Madras High Court
Pushpa vs Chandran on 20 July, 2012
Author: V.Periya Karuppiah
Bench: V.Periya Karuppiah
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS DATED: 20.07.2012 CORAM THE HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE V.PERIYA KARUPPIAH Second Appeal No.773 of 2003 1. Pushpa 2. Kannan (deceased) 3. K.Karthik 4. K.Subbulakshmi Appellants 3 and 4 brought on record as LRs of the deceased 2nd appellant vide order of Court dated 3.9.2010 made inCMP.NO.841/2010 ..Appellants Vs. 1. Chandran 2. Sakunthala ..Respondents Appeal filed under Section 100 of Civil Procedure Code against the judgment and decree passed in A.S.No.51 of 2002 (A.S.No.49 of 1998 of Sub-Court, Tindivanam) passed by the Additional District Judge ( Fast Track Court No.1), Tindivanam in reversing the judgment and decree made in O.S.No.512 of 1994 dated 13.2.1998 by the Principal District Munsif, Tindivanam. For Appellant : Mrs.N.Mala for Mr.K.Sathish For Respondents: Mr.R.Rajaramani for R1 No appearance for R2 J U D G M E N T
This appeal is directed against the judgment and decree passed by the first appellate court in A.S.No.51 of 2002 (A.S.No.49 of 1998 of Sub-Court, Tindivanam) dated 18.6.2002 in reversing the judgment and decree passed by the trial court made in O.S.No.512 of 1994 dated 13.2.1998 in dismissing the suit. The appellants 1 and 2 herein were the defendants 2 and 3 and the respondents 1 and 2 were the plaintiff and the first defendant respectively before the trial Court. The appellants 3 and 4 are the legal representatives of the deceased second appellant. For convenience, the status of parties before the trial Court is adopted in this judgment.
2. The case of the plaintiff as stated in the plaint before the trial Court would be follows:
The suit property belonged to the plaintiff. Originally, the suit property belonged to Boomi Achari. Boomi Achari died in the year 1972. The first defendant is the wife and the second defendant is the daughter of Boomi Achari. In respect of the suit property, Boomi Achari had executed a settlement in favour of the first defendant on 16.2.1965 which came into force after his death. The first defendant was given with life estate and the vested remainder was settled to the second defendant when she was minor. After the death of Boomi Achari, the first defendant became the guardian of the second defendant who was a minor. The first defendant is entitled to alienate the life estate to whomsoever concern and as a guardian of the second defendant, she can alienate the property for legal necessity and for the maintenance of the minor. The first defendant had executed a sale deed in favour of the plaintiff for discharging the outstanding mortgaged debt and also for the maintenance of the minor second defendant. The said sale deed executed by the first defendant in favour of the plaintiff would also bind the second defendant. If the second defendant wanted to question the execution of the said sale deed executed by the first defendant in favour of the plaintiff, she could have taken action within 3 years after attaining majority but the second defendant did not take any action and therefore, the alienation done by the first defendant has become absolute. The second defendant had encroached into the suit property in the year 1994 and even though, a notice has been sent by the plaintiff to hand over possession, the second respondent has neither handed over possession nor replied to the notice. Hence, the suit has been filed by the plaintiff for declaration of his title and for recovery of possession of the suit property, as he was the purchaser of the suit property .
3. The case of the defendants 2 and 3 before the trial Court as seen from the written statement would be as follows:
The suit filed by the plaintiff is not maintainable. The settlement deed executed by the father, Boomi Achari was clearly intended that his wife / first defendant to enjoy the property till her life time and after her life time, the absolute right of the said property would devolve upon the second defendant. Therefore, the vested remainder on the second defendant when she was minor, cannot be disturbed by the first defendant, since Boomi Achari, father has expressly barred the alienation by the first defendant. Such settlement executed by Boomi Achari is known to the plaintiff and others. The sale deed executed by the first defendant in favour of the plaintiff did not come into force at any point of time, since the suit property was in continuous possession of the second defendant. The plaintiff was never found in in possession of the suit property. The plaintiff is not entitled for the relief asked for. Therefore, the suit has to be dismissed with costs.
