Rajasthan High Court - Jodhpur
Kartar Singh vs B.O.R.For Raj.At Ajmer & Ors on 31 August, 2009
Equivalent citations: AIR 2010 (NOC) 108 (RAJ.)
Author: Dinesh Maheshwari
Bench: Dinesh Maheshwari
1
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN AT
JODHPUR.
<<>>
:: O R D E R ::
(1) Kartar Singh Vs. Board of Revenue for Rajasthan at Ajmer & Ors.
S.B. CIVIL WRIT PETITION NO.5263/2005.
(2) Kartar Singh Vs. Board of Revenue for Rajasthan at Ajmer & Ors.
S.B. CIVIL WRIT PETITION NO.5429/2005.
(3) Surendra Singh & Ors. Vs. Board of Revenue for Rajasthan at Ajmer & Ors.
S.B. CIVIL WRIT PETITION NO.6647/2005.
(4) Kartar Singh Vs. Board of Revenue for Rajasthan at Ajmer & Ors.
S.B. CIVIL WRIT PETITION NO.3336/2005.
Date of Order :: 31st August 2009
PRESENT
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE DINESH MAHESHWARI
Mr. T.S. Champawat ] for Kartar Singh, petitioner in CWP
Mr. Mridul Jain ] Nos.5263/2005, 5429/2005 & 3336/2005
Mr. Paramveer Singh ] (respondent in CWP No.6647/2005)
Mr. K.C. Sharma ]
Mr. J.R. Beniwal ] for Surendra Singh & Ors., petitioners
Mr. Sunil Beniwal ] in CWP No.6647/2005 (respondents in
Mr. B.L. Choudhary ] CWP Nos. Nos.5263/2005, 5429/2005 &
Mr.Varun Goyal ] 3336/2005)
.....
Reportable BY THE COURT:
INTRODUCTORY:
These four writ petitions preferred against two separate orders passed by the Board of Revenue for Rajasthan, Ajmer ('the 2 Board'/'the Board of Revenue' for short) on 20.05.2005 have been considered together for several common features including those of the common contesting parties, commonness of the substantial part of the land in dispute, and even similitude of some of the issues involved; and are taken up for disposal by this common order.
Three of these writ petitions, CWP Nos.5263/2005, 5429/2005, and 6647/2005 relate to the common order dated 20.05.2005 passed by the Board of Revenue in Appeal No.9/2004/TA/Sriganganagar and in Appeal No.10/2004/TA/Sriganganagar. The other writ petition, CWP No.3336/2005, relates to a separate order dated 20.05.2005 passed by the Board of Revenue in Appeal No.11/2004/TA/Sriganganagar.
CWP Nos.5263/2005, 5429/2005 and 6647/2005 have their genesis in Revenue Suit No.146/1991 titled Kartar Singh Vs. Ajeet Singh and others as filed in the Court of the Sub Divisional Officer, Sriganganagar ('the SDO' for short) for division of the agricultural land situated at Chak 5Z, Tehsil and District Sriganganagar wherein the learned SDO proceeded to pass the preliminary decree on 16.07.1993 and the final decree on 04.01.1994. These decrees were questioned by Kartar Singh (the petitioner in CWP Nos.5263/2005 and 5429/2005) in two appeals bearing numbers 10/2004 and 11/2004 before the Revenue Appellate Authority, Sriganganagar ('the RAA' for short) essentially on the allegations that the said suit bearing number 146/1991 was filed in his name by somebody 3 impersonating himself as Kartar Singh; and while maintaining that he did not file such a suit, the petitioner-appellant Kartar Singh submitted that he came to know about such decree from the Patwari concerned only on 18.12.2003. In the said appeals, no other defendant of the disputed suit was joined as a party except the State of Rajasthan. The RAA proceeded to allow the appeals on 31.01.2004 and, while setting aside the questioned decrees, remanded the matter to the SDO for decision afresh after hearing the parties. The petitioners of CWP No.6647/2005, Surendra Singh and others, while joining the other defendants of the said suit or their legal representatives, preferred two appeals bearing numbers 9/2004/TA/Sriganganagar and 10/2004/TA/ Sriganganagar before the Board questioning the aforesaid order dated 31.01.2004. The Division Bench of the Board by its common order dated 20.05.2005 proceeded to dispose of the appeals with the directions that the matter shall stand remanded for decision of the Trial Court only on the question of impersonation of Kartar Singh. The learned Members of the Board observed that if Kartar Singh would succeed in his allegations on impersonation, the questioned decrees shall stand annulled but if he would fail to prove his case of impersonation, the said decrees shall stand upheld. The petitioner-appellant Kartar Singh is aggrieved of the observations made and limitation put by the learned Members of the Board on the scope of enquiry before the Trial Court and has, therefore, filed CWP Nos.5263/2005 and 4 5429/2005. The opposite party, Surendra Singh and others are, on the other hand, aggrieved of the directions regarding remand of the matter as made by the learned Members of the Board and have, therefore, filed the other writ petition, CWP No.6647/2005, with the submissions that the order of remand remains unjustified and while allowing their appeal, the Board ought to have restored the decrees as passed by the Trial Court.
The controversy in other petition, CWP No.3336/2005, is, of course, a bit different. This petition has its genesis in a separate revenue suit bearing number 149/2003 as admittedly filed by the petitioner Kartar Singh. The said suit was dismissed as withdrawn on 17.11.2003 by the SDO on an application to that effect made on behalf of the plaintiff Kartar Singh. The plaintiff-petitioner Kartar Singh, however, preferred an appeal before the RAA on 27.11.2003 questioning the said order dated 17.11.2003 on the allegations that he was prevailed upon to sign the application for withdrawal by the opposite party while suggesting their acceptance of his (Kartar Singh's) exclusive right over the land in question; but after withdrawal of suit, the opposite party intended to deny him of the property. The learned RAA proceeded to allow the said appeal bearing number 118/2003 on 13.04.2004 accepting the contentions of the plaintiff Kartar Singh; and ordered remand of the matter for decision of the suit on merits in accordance with law; and also issued an injunction against the defendants prohibiting them from 5 transferring the property in any manner and directed status quo to be maintained. The opposite party, however, questioned the said order dated 13.04.2004 in another appeal bearing number 11/2004/TA/ Sriganganagar before the Board. The same Division Bench of the Board on the same day i.e., 20.05.2005 proceeded to allow this appeal, set aside the order passed by the RAA on 13.04.2004, and restored the one passed by the SDO on 17.11.2003 with the obvious result that the suit as filed by the plaintiff Kartar Singh bearing number 149/2003 stands dismissed as withdrawn. The plaintiff Kartar Singh is aggrieved of the said order dated 20.05.2005 as passed by the Board in Appeal No.11/2004/TA/Sriganganagar and hence, has filed the other petition bearing CWP No.3336/2005.
Having broadly taken note of the relevant features of these petitions, appropriate it shall be to deal with the three writ petitions relating to Revenue Suit No.146/1991 separately and before the other writ petition relating to Revenue Suit No.149/2003. CWP NOS.5263/2005, 5429/2005 AND 6647/2005 The appeals before the RAA and the assertion of the petitioner Kartar Singh:
As noticed, these writ petitions have their genesis in Revenue Suit No.146/1991. The said suit, titled Kartar Singh Vs. Ajeet Singh was filed in the Court of SDO, Sriganganagar on 25.09.1991 with the averments in the plaint that the parties were having different 6 shares in the land in question as situated at Chak 5Z, Tehsil and District Sriganganagar and have carried out settlement and got registered a deed of partition on 20.05.1983; that the parties were in possession of their respective shares under the partition deed but, for the division having not been made in the records, were facing difficulties in making payment of the land revenue and in obtaining irrigation facilities etc. and hence, the land was required to be divided. The written statements were filed in the said suit on behalf of some of the defendants admitting the plaint averments; and the statements of the plaintiff were recorded on 30.11.1992. Thereafter, the learned SDO proceeded to pass an order dated 12.07.1993 decreeing the suit preliminarily, and accordingly a preliminary decree was passed on 16.07.1993 that reads as under:-
"न रय द क 12-7-93 ज सक पन सलग ह, क अ स र
व एव पन व गर क चक 5 ड हस ल व ज ल
गग गर म" म. . 3, 4, 5, 10, 11, 12, 13, 15, 16, 17, 18,
22, 25, 26, 27, 28 क कल रकब 294-02 ब घ क
बटव र म ब म" दहसस एव बटव र म क अ स र
(पन सलग ) ककय व । थ स र लग अलग स
क यम कर क पस व य र कर य व ।"
Pursuant to the aforesaid preliminary decree, the Tehsildar's proposals were obtained for division of the holdings and ultimately, the learned SDO passed the final decree on 04.01.1994 in the following terms:-
"व एवम पन व गर क चक 5 ड हस ल व ज ल
श गग गर क म. . 3, 4, 5, 10, 11, 12, 13, 15, 16, 17, 18,
22, 25, 26, 27, 28 क कल रकब 294-02 ब ध क
7
म बबक पस व हस ल र (र सव) श गग गर क अज- म
डडक र क ह । (वववरर सलग ह )"
The petitioner Kartar Singh, however, preferred two appeals before the RAA on 14.01.2004 while complaining that the preliminary decree dated 16.07.1993 and the final decree dated 04.01.1994 in the said suit were obtained with somebody posing as Kartar Singh. The petitioner Kartar Singh submitted that he did not file any suit for partition of the land in question; that he had been in possession of the land in question for about 50 years; that somebody else, while stating his name and forging his signatures, filed a suit and obtained the preliminary decree dated 16.07.1993 and final decree dated 04.01.1994. The petitioner Kartar Singh asserted that because of old possession, he had already acquired khatedari rights over the land in question; and there was no any requirement for him to file the suit for partition nor did he file any such suit. The petitioner-appellant further submitted that the other defendants having not put any contest in the said suit, they could not be considered necessary parties; and as the record was likely to be changed only by the State, the State alone was joined as a party in the appeal. The petitioner also submitted an application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act seeking condonation of delay with the submissions that he came to know about the decrees only on 18.12.2003 from the Patwari concerned. The Government Counsel appearing in the appeals for the State contended that the decree for division of holdings was 8 passed as per the consent of the parties and according to their family settlement and, thereafter, the final decree has been passed and the State has not raised any objection for the division and, therefore, there was no reason to interfere with the decrees in question.
