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[Cites 13, Cited by 1]

Delhi High Court

Manohar Lal Sharma vs Union Of India And Anr on 1 September, 2011

Author: Dipak Misra

Bench: Chief Justice, Sanjiv Khanna

*IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI

                                    Date of order: 1st September, 2011
+     W.P.(C) 6355/2011

MANOHAR LAL SHARMA                               ..... Petitioner
                   Through                 Mr. Manohar Lal Sharma, Adv.
            versus

UNION OF INDIA AND ANR                           ..... Respondent
                  Through                  Mr. A.S. Chandhiok, ASG with
                                           Ms. Maneesha Dhir, Mr. Ritesh
                                           Kumar, Mr. K.P.S. Kohli and
                                           Mr. Mithu Jain Advs.
CORAM:
HON'BLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SANJIV KHANNA

1. Whether Reporters of local papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes.
2. To be referred to the Reporter or not ? Yes.
3. Whether the judgment should be reported in the Digest ? Yes.

DIPAK MISRA, CJ:

       The petitioner, a practising advocate, has invoked the

jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India

seeking for appropriate direction to the respondents to provide equal

opportunity to the petitioner and other citizens to file their

representations and objections and participate in the discussion

pertaining to the Lokpal Bill in the same manner and time as that has

been allowed to the five member NGO and further to declare the entire

process of the drafting committee and actions related to as it

unconstitutional being violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of


W.P.(C) 6355/2011                                                    Page 1 of 11
 India. That apart, it has been prayed to declare the respondents‟ action

dated 4th August, 2011 as ultra vires the rules of the House and to

further declare the action of the respondents in introducing any of the

Lokpal Bills, including government bill and private bills, as

unconstitutional being violative of Article 117 of the Constitution and

to direct the respondents to disclose all true facts and details about the

subject matter upon the Lokpal Bill i.e. annual extra cost to the country

and other ancillary aspects.

2.     It is submitted by Mr. Manohar Lal Sharma, who has appeared

in person, that the Lokpal Bill, as is discernible, is basically a money

bill and, therefore, the presidential consent is necessary prior to the

introduction of such a bill in the Parliament. It is his further submission

that the procedure adopted by the Ministry of Parliamentary Affairs

and Ministry of Law and Justice is absolutely contrary to the

provisions of the Constitution and the rules framed under Article 118

of the Constitution, which pertain to bill originating in the House. It is

urged by him that when a Bill postulates expenditure from the

Consolidated Fund, a specified particular procedure has to be followed

and every citizen has a right to know and the same cannot be

smothered or scuttled. The petitioner would contend that the

respondents are under obligation to furnish all requisite information

and unless the same is done, the whole exercise shall fall foul of

W.P.(C) 6355/2011                                               Page 2 of 11
 Article 14 of the Constitution of India. To bolster the said submission,

he has commended us to the decision of the Constitution Bench in

Ramdas Athawale Vs. Union of India and Others (2010) 4 SCC 1.

Mr. Sharma has further canvassed that others also should have the

opportunity to submit bills to the government for introducing before

the Parliament.

3.     Mr. A.S. Chandhiok, learned Additional Solicitor General,

resisting the submissions put forth by Mr. Sharma, has contended that

whether the Bill is a money bill or not is to be determined by the

Speaker of the Lok Sabha under Article 110 of the Constitution. He

would further submit that at the bill or pre Bill stage, the power of

judicial review is not to be invoked in view of the Division Bench‟s

decision dated 2nd May, 2011 of this Court in W.P.(C) 2671/2011 titled

Hemant Baburao Patil Vs. Union of India and Others.

4.     To appreciate the submissions raised at the Bar, it is appropriate

to refer to Article 107 of the Constitution which relates to provisions as

to introduction and passing of bills. It reads as follows:-

             "107. Provisions as to introduction and passing
            of Bills.--(1) Subject to the provisions of Articles
            109 and 117 with respect to Money Bills and other
            financial Bills, a Bill may originate in either
            House of Parliament.
            (2) Subject to the provisions of Article 108 and
            109, a Bill shall not be deemed to have been
            passed by the Houses of Parliament unless it has
            been agreed to by both Houses, either without

W.P.(C) 6355/2011                                                 Page 3 of 11
             amendment or with such amendments only as are
            agreed to by both Houses.
            (3) A Bill pending in Parliament shall not lapse by
            reason of the prorogation of the Houses.
            (4) A Bill pending in the Council of States which
            has not been passed by the House of the People
            shall not lapse on a dissolution of the House of the
            People.
            (5) A Bill which is pending in the House of the
            People, or which having been passed by the House
            of the People is pending in the Council of States,
            shall, subject to the provisions of Article 108,
            lapse on a dissolution of the House of the People."