4. On the above pleadings, the trial Court had framed necessary issues and had entered trial. After appraising the evidence, the trial Court had come to the conclusion of dismissing the suit filed by the plaintiff. The aggrieved plaintiff preferred an appeal before the Sub-Court, Tindivanam in A.S.No.49 of 1998 challenging the judgment and decree passed by the trial Court and the same was transferred to the file of the Additional District and Fast Track Court-I, Tindivanam and was renumbered as A.S.No.51 of 2002. After hearing both parties, the first appellate Court had come to the conclusion of setting aside the judgment and decree passed by the trial court and allowed the appeal and consequently, the suit filed by the plaintiff was decreed. The aggrieved defendants 2 and 3 have filed the present second appeal challenging the judgment and decree passed by the first appellate Court in reversing the judgment and decree passed by the trial Court.
5. On admission of this appeal, this Court had formulated the following substantial questions of law for being considered for the disposal of this appeal.
"1. Whether the natural guardian (D-1) having joined a third party (D-4) and living with the 4th defendant without a marital relationship will take away her right of guardianship over the minor, 2nd defendant who was under the care and protection of her uncle?
2. Is not the alienation by a guardian who has ceased to be a guardian, of the minor's property ab-initio void and therefore the erstwhile minor need not set aside sale?
3. Is not the restriction against the alienation of the minor's property who has been given the property absolutely after the life time of the natural guardian, not being a restriction to deal with the interest of the life estate owner outside the purview of Section 10 of the Transfer of Property act and therefore valid?"
6. Heard, Mrs.N.Mala, learned counsel appearing for the appellants/defendants 2 and 3 and Mr.R.Raja Ramani, learned counsel appearing for the first respondent/plaintiff .
7. Learned counsel for the appellants/defendants 2 and 3 would submit in her arguments that the first appellate Court had applied the principle of law erroneously to land a different decision and thereby the judgment and decree passed by the trial court was set aside. He would further submit that the settlement deed executed by the father Boomi Achari was clearly intended in favour of the first defendant wife to enjoy the property till her life time and after her life time, the absolute right of the said property would devolve upon the second defendant and such a vested remainder was on the second defendant, when she was a minor, cannot be disturbed by the first defendant since the settlor has expressly barred the alienation by the first defendant. She would also submit in her argument that the said restriction imposed upon the first defendant not to alienate the property till her life time and to vest the remainder interest namely, the absolute interest on the second defendant would not be in any way attracted under the provisions of Section 10 of the Transfer of Property Act. She would also submit that the concept of section 10 of the transfer of Property Act has been misapplied by the first appellate Court in a case, where there was no condition imposed to avoid the transfer perpetually. She would also submit in her argument that the first defendant/ mother was not living with the father, even after the execution of settlement deed and she went away with a third party namely, the fourth defendant and the minor second defendant was under the care of her father for some time and thereafter, under the care of her uncle and therefore, there cannot be any guardianship accrued to the first defendant as mother when the second defendant/ daughter was not under the care and protection of the first defendant.
8. Learned counsel would also submit that the evidence adduced on either side would go to show that the first defendant was not living with, nor looking after the second defendant's welfare and therefore, the first defendant would not have competency to execute a sale deed in respect of the vested remainder right, which has to be enjoyed after the life time of the first defendant in respect of the suit property. She would also submit that when the first defendant could not alienate the property as a guardian, the transaction namely, the sale executed by the first defendant in favour of the plaintiff in respect of the suit property through Ex.A2 sale deed would be void abinitio. She would also submit that the plaintiff was not in possession of the suit property on the date of the suit as well as from the date of the alleged sale deed since it was admitted a vacant land at that time.
