Himachal Pradesh High Court
Reserved On: 05.05.2025 vs Central Bureau Of Investigation on 30 May, 2025
2025:HHC:16789 IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA Cr. Appeal No. 38 of 2011 Reserved on: 05.05.2025 Date of Decision: 30.05.2025 Gurmeet Singh Bhalru ...Appellant.
Versus Central Bureau of Investigation ...Respondent. Coram Hon'ble Mr Justice Rakesh Kainthla, Judge.
Whether approved for reporting?1 No.
For the Appellant : Mr. V.S. Chauhan, Senior
Advocate, with M/s Arsh
Chauhan and Arthav Gharaik,
Advocates.
For the Respondent/CBI : Mr. Janesh Mahajan, Advocate,
Special Public Prosecutor.
Rakesh Kainthla, Judge
The present appeal is directed against the judgment dated 23.2.2011, passed by learned Special Judge, Shimla, H.P. (learned Trial Court), vide which the appellant (accused before learned Trial Court) was convicted of the commission of offences punishable under Sections 420, 467, 468, 471, 477-A, 1 Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes. 2 201 of the Indian penal Code (IPC) and Section 13(1)(d) punishable under Section 13(2) of Prevention of Corruption Act (PC Act) and sentenced as under: -
Accused No.1:
Under Sections 420, 467, To suffer rigorous imprisonment 468, 471, 477-A, 201, 120-B for one year each, pay a fine of of IPC and Section 13(2) of ₹5,000/- (₹Five Thousand only) the Prevention of Corruption each, and in default of payment of Act, 1988. fine, to undergo simple imprisonment for three months on each count.
The substantive sentences of imprisonment were directed to run concurrently.
Accused No.2:
Under Sections 420, 467, To suffer rigorous imprisonment 468, 471, 477-A, 409, 120-B for one year each. and 201 of IPC and Section 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988.
The substantive sentences of imprisonment were directed to run concurrently.
(Parties shall hereinafter be referred to in the same manner as they were arrayed before the learned Trial Court for convenience.) 3
2. Briefly stated, the facts giving rise to the present appeal are the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) presented a charge sheet before learned Trial Court against the accused for the commission of offences punishable under Sections 120-B, 420, 467, 468, 471, 477-A and 201 of the IPC and Section 13(2) read with Section 13(1)(d), and 13(2) read with Section 13(1)(c) of PC Act. It was asserted that Gurmeet Singh Bhalru (the appellant) was posted as Branch Manager, and Sarabjit Singh (co-accused) was posted as Clerk-cum-Cashier in the Mubarakpur Branch of Punjab & Sind Bank. They conspired with each other to deprive the bank of ₹20,000/- by dishonestly withdrawing ₹20,000/- and forging loan documents in the name of Shanti Devi. Sarabjit Singh also misappropriated an amount of ₹12,000/- handed over to him by Smt. Shanti Devi to deposit it into her account. Shanti Devi had a Recurring Deposit (RD) Account No. 703 with the Mubarakpur Branch of Punjab & Sind Bank since 2.7.1996. She had deposited ₹1,000/- per month for 36 months by handing over ₹1,000/- per month to Sarabjit Singh, Clerk-cum-Cashier. Sarabjit Singh showed the interest in the passbook handed over to Shanti Devi. He received ₹36,000/-
from Shanti Devi but only deposited ₹24,000/- in the bank. He 4 misappropriated ₹12,000/-. The Government Examiner of Questioned Documents (GEQD) opined that entries in the RD Passbook as well as the Ledger Sheet were in the handwriting of Sarabjit Singh. Gurneet Singh (appellant) and Sarabjit Singh, in connivance with each other, raised a fictitious loan of ₹20,000/- against the RD Account No. 703 of Smt. Shanti Devi, without her knowledge. Sarabjit Singh made an entry in the MDP Register, and these entries were authenticated by the appellant. Shanti Devi had never applied for any loan against her recurring deposit, nor had she received the loan amount from the Bank. The accused, by abusing their position, cheated the Bank of ₹20,000/- based on the forged loan documents in the name of Shanti Devi. Sarabjit Singh was dismissed from the services on 29.9.2003. Sanction to prosecute the accused Gurmeet Singh Bhalru, was accorded by the competent authority on 26.12.2023. Therefore, it was prayed that the accused be summoned and tried as per law.
