Rajasthan High Court - Jodhpur
Rajendra Kumar vs Jagdish Gehlot And Ors on 24 July, 2025
[2025:RJ-JD:31769]
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN AT
JODHPUR
S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 5278/2016
Rajendra Kumar S/o Shri Sohnalal Ji Sankhla, by Caste Mali, R/o
Mahamandir Dado Ka Bas, Jodhpur, Malik Firm Rajendra Kumar
Electricals Mahamandir Dhan Mandi, Jodhpur.
----Petitioner
Versus
Legal Representatives of Jagdish Gehlot
1. Shri Jagdish Gehlot S/o Late Shri Purkharam Ji, disciple of:-
1/1. Ajay Gehlot S/o Late Shri Jagdish Gehlot
1/2. Sanjay Gehlot S/o Late Shri Jagdish Gehlot
1/3. Vijay Gehlot S/o Late Shri Jagdish Gehlot
All Residents of Mahamandir Dado Ka Bas, Jodhpur.
2. Shri Gyaneshwar Gehlot S/o Late Shri Purkharam Ji
3. Shri Sudheer Gehlot S/o Late Shri Gyaneshwar Gehlot
Residents of Mahamandir Dado Ka Bas, Jodhpur.
...Respondents/Plaintiffs
4. Additional Civil Judge & Metropolitan Magistrate No.6,
Metropolitan, Jodhpur.
----Respondents
For Petitioner(s) : Mr. H.R. Soni
Mr. Narottam Soni
Mr. Kapil Soni
Mr. Jitendra Soni
For Respondent(s) : Mr. Yogesh Parmar
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SANDEEP SHAH
Order REPORTABLE Reserved On- 11-07-2025 Pronounced On- 24/07/2025
1. The present writ petition has been filed by the petitioner- defendant assailing the order dated 01.04.2015 passed by the learned Additional Civil Judge-cum-Metropolitan, Magistrate No.6, Jodhpur, in Civil Original Suit No.98/2004, (Jagdish & Ors. v. Rajendra), whereby the application under Section 13(5) of the (Downloaded on 24/07/2025 at 09:56:18 PM) [2025:RJ-JD:31769] (2 of 22) [CW-5278/2016] Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1950 (hereinafter referred to as "the Act of 1950" for the sake of brevity) has been allowed, and the application filed by the petitioner-defendant seeking extension of time for depositing the provisional rent, has been rejected. The petitioner-defendant has also challenged the order dated 24.04.2016 passed by the learned Additional District Judge No.2, Jodhpur, Metropolitan in Civil Appeal No.05/2015 (Rajendra Kumar v. Jagdish & Ors.), whereby the order dated 01.04.2015 passed by the learned Trial Court was affirmed.
2. Shorn of unnecessary details, the relevant facts for adjudication of the present case are that the respondents- plaintiffs filed a suit under Section 13 of the Act of 1950, wherein one of the ground of eviction was default in payment of rent as provided under Section 13(1)(a) of the said Act. In accordance with the procedure prescribed under sub-section (3) of Section 13 of the Act of 1950, the learned Trial Court initially determined the provisional rent vide order dated 16.11.2004. However, the said order was set aside by the Appellate Court, and the matter was remanded to the learned Trial Court for fresh determination. Thereafter, the learned Trial Court, vide order dated 22.02.2008, determined the provisional rent to be a sum of ₹49,596/- up to the month of January, 2008. The petitioner-defendant was directed to deposit the aforesaid amount after deducting the amount already paid by him. Furthermore, as regards the rent for the subsequent months, the same was directed to be deposited by the 15 days of each month in the bank account of the respondents-plaintiffs.
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3. Since, the rent determined was not paid by the petitioner- defendant, the respondent-plaintiffs filed an application on 19.04.2008 under Section 13(5) of the Act of 1950 for striking out the defence of the petitioner-defendant against eviction.