The learned RAA noted the averments contained in the plaint in question, inter alia, to the effect that the parties had already divided the property according to the family settlement and the partition deed was got registered on 20.05.1983 but then, for the revenue records having not been mutated, the parties were facing problems in making payment of revenue and in obtaining irrigation facilities etc. The RAA also noticed the fact that the defendants did file the written statements admitting the plaint averments; and the State in its written statement did not state any objection in carrying out the division. The learned RAA further noticed that after framing of the issues, the plaintiff Kartar Singh was examined in evidence and ultimately, the suit was decreed on 12.07.1993 and, accordingly, the preliminary decree was drawn on 16.07.1993 and the Tehsildar, Sriganganagar was asked to submit the proposals for division; and then, after receipt of the proposals from the concerned Tehsildar, the final decree was drawn on 04.01.1994.
After taking note of the factual background, the learned RAA first of all examined the question regarding maintainability of the appeals and, with reference to the provisions as contained in Section 223 of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act, 1955 ('the Act of 1955') and 9 Order XXIII Rule 3A of the Code of Civil Procedure (CPC) held the appeals maintainable for having been filed in challenge to the decree passed on the basis of alleged settlement. The learned RAA further found the appellant Kartar Singh to be a person aggrieved when he claimed adverse possession over land in question for 50 years and found that the questioned decree might operate against his interest, if not appealed against. The learned RAA thereafter dilated on the third question regarding limitation and observed that though the appeals had been filed after about ten years from the final decree but then, according to the appellant, he did not file the suit at all and hence, the decree had been passed without hearing him; and, while accepting the case of the appellant that he came to know about the decree only on 18.12.2003, the learned RAA condoned the delay in filing.
The learned RAA thereafter took up the fourth question as to whether the appeals were competent despite the other defendants having not been joined as parties. In that regard, the learned RAA noted the contention on the part of the petitioner-appellant Kartar Singh to the effect that the suit had been filed in the Subordinate Court with his forged signature wherein the defendant filed the written statement of admission and there was existing a registered settlement deed; and hence, there would not be any adverse effect on the rights of the defendants. The learned RAA stated the opinion that there was no adverse effect on the appeals even if the other 10 defendants were not joined as the parties; that even otherwise, the appellant could not be forced to join any person as a party; and that a decree obtained by fraud could be set aside by the Court in its inherent powers. The learned RAA, accordingly, held that non- joinder of other persons as parties was not fatal to the appeals.
The learned RAA, thereafter, took up the questions involved in the appeals and considered the contention of the appellant that someone else had filed the suit while forging his signatures. The RAA also considered a so-called report of the hand-writing expert produced by the appellant Kartar Singh opining that the signatures available in the plaint were not that of the real person Kartar Singh and then, stated the conclusion in the manner that "evidently, the suit appeared to have been filed with forged signatures of the appellant Kartar Singh". The learned RAA further referred to a report dated 12.12.2003 as made by the Patwari and the Land Record Inspector to the effect that the entire land was in possession of the appellant Kartar Singh. The learned RAA observed that it was beyond comprehension as to why the appellant Kartar Singh would come forward to file a suit for division when he was in exclusive possession. The learned RAA also observed that had he filed the suit in the year 1994, the plaintiff would not have remained silent for about 10 years because even the limitation for execution of the decree comes to an end after 12 years; and, according to the learned RAA, for these factors too, the possibility of some other 11 person having filed the suit could not be ruled out. The learned RAA further observed that execution proceedings after about 10 years gave rise to serious doubts and strengthened the point that the suit was false and fabricated. It was also observed that the appellant ought to have been served with a notice for execution that had not been given.
The aforesaid considerations led the learned RAA to conclude that the appeals were required to be allowed. The learned RAA, accordingly, allowed both the appeals by the impugned order dated 31.01.2004 and, while setting aside the preliminary decree dated 16.07.1993 and final decree dated 04.01.1994, remanded the matter to the SDO.
The appeals before the Board of Revenue:
The opposite parties, being aggrieved of the aforesaid common order dated 31.01.2004 as passed by the RAA, preferred two appeals bearing numbers 9/2004/TA/Sriganganagar and 10/2004/TA/Sriganganagar before the Board.
While deciding the appeals by the impugned common order dated 20.05.2005, the learned Members of the Board though agreed with the RAA on the question of maintainability of the appeals under Section 223 of the Act of 1955 and so also on the question of condonation of delay but then, while adverting to the question that according to the plaintiff Kartar Singh, someone impersonated him and filed the aforesaid suit bearing number 146/1991 observed that if 12 so, it were a very serious matter. The learned Members also referred to the report of the hand-writing expert and then stated the opinion that in an overall view of the matter, the case was required to be remanded to the original Court with the directions that the said Court would take the pleadings of both the parties on record, examine the records and the statements of the witnesses, and decide afresh the controversy but only to the extent of impersonation. The learned Members observed that if Kartar Singh would succeed in proving the case of impersonation, the questioned decrees shall stand cancelled and the entries made in the revenue record on the basis of impugned decrees would be set at naught; however, if Kartar Singh would fail in his case to prove impersonation, the questioned decrees shall stand upheld. Challenge to the order dated 20.05.2005 on the part of the petitioner Kartar Singh:
The petitioner Kartar Singh has questioned the aforesaid common order dated 20.05.2005 as passed by the Board of Revenue in CWP Nos. 5263/2005 and 5429/2005 on the grounds:
(a) that the Board of Revenue having noticed the report of hand writing expert clearly making out that the signatures on the plaint filed in the Trial Court do not tally with the signatures of Kartar Singh and having affirmed the finding of fact as recorded by the RAA on the case of impersonation, has apparently erred in interfering with the valid and justified order passed by the RAA; (b) that as per 13 Section 107 CPC, the Appellate Court could determine the case finally and could also remand a case or frame the issues and refer them for trial but then, in the given set of facts, before remanding the case, the Appellate Court was required to quash and set aside the judgment and decree passed by the Trial Court and else the very purpose of remand is frustrated; (c) that as per Order XLI order 25 CPC, the Appellate Court may frame issue and send the matter for trial with directions to allow the parties to lead evidence and to return its findings to the Appellate Court but in the present case, the Board has not acted in conformity with such requirements and, thus, the impugned order cannot be sustained; (d) that in whatever manner the controversy is decided by the Trial Court after remand, the decision would remain subject to first appeal and the first Appellate Court shall have complete jurisdiction to appreciate the evidence and to pass appropriate order but then, if the decision of the Board of Revenue is maintained, it might prejudice the rights and interest of the petitioner.
It has strenuously been contended on behalf of the petitioner Kartar Singh that the order as passed by the Board of Revenue, being not in conformity with the requirements of an order of remand, deserves to be set aside; and that there was no reason for the Board to have interfered with the order as passed by the RAA. 14 Challenge to the order dated 20.05.2005 by Surendra Singh and others:
The petitioners Surendra Singh and others are also aggrieved of the same common order dated 20.05.2005 and seek to contend that the order of remand deserves to be set aside and the decrees of the Trial Court deserve to be restored. These petitioners have founded their writ petition on the facts that the land in question was jointly purchased by six persons and even in the ceiling cases, the facts were admitted by Shri Jawahar Singh, father of Kartar Singh, that he was having 1/6th share in the total land admeasuring 321 bighas and 10 biswas; and that ultimately, a registered partition deed was executed on 20.05.1983 with regard to the land in dispute whereby the land was divided amongst the six khatedars. These petitioners Surendra Singh and others maintain that the said suit bearing No. 146/1991 was indeed filed by Kartar Singh wherein the factum of partition was categorically mentioned; and written statements were submitted by some of the defendants admitting the facts stated in the plaint and even one of the brothers of Kartar Singh also filed a written statement of admission; that the statements of Kartar Singh were recorded before the Sub-Divisional Officer on 30.11.1992 in the said suit and then, the preliminary decree was passed on 16.07.1993 that was followed by the final decree dated 04.01.1994. The petitioners Surendra Singh and others contend that there being a registered partition deed executed by the co-tenants, 15 no other order could be passed about partition of the land; and that the Board of Revenue has committed an error in not mentioning anything about the registered partition deed while passing the order impugned.
The petitioners Surendra Singh and others further contend that so far the controversy about impersonation is concerned, such a dispute could only be raised before the competent Civil Court and remains beyond the jurisdiction of the Revenue Court; and, therefore, the directions as issued by the Board being contrary to law deserve to be quashed. It has also been contended that the appellant Kartar Singh filed the appeals before the RAA after a delay of about 10 years and that too, while deliberately not impleading the other defendants as parties though they were the necessary parties and in their absence, the appeals were not maintainable.
It is further contended in CWP No. 6647/2005 that the appellant Kartar Singh filed the appeal before the RAA simply on the ground that the plaint, vakalatnama and other documents available in the Trial Court's record do not bear his signatures and in support, filed a report of the hand writing expert but the said report was not proved according to law and on the other hand, the record of the Trial Court shows that the suit was indeed filed and the plaintiff's statements were recorded and after considering the entire material, the decree was passed by the Trial Court. It has been suggested that the land in question is a farm having the annual income of Rs. 1 16 Crore and the appellant Kartar Singh had earlier been making payment of the share to the other co-sharers until the month of August 2003 but had stopped thereafter causing huge losses to the other co-sharers.
