Madras High Court
The Managing Director vs Periyapatty on 11 June, 2014
Author: S. Manikumar
Bench: S. Manikumar
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE OF MADRAS DATED: 11.06.2014 CORAM: THE HONBLE MR. JUSTICE S. MANIKUMAR CMA No. 1620 of 2014 and M.P.No.1 of 2014 The Managing Director, Tamilnadu State Transport Corpn. (Div.I) Chennimalai Road, Erode. ... Appellant Vs. 1.Periyapatty 2.Santha @ Santhamani 3.Subramanian 4.Savinthiri 5.S.Paraman 6.S.Moorthy 7.S.Babu Respondents The Civil Miscellaneous Appeal is filed under Section 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act against the award & Decree dated 30.11.2012 made in M.C.O.P.No.230 of 2011 on the file of the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal (Sub Judge), Sathyamangalam. For Appellant : Mr.Udayakumar JUDGMENT
At the outset, Mr.Udayakumar, learned counsel for the appellant State Transport Corporation submitted that the finding of the claims tribunal fixing negligence on the driver of the State Transport Corporation bus bearing Regn.No.TN33N1502 involved in the accident, is not challenged in this appeal. Submission of the learned counsel is placed on record. Hence, there is no need to advert to the aspect of negligence.
2. However, the learned counsel for the State Transport Corporation submitted that the claims tribunal has erred in fixing the monthly income of the deceased as R.4,500/- without any basis and consequently, awarded exorbitant compensation under the head loss of contribution to the respondents, who are the husband, son and daughters of the deceased.
3. Adverting to the above, it is the case of the respondents/claimants, that at the time of accident, the deceased was aged 60 years and as a vegetable vendor earned Rs.6,000/- per month. In the absence of any documentary proof, the claims tribunal declined to fix the monthly income as Rs.6,000/-. However, by fixing the monthly income as Rs.4,500/-, and by applying '9' multiplier with < deduction towards the personal and living expenses of the deceased, awarded Rs.3,64,500/- under the head loss of contribution to the family. In addition to the above, the claims tribunal awarded Rs.10,000/- under the head loss of consortium, Rs.60,000/- under the head loss of love and affection, Rs.5,000/- towards funeral expenses and a further sum of Rs.40,500/- under the head loss of estate and accordingly, apportioned the said amount to the respondents/claimants.
4. The deceased was stated to be a vegetable vendor. Small traders cannot be expected to produce any documentary evidence. Even taking it for granted that there is no proof, still, the loss of gratuitous and invaluable services rendered by a wife to her husband and as mother to her surviving children, cannot be lost sight of and more so, when the Apex Court, has held that gratuitous services rendered by a home maker can always be measured in terms of money for the purpose of computing the loss of contribution to the family and reference can be made to the decision in Arun Kumar Agrawal & Anr. Vs. National Insurance Co. Ltd. & Ors., reported in 2010(9) SCC 218, wherein, the Hon'ble Supreme Court, after considering the services, which the husband and the family stand to lose, due to the death of the house wife, as per Kemp on Negligence, at paragraph Nos.23 to 27, held as follows:
"23. In India the Courts have recognised that the contribution made by the wife to the house is invaluable and cannot be computed in terms of money. The gratuitous services rendered by wife with true love and affection to the children and her husband and managing the household affairs cannot be equated with the services rendered by others. A wife/mother does not work by the clock. She is in the constant attendance of the family throughout the day and night unless she is employed and is required to attend the employer's work for particular hours. She takes care of all the requirements of husband and children including cooking of food, washing of clothes, etc. She teaches small children and provides invaluable guidance to them for their future life. A housekeeper or maidservant can do the household work, such as cooking food, washing clothes and utensils, keeping the house clean 2 etc., but she can never be a substitute for a wife/mother who renders selfless service to her husband and children.