4. In counter to the application filed by the respondents- plaintiffs, the petitioner-defendant filed an application for extension of time on 19.05.2008, wherein the sole ground mentioned was his inability to deposit the balance amount despite best efforts, and therefore, an extension till 23.05.2008 was prayed for. It is pertinent to note that along with the said application, no affidavit sworn by the defendant was filed. However, the said application was filed after the expiry of the 15 days period as prescribed under the Act of 1950. As per the claim of the petitioner-defendant, he had earlier deposited a sum of Rs.32,600/-, which was liable to be adjusted against the total amount of Rs.39,596/- as determined by the learned Trial Court. Consequently, the outstanding amount remaining to be deposited was only Rs.17,296/-. The petitioner-defendant claims to have deposited a sum of Rs.3,000/- on 16.04.2008, Rs.4,296/- on 13.05.2008, and Rs.5,000/- on 19.05.2008. On 19.05.2008, the petitioner-defendant thus, moved an application before the learned Trial Court stating that, despite his best efforts, he was unable to arrange for the balance amount, and that only Rs.5,000/- remained to be deposited. Accordingly, he sought time up to 23.05.2008 to deposit the said remaining amount.
5. Thereafter, the petitioner-defendant deposited the residual amount of Rs.5,000/- on 21.05.2008. The learned Trial Court, vide order dated 19.05.2008, allowed the application filed by the (Downloaded on 24/07/2025 at 09:56:18 PM) [2025:RJ-JD:31769] (4 of 22) [CW-5278/2016] petitioner-defendant seeking extension of time, without affording any opportunity of hearing to the respondents-plaintiffs. Aggrieved by the said order, the respondents-plaintiffs preferred an appeal bearing Civil Appeal No. 26/2008, which was allowed on 23.03.2010. By the said judgment, the order dated 19.05.2008 was set aside, and the matter was remanded to the learned Trial Court for fresh adjudication, with specific directions to pass an appropriate order after affording an opportunity of hearing to both the parties.
6. Pursuant to the remand, the learned Trial Court reconsidered both applications, and vide order dated 01.04.2015, dismissed the application filed by the petitioner-defendant seeking extension of time, on the ground that it had been filed after the expiry of the mandatory period of 15 days and was therefore not maintainable. Simultaneously, the learned Trial Court allowed the application filed by the respondents-plaintiffs seeking striking out of the petitioner-defendant's defence against eviction.
7. The order dated 01.04.2015 was challenged in appeal by the petitioner-defendant before the learned Appellate Court. However, the learned Appellate Court, vide its order dated 24.02.2016, after considering various judicial pronouncements, upheld the order passed by the learned Trial Court. Being aggrieved by both the orders dated 01.04.2015 and 24.02.2016, the petitioner- defendant has preferred the present petition.
8. The learned counsel for the petitioner-defendant, Mr. H.R. Soni while assailing both the aforementioned orders, submits that the Courts below have erred in law in interpreting the scope and import of the Act of 1950. He contends that there is (Downloaded on 24/07/2025 at 09:56:18 PM) [2025:RJ-JD:31769] (5 of 22) [CW-5278/2016] no statutory embargo under the first part of sub-section (4) of Section 13 that prohibits the filing of an application for extension of time even after the expiry of the initial 15 days period. The only limitation, as per the said provision, is that the extension of time granted cannot exceed a total period of three months. Learned counsel further submits that both the Courts below have incorrectly read into the provision a restriction which the legislature has not envisaged. It is his emphatic submission that even after the expiry of the initial 15-days period, an application seeking extension of time can validly be entertained, provided it is within the overall ceiling of three months as stipulated under sub- section (4) of Section 13 of the Act of 1950. He further submits that not just one, but multiple applications for extension of time can be maintained--subject to the condition that the cumulative period of such extensions does not exceed three months as prescribed under the said provision.
8.1 He further submits that both the Courts below has erred in not considering the above mentioned provisions correctly and the same has caused grave in-justice to the petitioner-defendant. To support his arguments, the counsel for the petitioner-defendant has placed reliance upon the judgments passed by the Division Bench of this Court, in the case of "Chetan Prakash v. Additional District Judge No.2, Kota & Ors.", 2016 (3) DNJ (Rajasthan) 1286 and in the case of "Raj Kumar & Ors. v. Lal Chand & Ors.", 1987 Raj LW 697.
