Himachal Pradesh High Court
Union Of India Through (Secretary) & ... vs . on 19 September, 2023
Union of India through (Secretary) & others vs. .
Secretary (Animal Husbandry) & others.
CMP No. 8117 of 2019 in RSA No. 392 of 2019 Order reserved on: 08.09.2023 19.09.2023 Present: Mr. Shashi Shirshoo, Central Government Counsel, for the appellants.
of Mr. Navlesh Sharma, Additional Advocate General, for respondents No. 1 to 4 and 9., The name of respondent No. 5 stands deleted. rt Respondents No. 6 to 8 already ex parte. The applicants have filed the present application seeking interim direction for staying the operation and execution of the judgment and decree dated 19.06.2017 passed by learned District Judge, Kinnaur, Civil Division at Rampur Bushehar, H.P. in Civil Appeal No. 02 of 2017 and to direct the parties to maintain status quo qua the nature and possession of the suit land till the disposal of the final appeal. It has been asserted that applicants are owners in possession of the suit land. The non-applicants/respondents are threatening to execute the judgment and decree passed by the learned First Appellate Court. In case, the operation and execution of the judgment and decree is not stayed, the very purpose of filing the appeal would be frustrated. No prejudice would be caused to the non-
applicants/respondents by the stay of the operation of the ::: Downloaded on - 19/09/2023 21:29:17 :::CIS judgment and decree; hence, it was prayed that this .
application be allowed.
2. No reply was filed to the application.
3. I have heard Mr.Shashi Shirshoo, learned Central of Government Counsel, for the applicants/ appellants and Mr. Navlesh Verma, learned Additional Advocate General, for rt non-applicnats/respondents No. 1 to 4 and 9.
4. Mr. Shashi Shirshoo, learned Central Government Counsel submitted that the learned Trial Court had rightly dismissed the suit. Learned First Appellate Court erred in allowing the appeal and declaring Secretary (Animal Husbandry) to be the owner of the suit land. The non-
applicants/respondents are bent upon executing the decree and in case, the judgment and decree are executed, the very purpose of filing the suit would be frustrated; hence, he prayed that this application be allowed and the judgment and decree passed by learned First Appellate Court be stayed.
5. Mr. Navlesh Verma, learned Additional Advocate General, for non-applicants/respondents No. 1 to 4 and 9 submitted that learned First Appellate Court had rightly allowed the appeal. A sale deed was executed in favour of respondent no. 1. Any gift deed could not have been executed ::: Downloaded on - 19/09/2023 21:29:17 :::CIS regarding the same land. The applicants have no prima facie .
arguable case; hence, he prayed that this application be dismissed.
6. I have given considerable thought to the rival of submissions at the bar and have gone through the records carefully.
7. rt The main suit was filed by respondents 1 to 4 (plaintiffs before learned Trial Court) seeking a declaration and permanent prohibitory injunction with the averments that the plaintiffs had purchased the suit land bearing Khasra No. 799/3 measuring 2-7 Bigha on 15.06.1981 vide sale deed No. 108/81 from late Sh. Kailash Chand father of defendants No. 4 to 7. He delivered the possession to the plaintiffs. However, Kailash Chand gifted the suit land fraudulently to ITBP, Sarahan. Mutation No. 97 was also sanctioned based on the gift deed on 22.02.1995.
8. The defendants opposed the suit for want of knowledge that the plaintiffs had purchased the land from Kailash Chand on 15.06.1981. However, it was admitted that Kailash Chand had executed a gift deed in favour of the defendants and a mutation was attested based on the gift deed. The gift deed was executed based on the revenue ::: Downloaded on - 19/09/2023 21:29:17 :::CIS entries existing on the relevant date; hence, it was prayed .
that the suit be dismissed.
9. Learned Trial Court held that the sale deed was duly registered but it was not signed by the purchaser. The of sale deed was also not produced before the revenue authorities for the attestation of the mutation. Kailash rt Chand had executed the gift deed based on the revenue record and there is no infirmity in the same; hence, the suit was dismissed.
10. Respondent No.1 filed an appeal, which was decided by learned District Judge, Kinnaur. Learned First Appellate Court held that there is no requirement of putting the signatures by the purchaser and the sale deed could not have been invalidated on the grounds of lack of signatures of the purchaser. Kailash Chand was not competent to execute any gift deed, since, he had no title over the property.
Kendriya Vidyalaya Sangathan was in possession and was not a party; therefore, the relief of possession and injunction could not be granted to the plaintiff.
