Delhi High Court
Regal Traders Pvt. Ltd. And Anr. vs Lt. Governor Of Delhi And Ors. on 23 May, 1990
Equivalent citations: AIR1990DELHI282, 42(1990)DLT44, 1990RLR334, AIR 1990 DELHI 282, (1990) ILR(DEL) 2 DEL 1, (1990) 2 RRR 211, (1990) 2 DL 443, (1990) ILR 2 DEL 1
JUDGMENT R.N. Pyne, J.
(1) In this writ petition, the petitioners have thrown a challenge to the Lt. Governor's order of demolition and sealing of the premises dated 12th January, 1989 affirming the orders of demolition of the Appellate Tribunal dated 29-6-1988 and of Zonal Engineer (B) of the Municipal Corporation of Delhi dated 23-10-1987 as also the orders for sealing of the premises of the Appellate Tribunal dated 29th June, 1988 and of the Deputy Commissioner (L) dated 3/8th September, 1987, and have prayed for quashing of the same. They have also prayed for as writ of mandamus restraining the respondents Delhi and others. from demolishing the building on plot No. 411 1 2 2 situated in Lal Dora (Firni or extended abadi) of village Mundka. in the Union Territory of Delhi and to unseal the premises (2) The relevant facts which emerge from the pleadings are that the petitioners have raised some construction on plot No. 411 1 2 2, Village Mundka, Delhi, which according to them, falls in Lal Dora (Firni or extended abadi) and of which they are the owners. The Municipal Corporation, Delhi having found that some construction has been raised on I he plot in dispute, initially issued a show cause notice for demolition dated 30-12-1986 and thereafter a revised show cause notice for dated 20-1-1987 to the petitioners. Having received no satisfactory reply, the demolition notice dated 17-2-1987 was issued and served on the petitioners. Another show cause notices for demolition dated 31-3-1987 was also issued for the additional construction to the petitioners. Thereafter another demolition notice I order dated 9-4-1987 was issued and served on the petitioners. Having felt aggrieved agains' the notice order of demolition, the petitioners preferred a civil writ petition No. 1737186 a direction was given by this court to pass fresh orders after hearing the petitioners. After having complied' with the court's order and considered the matter, the Zonal Engineer (Bldg.) on 23-10-1987 ordered for demolition of the building by the Corporation under Section 343(1) of the Delhi Municipal Corporation Act (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act'). It appears, in the meantime the Deputy Commissioner(L) also passed an order for sealing of the premises (Ann. P-15) and it was directed that no person shall remove the seal except under the orders of the Deputy Commissioner (L) or as provided under Section 445-A(3) of the Act. Having felt aggrieved against these orders of demolition and sealing of the premises. the petitioners filed appeals before the Appellate Tribunal which were dismissed on 29th June, 1988 by two separate orders upholding the sealing and demolition of the premises. The petitioners thereafter filed appeals before the Lt. Governor Delhi against the orders of the Appellate Tribunal which were also dismissed by a comma older dated 12-3-1989 there upholding the order of scaling and demolition of the construction raised on the land. Against these orders of sealing and demolition the petitioners have filed the present writ pettiion.
(3) The case set up by the petitioner in this writ petition as well as before Lt. Governor and other authorities concerned is that the laud of the property in question is. situated within the Lal Dora of Firni or abadi of the village as extended during the consolidation operation of village Mundka during 1975-76 under the provisions of Delhi Land Reforms Act read with the East Punjab Holdings (Consolidation & Prevention of Fragmentation) Act, 1948 and that by virtue of 'notification No. RNZ11731 dated 24-8-1963 issued by the Municipal Corporation of Delhi under Section 507(b)(i) of the Act, it is exempted from building regulations provided in Sections 332-336 and 342 and 347 of the Act and as such the construction raised is not unauthorised. On the other hand the respondents have submitted that no doubt the above notification exempted certain rural areas lying within the village abadi from the provisions of Sections 332-336 etc. but does not exempt the petitioners from applicability of provisions of Sections 312 and 313 of the Act and as such construction raised in contravention of Sections 312 and 313 of the Act is unauthorised and requires demolition. Further the are in dispute does not fall, on facts, in the extended abadi and therefore the sanction under Section 332 and 333 of the Act for construction of the house will also' be required.