9. Per contra, the learned counsel for the respondents- plaintiffs, Mr. Yogesh Parmar submits that a plain reading of the language employed in the Act of 1950, coupled with the laudable (Downloaded on 24/07/2025 at 09:56:18 PM) [2025:RJ-JD:31769] (6 of 22) [CW-5278/2016] object of the legislation, makes it abundantly clear that any application seeking extension of time must necessarily be filed within the mandatory period of 15 days, and cannot be entertained beyond that period. He asserts that the said Act is a special statute, enacted with a specific purpose, and would therefore override the provisions of the General Law, including the Limitation Act, 1963. The learned counsel further submits that the question regarding the applicability of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 to proceedings under Section 13 of the Act of 1950 has already been conclusively settled by the Hon'ble Supreme Court, which has held that the provisions of the Limitation Act, particularly Section 5, have no application to the Rajasthan Rent Control legislation. For the above mentioned purpose, he places reliance upon the judgment passed by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of "Nasiruddin & Ors. v. Sita Ram Aggarwal", (2003) DNJ (SC) 180. He further submits that the identical issue has already been decided by a coordinate Bench of this Court, in the case of "Gopal Singh v. Civil Judge (Junior Division) Bijaynagar", reported in 2011 (1) CDR 333 (Raj.). As also in the case of "Gopal & Ors. v. Murlidhar & Ors.", reported in 2015 (3) CDR 1101 and in case of "Prahladrai & Ors. v. Madhusudanacharya & Ors." reported in 2018 (1) WLN Page 13 (Raj.). He further submits that the language of Section 13(4) and the word shall used therein along with the consequences provided under sub-section 5 of Section 13 of the Act of 1950, clearly shows that the use of word shall followed by consequences, leaves no doubt that the provisions are mandatory and cannot be treated as directory. (Downloaded on 24/07/2025 at 09:56:18 PM) [2025:RJ-JD:31769] (7 of 22) [CW-5278/2016]
10. Heard the learned counsel for both the sides and perused the record of the case. To have a better understanding of the controversy in hand, relevant provisions of Section 13, are quoted as under:-
"13. Eviction of Tenants:- (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in any law or contract, no Court shall pass any decree, make any order, in favour of a landlord, whether in execution of a decree or otherwise, evicting the tenant so long as he is ready and willing to pay rent therefore to the full extent allowable by this Act, unless it is satisfied-
(a) That the tenant has neither paid nor tendered the amount of rent due from him for six months; or------------ (3) In a suit for eviction on the ground set forth in clause (a) of sub-section (1) with or without any of the other grounds referred to in that sub-section, the court shall, on the first date of hearing or on any other date as the court may fix in this behalf which shall not be more than three months after filing of the written statement and shall be before the framing of the issues, after hearing the parties and on the basis of material on record provisionally determine the amount of rent to be deposited in court or paid to the landlord by the tenant. Such amount shall be calculated at the rate of rent at which it was last paid or was payable for the period for which the tenant may have made default including the period subsequent thereto upto the end of the month previous to that in which such determination is made together with interest on such amount calculated at the rate of six per-cent per annum from the date when any such amount was payable upto the date of determination.
Provided that while determining the amount under this sub- section the court shall not take into account the amount of rent which was barred by limitation on the date of the filing of the suit.
(4) The tenant shall deposit in court or pay to the landlord the amount determined by the court under sub-section (3) within fifteen days from the date of such determination, or within such further time, not fifteen days from the date of such determination, or within such further time, not exceeding three months, as may be extended by the court. The tenant shall also continue to deposit in court or pay to the landlord, month by (Downloaded on 24/07/2025 at 09:56:18 PM) [2025:RJ-JD:31769] (8 of 22) [CW-5278/2016] months the monthly rent subsequent to the period upto which determination has been made, by the fifteenth of each succeeding month or within such further time, not exceeding fifteen days, as may be extended by the court, at the monthly rate at which the rent was determined by the court under sub- section (3).
(5) If a tenant fails to deposits or pay any amount referred to in sub-section (4) on the date or within the time specified therein, the court shall order the defense against eviction to be struck and shall proceed with the hearing of the suit."
11. A perusal of the above-mentioned statutory provision reveals that in a suit for eviction filed on the ground of default under the Act of 1950, it is incumbent upon the learned Trial Court to first determine the provisional rent under sub-section (3) of Section
13. Upon such determination, sub-section (4) prescribes the time frame for deposit of the determined amount, as well as the permissible limit for extension of such time. Furthermore, sub- section (5) also contemplates the consequence of non-compliance namely, the striking out of the defence of the tenant against eviction. Sub-section (4) is bifurcated into two distinct parts. The first part pertains to the deposit of the outstanding provisional rent as determined under sub-section (3), whereas the second part governs the month-to-month payment of rent subsequent to such determination. Insofar as the first part is concerned, it mandates that the entire amount of provisional rent must be deposited within 15 days from the date of determination, or within such further time as may be extended by the Court, not exceeding three months. A perusal of the second part, however, reveals that the monthly rent, as determined under sub-section (3), is required to be deposited by the 15th day of each succeeding month, or (Downloaded on 24/07/2025 at 09:56:18 PM) [2025:RJ-JD:31769] (9 of 22) [CW-5278/2016] within such extended time, not exceeding 15 days, as may be granted by the Court.
