Himachal Pradesh High Court
Reserved On: 17.11.2025 vs Of on 11 December, 2025
2025:HHC:42907
IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA
Cr. Revision No. 136 of 2014
Reserved on: 17.11.2025
.
Date of Decision: 11.12.2025
Harish Kumar ...Petitioner
Versus
of
State of H.P. ...Respondent
Coram
rt
Hon'ble Mr Justice Rakesh Kainthla, Judge.
Whether approved for reporting?1 No
For the Petitioner : Ms Devyani Sharma, Senior
Advocate, with Mr Shivam Sharma.
For the Respondent/State : Mr Lokender Kutlehria, Additional
Advocate General.
Rakesh Kainthla, Judge
The present revision is directed against the judgment dated 09.05.2014, passed by learned Additional Sessions Judge-
II, Solan, District Solan, H.P. (learned Appellate Court), vide which the judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated 19.11.2012 passed by learned Judicial Magistrate First Class, Court No.1, Kasauli, District Solan, H.P. (learned Trial Court) were partly upheld. (Parties shall hereinafter be referred to in the same 1 Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes.
::: Downloaded on - 11/12/2025 20:38:33 :::CIS 22025:HHC:42907 manner as they were arrayed before the learned Trial Court for convenience.)
2. Briefly stated, the facts giving rise to the present .
revision are that the police presented a challan before the learned Trial Court for the commission of offences punishable under Sections 353, 504 and 506 of the IPC. It was asserted that the of informant Raj Kumar (PW1) was posted as Naib Tehsildar in the sub-Tehsil Krishangarh (Kuthar). The accused Harish Kumar rt was employed as a part-time worker in the office. The informant was discharging his duties on 18.07.2009 at about 1:00 pm. The accused was moving outside the office armed with a stick. He abused the informant and threatened to kill him. The accused obstructed the informant in the discharge of his official duties.
Shiv Ram (PW3), Tara Chand (PW2), and Manoj Kumar witnessed the incident. The matter was reported to the police, and an entry (Ext.PW10/A) was recorded in the daily diary. ASI Inder Lal (PW13) and Constable Pal Chand went to the spot for verification.
ASI Inder Lal (PW13) recorded Raj Kumar's statement (Ext.PW1/A) and sent it to the Police Station, where FIR (Ext.PW11/A) was registered. ASI Inder Lal investigated the matter. He prepared the site plan (Ext.PW13/A). The accused ::: Downloaded on - 11/12/2025 20:38:33 :::CIS 3 2025:HHC:42907 produced the stick which was seized vide memo (Ext.PW1/B). The site plan of recovery (Ext.PW13/B) was prepared. The appointment and posting order of the informant (Ext.PW9/B) .
and appointment letter of accused (Ext.PW9/C) were seized. The statements of witnesses were recorded as per their version, and after the completion of the investigation, the challan was of prepared and presented before the learned Trial Court.
3. The learned Trial Court found sufficient reasons to rt summon the accused. When the accused appeared, he was charged with the commission of offences punishable under Sections 353, 504 and 506 of the IPC, to which he pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried.
4. The prosecution examined 13 witnesses to prove its case. Raj Kumar (PW1) is the informant. Tara Chand (PW2) and Shiv Ram (PW3) are the witnesses to the incident. Ramesh Chand (PW4) and Balak Ram (PW5) did not support the prosecution's case. Om Parkash (PW6) witnessed the recovery. Raj Paul (PW7) did not support the prosecution's case. HC Deep Ram (PW8) is the witness to the disclosure statement made by the accused.
Harbans Rani (PW9) produced the appointment and posting order of the informant. Jai Chand (PW10) proved entry in the ::: Downloaded on - 11/12/2025 20:38:33 :::CIS 4 2025:HHC:42907 daily diary. Chet Ram (PW11) signed the FIR. Ramesh Thakur (PW12) prepared the challan. ASI Inder Lal (PW13) investigated the matter.
.
5. The accused, in his statement recorded under Section 313 of Cr.P.C., denied the prosecution's case in its entirety. He stated that a false case was made against him. The witnesses of deposed falsely against him. He did not lead any evidence in defence.