9. She would also submit that the plaintiff who has come forward with a case that the suit property belonged to the minor was alienated for the necessity and welfare of the minor and ought to have proved to get a decree in his favour. She would also submit that the first appellate Court did not apply the principles of law properly but had simply decided that the plaintiff obtained title to the suit property by virtue of Ex.A2 sale deed. She would also submit that the second defendant was given with patta in Ex.B1 after the said property was converted as patta lands from natham lands and 2nd defendant being a vested remainder holder should be deemed to have been in possession and enjoyment of the said property unless the sale deed executed by the first defendant was proved to have taken effect. She would also submit that the second defendant being in possession need not set aside the sale in Ex.A2 as voidable within a period of 3 years from the date of attaining majority. She would also submit that the judgment of the Honourable Apex Court reported in 2011 (3) LW 48 (SC) (Rangammal v. Kuppuswami & anr.) would squarely on the point and the dictum laid down that the minor whose property has been alienated by the guardian need not file the suit within 3 years to set aside the sale, when he or she is in possession of the said property is applicable. She would further submit that if the principle is applied to the present case, the second defendant who is admittedly found in possession need not file a suit to set aside the sale Ex.A2 within three years from the date she attained the age of majority. The main reason attributed to the first appellate Court was to the effect that the second defendant did not take any action within 3 years to set aside the voidable document namely Ex.A2 and therefore, she is barred from questioning the said sale deed cannot be sustained in view of the principle laid down by the Honourable Apex Court.
10. Learned counsel would also bring it to the notice of this Court, a judgment of this Court reported in 1979 LW 368 (Sundarammal v. Govindarajulu) for the same principle. Relying upon those decisions, the learned counsel for the appellants/defendants 2 and 3 would insist in her argument that there was no limitation for raising the plea of voidable nature of transaction, in the said circumstances. She would also submit in her arguments that the trial Court had considered the construction of the settlement deed Ex.A1 and found that the first defendant has no right to alienate the entire property and the absolute rights in the property and had come to the conclusion of dismissing the suit which was interfered by the first appellate Court without any valid reason nor supported by any legal principle. Therefore, she would request the Court to set aside the judgment and decree passed by the first appellate Court and to restore the judgment and decree of the trial Court and thus, to allow the second appeal.
11. Learned counsel for the first respondent/ plaintiff would submit in his argument that the settlement deed executed by father Boomi Achari in favour of defendants 1 and 2 was not disputed and the first defendant was given with life estate and the vested remainder was settled to the second defendant, when she was minor. He would also submit that the first defendant was entitled to alienate the life estate to whomsoever and as a guardian of the second defendant, she can alienate the right of the 2nd defendant also for legal necessity and for the maintenance of the minor. He would also submit that accordingly, the first defendant had executed the sale deed in favour of the plaintiff for discharging the outstandings of the mortgage debt and also for the maintenance of the minor second defendant. He would also submit in his argument that no oral evidence can be adduced against the documentary evidence in accordance with Section 91 of the Evidence Act and therefore, the oral evidence adduced to the effect that the first defendant cannot act as a guardian for the minor second defendant, at the time of execution of the sale deed, cannot be sustained. He would also submit that when the second defendant was a minor represented by the first defendant/ mother, as a natural guardian she executed the sale deed and such sale deed is voidable at the option of the second defendant and if the 2nd defendnt elected to question the same, she could do it within 3 years after attaining majority and she has to obtain a decree that the transaction was a void one. But the second defendant did not take any action and therefore, the alienation done in Ex.A2 sale deed became absolute and therefore, it cannot be set aside, at this stage.
12. Learned counsel would also submit in his argument that the principles laid down by the Honourable Apex court reported in 2011 (3) LW 48 (Rangammal v. Kuppuswami & anr.) is not applicable to the present case since possession was already handed over to the plaintiff. He would also submit that the second defendant could not be in possession of the property since the first defendant is alive still and therefore, the principles laid down in the said judgment, cannot be relevant or applied in this case. He would bring it to the notice of the Court that possession had been handed over as mentioned in Ex.A2 sale deed and therefore, the case of the second defendant that she is in possession through out cannot be considered as true. He would also submit that the documents produced in Exs.B2 and B3 are purely after the suit and therefore, it cannot be relied upon. He would also submit that the second defendant had encroached the property in the year 1994 and therefore, the notice has been sent by the plaintiff to hand over possession but it was neither handed over nor replied. He would also submit that the plaintiff has therefore, asked for possession as it was encroached by the second defendant. He would submit in his argument that the second defendant ought to have proved that the sale transaction Ex.A2 was a void one by resorting to Court and it was not done by her. Therefore, it has become a valid document and the plaintiff is entitled to a decree as sought for by him.
