Delhi District Court
M/S Alza Interiors Private Limited vs Shri Juggal Uppal on 2 May, 2018
IN THE COURT OF SHRI GIRISH KATHPALIA,
DISTRICT & SESSIONS JUDGE
SOUTH EAST : SAKET COURT, NEW DELHI.
ARBITRATION No. 209/2016 (20311/2016)
M/S ALZA INTERIORS PRIVATE LIMITED
THROUGH ITS DIRECTOR, MR. AMIT RAMANI
REGISTERED OFFICE AT
3/30, WEST PATEL NAGAR
NEW DELHI ....PETITIONER
VERSUS
1. SHRI JUGGAL UPPAL
S/O LATE SUDESH UPPAL
R/O 125126, DOUBLE STOREY
NEW RAJINDER NAGAR
NEW DELHI 1100060
2. SMT. RANJANA UPPAL
W/O SHRI JUGGAL UPPAL
R/O 125126, DOUBLE STOREY
NEW RAJINDER NAGAR
NEW DELHI 1100060
...RESPONDENTS
Date of filing : 15.01.2016 First date before this court : 11.05.2017 Arguments concluded on : 21.04.2018 Date of Decision : 02.05.2018 Appearance: Shri Ambar Qamruddin, counsel for petitioner Shri S.S. Wadhwa, counsel for respondent Arbitration No. 209/2016 (20311/2016) Page 1 of 19 pages M/s Alza Interiors vs Juggal Uppal & Anr.
J U D G M E N T
1. By way of this petition, brought under the provisions of Section 34 of the Arbitration & Conciliation Act 1996, petitioner has sought setting aside of the arbitral award dated 19.10.2015, passed by learned Sole Arbitrator, whereby the petitioner company was held liable to pay to the respondents a sum of Rs. 47,13,766.39 within 30 days of the receipt of the award, failing which the petitioner would be liable to pay interest on the awarded amount at a rate of 9% per annum till realization. Upon service of notice, respondents appeared and filed a detailed reply opposing the petition. I have heard learned counsel for both parties, who took me through records of arbitral proceedings.
2. Briefly stated, the present petitioner, who was claimant in the arbitral proceedings setup its case as follows.
2.1 The present respondents, who were respondents in the arbitral proceedings also, are joint owners of second floor of premises bearing no. B77, Defence Colony, New Delhi (hereinafter referred to as "the said premises") and they leased out the same to the petitioner by way of registered lease deed dated 25.11.2011 for a period of three years at a monthly rent of Rs. 5,04,312.50 excluding water, electricity and other charges payable to authorities.
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2.2 Prior to the registration of lease deed dated 25.11.2011, parties had also entered into an unregistered lease deed dated 15.11.2011 upon finalization of the deal, when one of the Directors of the petitioner company issued a rent cheque for the month of December 2011 from his personal account. However, contents of the registered lease deed as well as the unregistered lease deed were identical.
2.3 The registered lease deed stipulated a one month rent free fit out period from the date of commencement, therefore, the month of December 2011 was to remain rent free. The crucial part of the said registered lease deed, which is at the fulcrum of present dispute was clause 11 of the lease deed and the same is quoted as below :
"11. That as per requirement of the LESSEE, the LESSORS has provided the following services that have been understood to be essential for the running of the business of the LESSEE in the demised premises along with the space throughout the term of the lease deed :
(a) Electricity load of 20 KW connected at one point in the demised premises along with separate electricity meter.
(b) The LESSORS shall provide 100% DG backup as agreed.
(c) That the LESSORS shall provide two small car parking spaces in the stilt floor.
(d) That as agreed the LESSORS shall provide one passenger lift facility to the LESSEE.
(e) Municipal water connection with separate water meter."
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2.4 Subsequently, the claimant petitioner realized that the said clause 11 of the lease deed was based on fraud and misrepresentation committed by the respondents insofar as it was falsely communicated that the said services and facilities were complete in all respects and only some minor work remained, which would be completed before 01.12.2011 when the claimant petitioner was scheduled to move in for the fit out as per its requirements.