11. Being aggrieved from the judgment and decree passed by the learned First Appellate Court, the defendants filed the present appeal asserting that the learned First ::: Downloaded on - 19/09/2023 21:29:17 :::CIS Appellate Court had wrongly reversed the well-reasoned .
judgment and decree passed by the learned Trial Court. The sale deed did not contain the signatures of the purchaser and learned Trial Court had rightly refused to place reliance on of the same. The sale deed was not presented before the revenue authorities and the learned Trial Court had rightly rt held the gift deed to be genuine, therefore, it was prayed that the present appeal be allowed and judgment and decree passed by the learned First Appellate Court be set aside.
12. It is apparent from the judgments of learned Courts below that they had upheld the plea of the plaintiffs that the sale deed was executed in their favour. Learned Trial Court refused to rely upon the sale deed on the ground that it does not bear the signatures of the purchaser. Learned First Appellate Court had rightly held that there is no requirement to obtain the signatures of the purchaser on the sale deed. It was also laid down by Hon'ble Supreme Court in Aloka Bose v.
Parmatma Devi, (2009) 2 SCC 582: 2008 SCC OnLine SC 1904, that the sale deed is not bad because it does not bear the signatures of the purchaser. It was observed:
"13. The defendant submitted that a contract for sale, like any other contract, is bilateral in nature under which both vendor and the purchaser have rights and obligations. It is submitted that an ::: Downloaded on - 19/09/2023 21:29:17 :::CIS agreement for sale being a contract for sale, creating .
a right in the purchaser to obtain a deed of conveyance in terms of the agreement under which, the vendor agrees to convey to the purchaser, and the purchaser agrees to purchase, the subject-matter of the agreement for an agreed consideration, subject to the terms and conditions stipulated in the said agreement, it is bilateral. It is therefore of contended that an agreement of sale is neither complete nor enforceable unless it is signed by both parties.
14. A certain amount of confusion is created on rt account of two divergent views expressed by two High Courts. In S.M. Gopal Chetty v. Raman [AIR 1998 Mad 169] a learned Single Judge held that where the agreement of sale was not signed by the purchaser, but only by the vendor, it cannot be said that there was a contract between the vendor and the purchaser; and as there was no contract, the question of specific performance of an agreement signed only by the vendor did not arise. On the other hand, in Mohd. Mohar Ali v. Mohd. Mamud Ali [AIR 1998 Gau 92] a learned Single Judge held that an agreement of sale was a unilateral contract (under which the vendor agreed to sell the immovable property to the purchaser in accordance with the terms contained in the said agreement), that such an agreement for sale did not require the signatures of both parties and that therefore an agreement for sale signed only by the vendor was enforceable by the purchaser.
15. We find that neither of the two decisions has addressed the real issue and cannot be said to be laying down the correct law. The observation in Mohd. Mohar Ali [AIR 1998 Gau 92] stating that an agreement of sale is a unilateral contract is not correct. A unilateral contract refers to a gratuitous promise where only one party makes a promise without a return promise. A unilateral contract is explained thus by John D. Calamari and Joseph M. Perillo in The Law of Contracts [4th Edn., Para 2- 10(a) at pp. 64-65]:
::: Downloaded on - 19/09/2023 21:29:17 :::CIS"If A says to B, 'If you walk across the Brooklyn .
Bridge I will pay you $100,' A has made a promise but has not asked B for a return promise. A has asked B to perform, not a commitment to perform. A has thus made an offer looking to a unilateral contract. B cannot accept this offer by promising to walk the bridge. B must accept, if at all, by performing the act. Because no return of promise is requested, at no point is B bound to perform. If B does perform, a contract involving two parties is created, but the contract is classified as unilateral because only one party is rt ever under an obligation."
All agreements of sale are bilateral contracts as promises are made by both -- the vendor agreeing to sell and the purchaser agreeing to purchase.
16. On the other hand, the observation in S.M. Gopal Chetty [AIR 1998 Mad 169] that unless an agreement is signed both by the vendor and purchaser, it is not a valid contract is also not sound. An agreement of sale comes into existence when the vendor agrees to sell and the purchaser agrees to purchase, for an agreed consideration on agreed terms. It can be oral. It can be by exchange of communications which may or may not be signed. It may be by a single document signed by both parties. It can also be by a document in two parts, each party signing one copy and then exchanging the signed copy as a consequence of which the purchaser has the copy signed by the vendor and a vendor has a copy signed by the purchaser. Or it can be by the vendor executing the document and delivering it to the purchaser who accepts it.