13. Learned counsel for the first respondent would also cite a judgment of this Court reported in 2011 (2) LW 151 (Murugesa Gounder & another v. Brindhavathi Ammal & others) in support of his argument. Yet another judgment of this Court is also relied upon by the learned counsel for the first respondent reported in 2010 (3) CTC 502 ( Murugan v. Kesava Gounder). for the same principle. Learned counsel for the first respondent had also cited a judgment of the Honourable Apex Court reported in 2001 (6) SCC 163 (Vishwambhar v. Laxminarayan) for the principle that when a minor's property has been transferred by the mother/ guardian, the minor should question the sale as void and inoperative and without legal necessity, within a period of 3 years after he or she attained majority under Article 60 of the Limitation Act. Placing reliance upon those judgments, learned counsel for the plaintiff would request the Court that the judgment and decree passed by the First Appellate Court was well considered and the judgment and decree of the trial Court was rightly interfered and set aside and therefore, there would not be any necessity to interfere with the first appellate Court judgment Therefore, he would request the Court to dismiss the second appeal and thereby to confirm the judgment and decree passed by the first appellate Court.
14. I have given anxious thoughts to the arguments advanced on either side.
15. The suit has been filed by the first respondent /plaintiff for declaration of his title and recovery of possession of the suit property from the second defendant and for mesne profits. The admitted case of both parties would be that the suit property was originally a patta land of an extent of 6 cents as detailed in the plaint schedule which was belonging to one Boomi Achari . Boomi Achari and the first defendant Sakuntala were husband and wife. They got a child namely second defendant. There was some dispute between the said Boomi Achari and Sakuntala and therefore, the said Boomi Achari had executed a settlement deed in favour of Sakuntala, the first defendant in respect of the suit property to enjoy the suit property till her life time without any power to alienate and after her life time, should fall upon the second defendant, who was then daughter absolutely. Therefore, it could be seen that the first defendant/ wife viz., Sakuntala was given with a right to enjoy over the said property till her death without any power of alienation and the second defendant then minor was given with absolute right namely vested remainder. The first defendant had subsequently sold the said property to the plaintiff showing herself as the guardian of the second defendant in respect of the entire property. The said sale deed has been questioned as not valid by the second defendant, whereas it has been insisted by the plaintiff that the second defendant cannot raise any voice as to its validity as a void document because it is voidable in nature and it has to be held as void by the court of law and the second defendant taking action within 3 years period after she attained majority .
16. The judgment Honourable Apex Court reported in 2001 (6) SCC 163 (Vishwambhar v. Laxminarayan) was relied upon by the first respondent/ plaintiff for the said purpose. The relevant passage would be as follows:
"9. .... They also held that no prior permission of the Court was taken for the said alienations. The question is, in such circumstances, are the alienations void or voidable? In Section 8(2) of the Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act, 1956, it is laid down, inter alia, that the natural guardian shall not, without previous permission of the court, transfer by sale any part of the immoveable property of the minor. In sub-section (3) of the said section, it is specifically provided that any disposal of immoveable property by a natural guardian, in contravention of sub-section (2) is voidable at the instance of the minor or any person claiming under him. There is, therefore, little scope for doubt that the alienations made by Laxmibai which are under challenge in the suit were voidable at the instance of the plaintiffs and the plaintiffs were required to get the alienations set aside if they wanted to avoid the transfers and regain the properties from the purchasers."
17. The said principle laid down by the Honourable Apex Court has been followed in the judgment of this Court reported in 2010 (3) CTC 502 ( Murugan v. Kesava Gounder). The relevant passage would be as follows:
"24. .......Therefore, the appellants challenging the alienations made by Balaraman on his behalf and on behalf of his minor son Palanivel in contravention of Section 8(2) and (3) of the Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act , 1956 and seeking declaration and possession of the property can bring the Suit only within the prescribed period of three years from the date of death of minor under Article 60(b)(ii) of the Limitation Act, 1963."
18. Yet another judgment of this court was also cited before me, for the following principle reported in 2011 (2) LW 151 (Murugesa Gounder & another v. Brindhavathi Ammal & others) and the relevant passage is as follows:
"18. ....The law also is well settled in this regard that if any alienation by a life estate holder is erroneous, then the absolute owners/ vested remainders should filed a suit seeking for annulment of the same within three years after attaining majority, but in this case no such action was undertaken by Vaithilinga Gounder, the father of the plaintiff."