5.     Article 109 provides a special procedure in respect of Money

Bills. Article 110 defines, which Bill shall be a „Money Bill‟. For the

sake of completeness, we think it appropriate to reproduce Article 110.

It reads as under:-

         "110. Definition of "Money Bills.--(1) For the
         purposes of this Chapter, a Bill shall be deemed to be
         a Money Bill if it contains only provisions dealing
         with all or any of the following matters, namely--
         (a) the imposition, abolition, remission, alteration or
         regulation of any tax;
         (b) the regulation of the borrowing of money or the
         giving of any guarantee by the Government of India,
         or the amendment of the law with respect to any
         financial obligations undertaken or to be undertaken
         by the Government of India;
         (c) the custody of the Consolidated Fund or the
         Contingency Fund of India, the payment of moneys
         into or the withdrawal of moneys from any such
         Fund;
         (d) the appropriation of moneys out of the
         Consolidated Fund of India;
         (e) the declaring of any expenditure to be
         expenditure charged on the Consolidated Fund of


W.P.(C) 6355/2011                                                  Page 4 of 11
          India or the increasing of the amount of any such
         expenditure;
         (f) the receipt of money on account of the
         Consolidated Fund of India or the public account of
         India or the custody or issue of such money or the
         audit of the accounts of the Union or of a State; or
         (g) any matter incidental to any of the matters
         specified in sub-clauses (a) to (f).
         (2) A Bill shall not be deemed to be a Money Bill by
         reason only that it provides for the imposition of
         fines or other pecuniary penalties, or for the demand
         or payment of fees for licences or fees for services
         rendered, or by reason that it provides for the
         imposition, abolition, remission, alteration or
         regulation of any tax by any local authority or body
         for local purposes.
         (3) If any question arises whether a Bill is a Money
         Bill or not, the decision of the Speaker of the House
         of the People thereon shall be final.
         (4) There shall be endorsed on every Money Bill
         when it is transmitted to the Council of States under
         Article 109, and when it is presented to the President
         for assent under Article 111, the certificate of the
         Speaker of the House of the People signed by him
         that it is a Money Bill."

6.     We have referred to the said Article as the petitioner has urged

with vehemence that as the Bills now being circulated are Money Bills,

the parliamentary procedure as per the Rule has to be followed. Per

contra, Mr. Chandhiok would submit that in view of the language

employed in sub-article (3) of Article 110, the verdict of the Speaker

with regard to the status of the Bill is final.

7.     In the case of Ramdas Athawale (supra), the controversy had

travelled to the Apex Court as the petitioner therein had filed a writ

petition under Article 32 of the Constitution challenging the validity of

W.P.(C) 6355/2011                                                 Page 5 of 11
 the proceedings in the Lok Sabha commencing 29th January, 2004 on

the ground that the President had not addressed both Houses of the

Parliament as envisaged under Article 87 of the Constitution and,

therefore, an appropriate writ or direction should be issued declaring

that the session of the Lok Sabha called by the notice dated 20th

January, 2004 is the first session in the year 2004 and the proceedings

of the Lok Sabha pursuant to the notice dated 20th January, 2004 are

unconstitutional, illegal, null and void. Be it noted, in the said case, it

has been put forth that the "first session" means, the session which is

held first in point of time in a given year and accordingly, the session

which commenced on 29th January, 2004 was the first session of the

House of the year 2004. Their Lordships adverted to the facts in

paragraph 3, which is as follows:-

            "3. There is no dispute before us that the fourteenth
            session of the Thirteenth Lok Sabha commenced on
            2-12-2003 and was adjourned sine die on 23-12-
            2003. Thereafter on 20-1-2004, the Secretary
            General of the Lok Sabha, by way of a notice
            informed all the Members of the Thirteenth Lok
            Sabha, duly stating that under Rule 15 of the Rules
            of Procedure and Conduct of Business in Lok Sabha,
            the Speaker has directed that the Lok Sabha which
            was adjourned sine die on 23-12-2003 will resume
            its sittings on 29-1-2004."