24. It is not possible to quantify any amount in lieu of the services rendered by the wife/mother to the family i.e. husband and children. However, for the purpose of award of compensation to the dependents, some pecuniary estimate has to be made of the services of housewife/mother. In that context, the term `services' is required to be given a broad meaning and must be construed by taking into account the loss of personal care and attention given by the deceased to her children as a mother and to her husband as a wife. They are entitled to adequate compensation in lieu of the loss of gratuitous services rendered by the deceased. The amount payable to the dependants cannot be diminished on the ground that some close relation like a grandmother may volunteer to render some of the services to the family which the deceased was giving earlier.
25. In Lata Wadhwa v. State of Bihar (supra), this Court considered the various issues raised in the writ petitions filed by the petitioners including the one relating to payment of compensation to the victims of fire accident which occurred on 3.3.1989 resulting in the death of 60 persons and injuries to 113. By an interim order dated 15.12.1993, this Court requested former 2 Chief Justice of India, Shri Justice Y.V. Chandrachud to look into various issues including the amount of compensation payable to the victims. Although, the petitioners filed objection to the report submitted by Shri Justice Y.V. Chandrachud, the Court overruled the same and accepted the report. On the issue of payment of compensation to housewife, the Court observed: So far as the deceased housewives are concerned, in the absence of any data and as the housewives were not earning any income, attempt has been made to determine the compensation on the basis of services rendered by them to the house. On the basis of the age group of the housewives, appropriate multiplier has been applied, but the estimation of the value of services rendered to the house by the housewives, which has been arrived at Rs.12,000 per annum in cases of some and Rs.10,000 for others, appears to us to be grossly low. It is true that the claimants, who ought to have given data for determination of compensation, did not assist in any manner by providing the data for estimating the value of services rendered by such housewives. But even in the absence of such data and taking into consideration the multifarious services rendered by the housewives for managing the entire family, even on a modest estimation, should be Rs.3000 per month and Rs.36,000 per annum. This would apply to all those housewives between the age group of 34 to 59 and as such who were active in life. The compensation awarded, therefore, should be recalculated, taking the value of services rendered per annum to be Rs.36,000 and thereafter, applying the multiplier, as has been applied already, and so far as the conventional amount is concerned, the same should be Rs.50,000 instead of Rs.25,000 given under the Report. So far as the elderly ladies are concerned, in the age group of 62 to 72, the value of services rendered has been taken at Rs.10,000 per annum and the multiplier applied is eight. Though, the multiplier applied is correct, but the values of services rendered at Rs.10,000 per annum, cannot be held to be just and, we, therefore, enhance the 2 same to Rs.20,000 per annum. In their case, therefore, the total amount of compensation should be redetermined, taking the value of services rendered at Rs.20,000 per annum and then after applying the multiplier, as already applied and thereafter, adding Rs.50,000 towards the conventional figure. (emphasis supplied)
26. The judgment of Lata Wadhwa's case was referred to with approval in M.S. Grewal and another v. Deep Chand Sood and others (2001) 8 SCC 151 for confirming the award of compensation of Rs.5 lacs in a case involving death of school children by drowning due to negligence of teachers of the school. In Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay v. Laxman Iyer and another (2003) 8 SCC 731, a two-Judge Bench while deciding the issue of award of compensation under Sections 110-A and 110- B of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, referred to the judgments in Lata Wadhwa's case and M.S. Grewal's case.