(4) The Appellate Tribunal whose findings have been endorsed by the Lt. Governor, has upheld the order of demolition and sealing. We will, therefore, while discussing the basis reasoning on which the order of demolition sealing has been passed, refer to the orders of the. Appellate Tribunal.
(5) In order to appreciate the contentions of the parties, we consider it necessary to produce the relevant extract of the notification :
"(MUNICIPALCorporation of Delhi) Delhi, the 24th August, 193 No. RNZ11731 :-In exercise of the powers conferred by sub-clause (i) of clause (b) of Section 507 of The Delhi Municipal Corporation Act, 1957 (66 of 1957) the Municipal Corporation of Delhi has, with the prior approval of the Central Government exempted the rural areas from the provisions of the said Act mentioned in column 2 of the Schedule given below to the extent given in column 4 of the said schedule." SCHEDULE ____________________________________________________________________________ S. Section Brief Extent No. Description ____________________________________________________________________________ 1. 332, 333, 334. 335, Building Only such portion of 336,342, 347 regulations the rural areas as lie within the village abadis as defined in the revenue records (firni) provided that the exemption shall not apply to factories, ware-houses, cold storage and slaughter houses. ____________________________________________________________________________ (6) Mr. Banerjee at the very outset contended that admittedly in the show cause notice issued under proviso to Section 343 of the Act, there was no mention that construction was in violation of Sections 312 and 313 of the Act, and this could not be taken as a ground for demolition order. The finding of the Tribunal to the effect that this is purely a legal plea. and does not require evidence and no prejudice has been caused to the petitioners is obviously erroneous. There seems to be a good deal of force in this submission.
(7) In order to attract the application of Sections 312 and 313 of the Act, is is necessary to prove, in the first instance, that an owner of la.nd, if utilises such land for construction of buildings thereon, ha sto submit a lay-out plan under Section 313 of the Act to the Commissioner showing therein the plots into which the land is proposed to be divided, the purpose for which buildings are to be used etc. Since this requires adducing of evidence, such a plea cannot be termed as a pure legal plea. Such a plea, therefore, could not have been considered by the authorities concerned, in the absence of mention of such provision in the show cause notice.
(8) However, since both the parties have addressed arguments on this aspect, regarding the application of Section 312 and 313 of the Act, we proceed on this basis that such a plea can be gone into and to examine the matter, in the light of .such provision.
(9) Mr. Banerjee, learned counsel, for the petitioners, very strongly contended that Sections 312 and 313 of the Act for filing an application to seek permission for sanction of the lay out plan of the land are not attracted in the present case as the petitioners have raised construction and want to raise construction on a single undivided plot with a single complex with one boundary limit. Section 312 provides that if the owner of any land utilises, sells, leases out or otherwise disposes of such land for the construction of buildings thereon, he shall lay down and make a street or street? giving access to the plots into which the land may be divided and connecting with a existing public or private street. Section 313 provides that before utilising, selling or otherwise dealing with any land under Section 312, the owner thereof shall send to the Commissioner a written application with a lay-out plan of the land showing the particulars, namely, the plots into which the land is proposed to be divided for the erection of buildings thereon and the purpose or purposes for which such buildings are to be used, amongst others.
(10) The purpose of this provision appears to be that the plots of the land which an owner wants to utilise for construction should be divided in such a way that it should be possible to provide access to the private streets which may be connected with either private streets already existing or public streets thereby cater to the needs of communication and transport. In this connection the petitioners have relied upon the case of Shri Chet Ram Vashisht v. Municipal Corporation of Delhi and another where the Supreme Court dealt with the question whether the failure of the Standing Committee of the Delhi Municipal Corporation to consider under subsection ( 3) of Section 313, Delhi Municipal Corporation Act, 1957, an application for sanction to a lay-out plan within the period specified in the sub-section resulted in a 'deemed'' grant of the sanction. The Supreme Court explained and referred to the purpose of Sections 312 and 313 as under . "............THE.purpose of filing a lay-out plan under subS.(1) of S. 313 is related immediately to deter" mining whether the access provided by the' proposed private streets is sufficiently and adequately serves the purpose enacted in S. 312, and that is why the lay-out plan must show the particulars specified in Sub-S.(1) of S. 313. Sanction to the layout plan is also a preliminary step in the process of utilising the land for the construction of building thereon. It is necessary to obtain that sanction because it is a pre-requisite to the grant of sanction for the erection of the building or the execution of the work."