6. rt Learned Trial Court held that the informant's statement was duly corroborated by the statements of Tara Chand (PW2) and Shiv Ram (PW3). There was no reason to disbelieve the testimonies of prosecution witnesses. The matter was reported to the police, and the prompt lodging of the FIR ruled out the concocted version. The fact that the witnesses did not support the prosecution's case was not sufficient to doubt it because they contradicted their previous statements. The informant was a public servant. The defence version that the informant had asked the accused to do his domestic work, and a false case was made against the accused on his refusal, was not believable. Minor contradictions in the statements of the witnesses are insufficient to doubt the prosecution's case. Hence, ::: Downloaded on - 11/12/2025 20:38:33 :::CIS 5 2025:HHC:42907 the accused was convicted of the commission of offences punishable under Sections 353, 504 and 506 of the IPC and was sentenced as under:
.
Sections Sentences
353 of IPC The accused was sentenced to undergo rigorous
imprisonment for six months, pay fine of ₹1000/- and in default of payment of fine to undergo of further rigorous imprisonment for one month.
504 of IPC The accused was sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for six months, pay fine of ₹1000/-
rt and in default of payment of fine to undergo further rigorous imprisonment for one month.
506 of IPC The accused was sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for six months, pay fine of ₹1000/- and in default of payment of fine to undergo further rigorous imprisonment for one month.
It was ordered that all the substantive sentences of imprisonment shall run concurrently.
7. Being aggrieved by the judgment and order passed by the learned Trial Court, the accused filed an appeal, which was decided by the learned Additional Sessions Judge-II, Solan, District Solan, H.P. (learned Appellate Court). Learned Appellate Court held that the abuses and threats advanced by the accused were not sufficient to prove the commission of an offence punishable under Section 353 of the IPC. There was no use of ::: Downloaded on - 11/12/2025 20:38:33 :::CIS 6 2025:HHC:42907 criminal force or assault. The exact nature of the abuses was not given, and it was difficult to say that the abuses were of the nature that would provoke the informant to commit breach of .
peace. Hence, the accused was acquitted of the commission of offences punishable under Sections 353 and 506 of the IPC.
However, the conviction recorded under Section 506 of the IPC of was maintained. The sentence was reduced, and the accused was sentenced to undergo simple imprisonment for one month, pay a rt fine of ₹1000/-, and, in default of payment of the fine to undergo simple imprisonment for 15 days.
8. Being aggrieved by the judgments and order passed by the learned Courts below, the accused has filed the present revision asserting that the learned Courts below erred in appreciating the material placed before them. The offence punishable under Section 506 of the IPC was not proved. The statement of informant Raj Kumar was not supported by other witnesses. The informant materially improved upon his version and stated that the accused had advanced threats to do away with his life. This version should not have been believed by the learned Courts below. The conviction can be recorded on the sole testimony of a witness if it is of a sterling nature. However, the ::: Downloaded on - 11/12/2025 20:38:33 :::CIS 7 2025:HHC:42907 informant's statement was not of a sterling nature. The defence version that the informant had asked the accused to do his domestic work, and a false case was made when the accused .
refused to do so, was highly probable. The benefit of the Probation of Offenders Act was not extended to the accused.
Therefore, it was prayed that the present revision be allowed and of the judgments and order passed by the learned Courts below be set aside.
9. rt I have heard Ms Divyani Sharma, learned Senior Advocate, assisted by Mr Shivam Sharma, Advocate for the petitioner and Mr Lokender Kutlehria, learned Additional Advocate General for the respondent/State.
10. Ms Divyani Sharma, learned Senior Advocate, for the petitioner, submitted that the learned Courts below erred in convicting the accused of the commission of an offence punishable under Section 506 of the IPC. The necessary ingredients of the commission of offences were not satisfied. The official witnesses did not support the informant's version, and the informant had materially improved upon his version. The learned Appellate Court found that the offences punishable under Sections 353 and 506 of the IPC were not committed, but relied ::: Downloaded on - 11/12/2025 20:38:33 :::CIS 8 2025:HHC:42907 upon the same evidence to record the conviction of the accused for the commission of an offence punishable under Section 506 of the IPC, which is impermissible. Therefore, she prayed that .
the present revision be allowed and the judgments and order passed by the learned Courts below be set aside. She relied upon the judgments of this Court in State of Himachal Pradesh vs. Dhani of Ram and another 2011:HHC:4395:DB and Jagat Singh Negi versus Surat Singh Negi 2025:HHC:19450 in support of her submission.