2.5 The claimant petitioner clicked photographs of the said premises on 23.12.2011 which depicted active construction activity as on that date, establishing that at the time of registration of the lease deed and even on 01.12.2011, the said premises were not complete and usable.
Therefore, neither any fit out nor any business could be commenced in the said premises. On the other hand, the respondents were secure as they had received advance rent for seven and half months and also banked upon 24 months lockin period leaving the entire risk on the shoulders of the claimant petitioner.
2.6 Under these circumstances, the claimant petitioner invoked the arbitration clause 37 of the lease deed and got served on the respondents legal notice dated 01.01.2012. But by bonafide mistake on account of two lease deeds, the claimant petitioner in the said legal notice referred to termination of lease deed dated 15.11.2011 instead of the registered lease deed. As such, the claimant petitioner issued second Arbitration No. 209/2016 (20311/2016) Page 4 of 19 pages M/s Alza Interiors vs Juggal Uppal & Anr.
legal notice dated 28.01.2012 in continuation of previous legal notice dated 01.01.2012. But despite repeated efforts, the claimant petitioner could not serve the second legal notice dated 28.01.2012 on the respondents through courier, so the same was ultimately delivered personally on the respondents on 08.02.2012. Respondents issued reply dated 13.02.2012 to the legal notice. Since in reply dated 13.02.2012 the respondents denied having received the first legal notice dated 01.01.2012, the claimant petitioner sent the same again and upon receipt thereof, respondents issued reply dated 22.02.2012.
2.7 On getting no response of settlement, the claimant petitioner issued statutory notices dated 23.03.2012 under Section 11 of the Arbitration & Conciliation Act, appointing Shri Jitender Mohan Sharma Advocate as arbitrator from the side of claimant so that respondents could appoint arbitrator from their side and the two arbitrators could choose a third person to act as presiding arbitrator in terms with clause 37 of the lease deed. In reply dated 11.04.2012, respondents evasively relied upon the condition of the lockin period, so left with no option, claimant petitioner approached the Hon'ble Delhi High Court, which appointed Shri M.L. Sahni as sole arbitrator.
2.8 The claimant petitioner received legal notice dated 04.07.2012 whereby the respondents terminated the tenancy and called upon the claimant to handover vacant and peaceful possession of the said Arbitration No. 209/2016 (20311/2016) Page 5 of 19 pages M/s Alza Interiors vs Juggal Uppal & Anr.
premises. The claimant petitioner opted not to respond to that notice since according to the claimant petitioner, lease already stood terminated vide legal notice dated 01.01.2012 and 28.01.2012.
2.9 The claimant petitioner raised a claim before the learned Sole Arbitrator for a sum of Rs. 37,82,343.75 plus Rs. 24,552.95 towards refund of advance rent and security which had been paid to the respondents and a sum of Rs. 30,00,000/ towards loss of business and damage caused to goodwill of director of claimant. The claimant petitioner also raised a claim before the learned Sole Arbitrator seeking to validate termination of the lease deed dated 25.11.2011 without payment of the rental of 24 months since December 2011 in view of fraud and also claimed costs and interest.
3. Respondents appeared before the learned Sole Arbitrator and filed written statement to the claim petition, thereby denying its contents and also raised a counterclaim for a sum of Rs. 22,69,406.25 towards arrears of rent upto 01.12.2012 and Rs. 60,51,750/ towards lease rental from 02.12.2012 upto lockin period ending on 01.12.2013. Respondents set up their case in the written statement cum counterclaim as follows.
3.1 Since the claim petition has not been filed by the duly authorized person, the same is liable to be dismissed. The claimant Arbitration No. 209/2016 (20311/2016) Page 6 of 19 pages M/s Alza Interiors vs Juggal Uppal & Anr.
petitioner has concealed material facts and wants to wriggle out of the terms and conditions of lease deed dated 25.11.2011.
3.2 The respondents have been sending month by month invoices in respect of rent and service tax in terms with lease deed dated 25.11.2011 but instead of paying monthly rent and service tax, claimant got issued false and frivolous notices.
3.3 The claimant petitioner had no authority to terminate lease prior to the expiry of lockin period of 24 months, so it is liable to pay rent and other charges pertaining to that period.
