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[Cites 22, Cited by 0]

Himachal Pradesh High Court

Decided On: 11Th March vs Of on 11 March, 2026

                                            2026:HHC:6970




         IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH SHIMLA
    .



                                                          CWPOA No.2181 of 2019
                                     Decided on: 11th March, 2026




                                                                            .
    ___________________________________________________________________





    Prakash Chand (deceased) through
    his LRs Arun Kumar and others                                          ...Petitioners





                                              Versus




                                                 of
    State of Himachal Pradesh and others              ...Respondents
    _____________________________________________________________________
    Coram
    Hon'ble Mr. Justice Jiya Lal Bhardwaj, Judge

rt Whether approved for reporting? 1 Yes For the petitioners: Mr. Surender Sharma, Advocate.

For the respondents: Mr. Hemant Kumar Verma, Deputy Advocate General.

Jiya Lal Bhardwaj, Judge (Oral) By way of the present petition, the original petitioner Prakash Chand, who expired on 25.11.2021 and substituted by his Legal heirs, (for short "petitioner) has prayed for the following substantive reliefs:-

"(i) That the respondents may kindly be directed to grant the petitioner three ACP increments, on completion of his 4-9-2014 years of regular services as JBT Teacher and to pay the arrears and other allowances along with interest @12% per annum;
1

Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment?

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(ii) That the respondents may kindly be directed to pay the salary for a period of 68 days during which the services of the petitioner remained terminated by the regularizing the period of termination;"

.

2. Shorn of unnecessary details, the key facts of the case are that the petitioner vide office order dated 14.02.1992 (Annexure P/A) was appointed as Volunteer Teacher (Primary) in of Government Primary School Simbal. In sequel to said office order, he joined duties on 03.03.1992 as claimed in letter dated rt 10.08.2012 (Annexure P/E).

3. Feeling aggrieved by the appointment of the petitioner as Volunteer Teacher, one Smt. Meeran Devi (wrongly mentioned as Meera Devi), who also participated in the selection process, had preferred Original Application before the Himachal Pradesh State Administrative Tribunal, which was registered as O.A. No.816 of 1993.

4. It has been mentioned in the petition that another Original Application preferred by Smt. Meeran Devi (wrongly mentioned as Meera Devi) against appointment of one Sh.

Pardhan Singh, was registered as O.A. No.431 of 1992. In this ::: Downloaded on - 12/03/2026 20:31:53 :::CIS 3 Original application, Sh. Pardhan Singh was offered appointment in Government Primary School Chobhu (Baijnath .

Block).

5. The Original Application filed by Smt. Meeran Devi against the selection of the petitioner as Volunteer Teacher (Primary remained pending before the Tribunal, but in the of meantime, the services of the petitioner were regularized as Junior Basic Teacher w.e.f. 01.08.1998. After regularizing the rt services of the petitioner as JBT, the original application preferred by Smt. Meeran Devi was decided on 29.07.2004 (Annexure R-I) by the Tribunal holding that selection of private respondent i.e. the petitioner was not the result of fair play, rather the procedure adopted by the respondents-State vitiates and the selection smacks of malafides. Consequently, the selection proceedings appointing the petitioner as Volunteer Teacher (Primary) vide Annexure A-5 appended with the original application were quashed and respondents-State were given liberty to hold the interview afresh for the post of Volunteer ::: Downloaded on - 12/03/2026 20:31:53 :::CIS 4 Teacher in Government Primary School, Simbal, within a period of four months.

.

6. Despite categorical directions given by the Court to hold the interview afresh for the post of Volunteer Teacher in Government Primary School, Simbal within a period of four months, the authorities of the respondents-State did not take of any action, however, later on services of the petitioner were terminated on 21.02.2005. After termination, the petitioner had rt filed writ petition bearing CWP No.181 of 2005, titled, Parkash Chand vs. State of H.P. and others, before this Court, laying challenge to the order dated 29.07.2004, passed by the Tribunal and also the order of termination of his services dated 21.02.2005 and this Court vide order dated 21.04.2005 (Annexure P/C) stayed the order of termination of the petitioner.

7. Subsequently, vide judgment dated 26.03.2007, in CWP No.181 of 2005, the Hon'ble Division Bench of this Court had set aside the judgment passed by the Tribunal in O.A. ::: Downloaded on - 12/03/2026 20:31:53 :::CIS 5 No.816 of 1993 and remanded the matter to the Tribunal for decision afresh on merits after hearing the parties (Annexure R-

.