17. Section 10 of the Act provides that all agreements are contracts if they are made by the free consent by the parties competent to contract, for a lawful consideration and with a lawful object, and are not expressly declared to be void under the provisions of the Contract Act. The proviso to Section 10 of the Act makes it clear that the section will not apply to contracts which are required to be made in writing the presence of witnesses or any law relating to the ::: Downloaded on - 19/09/2023 21:29:17 :::CIS registration of documents. Our attention has not .
been drawn to any law applicable in Bihar at the relevant time, which requires an agreement of sale to be made in writing or the presence of witnesses or to be registered. Therefore, even an oral agreement to sell is valid. If so, a written agreement signed by one of the parties, if it evidences such an oral agreement will also be valid.
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18. In any agreement of sale, the terms are always negotiated and thereafter reduced in the form of an agreement of sale and signed by both parties or the vendor alone (unless it is by a series of offers and rt counter-offers by letters or other modes of recognised communication). In India, an agreement of sale signed by the vendor alone and delivered to the purchaser, and accepted by the purchaser, has always been considered to be a valid contract. In the event of a breach by the vendor, it can be specifically enforced by the purchaser. There is, however, no practice of the purchaser alone signing an agreement of sale.
19. The defendant next contended that the agreement of sale in this case (Ext. 2) was clearly in a form which required the signatures of both the vendor and purchaser. It is pointed out that the agreement begins as: "Agreement for sale between Kanika Bose and Parmatma Devi" and not an "Agreement of sale executed by Kanika Bose in favour of Parmatma Devi". Our attention is also drawn to the testimonium clause (the provision at the end of the instrument stating when and by whom it was signed) of the agreement, which reads thus:
"In witnesses whereof, the parties hereto have hereunto set and subscribed their respective hands and seals on these presents."
It is therefore contended that the agreement specifically contemplated execution by both parties; and as it was not so executed, it was incomplete and unenforceable.
20. We have carefully examined the agreement (Ext.
2), a photocopy of which is produced. The testimonium portion in the agreement is in an ::: Downloaded on - 19/09/2023 21:29:17 :::CIS archaic form which has lost its meaning. Parties no .
longer "subscribe their respective hands and seals".
It is true that the format obviously contemplates signature by both parties. But it is clear that the intention of the parties was that it should be complete on signature by only the vendor. This is evident from the fact that the document is signed by the vendor and duly witnessed by four witnesses and of was delivered to the purchaser. Apart from a separate endorsement made on the date of the agreement itself (7-9-1979) by the vendor acknowledging the receipt of ₹ 2001 as advance, it also contains a rt second endorsement (which is also duly witnessed) made on 10-10-1979 by the vendor, acknowledging the receipt of a further sum of ₹ 2000 and confirming that the total earnest money received was ₹ 4001. This shows that the purchaser accepted and acted in terms of the agreement which was signed, witnessed and delivered to her as a complete instrument and that she then obtained an endorsement thereon by the vendor, in regard to the second payment. If the agreement was not complete, the vendor would not have received a further amount and endorsed an acknowledgement thereon on 10- 10-1979.
21. Apart from the above, the evidence of the witnesses also shows that there was a concluded contract. Therefore, even though the draftsman who prepared the agreement might have used a format intended for execution by both vendor and purchaser, the manner in which the parties had proceeded, clearly demonstrated that it was intended to be executed only by the vendor alone."
13. Therefore, the learned First Appellate Court had rightly reversed the finding recorded by the learned Trial Court that the sale deed was not valid due to the absence of signatures of the vendee.
::: Downloaded on - 19/09/2023 21:29:17 :::CIS14. It was submitted that the sale deed was not .
presented before the revenue authorities. No mutation was attested on the same; hence, the plaintiffs cannot claim themselves to be the owners. This submission proceeds on of the basis that mutation confers the title upon the person in whose favour the mutation has been attested. This is not a rt correct proposition of law. It was laid down by the Hon'ble Privy Council about 100 years ago in Nirman Singh vs. Lal Rudra Partab Narain Singh AIR 1926 P.C. 100 that the mutation proceedings are not judicial and they do not decide the title. It was observed:-
"The perusal by their Lordships of the judgment of the Court of the Judicial Commissioner of Oudh leads their Lordships to think that it is to a great degree based on the mischievous but persistent error that the proceedings for the mutation of names are judicial proceedings in which the title to and the proprietary rights in immovable property are determined. They are nothing of the kind, as has been pointed out times innumerable by the Judicial Committee. They are much more in the nature of fiscal inquiries instituted in the interest of the State for the purpose of ascertaining which of the several claimants for the occupation of certain denominations of immovable property may be put into the occupation of it with the greater confidence that the revenue for it will be paid."::: Downloaded on - 19/09/2023 21:29:17 :::CIS