3.4 The respondents have already spent huge amount of money to provide the agreed facilities in the said premises and to make the same as per specifications of the claimant, so they are not liable to refund any amount to the claimant.
3.5 Prior to entering into lease, Shri Amit Ramani, Director and authorized representative of claimant company had duly inspected the said premises and opted to take the same on lease only after satisfying himself. The claimant petitioner never challenged the truthfulness of the contents of the lease deed even at the stage of its registration. Since the foreign collaborators of the claimant have now canceled their business deal, claimant has created false excuse in order to wriggle out.
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3.6 The photographs relied upon by the claimant are not pertaining to the said premises .
3.7 Therefore, the claim petition is liable to be rejected and counterclaim of Rs. 83,21,156.25 deserves to be allowed.
4. On the basis of rival pleadings, learned Sole Arbitrator framed five issues and recorded evidence adduced on behalf of both sides. After analysis of evidence adduced by both sides, the learned Sole Arbitrator held that the claimant petitioner is not entitled to any amount of money from the respondents because there was a valid and legally binding lease agreement between the parties which could not be terminated by either of the parties prior to the expiry of lockin period. As regards counterclaim, the learned Sole Arbitrator after detailed analysis of evidence on record found the case of the claimant petitioner not believable that respondents had delivered possession of the said premises only on paper and not physically; therefore, the learned Sole Arbitrator held that the claimant was liable to pay to the respondents a sum of Rs. 47,13,766.39 towards outstanding rent and service tax within 30 days of receipt of copy of award failing which the claimant would be liable to pay interest on the said amount at a rate of 9% per annum.
5. Hence, the present petition.
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6. During arguments, learned counsel for both sides took me through original records of arbitral tribunal and both sides laid major emphasis on clause 11 of the lease deed.
7. Learned counsel for claimant petitioner argued that none of the circumstances mentioned in clause 11 of the lease deed truly existed at the time of execution of lease, therefore, the claimant petitioner could not utilize the said premises for any purpose whatsoever and consequently, the claimant petitioner is entitled to refund of advance rent and security as well as to damages on account of loss of business. It was argued on behalf of claimant petitioner that as reflected from documentary evidence, till 05.12.2011, work of electricity installation was continuing in the said premises and that shows falsity of the sub clause (a) of clause 11 of the lease deed. It was further argued that according to the documentary evidence, the DG set was sent from Gujarat on 21.12.2011, which falsifies subclause (b) of clause 11 of the lease deed. It was further argued that documentary evidence shows that even on 23.12.2011, there was no car parking space available and that falsifies subclause (c) of clause 11 of the lease deed. It was also argued that according to documentary evidence, till 29.12.2011, no lift was available in the said premises which falsifies subclause (d) of clause 11 of the lease deed. It was also argued that since the learned Sole Arbitrator ignored the vital documents as mentioned above, the award is liable to be set aside. Learned counsel for petitioner placed reliance on Arbitration No. 209/2016 (20311/2016) Page 9 of 19 pages M/s Alza Interiors vs Juggal Uppal & Anr.
the judgments of Hon'ble Delhi High Court in the case of Hindustan Lever vs Shri Shiv Khullar, 2008(2) ARBLR 42 (Delhi) and Engineering Development Corporation vs MCD, MANU/DE/9182/ 2007 in support of his contention that there is a difference between re appreciating evidence and considering whether material evidence has been ignored, which in present case is the documentary evidence qua nonexistence of electricity supply, DG set and lift at the time of execution of lease deed. It was also argued that learned Sole Arbitrator misinterpreted clause 11 of the lease deed by reading the word "has" as "shall".
8. On the other hand, learned counsel for respondents after taking me through the impugned arbitral award contended that it cannot be said that the learned Sole Arbitrator ignored any documentary evidence. It was argued on behalf of respondents that it remains unexplained as to why the petitioner remained silent till December 2013 qua the alleged deficiencies and continued to pay rent. It was argued that the learned Sole Arbitrator has interpreted clause 11 of the lease deed in accordance with law. Learned counsel for respondents placed reliance on the judgments in the case of National Highways Authority of India vs Gammon Atlanta (JV), 2017 Legal Eagle 122 and Gujarat Nre Coke Limited vs Jindal Steel & Power Limited, 2017 Legal Eagle 74 in support of his argument that under Section 34 of the Arbitration & Arbitration No. 209/2016 (20311/2016) Page 10 of 19 pages M/s Alza Interiors vs Juggal Uppal & Anr.