II). However, the said petition could not be decided by the Tribunal after remand, as the petition was transferred to this Court on abolition of the Tribunal and registered as CWP(T) No.2134 of 2008, titled, Meeran Devi vs. State of H.P. and of others.

8. The petition instituted by Smt. Meeran Devi was rt dismissed on 09.05.2011 by the learned Single Judge of this Court. Smt. Meeran Devi feeling aggrieved by the judgment dated 09.05.2011 passed by learned Single Judge of this Court had preferred LPA No.455 of 2011, titled, Meeran Devi vs. State of H.P. and others, and the same was dismissed on 27.03.2014.

9. The petitioner by way of the present petition had claimed that he was entitled to 3 ACP increments on completion of his 4, 9 and 14 years of regular services as JBT as well as that he may be paid the salary for a period of 68 days during which period he remained out of job on account of termination order ::: Downloaded on - 12/03/2026 20:31:53 :::CIS 6 passed against him, since the termination order was quashed by this Court and the writ petition filed by Smt. Meeran Devi .

against his selection as Volunteer Teacher was dismissed by this Court.

10. The respondents-State filed reply to the writ petition and contested the same on the ground that the grant of ACP of increment to the petitioner could not be decided on account of the fact that the matter remained pending before this Court due rt to which termination period remained undecided and further the plea raised by the petitioner that he is entitled to salary for a period of 68 days during which his services remained terminated, is not sustainable, because the period for which the petitioner has not worked cannot be counted for the purpose of salary on the principle of "No Work No Pay". The respondents have not disputed that services of the petitioner were regularized w.e.f. 01.08.1998 and also the order of termination was set aside by this Court.

11. The petitioner filed rejoinder to the reply and ::: Downloaded on - 12/03/2026 20:31:53 :::CIS 7 controverted the facts and reiterated the facts narrated in the petition. It has also been averred that once the petitioner was .

reinstated by virtue of the orders passed by this Court, the period during which he remained out of job, is to be regularized for all intents and purposes.

12. I have heard Mr. Surender Sharma, learned counsel of for the petitioners and Mr. Hemant Kumar Verma, learned Deputy Advocate General, for the respondents-State and also rt perused the record carefully.

13. It is not in dispute that petitioner's services were regularized on 01.08.1998 on the post of JBT and the order of termination was set aside by this Court. It is also not in dispute that the petition preferred by one Smt. Meeran Devi against the appointment of the petitioner though was initially allowed by the Tribunal on 29.07.2004, but subsequently, the same was dismissed by this Court on 09.05.2011 (Annexure P/D).

14. The appeal preferred by Smt. Meeran Devi was also dismissed by this Court on 27.03.2014 (Annexure R-III).

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15. No doubt, the petitioner had remained out of service on account of termination order passed against him by .

the authorities after the decision on the original application on 29.07.2004, but subsequently the said order was quashed by this Court vide judgment dated 26.03.2007 when the Court had returned specific findings that the Tribunal had wrongly noticed of the facts of some other case while quashing the appointment of the petitioner and thereafter also this Court had dismissed the rt petition and LPA preferred by Smt. Meeran Devi respectively on 09.05.2011 and 27.03.2014.

16. The respondents have not denied the entitlement of the petitioner for grant of ACP, but the plea which has been taken is only to the effect that the matter remained pending before this Court due to which termination period remained undecided and the petitioner could not be extended the benefit of ACP increments. Since the respondents have not disputed the fact that the petitioner is entitled to the benefit claimed in the writ petition, the same could have been extended to him after ::: Downloaded on - 12/03/2026 20:31:53 :::CIS 9 dismissal of the LPA preferred by Smt. Meeran Devi on 27.03.2014 and thus, the action on the part of the respondents-

.

State is illegal and wrong.

17. Another plea, taken for the non-grant of the salary qua the period during which the petitioner remained out of job is that he did not work during that period and, therefore, on the of principle of "No Work No Pay", he is not entitled to the salary.

18. It is a settled law that if there is no fault on the part rt of an employee and further once the termination is held to be illegal, the natural corollary would be to grant him the salary of the period of his absence. The petitioner could not perform the duties only for the reason that he was not permitted to perform his duties.