27. In A.Rajam v. M.Manikya Reddy, 1989 ACJ 542 (Andhra Pradesh HC), M. Jagannadha Rao, J. (as he then was) advocated giving of a wider meaning to the word `services' in cases relating to award of compensation to the dependants of a deceased wife/mother. Some of the observations made in that judgment are extracted below: The loss to the husband and children consequent upon the death of the housewife or mother has to be computed by estimating the loss of 'services' to the family, if there was reasonable prospect of such services being rendered freely in 2 the future, but for the death. It must be remembered that any substitute to be so employed is not likely to be as economical as the housewife. Apart from the value of obtaining substituted services, the expense of giving accommodation or food to the substitute must also be computed. From this total must be deducted the expense the family would have otherwise been spending for the deceased housewife. While estimating the `services' of the housewife, a narrow meaning should not be given to the meaning of the word `services' but it should be construed broadly and one has to take into account the loss of `personal care and attention' by the deceased to her children, as a mother and to her husband, as a wife. The award is not diminished merely because some close relation like a grandmother is prepared to render voluntary services."
At paragraph No.32, the Apex Court further held that, the gratuitous services rendered by wife/mother to the husband and children cannot be equated with the services of an employee and no evidence or data can possibly be produced for estimating the value of such services. It is virtually impossible to measure in terms of money the loss of personal care and attention suffered by the husband and children on the demise of the 2 housewife. In its wisdom, the legislature had, as early as in 1994, fixed the notional income of a non-earning person at Rs.15,000/- per annum and in case of a spouse, 1/3rd income of the earning/surviving spouse for the purpose of computing the compensation. Though, Section 163A does not, in terms apply to the cases in which claim for compensation is filed under Section 166 of the Act, in the absence of any other definite criteria for determination of compensation payable to the dependents of a non-earning housewife/mother, it would be reasonable to rely upon the criteria specified in clause (6) of the Second Schedule and then apply appropriate multiplier keeping in view the judgments of this Court in General Manager Kerala State Road Transport Corporation v. Susamma Thomas (Mrs.) and others, U.P. S.R.T.C. v. Trilok Chandra, Sarla Verma (Smt.) and others v. Delhi Transport Corporation and another and also take guidance from the judgment in Lata Wadhwa's case.
5. In Arun Kumar Agrawal's case, though the legal representatives claimed that she earned Rs.50,000/- per month by painting and handicrafts, the tribunal therein fixed the monthly income at Rs.5,000/- for computing the loss of contribution to the family and awarded Rs.6,00,000/- as compensation. But then, on appeal, the High Court reduced the same. When the correctness of the decision of the High Court was tested, the Apex Court by considering the various principles, The Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), gratuitous service rendered by the wife/mother and also by observing that gender equality has to be maintained, in assessing compensation for house wives, victims of road accident, restored the original compensation awarded by the claims tribunal.
6. In the case on hand the accident has occurred on 11.04.2011. A sum of of Rs.4,500/- fixed as the monthly income of the deceased cannot be said to be grossly excessive. Even if a house maid is engaged to do household works such as washing, cleaning and other incidental activities, in the year 2011, the wages or income that would have been paid to such housemaid would be around Rs.100/- to Rs.150/- per day. Even under the minimum wages Act, a daily rated workman could have been paid Rs.150/- per day. Therefore, in the light of the decisions stated supra and the discussion, this Court is of the view that a sum of Rs.4,500/- fixed as monthly income of the deceased, stated to be a vegetable vendor, cannot be said to be grossly excessive.
7. In Rajesh and others Vs. Rajbir Singh, reported in 2013 ACJ 1403, while considering the compensation awarded under the head, funeral expenses, the Apex Court taking judicial notice of the fact that the compensation awarded under the abovesaid head is less, at paragraph No.21, observed as follows:
We may also take judicial notice of the fact that the Tribunals have been quite frugal with regard to award of compensation under the head 'Funeral Expenses'. The 'Price Index', it is a fact has gone up in that regard also. The head 'Funeral Expenses' does not mean the fee paid in the crematorium or fee paid for the use of space in the cemetery. There are many other expenses in connection with funeral and, if the deceased is follower of any particular religion, there are several religious practices and conventions pursuant to death in a family. All those are quite expensive. Therefore, we are of the view that it will be just, fair and equitable, under the head of 'Funeral Expenses', in the absence of evidence to the contrary for higher expenses, to award at least an amount of Rs.25,000/-.