Conciliation Act, an arbitral award can be set aside only if the conditions mentioned in the said provision exist and not otherwise on any other ground.
9. It is in the backdrop of above rival pleadings and arguments that the impugned arbitral award has to be examined.
10. Broadly speaking, case set up by the petitioner before the arbitral tribunal was that the amenities assured in subclauses (a) to (e) of clause 11 of the lease deed were essential for running of the business of the claimant, so those services could not have been agreed to be provided in future and since those services were not existing as on 25.11.2011, claimant could not conduct the fit out and consequently could not commence its business from the said premises, therefore, claimant is entitled to refund of the advance rent and security. On the other hand, case set up by the respondents was that prior to execution of the lease deed, Shri Amit Ramani had duly inspected the said premises and had opted to take the same on lease after satisfying himself about the available facilities and claimant never challenged any of the terms of the lease deed ever; according to respondents, since foreign collaborators of claimant canceled their deal, the claimant fabricated false ground in order to wriggle out of its liability.
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11. Learned Sole Arbitrator examined the evidence adduced on record and specifically observed in the impugned award thus :
"After closely reading into the lines of the above cited clause (clause 11), in the light of entire evidence that has come on record in the form of affidavits of the witnesses especially crossexamination of Shri Ramani (CW1) held on various dates, it can be easily smelt that the claimants have made a futile attempt to find out an escape route to avoid the lockin period after their prospective foreign collaborator declined to go ahead with the claimant to start their business venture in India. A perusal of crossexamination of Shri Ramani proves the fact that the claimant backed out from the terms of the lease agreement because their business partners backed out of the deal with the claimant. In his crossexamination dated 07.12.2013, he clearly admits this fact which clinches the issue. He, in clear and categorical terms admits it to be correct that 'our business partners since backed out, therefore, we also backed out from the lease agreement'............. From crossexamination dated 19.05.2013 of Shri Ramani (CW1) it is also clear that the claimant had taken legal advice before signing the lease deed, where lockin period was mentioned in clear terms as 24 months. It, therefore, does not lie in his mouth that he was not aware if the services and the facilities mentioned in clause 11 of the lease deed were not available in the demised premises or few of these would be provided in due course. It is evident from the use of word "shall" in clause 11 of the lease deed. He also stands falsified that he was forced to sign the lease deed by fraud or misrepresentation, when he admits that before signing the deed he had taken legal advice. He is admittedly a well qualified architect. ..... From the above discussion, it can be safely concluded that there was a legally binding and valid lease agreement executed between the parties Arbitration No. 209/2016 (20311/2016) Page 12 of 19 pages M/s Alza Interiors vs Juggal Uppal & Anr.
and that lease could not be terminated before the expiry of lockin period ...".
12. To begin with, argument of learned counsel for petitioner that the learned Sole Arbitrator misinterpreted clause 11 of the lease deed is not legally sound. Keeping in mind the expressions "has provided" and "shall provide" used in clause 11, the issue as to whether clause 11 of the lease deed must be read to mean that the facilities mentioned in subclauses (a) to (e) thereof were already in existence at the time of execution of the lease deed or that the same were understood to be provided in future has to be left to the interpretation of the learned Sole Arbitrator. For, in view of both the said expressions "has provided"
and "shall provide" used in same clause of the lease deed, both interpretations were plausible in the overall factual matrix of this case.