19. In the present case, it was not the petitioner who had approached this Court as evident from the facts stated above. His appointment was assailed by a candidate, who remained unsuccessful in the selection process and the Tribunal had though quashed the appointment of the petitioner, but this ::: Downloaded on - 12/03/2026 20:31:53 :::CIS 10 Court had subsequently dismissed the writ petition preferred by the unsuccessful candidate and thus, the petitioner was entitled .

to all the benefits, which were to be given to him, had said unsuccessful candidate not approached the Court.

20. A three-Judge Bench of the Hon'ble Court had the occasion to deal similar proposition in M/s Hindustan Tin Works of Pvt. Ltd. vs. The Employees of M/s. Hindustan Tin Works Pvt.

Ltd. And others, (1979) 2 SCC 80, wherein it was held that full rt back wages would be normal rule and the party objecting to it must establish the circumstances necessitating departure. The relevant para of the judgment is reproduced as hereunder:-

"9. It is no more open to debate that in the field of industrial jurisprudence a declaration can be given that the termination of service is bad and the workman continues to be in service. The spectre of com-mon law doctrine that contract of personal service cannot be specifically enforced or the doctrine of mitigation of damages does not haunt in this branch of law. The relief of reinstatement with continuity of service can be granted where termination of service is found to be invalid. It would mean that the employer has taken away illegally the right to work and simultaneously deprived the workman of his earnings. If thus the of the workman contrary to the relevant law or in breach of contract ::: Downloaded on - 12/03/2026 20:31:53 :::CIS 11 employer is found to be in the wrong as a result of which the workman is directed to be reinstated, the employer could not shirk his responsibility of paying the wages which the workman has been deprived of .
by the illegal or invalid action of the employer.
Speaking realistically, where termination of service is questioned as invalid or illegal and the workman has to go through the gamut of litigation, his capacity to sustain himself throughout the protracted litigation is itself such an awesome factor that he may not survive to see the day when relief is granted. More so in our of system where the law's proverbial delay has become stupefying. If after such a protracted time and energy consuming litigation during which period the workman just sustains himself, ultimately he is to be rt told that though he will be reinstated, he will be denied the back wages which would be due to him, the workman would be subjected to a sort of penalty for no fault of his and it is wholly undeserved. Ordinarily, therefore, a work-man whose service has been illegally terminated would be entitled to full back wages except to the extent he was gainfully employed during the enforced idleness. That is the normal rule. Any other view would be a premium on the unwarranted litigative activity of the employer. If the employer terminates the service illegally and the termination is motivated as in this case, viz., to resist the workmen's demand for revision of wages, the termination may well amount to unfair labour practice. In such circumstances reinstatement being the normal rule, it should be followed with full back wages. Articles 41 and 43 of the Constitution would assist us in reaching a just conclusion in this respect. By a suitable legislation, to wit, the U. P. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, the State has endeavoured to secure work to the workmen. In breach of the ::: Downloaded on - 12/03/2026 20:31:53 :::CIS 12 statutory obligation the services were terminated and the termination is found to be invalid; the workmen though willing to do the assigned work and earn their livelihood, were kept away therefrom. On top of it .
they were forced to litigation up to the apex Court now they are being told that some-thing less than full back wages should be awarded to them. If the services were not terminated the workmen ordinarily would have continued to work and would have earned their wages. When it was held that the termination of services was neither proper nor of justified, it would not only show that the workmen were always willing to serve but if they rendered service they would legitimately be entitled to the wages for the same. If the workmen were always rt ready to work but they were kept away therefrom on account of an invalid act of the employer, there is no justification for not awarding due to them. sion Bench of the Gujarat High Court in Dhari Gram Panchayat v. Safai Kamdar Mandal, and a Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court in Postal Seals Industrial Co-operative Society Ltd. v. Labour Court II, Lucknow, have taken this view and we are of the opinion that the view taken therein is correct.
10. The view taken by us gets support from the decision of this Court in Workmen v. Calcutta Dock Labour Board. In this case seven workmen had been detained under the Defence of India Rules and one of the disputes was that when they were released and reported for duty, they were not taken in service and the demand was for their reinstatement. The tribunal directed reinstatement of five out of seven workmen and this part of the award was challenged before this Court. This Court held that the workmen concerned did not have any opportunity of explaining why their services should not be terminated and, therefore, ::: Downloaded on - 12/03/2026 20:31:53 :::CIS 13 reinstatement was heid to be the appropriate relief, and set aside the order of the Tribunal. It was observed that there was no justification for not awarding full back wages from the day they offered .
to resume work till their reinstatement. Almost an identical view was taken in Management of Panitole Tea Estate v. Workmen.
11. In the very nature of things there cannot be a strait-jacket formula for awarding relief of back wages. All relevant considerations will enter the verdict. More or less, it would be a motion addressed of to the discretion of the Tribunal. Full back wages would be the normal rule and the party objecting to it must establish the circumstances necessitating departure. At that stage the Tribunal will exercise its rt discretion keeping in view all the relevant circumstances. But the discretion must be exercised in a judicial and judicious manner. The reason for exercising discretion must be cogent and convincing and must appear on the face of the record. When it is said that something is to be done within the discretion of the authority, that something is to be done according to the rules of reason and justice, according to law and not humour. It is not to be arbitrary, vague and fanciful but legal and regular (see Susannah Sharp v. Wakefield)."