In this context Mr. Banerjee, teamed counsel for the petitioner also referred to 'Private Street and Lay-out Plans' on page 531 of 'A Treatise on the Calcutta Municipal Corporation Act, 1980' by D. N. Banerjee & S. Sen Gupta which may be reproduced below : "APART from public street, there is a wide network of private streets belonging to private persons which also cater to the needs of communication and transport in the city. These private streets provide inner access from the public streets. As classified in Section 346, a public street may be an arterial road or a sub-arterial road or a collector road or a local road according to the function it performs as a public thoroughfare. The private roads supplement the system and take the communication facilities to inner areas. In this way, a private street has either to connect itself ultimately with a public street of any description or terminate in another private street which so connects itself. This is, again, intimately connected with sub-division of plots or landholdings. If the plots are sub-divided into small units it becomes difficult either to give access to such sub-division or to have a sizeable construction upon it."
(11) From the above it follows that the necessity of making lay-out plan for the land and for making an application to that effect to the Commissioner will arise in case an owner of any land utilise, sells. leases out or otherwise disposes of such land for the construction of buildings thereon and divides the plots into which the land is proposed to be divided for the erection oi buildings thereon and the purpose or purposes for which such buildings are to be used. the idea behind this is that if the owner of the land subdivides his land into small units, it will become difficult either to give access to the sub-division or to have sizeable construction upon it In order to avoid this situation the requirement of the sanction of lay-out plan has been envisaged under Sections 312 and 313 of the Act. In cases, however, where the owner of the land wants to raise construction on his land without sub-division into various plots, normally, no difficulty would be experienced in providing access to such land and construction raised thereon through public streets or private streets connecting with the public streets. In such a situation where the owner wants to build a single complex on the land, in his own interest, normally, he will raise the construction providing access either to the public streets or private streets connected with public streets. That is why the legislature in its wisdom under Sections 312 and 313 has provided for requiring sanction of the lay-out plan for the land which is proposed to be sub-divided for the construction of plots thereon, and not for other persons who want to raise construction on the land as a single complex with one boundary limit without sub-division. This has no relevance to the question of developmental planning. To our mind the provisions of Sections 312 and 313 arc intended to be made applicable to the colonisers and other owners of the land referred to therein.
(12) In the light of what is discussed above, since the petitioners in this case have raised and want to raise construction as a single complex with one boundary limit without sub-dividing into various plots, we hold that Sections 312 and 313 are not attracted and the petitioners have accordingly not required to make a written application For the sanction of lay-out plan of the land as contemplated under Section 313 of the Act.
(13) The main thrust of 'the argument of Mr. Sabharwal, learned counsel for the respondent is that the provision for sanction of lay-out plan as squired under Sections 312 and 313 of the Act has been provided to show that the development of Delhi takes place in a planned manner keeping in view the principles of City Planning. The development plans or the lay-out plan is a mechanism to provide an environment for living which all may desire but which would not be obtained through fragmented decisions of individuals. It is meant to achieve the public good of the society and is required to be maintained. Therefore, the sanction for lay-out plan as required under Sections 312 and 313 of the Act is mandatory for the erection of construction of building on the land. We are afraid we are unable to accept this argument. In this connection we have already discussed earlier that the provision of layout plan envisaged in Sections 312 and 313 of the Act has nothing to do with the development and planning of the city or village. It is only intended to provide for communication and access to the plots or sub-plots which have been carved out of a chunk of land belonging to a person. This situation will not arise in a case where a person wants to raise construction as a single complex on the land without subdividing his land into various plots as when the construction sought to be raised by an owner on his own land as a single complex, normally, no difficulty would be experienced in providing access to such land and the construction thereon through public or private streets. Therefore, no sanction for the lay-out plan would be required by a person who wants to raise construction on his land as a single complex with one boundary limit. This also, in our opinion, will not stand in any way against the planned development or will result haphazard growth of the town or village. Furthermore, the exclusion of the application of this provision in Sections 312 and 313 of the Act to a person who wants to raise construction on the land without sub-division of plots will not absolve the Corporation from discharging its obligatory functions and duties under Section 42 of the Act which also include, amongst others the construction, maintenance, alteration and improvements of public streets, bridges, culverts, causeways and the like, which have been enacted in the interest of planned development of the area of the Corporation.
