Calcutta High Court (Appellete Side)
Prabash Aich And Another vs Sri Shiv Shankar Aich And Others on 6 December, 2017
Author: Harish Tandon
Bench: Harish Tandon
Form No. J(2) IN THE HIGH COURT AT CALCUTTA Civil Revisional Jurisdiction Appellate Side Present:
The Hon'ble Justice Harish Tandon.
C.O. 4697 of 2016 Prabash Aich and another.
Vs. Sri Shiv Shankar Aich and others.
For the Petitioners : Mr. S. P. Roy Chowdhury,
Mr. Indra Nath Mukherjee.
For the Opposite Party No. 1 : Mr. Hiranmoy Bhattacharya,
Mr. Tarak Nath Halder.
Judgment on : 6th December 2017.
The Court: This revisional application is directed against order no. 28 dated 20th September 2016 passed by the learned Civil Judge (Senior Division), Sealdah in Title Suit No. 116 of 2014, by which an application under Order VII Rule 11(d) of the Code of Civil Procedure is rejected.
The petitioners are the defendant nos. 2 and 4 in a suit for declaration that the purported deed of gift dated 15th October 2008 is void, inoperative, illegal and be declared as such. Apart from the same, the plaintiff/opposite party claimed further relief in the form of partition and separation of shares.
Before this Court proceeds to decide the core issue involved in the instant application, it would be relevant and profitable to adumbrate the salient features of the case.
It is alleged in the plaint that one Namita Rani Aich, since deceased, being the mother of the plaintiff/opposite party, was a thika tenant in respect of a land measuring one cottah one chittak and was also the owner of the structure/dwelling house constructed thereupon and comprised in premises no. B/20/H/22, Harish Neogy Road, P.S. Maniktala, Kolkata - 700067. The said thika tenanted property devolved upon her five sons and two daughters on the death of the said mother, who are arraigned as parties in the said proceeding. During pendency of the suit the original defendant no. 1 died and his heirs and legal representatives are duly substituted.
The plaintiff/opposite party asserts that by virtue of intestate succession according to Hindu Law all the sons and daughters inherited the estate left by the mother and became joint owners of the said thika tenanted property. The plaintiff/opposite party asked for amicable partition, which was refused by the defendants, more particularly, the defendant nos. 2 and 4, the petitioners herein, on the pretext that by virtue of a purported deed of gift executed and registered by the mother on 15th October 2008, all her interest in the said property was gifted in their favour.
A certified copy of the purported deed of gift was obtained from the Registration Office and it was found that the said deed of gift cannot have any legal flavour in view of an express embargo created under Section 5 of the West Bengal Thika Tenancy (Acquisition and Regulation) Act, 2001 (hereinafter referred to as 'said Act'). In other words, the said deed of gift was executed without obtaining prior permission of the Thika Controller, which is sine qua non for transfer inter se.
It is further alleged that the donor was incompetent to read and understand the English language and it appears that in the single page of the deed of gift her signature appears to be in Bengali language and, therefore, it raises a doubt as to her capacity to understand the nature of the document at the time of its purported execution. It is further averred that she was suffering from various ailments and also lost her sight and she was, therefore, incapable to understand the real affairs.
The relief claimed in the said suit is not only that the purported deed of gift is illegal, void and inoperative but by virtue of intestate succession a decree for partition be passed separating the shares of the co-sharers.
Though the petitioners have filed a written statement in the said suit but they took a specific plea that the court cannot decide whether the purported deed of gift was executed strictly in conformity with the provision of Section 5 of the said Act or not and the power to determine the same is vested upon the Thika Controller, West Bengal and not by the Civil Court.
Apropos such stand taken in the written statement, an application under Order VII Rule 11(d) of the Code was taken out for rejection of the plaint as the relief claimed therein is expressly barred under the provisions of the said Act.
The trial court rejected the said application on the ground that whether the donor had a capacity to execute the deed of gift is a matter to be decided by a Civil Court and not by the Thika Controller under the said Act and proceeded to dismiss the said application on that score alone.