12. In the present case, the controversy pertains exclusively to the first part of sub-section (4), and there is no dispute in relation to the second part.
13. There existed a divergence of judicial opinion regarding the scope of the Court's power to extend the time prescribed under the Act of 1950 specifically, whether such extension could be granted beyond the period stipulated under the statute. Another issue that arose was whether the provisions of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963, could be invoked in proceedings under Section 13(4) of the Act of 1950. In view of the conflicting views on these legal questions, the matter was referred to a Full Bench of this Court, and was subsequently carried to the Hon'ble Supreme Court for its authoritative adjudication. The Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Nasiruddin & Sita Ram Aggarwal (Nasiruddin v Sita Ram Agarwal), (2003) 2 SCC 577, (2003) DNJ (SC) 180, considered the provisions of various Rent Control Acts, PAN India, as also the use of word shall under sub-section 4 of Section 13 of the Act of 1950, and while relying on settled principles of statutory interpretation, the Court held that where the statute does not provide for either extension of time or condonation of default in depositing rent within the prescribed period, the Court lacks the jurisdiction to grant such relief. It was unequivocally held that, in the absence of an express provision under the Act permitting extension or condonation, the Court cannot extend the time for deposit of rent or condone the delay in making such deposit. Furthermore, the Hon'ble Supreme Court clarified that the (Downloaded on 24/07/2025 at 09:56:18 PM) [2025:RJ-JD:31769] (10 of 22) [CW-5278/2016] provisions of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963, are not applicable to the Rajasthan Rent Control Act, and particularly not to delays in compliance with Section 13(4) of the Act of 1950.
14. As far as the present controversy is concerned, two paragraphs of the judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Nasiruddin (supra) will be relevant and the same are quoted as under:-
"(47) The matter may be examined from another angle. The deposit by the tenant within 15 days is not an application within the meaning of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963. Since the deposit does not require any application, therefore, the provisions of Section 5 cannot be extended where the default takes place in complying with an order under sub-section (4) of Section 13 of the Act.
(48) The provisions of Section 5 of the Limitation Act must be construed having regard to Section 3 thereof. For filing an application after the expiry of the period prescribed under the Limitation Act or any other special statute a cause of action must arise. Compliance of an order passed by a Court of Law in terms of a statutory provision does not give rise to a cause of action. Failure to comply with an order passed by a Court of Law instant consequences are provided for under the statute. The court can condone the default only when the statute confers such a power on the Court and not otherwise. In that view of the matter we have no other option but to hold that Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 has no application in the instant case."
15. A perusal of the above mentioned paragraphs will reveal that the Hon'ble Apex Court gave a definite finding that for deposit of rent by the tenant within 15 days, no application under section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 was required, as the deposit does not require any application, and therefore, the provisions of Section 5 cannot be extended where default takes place in complying with (Downloaded on 24/07/2025 at 09:56:18 PM) [2025:RJ-JD:31769] (11 of 22) [CW-5278/2016] an order under sub-section 4 of Section 13 of the Act. It has further been observed that where a party fails to comply with an order passed by a court of law, and where the statute itself prescribes specific consequences for such non-compliance, those consequences shall automatically follow. It is, therefore, evident that in cases where the payment is not made in accordance with the order of the Court or within the time frame prescribed under the provisions of the Act, the statutory consequences would ensue upon the expiry of the stipulated period. In such circumstances, the filing of any application seeking further extension of time would not be permissible in law.