13. In the case of Rashtriya Ispat Nigam Ltd. vs M/s Dewan Chand Ram Saran, Civil Appeal No. 3905/12 decided on 25.04.2012 by the bench of Hon'ble Mr. Justice H.L. Gokhale, the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India held thus :
"29. In any case, assuming that clause 9.3 was capable of two interpretations, the view taken by the arbitrator was clearly a possible if not a plausible one. It is not possible to say that the arbitrator had travelled outside his jurisdiction, or that the view taken by him was against the terms of contract. That being the position, the High Court had no reason to interfere with the award and substitute its view in place of the interpretation accepted by the arbitrator. The legal position in this behalf has been summarized in Arbitration No. 209/2016 (20311/2016) Page 13 of 19 pages M/s Alza Interiors vs Juggal Uppal & Anr.
paragraph 18 of the judgment of this court in SAIL vs Gupta Brother Steel Tubes Ltd. (supra) and which has been referred to above. Similar view has been taken later on Sumitomo Heavy Industries Ltd. vs ONGC Ltd. reported in [2010 (11) SCC 296] to which one of us (Gokhale J.) was a party. The observations in paragraph 43 thereof are instructive in this behalf. This paragraph 43 reads as follows :
43. The umpire has considered the fact situation and placed a construction on the clauses of the agreement which according to him was the correct one. One may at the highest say that one would have preferred another construction of Clause 17.3 but that cannot make the award in any way perverse. Nor can one substitute one's own view in such a situation, in place of the one taken by the umpire, which would amount to sitting in appeal. As held by this Court in Kwality Mfg. Corpn. v. Central Warehousing Corpn*.
The Court while considering challenge to arbitral award does not sit in appeal over the findings and decision of the arbitrator, which is what the High Court has practically done in this matter. The umpire is legitimately entitled to take the view which he holds to be the correct one after considering the material before him and after interpreting the provisions of the agreement. If he does so the decision of the umpire has to be accepted as final and binding. *[2009 (5) SCC 142] (emphasis supplied)
14. Besides, in the case of National Highways Authority of India vs Oriental Structural Engineers Pvt. Ltd., MANU/DE/0080/2015, the Hon'ble Delhi High Court referred to the judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court of India in the case of Steel Authority of India Ltd. vs Gupta Brother Steel Tubes Ltd., (2009) 10 SCC 63 in which it was held that an error by the arbitrator related to interpretation of contract is an error within his jurisdiction and is not an Arbitration No. 209/2016 (20311/2016) Page 14 of 19 pages M/s Alza Interiors vs Juggal Uppal & Anr.
error on the face of the award and is not amenable to corrections by the courts. It was further held that the legal position is no longer res integra that the arbitrator having been made final arbiter of resolution of disputes between the parties, the award is not open to challenge on the ground that arbitrator reached at a wrong conclusion. Traversing through various judicial pronouncements, the Hon'ble Delhi High Court held that if we were to start analyzing the contract between the parties and interpreting the terms and conditions thereof and which will necessarily have to be in the light of the contemporaneous conduct of the parties, it will be nothing else than sitting in appeal over the arbitral award and that is not permissible.
15. Further, a reading of the impugned arbitral award in the present case clearly reflects that the core issue before the learned Sole Arbitrator was as to whether stand of the claimant about his unawareness of nonexistence of facilities mentioned in clause 11 of the lease deed was a truthful stand or whether the same was a ruse to wriggle out since its foreign collaborator had canceled the deal. The core issue was not interpretation of clause 11 of the lease deed, as has been tried to be projected by learned counsel for petitioner. Once the arbitrator has analysed the evidence on record in order to arrive at finding of fact, in view of the settled legal position, this court acting under Section 34 of the Arbitration & Conciliation Act cannot sit as a court of appeal by re appreciating evidence.
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16. It is not a case of the learned Sole Arbitrator having ignored any evidence, as alleged on behalf of petitioner. The allegedly ignored documentary evidence, referred to by learned counsel for petitioner in support of his contention that the facilities of electricity supply, diesel genset and lift did not exist at the time of execution of the lease deed, has no relevance since as mentioned above, the core issue as understood by the learned Sole Arbitrator was as to whether the claimant was unaware about nonexistence of those facilities and according to the reading of the evidence by the learned Sole Arbitrator, the lease deed was executed only after Shri Ramani had inspected the said premises.
17. The scope of judicial review of an arbitral award is akin to review under Article 226 of the Constitution of India of the decision of bodies, where it is a settled principle of law that judicial review is of the decision making process and not of the decision itself on merits and the same cannot be converted into an appeal. Even Section 34 (2) (a) of the Act of 1996 amply clarifies the grounds of challenge on the lines of violation of principles of natural justice in making of the award or invalidity of the arbitral agreement and nonarbitrability of disputes arbitrated and composition of the arbitral tribunal or arbitral procedure being not in accordance with the agreement between the parties. None of the legislated grounds permits to challenge an arbitral award on merits by way of fresh appreciation of evidence.