Mr. S. P. Roy Chowdhury, learned senior advocate appearing on behalf of the petitioners, submits that the principal relief in the instant suit relates to declaration as to the validity or invalidity of the purported deed of gift on the ground that it offends the provisions contained under Section 5 of the said Act and can only be decided by the Thika Controller. He strenuously submits that in view of Section 21 of the said Act the jurisdiction of the Civil Court has been expressly excluded in relation to matters and affairs concerning Thika Controller and, therefore, the trial court erred in law in rejecting the application under Order VII Rule 11(d) of the Code. In other words, Mr. Roy Chowdhury emphasized on the provisions contained under Section 5(4) of the said Act, which makes imperative on the parties before transferring the shares inter se amongst the heirs and the legal representatives or the prospective heirs to take prior permission of the Thika Controller and if the stand of the plaintiff, as would appear in paragraph 7 of the plaint, is that the said deed is inoperative, void and illegal, as no prior permission was taken, such issue can only be decided by the Thika Controller and not by the Civil Court. In support of the aforesaid contention, he firstly relies upon a judgment of a Co-ordinate Bench in case of Smt. Suchita Ruia & Ors. Vs. Vikash Fabrics Pvt. Ltd. & Ors., reported in (2016) 5 West Bengal Law Reports (Cal) 370 and secondly, a judgment of this Court in case of Sri Samaarendra Nath Das @ Samar Das vs. M/s. Bengal Central Building Society Limited & Ors., reported in (2016) 2 West Bengal Law Reports (Cal) 350. He strenuously submits that unless the principal relief is adjudicated and/or determined the relief in the form of partition of the property is ancillary and incidental thereto and, therefore, cannot stand independently.
On the other hand, Mr. Hiranmoy Bhattacharya, learned advocate appearing on behalf of the plaintiff/opposite party, submits that the challenge to the purported deed of gift is launched in two ways; firstly, that it is in contravention to the provisions contained under Section 5(4) of the said Act and secondly, incapacity of the mother to understand and the deed having obtained by fraud and undue influence. According to Mr. Bhattacharya, if both the grounds are taken to impinge the deed of gift, the court should not segregate such ground suo motu and reject the plaint as one of the grounds appears to be barred by provisions of law.
On the conspectus of the aforesaid submissions, the core issue involved in the instant revisional application is whether the trial court committed any error in rejecting the application under Order VII Rule 11(d) of the Code on the ground that the second ground of attack to the impugned deed is within the jurisdiction and powers of the Thika Controller.
There is no hesitation in my mind that the plaintiff/opposite party claimed twin fold reliefs in the plaint; firstly, declaration of the purported deed to be illegal, void and inoperative having executed in contravention to the provisions of the Act and secondly, a decree for partition, as the thika tenanted property being heritable one, is also capable of being partitioned amongst the heirs and legal representatives of the original owner. It would be apt to recapitulate the relevant provisions, which, in my opinion, would be applicable and needs interpretation for the limited purpose as indicated above.
"Section 5. Incidents of tenancies in respect of lands vested in this State.-(1) Subject to the provisions of the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976 (33 of 1976), and the provisions of this Act, every thika tenant, occupying any land under a landlord on the date of commencement of this Act, shall occupy such land, on such terms and conditions as may be prescribed, directly under the State as if the State had been the landlord in respect of that land.
(2) Every thika tenant holding directly under the State under sub-
section (1) shall be liable to pay to the State Government in the prescribed manner such revenue as may be determined.
[(3) If any question arises as to whether a person is a thika tenant or not or whether the land in question is thika land or not, the Controller, either on his own motion or upon receiving any information, may, after giving the persons interested an opportunity of being heard and after examining all such documents and particulars as may be considered necessary, enquire upon and decide such question.] (4) The interests of the thika tenants holding directly under the State under sub-section (1) shall be heritable and shall not be transferable except inter se amongst the heirs and existing co-shares-interest and spouses or to the prospective heirs, with a prior permission of the Controller, subject to the provisions of sub-section (1) of section 6.
(5) The thika tenants holding directly under the State under sub- section (1) shall be entitled [to construct pucca structures or to change the nature, character and dimension of an existing structure on the land] in accordance with the building plans sanctioned under the Kolkata Municipal Corporation Act, 1980 (West Ben. Act LIX of 1980), and the rules made thereunder, or the Howrah Municipal Corporation Act, 1980 (West Ben. Act LVIII of 1980), and the rules made thereunder, according as the land may be situated within Kolkata as defined in clause (9) of section 2 of the Kolkata Municipal Corporation Act, 1980 (West Ben. Act LIX of 1980), or Howrah as defined in clause (15) of section 2 of the Howrah Municipal Corporation Act, 1980 (West Ben. Act LVIII of 1980), for-
a) residential and business purposes for themselves and the Bharatias under them; and
b) essential common facilities like common pathway, common bath, toilet, water supply, drainage, sewerage, lighting and similar other purposes :
Provided that the thika tenants holding directly under the State under sub-section (1), shall obtain a no objection certificate from the Controller before making any pucca construction or changing the nature, character and dimension of an existing structure on the land, irrespective of the area of the land.