8.     The Constitution Bench posed a question in paragraph 28, which

is as follows:-

          "28. The question that arises for consideration in this

W.P.(C) 6355/2011                                               Page 6 of 11
          writ petition is whether the decision of the Speaker
         directing resumption of sitting of the Lok Sabha which
         was adjourned sine die on 23-12-2003 is susceptible to
         judicial review in a proceeding under Article 32 of the
         Constitution of India?"

9.     Thereafter, their Lordships referred to Article 122 of the

Constitution and proceeded to express thus:-

         "30. A plain reading of Article 122 makes it
         abundantly clear that the validity of any proceeding in
         Parliament shall not be called in question on the
         ground of any irregularity of procedure. The prayer in
         the writ petition is to declare the proceedings in the
         Lok Sabha pursuant to the Notice dated 20-1-2004
         issued under the directions of the Speaker as
         unconstitutional. The petitioner is essentially raising a
         dispute as to the regularity and legality of the
         proceedings in the House of the People. The dispute
         raised essentially centres around the question as to
         whether the Speaker's direction to resume sittings of
         the Lok Sabha which was adjourned sine die on 23-12-
         2003 is proper?
         31. The Speaker is the guardian of the privileges of the
         House and its spokesman and representative upon all
         occasions. He is the interpreter of its rules and
         procedure, and is invested with the power to control
         and regulate the course of debate and to maintain order.
         The powers to regulate the procedure and conduct of
         business of the House of the People vests in the
         Speaker of the House. By virtue of the powers vested
         in him, the Speaker, in purported exercise of his power
         under Rule 15 of the Rules of Procedure and Conduct
         of Business in Lok Sabha got issued Notice dated 20-1-
         2004 through the Secretary General of the Lok Sabha
         directing resumption of sittings of the Lok Sabha
         which was adjourned sine die on 23-12-2003. Whether
         the resumed sitting on 29-1-2004 was to be treated as
         the second part of the fourteenth session as directed by
         the Speaker is essentially a matter relating purely to the
         procedure of Parliament. The validity of the
         proceedings and business transacted in the House after

W.P.(C) 6355/2011                                                Page 7 of 11
          resumption of its sittings cannot be tested and gone
         into by this Court in a proceeding under Article 32 of
         the Constitution of India."

10.    In the said decision, reference was made to the decision in

Powers, Privileges and Immunities of State Legislatures, Re v., AIR

1965 SC 745 and eventually, their Lordships opined thus:-

         "38. Under Article 122(2), the decision of the Speaker
         in whom powers are vested to regulate the procedure
         and the conduct of business is final and binding on
         every Member of the House. The validity of the
         Speaker's decision adjourning the House sine die on
         23-12-2003 and latter direction to resume its sittings
         cannot be inquired into on the ground of any
         irregularity of procedure. The business transacted and
         the validity of proceedings after the resumption of
         sittings of the House pursuant to the directions of the
         Speaker cannot be inquired into by the courts.

         39. No decision of the Speaker can be challenged by a
         Member of the House complaining of mere irregularity
         in procedure in the conduct of the business. Such
         decisions are not subject to the jurisdiction of any court
         and they are immune from challenge as understood and
         explained in Keshav Singh case and further explained
         in Indira Nehru Gandhi v. Raj Narain wherein it was
         observed that: (Indira Nehru case, SCC p. 46, para 70)

               "70. ... the House is not subject to the
               control of the courts in the administration of
               the internal proceedings of the House."

         40. It is a right of each House of Parliament to be the
         sole judge of the lawfulness of its own proceedings.
         The courts cannot go into the lawfulness of the
         proceedings of the Houses of Parliament. The
         Constitution aims at maintaining a fine balance
         between the legislature, executive and judiciary. The
         object of the constitutional scheme is to ensure that
         each of the constitutional organs function within their

W.P.(C) 6355/2011                                                Page 8 of 11
           respective assigned sphere. Precisely, that is the
          constitutional philosophy inbuilt into Article 122 of the
          Constitution of India."