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18. In the case of Associate Builders vs DDA, (2015) 3 SCC 49, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held thus :
"It must clearly be understood that when a court is applying his public policy test to an arbitration award, it does not act as a court of appeal and consequently errors of fact cannot be corrected. A possible view by the arbitrator on facts has necessarily to pass muster as the arbitrator is the ultimate master of the quantity and quality of evidence to be relied upon when he delivers his arbitral award. Thus, an award based on little evidence or on evidence which does not measure up in quality to a trained legal mind would not be held to be invalid on this score. Once it is found that arbitrator's approach is not arbitrary or capricious, then he is the last word on facts." (emphasis supplied)
19. In the case of Delhi Development Authority vs Bhardwaj Brothers, MANU/DE/1753/2014, a division bench of the Hon'ble Delhi High Court observed thus :
"It cannot also be lost sight of that nonconferring of finality on the arbitral awards not only affects the speed and expense of arbitration but also has a more subtle consequences of, extensive judicial review changing the nature of the arbitral process to an even greater extent. If arbitration becomes simply another level of decision making, subject to judicial review on merits, arbitrators may begin to decide cases and write opinions in such a way as to insulate their awards against judicial reversal producing opinions that parrot the appropriate statutory standards in conclusory terms, but suffer from a lack of reasoned analysis. Such a shift from the arbitral model in which decision makers are free to focus solely on the Arbitration No. 209/2016 (20311/2016) Page 17 of 19 pages M/s Alza Interiors vs Juggal Uppal & Anr.
case before them rather than on the case as it might appear to an appellate court, to the administrative model, in which decision makers are often concerned primarily with building a record for review, in my opinion would substantially undercut the ability of arbitrators to successfully resolve disputes. The courts therefore have no business weighing the merits of the grievance, considering whether there is equity in a particular claim or determining whether there is particular language in the written instrument which will support the claim. The agreement is to submit all grievances to arbitration, not merely those which the court may deem meritorious. The courts if start undertaking to determine the merits of the grievance, would be usurping the function which under the Arbitration Act, 1996 is entrusted to the arbitration tribunal. This plenary review by the courts of the merits would make meaningless the provisions that the arbitral award is final, for in reality it would almost never be final".
20. The impugned arbitral award in the present case is well reasoned. The learned Sole Arbitrator has also provided detailed reasons for awarding the money claimed in the counterclaim by the present respondents as discussed above, mainly on the principle that there was a legally binding and valid lease agreement between the parties which could not be terminated by either side prior to the expiry of the lockin period. The Sole Arbitrator also discussed at length the evidence brought on record through five witnesses examined on behalf of the present respondents pertaining to service tax records, payment receipts and rent invoices.
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21. There is no allegation in the present case that the learned sole arbitrator did not adopt a judicial approach or acted in violation of jus naturale. It is also nobody's case that the learned sole arbitrator has not acted bonafide or has not dealt with the subject in a fair, reasonable and objective manner or that the decision of the learned sole arbitrator was actuated by any extraneous consideration. No perversity or irrationality in the award has been made out nor it is contended to be a case of nonapplication of mind by the learned sole arbitrator.
22. I am unable to find any ground on which the impugned arbitral award could be set aside under the provisions of Section 34 of the Arbitration & Conciliation Act 1996, so the same is upheld. The objection petition is held meritless and the same is dismissed.
23. The original records of arbitral proceedings be returned to the learned Sole Arbitrator along with a copy of this judgment and file be consigned to records.
Announced in the open court on
this 02nd day of May 2018 (GIRISH KATHPALIA)
District & Sessions Judge
Digitally
signed by
South East, Saket Courts
GIRISH
GIRISH
KATHPALIA
New Delhi 02.05.2018 (a)
KATHPALIA Date:
2018.05.02
15:00:52
+0530
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M/s Alza Interiors vs Juggal Uppal & Anr.