8. In the abovesaid case, the accident occurred on 05.10.2007. In the light of the observation of the Hon'ble Supreme Court, reverting back to the case on hand, the quantum of compensation of Rs.5,000/-, awarded under the head, 'funeral expenses is less. The Apex Court in the reported judgment awarded Rs.25,000/- towards funeral expenses.
9. Further, the claims tribunal has not awarded a just and reasonable compensation under the head transportation. A sum of Rs.40,800/- has been awarded under the head loss of estate. The excess compensation awarded under the head loss of estate, could be adjusted against the inadequate compensation under the head transportation and conventional damages to clothes and articles.
10. Though the learned counsel for the State Transport Corporation, made a submission that except the husband, sons and daughters are not entitled to compensation, this Court is not inclined to accept the said contention for the reason that the issue as to whether married sons and daughters are entitled to claim compensation, has been considered by this Court in the Branch Manager, M/s. National Insurance Co. Ltd., v. Tmt.Sumathi and others reported in 2012 AAC 2965, wherein this Court at paragraphs 25 to 28 and 34, held as follows:-
"25. 'Legal Representative' ordinarily includes heirs as well as persons, who represent the estate of the deceased person or a person, on whom, the estate devolves on the death of an individual. Right to claim for compensation by any or all legal representatives under Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act is a legal right. It is an assertable right enforceable before Courts and administrative agencies, in its wider sense and therefore, a legal right has to be understood, as any advantage or benefit conferred upon a person by a rule of law; and having regard to the manner, in which, a provision has to be interpreted, as held by the Supreme Court in the decisions stated supra, this Court is of the view that the definition of legal representatives cannot be restricted to exclude married daughters/sisters, from making any claim under section 166 of the Act and consequently, restrict their claim, only under Section 140 of the Act, which has been engrafted in the statute, with a specific object of compensating all the legal representative, whether there is negligence, on the part of the deceased or not. It is a "No Fault Liability" clause.
26. Courts have consistently held that what has been specifically excluded by a legislation in a provision cannot be imported into the section by the decisions of Court. By engrafting Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, enabling all the legal representatives to make a claim, in contra distinction to, Section 2(1)(d) of the Workmen's Compensation Act, which enables only the persons enumerated in the said section to claim compensation under section 3 of the Workmen's Compensation Act, the intention of the legislature is clear and the definition, "legal representative" cannot be narrowed down to mean only "dependents", excluding married daughters/sisters.
27. There could still be a case where there is contribution of a portion of the income of the deceased to a legal representative, who had preferred a claim and he/she would not be wholly dependent on the income of the deceased. A likelihood of loss of contribution from the deceased would give rise to a claim for compensation by him under Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, though he may not be a wholly dependent, as defined in Section 2(1)(d) of the Workmen's Compensation Act.
28. It is a well recognised rule of interpretation of statutes that the expressions used in the statute, should ordinarily be understood, in which, they harmonise with the object of the statute and which effectuate the objection of the legislature and the Court should adopt an object oriented approach, keeping in mind the language employed in the statute. When the legislature has used the words, Legal Representatives in Section 166 of the Act, and having regard to the duty of the Court to act upon the true intention of the legislature, Mens or Sententia Legis, this Court is not inclined to accept the submissions of the Insurance Company, intrepret and circumscribe the meaning of the words, Legal Representatives to mean only dependents. Just because a brother or sister is married, the right to represent the estate of the deceased is not taken away and such an interpretation, would make the provisions of law of succession, ineffective.
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34. Limiting the payment of compensation to some of the legal representatives, as per section 140 of the Act, to the exclusion of others, would amount to violation of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. In the light of the above, the contention that the married daughters are entitled to only compensation under Section 140 of the Motor Vehicles Act, under No Fault Liability claim of Rs.50,000/- alone cannot be countenanced. If the submissions of the learned counsel for the appellant-Insurance Company are to be accepted, then it would be introducing a bar or prohibition against a married daughter to prefer a claim under Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, which apparently is not the intention of the legislature. Monetary dependency is not the only factor to award compensation to the legal representatives.