(14) Mr. Sabharwal next contended that the land in question situated in village Mundka was the subject matter of consolidation proceedings in 1975-76 under the East Punjab Holding (Consolidation and Prevention of Fragmentation) Act, 1948 (for Short 'E.P.H. Act') and the land in question was declared as extended village abadi. The parcels of land falling in extended village abadi must have been divided into various plots in order to allot such abadi land to other persons as well. Tho land bearing khasra No. 411 1 2 2 measuring 5 bighas 18 biswas falling to the shares of the petitioners and allotted to them must have been divided sub-divided out of bigger parcel of land and that is why this has been given sub-number. Therefore, for the purpose of raising construction on such land. Sections 312 and 313 of the Act would be applicable.
(15) This argument is also without substance. Firstly there is no material placed on the record to show that the extended abadi (Firni or Lal Dora) allotted to the petitioner in consolidation proceedings was carved out of a bigger parcel of land and such a submission is based only on conjectures and surmises. But, even if it is so, such allotment has been made, as a result of consolidation proceedings under the Act by operation of law and the petitioners have not sub-divided the land into various plots for the purposes of raising construction and as such Sections 312 and 313 of the Act cannot be made applicable.
(16) The next question that arises for consideration is whether the area in dispute falls within the extended abadi (Lal Dora or Firni) of village Mundka in order to enable the petitioners to have the benefit of the gazette notification dated 24-8-1963. It has not been disputed by counsel for the respondent that if the area in dispute falls with the extended abadi (Lal Dora or Firni) then the petitioners shall have the benefit of the aforementioned notification and they will not be required to apply for sanction to the Commissioner for erecting the building under Sections 332 & 333 of the Act. In fact. "in Civil Writ Petition No. 1737 1986-Municipal Corporation of Delhi vs. Dalmia Dairy Industries Ltd. and another decided on 27th July, 1987 a Division Bench of this Court (2) has held that the notification dated 24-8-1963 is of a general nature and it applies to all the rural areas as lie within the village abadis as defined in the revenue records. Therefore, it applies to the extended village abadis, as well. However, the Appellate Tribunal in the present case on facts has found that the area in dispute does not fall within the extended abadi (Lal Dora or Firni) and, therefore, the notification dated 24-8-1963 exempting certain area from the purview of Sections 332 and 333 of the Act is not applicable to the present case. Mr. Banerjee, learned counsel for the petitioners, submitted that the finding of the Appellate Tribunal confirmed by the Lt. Governor that the area in dispute does not fall within the extended abadi apparently suffers from erroneous legal approach and has resulted not only to an error apparent on the face of the record but also in the material irregularity in the exercise of jurisdiction and such a finding, therefore, deserves to be set aside. In this connection, it may be reiterated at this stage that this village came under the operation of the consolidation proceedings during the year 1975-76 pursuant to the provisions of Delhi Land Reforms Act read with the E.P.H. Act. Under Section 18 of the E.P.H. Act it shall be lawful for the Consolidation Officer to direct that if in any area under consolidation no land is reserved for any common purpose including extension of village abadi, or if land is so reserved is inadequate, to assign other land for such purpose. 'Common Purpose' has been defined in Section 2(bb) as 'any purpose in relation to any common need, convenience or benefit of the village' and includes extension of village abadi. As a result of such an operation the village abadi was also extended and consequently re-partition has taken place and the records of rights have also been prepared accordingly as required under the provisions of the Act.
(17) In order to demonstrate that the area in dispute falls within the extended abadi (Lal Dora or Firni) the petitioners have referred to various documents which we would discuss hereinafter.
(18) A copy of the Aks Shajra (field map) (filed as annexure P-4 to the writ petition and at annexure P-23 to the rejoinder) prepared during such consolidation operation clearly demonstrates that the area in dispute falls within the Firni (extended abadi or Lal Dora). Aks Shajra is a record of right and entries in a record of rights shall be presumed to be correct unless the contrary is shown.
