Selvam vs Mangaiyarkarasi on 24 January, 2013

[Cites 25, Cited by 2]

Madras High Court

Selvam vs Mangaiyarkarasi on 24 January, 2013

The suit was filed informa pauperis in O.P.44 of 1991 by the father (on behalf of his three minor sons) and the major son seeking declaration that the sale deed, dated 22.07.1981, will not bind the plaintiffs 4/5th share and for consequential reliefs. The suit was decreed. The defendant preferred the first appeal in A.S.No.54 of 1997. During the pendency of the first appeal, the plaintiffs 2 to 4 were declared, as majors, as per order dated 22.02.1999 in I.A.No.185 of 1997. The appeal was allowed. Challenging the judgment and decree of the first appellate Court, (dismissing the suit) the second appeal was filed, raising the following substantial questions of law:-

"(i) Whether the sale of property of minors without prior permission of the District Court is valid?

(ii)Whether the mother of the minors is competent to sell property of the minor children?

(iii) Whether attestation by the father amounts to conveyance?

(iv) Whether the question of legal necessity is relevant in the case of sale of minor's property?

(v) Whether a woman can act as Kartha or Manager of a joint Hindu family?"

2. Brief facts:

The suit property consists of two items situated at Pallavaraya natham, Panruti Sub Registry, Cuddalore Taluk.

i) R.S.No.245/3 - A.c. 1.11

ii)R.S.No.266/2 - A.c.0.89 2.1. The plaintiff's father Ranganathan purchased the suit property on 12.06.1980, for a sum of Rs.16,000/- in the name of his wife and his four sons, the plaintiffs. Jayalakshmi sold the property for a sum of Rs.17,555/- in the capacity as guardian for her four sons also. The recitals in the sale deed are false. Permission of the court was not obtained to sell the property. The plaintiffs issued notice on 05.11.1990 for which the defendants did not send any reply. The sale deed would confer title only to the extent of share of Jayalakshmi. The plaintiffs are entitled to 4/5th share of the suit property, along with past and future mesne profits.

3. The plaintiffs claim was resisted by the defendant on the following contentions:-

(i) Purchase of the suit property by Ranganathan in the name of his wife and sons is a benami purchase.

(ii) The sale of the said property was for the purpose of family expenses and educational expenses of minor sons. It is only Ranganatha Padayachi who sold the property and not his wife.

(iii) Suit is barred by limitation.

(iv)The claim of past and future mesne profits are high.

4. The issues framed and the corresponding findings rendered by the trial court are as detailed below:-

(1) Whether the suit is barred by limitation?

Even though the first plaintiff has attained majority, the other plaintiffs were minors on the date of filing of the suit and they are entitled to file the suit within three years after the cessation of minority as per section 7 of the Limitation Act and therefore, the suit is not barred by limitation.

(2) and (3) Whether the suit property was purchased benami in the name of the plaintiffs by Ranganatha Padayachi?

Whether the sale deed dated 22.07.1981 has to be set aside, so far as the plaintiffs 4/5th share?

It was contended by the defendant that

a) the suit property was purchased benami by Ranganathan

b) the suit property was purchased from out of the separate money of Ranganathan;

Therefore, the suit property is the separate property of Ranganatha Padayachi or it is the joint family property belonging to the Ranganathan and the plaintiffs, is the branching issue.

5. The trial court also took note of the omission in the evidence of the defendant where he did not say either that the suit property was purchased from out of the joint family income or it was purchased for the benefit of the members of the joint family. Referring to the evidence of Ranganatha Padayachi, wherein he himself stated that the suit property was purchased from out of his separate income and also considering that there was not even a suggestion that the suit property was purchased from out of the joint family income, the trial court came to the conclusion that the suit property was purchased by Ranganatha Padayachi for the benefit of the plaintiffs and therefore, the plaintiffs are the owners of the property.

6. With regard to the plea of benami, the contention of the plaintiffs was that the defendants are estopped from putting forth the plea of benami, by virtue of provisions of Section 4 of Benami Prohibition Transaction Act. The contention of the defendant was that there was exception under section 4(3)(A) of the said Act and therefore, they cannot be estopped from taking the plea of benami. The plea of the plaintiffs was accepted by the trial court and it was held that the property was not purchased benami in the name of the plaintiffs but that, the property was purchased for the benefit of the plaintiffs and their mother. The trial court gave the following the reason:-

(i) Written statement nowhere stated that the suit property was purchased either for the benefit of the members of the joint family or that the property was purchased from out of joint family funds.