11. Some of the decisions, on this aspect, relied on by this Court, in the above reported case, are as follows:
"29. The expression "legal representative" has been explained in Gujarat State Road Transport Corporation, Ahmedabad v. Ramanbhai Prabhatbhai and another reported in 1987 ACJ 561, as follows:
"10. Clauses ( b ) and ( c ) of sub-section (1) of Section 110-A of the Act provide that an application for compensation arising out of an accident may be made where death has resulted from the accident by all or any of the legal representatives of the deceased or by any agent duly authorised by all or any of the legal representatives of the deceased. The proviso to sub-section (1) of Section 110-A provides that where all the legal representatives of the deceased have not joined in any such application for compensation, the application shall be made on behalf of or for the benefit of all the legal representatives of the deceased and the legal representatives who have not so joined shall be impleaded as respondents to the application. The expression legal representative has not been defined in the Act. Section 2(11) of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 defines legal representative as a person who in law represents the estate of a deceased person and includes any person who intermeddles with the estate of the deceased and where a party sues or is sued in a representative character the person on whom the estate devolves on the death of the party so suing or sued. The above definition, no doubt, in terms does not apply to a case before the Claims Tribunal but it has to be stated that even in ordinary parlance the said expression is understood almost in the same way in which it is defined in the Code of Civil Procedure. A legal representative ordinarily means a person who in law represents the estate of a deceased person or a person on whom the estate devolves on the death of an individual. Clause (b) of sub-section (1) of Section 110-A of the Act authorises all or any of the legal representatives of the deceased to make an application for compensation before the Claims Tribunal for the death of the deceased on account of a motor vehicle accident and clause ( c ) of that sub-section authorises any agent duly authorised by all or any of the legal representatives of the deceased to make it. The proviso to sub-section (1) of Section 110-A of the Act appears to be of some significance. It provides that the application for compensation shall be made on behalf of or for the benefit of all the legal representatives of the deceased. Section 110-A(1) of the Act thus expressly states that ( i ) an application for compensation may be made by the legal representatives of the deceased or their agent, and ( ii ) that such application shall be made on behalf of or for the benefit of all the legal representatives. Both the person or persons who can make an application for compensation and the persons for whose benefit such application can be made are thus indicated in Section 110-A of the Act."
30. Interpreting Section 110-A (now amended as Section 166(1)), vis-a-vis, a corresponding provision in the Fatal Accidents Act, 1855, the Apex Court in Ramanbhai Prabhatbhai's case (stated supra) further held that, "These provisions are not merely procedural provisions. They substantively affect the rights of the parties. As the right of action created by the Fatal Accidents Act, 1855 was new in its species, new in its quality, new in its principles, in every way new the right given to the legal representatives under the Act to file an application for compensation for death due to a motor vehicle accident is equally new and an enlarged one. This new right cannot be hedged in by all the limitations of an action under the Fatal Accidents Act, 1855. New situations and new dangers require new strategies and new remedies."
31. While confirming the decision of Gujarat High Court in Megjibhai Khimji Vira v. Chaturbhai Taljabhai reported in 1977 ACJ 253 (Guj.), the Supreme Court at Paragraph 12, held that, "We feel that the view taken by the Gujarat High Court is in consonance with the principles of justice, equity and good conscience having regard to the conditions of the Indian society. Every legal representative who suffers on account of the death of a person due to a motor vehicle accident should have a remedy for realisation of compensation and that is provided by Sections 110-A to 110-F of the Act. These provisions are in consonance with the principles of law of torts that every injury must have a remedy. It is for the Motor Vehicles Accidents Tribunal to determine the compensation which appears to it to be just as provided in Section 110-B of the Act and to specify the person or persons to whom compensation shall be paid. The determination of the compensation payable and its apportionment as required by Section 110-B of the Act amongst the legal representatives for whose benefit an application may be filed under Section 110-A of the Act have to be done in accordance with well-known principles of law. We should remember that in an Indian family brothers, sisters and brothers children and some times foster children live together and they are dependent upon the bread-winner of the family and if the bread-winner is killed on account of a motor vehicle accident, there is no justification to deny them compensation relying upon the provisions of the Fatal Accidents Act, 1855 which as we have already held has been substantially modified by the provisions contained in the Act in relation to cases arising out of motor vehicles accidents."