(19) Two khasra girdawaris fur the year 1988-89 (annexure P-9A to the writ petition and annexure P-25 to the Rejoinder) also clearly show that the petitioners are the recorded owners in respect of field No. 411/1/2/2 measuring 5 bighas 18 biswas and the number of khatauni khata ha been shown therein as '189' under column 3. This implies that khatauni which is a record of rights has also been prepared by the revenue authorities. Although in annexure P-9A under column 18 the nature of land has not been specified but in annexure P-25 the nature of land has been shown as 'ghair mumken Mukkan' which means 'uncultivated land under building'. In other words, this is a abadi land. It is settled law that khasra girdawaris are public documents and can properly be proved by the production of certified copies and they are admissible under Section 35 of the Evidence Act. This document should have been given its due weight by the Appellate Tribunal. Although record of right like khatauni has not been produced by the petitioners but there is a definite reference in column 4 of khasra girdawari that the name of the tenure holder as classified in Part I of the khatauni has been given therein who have been described as petitioners as owners of the land in disputs. If the petitioners have not produced the khatauni although Khasra girdawari itself sufficiently shows that the petitioners have been recorded as owners on the basis of entries in the khatauni, the respondents could themselves have produced khatauni if it showed the entry otherwise. It appears that the petitioners filed an application dated 14-1-1988 before the Appellate Tribunal for permission to adduce additional evidence in the form of latest revenue record maintained by the revenue department but that application was not decided. Consequently the petitioners were net permitted to produce the latest revenue records.
(20) Another certified copy of a document Issued by the Revenue Asistant, Delhi dated 24-11-1986 (Annexure P-6 to the writ petition) has been placed on the record which states 'As per report of the patwari Halqa Mundka and Field Kanungo Tehsildar/C.C. Delhi House/Building/Plot No. 411/1/2/2 falls in khasra No. which has been earmarked as extended abadi during consolidation operation of village Munoka in the year 1975-76'.
(21) Similars another document dated 1-5-19-89 issued by the Revenue Assistant. Delhi (annexure P-24 to the rejoinder) has been placed on record where also it has been clarified that 'as per revenue record the plot/Kh. No. 411/1/2/2 falls in the Lal Dora of village Mundka, extended as a result of consolidation proceedings undertaken.....'.
(22) Another document dated 14-1-1988 issued by "Bandobast Adhikari, Chakbandhi, Delhi' which has been produced by the petitioner?, is a certificate clearly states that the area in dispute falls within the extended abadi/Firm. This document has been annexed as annexure P-7 to the writ petition.
(23) All these documents referred to above have been issued by the responsible officer of the revenue department or of consolidation department while discharging their official duties on the basis of the revenue records or based on the reports given by the subordinate officials of the revenue department in discharge of their official duties. It goes without saying that the officers of the revenue department while giving a certificate can always take the assistance of his subordinate official? in the matter.
(24) There is also a certificate issued by the village Pradhan (annexure P-5 to the writ petition) dated nil which certifies that the land in dispute belongs to the petitioners and falls within the extended abadi (Firni or Lal Dora). Pradhan is a very important functionary of the Gaon Panchayat which under Section 19(1) of the' Delhi Panchayat Raj Act, 1954 can make provision for extension of abadi and under Section 16 of the Delhi Panchayat Raj Act, 1954 the Patwari shall be bound, to assist the Pradhan or U-Pradhan of a Gaon Panchayat in the performance of the duties of the Gaon Panchayat relating to land management work under Chapter V of the Delhi Land Reforms Act, 1954, in respect of the village of his halqa situated in the jurisdiction of the Gaon Panchayat, in the manner and to the extent prescribed under that Act. Under Sections 155 and 156 of the Delhi Land Reforms Act, 1954 the Gaon Panchayat has also been entrusted with the management, functions and duties of the maintenance and development of abadi sites and village communications and the consolidation of holdings, amongst others. Therefore, the certificate issued by the village Pradhan is in the nature of an entry in a record which is made by him as a public servant in the discharge of his official duties.
(25) All these documents, referred to above, therefore, are not hearsay evidence-the only objection raised about the admissibility of evidence of such document-but are relevant pieces of evidence under Section 35 of the Evidence Act. 1872 as these documents clearly show that the entries in these documents have been made by responsible officers in due discharge of their official duties and such documents also throw light on the question whether or not the land in dispute falls within the extended abadi. Therefore, the documents are clearly relevant and admissible under Section 35 of the Evidence Act. Moreover, since these documents are coming from the responsible officers of the department, their probative value of evidence also cannot be under-estimated.
(26) There is no evidence produced by the respondents to rebut the evidence of the petitioners. After taking into consideration all the evidence discussed above, we have no hesitation to hold that the land in dispute definitely falls within the extended abadi.
(27) Mr. Sabharwal, however, by referring to the definition of 'village' in sub-section 23 of Section 3 of the Delhi Land Reforms' Act which provides : "'VILLAGE'means any local area whether compact or otherwise recorded as a village in the revenue records of the Delhi State and includes any area which the Chief Commissioner may, by a general or special order published in the official Gazette, declare to be a village."