(6) The thika tenant holding directly under the State under sub-
section (1), shall be liable to pay rent to the State Government at such rate and in such manner as may be prescribed.
Section 6. Thika tenant not to let out vacant land.-(1) The thika tenants holding lands directly under the State shall be entitled to let out in whole or in part structures existing on, or constructed after, the date of commencement of this Act on such lands but not any vacant land or any part thereof.
(2) Any transfer or agreement for transfer, whether oral or in writing, of any activity in contravention of the provisions of sub-section (4) [, or sub-section (5), or proviso to sub-section (5), of section 5], shall be declared invalid under an order of the Controller and the structure or part of structure, as the case may be, shall stand forfeited to the State in accordance with the procedure as may be prescribed.
(3) Notwithstanding anything contained in this section, where a pucca structure has been constructed without No Objection Certificate as required by the proviso to sub-section (5) of section 5, the Controller may , subject to the provisions of any other law for the time being in force, after being satisfied that the forfeiture of such structure to the State under sub- section (2) will cause hardship to the thika tenant or the Bharatia, as the case may be, issue a provisional certificate for the purpose of obtaining construction plan sanctioned by the local authority :
Provided that the Controller shall not issue final certificate unless the thika tenant has produced a construction plan of such structure sanctioned by the local authority to the Controller within such time and on payment of such fee, as may be prescribed :
Provided further that if the thika tenant fails to produce such sanctioned plan within such prescribed time to the Controller, the Controller may invoke the procedure of forfeiture under sub-section (2).
(4) Whenever it appears to the State Government that the land comprised in any thika tenancy is needed, or is likely to be needed, for any public purpose, it may, after giving the thika tenant and the Bharatias, if any, an opportunity of being heard, resume the land comprised in such thika tenancy with or without structures, if any, and take possession of the land :
Provided that immediately after such resumption, the State Government shall pay to the thika tenant or the Bhararia, if any, an amount not exceeding ten times of the compensation determined under sub-section (6) of section 7 of the Act in addition to the compensation determined under sub-section (6) of section 7.
(5) A Controller after satisfying himself that a Bharatia stays at the structure forfeited under sub-section (2) above may [grant licence to such Bhaaratia in respect of so much area of such structure as is occupied by such Bharatia and such licence may be granted on such terms and conditions, and in such manner, as may be prescribed.]"
It is manifest from the aforesaid provisions that the property comprised in thika tenancy stood vested in the State of West Bengal with effect from 18th January 1982 and the thika tenant shall hold the said property directly under the State and being liable to pay the State such revenue as may be prescribed. It is further discernable from the above provisions that any question relating to whether the person is thika tenant or not or whether the land in question is thika land or not shall be determined by the Controller. Sub-section (4) of Section 5, which, in my view, assumes significance and relevance in the issue involved herein provides that the interest of thika tenant shall be heritable but not transferable except inter se amongst the heirs and existing co-sharers or to the prospective heirs with the prior permission of the Controller. Sub-section (2) of Section 6 of the said Act renders any transfer or agreement for transfer to be illegal and void if it is in contravention to the provision of sub-section (4) of section 5 or proviso to sub-section (5) of Section 5 of the said Act and a declaration in this effect can be made by the Thika Controller in accordance with the procedure as may be prescribed.
It is axiomatic to record that any transfer whether oral or in writing or agreement for transfer or intention to create any interest in respect of a thika tenant is invalid, illegal and void. Since the thika tenancy right is heritable one and exception is curved out in relation to a transfer made amongst the heirs and co-sharers and also to the prospective heirs, which is again subject to the prior permission of the Thika Controller to be obtained by the intending thika tenant. Therefore, it cannot be said that the transfer of a thika tenancy right is absolutely prohibited or forbidden under the law but it can be so made inter se between the heirs and the co-sharers or creation of any such right upon the prospective heirs.