15. This position was reiterated by the Hon'ble .
Supreme Court in H. Lakshmaiah Reddy Vs. Venkatesh Reddy A.I.R. 2015 SC 2499, wherein it was held as under:-
"9. ... The assumption on the part of the High Court that as a result of the mutation, 1st defendant of divested himself of the title and possession of half share in suit property is wrong. The mutation entries do not convey or extinguish any title and those entries are relevant only for the purpose of collection rt of land revenue. The observations of this Court in Balwant Singh's case (supra) are relevant and are extracted below :
"21. We have considered the rival submissions and we are of the view that Mr Sanyal is right in his contention that the courts were not correct in assuming that as a result of Mutation No. 1311 dated 19-7-1954, Durga Devi lost her title from that date and possession also was given to the persons in whose favour mutation was effected. In Sawarni vs. Inder Kaur (1996) 6 SCC 223, Pattanaik, J., speaking for the Bench has clearly held as follows: (SCC p. 227, para 7) "7. ... Mutation of a property in the revenue record does not create or extinguish title nor has it any presumptive value on the title. It only enables the person in whose favour mutation is ordered to pay the land revenue in question. The learned Additional District Judge was wholly in error in coming to a conclusion that mutation in favour of Inder Kaur conveys title in her favour. This erroneous conclusion has vitiated the entire judgment."
22. Applying the above legal position, we hold that the widow had not divested herself of the title in the suit property as a result of Mutation No. 1311 dated 19-7-1954. The assumption on the part of the courts below that as a result of the mutation, ::: Downloaded on - 19/09/2023 21:29:17 :::CIS the widow divested herself of the title and .
possession was wrong. If that be so, legally, she was in possession on the date of coming into force of the Hindu Succession Act and she, as a full owner, had every right to deal with the suit properties in any manner she desired." In the circumstances, we are of the opinion that the High Court erred in concluding that the 1st of defendant by his conduct had acquiesced and divested himself of the title of his half share in the suit property and the said erroneous conclusion is rt liable to be set aside."
16. Similar is the judgment in Bhimabai Mahadeo Kambekar Vs. Arthur Import and Export Company AIR 2019 SC 719, wherein it was observed:-
"8. This Court has consistently held that mutation of land in the revenue records does not create or extinguish the title over such land nor it has any presumptive value on the title. It only enables the person in whose favour mutation is ordered to pay the land revenue in question. (See Sawarni(Smt.) vs. Inder Kaur, 1996 6 SCC 223, Balwant Singh & Anr. Vs. Daulat Singh(dead) by L.Rs. & Ors., 1997 7 SCC 137 and Narasamma & Ors. vs. State of Karnataka & Ors., 2009 5 SCC 591)."
17. This position was reiterated in Jitendra Singh Versus State of Madhya Pradesh & others (2021) 10 SCALE 413 wherein it was observed:
"6. Right from 1997, the law is very clear. In the case of Balwant Singh v. Daulat Singh (D) By Lrs., 1997 7 SCC 137, this Court had an occasion to consider the effect of mutation and it is observed and held that mutation of property in revenue records neither creates nor extinguishes title to the property nor has it any presumptive value on the title. Such entries are ::: Downloaded on - 19/09/2023 21:29:17 :::CIS relevant only for the purpose of collecting land .
revenue. A similar view has been expressed in the series of decisions thereafter.
6.1 In the case of Suraj Bhan v. Financial Commissioner, 2007 6 SCC 186, it is observed and held by this Court that an entry in revenue records does not confer a title on a person whose name appears in record-of-rights. Entries in the revenue records or jamabandi have only of "fiscal purpose", i.e., payment of land revenue, and no ownership is conferred on the basis of such entries. It is further observed that so far as the title of the property rt is concerned, it can only be decided by a competent civil court. A similar view has been expressed in the cases of Suman Verma v. Union of India, 2004 (12) SCC 58; Faqruddin v. Tajuddin, 2008 (8) SCC 12; Rajinder Singh v. State of J&K, 2008 (9) SCC 368; Municipal Corporation, Aurangabad v. State of Maharashtra, 2015 (16) SCC 689; T. Ravi v. B. Chinna Narasimha, 2017 (7) SCC 342; Bhimabai Mahadeo Kambekar v. Arthur Import & Export Co., 2019 (3) SCC 191; Prahlad Pradhan v. Sonu Kumhar, 2019 (10) SCC 259; and Ajit Kaur v. Darshan Singh, 2019 (13) SCC 70."