3. The learned Trial Court found sufficient reasons to summon the accused. When the accused appeared, they were charged with the commission of offences punishable under Sections 420, 467, 468, 471, 477-A, 201 read with Section 120-B 5 IPC and Section 13(2) read with Section 13(1)(d) of Prevention of Corruption Act, to which they pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried.
4. The CBI examined fourteen witnesses to prove its case. Devender Singh (PW1), General Manager, granted sanction to prosecute the accused. Shanti Devi (PW2) is the depositor in whose name the loan was obtained. Manmohan Singh (PW3) and Inderjeet Singh (PW4) are the witnesses to the taking of the specimen signatures. Harpreet Singh (PW5) is the Chief Manager in Punjab & Sind Bank, who gave details of various persons posted as Branch Managers in the Mubarakpur Branch. Yogesh Malhotra (PW6) handed over the record and explained the procedure for disbursal of the loan. Swaran Singh Sagu (PW7) was posted as Branch Manager and proved the procedure prevalent in the Bank. G.S. Bhandari (PW8) was posted as Head Cashier in the Branch. Devender Prakash Singh (PW9) explained the procedure for disbursal of the loan. Sudesh Kumar (PW10) was posted as Branch Manager. He described various officers/officials posted in the Branch and their responsibilities. Yogesh Kumar Verma (PW11) deposed about the procedure in the Bank. Dr. B.A. Vaid (PW12) is the Government Examiner of the 6 questioned documents, who had examined the disputed and the specimen handwriting. Suresh Kumar (PW13) proved the handwriting of the accused, Gurmeet Singh and Sarabjit Singh, and the deposit of the amount by Shanti Devi. Inspector R.K. Sagwan (PW14) conducted the investigation.
5. The accused, Gurmeet Singh, admitted that he and Sarabjit were posted in the Mubarakpur Branch in the year 1999. He stated that Shanti Devi had obtained the amount before his posting in the Bank. He admitted that she had deposited ₹1,000/- per month with the accused Sarabjit. He admitted that Sarabjit had misappropriated ₹12,000/-. He denied the rest of the prosecution's case. He stated that entries were made in his absence. The MDP Register was signed later on at the time of the inspection. Much verification is not required while taking a loan against the bank deposits. He admitted that he had put signatures in the presence of Yogesh, and Sarabjit Singh had put the signatures in the presence of Swaran Singh Sagu and Mahesh Kumar Sharma. He stated that the loan can be sanctioned in the absence of the Manager by the person in charge. There was a single safe at the Mubarakpur Branch for keeping security documents and cash. One key of the safe 7 remained with the Manager while the second key remained with the Cashier. In the absence of the Manager, the second key is handed over to the person in charge and in the absence of the Cashier, his key is handed over to the Second Cashier. A false case was made against him to save the skin of the real culprits. He had reported the matter to the higher authorities regarding the fraud committed by Sarabjit Singh. He initially stated that he wanted to lead evidence, but no evidence was led by him subsequently.
6. Learned Trial Court held that accused Sarabjit Singh had made the entries in the passbook regarding deposit of ₹36,000/-, whereas only ₹24,000/- were shown to have been deposited in the ledger. The entries were duly proved to be in the handwriting of Sarabjit Singh. He had misappropriated ₹12,000/- deposited with him. Hence, the offence punishable under Section 409 of IPC and Section 13(1)(c) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, punishable under Section 13(2) of the Act, was proved against him. It was also proved that a loan of ₹20,000/- was sanctioned in the name of Shanti Devi, however, she had not applied for any loan. The plea taken by the accused, Gurmeet, that he had put the signatures in the MDP register and token 8 book later was not acceptable. The sanction was properly given to prosecute accused No.1. The plea taken by him that a case was made against him to save some influential person was not acceptable. Therefore, the accused Gurmeet was convicted and sentenced as aforesaid.