In the instant case, the mother, who was admittedly a thika tenant, executed a deed of gift in favour of her two sons, the petitioners herein, and according to the plaintiff/opposite party, such deed is void, inoperative and illegal as no prior permission was obtained by the mother from the Thika Controller.
In view of the provisions contained under Section 6(2) of the said Act, there is no doubt in my mind that the Thika Controller enjoins powers and jurisdiction to pass an order invalidating the purported deed of gift having made in contravention to the provisions of sub-section (4) of Section 5 of the said Act.
The contention of Mr. Bhattacharya that the said purported deed of gift is not only challenged on such ground but the challenge is also thrown on the ground of undue influence, fraud, incapacity of the executant/donor to execute the said document. Mr. Bhattacharya wanted an accommodation to take necessary instruction so that the first ground of attack averred in paragraph 7 can be avoided and/or deleted from the plaint, as according to him the other grounds reflected in paragraph 8 of the plaint is sufficient enough to declare such deed to be void.
I am unable to accede to such prayer of Mr. Bhattacharya as this Court finds that even in absence of any express averments relating to non-taking of prior permission of the Thika Controller yet the question whether such deed is valid in view of the provisions contained in the said Act remains an issue to be decided and determined by the court. Even if this Court ignores, for the sake of the argument, the averments made in paragraph 7 of the plaint, yet this Court finds that the relief remains unaltered and the court has to first decide whether such deed offends any of the provisions of the Act applicable in this regard. Both the grounds though appear to have been taken independently but are intertwined and/or mingled in such fashion that the severance is practically impossible. Once the special statute conferred power and jurisdiction upon an authority, in this case Thika Controller, and contains an express exclusion provision, Section 9 of the Code is attracted in this regard and it is first and foremost duty of the Court to take a decision relating to the jurisdiction and competence to determine the issues. The rule of competence may also be pressed in action, as the order passed by the court lacking inherent jurisdiction is per se illegal, void and a nullity.
Section 21 of the said Act excludes the jurisdiction of a Civil Court to deal with any question or to determine any matter, which, by or under this Act, is required to be or has been, decided or dealt with, or which is to be, or has been, determined, by the Controller or the appellate or the other authority specified in the provisions of this Act, and no order or a judgment can be questioned before the Civil Court.
The applicability of the exclusion provision came up for consideration before the Co-ordinate Bench in case of Smt. Suchita Ruia & ors. (supra), where on somewhat identical facts the point arose whether the Civil Court is competent to decide any matter, which is expressly conferred upon the Thika Controller. The Co-ordinate Bench held:
"16. In terms of the said ratio of the decisions discussed above it seems to me that following considerations are essential for disposal of an application under Order VII Rule 11 of the Civil Procedure Code viz. (1) whether the meaningful reading discloses a specific cause of action or not; (2) whether by way of a clever drafting an important part of cause of action has been concealed under an artful advocacy; (3) whether the said cause of action attracts any legal bar or not. On perusal of the plaint of Title Suit No. 397 of 2008 it seems to me that consideration of thika tenancy is the integral part of the claim of the right of the respective parties. Now I am to consider Section 5(3) of Thika Tenancy Act (prior to amendment) once. It speaks "if any question arises as to whether a person is a tenant or not the matter shall be decided by the controller." Plaint speaks that the plaintiffs/opposite parties desires to establish their right over the suit property as a thika tenant and so in para 5 of the plaint they have stated that after promalgamation of Calcutta Thika Tenancy Act, 1981 status of his predecessor-in-interest has been changed and at present the plaintiffs and Nirmal Kumar Ruia had been continuing in their possession by erecting structure therein. Therefore, there is a clear indication in the plaint itself that they claim their title and right of properties whatsoever they may have on the basis of the thika tenancy right and naturally Section 21 of Thika Tenancy Act shall come into play. Section 21 of the Thika Tenancy Act clearly speaks "S. 21. Bar to jurisdiction. - No civil court shall have jurisdiction to decide, or to deal with, any question, or to determine any matter, which, by or under this Act, is required to be, or has been, decided or dealt with, or which is to be, or has been, determined, by the Controller or the appellate or other authority specified in the provisions of this Act, and no order or judgment passed, or proceedings including execution proceedings commenced, under the provisions of this Act shall be called in question in any civil court."