(ii) There was no evidence to that effect by the defendant.

(iii) P.W.1 Ranganatha Padayachi was not cross-examined on these lines.

(iv) The specific case in the written statement as well as in the evidence of the defendants is that the property was purchased by utilising the separate funds of Ranganatha Padayachi, but benami in the name of the plaintiffs.

On these considerations, it was held that the exception provided under section 4(3)(A) will not apply to the facts of the case.

7. The First Appellate court reversed the judgment and decree of the trial court holding that the suit property is a joint family property of Ranganatha Padayachi and the purchase was a benami purchase. It was also held that as the suit property is not the separate property of minors, Section 8 of the Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act is not applicable and therefore, the sale of property without obtaining permission from the Court is valid. Challenging the judgment and decree of the First Appellate Court, the second appeal is filed by the plaintiffs.

8. Learned counsel for the appellants contended that the suit ought to have been decreed, as the property of the minor had been sold obviously without permission from the Court.

8.1. Under section 8(2) of the Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act, 1956, the natural guardian of a Hindu Minor shall not, without the previous permission of the Court, transfer the property by sale. The sale by the natural guardian in contraversion of section 8(2) is voidable at the instance of the minor or any person claiming under him as per Section 8(3). Under section 8(4), no court shall grant permission to the natural guardian except in case of necessity or for an evident advantage to the minor.

8.2. Based on these provisions, the following issues have been raised:-

i) Who can be considered as the natural guardian, i.e., the father or the mother and under what circumstances?

ii) Whether the property is the separate property of minors or joint family property of minors and their father?

iii) If the property is the joint family property, whether the sale by the mother would be valid if the legal necessity is proved.

iv) Whether the father could be considered as an executant just because he attested the sale deed, executed by the mother?

v) Whether the father attesting the sale deed would be estopped from disputing the validity of the sale deed?

vi) Even if the sale is for the benefit of the minors, whether the minor or any person claiming under him can avoid the guardian's alienation which was done without obtaining previous permission of the court?

vii) Whether a transaction in violation of Section 8(2) has necessarily to be treated as a transaction in violation of statute and consequently it is voidable at the option of the minor?

9. The main contentions raised by the learned counsel for the respondent are:-

1. The suit properties are the joint family properties of Ranganathan, his wife and his sons and it is not the separate property of wife of Ranganathan and his sons.

2. The suit properties were sold only for legal necessity and the sale is binding upon the plaintiffs.

3.There is no necessity to obtain permission under Section 8 of the Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act, as the suit properties are not the separate properties but the joint family properties. When the property sold as the joint property it can be sold for legal necessity for which the permission of the Court is not required.

4.Even as a defacto guardian, the mother has got the authority to sell the property of minor and therefore, the sale by the mother on behalf of the minors, even in the presence of the father is a valid sale.

5. The suit claim is barred by limitation.

6.The father having signed in the sale deed is estopped from disputing the validity of the sale.

10. Contention Nos.3 and 4 of the respondent:

Admittedly, the suit properties were purchased by the father in a family where the wife was illiterate and the children were minors. The sale consideration had been provided, admittedly, only by the father. But the properties have been purchased not in the name of the father but in the name of the wife and children. In the Indian context, it is not uncommon for the husband to favour the wife and children by purchasing the property in the name of wife and children. Obviously, the intention of the purchase is to benefit the wife and children. On this score, the purchase by the father should be construed as the purchase favouring the wife and children, is the justification provided by the plaintiffs.

11. It is contended that the contribution by the father was from the properties belonging to the joint family. The learned counsel for the respondent contended that when the plaintiffs in whose name the properties are held is a co-parcener in a Hindu Undivided Family and the property are held for the benefit of the coparceners in the family, there is no prohibition to raise a plea of benami and therefore, the purchase in the name of the minors was a benami purchase. On these contentions, the defendants pleaded that the suit must be dismissed.

12. Therefore, the essential question to be decided is whether the property should be construed as a joint family property or the separate property. In a case of benami transaction, the intention and the nature of transaction are relevant criteria. When the property is purchased in the name of a person with the intention of evading public revenue or to conceal any unaccounted income or for allied illegal purposes, then the presumption is that it would be a benami purchase. So far as this case is concerned, no reason has been adduced, no motive has been imputed, no hidden agenda has been alleged on the part of the father to purchase the property in the name of the mother and children. Therefore, in the absence of any proof or intention as to why the father should purchase the property in the name of the wife and children, then the logical inference would be that the father intended to benefit the mother and children.