21. The similar view had again been reiteratedby the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Surendra Kumar Verma and others versus Central Government Industrial Tribunal-cum-Labour Court, New Delhi and another, (1980) 4 SCC 443, holding that only in exceptional circumstances reinstatement can be avoided ::: Downloaded on - 12/03/2026 20:31:53 :::CIS 14 with full back wages. The relevant paragraph of this judgment is reproduced as under:-

.
"6. We do not propose to refer to the cases arising under Sections 33 and 33-A of the Industrial Disputes Act or to cases arising out of references under Sections 10 and 10-A of the Industrial Disputes Act.
Nor do we propose to termination of the services of a workman in violation of the provisions of engage ourselves in the unfruitful task of answering the of question whether the Section 25-F is void ab initio or merely invalid and inoperative, even if it is possible to discover some razor's edge distinction between the Latin 'void ab initio' and the Anglo-Saxon 'invalid and rt inoperative'. Semantic luxuries are misplaced in the interpretation of 'bread and butter' statutes. Welfare statutes must, of necessity receive a broad interpretation. Where legislation is designed to give relief against certain kinds of mischief, the court is not to make inroads by making etymological excursions. Void ab initio', 'invalid and inoperative' or call it what you will, the workmen and the employer are primarily concerned with the consequence of striking down the order of termination of the services of the workmen. Plain common sense dictates that the removal of an order terminating the services of workmen must ordinarily lead to the reinstatement of the services of the workmen. It is as if the order has never been, and so it must ordinarily lead to back wages too. But there may be exceptional circumstances which make it impossible or wholly inequitable vis-a-vis the employer and workmen to direct reinstatement with full back wages. For instance, the industry might have closed down or might be in severe financial doldrums; the workmen ::: Downloaded on - 12/03/2026 20:31:53 :::CIS 15 concerned might have secured better or other employment elsewhere and so on. In such situations, there is a vestige of discretion left in the court to make appropriate consequential orders. The court .
may deny the relief of reinstatement where reinstatement is impossible because the industry has closed down. The court may deny the relief of award of full back back wages where that would place an impossible burden on the employer. In such and other exceptional cases the court may mould the relief, but, ordinarily the relief to be awarded must be of reinstatement with full back wages. That relief must be awarded where no special impediment in the way of awarding the relief is clearly shown. True, occasional hardship may be caused to an employer rt but we must remember that, more often than not, comparatively far greater hardship is certain to be caused to the workmen if the relief is denied than to the employer if the relief is granted."

22. The Hon'ble Supreme Court had again reiterated the same view in Pawan Kumar Agarwala vs. General Manager-II & Appointing Auth. State Bank of India and others, (2015) 13 SCALE 45, and had come to the conclusion that the view taken in J.K. Synthetics Ltd. versus K.P. Agrawal and another, (2007) 2 SCC 433, that on reinstatement, the employee/workman cannot claim continuity of service as of right is contrary to the ratio of the judgments in M/s Hindustan Tin Works case (supra), and ::: Downloaded on - 12/03/2026 20:31:53 :::CIS 16 Surendra Kumar's case (Supra) cannot be treated as good law.