18. On a careful perusal of the said judgment, I could see that the time for taking action to set aside the voidable transaction by the minor was within 3 years after attaining majority. Having relied upon the said dictum, it was strenuously argued by the learned counsel for the plaintiff that the second defendant had missed the bus she did not take any steps to set aside the voidable transaction namely Ex.A2 therefore, it has become absolutely valid. However, it was challenged by the defendant that even though the plaintiff said to have obtained possession of the suit property on the date of sale Ex.A2, was being a vacant site, he did not obtain possession but he had stated to have in possession by paying kist for 11 years on a single day but had complained that the second defendant had encroached in the said property by issuing self serving notice in his favour which would not amount to show his possession. The second defendant had also relied upon a patta granted to her produced in Ex.B1 to show his possession. It was the evidence of the second defendant that the patta land had been converted into natham promboke and she was granted patta in Ex.B1 and the said patta was issued finding that she was in possession and therefore, the case of the plaintiff that he was in possession and enjoyment of the said property throughout, cannot be correct. Considering the said document, I could see that the kist receipt produced by the plaintiff was paid on a single day. Ex.B1 patta would go to show that the second defendant was in possession of the suit property even prior to the date as mentioned in the notice issued by the plaintiff in Ex.A3. It is also an admitted case that the land was lying vacant throughout. When it is a vacant site, it cannot be said that the plaintiff was in possession overriding the patta granted to the second defendant in Ex.B1. In the said circumstances, whether the principle laid down by the Honourable Apex Court and this Court as cited by the learned counsel for the first respondent/plaintiff would apply to the present case is the crux of this case.
19. Learned counsel for the appellants/defendants 2 and 3 had cited a judgment of the Honourable Apex Court reported in 1979 LW 368 (Sundarammal v. Govindarajulu) for the principle that there would not be any question of limitation for the minor to question the voidable nature of the plaintiff's sale deed if he or she is maintaining possession of the said property. The relevant passage would run as follows:
"...Since the first defendant is already in possession, he is not obliged to file a suit himself to set aside the sale deed in favour of the plaintiff. He could wait till the plaintiff sought to evict him and then set up the voidable nature of the plaintiff's sale deed, in defence, and where the first defendant is merely pleading by way of defence the voidable nature of the plaintiff's sale deed, no question of limitation will arise. In other words, even if a suit, which the first defendant might have had to file against the plaintiff if the first defendant had not obtained possession, might be time barred in 1959, that would not prevent the first defendant from setting up the voidable nature of the plaintiff's sale deed by way of defence. S.28 of the Limitation Act, 1908 which says:
"At the determination of the period hereby limited to any persons for instituting a suit for possession of any property, his right to such property shall be extinguished."
applied only to a plaintiff institution a suit for possession and does not bar a defendant of the voidable nature of the deed even after the period of limitation."
20. The said principle has been approved in the judgment of the Honourable Apex Court reported in 2011(3) LW 48 (SC) (Rangammal v. Kuppuswami & anr.). The relevant passage would be as follows:
"14. ..... when the plaintiff/respondent No.1 pleaded that the disputed property fell into the share of the plaintiff by virtue of the sale deed dated 24.2.1951, then it was clearly for the plaintiff/ respondent No.1 to prove that it was executed for legal necessity of the appellant-while she was a minor. But, the High Court clearly took an erroneous view while holding that it is the defendant/ appellant who should have challenged the sale deed after attaining majority as she had no reason to do so since the plaintiff/ respondent No.1 failed to first of all discharge the burden that the sale deed in fact had been executed for legal necessity of the minor's predecessor mother was without permission of the court. It was not the defendant/ respondent who first of all claimed benefit of the sale deed or asserted its genuineness, hence the burden of challenging the sale deed specifically when she had not even been dispossessed from the disputed share, did not arise at all.
15. Plethora of commentaries emerging from series of case laws on burden of proof which are too numerous to cite, lay down that when a person after attaining majority, questions any sale of his property by his guardian during his minority, the burden lies on the person who upholds/ asserts the purchase not only to show that the guardian had the power to sell but further that the whole transaction was bona fide."