7. Being aggrieved from the judgment and order passed by the learned Trial Court, the accused has filed the present appeal, asserting that Sudesh Kumar (PW10) and Suresh Kumar (PW13) admitted that the MDP register can be signed in the evening or subsequently. This establishes the plea of the accused that he had put the signatures on the register in good faith. The loan sanction letter and original voucher regarding the disbursal of the loan were not produced on record. The absence of these documents shows that the loan was not sanctioned by the accused. The production of a certificate stating that the documents were not available on record is not sufficient to convict the accused for the commission of an offence punishable under Section 201 of the IPC. There was no evidence regarding the forgery of the documents. It was duly admitted that every branch of the Bank is subjected to periodical inspections, and no fraud was detected in any of the inspections. This clearly shows 9 that the accused had not committed any offence. All the transactions were done by Sarabjit Singh. The accused had received an award for unblemished services on the completion of 25 years of service. G.S. Bhandari (PW8) had enmity with the accused. The learned Trial Court shifted the burden to prove his innocence to the accused, which is contrary to the basic principles of criminal law. Therefore, it was prayed that the present appeal be allowed and the judgment and order passed by the learned Trial Court be set aside.
8. I have heard Mr. V.S. Chauhan, learned Senior Counsel, assisted by Mr. Arsh Chauhan and Mr. Atharv Gharaik, learned counsel for the appellant/accused and Mr. Janesh Mahajan, learned Special Public Prosecutor for the CBI.
9. Mr. V.S. Chauhan, learned Senior Counsel for the appellant/accused, submitted that the learned Trial Court erred in convicting and sentencing the accused. The plea taken by the accused that he had put the signatures on the documents in good faith is highly probable. He was exonerated in the departmental inquiry held against him. He was given an award for his meritorious service and unblemished career. There is a 10 distinction between negligence and criminal act, and the appellant/accused cannot be held liable simply because he was negligent in performing his duties. The learned Trial Court failed to notice this distinction and erred in convicting and sentencing the accused. He relied upon the judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in N. Raghavender Vs. State of Andhra Pradesh 2021 STPL 12152 SC, Ram Sharan Chaturvedi Vs. State of Madhya Pradesh 2022 STPL 10556 SC and Maghavendra Pratap Singh @ Pankaj Singh Vs. State of Chhattisgarh 2023 STPL 5007 SC in support of his submission.
10. Mr. Janesh Mahajan, learned Special Public Prosecutor for the respondent-CBI, submitted that the evidence on record duly proved that the accused was posted as Branch Manager. He had put the signatures on the loan disbursal documents. He cannot escape from the consequences of putting his signature on the documents. He was supposed to verify the documents before signing them. His plea that he had put the signatures in good faith cannot be accepted because he remained posted in the Bank for a pretty long time. Learned Trial Court had rightly appreciated the evidence, and no interference is required with the judgment and order passed by 11 the learned Trial Court. Hence, he prayed that the present appeal be dismissed.