11. rt Mr Lokender Kutlehria, learned Additional Advocate General for the respondent/State, submitted that the informant had specifically stated in his initial version that the accused was roaming outside the office armed with a stick and he was threatening to kill the informant. This version was proved in the Court by the informant on oath and was corroborated by Tara Chand (PW2). Learned Courts below rightly relied upon the prosecution's version, and this Court should not interfere with the concurrent findings of fact recorded by learned Courts below.
Hence, he prayed that the present revision be dismissed.
12. I have given considerable thought to the submissions made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully.
::: Downloaded on - 11/12/2025 20:38:33 :::CIS 92025:HHC:42907
13. It was laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Malkeet Singh Gill v. State of Chhattisgarh, (2022) 8 SCC 204:
(2022) 3 SCC (Cri) 348: 2022 SCC OnLine SC 786 that a revisional .
court is not an appellate court and it can only rectify the patent defect, errors of jurisdiction or the law. It was observed at page 207: -
of "10. Before adverting to the merits of the contentions, at the outset, it is apt to mention that there are concurrent findings of conviction arrived at by two courts after a detailed appreciation of the material and evidence brought rt on record. The High Court in criminal revision against conviction is not supposed to exercise the jurisdiction like the appellate court, and the scope of interference in revision is extremely narrow. Section 397 of the Criminal Procedure Code (in short "CrPC") vests jurisdiction to satisfy itself or himself as to the correctness, legality or propriety of any finding, sentence or order, recorded or passed, and as to the regularity of any proceedings of such inferior court. The object of the provision is to set right a patent defect or an error of jurisdiction or law. There has to be a well-founded error which is to be determined on the merits of individual cases. It is also well settled that while considering the same, the Revisional Court does not dwell at length upon the facts and evidence of the case to reverse those findings.
14. This position was reiterated in State of Gujarat v.
Dilipsinh Kishorsinh Rao, (2023) 17 SCC 688: 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1294, wherein it was observed at page 695:
14. The power and jurisdiction of the Higher Court under Section 397 CrPC, which vests the court with the power to call for and examine records of an inferior court, is for the ::: Downloaded on - 11/12/2025 20:38:33 :::CIS 10 2025:HHC:42907 purposes of satisfying itself as to the legality and regularities of any proceeding or order made in a case. The object of this provision is to set right a patent defect or an error of jurisdiction or law or the perversity which has crept in such proceedings.
.
15. It would be apposite to refer to the judgment of this Court in Amit Kapoor v. Ramesh Chander [Amit Kapoor v. Ramesh Chander, (2012) 9 SCC 460: (2012) 4 SCC (Civ) 687:
(2013) 1 SCC (Cri) 986], where scope of Section 397 has been considered and succinctly explained as under: (SCC p.
475, paras 12-13) of "12. Section 397 of the Code vests the court with the power to call for and examine the records of an inferior court for the purposes of satisfying itself as to the legality and regularity of any proceedings or order rt made in a case. The object of this provision is to set right a patent defect or an error of jurisdiction or law.
There has to be a well-founded error, and it may not be appropriate for the court to scrutinise the orders, which, upon the face of it, bear a token of careful consideration and appear to be in accordance with law.
If one looks into the various judgments of this Court, it emerges that the revisional jurisdiction can be invoked where the decisions under challenge are grossly erroneous, there is no compliance with the provisions of law, the finding recorded is based on no evidence, material evidence is ignored, or judicial discretion is exercised arbitrarily or perversely. These are not exhaustive classes, but are merely indicative. Each case would have to be determined on its own merits.
13. Another well-accepted norm is that the revisional jurisdiction of the higher court is a very limited one and cannot be exercised in a routine manner. One of the inbuilt restrictions is that it should not be against an interim or interlocutory order. The Court has to keep in mind that the exercise of revisional jurisdiction itself should not lead to injustice ex facie. Where the Court is dealing with the question as to whether the charge has been framed properly and in accordance with law in a ::: Downloaded on - 11/12/2025 20:38:33 :::CIS 11 2025:HHC:42907 given case, it may be reluctant to interfere in the exercise of its revisional jurisdiction unless the case substantially falls within the categories aforestated. Even the framing of the charge is a much-advanced stage in the proceedings under CrPC."
.