A reply has been filed on behalf of the appellant Kartar Singh in this CWP No. 6647/2005 contending, inter alia, that the ceiling cases have no relevance to the present controversy and the decisions in the said ceiling cases and the declaration therein, as filed in this writ petition, were not produced before the Trial Court. A copy of the said declaration had also been filed along with the replies as submitted in CWP Nos. 5263/2005 and 5429/2005 but the appellant Kartar Singh contends that such declaration had also been a forged document; and another hand writing expert's report dated 09.09.2005 has been filed with the reply in CWP No.6647/2005 as Annexure-R/3 with the submissions that the signatures of Jawahar Singh on such declaration were forged and in that regard a complaint had been filed before the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Sriganganagar (Annexure-R/4) that remains pending consideration.
In regard to the registered partition deed dated 20.05.1983, the appellant Kartar Singh asserts that he had not been a signatory to the alleged partition deed and is not bound by the same. It is also contended that the disputed question of fact regarding partition deed cannot be agitated in the writ petition. It is further submitted that the document of the partition deed was not a legal document being not 17 carrying the consent of the co-sharers as required by Section 53 of the Act of 1955. The factum of filing of the disputed suit has been denied and it is asserted that the preliminary decree dated 16.07.1993 and the final decree dated 04.01.1994 are nullity.
It has further been averred in the reply that though the land in dispute was purchased jointly in the year 1944 but Kartar Singh alone had developed the farm and established orchard in 70 bighas at the time of commencing of the Act of 1955 and the Rajasthan Colonisation Act; and the other part of the land has also remained in his personal cultivation with himself alone making all the investment.
It has been asserted that the plaint itself was presented with impersonation and so was the case with the alleged statements of the plaintiff. According to Kartar Singh, such findings of both the Appellate Courts cannot be said to be against law. It is contended that the opposite party has not placed anything on record to show that the signatures on the plaint as well as on the statements were of Kartar Singh. It is further submitted that the learned first Appellate Court was satisfied that the suit was not filed by Kartar Singh and it had been a case of impersonation; and, therefore, to do substantial justice, rightly set aside the decrees passed by the Trial Court and remanded the case for just and proper decision. It is maintained that the finding of impersonation of Kartar Singh was affirmed by the Board; and once the finding has been reached about impersonation in filing the suit, the decree passed therein could be set aside 18 wherever it comes to the knowledge of the Court at any stage of proceedings; impersonation being a fraud against the Court.
In regard to the contention about non-joinder of necessary parties, it is maintained in the reply filed by Kartar Singh that the suit was filed in his name and no other evidence was produced except his alleged statements made in impersonation; and once the Court found the case of impersonation, the judgment and decree of the Trial Court were nothing but nullity and nobody acquired any vested right thereunder. Thus, according to Kartar Singh, he had not committed any illegality in not impleading the other persons as parties before the first Appellate Court.
It is further submitted that when the crime of impersonation is detected by the Court or is brought to the notice of the Court, even if there is violation of principles of natural justice, the Court has ample powers to quash such orders because the Courts are meant to impart justice. It is maintained that the opposite parties are not entitled to seek equitable relief under Article 226 of the Constitution of India because substantial justice has been done by the first Appellate Court and even the Board has upheld the finding on impersonation. The appellant Kartar Singh maintains that the farm has been developed by himself with his own investment and labour; but denies the quantum of income as alleged by the opposite party. 19 Points for determination:
Upon examination of the stands of the respective parties in relation to Revenue Suit No. 146/1991 and the appeals as filed by the appellant Kartar Singh and the orders as passed by the RAA and the Board, broadly speaking, three points call for determination in these writ petitions : one, as to whether there had been a finding on impersonation in favour of the appellant Kartar Singh by the RAA and the same has been affirmed by the Board of Revenue; and if so, what is its effect; second, as to whether the appeals filed by the appellant Kartar Singh before the RAA have rightly been allowed; and third, as to whether the Board of Revenue has been justified in modifying the directions of the RAA and ordering a limited remand?
It appears necessary to observe that though the parties have chosen to refer to several of the documents and the background facts and factors including joint purchase of the property, ceiling cases, and declaration therein, however, any aspect relating to the factual disputes remains beyond and away from the real questions in controversy in these writ petitions and would not require much discussion. However, the fact regarding the registered partition deed would require dilation because the same formed the part of the arguments on behalf of the appellant Kartar Singh before the RAA for maintaining his appeals.20
The allegations of impersonation:
The appellant Kartar Singh has founded his both the writ petitions essentially on the basis that the finding on impersonation had been returned by the RAA in his favour and the same was affirmed in second appeal too and hence, the Board was not justified in setting aside the order of RAA and in altering the directions regarding remand. The submission is entirely baseless and is required to be rejected outright.
It is absolutely incorrect to say that the RAA, while passing the order dated 31.01.2004, had returned the finding that the suit was filed with somebody impersonating himself as Kartar Singh. There had not been any such finding of the RAA nor could have been so. The learned RAA, though proceeded to allow the appeals and to remand the matter but then, definitely stopped short of returning a categoric finding if it were a case of impersonation.
As already noticed, the appellant Kartar Singh chose to suggest impersonation while questioning the decrees passed by the learned Trial Court in the appeals filed by him 10 years later. The appellant Kartar Singh attempted to support his case of impersonation with reference to a so-called report by the hand writing expert. It is not found if the said hand writing expert was ever examined before the Court while giving the affected parties a right to cross-examine him; and no value could have been attached to the said report of the alleged expert. The learned RAA, on the 21 allegations of the appellant, rather proceeded on several surmises and conjectures but whatever drew were only the half-hearted and wavering inferences that cannot be termed as the legal findings. If the observations as made by the learned RAA are at all sought to be referred as the findings, this Court has no hesitation in saying that the findings had been absolutely baseless and bereft of any evidence.
The learned RAA noticed that the impugned decrees were challenged by the appellant Kartar Singh on the ground that he did not file the suit in the subordinate Court and that somebody else presented the plaint with his forged signatures. The learned RAA then referred to the report of the hand writing expert who opined that the plaint was not carrying the signatures of Kartar Singh and observed that the signatures on the statements had also been examined. Thereafter, in the name of finding, the learned RAA would say,-
"उसस स2ष ह कक अ2 ल ट कर रससह क फ 6 हस कर करक यह व पस कर प ह8 ह ।"
The learned RAA then referred to a report dated 12.12.2003 as made by the Patwari suggesting the possession of the appellant Kartar Singh and then, posed the questions as to why the appellant would file a suit for division of holdings and as to why the decree was not executed for about 10 years ? After expressing such doubts, the learned RAA said,-22
"इ थय; स भ व ककस अ-य वयड> द र पस कर
क सभ व स इ-क र ह ककय सक थ उ>
ववव द भ@सम क समब-ध म" 2 रर डडक स C 2003 म"
न ष2 क क यव ह कर अथ 10 स ल ब क यव ह
भ अ2 आ2 म" स ह स2 प ह8 ह थ उ> व क
फ 6 ह8 क बब- क8 सबल ब ह थ वर ब
डडक क न ष2 क क यव ह म" अ2 ल ट क8 8दटस
च दहए, 8 ह द य गय ह ।"
Having thoroughly examined the order as passed by the learned RAA, this Court has no doubt that the baseless surmises and conjectures and uncertain observations as made by the learned RAA cannot be termed as categorical finding to the effect that the suit suffered from impersonation as alleged by the appellant Kartar Singh. As already observed, if these observations are referred as anything of finding, they cannot be sustained for being based on no evidence. The so-called hand-writing expert's report could not have been taken conclusive of the matter unless the same was tendered in evidence and the opposite parties were given the chance to rebut the same. The assumption as made by the appellant Kartar Singh in his own favour on the basis of an opinion of hand-writing expert remains hollow and baseless. The edifice on which the petitioner- appellant Kartar Singh has based his challenge to the order passed by the Board of Revenue, thus, falls to the ground.
It cannot be said that there was any cogent finding by the RAA and that the Board endorsed any such finding. A look at the decision of the learned Members of the Board makes it clear that the learned Members found themselves unable to arrive definitely at the 23 conclusion about impersonation and thus, adopted the course of remanding the matter for decision on the question of impersonation. The question as to whether the learned Members of the Board were right in doing so would be examined in the other issues but it is required to be and is made clear that there had not been any specific finding accepting the case of the appellant Kartar Singh on his allegations about impersonation. Such a finding could not have been returned in this case at all.
The legality of the order dated 31.01.2004 passed by the Revenue Appellate Authority, Sriganganagar:
Taking up the order dated 31.01.2004 passed by the RAA, this Court has no doubt that the same cannot be sustained; and rather, the appeals as filed by the appellant-petitioner Kartar Singh ought to have been dismissed outright.
A comprehension of the background facts makes it clear that Revenue Suit No. 146/1991 was decreed by the Sub-Divisional Officer with the preliminary decree dated 16.07.1993 and thereafter, was disposed of with the final decree dated 04.01.1994. The appellant Kartar Singh alleged that it had been a suit filed with somebody forging his signatures and impersonating. The appellant alleged to have acquired knowledge about such decrees only on 18.12.2003. The question is as to whether there was anything for the appellant to appeal against and as to whether the appeals as filed were maintainable? The answers to these questions could only be in the negative.24
If the appellant at all had any grievance about impersonation, it is beyond comprehension that he would file the appeal wherein Appellate Court would take up consideration of the questions if the suit was filed with impersonation. It has rightly been argued on behalf of the opposite party, i.e., Surendra Singh and others, with reference to the decision of the Division Bench of this Court in the case of Gurucharan Singh & Ors. Vs. Mst. Gurudayal Kaur & Ors.:
AIR 1982 Rajasthan 91 that on the allegations as sought to be made, per Section 31 of the Specific Relief Act, the appellant Kartar Singh had the remedy of filing the civil suit in the Civil Court to have declaration against the particular judgment of the Revenue Court; but there was nothing to be appealed against nor the RAA could have adjudicated on the question as to whether the decrees were void for impersonation. Even if it be assumed for the sake of arguments that Kartar Singh could have moved an application before the original Court for setting aside the decrees on the ground of impersonation, it cannot be conceded yet that he could have maintained the appeals on such a complaint. The appeals preferred before the RAA were required to be dismissed.