The relavant para of the judgment is reproduced as hereunder:

.
"19. Further, the learned Single Judge has examined the opinion sought for from the C.V.O. by the disciplinary authority on the penalty to be imposed upon the appellant, the C.V.O. has suggested the major penalty of removal, the same is inconsistent with the norms applicable in the Bank's disciplinary proceedings. The learned Single Judge examined the of action of the disciplinary authority in relation to the Branch Manager Hallydayganj Branch that facilitating the second loan to the loanee, Mr. Tapan Kumar Sangma, closely known to the said Manager, rt the same allegation has been treated as a minor lapse, but in the context of the appellant they have imposed major penalty, which is a clear case of discrimination. The appellant's admission with regard to writing the loan applications of Abdul Kuddus Mondal and Hasanuzzaman to enable them to avail contract finance from the Hallydayganj Branch, the contention urged on behalf of the appellant is examined and held that the said applicants had availed loans to the extent of 10,000/-and 15,000/-
respectively from the Phulbari Branch of the S.B.I., projecting that minimal loss and both the loans were cleared of, assuming that the disciplinary proceedings were just and fair, learned senior counsel for the appellant argued that the minor punishment proposed by the disciplinary authority of pay reduction should have been considered reasonable in the context of the charges. The learned Single Judge, after considering the opinion/report DEX-4, held that the enquiry officer did not base his conclusion on any incriminatory materials and in fact ::: Downloaded on - 12/03/2026 20:31:53 :::CIS 17 the report DEX-4 was totally ignored which would have established the innocence of the delinquent and further held that the enquiry officer conducted the enquiry sans furnishing the copies of crucial .
documents and furnishing the list of witnesses. It appears to be a case of denial of fair opportunity to the delinquent in gross violation of the procedural requirements of the Service Rules. That finding is based on factual, undisputed facts and in conformity with Single Judge has rightly held that the enquiry the law, therefore, in our opinion, the learned conducted of against the appellant was unfair and the findings recorded on the charges are finding the learned Single Judge has also perverse in law. While recording such a proceeded to hold that the enquiry was found rt to be vitiated for the reason that the then Branch Manager Mr. Pradeep Kumar Das of Hallydaygani Branch was never examined in the enquiry and without his evidence, conclusion on culpability of the delinquent on the loans disbursed by the Branch Manager of Hallydayganj to the loanee could not have been reasonably reached by anyone, including the enquiry officer and imposing major penalty on the basis of the C.V.O. without there being any legal evidence on record, the enquiry was not properly conducted due to non-furnishing the list of witnesses and copies of the documents, therefore, the exercise of power on the basis of the C.V.O.'s opinion for removal of the appellant from service entail serious consequences. Therefore, placing reliance on K.P. Narayanan Kutty (supra), the learned Single Judge held that the action taken in accepting the C.V.O.'s view and passing order of removal is arbitrary, unreasonable and gross violation of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. Having said so, the learned Single Judge has set aside the order of removal and ::: Downloaded on - 12/03/2026 20:31:53 :::CIS 18 granted reinstatement of the appellant with 25% back wages in the absence of any proof to show that he was gainfully employed from the date of order of removal till the date of the decision rendered by the .
learned Single Judge and the Division Bench of the High Court, therefore, the same is contrary to the law laid down by this Court in the case of Deepali Gundu Surwase vs. Kranti Junior Adhyapak Mahavidyalaya (D. ED.) & Ors., (2013) 10 SCC 324, para 38 is quoted hereinunder:
"38. The propositions which can be culled out of from the aforementioned judgments are:
i) In cases of wrongful termination of service, reinstatement with continuity of service and back wages is the normal rule.
rtii) The aforesaid rule is subject to the rider that while deciding the issue of back wages, the adjudicating authority or the Court may take into consideration the length of service of the employee/workman, the nature of misconduct, if any, found proved against the employee/workman, the financial condition of the employer and similar other factors.
iii) Ordinarily, an employee or workman whose services are terminated and who is desirous of getting back wages is required to either plead or at least make a statement before the adjudicating authority or the Court of first instance that he/she was not gainfully employed or was employed on lesser wages. If the employer wants to avoid payment of full back wages, then it has to plead and also lead cogent evidence to prove that the employee/workman was gainfully employed and was getting wages equal to the wages he/she was drawing prior to the termination of service. This is so because it is settled law that the burden of ::: Downloaded on - 12/03/2026 20:31:53 :::CIS 19 proof of the existence of a particular fact lies on the person who makes a positive averments about its existence. It is always easier to prove a positive fact than to prove a negative fact. Therefore, once .

the employee shows that he was not employed, the onus lies on the employer to specifically plead and prove that the employee was gainfully employed and was getting the same or substantially similar emoluments.

iv) The cases in which the Labour Court/Industrial Tribunal exercises power under Section 11-A of of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and finds that even though the enquiry held against the employee/workman is consistent with the rules of natural justice and/or certified standing orders, if rt any, but holds that the punishment was disproportionate to the misconduct found proved, then it will have the discretion not to award full back wages. However, if the Labour Court/Industrial Tribunal finds that the employee or workman is not at all guilty of any misconduct or that the employer had foisted a false charge, then there will be ample justification for award of full back wages.