16. A coordinate Bench of this Court in the case of "Gopal Singh v. Civil Judge (Junior Division) Bijaynagar", reported in 2011 (1) CDR 333 (Raj.), after considering the analogous provisions of the Act of 1950, reached a definitive conclusion that any application filed by the tenant seeking extension of time, even within the permissible period of three months as provided under Section 13(4), must necessarily be filed within the statutory period of 15 days and not thereafter. Relying on the judgment in Nasiruddin v. Sita Ram Aggarwal, (2003) DNJ (SC) 180, a coordinate Bench held that no application filed post expiry of the 15 days period could be entertained. The relevant extract of the findings of this Court, is as under:-
"12. A more detailed analysis of Section 13(4) of the Act clearly reveals that the word "shall" imposes a mandatory duty upon the tenant to deposit the amount determined under Section 13(3) of the Act within a period of fifteen days. In case the tenant is unable to deposit the amount within the period of fifteen days, he is free to move an application for extension of time beyond the period of fifteen days. According to Section 13(4) of the Act, the Court has the power to extend the time (Downloaded on 24/07/2025 at 09:56:18 PM) [2025:RJ-JD:31769] (12 of 22) [CW-5278/2016] upto a maximum of three months and not beyond. Obviously, in case the tenant wants the statutory limit to be extended to a maximum of three months, he must file the application before the duration of fifteen days is over. Since a mandatory duty has been imposed upon him for depositing the rent within fifteen days, the mandatory duty must be fulfilled by him. In case he cannot fulfill the statutory duty, he must ask for extension of time before the said period is over.
13. In case the tenant were to file his application after the statutory period of fifteen days is over, he would be required to file an application for condonation of delay for his failure to perform his statutory duty within the statutory stipulated period. However, according to the decision of the Apex Court in the case of Nasiruddin & Ors. (supra), the power to condone the delay under the Limitation Act has not been bestowed upon the Court in an application filed under Section 13(4) of the Act. Therefore, in case the tenant wants the Court to extend the period for depositing the amount, obviously the application has to be filed before the completion of fifteen days. Therefore, in the present case, both the learned Courts below were justified in holding that since the application for extension of time was not filed within the stipulated period of fifteen days, the application deserved to be dismissed."
17. The above mentioned judgment of Gopal Singh (supra) was subsequently followed by a coordinate Bench of this Court in the case of "Gopal & Ors. v. Murlidhar & Ors.", reported in 2015 (3) CDR 1101, wherein again it was observed specifically that the application seeking extension in question was to be filed within a period of 15 days and post that no application can be entertained. The relevant part of the findings given by the Court, is as under:-
"12. In view of the aforestated legal position settled by the Apex Court as well as by this Court, there remains no shadow of doubt that when Section 13(4) of the said Act imposes mandatory duty upon the tenant to pay the amount determined under Section 13(3) of the said Act within 15 days, the said mandatory provision has to be fulfilled within the period specified under Section 13(4), meaning thereby the tenant has to deposit or pay the amount determined by the Court under sub-section (3) (Downloaded on 24/07/2025 at 09:56:18 PM) [2025:RJ-JD:31769] (13 of 22) [CW-5278/2016] within fifteen days from the date of such determination and continue to deposit or pay month by month, the monthly rent subsequent to the period upto which determination has been made, by the fifteen day of each succeeding month. Though the Court is empowered to extend the said time for further period, not exceeding 3 months in the former case, and not exceeding 15 days in the later case, the tenant must seek such extension within the time specified therein Again it is to be noted that the tenant can not claim extension of three months or fifteen days as the case may be, as a matter of right and it is the sole discretion of the Court whether to grant such extension within the specified time or not. The very expression "as may be extended by the Court" presupposes the extension before the expiry of specified period, and therefore, the extension of time upto permissible period should be sought by the tenant before the expiry of the said specified period. If he fails to do so, his defence would be liable to be struck off under Section 13(5) of the said Act."
18. Gopal Singh (supra) was again followed by a coordinate Bench of this Court in the case of "Prahladrai & Ors. v. Madhusudanacharya & Ors." reported in 2018 (1) WLN Page 13 (Raj.) with the following observations:-
"8. I am of the considered view that any application for extension of time for deposit of arrears of provisional rent with reference to directions first issued by the Trial Court has to be made before expiry of three months from the date of the order under Section 13(3) of the Act of 1950. Non deposit of provisional rent and its arrears within time granted or extended by the trial Court given a landlord a statutory right under Section 13(5) of the Act of 1950 to seek an automatic striking off the tenant's defence in the eviction petition under the Act of 1950. That right cannot be negated on a stretched interpretation of Section 13(4) of the Act of 1950. In the instant case the application for extension of time to deposit provisional rent was made only on 23.04.2014 after a delay of about 13 years. That application was rightly dismissed. In the circumstances deposit of rent on 02.06.2001 after the lapsing of 15 days of the Trial Court's order dated 09.05.2001 under Section 13(3) of the (Downloaded on 24/07/2025 at 09:56:18 PM) [2025:RJ-JD:31769] (14 of 22) [CW-5278/2016] Act of 1950 and directions therein without an order of extension of time was of no avail. I am therefore not inclined to interfere in the petition."