15. It was held in Kishan Rao v. Shankargouda, (2018) 8 SCC 165: (2018) 3 SCC (Cri) 544: (2018) 4 SCC (Civ) 37: 2018 SCC OnLine SC 651 that it is impermissible for the High Court to reappreciate the evidence and come to its conclusions in the of absence of any perversity. It was observed at page 169:
rt "12. This Court has time and again examined the scope of Sections 397/401 CrPC and the grounds for exercising the revisional jurisdiction by the High Court. In State of Kerala v. Puttumana Illath Jathavedan Namboodiri, (1999) 2 SCC 452: 1999 SCC (Cri) 275, while considering the scope of the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court, this Court has laid down the following: (SCC pp. 454-55, para 5) "5. ... In its revisional jurisdiction, the High Court can call for and examine the record of any proceedings to satisfy itself as to the correctness, legality or propriety of any finding, sentence or order. In other words, the jurisdiction is one of supervisory jurisdiction exercised by the High Court for correcting a miscarriage of justice. But the said revisional power cannot be equated with the power of an appellate court, nor can it be treated even as a second appellate jurisdiction.
Ordinarily, therefore, it would not be appropriate for the High Court to reappreciate the evidence and come to its conclusion on the same when the evidence has already been appreciated by the Magistrate as well as the Sessions Judge in appeal, unless any glaring feature is brought to the notice of the High Court which would otherwise tantamount to a gross miscarriage of justice. On scrutinising the impugned judgment of the High Court from the aforesaid standpoint, we have no ::: Downloaded on - 11/12/2025 20:38:33 :::CIS 12 2025:HHC:42907 hesitation in concluding that the High Court exceeded its jurisdiction in interfering with the conviction of the respondent by reappreciating the oral evidence. ..."
13. Another judgment which has also been referred to and .
relied on by the High Court is the judgment of this Court in Sanjaysinh Ramrao Chavan v. Dattatray Gulabrao Phalke, (2015) 3 SCC 123: (2015) 2 SCC (Cri) 19. This Court held that the High Court, in the exercise of revisional jurisdiction, shall not interfere with the order of the Magistrate unless it is perverse or wholly unreasonable or there is non- consideration of any relevant material, the order cannot of be set aside merely on the ground that another view is possible. The following has been laid down in para 14: (SCC p. 135) "14. ... Unless the order passed by the Magistrate is rt perverse or the view taken by the court is wholly unreasonable or there is non-consideration of any relevant material or there is palpable misreading of records, the Revisional Court is not justified in setting aside the order, merely because another view is possible. The Revisional Court is not meant to act as an appellate court. The whole purpose of the revisional jurisdiction is to preserve the power in the court to do justice in accordance with the principles of criminal jurisprudence. The revisional power of the court under Sections 397 to 401 CrPC is not to be equated with that of an appeal. Unless the finding of the court, whose decision is sought to be revised, is shown to be perverse or untenable in law or is grossly erroneous or glaringly unreasonable or where the decision is based on no material or where the material facts are wholly ignored or where the judicial discretion is exercised arbitrarily or capriciously, the courts may not interfere with the decision in exercise of their revisional jurisdiction."
14. In the above case, also a conviction of the accused was recorded, and the High Court set aside [Dattatray Gulabrao Phalke v. Sanjaysinh Ramrao Chavan, 2013 SCC OnLine Bom 1753] the order of conviction by substituting its view. This Court set aside the High Court's order, holding that the ::: Downloaded on - 11/12/2025 20:38:33 :::CIS 13 2025:HHC:42907 High Court exceeded its jurisdiction in substituting its views, and that too without any legal basis.
16. This position was reiterated in Bir Singh v. Mukesh Kumar, (2019) 4 SCC 197: (2019) 2 SCC (Cri) 40: (2019) 2 SCC (Civ) .
309: 2019 SCC OnLine SC 13, wherein it was observed at page 205:
"16. It is well settled that in the exercise of revisional jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code, the High Court does not, in the absence of of perversity, upset concurrent factual findings. It is not for the Revisional Court to re-analyse and re-interpret the evidence on record.
17. As held by this Court in Southern Sales & Services v.
rt Sauermilch Design and Handels GmbH [Southern Sales & Services v. Sauermilch Design and Handels GmbH, (2008) 14 SCC 457], it is a well-established principle of law that the Revisional Court will not interfere even if a wrong order is passed by a court having jurisdiction, in the absence of a jurisdictional error. The answer to the first question is, therefore, in the negative."