11.      After so stating, their Lordships referred to another decision of

the Constitution Bench in M.S.M. Sharma Vs. Dr. Shree Krishna

Sinha AIR 1960 SC 1186 wherein it has been held that the validity of

proceedings inside the legislature of the State cannot be called in

question on the allegation that the procedure laid down by law had not

been strictly followed.

12.      After so stating, in paragraphs 42, 43, 46 and 47, it has been held

thus:-

             "42. In the present case, there is no complaint of
          infringement of any guaranteed fundamental rights and
          therefore it may not be necessary to dilate on the question
          as to the parameters and extent of judicial review that
          may be available in case of infringement of any
          guaranteed fundamental rights of a Member of the House.

             43. One more aspect of the matter. The petitioner in
          this writ petition under Article 32 of the Constitution has
          challenged the validity of proceedings in the Lok Sabha
          commencing from 29-1-2004 on the grounds stated
          hereinabove, which we have dealt with in the preceding
          paragraphs. The petition has become infructuous, since
          the Lok Sabha was dissolved and thereafter two elections
          have been held. The issue raised in the petition is purely a
          hypothetical question. There is no existing lis between the
          parties. It is settled practice that this Court does not
          decide matters which are only of academic interest on the
          facts of a particular case.
                                      xxxxxx
          46. It is equally well settled that Article 32 of the
          Constitution guarantees the right to a constitutional
          remedy and relates only to the enforcement of the right

W.P.(C) 6355/2011                                                Page 9 of 11
          conferred by Part III of the Constitution and unless a
         question of enforcement of a fundamental right arises,
         Article 32 does not apply. It is well settled that no petition
         under Article 32 is maintainable, unless it is shown that
         the petitioner has some fundamental right. In Northern
         Corpn. v. Union of India this Court has made a pertinent
         observation that when a person complains and claims that
         there is a violation of law, it does not automatically
         involve breach of fundamental right for the enforcement
         of which alone Article 32 is attracted.

           47. We have carefully scanned through the averments
         and allegations made in the writ petition and found that
         there is not even a whisper of any infringement of any
         fundamental right guaranteed by Part III of the
         Constitution. We reiterate the principle that whenever a
         person complains and claims that there is a violation of
         any provision of law or a constitutional provision, it does
         not automatically involve breach of fundamental right for
         the enforcement of which alone Article 32 of the
         Constitution is attracted. It is not possible to accept that
         an allegation of breach of law or a constitutional
         provision is an action in breach of fundamental right. The
         writ petition deserves dismissal only on this ground."

13.    On a perusal of the aforesaid decision, it is clear that when a

fundamental right, as enshrined in Chapter III of the Constitution, is

not affected, a writ petition under Article 32 is not to be entertained.

14.    In the case at hand, as we understand, the grievance of the

petitioner is with regard to the manner and procedure of the

introduction of the bill. This Court in the case of Hemant Baburao

Patil (supra), wherein the challenge was made with regard to the

composition of the drafting committee, had held thus:-

            "6. Having heard learned counsel for the parties, it
            is manifest that members of the Committee do not

W.P.(C) 6355/2011                                                  Page 10 of 11
             hold public office and, hence, there cannot be any
            eligibility criteria. Therefore, the concept of quo
            warranto is not applicable. A drafting committee
            has been constituted which pertains to a pre-
            enactment stage. We have our grave doubt
            whether the same can be scrutinized while
            exercising the power of judicial review. The
            Constitution casts an obligation on the part of the
            Court while exercising power of judicial review to
            test the legislation in the constitutional backdrop,
            but not at a stage when the drafting of a Bill is in
            process. It is a resolution passed by the Ministry of
            Law and Justice for drafting of a Bill. It can be
            treated as an internal matter of the Executive and
            exclusively in the domain of Executive. The
            suitability of the persons, we are disposed to think,
            cannot be a matter of judicial review, more so in a
            matter of the present nature."

15.      In our considered opinion, the present writ petition has been

preferred without any legal foundation and the petitioner has made an

adroit endeavour to build a castle in Spain. Hence, we conclude and

hold that the controversy cannot be made a subject matter of assail

under Article 226 of the Constitution. Consequently, the writ petition,

being bereft of substratum, stands dismissed without any order as to

costs.



                                                CHIEF JUSTICE



                                                SANJIV KHANNA, J.

SEPTEMBER 01, 2011 NA W.P.(C) 6355/2011 Page 11 of 11