18. Therefore, in view of the binding precedents of the Hon'ble Supreme Court, the mutation does not confer any title and the absence of the mutation is not sufficient to take away the title upon the plaintiffs.
19. The Learned Trial Court held that the name of the plaintiffs was not recorded in the revenue record; therefore, the gift deed in favour of the defendants is valid. This reasoning ignores Section 3 of the Transfer of Property Act ::: Downloaded on - 19/09/2023 21:29:17 :::CIS and the definition of notice contained therein, which reads .
as under:-
"a person is said to have notice" of a fact when he actually knows that fact, or when but for wilful abstention from an enquiry or search which he ought to have made or gross negligence, he would have of known it.
Explanation I.--Where any transaction relating to immovable property is required by law to be and has rt been effected by a registered instrument, any person acquiring such property or any part of, or share or interest in, such property shall be deemed to have notice of such instrument as from the date of registration or, where the property is not all situated in one sub-district, or where the registered instrument has been registered under sub-section (2) of Section 30 of the Indian Registration Act, 1908 (XVI of 1908) from the earliest date on which any memorandum of such registered instrument has been filed by any Sub-Registrar within whose sub-district any part of the property which is being acquired, or of the property wherein a share or interest is being acquired, is situated:
Provided that--
(1) the instrument has been registered and its registration completed in the manner prescribed by the Indian Registration Act, 1908 (XVI of 1908) and the rules made thereunder, (2) the instrument or memorandum has been duly entered or filed, as the case may be, in books kept under Section 51 of that Act, and (3) the particulars regarding the transaction to which the instrument relates have been correctly entered in the indexes kept under Section 55 of that Act.
Explanation II.--Any person acquiring any immovable property or any share or interest in any ::: Downloaded on - 19/09/2023 21:29:17 :::CIS such property shall be deemed to have notice of the .
title, if any, of any person who is for the time being in actual possession thereof.
Explanation III.--A person shall be deemed to have had notice of any fact if his agent acquires notice thereof whilst acting on his behalf in the course of business to which that fact is material:
of Provided that, if the agent fraudulently conceals the fact, the principal shall not be charged with notice thereof as against any person who was a party to or otherwise cognizant of the fraud." rt
20. It is apparent from the bare perusal of the Section that where a document is registered, every person has deemed notice of the same. It was laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India in Bina Murlidhar Hemdev v.
Kanhaiyalal Lokram Hemdev, (1999) 5 SCC 222: 1999 SCC OnLine SC 596, that a person cannot claim to be a bona fide purchaser in respect of a transaction recorded by registered deed. It was observed:
"39. We now come to the question whether the 8th defendant can be said to be a bona fide purchaser for consideration without notice of the right of Murlidhar's heirs in the Lokram Group. Basically, we are of the view that the vendor of the builder could not have conveyed more interest than he had. If the release deed was bad, the vendor could not have conveyed the title of Murlidhar's branch. In that view of the matter, a plea of a bona fide purchase is, in fact, not available. If a buyer purchased from a vendor property which in part belonged to another and not to the seller, the real owners who were 3rd parties to the deed (Murlidhar's heirs) could not be told by the buyer that he was under the impression that somebody had purportedly sold their right to him.::: Downloaded on - 19/09/2023 21:29:17 :::CIS
Even so, we shall assume that a plea of bona fide .
purchaser without notice is permissible and examine whether the builder had no notice of Murlidhar's rights in the Lokram Group.
40. Now the rectification deed is a registered document. The agreement by the Sankhalas with the builder is dated 16-7-1994 and it specifically refers to the deed of rectification (dated 18-6-1992). The Jains' of agreement of sale dated 19-8-1994 with the builder no doubt omits to refer to the rectification deed and says that there are only some "claims" of the rt Lokrams. But the Sankhalas were obviously more truthful. Now if the agreement of the Sankhalas had put the builder on notice of the rectification deed specifically, as stated earlier, it is prima facie clear that the builder had actual notice and was obliged to enquire into its details. Thus there is actual notice.
There is also constructive notice in as much as the rectification deed is a registered deed and Section 3 of the Transfer of Property Act comes into play.