11. I have given considerable thought to the submissions made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully. Cr. MP No. 681 of 2012
12. Before advertising the merits of the case, it is necessary to dispose of an application filed by the applicant/appellant for leading additional evidence. It has been asserted that the applicant intends to bring on record certified copies of the office order dated 19.12.1995, the authorised signatories of the bank, the letter sent by the applicant/accused to the Zonal Manager, Chandigarh and the complaint dated 18.2.2000. All the documents were produced by the applicant/accused in another case bearing Case No. 3-S/7 of 2004, titled CBI Vs. Sarabjeet Singh and another. The applicant was arrayed as an accused in the aforementioned case and was acquitted by the learned Trial Court. The documents are necessary for the just decision of the case. (PW2) stated that the transactions were carried out by Sarabjeet Singh. She categorically stated that she had paid the amount to Sarabjeet 12 Singh. Learned Trial Court had returned wrong findings that Rs. 20,000/- were pocketed by the applicant/appellant. The applicant reported the matter to the Zonal Office after he detected the embezzlement. The documents could not be produced as they were not in the possession of the applicant. He procured the documents after his conviction from the Vigilance Department of the Bank. The Vigilance Department had collected all the documents to conduct a disciplinary inquiry against the bank officials. Therefore, it was prayed that the present application be allowed and the documents be taken on record.
13. The application is opposed by filing a reply reproducing the facts of the case. It was asserted that the accused had sought the opportunity to lead the evidence, but they failed to do so. The judgment was delivered by looking into all the aspects. Therefore, it was prayed that the application be dismissed.
14. I have heard Mr. Virender Singh Chauhan, learned Senior Counsel, assisted by M/s Arsh Chauhan and Arthav 13 Gharaik, learned counsel for the applicant and Mr. Janesh Mahajan, learned Special Public Prosecutor for the CBI.
15. Mr. Virender Singh Chauhan, learned Senior Counsel for the applicant, submitted that the documents are necessary to adjudicate the dispute pending between the parties. The documents could not be produced before the learned Trial Court, as these were taken by the Vigilance Department. Hence, he prayed that the present application be allowed and the documents be taken on record.
16. Mr. Janesh Mahajan, learned Special Public Prosecutor, submitted that the applicant/appellant had taken the opportunity before the learned Trial Court to lead evidence, however, he failed to lead any evidence. The documents were known to the applicant as he had written the letters and the complaint. He was aware of the record of the bank being the Manager. Therefore, he prayed that the present application be dismissed.
17. I have given considerable thought to the submissions made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully. 14
18. It was laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in State of Rajasthan v. Asharam, 2023 SCC OnLine SC 423, that Sections 311 and 391 of Cr. P.C. deal with the power of the Court to take additional evidence. Section 311 deals with the trial, while Section 391 deals with the appeal. The Appellate Court can examine the evidence, but it does not possess the wide powers conferred upon the Trial Court. It was observed:
"6. Both Sections 311 and 391 of the Cr. P.C. relate to the power of the court to take additional evidence; the former at the stage of trial and before the judgment is pronounced; and the latter at the appellate stage after judgment by the trial court has been pronounced. It may not be totally correct to state that the same considerations would apply to both situations, as there is a difference in the stages. Section 311 of the Cr. P.C. consists of two parts; the first gives power to the court to summon any witness at any stage of inquiry, trial or other proceedings, whether the person is listed as a witness, or is in attendance though not summoned as a witness. Secondly, the trial court has the power to recall and re-examine any person already examined if his evidence appears to be essential to the just decision of the case. On the other hand, the discretion under Section 391 of the Cr. P.C. should be read as somewhat more restricted in comparison to Section 311 of the Cr. P.C., as the appellate court is dealing with an appeal, after the trial court has come to a conclusion with regard to the guilt or otherwise of the person being prosecuted. The appellate court can examine the evidence in depth and detail, yet it does not possess all the powers of the trial court, as it deals with cases wherein the decision has already been pronounced."15
19. It was laid down in Sukhjeet Singh v. State of U.P., (2019) 16 SCC 712: (2020) 2 SCC (Cri) 434: 2019 SCC OnLine SC 72, that the additional evidence can be taken by the Appellate Court if the evidence is necessary for just determination of the case, however, Section 391 cannot be used for retrial. The order should not be made if the party had sufficient opportunities and had not availed them. It was observed at page 721:
"22. Chapter XXIX of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 deals with "Appeals". Section 391 CrPC empowers the appellate court to take further evidence or direct it to be taken. Section 391 is as follows:
"391. Appellate court may take further evidence or direct it to be taken. -- (1) In dealing with any appeal under this Chapter, the appellate court, if it thinks additional evidence to be necessary, shall record its reasons and may either take such evidence itself, or direct it to be taken by a Magistrate, or when the appellate court is a High Court, by a Court of Session or a Magistrate.