12.1. When the property is alleged to be joint family property, it is for the party raising the plea to prove that, there was sufficient joint family nucleus available, from which sufficient income to the extent of purchasing the property was available. So far as this case is concerned, the evidence is that the father Ranganathan had to maintain two daughters and four sons from out of income from his half share of 2.18 A.c.(from out of 4.36) which are alleged to be manavary punja lands (lands with no irrigation facilities, but lands fed by rainwater only) with no capability to yield income. Therefore, it is highly improbable that the father would have derived sufficient income from the property, he was holding to the extent of purchasing the suit property. In addition to that, the learned counsel for the appellants pointed out that there was absolutely no pleadings and no evidence to the effect that the father had sufficient income from the joint family property. Therefore, this Court holds that the suit properties are separate properties of the wife and children and not the joint family property.

12.2. The sale by the mother for herself and on behalf of the minors is dated 22.07.1981. Jayalakshmi has executed the sale deed on behalf of the minors, Selvam aged 13, Kumaran aged 8, Kannan aged 6 and Arivazhagan aged 2=. This sale deed has been executed within one year and fourty days from the date of purchase. The date of purchase of the property is 12.06.1980. The suit property has been purchased for a sum of Rs.16,000/- and the property has been sold for a sum of Rs.17,555/-. The recital in the sale deed dated 22.07.1981 (Ex.A2) is that, the properties are sold for the purpose of purchase of the property on 18.07.1981 in the name of Jayalaksmi, for the educational purposes of minors and other family expenses. Pointing out these details, it is contended by the learned counsel for the respondent that the sale was for the benefit of the minors and therefore, it was for legal necessity and hence, the sale cannot be challenged. Having regard to the stamp duty and registration charges payable, the sale cannot be construed to be a profitable sale. So far as the purpose is concerned, when the children are too young to go to any school, except Selvam and Kumar, who might have been studying Elementary/Middle School, the contention that the sale was for educational purposes for minors cannot be correct. The educational expenses during those time were very negligible. From the available evidence, the only conclusion is that the sale has been effected may be for the benefit of Jayalakshmi and not for the benefit of minors. Therefore, this Court holds that the sale by mother on behalf of the minors were not for legal necessity and therefore, the sale is not binding on minors (even assuming that the property is the joint family property).

13. When the property is the separate property of the minor and when the guardian effects sale of property without permission from the Court, the sale is voidable and that the plaintiffs' claim to treat the sale as voidable, is legally justifiable and therefore, that contention ought to have been accepted by the trial court is the contention of the learned counsel for the appellants and in support of the same, the following decisions are relied upon:-

(i) (1998) Law Weekly 410 (Annamalai Pillai. G. v. The District Revenue Officer, Cuddalore) (Madras High Court). In this decision, it has been held as follows:-

8. We have already seen that clause (3) of section 8 of the Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act, 1956, specifically makes the transaction voidable. The lease executed by the guardian in this case is prohibited and in that sense it was without any authority. On the legal efficacy and the distinction between valid, void and voidable agreements, we find the following passage in Salmon on Jurisprudence, Twelfth Edition at page 341:-

"A valid agreement is one which is fully operative in accordance with the intent of the parties. A void agreement is one which entirely fails to receive legal recognition or sanction, the declared will of the parties being wholly destitute of legal efficacy. A voidable agreement stands midway between these two cases. It is not a nullity, but its operation is conditional and not absolute. By reason of some defect in its origin it. is liable to be destroyed or cancelled at the option of one of the parties to it. On the exercise of this power the agreement not only ceases to have any efficacy, but is deemed to have been void ab initio. The avoidance of it relates back to the making of it......

(ii) Affirming the judgment of the Madras High Court, cited supra, the Hon'ble Supreme Court also held that the transaction which is voidable in terms of Section 8 (3) of the Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act, when validly avoided, relates back to the date of transaction and it is unenforceable from the very inception. The relevant observation quoted in 1993-2-L.W.15 (G.Annamalai Pillai v. The District Revenue Officer & others) (SC) reads as under:-

"We have, therefore, no doubt that when the fifth respondent avoided the lease executed by his father, the fourth respondent, the lease became void from its inception and no statutory rights, could, therefore, accrue in favour of the appellant herein."