17. Before coming to the conclusion in regard to under Order VII Rule 11 of the Civil Procedure Code the first question to be answered is:-
(1) Do these disputes involve any question (whether legal or factual) on which the existence or extent of a legal right of the plaintiffs depends? If it does then the next question is whether the raising of such disputes is barred by any law. If the aforesaid questions, the answers are afirmative, then the plaint must be rejected as a whole. Where truth is covered under a thin layer of mystery and falsehood, the duty of the Court is to unveil the mystery and to explore the truth."
In case of Sri Samarendra Nath Das @ Samar Das (supra), the Division Bench was considering the same point, which is urged in the instant revisional application, pertaining to a suit filed by the plaintiff therein for declaration of a deed to be void and mandatory injunction to restore the property to him. In the said report, the purported deed was admittedly executed after coming in force of the West Bengal Thika Tenancy (Acquisition and Regulation) Act, 2001. A plea was taken by the defendant before the trial court that the relief of such nature is expressly barred and the Civil Court cannot determine the same because of Section 21 of the said Act. The Division Bench held:
"8. In our instant case a plaint reading of the averments in the plaint shown that in the garb of a decree for declaration and mandatory injunction plaintiff has assailed the transfer in respect of 'B' schedule property in favour of defendant No. 2 by virtue of the deed of conveyance dated 27th July, 2011. In paragraph 13 of the plaint it has been stated that the schedule 'B' property is comprised in Thika tenancy and as such the transfer of the said property by the defendant No. 1 offends the provision of the W.B.T.T. Act 2001 and consequently renders the deed of conveyance void. Manifestly, without declaring as invalid the said deed of conveyance, the reliefs sought for by the plaintiff in the suit cannot be granted. Sub-section (2) of Section 6 of the W.B.T.T. Act 2001 clearly provides that any transfer of agreement for transfer, whether oral or in writing or any activity in contravention of the provisions of sub-section (4) or sub-section (5) or Section 5 or proviso to sub-section (1) of this Section, shall be declared invalid under an order of the Controller. The power to declare as invalid the deed of conveyance in question which has been challenged by the plaintiff in Paragraph 13 of the plaintiff exclusively vests with the Controller in view of sub-section (2) of Section 6 of the Act. Therefore the jurisdiction of the Civil Court to decide the issue has been completely excluded in Paragraph 8 of the plaint it has been mentioned that schedule 'B' property is a part of schedule 'A' property whereas the suit schedule 'C' property is a part of schedule 'B' property. The relief sought for by the plaintiff is in respect of schedule 'C' property which is, as per the above statement in the plaint, a part of schedule 'B' property which is the subject of the impugned deed of conveyance dated 27th July, 2011. Section 21 of the W.B.T.T. Act clearly bars the jurisdiction of the Civil Court to deal with or to decide any question, or to determine any matter, which, by or under this Act, is required to be, or has been, decided or dealt with, or which is to be or has been, determined by the Controller, or the appellate or other authority specified in the provisions of this Act. The fact that the plaintiff has challenged the sale deed in question is also clear from Paragraph 14 of the plaint wherein it has been averred that the cause of action of the suit arose on diverse dates starting from the month of July, 2011 with the execution of the sale deed between the defendant No. 1 and the defendant No. 2. Evidently, a bare perusal of the plaint itself reveals that the crux of the dispute is the impugned deed of conveyance dated 27th July, 2011. Without declaring the aforesaid deed as void, a decree for restoration of possession in respect of schedule 'C' property as prayed for by the plaintiff cannot be granted. As already mentioned, Sub- Section (2) of Section 6 of the W.B.T.T. Act authorises the Controller to decide the aforesaid dispute raised by the plaintiff in the suit."