(2) When the additional evidence is taken by the Court of Session or the Magistrate, it or he shall certify such evidence to the appellate court, and such court shall thereupon proceed to dispose of the appeal.
(3) The accused or his pleader shall have the right to be present when the additional evidence is taken.
(4) The taking of evidence under this section shall be subject to the provisions of Chapter XXIII, as if it were an inquiry."16
23. The key words in Section 391(1) are "if it thinks additional evidence to be necessary". The word "necessary" used in Section 391(1) is to mean necessary for deciding the appeal. The appeal has been filed by the accused, who have been convicted. The powers of the appellate court are contained in Section 386. In an appeal from a conviction, an appellate court can exercise power under Section 386(b), which is to the following effect:
"386. (b) In an appeal from a conviction--
(i) reverse the finding and sentence and acquit or discharge the accused, or order him to be re-tried by a court of competent jurisdiction subordinate to such appellate court or committed for trial, or
(ii) alter the finding, maintaining the sentence, or
(iii) with or without altering the finding, alter the nature or the extent, or the nature and extent, of the sentence, but not so as to enhance the same;"
24. Power to take additional evidence under Section 391 is, thus, with an object to appropriately decide the appeal by the appellate court to secure ends of justice. The scope and ambit of Section 391 CrPC has come up for consideration before this Court in Rajeswar Prasad Misra v. State of W.B. [Rajeswar Prasad Misra v. State of W.B., AIR 1965 SC 1887: (1965) 2 Cri LJ 817] Hidayatullah, J., speaking for the Bench held that a wide discretion is conferred on the appellate courts and the additional evidence may be necessary for a variety of reasons. He held that additional evidence must be necessary not because it would be impossible to pronounce judgment but because there would be a failure of justice without it. The following was laid down in paras 8 and 9: (AIR p. 1892) "8. ... Since a wide discretion is conferred on appellate courts, the limits of that court's jurisdiction must obviously be dictated by the exigency of the situation and fair play and good 17 sense appear to be the only safe guides. There is, no doubt, some analogy between the power to order a retrial and the power to take additional evidence. The former is an extreme step appropriately taken if additional evidence will not suffice. Both actions subsume failure of justice as a condition precedent. There, the resemblance ends, and it is hardly proper to construe one section with the aid of observations made by this Court in the interpretation of the other section.
9. Additional evidence may be necessary for a variety of reasons, which it is hardly necessary (even if it was possible) to list here. We do not propose to do what the legislature has refrained from doing, namely, to control the discretion of the appellate court under certain stated circumstances. It may, however, be said that additional evidence must be necessary not because it would be impossible to pronounce judgment but because there would be a failure of justice without it. The power must be exercised sparingly and only in suitable cases. Once such action is justified, there is no restriction on the kind of evidence which may be received. It may be formal or substantial. It must, of course, not be received in such a way as to cause prejudice to the accused, as, for example, it should not be received as a disguise for a retrial or to change the nature of the case against him. The order must not ordinarily be made if the prosecution has had a fair opportunity and has not availed of it unless the requirements of justice dictate otherwise."
25. This Court again in Rambhau v. State of Maharashtra [Rambhau v. State of Maharashtra, (2001) 4 SCC 759: 2001 SCC (Cri) 812] had noted the power under Section 391 CrPC of the appellate court. Following was stated in paras 1 and 2: (SCC p. 761) 18 "1. There is available a very wide discretion available in the matter of obtaining additional evidence in terms of Section 391 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. A plain look at the statutory provisions (Section 391) would reveal the same...