17. A similar view was taken in Sanjabij Tari v. Kishore S. Borcar, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 2069, wherein it was observed:
"27. It is well settled that in exercise of revisional jurisdic- tion, the High Court does not, in the absence of perversity, upset concurrent factual findings [See: Bir Singh (supra)]. This Court is of the view that it is not for the Revisional Court to re-analyse and re-interpret the evidence on record. As held by this Court in Southern Sales & Services v. Sauermilch Design and Handels GMBH, (2008) 14 SCC 457, it is a well-established principle of law that the Revisional Court will not interfere, even if a wrong order is passed by a Court having jurisdiction, in the absence of a jurisdic- tional error.
28. Consequently, this Court is of the view that in the ab- sence of perversity, it was not open to the High Court in ::: Downloaded on - 11/12/2025 20:38:33 :::CIS 14 2025:HHC:42907 the present case, in revisional jurisdiction, to upset the concurrent findings of the Trial Court and the Sessions Court.
18. The present revision has to be decided as per the .
parameters laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court.
19. Learned Trial Court convicted the accused of the commission of an offence punishable under Section 506 of the of IPC. This conviction was upheld by the learned Appellate Court.
Criminal intimidation is defined in Section 503 of the IPC as under: -
rt
503. Criminal intimidation Whoever threatens another with any injury to his person, reputation or property, or to the person or reputation of anyone in whom that person is interested, with intent to cause alarm to that person, or to cause that person to do any act which he is not legally bound to do, or to omit to do any act which that person is legally entitled to do, as the means of avoiding the execution of such threat, commits criminal intimidation.
Explanation- A threat to injure the reputation of any deceased person in whom the person threatened is interested is within this section.
20. Section 503 requires that the threat of injury should have been made with an intent to cause alarm to a person, to do an act, which a person is not legally bound to do or omit to do any act which he is legally entitled to do. It was laid down by this Court in Inder Pratap Singh Versus State of Himachal Pradesh 2003 ::: Downloaded on - 11/12/2025 20:38:33 :::CIS 15 2025:HHC:42907 (1) Crimes 345 (HC) that the complainant should have been alarmed by the threat advanced by the accused to attract Section 506 of IPC. It was observed:
.
"21. Similarly, before an offence of criminal intimidation can be made out, it must be established prima facie that the accused persons (like petitioners in the present case) intended to cause an alarm to the complainant party i. e., Jasbeer Singh. Mere threats, as alleged by him, extended by the petitioners, with a view to deter the complainant of from interfering with what the petitioner believed to be his exclusive property, would not constitute an offence of criminal intimidation."
rt
21. Similar is the judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court in Vikram Johar v. State of U.P., (2019) 14 SCC 207: (2019) 4 SCC (Cri) 795: 2019 SCC OnLine SC 609 wherein it was held at page 209: -
"25. Now, reverting back to Section 506, which is an offence of criminal intimidation, the principles laid down by Fiona Shrikhande v. State of Maharashtra, (2013) 14 SCC 44 : (2014) 1 SCC (Cri) 715 have also to be applied when the question of finding out as to whether the ingredients of the offence are made or not. Here, the only allegation is that the appellant abused the complainant. For proving an offence under Section 506 IPC, what are the ingredients that have to be proved by the prosecution? Ratanlal & Dhirajlal on Law of Crimes, 27th Edn., with regard to proof of offence, states the following:
"... The prosecution must prove:
(i) That the accused threatened some person.
(ii) That such threat consisted of some injury to his person, reputation or property; or to the person, reputation or property of someone in whom he was interested;::: Downloaded on - 11/12/2025 20:38:33 :::CIS 16
2025:HHC:42907
(iii) That he did so with intent to cause alarm to that person; or to cause that person to do any act which he was not legally bound to do, or omit to do any act which he was legally entitled to do as a means of avoiding the execution of such threat." (emphasis supplied) .
A plain reading of the allegations in the complaint does not satisfy all the ingredients as noticed above.
22. Therefore, it is necessary to prove that the accused had caused an alarm to the informant or had caused him to do of anything which he would not have done or omitted to do anything which he would have done but for the threat.