Taking a far stretched alternative view of the matter and assuming that the appellant Kartar Singh could have maintained the appeals, this Court has no hesitation in pronouncing that the appeals as filed before RAA were entirely incompetent; and no finding could have been reached therein so as to annul the decrees passed by the 25 learned Trial Court.
Admittedly, the appellant Kartar Singh did not implead any other defendant as respondent in the appeals except the State. The preliminary decree had been of declaring the shares of the respective parties in the property in question and the final decree had been of directing division of the holdings as per the proposal made by the Tehsildar. With and under such decrees, specific rights came existing in the parties to the said suit including all the defendants and, on the very first principles, such rights could not have been taken away at the back of such defendants and without hearing them.
Interestingly, the appellant Kartar Singh made the submissions and suggestions on this question of maintainability of the appeals in the absence of other defendants in the manner and form that had only been self-defeating. The appellant, curiously enough, while relying upon the written statements of admission and the registered partition deed dated 20.05.1983 suggested, on their basis, that there would not be any effect on the rights of the defendants and, therefore, they were not the necessary party in the appeal ! The learned RAA proceeded to accept such a preposterous argument with the following discussion:-
"अब चGथ क @ बब- आ ह कक अ2 ल ट अ2 ल म" सटट क अल व अ-य भ पन व गर क8 2कक र ह ब य गय ह ।
ऐस जसथन म" कय अ2 ल चल सक ह अथव ह ? इसक सलए
अ2 ल ट क क ह कक ख ववभ क व अध . -य य लय म"
26
अ2 ल ट क म स उसक फ 6 हस कर कर पस ककय ह ।
ज सम" पन व गर इकब ल व द य ह थ 2ररव र क
समझG 2 कL ह । ऐस जसथ न म" ब म" इकब सलय
व ब व 2श कर स उ क दहसस 2र क8ई कठ र घ ह
ह8ग । अगर अ2 ल म" 2कक र ह ब य ह, 8 भ
बटव र म रज सटड ह । अ2 ल म" उ क8 आवशयक 2कक र ह
म कर 2कक र ह ब य ह । कय;कक अगर डडक अजस तव म"
ह रह ह 8 पन व गर क दह ; 2र क8ई कठ र घ ह
ह8 ह । इससलए मर र य म" उ क8 2कक र ह ब य ह,
8 भ अ2 ल 2र क8ई वव2र पभ व प ह ह8 ह । वस भ
अ2 ल ट क8 2कक र ब क सलए ब धय ह ककय सक ।"
The learned RAA totally failed to consider that even if the defendants had filed the written statements of admission in the suit for division of holdings and the division had been ordered as per the registered partition deed, the rights that came existing in the defendants because of the decrees as passed in the suit could not be taken away in their absence. It was rather extravagant a proposition that for existence of the registered partition deed, the defendants were not to be heard in the appeals at all.
This Court is clearly of opinion that the appeals were not maintainable in the absence of the other defendants whose rights came into existence with the decrees passed by the Trial Court; and the learned RAA had acted wholly illegally in assuming the appeals to be maintainable.
As already noticed, the learned RAA has allowed the incompetent appeals with baseless surmises and uncertain observations and only on doubts without coming to a cogent finding on the allegations of the appellant; of course, there being no 27 occasion to come to any cogent finding on such allegations. Merely on the basis of the doubts as expressed by the learned RAA as to why the suit would at all be filed by the appellant though in possession of the land and as to why the decree was not executed for 10 years, no finding could have been reached in favour of Kartar Singh; and on such doubts, the considered decrees of the Trial Court could not have been set aside. It may be observed that if at all any inference was to be drawn, the registered partition deed itself was sufficient to find the logic behind the suit so as to bring about actual division of holdings. Looking to the old relationship of the parties, there was nothing unnatural if the decree was not put to specific execution for 10 years. In any case, the valid decrees rendered after due trial could not have been annulled in the incompetent and baseless appeals filed by the petitioner Kartar Singh.
It has repeatedly and strenuously been argued by the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner Kartar Singh that it being the case of impersonation, the impugned order as passed by the RAA subserves the cause of justice and hence, deserves to be maintained. The argument remains absolutely baseless. The argument proceeds on the self-conceived assumption of the appellant Kartar Singh as if his allegation of impersonation is itself conclusive of the matter; and as if the decrees passed by the SDO are rendered void for his merely uttering such allegation and putting forward an opinion of hand writing expert without proper adjudication 28 with opportunity of hearing to the affected parties. What to say of serving the cause of justice, this Court is clearly of opinion that the impugned order as passed by the RAA, if allowed to stand, would be a travesty of justice where the rights existing in the defendants under the decrees in question would be annihilated without hearing them. The learned counsel for the petitioner Kartar Singh urged that the cause of substantial justice ought to prevail. There is no doubt about the proposition that it is the cause of substantial justice that prevails over anything else. It is this very cause of substantial justice that prevails over the baseless appeals filed by the appellant Kartar Singh.
The learned counsel for the appellant Kartar Singh has relied upon several of the decisions to suggest that the order impugned as passed by the RAA cannot be said to be violative of cause of justice even if the defendants were not the parties in the appeals. The decisions as relied upon could be taken note of for their essential ratio.
In the case of M.C.Mehta Vs. Union of India and Ors.: AIR 1999 SC 2583, on the aspect of principles of natural justice, the Hon'ble Supreme Court, with reference to the decision in the case of Gadde Venkateswara Rao Vs. Govt. of Andhra Pradesh: AIR 1966 SC 828 said,-
"The above case is clear authority for the proposition that it is not always necessary for the Court to strike down an order merely because the order has been passed against the petitioner in breach of natural 29 justice. The Court can under Article 32 or Article 226 refuse to exercise its discretion of striking down the order if such striking down will result in restoration of another order passed earlier in favour of the petitioner and against the opposite party, in violation of principles of natural justice or is otherwise not in accordance with law."
The Hon'ble Supreme Court further said,-
''It is, therefore, clear that if on the admitted or indisputable factual position, only one conclusion is possible and permissible, the Court need not issue a writ merely because there is violation of principles of natural justice.'' In the case of Managing Director, ECIL, Hyderabad and Ors. Vs. B.Karunakar and Ors.: (1993) 4 SCC 727 on the aspect of prejudice caused for non-supply of enquiry officer's report, the Hon'ble Supreme Court said that the order of punishment should not be mechanically set aside by a Court/Tribunal on the ground that the report was not furnished and it is only after the Court/Tribunal finds that furnishing of report would have made a difference that the order of punishment could be set aside. In the context, the Hon'ble Supreme Court pointed out that the theory of reasonable opportunity is not that of rites to be performed on all and sundry occasions and whether in fact prejudice has been caused to the employee or not on account of denial of report has to be considered on the facts and circumstances of each case. In the case of Canara Bank and Ors. Vs. Debasis Das & Ors.: 2003 (4) RLW SC 509, the connotations of the principles of natural justice have come to their fuller exposition 30 with the Hon'ble Supreme Court re-emphasising that the aspect of prejudice is relevant a consideration while examining the grievance of denial of opportunity of hearing. In the case of the Chairman, Board of Mining Examination and Chief Inspector of Mines and Anr. Vs. Ramjee: AIR 1977 SC 965, the Hon'ble Supreme Court observed,-
"........ Natural justice is no unruly horse, no lurking land mine, nor a judicial cure-all. If fairness is shown by the decision-maker to the man proceeded against, the form, features and the fundamentals of such essential processual propriety being conditioned by the facts and circumstances of each situation, no breach of natural justice can be complained of. Unnatural expansion of natural justice without reference to the administrative realities and other factors of a given case, can be exasperating. We can neither be financial nor fanatical but should be flexible yet firm in this jurisdiction. No man shall be hit below the belt - that is the conscience of the matter."
In the case of Union of India Vs. Trustees of Major Maharaj Harisingh Benefit of Defence Services Personnel Charitable Trust and Ors.: 2005 (3) RLW Rajasthan 1878, the Division Bench of this Court found that the respondent of his own had given the land and received compensation from the Government of India and subsequently raised the objections that were rejected and the Collector issued acquisition notice that were challenged in the writ petition on the ground of denial of opportunity of personal hearing. The Hon'ble Division Bench found that the situation had become irreversible and even after hearing, the competent authority was not to discharge the notice of acquisition and thus, in the given fact 31 situation, the aspect of personal hearing was found to be of empty formality.
This Court is unable to find any principle from the aforesaid decisions that could support the maintainability of the curious appeals as filed by the appellant Kartar Singh before the RAA wherein the decrees for declaration of shares and division of holdings that had become final 10 years back, were challenged on the ground of impersonation without even joining the other parties to the suit as respondents in the appeals. As already noticed, every aspect of prejudice hits the maintainability of such appeals fair and square. Any order to be passed in the appeal was to take away or interfere with the declared rights of the defendants. It had been a case of extreme prejudice being caused to the defendants; and the appeals could not have been heard in their absence.
The matter could be viewed from yet another angle. In the suit in question, some of the defendants did file their written statements of admission. In the said suit, even the statements of Kartar Singh were recorded. If the appellant Kartar Singh at all suggests the offence of impersonation, the same obviously hits the defendants too. Such a drastic allegation of impersonation could not have been permitted to be made in the appeals in the absence of other defendants particularly who filed the written statements of admission. The appeals could not have been entertained by the RAA and ought to have been dismissed.