2. A word of caution, however, ought to be introduced for guidance, to wit: that this additional evidence cannot and ought not to be received in such a way so as to cause any prejudice to the accused. It is not a disguise for a retrial or to change the nature of the case against the accused. This Court in Rajeswar Prasad Misra v. State of W.B. [Rajeswar Prasad Misra v. State of W.B., AIR 1965 SC 1887: (1965) 2 Cri LJ 817] in no uncertain terms observed that the order must not ordinarily be made if the prosecution has had a fair opportunity and has not availed of it. This Court was candid enough to record, however, that it is the concept of justice which ought to prevail, and in the event, the same dictates exercise of power as conferred by the Code, there ought not to be any hesitation in that regard."
26. From the law laid down by this Court as noted above, it is clear that there are no fetters on the power under Section 391 CrPC of the appellate court. All powers are conferred on the court to secure the ends of justice. The ultimate object of judicial administration is to secure the ends of justice. The court exists for rendering justice to the people." (Emphasis supplied)
20. This position was reiterated in State (NCT of Delhi) v. Pankaj Chaudhary, (2019) 11 SCC 575: (2019) 4 SCC (Cri) 264: 2018 SCC OnLine SC 2256, and it was held that this power should not be exercised to fill up the gaps by the other side and especially to 19 reverse the judgment of learned Trial Court. It was observed at page 586:
"25. The High Court observed that the trial court erred in saying that the accused failed to prove the making of previous complaints against the prosecutrix. While saying so, the High Court referred to certain complaints made against the prosecutrix, including the one allegedly given on 21-7-1997, which were produced by the Bar at the time of arguments. The power conferred under Section 391 CrPC is to be exercised with great care and caution. In dealing with any appeal, the appellate court can refer to the additional evidence only if the same has been recorded as provided under Section 391 CrPC. Any material produced before the appellate court to fill in the gaps by either side cannot be considered by the appellate court; more so, to reverse the judgment of the trial court."
21. Similarly, it was held in H.N. Jagadeesh v. R. Rajeshwari, (2019) 16 SCC 730: (2020) 2 SCC (Cri) 450: (2020) 2 SCC (Civ) 758: 2017 SCC OnLine SC 1813, that where the complainant had failed to produce the notice before the learned Trial Court, he could not be permitted to lead the evidence before the learned Appellate Court to prove it. It was observed at page 731:
"6. We are unable to agree with this approach of the High Court, in the facts of this case, which is inappropriate in law. The service of the statutory notice calling upon the drawer of the cheque (after it has been disowned) to pay the amount of the cheque is a necessary precondition for filing the complaint under Section 138 of the Act. Therefore, it was incumbent upon the respondent to 20 produce the said statutory notice on record to prove the same as well. In this case, this document was not even filed by the respondent along with the complaint, and the question of proving the same was, therefore, a far cry. In a case like this, we fail to understand how the aforesaid omission on the part of the respondent in not prosecuting the complaint properly could be ignored, and another chance could have been given to the respondent to prove the case by producing further evidence. It clearly amounts to giving an opportunity to the respondent to fill up the lacuna."
22. It was laid down in Rajvinder Singh v. State of Haryana, (2016) 14 SCC 671: (2016) 4 SCC (Cri) 421: 2015 SCC OnLine SC 971 that where it was possible to examine the Forensic Expert at the trial stage, an application to examine him at the appellate stage cannot be allowed. It was observed at page 677 "12. At the outset, we must deal with submissions as regards the application for leading additional evidence at the appellate stage. It has been the consistent defence of the appellant that the dead body found in agricultural fields in District Muzaffarnagar was that of Pushpa Verma, and he went to the extent of producing a photograph of the dead body in the present trial. He also examined Brahm Pal Singh, Sub-Inspector and other witnesses. It was certainly possible to examine a forensic expert at the trial court stage itself, and the High Court was right and justified in rejecting the prayer to lead additional evidence at the appellate stage. Nonetheless, we have gone through the report of the said forensic expert engaged by the appellant. The exercise undertaken by that expert is to start with the admitted photograph of Pushpa Verma on a computer, then remove the "bindi" by some process on the computer, then by same process remove her spectacles and by computer imaging change 21 the image as it would have looked if the lady was lying down in an injured condition. The computer image so changed was then compared with the photograph of the dead body. We have seen both the images, and we are not convinced at all about any element of similarity. We do not, therefore, see any reason to differ from the view taken by the High Court."