41. Under Section 3 of the Transfer of Property Act, "a person is deemed to have notice" of a fact when he actually knows that fact or when, but for wilful abstention from an enquiry or search which he ought to have made or gross negligence, he would have known it. Explanation I thereto says:
"Explanation I.--Where any transaction relating to immovable property is required by law to be and has been effected by a registered instrument, any person acquiring such property or any part of, or share or interest in, such property shall be deemed to have notice of such instrument as from the date of registration...."
42. In as much as the rectification deed is a registered deed, it is deemed to be notice to the builder in view of Section 3 of the Transfer of Property Act.
43. Once notice is there, actual as well as constructive, a plea of bona fide purchaser without notice of rights of the Lokram Group is not ::: Downloaded on - 19/09/2023 21:29:17 :::CIS permissible. For the present, we are not going into .
the question whether the fiction of a so-called release deed by Murlidhar's heirs is a creation of KanhaiyalalLokram alone or whether the builder had also a role in the creation of the release deed."
21. Thus, no advantage can be derived from the absence of mutation in favour of the plaintiffs.
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22. Both the learned Courts below have concurrently rt found that the sale deed was executed in favour of the plaintiffs. The gift deed was executed after the sale deed.
Thus, Kailash Chand was not left with any title to convey after the execution of the sale deed. It was laid down by Hon'ble Supreme Court in Kavita Kanwar Versus Mrs Pamela Mehta And Others AIR 2020 SC 2614, that no one can confer a better than what he has. It was observed:-
"30.6. It remains trite that no one can convey a better title than what he had; as expressed in the maxim:
'Nemo dat quod non habet'.[ See, for example, Narinder Singh Rao vs. Air Vice-Marshal Mahinder Singh Rao & Ors., (2013) 9 SCC 425, where the testatrix had bequeathed property in excess to her share and this Court held that the bequest has to be treated only to the extent of the share held by the testatrix.] The testatrix never had any right over the property belonging to the appellant and could not have conveyed to respondent No.1 any property which was of the ownership of the appellant or which might be acquired or raised by the appellant in future by her own funds. On this ground alone, the Will in question is required to be considered void as per Section 89 of the Succession Act, when the principal bequeathing stipulation in the Will suffers from uncertainty to the hilt."::: Downloaded on - 19/09/2023 21:29:17 :::CIS
23. Similar is the judgment in Mrs Umadevi Nambiar .
Versus Thamarasseri Roman Catholic Diocese (2022) 7 SCC 90, wherein it was observed:-
"19. It is a fundamental principle of the law of transfer of property that "no one can confer a better title than of what he himself has" (Nemo dat quod non-habet). The appellant's sister did not have the power to sell the property to the vendors of the respondent. Therefore, the vendors of the respondent could not have derived rt any valid title to the property. If the vendors of the respondent themselves did not have any title, they had nothing to convey to the respondent, except perhaps the litigation."
24. Therefore, the learned First Appellate Court had rightly declared the plaintiffs to be the owners of the suit land.
25. It was submitted that the execution of the sale deed was not proved by examining a competent person. In this regard, it is to be noticed that the defendants had not specifically denied the execution of the sale deed in favour of the plaintiffs but had denied it for want of knowledge, which is no denial at all. Even the learned Trial Court had not held that the execution of the sale deed was not properly proved.
It had proceeded on the basis that since the signatures of the purchasers were not put in the sale deed; therefore, the sale deed was bad. Thus, the plea that the execution of the sale deed was not properly approved is not acceptable.
::: Downloaded on - 19/09/2023 21:29:17 :::CIS26. Thus, the applicants have failed to prove a prima .
facie arguable case in their favour.
27. In case, the injunction prayed for is withheld, the applicants will not suffer as they have failed to prove that of they are the owners of the suit land. The gift deed executed in their favour was held to be bad by the learned First rt Appellate Court for want of competence and there is no infirmity in the findings recorded by the learned First Appellate Court, whereas, the non-applicants/respondents will suffer as they will be deprived of the land to which, they are entitled being the purchasers, thus, the balance of convenience also does not exist in favour of the applicants.
28. In view of the above, the present application fails and the same is dismissed. The observations made hereinbefore shall remain confined to the disposal of the application and will have no bearing whatsoever on the merits of the case.
The application stands disposed of.
(Rakesh Kainthla) Judge 19th, September, 2023 (saurav pathania) ::: Downloaded on - 19/09/2023 21:29:17 :::CIS