19. With regard to the judgment relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioner-defendant, in "Raj Kumar & Ors. v. Lal Chand & Ors.", it is submitted that the said decision was rendered in the year 1987, at a time when there were divergent views on the interpretation and scope of the Act of 1950. However, following the authoritative pronouncement of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in "Nasiruddin v. Sita Ram Aggarwal", there is now no manner of doubt that any application for extension of time must be filed strictly within the period of 15 days as prescribed under sub-section (4) of Section 13 of the Act of 1950.
20. As far as the judgment passed by the Division Bench of this Court in the case of Chetan Prakash (supra) is concerned, it will be relevant to mention here that in view of conflicting judgments passed by two Single Bench with regard to interpretation of Section 13 (4) of the Act of 1950, in the case of "Gopal Singh v. Civil Judge (Junior Division) Bijaynagar", (refer to supra) and in the cases of "Jagannath v. Jodha Ram", reported in 1980 RLW 42, and "Jamna Lal v. Kanhaiya Lal", reported in 1982 WLN 751, the matter was thereafter referred to a Division Bench, which observed that in the case of "Jagannath v. Jodha Ram", the issue before the Court pertained solely to the question of computation of limitation. In that case, the Court was closed for winter vacation from 21.12.1975 to 01.01.1976, and the arrears of rent were deposited on 02.01.1976, the first working day following the vacation. The question for consideration was whether, if the last date for depositing rent fell during the vacation period, payment (Downloaded on 24/07/2025 at 09:56:18 PM) [2025:RJ-JD:31769] (15 of 22) [CW-5278/2016] made on the reopening of the Court would still be regarded as delayed, and whether, under such circumstances, the defence was liable to be struck down particularly in the absence of any application seeking extension of time. The Division Bench held that the said decision was rendered on the peculiar facts and circumstances of that case, and the question of seeking an order of the Court for extension of time for deposit of rent did not arise therein.
21. It was further observed that as far as the case of "Jamna Lal v. Kanhaiya Lal", (supra) the issue pertained to the fact that although the amount of rent had been deposited within the statutory period, the interest thereon was not paid within the prescribed time. In that case, the petitioner-defendant filed an application requesting the respondents-plaintiffs to provide details regarding the calculation of interest. Notably, no application for extension of time was filed. The Single Judge observed that since the petitioner-defendant was contesting the computation of interest and had moved an application to challenge the award and calculation thereof, the tenant was entitled to an extension of time for depositing the interest. It was accordingly held that the decision was rendered in the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case, where no application for extension of time was made. The Division Bench subsequently considered the judgment passed in the case of "Gopal Singh" (supra) and observed as under:-
"23. This being the legal position settled by the Apex Court, there remains no doubt in our mind to hold that Section 13(4) of the Act 1950 imposes a mandatory duty upon the tenant to deposit in Court or to pay to the landlord the amount determined by the Court under sub-section (3) within fifteen days from the date of such determini tion, at the same time it (Downloaded on 24/07/2025 at 09:56:18 PM) [2025:RJ-JD:31769] (16 of 22) [CW-5278/2016] casts a legal obligation upon the tenant to deposit the monthly rent by the 15th of each succeeding month, as envisaged under Section 13 (4) of the Act 1950, meaning thereby the tenant has to deposit or pay the amount determined by the Court under sub-section (3) within 15 days from the date of such determination and continue to deposit or pay month by month, the monthly rent subsequent to the period, upto which determination has been mide by the fifteenth day of each succeeding month and the Court is empowered to extend the time for further period, not exceeding three months in the former case and not exceeding 15 days in the later case and if the provisional rent is not deposited within the specified time by the fifteenth day of succeeding month, the tenant has to seek extension of time to deposit the rent within another 15 days. The scheme of the Act 1950 and Section 13(4) clearly contemplate that the tenant has to move an application seeking extension of time and such extension he cannot claim as a matter of right and it is the sole discretion of the Court whether to grant such extension within the specified time or not.