21. As per the aforesaid judgment of the Honourable Apex Court, we could see that the minor who was to defend his/ her title on a voidable transaction did not set aside the said transaction as void within the time limit. She can defend her possession to the said property by raising the same plea as a defence to the claim of the person who has obtained through the said transaction when she is in possession. No doubt, the second defendant is in possession and enjoyment of the suit property and the plaintiff has sought for recovery of possession from the second defendant on the basis of the sale deed obtained by him from the first defendant in Ex.A2. At this stage, the voidability of the said document Ex.A2 can be gone into as per the dictum laid down by the Honourable Apex Court. The second defendant is at the stage of defending her title through voidability since there was no limitation for defending her right in the said property.
22. However, learned counsel for the plaintiff submitted that the second defendant was in unlawful possession since she would get the possession only after the life time of the first defendant and therefore, the possession held by the 2nd defendant was not lawful and therefore, the principles laid down by the Honourable Apex Court in the aforesaid judgment, would not apply. The said arguments of the learned counsel for the plaintiff could not be sustained for the reason that the second defendant who was then minor, entitled to a vested remainder which is at the defending stage over her right given under Ex.A1 and therefore, the character of the possession of the second defendant cannot be a bar for her to defend her right over the suit property and to plead the voidability of Ex.A1 in order to defend her right.
23. The principles laid down by the Honourable Apex Court in the said judgment would also go to show that the person who claims the right over the property namely, the plaintiff must come forward to prove that it was a valid document and it cannot be considered as a voidable document at the instance of the second defendant since he is claiming title over the said document. Therefore, I could see that the plaintiff is at the burden of proving that the title deed produced by him in Ex.A2 was for the benefit and welfare and maintenance of the then minor and the second defendant was looked after by the first defendant as guardian for the person and property.
24. In the evidence produced by the plaintiff, nothing was spoken about the discharge of the usufructuary mortgage dated 23.10.1972 for a sum of Rs.400/- and the payment of Rs.100/- to the first defendant and the payment of Rs.800/- before the Sub-Registrar through acceptable evidence. No discharged mortgage deed has been produced. The evidence produced by the second defendant would go to show that immediately after the execution of settlement deed by Boomi Achari in favour of the first defendant Sakuntala, she left her husband Boomi Achari and joined with 4th defendant to lead an immoral life. It was not denied by the plaintiff that the second defendant was left in the custody of the father Boomi Achari for some time and after his death, she was in the custody of her uncle and was maintained by her uncle till she was married. Therefore, the custody and maintenance of the second defendant with the first defendant has not been proved by the plaintiff. The welfare of their minor 2nd defendant was not looked after by the 1st defendant. Furthermore, it has been established through the evidence of second defendant that the first defendant did not act as a guardian to consider the welfare of the minor 2nd defendant nor maintained the second defendant in order to execute a sale deed in favour of the plaintiff. In the said circumstances, I could see that the plaintiff did not prove the case that the sale deed executed by the first defendant in his favour was done for the benefit and welfare of the then minor, second defendant. When it is not proved by the plaintiff as per the dictum laid down by the Honourable Apex Court in 2011 (3) LW 48 (SC) (Rangammal v. Kuppuswami & anr.), the then minor can defend her title and possession of the suit property even though the period of limitation expired long before. In the said circumstances, I am of the considered view that the questions of law framed are to be decided only in favour of the appellant as per the dictum laid down by the Honourable Apex court reported in 2011 (3) LW 48(SC) (Rangammal v. Kuppuswami & anr.).
25. In view of such decision, I am of the considered view that the first appellate court had wrongly applied the principles of law in respect of Section 10 of the Transfer of Property Act as well as misapplied the law of guardianship and was perversely misguided to interfere with the well considered judgment of the trial Court. Therefore, the judgment and decree passed by the first appellate Court are liable to be interfered and set aside and thus, the appeal is liable to be allowed. Consequently, the judgment and decree passed by the trial Court are restored.
26. In fine, the Second Appeal is allowed with costs. The judgment and decree passed by the first appellate Court are set aside and the judgment and decree passed by the trial Court are restored. Consequently, connected civil miscellaneous petition is closed.
20.07.2012 Index:Yes/No Internet:Yes/No vsi To
1. The Additional District Judge ( Fast Track Court No.1), Tindivanam.
2. The Principal District Munsif, Tindivanam.
V.PERIYA KARUPPIAH.,J.
Vsi Pre-delivery judgment made in Second Appeal No.773 of 2003 20.07.2012