We agree with the reasoning and the conclusions reached by the Division Bench of the High Court and as such this appeal has to be dismissed.

(iii) Explaining the object behind the introduction of Section 8 of the Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act, the Hon'ble Supreme Court, in the case reported in 1994-1-L.W.40 (Panni Lal v. Rajinder Singh & another) (SC), held as follows:-

8. The provisions of S.8 are devised to fully protect the property of the minor, even from the depredations of his parents. S.8 empowers only the legal guardian to alienate a minor's immovable property provided it is for the necessity or benefit of the minor or his estate and it further requires that such alienation shall be effected after the permission of the Court has been obtained. It is difficult, therefore, to hold that the sale was voidable, not void, by reason of the fact that the mother of the minor respondents signed the sale deed and father attested it.

(iv) Contending that the contract entered into is not a valid contract but a contingent contract, the validity of which would depend upon the permission obtained from the Court, the decision reported in 1999-L.W.110 (DB) (Thilakam, M. v. M.R.Radhika) is relied upon.

(v) When the inhibition of the transaction is by a statute and when the statute in plain and unambiguous language prohibit alienation of property, without the permission from the Court, the transaction cannot be upheld, even if the sale is for legal necessity. So contending, the decision reported in (1985) 2 MLJ 366 (Dhanasekaran v. Manorajnithammal) is relied upon. In this decision, it has been held as follows:-

3. Section 8 (2) lays down in specific and explicit terms that the natural guardian shall not, without the previous permission of the Court, indulge in and effect any of the alienations set out in sub-clauses (a) and (b). Section 8 (3) is categoric leaving no room for any argument that any disposal of immovable property by a natural guardian in contravention of Section 8 (2) is voidable at the instance of the minor. The field and sphere of argument that such an alienation is for binding necessities and should be upheld are no longer available. When the inhibition is of the statute and it is plain and unambiguous, it is not open to sustain an alienation done in contravention of it by still investigating and finding out justifying factors therefor."

(vi) (2001) 6 Supreme Court Cases 163 (Vishwambhar v. Laxminarayan) is relied upon for the proposition that the challenge to alienation by natural guardian of property of minor without court sanction and without legal necessity is voidable and not void ab initio; proper relief must be sought and within limitation period.

(vii) Contending that the alienation of minor's property by a defacto guardian, being against the statutory prohibition (under Section 11 of the Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act) is void ab initio and that the alienee would not acquire any title to the property and therefore, the transaction need not even be set-aside, the decision reported in (2002) 1 M.L.J. 169 (SC) (Madhegowda v. Ankegowda) is relied upon. The relevant and important observation runs as follows:-

Transfer in violation of Section 11 of the Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act is ab initio void; it need not be set aside by filing a suit or judicial proceeding; minor, on attaining majority transferring his interest in the property; it is sufficient to show that minor repudiated the transfer; there is little scope for doubt that the transfer of minor's interest by a defacto guardian / manager having been made in violation of the express bar provided under Sec.11 of The Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act is per se invalid. The existence or otherwise of legal necessity is not relevant in the case of such invalid transfer. A transferee of such an alienation does not acquire any interest in the property. Such an invalid transaction is not required to be set aside by filing a suit or judicial proceeding. The minor, on attaining majority, can repudiate the transfer in any manner as and when occasion for it arises. After attaining majority if he/she transfers his/her interest in the property in a lawful manner asserting his/her title to the same that is sufficient to show that the minor has repudiated the transfer made by the defacto guardian / manager. To the same proposition, the decision reported in (2010) 3 MLJ 961 (Natarajan v. Paramasivam) is also relied upon.

(viii) (2006) 1 M.L.J. 533 (Thiruvenkada Gounder (died) v. Ammaiappan alias Kothandaraman). In this decision, it has been held as follows:-

10. The Honourable Supreme Court in the decision reported in 2002 (4) Law Weekly 330 (Madhegowda (D) by Lrs. v. Ankegowda (D) by Lrs & Others) in paragraphs 10, 11 and 12 held as under, "10. ... In Sub-section (1) of Section 8 it is declared that the natural guardian of a Hindu minor has power, subject to the provisions of the section, to do all acts which are necessary or reasonable and proper for the benefit of the minor or for the realization, protection or benefit of the minor's estate; but the guardian in no case can bind the minor by a personal covenant.

