests the need to reach a cause-and-effect relationship between the cruelty and the suicide for the purpose of raising a presumption. Last but not the least, the presumption is not an irrebuttable one. In spite of a presumption having been raised the evidence adduced in defence or the facts and circumstances otherwise available on record may destroy the presumption. The phrase 'may presume' used in Section 113-A is defined in Section 4 of the Evidence Act, which says?'Whenever it is provided by this Act that the court may presume a fact, it may either regard such fact as proved, unless and until it is disproved, or may call for proof of it.' "
(emphasis in original)"
29. Aforesaid judgments clearly encapsulate the aspects required for conviction under section 306 IPC particularly bringing into play the presumption required under section 113-A and the said judgments have clearly held that the presumption under section 113-A IPC is not mandatory and therefore not required to be applied mechanically merely on account of the fact that suicide has occurred within seven years of marriage. It has also been held that mere harassment by itself would be insufficient to prove guilt of the accused of abetment of sucide under section 306 IPC, in the absence of a clear intention or mens rea to abet the suicide. It has been held that in order to prove the guilt of accused for offence under section 306 IPC, it is essential for the prosecution to establish an active or direct action taken by the accused which has led to the deceased taking the extreme step of suicide. It has also been held that without any overt and positive act by accused which either instigates for aids the commission of suicide, conviction under section 306 IPC cannot be sustained.
30. The aforesaid judgments have clearly drawn a distinction regarding wordings of Section 113-A IPC as distinct from presumption required under section 113-B IPC where presumption is mandatory but not in the case of 113-A.
31. In view of the aforesaid judgments, it was thus imperative for prosecution to have established any overt or covert act on the part of the appellants which was proximate enough to have led the deceased to have committed suicide.
32. From a perusal of the impugned judgment, there is no such direct covert or overt act attributed to the appellants which was proximate enough or continuous enough to have led the deceased to have committed suicide. In the considered opinion of this court, the aspect only of the deceased having not taken any food since morning and the appellants having not induced her to take any food or raise any concern with regard to the said aspect would not come within definition of any instigation in terms of Section 107 IPC due to which trial court has erred in recording a conviction under Section 306 IPC.
33. In view of discussion made herein above, the impugned judgment and order dated 6th April, 2010 passed in Session Trial No. 911 of 2004 (State of U.P. versus Munni Lal and others) and the conviction of appellants recorded under Sections 498-A and 306 IPC registered as case crime No. 36 of 2004, under Sections 498A, 306 I.P.C., P.S. Thakurganj, District Lucknow is hereby set aside.
34. The appeal therefore stands allowed.
35. The appellants are on bail and they need not surrender. Their bail bonds are cancelled and sureties discharged.
36. Appellants are directed to file personal bond and two sureties each in the like amount to the satisfaction of the Court concerned in compliance of Section 437-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, corresponding to Section 481 of the Bhartiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita (BNSS), 2023.
37. Let a copy of this judgment and original be transmitted to the Trial Court concerned forthwith for necessary information and compliance.
(Manish Mathur,J.) May 6, 2026 prabhat