32
Moreover, the learned RAA missed altogether the very basic and significant part of the matter that if the appellant Kartar Singh was relying on the registered partition deed to suggest that the rights of the defendants were intact, and when it was not the case of the appellant if the decrees in question were in any manner contrary to the said partition deed, any other assertion on the part of the appellant including the assertion that he was in exclusive possession of the land fell to the ground. The decrees in question are only in recognition of the said partition deed; and going by what has been suggested by the appellant Kartar Singh before the Appellate Court and what had been pleaded in the disputed plaint and the contents of the registered partition deed, when it is found that the decrees in question are only in conformity with such partition deed, the very basis of allegation of the appellant Kartar Singh is shaken to the core. On the very suggestion as made by the appellant Kartar Singh for the purpose of maintaining his appeals in the absence of the defendants, the decrees in question were required to be maintained; particularly when the appellant relied upon the registered partition deed and the decrees were not shown at variance with such registered instrument.
Having examined the matter from different angles, this Court has no hesitation even in finding that the appeals as filed by Kartar Singh were only an eye wash and rather lacking in bona fides. If at all impersonation was the grievance, there was no reason that the 33 appellant Kartar Singh would not have joined other defendants as parties in the appeals and would not have sought proper enquiry in appropriate forum.
The legality of the order dated 20.05.2005 as passed by the Board of Revenue:
On the conclusion as reached hereinabove, when the appeals before the RAA were fundamentally incompetent and were required to be dismissed, this Court is clearly of opinion that the Board of Revenue ought to have allowed the appeals filed by the opposite parties.
A comprehension of the common order dated 20.05.2005 as passed by the learned Members of the Board makes it clear that the learned Members totally missed the real questions in controversy. To the extent of the observations made by the learned Members regarding condonation of delay etc. nothing is required to be discussed about but then, the very fundamental question as to whether the appeals before the RAA were at all competent for the relevant persons having not been joined as parties, was not even adverted to by the learned Members of the Board who abruptly concluded that the question of impersonation was required to be determined by the Trial Court. The learned Members of the Board failed to notice that Kartar Singh very consciously filed the appeals before the RAA without impleading the other persons as parties but neither made an application before the Trial Court nor filed a civil 34 suit. It would be defeating the cause of justice if a considered decree of the Revenue Court for division of holding would be put under suspension in the name of enquiry into the allegations of impersonation as levelled by Kartar Singh nearly 10 years after passing of the decree and that too, by way of appeal without joining other defendants.
As aforesaid, the very fundamental argument in justification for non-joinder of the relevant persons as parties to the appeals had been that according to Kartar Singh, their rights were intact for the registered partition deed. It sounds rather preposterous that any complaint regarding impersonation could be entertained in the face of such an admitted position about registered partition deed when apparently the decrees were no more than providing division by mets and bounds in conformity with such registered partition deed. The learned Members of the Board were thoroughly unjustified in remanding the matter for an entirely uncalled for enquiry. The appeals as filed by the opposite parties ought to have been allowed in toto.
The conclusion regarding Revenue Suit No.146/1991:
As a result of the discussion aforesaid, this Court is clearly of opinion that the appeals as filed by Kartar Singh before the RAA bearing numbers 9/2004 and 10/2004 are required to be dismissed. As a necessary corollary, the preliminary decree dated 16.07.1993 35 and the final decree dated 04.01.1994 in the Revenue Suit No.146/1991 are required to be affirmed. The writ petitions filed by Kartar Singh, CWP Nos.5263/2005 and 5429/2005, therefore, deserve to be dismissed and the writ petition filed by Surendra Singh and others, CWP No.6647/2005, deserves to be allowed. WRIT PETITION NO.3336/2005:
The background facts:.
This writ petition has the genesis in a revenue suit admittedly filed by the petitioner Kartar Singh (No.149/2003) on 21.10.2003 before the SDO. This suit was filed with reference to the chunk of land as referred in the previously discussed suit (No.146/1991) and some other parcels of land too, of course, situated at Chak 5Z only.
The petitioner Kartar Singh asserted in this suit (No.149/2003) that the entire land had been in his cultivatory possession and the other co-tenants had never cultivated the land nor made payment of revenue and, therefore, he has become khatedar with adverse possession. The plaintiff Kartar Singh further asserted in this suit that the defendants Nos.1 to 4 Jitendra Singh, Haremendra Singh, Balwant Singh and Manmohan Kaur (sons and wife of Shravan Singh) were intending to alienate the land and to forcibly dispossess him whereas other defendants have not raised any objection. The plaintiff Kartar Singh asserted that he was entitled to get himself declared the khatedar of the land in question and to have the land recorded in the revenue records in his name with deletion of the 36 names of the defendants; and averred that he requested the defendants to do so but they avoided and two days before, flatly refused which was the cause of action for filing the suit. The plaintiff Kartar Singh filed this suit for declaration and perpetual injunction with reference to the provisions of Sections 88, 91, 92-A and 188 of the Act of 1955 seeking declaration of his exclusive right in the land in question and for correction of the revenue records with deletion of names of other co-tenants; and for injunction that the defendants may not interfere with his cultivatory possession. The plaintiff-
petitioner Kartar Singh also moved an application under Section 212 of the Act of 1955 seeking temporary injunction against the defendants.
The learned SDO, while issuing notices to the defendants, issued an ad interim injunction that they would not alienate the land in question until the next date i.e., 28.10.2003. On 28.10.2003, while awaiting service, the learned SDO adjourned the matter to 03.12.2003 and extended the interim order until then. However, a development took place on 17.11.2003, which is the bone of contention in this writ petition.
On 17.11.2003, an application came to be moved on behalf of the plaintiff-petitioner purportedly under Order XXIII Rule 1 CPC with the submissions that the respective co-tenants were in possession of the land in question according to their shares wherein the plaintiff Kartar Singh and his sons Manmohan Singh and Satnam Singh had 37 no right and would not raise any objection in relation to such shares of the other khatedars; that other khatedars shall have the rights to transfer the land without any objection by the plaintiff and his sons whose signatures were put on the application; and that the plaintiff was not interested in prosecuting the suit further; and thus, the suit be dismissed. The application was duly notarised on 17.11.2003 and was presented to the Trial Court whereupon the suit was taken up for consideration and was dismissed in accord with the application. As a necessary consequence of dismissal of the suit, the application for temporary injunction was also dismissed by the Trial Court. The contents of the application dated 17.11.2003 read as under:-
" आव - 2त अ- ग आ श
23 न यम 1 ससववल पककय
सदह 1908
-य य लय उ2खणड अधधक र (र सव)
श गग गर
कर रससह ब म ज -Vससह आद
व पन व गर
. 2श 3.12
व कLवर भ@सम क अधधक र; व घ8रर व न रध श क समब-ध म" ।
शम ,
यह कक कर रससह व न म सलखख आव 2त पस कर
ह:-
1- यह कक चक 5 ड हस ल व ज ल श गग गर क सय> ख
सखय 8/8 क मरबब मबर 1-3-4-5-7-10-11-12-13-15-16-17-22-26-
व 27 क कल 74.407 हकटयर और ख इस चक क ख सखय 2/2
क मरबब मबर 1-2-19-21-22-23-24 क कल 35.635 हकटयर क
समस ख र 8 कक मG @ म ब म" ख र ह य उ क
व ररस सभ अ2 दहसस अ स र म सलक व क बब ह। प थ6 ससफ
अ2 दहसस क ख र व क बब ह। प थ6 कर रससह व उसक लडक8
क चक 5 ड श गग गर क ख सखय 2/2 म" क8ई हक, दहसस व
कब ह ह और ह क8ई सर8क र ह।
38
2- यह कक उ2र8> कLवर भ@सम क 8 ; ख 8 8/8 व 2/2 क समस
ख र सव श ज -Vससह, हरर-Vससह व2सर श सर ससह, श म
म म8ह कGर 2त श सर ससह व सर ससह 2त श पय रससह सवय,
शम गरबखशकGर बव श न र ससह, इ-Vम8ह ससह-हरम8ह ससह-
म8ह व रससह व2सर श न र ससह श म सर कGर बव श
सव ससह, हरचर ससह-स -Vससह-ज -Vससह व2सर श सव ससह,
स 8खससह- 8ग-Vससह व2सर श स- रससह, ई-V ससह-
कवर ससह- सर-Vससह- सव रससह व2सर श स8ह ससह, बलव ससह-
हरककर ससह- अमर ससह व2सर श हर मससह, 8न ह लससह-
भ@2-Vससह व2सर श कमससह, हर ससह- म ससह व2सर श
द लब गससह, श म मह-VकGर बव श द लब गससह एव कर रससह 2त
श व हरससह सवय, श अ ससह- श गरशररससह व2सर श
व हरससह, श स2 लससह- श हरभ ससह- श स 2 लससह व2सर श
ल 2ससह, श म ल कGर बव श ल 2ससह, श सर-Vससह- श
सर ससह- श हर ससह व2सर श गरबकशससह, श म 8ग-VकGर
बव श गरबकशससह न व स य चक 5 ड हस ल व ज ल
श गग गर अ2 दहसस अ स र म सलक और क बब ह। प थ6
कर रससह व उसक लडक8 म म8ह ससह व स मससह व इ क ककस
अ-य व ररस क उ2र8> ख र क दहसस क म म" क8ई हक व
दहसस ह ह और ह क8ई सर8क र ह।
प थ6 व उसक लडक म म8ह ससह व स मससह व अ-य
व ररस उ2र8> अ-य ख र क दहसस क कLवर भ@सम क ब र म"
ए र ह करग" । हर ख र अ2 दहसस अ स र अ2 कLवर भ@सम
क8 रह , बय व अ-य र क स म- ककल कर क 2@र अधधक र ह8ग ।
और अ-य ककस ख र व प थ6 व उसक लडक क8ई ए र ह कर
सकग" । प थ6 व उसक लडक8 क र म- क हस कर इस आव 2त
2र अकक ह। प थ6 व चल ह चह ।
अ : आव 2त पस कर न व ह कक व उ2र8> ह ल म"
न रस फरम य व।
द क - प थ6
प थ6 क 2त; क सहमन क हस कर एस. ड .