32. In United India Insurance Company v. Kasiammal reported in 1997 (III) CTC 346, one of the contentions raised therein, challenging the award, was that a married son, who was living separately and not a dependant, is not entitled to claim compensation. The short question framed by this Court, at Paragraph 6 of the judgment, was whether the claimants, who were married sons and married daughters, entitled for compensation? While addressing the abovesaid question, a learned Judge has considered two decisions relied on by the appellant-Insurance Company therein in Revanben v. Kantibhai Narottamehai Gohil reported in 1995 ACJ 548 and U.P.State Road Transport Corporation v. Tara Devi reported in 1995 ACJ 1220 and also the decisions of the Apex Court in Bhagwatidin v. Gheesalal reported in 1980 ACJ 116, Gujarat State Road Transport Corporation, Ahmedabad v. Ramanbhai reported in AIR 1987 SC 1690 and Pushpam v. Nirmala reported in 1991 TLNJ 101, and at Paragraphs 15, 16 and 17, held as follows:
15. As pointed out earlier, the compensation amount is being paid to the legal representatives on account of untimely death of their ancestor. The dependency of the legal representatives is a question to be considered and does no mean only the dependents can claim compensation. The compensation being the amount for the loss to the estate of the deceased, it has to be considered as to whether the legal representatives had been put to loss because of the death of the deceased. Wherever the deceased is an earning member, naturally his savings is an accumulation for the estate which can be divided by the legal representatives after the death of the deceased. As the legal representatives had been put to loss of the earning of the deceased, the legal representatives are also entitled for the compensation.
16. Further in this case there is absolutely no evidence to show that the married sons are living separately. When they are residing with the mother, naturally the married sons had lost not only the assistance of the deceased mother but also lost her valuable advice in family matters. The deceased, being a widow, naturally she could have lived with any one of the sons. When the legal representatives, the married sons of the deceased are entitled for compensation even though they are residing separately, the claimants herein will be entitled for compensation; especially when they are residing with the deceased. More over, the aged parents in many a house are the watch dogs for the entire house, servants and the grand children except a few exceptional cases. When the claimants had lost such valuable services of their mother they are entitle for compensation. The loss cannot be substituted by any other confident or responsible person either in the family or by appointing a servant. If the contention of the counsel for the appellant is accepted, I do not surprise that in future the appellant may plead that generally the aged ones are only a liability in the family and since due to the accident the aged one died, the family is get rid of the same and the driver should be suitably rewarded by the legal representatives instead of claiming any compensation for the death of the deceased.
17. Further if the contention of the counsel for the appellant that the claimants are entitled only for the no fault amount is accepted, then a person who sustained some grievous injuries will be paid more than the amount that would be paid to the legal representatives i.e., married sons and daughters of the deceased and in that case it would be cheaper to kill than maim. If the claimants are to be paid the no fault amount, that may mean that the claimants are being paid some ex gratia payment out of sympathy and not for the loss of life of their ancestor. Hence the contention of the counsel for the appellant cannot be countenanced and there is absolutely no merit in the appeal and is dismissed."