24. After taking note of the scheme of the Act 1950 and Sections 13(3) and 13(4) in particular, which casts a duty upon the tenant to deposit in Court or pay to the landlord the amount determined by the Court under sub-section (3) within fifteen days from the date of such determination or such further time not exceeding three months in the former case and not exceeding 15 days in the case of later, and has to continue to deposit in Court or pay to the landlord month by month, the monthly rent on or before the fifteenth day of each succeeding month and if the tenant fails to deposit the monthly rent by the fifteenth day of succeeding month and seeks extension of time, which may not exceed further 15 days, he is under an obligation to move an application for regularization of the extended period which may not exceed 15 days, but he cannot claim extension of time as a matter of right and it is the discretion of the Court whether to grant such extension, prayed for. The very expression "as may be extended by the Court", presupposes the extension by a judicial order and, therefore, in our considered view, the extension of time upto permissible period may be sought by phe tenant by filing an application within 15 days available at his disposal and is open for the Court to consider the genuine difficulties or unforeseen (Downloaded on 24/07/2025 at 09:56:18 PM) [2025:RJ-JD:31769] (17 of 22) [CW-5278/2016] obstacle which might have come in his way, or for reasons beyond his control, due to which the rent could not be deposited by him within the prescribed time by fifteenth day of the succeeding month.
25. It is always expected from the Court to exercise its discretion in a judicial manner, at the same time in the absence of there being any restrictive provisions in that respect, the Court could extend the time for making the deposit at any time, subject to the only condition which is prescribed by the Legislature that further extension could not be made beyond the period of 15 days after the expiry of 15th day of the month and of-course, it must be understood that it is not the right of a tenant to obtain such an extension, but the Court has a discretion. which, as already discussed above, should always be exercised in a judicial manner.
26. In view of the discussion made above, we answer the question, raised for our consideration, in the following terms:-
"If the tenant fails to deposit in Court or pay to the landlord under Section 13(4) of the Act 1950 the amount determined by the Court under sub- section (3) of Section 13 of the Act 1950, within 15 days from the date of such determination, or fails to continue to deposit or pay month by month the monthly rent by the fifteenth day of each succeeding month, there is no other option left with the tenant but to make an application to the Court, which may exercise its discretion vests in It and it is open for the Court to consider and pass an order, in accordance with lav, failing which it entail consequence envisaged under Section 13(5) cf the Act 1950.""
22. A bare perusal of the observations made by the Division Bench further fortifies the position that the judgment in "Gopal Singh" was upheld, with due reliance on the ruling in "Nasiruddin". The Division Bench unequivocally held that the tenant is required to file an application for extension within the statutory period of 15 days available to him. Upon such timely filing, the Court may consider any genuine difficulties or unforeseen obstacles beyond (Downloaded on 24/07/2025 at 09:56:18 PM) [2025:RJ-JD:31769] (18 of 22) [CW-5278/2016] the tenant's control, which prevented the deposit of rent within the prescribed period. However, it was emphatically observed that the tenant cannot claim extension of time as a matter of right or mere indulgence.
23. The language of Section 13(4) of the Act, wherein the word shall is employed, together with the consequences prescribed under Section 13(5), leaves no room for doubt that the provision is mandatory and must be strictly complied with. Guidance in this regard can be drawn from the Constitution Bench decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of "New India Insurance Company Limited v. Hilli Multipurpose Cold Storage Private Limited", (2020) 5 SCC 757. The Court observed that even if a statutory provision causes hardship or inconvenience to either party, if the language of the statute is clear and unambiguous, the Court is bound to enforce it strictly and without exception. In this case, the Apex Court was considering analogous provisions under Section 13 of the Consumer Protection Act, which prescribes a limitation period for filing a reply or written statement. After considering series of judgments, the Court held that these provisions are intra vires and that the District Consumer Forum has no jurisdiction to extend the time for filing a response beyond the statutory period of 15 days plus an additional 30 days as provided under Section 13 of the Consumer Protection Act. The relevant paragraphs, are as under:-
"21. By specifically enacting a provision under sub-section (3) of Section 13, with a specific clarification that violation of the principles of natural justice shall not be called in question where the procedure prescribed under sub-sections (1) and (2) of Section 13 of the Consumer Protection Act has been followed or complied with, the intention of the legislature is clear that mere (Downloaded on 24/07/2025 at 09:56:18 PM) [2025:RJ-JD:31769] (19 of 22) [CW-5278/2016] denial of further extension of time for filing the response (by the opposite party) would not amount to denial or violation of the principles of natural justice. This provision of Section 13(3) reinforces the time-limit specified in Section 13(2)(a) of the Act.
22. This Court in Lachmi Narain v. Union of India has held that:- (SCC p. 969, para 68):-
"68. If the provision is couched in prohibitive or negative language, it can rarely be directory, the use of peremptory language in a negative form is per se indicative of the intent that the provision is to be mandatory."