v) The cases in which the competent Court or Tribunal finds that the employer has acted in gross violation of the statutory provisions and/or the principles of natural justice or is guilty of victimizing the employee or workman, then the Court or Tribunal concerned will be fully justified in directing payment of full back wages. In such cases, the superior Courts should not exercise power under Article 226 or 136 of the Constitution and interfere with the award passed by the Labour Court, etc., merely because there is a possibility of forming a different opinion on the ::: Downloaded on - 12/03/2026 20:31:53 :::CIS 20 entitlement of the employee/workman to get full back wages or the employer's obligation to pay the same. The Courts must keep in view that in the cases of wrongful/illegal termination of service, .

the wrongdoer is the employer and the sufferer is the employee/workman and there is no justification to give a premium to the employer of his wrongdoings by relieving him of the burden to pay to the employee/workman his dues in the form of full back wages.

vi) In a number of cases, the superior Courts have of interfered with the award of the primary adjudicatory authority on the premise that finalization of litigation has taken long time ignoring that in majority of cases the parties are rt not to infrastructure and manpower is the principal cause for delay in the disposal of cases.

For this the litigants cannot be blamed or penalised. It would amount to grave injustice to an employee or workman if he is denied back wages simply because there is long lapse of time between the termination of his service and finality given the order of reinstatement. The Courts should bear in mind that in most of these cases, the employer is in an advantageous position vis-à-

vis the employee or workman. He can avail the services of best legal brain for prolonging the agony of the sufferer, i.e., the employee or workman, who can ill afford the luxury of spending money on a lawyer with certain amount of fame. Therefore, in such cases it would be prudent to adopt the course suggested in Hindustan Tin Works Private Limited vs. Employees of Hindustan Tin Works Private Limited, (1979) 2 SCC 80.

vii) The observation made in J.K. Synthetics Ltd. v.

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K.P. Agrawal, (2007) 2 SCC 433 that on reinstatement the employee/workman cannot claim continuity of service as of right is contrary to the ratio of the judgments of three Judge .

Benches referred to hereinabove and cannot be treated as good law. This part of the judgment is also against the very concept of reinstatement of an employee/workman."

23. In view of the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme of Court in the aforementioned pronouncements, since there is no fault on the part of petitioner in not being in service with the rt respondents during the period he remained out of service, he is held entitled to the salary for the said period of absence.

24. This Court cannot lose sight of the fact that the petitioner was regularized as JBT by the respondents on 01.08.1998. Once the petitioner was made regular with the respondents and the respondents themselves have admitted this fact while filing reply and furthermore, once the termination order has been set aside by this Court which fact has also not been disputed by the respondents, the petitioner is held entitled to both the reliefs; benefit of ACP increments and the salary of the absence period.

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25. The plea taken by the respondents that since the petitioner has not worked for the said period is rejected for the .

reason that the petitioner was compelled not to serve with the respondents on account of the termination order. As already observed above, once the said termination order has been quashed, the petitioner cannot be denied the salary qua the of said period.

26. rt One more glaring fact is to be taken note of that in the present case, the services of the petitioners were not terminated on account of misconduct or misbehaviour. Further his selection was made by the respondents, which was set aside by the Tribunal and thereafter his services were terminated after expiry of our months period given to the respondents to do the entire exercise of making selection. The services of the petitioner were regularized to the post of JBT on 01.08.1998 and further once, this Court had already quashed the said order, the petitioner is held entitled to all the benefits as given to other employee and also the salary qua the period of absence.

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27. Consequently, the present petition is allowed and the respondents are directed to grant three ACP increments to .

the legal heirs of the petitioner on completion of his 4, 9 and 14 years of regular service as JBT Teacher from due date and further the salary of the absence period of 68 days w.e.f.

23.02.2005 to 30.04.2005 be also paid to them.

of

28. Since the original petitioner has died, the benefits be given to his legal heirs, who have been brought on record rt vide order dated 25.11.2021. In case, the arrears on account of the grant of ACP and salary are not released in favour of the legal heirs of the petitioner within a period of three months from today, the same shall carry interest at the rate of 6% per annum from the date of filing of the petition till its payment.

29. Pending miscellaneous application(s), if any, shall also stand disposed of.

    11th March, 2026                                ( Jiya Lal Bhardwaj )
          (ankit)                                           Judge




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