11. In Sub-section (2) of Section 8 it is laid down that the natural guardian shall not, without the previous permission of the Court -

(a) mortgage or charge, or transfer by sale, gift, exchange or otherwise, any part of the immovable property of the minor, or

(b) lease any part of such property for a term exceeding five years or for a term extending more than one year beyond the date on which the minor will attain majority.

12. In sub-section (3) in which the consequences of contravention of sub-section (1) or sub-section (2) are provided it is laid down that "any disposal of immovable property by a natural guardian, in contravention of sub-section (1) or sub-section (2), is voidable at the instance of the minor or any person claiming under him".

(ix) (2007) 4 MLJ 1234 (Brammagiri v. Minor Sivasubramaniam). In this decision, it has been held that a release deed executed without obtaining prior permission of Court, would not be binding on the plaintiff minor son and a claim for partition would be possible without reference to release.

(x) (2008) 6 MLJ 1004 (Koothayyan v. Minor Ayyappan). In this decision, it has been held that when the minor's property has been sold by the mother of the minor, without obtaining the permission of the District Court and it was not established that the sale was for the benefit of the minor, then the said sale is liable to be cancelled at the instance of the minor.

13.1. Learned counsel for the appellants has also placed reliance upon the decision reported in AIR 1999 SC 1149 (Geetha Hariharan v. Reserve Bank of India), pointing out the facts which are distinguishable. In the said decision, where the father was not taking any interest in his minor's daughter's affairs and it was the mother, who was actually managing the affairs of her minor daughter, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that when the father was not taking any interest in the affairs of the minor, then it was as good, as if he was non-existent, so far as the minor was concerned.

13.2. The factual aspect available in this case does not show that the father was not taking any interest in the affairs of the minor.

14. The learned counsel for the respondent commented upon the conduct of the father in attesting the sale deed and it was contended that the attestation of the sale deed would amount to execution itself. On the other hand, it is contended by the learned counsel for the appellant that, mere attestation of the document by the father, in a transaction executed by the mother would not confer validity upon the transaction entered into on behalf of the minor. The mother has acted as guardian in selling her property of her minor sons admittedly, in the presence of the father. The father has signed in the sale deed as attestor. It is not a case where disqualification is alleged on the part of the father. It is a case where the father, of course, on behalf of the minors, challenged the sale made by the mother on behalf of the minors. Just because, the father is an attesting witness to the document of sale executed by the mother whether it could be contended that father is the Executant of the sale deed. What is the legal effect and impact of the father signing in the sale deed as an attestor, is an issue to be considered.

14.1. The decision reported in (1989) 1 M.L.J. 54 (T.N.Panchayats Devel. Officers Assn. v. Govt. of T.N.) is relied upon by the learned counsel for the appellants and the observation runs as follows:-

Under the personal law of the parties, the mother of the 1st plaintiff though appointed as guardian in respect of the property-settled on the first plaintiff, would only be in the nature of a de facto guardian in the presence of the father of the first plaintiff who would be the dejure guardian. There is no dispute that the exchange deed had been entered into on behalf of the first plaintiff through her mother and her father had not been participating in that transaction at all. In other words the deed of exchange would be a transaction entitled into on behalf of the 1st plaintiff through her de facto guardian and such a transaction by the father of the 1st plaintiff would not confer any sanctity or legality on that transaction. Thus from the mere attestation of the exchange deed by the father of the 1st plaintiff, the validity of the transaction cannot be upheld. 14.2. The decisions relied upon by the appellants clearly go to show that the sale effected by the mother, though attested by the father, is the sale executed only by the mother and not by the father. The sale executed by the mother is not valid, as the permission of the Court was not obtained.

15. Contending that the suit claim is barred by limitation, the learned counsel for the respondent relied upon the following decisions:-

(i) AIR 1972 MADRAS 3 (V.59 C 2) (1) (Subramanyam Vs. Venkataraman and others) :-

"After the elder brother became major he would be the Manager of the joint family who could give a valid discharge. He having not filed the suit within three years after becoming major, the younger brother could not file the suit thereafter."

(ii) AIR 1974 MADRAS 203 (V.61, C.65) (Venkatesan Vs. Neelayathakshiammal and others):-

The suit by the younger brother was barred by limitation. As manager of the joint family, the elder brother should have instituted the suit within a period of three years of his attaining majority, as provided for in Section 8 of the Limitation Act, since adverse possession commenced from the date of the alienation. His failure to take such an action was the effect of extinguishing the title of the joint family itself. AIR 1961 SC 1074 and AIR 1915 Mad 1201 and AIR 1972 Mad 3.