Further, hardship cannot be a ground for changing the mandatory nature of the statute, as has been held by this Court in Bhikraj Jaipuria v. Union of Indiale and Fairgrowth Investments Ltd. v. Custodian Hardship cannot thus be a ground to interpret the provision so as to enlarge the time, where the statute provides for a specific time, which, in our opinion, has to be complied in letter and spirit.
23. This Court, in Rohitash Kumar v. Om Prakash Sharma has, in para 23, held as under: (SCC pp. 459-60) "23. There may be a statutory provision, which causes great hardship or inconvenience to either the party concerned, or to an individual, but the court has no choice but to enforce it in full rigour It is a well-settled principle of interpretation that hardship or Inconvenience caused cannot be used as a basis to alter the meaning of the language employed by the legislature, if such meaning is clear upon a bare perusal of the statute. If the language is plain and hence allows only one meaning, the same has to be given effect to, even if it causes hardship or possible injustice."
While concluding, it was observed: (SCC p. 460, para 26) "26. that the hardship caused to an individual, cannot be a ground for not giving effective and grammatical meaning to every word of the provision, if the language used therein, is unequivocal".
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24. Further, it has been held by this Court in Popat Bahiru Govardhane v. LAO that the law of limitation may harshly affect a particular party but it has to be applied with all its vigour when the statute so prescribes and that the Court has no power to extend the period of limitation on equitable grounds, even if the statutory provision may cause hardship or inconvenience to a particular party.
27. It is thus settled law that where the provision of the Act is clear and unambiguous, it has no scope for any interpretation on equitable ground.
47. As such in our view, the said judgment would hold the field with regard to Order 8 Rule 1 of the Code and would not be applicable to cases dealing with the provisions of Section 13(2) of the Consumer Protection Act, or such other enactment wherein a provision akin to Section 13(2) is there and the consequences are also provided."
24. Thus, in view of the language of the Act of 1950, and the consistent judicial pronouncements thereon, it is beyond any doubt that an application for extension of time under Section 13(4) must be filed strictly within the mandatory period of 15 days as prescribed under the first part of sub-section (4) of Section 13. This applies equally to the second part of sub-section (4) of Section 13. Once the said period of 15 days has elapsed, the Court is wholly without jurisdiction to entertain any application for extension of time, and any such belated application must be rejected. The series of judgments cited above clearly establishes that the language of Section 13(4) of the Act of 1950 leaves no iota of doubt that if the application is not filed within the statutory period of 15 days, then the consequences provided under the statue (under Section 13(5) in the present case), will follow and post that, the application for condonation of delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 is not maintainable. Thus, if (Downloaded on 24/07/2025 at 09:56:18 PM) [2025:RJ-JD:31769] (21 of 22) [CW-5278/2016] at all the application is to be filed seeking extension, then the same is to be filed within the exact period of 15 days only.
25. Accordingly, it is held that any application for extension of time as permitted by law namely, up to three months under the first part of sub-section (4) of Section 13, and up to 15 days under the second part of the Act of 1950 must be filed strictly prior to the expiry of the initial 15-days period allowed for payment of the provisional rent or the month-to-month rent thereafter. Under no circumstances can such an application be entertained or considered by the Court if filed after the expiration of the prescribed 15 days period.
26. The learned Trial Court and the learned Appellate Court have rightly interpreted and applied the law applicable to the present case. They have correctly held that the belated application for extension of time could not be entertained, and consequently, have rightly struck down the defence of the petitioner-defendant against eviction. The impugned orders are, therefore, affirmed and sustained.
27. It is furthermore, clear that extension of time, even if it is filed within the permissible statutory time limit, is a discretion of the Court and cannot be demanded by the tenant as a matter of right. In the present case, a perusal of the application filed by the tenant (Annexure-R-2), dated 19.05.2008 will reveal that no reasons whatsoever have been stated for extension of the time except for stating that the petitioner-defendant could not make arrangement for the amount in question. Thus, even on merits, there were no substance in the application filed by the petitioner- defendant seeking extension of time.
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28. In view of the foregoing, the present S.B. Civil Writ Petition 5278 of 2016 being bereft of merit, is hereby, dismissed.
29. The learned Trial Court is hereby directed to expedite the proceedings pending before it.
(SANDEEP SHAH),J 318-devrajP/-
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