33. It is worthwhile to reproduce the judgments in Pushpam's case (cited supra) and Bhagwatidin's case, which are as follows:
10. In fact in judgment reported in Pushpam v. Nirmala reported in 1991 TLNJ 101, the question considered is whether in a petition claiming compensation for injuries sustained by the claimant, after his death whether the sister can come on record as the legal representative. Venkataswami, J/has held, that the sister of the deceased claimant can be brought on record as the legal representative, in the following terms:-
"In more or less identical circumstances, V. Ramaswami, J, a he then was, in 1981 ACJ 185 (supra), after noticing a Division Bench Judgment of this Court in C.P.Kandaswamy v. Mariappa Stores, 1974 ACJ 3 held that by introducing Section 110-A in the Motor Vehicles Act, Parliament intended not to restrict the statutory right to claim damages to the injured alone. In the case of claims arising out of motor accidents, Clause (b) provides that the cause of action would survive to the legal representative where death has resulted from the accident. This was an exception to the general principle actio personalis moritor cum persona. It is true there is a distinction between case of death resulting from the accident and a case of other personal injuries not causing the death of the party, i.e., the party dying subsequently during the pendency of the proceedings not due to the accident. But the Motor Vehicles Act does not, in my opinion, make any distinction so far as the right to claim damages. The claims in all these cases are no statutory rights. Therefore, there appears to be no reason to restrict the right to the injured alone." Therefore, there appears to be no reason to restrict the right to the injured alone." The learned Judge further distinguished the Division Bench case (1974 ACJ 362) on facts. The learned Judge ultimately held as reasonable question of recovering the actual expenses incurred by the deceased, I have no doubt that the claim will survive since that amount if had not been spent might have been available as the estate of the deceased to be succeeded by his legal representatives." In 1987 II ACJ 561 (supra) the Supreme Court has elaborately considered the expression 'legal representative' in Section 110-A of the Act. After noticing the divergent views of the various High Courts, the Supreme Court has held as follows:-
"In the light of the principles laid down in the above two judgments, I am of the view that the decisions cited by the learned counsel for the first respondent, namely reported in Videowala v. Union of India, 1986 (II) MLJ 345 and reported in Kandaswamy v. Mariappa Stores, 86 L.W. 667, cannot be pressed into service. I am further of the view that the question of bringing on record or coming on record as legal representatives and the further question whether they are entitled to compensation on the facts and circumstances of the case are two different issues. Merely because they are brought on record, that does not automatically entitled them to get compensation. In the light of the wider meaning given to the expression 'legal representative' by the Supreme Court, though in a case of death in a motor accident, the order of the Court below cannot be sustained. Therefore, I hold that the petitioner is entitled to continue the proceedings and it is for the court below to decide whether the petitioner is entitled to compensation at all, and if so, how much in the light of the principles laid down in 1981 ACJ 185 (supra) and other cases."
12. On the whole, the quantum of compensation of Rs.4,80,000/- with interest at the rate of 7.5% per annum awarded to the legal representatives of the deceased, including the husband, cannot be said to be grossly excessive or a bonanza to the bereaved family, warranting interference. Hence, the Civil Miscellaneous Appeal is dismissed. No Costs. Consequently, the connected Miscellaneous Petition is closed.
13. Consequent to the dismissal of the appeal, the appellant Transport Corporation, is directed to deposit the entire award amount, with proportionate accrued interest and costs, less the statutory deposit, to the credit of M.C.O.P.No.230 of 2011 on the file of the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal (Sub Judge), Sathyamangalam, if not deposited earlier, within a period of four weeks from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. On such deposit, the respondents/claimants are permitted to withdraw their share in the award amount, with proportionate accrued interest and costs, as apportioned by the tribunal, by making necessary applications.
11.06.2014 Index: Yes/No Internet: Yes/No ars S.MANIKUMAR, J., ars To
1. The Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal (Sub Judge), Sathyamangalam
2. The Section Officer, VR Section, High Court, Madras.
CMA No. 1620 of 201411.06.2014