एस. ड . कर रससह 2त श व हरससह न
अर8ड ससख न व स 5 ड हस ल
व ज ल श गग गर (र सथ )"
The plaintiff's appeal before the Revenue Appellate Authority, Sriganganagar:
The plaintiff Kartar Singh, however, chose to file an appeal before the RAA on 27.11.2003 against the aforesaid order dated 17.11.2003 with the submissions that soon after withdrawal of the suit, the defendant No.1 Jitendra Singh asked him to vacate the land in question so as to facilitate alienation of the same. According to the plaintiff, the said defendant suggested that only for the purpose 39 of getting the suit withdrawn that a false promise was made to him that the defendants would not interfere with his possession on the land in dispute; and that for this reason, without letting the plaintiff and his sons read the application, their signatures were obtained thereupon. The plaintiff Kartar Singh alleged that only upon such suggestions made by the defendant he came to know about the fraud having been played where he was made to withdraw the suit by way of the application dated 17.11.2003.
The RAA proceeded to decide this appeal (No.118/2003) as preferred by the plaintiff Kartar Singh by the order dated 13.04.2004. While considering the question about competence of the appeal, the learned RAA referred to the pleadings of the parties and then, to the submissions as made in the memo of appeal wherein the plaintiff appellant suggested that the defendant No.1 Jitendra Singh accepted his rights on the land in question and, therefore, prevailed upon him to withdraw the suit; that the plaintiff- appellant put his signatures on the application in good faith; that there was material difference between what was told to him and what was stated in the application; and that the facts came to his knowledge only on 19.11.2003 when the defendant No.1 asked him to leave the land and then divulged that the things were manipulated only in order to get the suit withdrawn. The learned RAA, thereafter, referred to a decision of the Board of Revenue wherein a revision petition against the order passed in an appeal arising from 40 withdrawal of the suit was considered by the Board without making any comment against the maintainability of the appeal; and, thus, concluded that the appeal was maintainable.
The learned RAA thereafter observed that when the plaintiff had filed the suit for declaration on the basis of adverse possession, there was no reason to state elaborate facts in the application; and withdrawal could have been suggested only in one line. The learned RAA also observed that the plaint and the application were containing contradictory averments. The learned RAA referred to the Patwari's report showing possession of the plaintiff Kartar Singh on the land in question and again posed the question as to why the plaintiff would at all withdraw the suit? The learned RAA thereafter drew the inference that the defendant No.1 took the appellant in confidence and then framed an application for withdrawal of the suit purportedly in the name of compromise deed. The learned RAA with such discussions arrived at the conclusion that there was a compromise between the parties but the terms of the compromise were not reduced in writing as agreed and the defendant No.1 deceitfully got the signatures of the plaintiff on the application for withdrawal.
The learned RAA thereafter considered the question of maintainability of the appeal against a decree passed on compromise and referred to the provisions of Order XLIII Rule 1A, Section 96 (1), and Order XXIII Rule 3A CPC and then held 41 the appeal maintainable. The learned RAA also referred to some of the decided cases to the effect that such an order obtained fraudulently could be cancelled by the Trial Court itself and the plaintiff could file a separate suit too.
After this much of discussion, the learned RAA concluded in the impugned order dated 13.04.2004 that the suit having not been decided on merits, the appeal was required to be accepted and, while setting aside the order passed by the SDO on 17.11.2003, ordered the matter to be remanded for decision of the Trial Court after extending opportunity of hearing to the parties and while giving permission to the plaintiff to implead the State as party to the suit. Thereafter, the learned RAA proceeded to issue an injunction too, that until decision of the suit the defendants would not alienate the property in question.
The defendants' appeal before the Board of Revenue:
The defendant in the said suit, being aggrieved of the order dated 13.04.2004, proceeded to prefer an appeal under Section 225 of the Act of 1955 before the Board and the said appeal has been decided by the same Division Bench of the Board who had decided the other appeals as noticed hereinbefore by another order of the even date i.e., 20.05.2005. The learned Members of the Board referred to the decisions of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of State of Maharashtra Vs. Ramdas Shrinivas Nayak and Anr.: AIR 42 1982 SC 1249 and in Roop Kumar Vs. Mohan Thedani: AIR 2003 SC 2418 and observed that the contents of the order-sheet dated 17.11.2003 were required to be accepted as correct. The learned Members rejected the case of the plaintiff Kartar Singh about any deceit while observing that the application carried the signatures of Kartar Singh and his two sons, was attested by the Notary Public, was presented by the counsel for the plaintiff Kartar Singh, the file was taken up on the application moved by the plaintiff, and the decision also carried the signatures of Kartar Singh. The learned Members also observed that Kartar Singh and his sons had put their signatures in english and their hand-writings suggested that they were the literate persons and it was very difficult to accept that the application for withdrawal was moved by Kartar Singh for any deceit. The learned Members also observed that the khatedari rights were claimed in the plaint and, therefore, there was nothing wrong if the application stated that rights of khatedars shall remain as per the records and the plaintiff Kartar Singh and his sons shall have no right therein. With this discussion, the learned Members observed that other points were not required to be decided; and, while setting aside the order dated 13.04.2004 as passed by the RAA, affirmed the order dated 17.11.2003 as passed by the SDO. 43
Grounds of challenge in CWP No.3336/2005:
Seeking to challenge the aforesaid order dated 20.05.2005 as passed by the Board, the plaintiff-petitioner Kartar Singh has filed this writ petition, CWP No.3336/2005.
In the first place, it is submitted with reference to Section 225 of the Act of 1955 that the appeal as filed by the opposite party before the Board against the order passed by the RAA was not maintainable at all. It is contended that the impugned order dated 13.04.2004 was passed by the RAA while exercising the appellate jurisdiction and was not a final order passed on an application of the nature specified in the Third Schedule to the Act of 1955. Thus, according to the petitioner, the Board of Revenue has committed a jurisdictional error in exercising appellate jurisdiction under Section 225 of the Act of 1955.
The petitioner further submits that ad interim stay order had been passed in his favour and the defendants were not even served with the notices but yet proceeded to file a reply on 17.11.2003 and contends that these facts and circumstances are clearly suggestive of the fact that they had deceitfully induced the plaintiff and his sons to sign the application. According to the petitioner, the application was signed only under misrepresentation and for good faith without reading the same but soon after withdrawal of the suit, the posture of the defendants changed and hence, the plaintiff-petitioner was left 44 with no alternative but to challenge the impugned order before the competent Court as per advice.
The petitioner has further taken the ground that the Board of Revenue has committed an error apparent on the face of the record while saying that the order passed by SDO was signed by Kartar Singh though the order-sheet does not mark the attendance of Kartar Singh; and rather the application was moved by his counsel. The petitioner further contends that the learned RAA has given categorical finding that the signature of Kartar Singh were obtained by deceitful means and there was no occasion to set aside such finding, the same being neither perverse nor illegal. The petitioner further contends that the Board of Revenue has not discussed anything regarding the finding given by the Revenue Appellate Authority but has merely commented that the plaintiff and his sons were literate persons. According to the petitioner, the Board of Revenue has not applied its mind to the facts found by the learned RAA and hence, the impugned order cannot be sustained.
The petitioner maintains that the Revenue Appellate Authority had taken conscious note of the surrounding circumstances and had rightly allowed the appeal with categorical findings; and the Board of Revenue has erred in setting aside the order passed by the RAA without even dealing with the reasonings and findings of the RAA. Thus, according to the petitioner, the order passed by the Board of Revenue deserves to be set aside.
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The petitioner further suggests that a bare reading of the application dated 17.11.2003 makes it clear that something had indeed transpired orally between the plaintiff and the defendants and the Board has committed an error in not considering the contents of the application and the surrounding circumstances. The petitioner maintains that when he has claimed right over the land in dispute on the basis of adverse possession and then, ad interim injunction was operating in his favour, unless something transpired between him and the defendants, there was no occasion for him to withdraw the suit. According to the plaintiff-petitioner, it was only on the assurance given by the defendants that the application was signed by himself and his sons without reading it; however, upon the threat coming from the defendants immediately after withdrawal of the suit, within no time did he come forward with the case that the fraud has been played. It is suggested that the plaintiff-petitioner, being bona fide and being supported by the judgment of the RAA, leaving aside the technicalities, is entitled to seek relief from this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India to secure the ends of justice that the order dated 17.11.2003 be quashed and the suit filed by him be restored for consideration on merits.
Learned counsel for the petitioner, with reference to the facts of the case, made a fervent plea that interest of justice demands decision of the suit on merits and the petitioner deserves not to be non-suited for his having acted bona fide on the representation made 46 by the defendants. Learned counsel assailed the impugned order dated 20.05.2005 as passed by the Board with the submissions that the cogent and considered findings of the RAA have not been considered by the Board. Learned counsel further referred to the observations as made by the Board about the availability of signatures of Kartar Singh on the order passed by the SDO and pointed out that such observations are not in conformity with the record. Learned counsel further referred to the attestation as made by the Notary Public on the application dated 17.11.2003 and pointed out the fact that the petitioner-plaintiff Kartar Singh was identified by none other but Jitendra Singh, defendant No.1 whose signatures appear with the attestation by the Notary. Learned counsel also referred to the fact that the defendants had not even been served in the suit and yet proceeded to file a written statement on 17.11.2003. The learned counsel submitted with reference to these facts and circumstances that obviously, the defendants had been in touch and dialogue with the plaintiff and upon their specific representation that the petitioner in good faith signed the application. The learned counsel also read over the contents of the application dated 17.11.2003 and submitted that there was no reason for the plaintiff-petitioner to make such an elaborate application merely for the purpose of withdrawal of the suit; and such elaborate contents clearly show that something else was represented to the petitioner. According to the learned counsel, the 47 cumulative effect of all these factors justify the order as passed by the RAA. In the circumstances, learned counsel contended, the impugned order as passed by the SDO on 17.11.2003 deserves to be set aside and the suit deserves to be considered on merits. This writ petition also remains baseless:
Having given an anxious consideration to the submissions made by the learned counsel for the petitioner in relation to this writ petition (CWP No.3336/2005) and having examined the record, this Court has no doubt that the submissions made on behalf of the petitioner are totally baseless and this writ petition deserves to be dismissed.