(iii) AIR 1961 SC 1074 (Sarda Prasad and Others v. Lala Jumma Prasad and others).

15.1. These decisions obviously do not apply to the facts of this case. Therefore, the contention that the suit is barred by limitation cannot stand.

15.2. Contending that the mother can act as guardian for the minor, and that as the sale is for the benefit of the minor, the validity of the transaction has to be upheld, the learned counsel for the respondent relied upon the following decisions:-

(i) 1969 (1) MLJ 177 (Mayilswami Chettiar Vs. Kaliammal and Others):-

The question that arose for consideration was whether the mortgage executed by the mother as the defacto guardian of the minors, while the father is alive, is valid or not. The Madras High Court, in the above case, gave an interesting finding that both the father and the mother are natural guardians and that only if a contest arose as between the father and the mother as to who should be the guardian for the mother, then it will be the father, who would be the guardian. On this finding, it was held that if the alienation of minor's estate is made by the natural guardian, it would be valid if it is for necessity. It was further held that the father having attested the mortgage deed and the management of the property, having all along, been with the mother, the father should also be deemed to have acquiesced in the mortgage.

(ii) The proposition quoted in the above decision was approved in the decision reported in (1997) 2 MLJ 353 (A.R.Deivasigamani Mudaliar v. T.N.Somasundaram Nadar).

15.3. These two decisions by the Madras High Court cannot prevail over the decision of the Supreme Court reported in AIR 1999 SC 1149 (referred to supra). Therefore, these two decisions cannot substantiate the case of the respondents.

15.4. The learned counsel for the respondent vehemently contended that the present case is one of the usual litigation filed by the minor children with the encouragement of the parents and that the mother as a parent cannot have unjust enrichment, in case the sale is held to be not binding on the minors. The observations made in the decision reported in 1976 (II) M.L.J. 134 (Santanavenugopalakrishnan v. K.V.Venugopal and others) is relied upon.

"24. In passing, we have to reiterate that this is one of those usual litigations filed by the minor children in the joint family attacking the alienations made by the father either during their minority or immediately thereafter but, certainly, with the encouragement and active support of the parents. Without the first and the second defendants having a hand in the litigation, the plaintiffs would not have dared or could not have been encouraged to file the same. The mother of some of the plaintiffs was representing some of the minors. What prevented her from going into the box and speak against her husband remains unexplained. The appeal is dismissed. As the litigation, in our view, ought to have been sponsored by the parents and the minor plaintiffs ought not to be blamed for it, there will be no order as to costs in this appeal. The appellants, however, will pay the Court-fee payable to the Government."

16. Even though the plaintiff has succeeded in the suit, because of the legal position, as observed in the above case, this litigation is a sponsored litigation by the father. No doubt, as per Section 8 of the Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act, the sale is voidable at the instance of the minor, if the permission of the Court is not obtained. The opening lines in Section 8 reads that the duty is enjoined upon the guardian to obtain the permission of the Court before selling. The guardian has not done so. The violation is on the part of the guardian also for which purchaser alone cannot be penalised. The guardian / mother should not be permitted to enrich herself by purchasing the property in her name, from and out of the sale consideration and later on, assisting the minors to get the sale deed set-aside. Had she been a party in this litigation, this Court would have ordered the return of purchase money with some equalising value of money to the purchaser. As she is not a party, the Court is not in a position to pass any further orders. Therefore, liberty is given to the purchaser to proceed against the guardian / mother, who sold the property, for appropriate relief.

17. In the result, the Second appeal stands allowed. The judgment and decree of the learned Principal District Judge of Cuddalore, dated 9.7.2000 passed in A.S.No.54 of 1997 is set-aside and the the decree and judgment of the Subordinate Judge of Panruti in O.S.No.14 of 1996, dated 16.6.1997, is confirmed. No costs.

24.01.2013 Index : Yes / No Web : Yes / No aes / srk To

1. The Principal District Court, Cuddalore

2. The Subordinate Court, Panruti

3. The Section Officer, V.R.Section, Madras High Court, Chennai S.VIMALA, J., aes / srk Pre-Delivery Judgment in Second Appeal No.1057 of 2001 24.01.2013

Unlock Advanced Research with PRISMAI

Madras High Court