Tried to convass since the petitioners have not produced any copy of the notification in order to show that the Administrator. has declared the land in dispute as a village abadi or extended abadi, therefore, such land cannot fall within the extended abadi. We fail to understand in the first instance how the definition of 'village' in the Delhi Land Reforms Act would be relevant in the present context and secondly how this definition helps the case of the respondents.
(28) Mr. Sabharwal, learned counsel for the respondents, next tried to take the help of the definition of land' under the Delhi Land Reforms Act which mean the land help or occupied for purposes connected with agriculture, horticulture of animal husbandry including pisciculture and poultry farming and includes buildings appurtenant thereto, village abadis. grovelands, lands for village pasture or land covered by water and used for growing singharas and other produce or land in the bed of a liver and used for casual or occasional cultivation but does not include land occupied by buildings in belts of areas adjacent to Delhi town and New Delhi town, which the Chief Commissioner may by a notification in the official Gazette declare as an acquisition thereto. From this definition he tried to substantiate that even though the land falling within the village abadi (Lal Dora or Firni) cannot be utilised for purposes other than specifier under Section 3(13) of the Delhi Land Reforms Act. This argument, to our mind, is also hardly of any relevance or substance. This definition is relevant only for the purpose of the revenue authorities to decide at the commencement of the Delhi Land Reforms Act, whether any land is covered by the Act or not and whether the Delhi Land Reforms Act should be applied to the said land or not. Once at the commencement of the Act, the Act is applied 'hen the said land will continue to be the land governed by the said Act and cannot be taken out of the said Act by any subsequent Act. The very fact that khasra numbers were allotted to this land by the revenue authorities and that the consolidation officer had also included the said land into the consolidation scheme and issued aks shajra of the same, shows that this land falls within the definition of Section 3(13) of the Delhi Land Reforms Act. Furthermore, the land occupied by buildings also falls within the definition of abadi land as the laud in question is a land of village abadi and is being used as such. The latter part of this section which says does not include land occupied by buildings in belts of areas adjacent to Delhi town and New Delhi town which the Chief Commissioner may by notification in the official Gazette declare as acquisition thereto' clearly shows that there should be a notification by the Chief Commissioner in respect of buildings or in respect of land occupied by buildings adjacent to Delhi town and New Delhi town and only then they could be taken out from the provisions of Delhi Land Reforms Act. This contention of the learned counsel for the respondents, therefore, fails.
(29) The next contention of Mr. Sabharwal, learned counsel for the respondents, that the petitioners have not produced the sale deeds which, according to him, could have shown that the land in dispute falls within the extended abadi also cannot improve the case of the respondents. The respondents have not produced any evidence to rebut the evidence led by the petitioners. In the face of the evidence adduced by the petitioners, already discussed, we have already held that the land in dispute falls within the extended village abadi. Therefore, this contention of the learned counsel also fails.
(30) Since we are taking the view that the land in dispute falls within the extended abadi, no sanction would be required from the Commissioner for raising construction of the building under Sections 332 and 333 of the Act as the petitioners are exempt under the provisions of the notification dated 2t-8-1963 and that further sections 312 and 313 of the Act are not attracted in this case, the findings of Lt. Governor and the Appellate Tribunal to the contrary suffer from error apparent on the face of record and also result in exercise of jurisdiction with material irregularity. The order of demolition passed by the authorities concerned cannot be sustained in law and requires to be set aside, the order of sealing consequently will also not survive and deserves to be quashed.
(31) In the light of the above discussion we therefore allow the writ petition and quash the Lt. Governor's order of demolition and sealing of the premises dated 12th January, 1989 affirming the orders of demolition of the Appellate Tribunal dated 29-6-1988 and of Zonal Engineer (B) of the Municipal Corporation of Delhi dated 23-10-1987 as also the orders for sealing of the premises of the Appellate Tribunal dated 29-6-1988 "and of the Deputy Commissioner (,L) dated 3/8-9-1987. We further issue a writ of mandamus re-training the respondents from demolishing the building on plot No. 411/22 situated in Lal Dora (Firni or extended abadi) of village Mundka in the Union Territory of Delhi and unsealing of the premises. The petitioners shall be entitled to costs of this writ petition- counsel's' fee Rs. 2,000.00 .