There is no denying the fact that the petitioner filed this suit claiming declaration of his exclusive right in the land in question on the basis of so-called adverse possession. There is also no denying the fact that on 21.10.2003, the learned Trial Court issued an ex parte ad interim injunction in favour of the petitioner. It is also apparent that on 28.10.2003, the learned Trial Court noted in the injunction application that the notices had not been received back after service and on the other hand in the suit file, noted that the summons had not been issued to the defendants; and the matter was adjourned to 03.12.2003 while continuing with the interim order. It is also not in doubt or dispute that the application in question was indeed moved before the learned Trial Court on behalf of the plaintiff by his counsel on 17.11.2003; and the application was, of course, 48 signed by the plaintiff-petitioner Kartar Singh and his two sons; and was attested by the Notary Public too. The fact further remains indisputable that in the endorsement of attestation by the Notary Public, the plaintiff-petitioner Kartar Singh was identified by the defendant Jitendra Singh. It is also indisputable that a written statement was filed on 17.11.2003 on behalf of some of the defendants. It is also true that the application dated 17.11.2003 mentioned in detail the names of the co-tenants and admission on behalf of the plaintiff-petitioner and his sons about the rights of the co-tenants and that they would not raise any further objection against the rights of the co-tenants.
However, the suggestion as made by the plaintiff-petitioner on the basis of the bits and pieces of such circumstances like his identification by defendant No.1, like moving of the application for withdrawal before the date of hearing and existing the interim order, and like the detailed contents of the application, cannot, even remotely, be taken supporting his case that there had been any fraud played. None of these facts could, in the opinion of this Court, lead to even a surmise what to say of legal inference, if there had been any deceit on the part of the defendants wherefor the plaintiff proceeded to move the said application for withdrawal before the date of hearing in the suit.
If the inferences are to be drawn at all , the fundamental fact cannot be ignored in the first place that according to the plaint 49 averments, the land in question was of joint khatedari and the plaintiff Kartar Singh wanted to assert his rights on the basis of so- called adverse possession. The plaintiff alleged that some of the khatedars had never cultivated the land in question and he alone was cultivating the same and making payment of land revenue and, therefore, khatedari rights of the co-tenants have come to an end and he has become exclusive khatedar. Though this Court would not be entering into the merits of the case but then, the facts cannot be ignored that the petitioner sought to claim the rights on the basis of so-called adverse possession but the plaint had been laconic and bereft of the essential ingredients for making out a case of adverse possession. In any case, a person claiming adverse possession has no equity in his favour and any assertion on the part of such a person of any fraud having been played upon him by the person against whom he intends to assert adverse possession needs rather closure scrutiny. The presumptions in such a case would, if needed, be primarily against the person claiming adverse possession with no equity in his favour.
In the given set of facts with admittedly the other persons as named in the plaint and the application being the co-tenants, if on a given day, the plaintiff Kartar Singh saw the reasons and came forward to withdraw the suit while accepting the rights of the co- tenants, there was nothing unnatural or improbable about the same; and if in moving of such an application, the defendant identified him 50 before the Notary Public, the indications could only be of some sense of rapprochement being prevailing, curbing or diluting the litigating mode the parties were poised at. However, the fact of the matter was that by way of the application, the plaintiff only came forward to withdraw. Even on extreme conjectures, it cannot be accepted that there was any suggestion of the defendants that they were admitting the rights of the plaintiff and the plaintiff was withdrawing for this reason. If that were so, the deed itself would have been entirely different. Moreover, there appears not even a remote reason wherefor all the defendants would have readily agreed on the plaintiff's claim of alleged adverse possession. In the given set of facts, there appears no reason to permit the petitioner Kartar Singh to say anything against and contrary to the specific contents of the application for withdrawal admittedly signed by him and his sons.
The learned Revenue Appellate Authority, in the present case too, proceeded to accept whatever was suggested by the petitioner Kartar Singh as gospel truth and even proceeded on extreme conjectures as to why the plaintiff would move the application for withdrawal at all. The very nature of the suit was sufficient to find that there was every possibility of the plaintiff moving such an application and withdrawing from litigation. There was no reason for the RAA to have accepted the baseless appeal as filed by the petitioner Kartar Singh.51
The learned counsel for the petitioner has referred to and relied upon the decisions in Banwari Lal Vs. Chando Devi (Smt) (Through LRs) & Anr.: (1993) 1 SCC 581, Pushpa Devi Bhagat (D) by LR Vs. Rajinder Singh & Ors. : 2006 AIR SCW 3549, Gopal Lal Vs. Babu Lal & Ors.: 1996 (2) WLC 125 and the Division Bench decision in the same case Gopal Lal Vs. Babu Lal & Ors. as reported in 2004 (3) RLR 439 to contend that the appeal as filed before the RAA was maintainable. None of these decisions support the case of the petitioner Kartar Singh. Though this Court has already found that on merits, the claim of the petitioner against the application dated 17.11.2003 remains baseless and hence, this writ petition is required to be dismissed however, it may be pointed out that even on the maintainability aspect, the appeal as filed before the RAA in this matter was also fundamentally incompetent.
The RAA has made a cursory reference to one of the decisions of the Board of Revenue to suggest that therein an appeal was entertained by the RAA and the Board did not make any adverse comment while considering the revision petition. Such an order of the Board was not giving the ratio that an appeal was maintainable against an order passed in dismissing the suit as withdrawn under Order XXIII Rule 1 CPC. The impugned order dated 17.11.2003 was nothing but an order for dismissal of the suit for the plaintiff withdrawing per Order XXIII Rule 1 CPC. The order was not an appealable one. The decisions as referred by the learned 52 counsel essentially dealing with the maintainability of the appeal questioning a decree on compromise have absolutely no relevance to the fact situation of the present case. Herein, there was no deed of compromise nor did the Trial Court pass any order or decree on any compromise. The present one was a case of withdrawal simplicitor and the order impugned was not open to appeal at all.
The other decisions as referred by the learned counsel for the petitioner are not only of no assistance to the contentions sought to be urged on behalf of the petitioner Kartar Singh but, on the other hand, clearly show that the appeal as filed in this case before the RAA was not maintainable at all. In the case of Rameshwar Sarkar Vs. State of West Bengal & Ors.: AIR 1986 Calcutta 19, the suit had been dismissed as withdrawn on an application mistakenly moved by the plaintiff who subsequently filed an application for withdrawal of the application for withdrawal and the Hon'ble Calcutta High Court held that such an application could be allowed under the inherent powers by the Court. This proposition was approved by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Jet Ply Wood Pvt. Ltd. & Anr. Vs. Madhukar Nowlakha & Ors.: AIR 2006 SC 1260. In the case of State Bank of India, Deoria Vs. Firm Jamuna Prasad Jaiswal and Sons & Anr.: AIR 2003 Allahabad 337, again, it was held that application for withdrawal of an application for withdrawal of suit or appeal was maintainable if fraud had been played upon the plaintiff or appellant as the case may be; and in the given fact situation, after finding that 53 constructive fraud had been played on the appellant, the Court held the application for withdrawal of the application for withdrawal to be maintainable. In the said case too, the Court pointed out that by its very nature, such an application has to be moved in the same forum where the earlier application which is sought to be withdrawn was filed.
In the present case, the petitioner-plaintiff consciously chose not to move any application before the Trial Court and, instead, attempted to level allegations of deceit only before the appellate Court. Even on the principles as referred by the learned counsel for the petitioner, if at all any application was to be moved complaining of fraud wherefor the plaintiff was made to move the application for withdrawal, such an application could only have been moved before the Trial Court. The appeal before the RAA cannot be held competent even by stretch of arguments.
So far the appeal before the Board is concerned, when the RAA had purportedly entertained an appeal and passed an order of remand and even issued temporary injunction until the decision of the suit, the Board cannot be said to have committed jurisdictional error in entertaining the challenge to the said order of remand and injunction as made by the First Appellate Court.
True it is that the Board while drawing its impugned order dated 20.05.2005 has not made elaborate discussion and has made a wrong mention about Kartar Singh's signatures being there 54 on the order, however, such lacunae cannot override the substance of the matter nor vitiate the impugned order nor make out a case for interference by this Court in the extraordinary writ jurisdiction.
Having examined the record and having taken into comprehension the surrounding circumstances, this Court is clearly of opinion that it were a case where the plaintiff consciously moved an application for withdrawal; and the Trial Court did not commit any error in dismissing the suit on such an application. The application was admittedly signed by the plaintiff and was attested by the Notary Public and was presented by the plaintiff's counsel. Any attempt on the part of the plaintiff to suggest some different state of affairs could only be dubbed as that of rather unfair afterthought. The learned Members of the Board have rightly set aside the baseless order passed by the RAA and have rightly restored the order dated 17.11.2003 as passed by the SDO.