However, an identical argument was sought to be made before the Division Bench that the validity and/or invalidity of the impugned transfer on other grounds than a mere ground of sub-section (4) of Section 5 can only be determined by the Civil Court. Rejecting the aforesaid contention, the Division Bench held:
"9. The decisions referred by the learned Counsel for the appellant are clearly distinguishable on facts from our present case. In the case of State of Tamil Nadu v. Ramlinga Samigal Madam reported in (1985)4 SCC 10 it was held that the Settlement Officer's decision regarding grant or refusal to grant ryotwaari patta in respect of land would not bar or exclude the Civil Court's jurisdiction to determine the nature of the land. This judgment differs on facts from our present case. In Dhulabhai's case reported in AIR 1969 Supreme Court 78 the principles regarding exclusion of jurisdiction of the Civil Court have been laid down. It has been held in the aforesaid decision that where the statute gives a finality to the orders of the special tribunals the Civil Court's jurisdiction must be held to be excluded if there is adequate remedy to do what the Civil Court would normally do in a suit. In our instant case the plaintiff/appellant's specific case in the plaint is that the subject of the deed of conveyance dated 27th July, 2011 is schedule 'B' property which is comprised in thika tenancy and as such the transfer of such property offends the provision of W.B.T.T. Act 2001 and consequently renders the deed of conveyance void. In paragraph 8 of the plaint it has been mentioned that schedule 'B' property is a part of schedule 'A' property whereas schedule 'C' property is a part of schedule 'B' property. In view of sub-section (2) of Section 6 of the W.B.T.T. Act 2001, it is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Controller to declare the impugned transfer of such property as invalid which the plaintiff virtually seeks from the Civil Court in terms of prayers
(b), (c) and (d) of the plaint. Granting the aforesaid reliefs to the plaintiff would be tantamount to declaring as invalid the alleged transfer of the property in question by virtue of the impugned deed of conveyance. The above mentioned provision of the W.B.T.T. Act clearly excludes the Civil Court's jurisdiction to deal with the matter. The judgments report in (2008) 15 SCC 517 (N. Padmamma and others v. S. Ramkrishna Reddy and others) and AIR 2010 Supreme Court 2897 (Ramesh Gobindram (deceased by LRs.) v. Sugra Humayun Mirza Wakf.) are also of no avail to the appellant for the simple reason that from the statements in the plaint itself, the suit appears to be barred by Section 21 of the West Bengal Thika Tenancy (Acquisition and Regulation) Act, 2001."
The proposition of law enunciated in the aforesaid two reports are that normally the suit for declaration of civil right is maintainable before the Civil Court unless the jurisdiction of the Civil Court is barred by law expressly or by necessary implication (see Section 9 of the CPC). The court shall confine its scrutiny in an application for rejection of the plaint, to the averments made in the plaint and the documents disclosed along with it to ascertain whether the suit is otherwise barred by law. The court should not look into the other materials or the averments disclosed by the defendant either in the application under Order VII Rule 11(d) of the Code or otherwise under the provisions of Order VII Rule 11(d) of the Code.
The meaningful reading of the averments made in the plaint if leaves no doubt that the same is barred by law, it is imperative and mandatory on the court to reject the plaint. The court should not reject the plaint if the other reliefs, which are independent and seperable from the first relief, as law does not permit partial rejection of the plaint. Also in a case where the court has to make a hovering scrutiny and interpretation of various documents and also facts to be gone into, it would not be proper to reject the plaint at the threshold but a specific issue should be framed in this regard and may be decided as a preliminary issue in the suit. The other concept, which appears to this court, in this regard is the court may reject the plaint if it is aimed at the abuse of the process of the court and is frivolous, vexatious, harrasive and illusory cause of action is created with a clever draftmanship.
Reverting back to the factual matrix of this case, the primary relief claimed in the plaint is the declaration of the purported deed of gift as invalid, inoperative and void and the relief in the form of partition and separation of shares takes a backseat and depends upon the decision taken in a main relief. If the main relief cannot be granted by the Civil Court in view of the interdiction of the provisions of law, the ancillary or dependent relief also cannot be entertained by the court.
Though the Civil Court is competent to decide the case relating to partition and separation of shares, yet the aforesaid reliefs being the dependent one, particularly depending upon the issue of validity and invalidity of the deed of gift, this Court finds that the plaint, as stands as a whole, cannot stand in the eye of law. The trial court committed error in rejecting the application for rejection of plaint.
The order impugned is, thus, set aside. As a consequence whereof, the application under Order VII Rule 11(d) of the Code is allowed. The plaint stands rejected.
However, the parties are at liberty to exhaust their remedies before the appropriate forum and the order of rejection of the plaint shall not stand in the way of determining such issue.
With these observations, the revisional application is disposed of. There shall, however, be no order as to costs.
ab (Harish Tandon,J.)