23. rt Raj Kumar (PW1) stated that the accused Harish Kumar was moving outside the office with a stick. He came inside the office and threatened to kill. He was sitting on the dias. The accused jumped towards the dias. The accused asked him to change the duty time.
24. The informant has not stated in his examination-in-
chief that the threats advanced by the accused caused any alarm in his mind. He stated that the accused asked him to change his duty hours, but the informant did not say that the threat was with the view to do some act which he was not legally bound to do. He clarified in the cross-examination that he used to change the duty hours of the accused on his request, which means that the accused had earlier requested a change of the duty hours, ::: Downloaded on - 11/12/2025 20:38:33 :::CIS 17 2025:HHC:42907 which were accepted, and his testimony does not prove that the accused had intimidated the informant to change the duty hours.
25. Tara Chand (PW2) stated that the accused was .
abusing and creating a ruckus. He was permitted to be cross-
examined. He denied that the accused was moving with the stick and was threatening to kill the informant. He clarified in the of cross-examination by the defence that the accused was talking loudly and was not abusing any particular person. This witness rt specifically denied that the accused had advanced any threat.
Therefore, his testimony does not prove the prosecution's case regarding the intimidation.
26. Shiv Ram (PW3) stated that the accused was hurling filthy abuses, and he was armed with the stick. The abuses were not directed at any particular person. The police came and took the accused with them. He was permitted to be cross-examined.
He denied that the accused had a scuffle with the informant. He was not asked whether the accused had intimidated any person or not. Therefore, his testimony does not prove the prosecution's case regarding the commission of an offence punishable under Section 506 of the IPC.
::: Downloaded on - 11/12/2025 20:38:33 :::CIS 182025:HHC:42907
27. Ramesh Chand (PW4) stated that he had gone for lunch. He was informed by his colleagues that the accused had been taken by the police. He was permitted to be cross-examined.
.
He denied that the accused was roaming with the stick and was abusing the people. The statement of this witness also does not prove the criminal intimidation.
of
28. Balak Ram (PW5) stated that he had gone for lunch, and when he returned, he was informed that the police had taken rt the accused with them. He was not aware of the reason why the accused was taken by the police. He was permitted to be cross-
examined. He denied that the accused was threatening to kill the informant. He denied the previous statement recorded by the police. The statement of this witness also does not prove any criminal intimidation.
29. Raj Paul (PW7) stated that he had gone for lunch, and when he returned, he was told that the police had taken the accused with them. He did not know why the police had taken the accused with them. He was permitted to be cross-examined. He denied that the accused was abusing the informant. He denied the previous statement recorded by the police. The statement of this witness also does not prove the criminal intimidation.
::: Downloaded on - 11/12/2025 20:38:33 :::CIS 192025:HHC:42907
30. There is no other witness to the incident.
31. Thus, only the informant has stated about the criminal intimidation. There is a force in the submission of Ms. .
Divyani Sharma, learned Senior Counsel for the accused that when the testimony of the informant has been disbelieved regarding the commission of offences punishable under Sections of 353 and 506 of IPC, the same testimony should not have been believed regarding the commission of an offence punishable rt under Section 506 of IPC when it was not corroborated by the other witnesses.
32. Therefore, the learned Courts below erred in convicting the accused of the commission of an offence punishable under Section 506 of the IPC. Hence, the present revision is allowed, and the judgments and order passed by the learned Courts below convicting and sentencing the accused of the commission of an offence punishable under Section 506 of IPC are ordered to be set aside. The fine amount be refunded.
33. In view of the provisions of Section 437-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure [Section 481 of Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (BNSS)], the petitioner/accused is directed to furnish his personal bond in the sum of ₹25,000/-
::: Downloaded on - 11/12/2025 20:38:33 :::CIS 202025:HHC:42907 with one surety in the like amount to the satisfaction of the learned Registrar (Judicial) of this Court/learned Trial Court, within four weeks, which shall be effective for six months with .
stipulation that in the event of Special Leave Petition being filed against this judgment, or on grant of the leave, the petitioner/accused, on receipt of notice(s) thereof, shall appear of before the Hon'ble Supreme Court.
34. A copy of this judgment, along with the records of the learned Courts rtbelow, be sent back forthwith. Pending miscellaneous application(s), if any, also stand(s) disposed of.
(Rakesh Kainthla) Judge 11th December, 2025 (Nikita) ::: Downloaded on - 11/12/2025 20:38:33 :::CIS