The writ petition as filed by the plaintiff-petitioner Kartar Singh in challenge to the order dated 20.05.2005 as passed in Appeal No. TA/11/2004/Sriganganagar deserves to be dismissed. CONDUCT OF THE PETITIONER KARTAR SINGH AND OTHER ASPECTS:
Having separately dealt with the aspects relating to the two suits, the conclusions as reached above make it clear that: (a) in relation to Revenue Suit No.146/1991, both the writ petitions filed by 55 the petitioner Kartar Singh, CWP Nos.5263/2005 and 5429/2005 deserve to be dismissed and the writ petition filed by the opposite party Surendra Singh and others, CWP No.6647/2005, deserves to be allowed; and the decrees dated 16.07.1993 and 04.01.1994 deserve to be maintained; and (b) the other writ petition filed by the petitioner Kartar Singh, CWP No.3336/2005, in relation to Revenue Suit No.149/2003 deserves to be dismissed while upholding the order dated 17.11.2003 dismissing the said suit as withdrawn.
Though the matters could be disposed of with these findings and conclusions but then, in the peculiar features of these cases, per force, a few comments appear apposite, particularly on the conduct of the plaintiff-petitioner Kartar Singh; and a few further directions also appear requisite and necessary.
It is seen that the petitioner Kartar Singh preferred the appeals questioning the decrees as passed in the suit for division of holdings (No.146/1991) only on 14.01.2004 alleging impersonation. However, the same petitioner Kartar Singh had filed the other suit seeking to claim the rights on the basis of adverse possession in the month of October 2003 and withdrew the same on 17.11.2003. Then, the petitioner Kartar Singh prepared the appeal against the order dated 17.11.2003 on 19.11.2003 i.e., within two days of the order and presented the same to the Revenue Appellate Authority on 27.11.2003. Thus, the appeals in relation to the previous suit No.146/1991 were filed only after the appeal in relation to the later 56 suit. However, the petitioner Kartar Singh consciously omitted to implead the other persons as parties in the appeals filed later in relation to the former suit; and this later appeal (filed on 14.01.2004 ) was decided on 31.01.2004 whereas the other appeal relating to the later suit was decided only on 13.04.2004. The appellant petitioner Kartar Singh apparently acted thoroughly unfair and purposedly avoided to join the relevant persons as parties in the later appeal though he was aware of the existence of rights of other persons.
The petitioner Kartar Singh had been approbating and reprobating to the maximum as could be seen from the fact that for the purpose of maintaining the appeals against the decrees as passed in the suit for division of holdings, he did not implead the other defendants as parties and justified such non-impleadment with the submissions that the rights of such defendants were intact because of the registered partition deed. However, when it came to filing of the reply in CWP No.6647/2005, the same person Kartar Singh has gone to the extent of alleging that he was not bound by the partition deed, being not a party thereto; and has even questioned the legality of this partition deed. The submissions are wrong and are contrary to his stand before the subordinate Courts. Noteworthy it is that the partition deed had been a registered one and was signed on behalf of Kartar Singh by his brother Niranjan Singh who acted as power of attorney not only for Kartar Singh but also for other sons of Jawahar Singh. The overall circumstances 57 leave no manner of doubt that the appellant Kartar Singh had always been shifting his stand and disowning everything so as to somehow deprive the other co-tenants of the property in question.
The conduct of the appellant Kartar Singh has been thoroughly unfair where he would choose to disown his earlier suit, his application for withdrawal, and even the admitted registered partition deed. These writ petitions, thus, deserve to be dismissed with heavy costs with other necessary directions for implementation of the final decree dated 04.01.1994.
It appears that the property in dispute is a big chunk of land and the respondents have alleged that the same was yielding substantial income that was earlier shared with them by Kartar Singh who later on stopped sharing. It is noticed that in CWP No.3336/2005, while placing the matter for final disposal, on 23.09.2005, this Court directed the petitioner Kartar Singh to submit a security in the form of bank guarantee to the tune of Rs.20 lacs before the Dy. Registrar (Judicial) of this Court. It appears that though said guarantee was furnished but was in force upto 27.09.2006.
Having regard to the circumstances, this Court considers it proper that while the decree dated 04.01.1994 should be directed to be put to execution without delay, the question of usufruct of the land in question and mesne profits should also be ordered to be determined by the Executing Court; and until determination of such 58 questions, the share of the petitioner Kartar Singh in the land in question should remain in attachment with SDO, prohibiting any alienation by the petitioner Kartar Singh.
It may also be observed in relation to CWP No.3336/2005 that an application (IA No.12638/2008) as moved by the applicants Sanjeet Singh and Amrita Kaur seeking deletion of their name from the array of parties has remained pending. Though the said petition is being dismissed but having regard to the circumstances and to put the record straight, the application is allowed and the names of the said applicants are ordered to be deleted from the array of parties. CONCLUSIONS AND DIRECTIONS:
As a result of the aforesaid:
A. (i) CWP Nos.5263/2005 and 5429/2005 are dismissed and CWP No.6647/2005 is allowed;
(ii) The order dated 20.05.2005 as passed by the Board of Revenue in Appeal No. 9/2004/TA/Sriganganagar and in Appeal No.10/2004/TA/Sriganganagar is modified and the said appeals are allowed in toto; and consequently, the order dated 31.01.2004 as passed by the Revenue Appellate Authority, Sriganganagar in Appeal Nos.10/2004 and 11/2004 is quashed and set aside and both these appeals are dismissed; and 59
(iii) The preliminary decree dated 16.07.1993 and the final decree dated 04.01.1994 as passed in Revenue Suit No.146/1991 by the SDO stand affirmed;
B. (i) CWP No.3336/2005 stands dismissed and the order dated 20.05.2005 as passed by the Board of Revenue in Appeal No.TA/11/2004/ Sriganganagar stands affirmed; and
(ii) As a result of the affirmance of the aforesaid order dated 20.05.2005 in Appeal No.TA/11/2004/Sriganganagar, Revenue Suit No.149/2003 stands dismissed as withdrawn; C. (i) It shall be required of the Sub Divisional Officer, Sriganganagar to take up immediately the execution of the final decree dated 04.01.1994 as passed in Revenue Suit No.146/1991 upon production of certified copy of this order; and to conclude the execution proceedings at the earliest; and
(ii) It shall also be required of the SDOto take up the question of usufruct and mense profits from the land in question and to order grant of mesne profits to the opposite parties payable by the petitioner Kartar Singh after appropriate enquiry; and until determination of all the relevant questions, the share of the petitioner Kartar Singh in the land in question shall remain under attachment with the SDO who shall be entitled to deal with the same in accordance with law;
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D. In relation to CWP Nos.5263/2005, 5429/2005 and 3336/2005, the petitioner Kartar Singh shall make payment of the costs in each writ petition in the sum of Rs.50,000/- (i.e., in all a sum of Rs.1,50,000/-) to the contesting respondents.
(DINESH MAHESHWARI), J.
//Mohan// MK 61 S.B. CIVIL WRIT PETITION NO.5429/2005.
Kartar Singh Vs. Board of Revenue for Rajasthan at Ajmer & Ors.
Date of Order :: 31st August 2009
PRESENT
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE DINESH MAHESHWARI
Mr. T.S. Champawat ] for Kartar Singh, petitioner in CWP Mr. Mridul Jain ] Nos.5263/2005, 5429/2005 & 3336/2005 Mr. Paramveer Singh ] (respondent in CWP No.6647/2005) Mr. K.C. Sharma ] Mr. J.R. Beniwal ] for Surendra Singh & Ors., petitioners Mr. Sunil Beniwal ] in CWP No.6647/2005 (respondents in Mr. B.L. Choudhary ] CWP Nos. Nos.5263/2005, 5429/2005 & Mr.Varun Goyal ] 3336/2005)\ .....
The writ petition is dismissed with costs and directions vide common order made in S.B.Civil Writ Petition No.5263/2005 (Kartar Singh Vs. Board of Revenue for Rajasthan at Ajmer & Ors.).
B.O. COURT MASTER MK 62 S.B. CIVIL WRIT PETITION NO.6647/2005.
Surendra Singh & Ors. Vs. Board of Revenue for Rajasthan at Ajmer & Ors.
Date of Order :: 31st August 2009
PRESENT
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE DINESH MAHESHWARI
Mr. T.S. Champawat ] for Kartar Singh, petitioner in CWP Mr. Mridul Jain ] Nos.5263/2005, 5429/2005 & 3336/2005 Mr. Paramveer Singh ] (respondent in CWP No.6647/2005) Mr. K.C. Sharma ] Mr. J.R. Beniwal ] for Surendra Singh & Ors., petitioners Mr. Sunil Beniwal ] in CWP No.6647/2005 (respondents in Mr. B.L. Choudhary ] CWP Nos. Nos.5263/2005, 5429/2005 & Mr.Varun Goyal ] 3336/2005)\ .....
The writ petition is allowed with directions vide common order made in S.B.Civil Writ Petition No.5263/2005 (Kartar Singh Vs. Board of Revenue for Rajasthan at Ajmer & Ors.).
B.O. COURT MASTER MK 63 S.B. CIVIL WRIT PETITION NO.3336/2005.
Kartar Singh Vs. Board of Revenue for Rajasthan at Ajmer & Ors.
Date of Order :: 31st August 2009
PRESENT
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE DINESH MAHESHWARI
Mr. T.S. Champawat ] for Kartar Singh, petitioner in CWP Mr. Mridul Jain ] Nos.5263/2005, 5429/2005 & 3336/2005 Mr. Paramveer Singh ] (respondent in CWP No.6647/2005) Mr. K.C. Sharma ] Mr. J.R. Beniwal ] for Surendra Singh & Ors., petitioners Mr. Sunil Beniwal ] in CWP No.6647/2005 (respondents in Mr. B.L. Choudhary ] CWP Nos. Nos.5263/2005, 5429/2005 & Mr.Varun Goyal ] 3336/2005)\ .....
The writ petition is dismissed with costs and directions vide common order made in S.B.Civil Writ Petition No.5263/2005 (Kartar Singh Vs. Board of Revenue for Rajasthan at Ajmer & Ors.).
B.O. COURT MASTER MK