23. It was held in Ajitsinh Chehuji Rathod v. State of Gujarat, (2024) 4 SCC 453: 2024 SCC OnLine SC 77, that the power under Section 391 of Cr.P.C. can be exercised when the party was prevented from presenting the evidence despite the exercise of due diligence or the facts giving rise to such prayer came to light during the pendency of the appeal. It was observed at page 455:
"8. At the outset, we may note that the law is well-settled by a catena of judgments rendered by this Court that power to record additional evidence under Section 391CrPC should only be exercised when the party making such request was prevented from presenting the evidence in the trial despite due diligence being exercised or that the facts giving rise to such prayer came to light at a later stage during pendency of the appeal and that non- recording of such evidence may lead to failure of justice."
24. In the present case, it was specifically mentioned in the application that the applicant was arrayed as an accused in Case No. 3-S/7 of 2004. This is also apparent from the certified copies in which the name of the applicant has been mentioned at Serial No.2. Hence the applicant was aware of the documents being an accused and the plea taken by him that he was not 22 aware of the documents or he was not in possession of the documents is not acceptable. He is seeking to file the certified copies of the documents, which he could have filed before the learned Trial Court as well. Therefore, the explanation provided by the applicant regarding the non-production of the documents before the learned Trial Court is not correct.
25. The relevance of the documents has also not been established. The applicant seeks to produce the complaints made by him, but these are in the nature of an admission made by a person in his favour, and are inadmissible under Section 21 of the Indian Evidence Act. The applicant wants to produce the specimen signatures, however, he has not disputed his signatures, and there is no justification for producing the specimen signatures. The relevance of the duty roster has also not been specified, and it is not permissible to take the documents on record whose relevance is not at all clear.
26. In view of the above, the documents mentioned in the application cannot be taken on record, hence, the application fails, and the same is dismissed. The application stands disposed of.
23
27. Now adverting to the main case. The accused has not disputed in his statement recorded under Section 313 of Cr.P.C. that he was posted as Branch Manager in the Bank. He has also not disputed the fact that the MDP register (Ex.PW7/6) and the token book (Ex.PW7/7) were authenticated by him. He claimed that, as per the practice, the MDP register used to be signed later on. Therefore, the only question for determination is whether the accused had put the signatures in good faith or deliberately.
28. Shanti Devi (PW2) stated that she had opened an RD Account with Punjab & Sind Bank, Mubarakpur, for three years. She deposited ₹1,000/- per month in the account. She used to hand over the amount to Sarabjit Singh. She received the maturity amount in July 1999. She never procured any loan of ₹20,000/- against the RD Account No. 703/36. She was summoned by the Bank Officer in the year 2002 and was told that a loan of ₹20,000/- was outstanding in her name and an amount of ₹12,000/- was to be paid to her. She replied that she had not taken any loan, nor was any amount to be paid to her. She filed an application to this effect before the Branch Manager. She stated in her cross-examination by learned counsel for the accused, Gurmeet Singh, that Bank people had 24 told her orally about ₹20,000/-. She could not name the person. She was not shown any document of the transaction. She denied that she had not filed any application before the Bank.
29. The cross-examination of this witness shows that much of her testimony was not disputed in her cross- examination. It was not disputed that she had not applied for any loan. No suggestion to this effect was given to her in her cross-examination. It was laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in State of Uttar Pradesh Versus Nahar Singh 1998 (3) SCC 561 that where the testimony of a witness is not challenged in the cross-examination, the same cannot be challenged during the arguments. This position was reiterated in Arvind Singh v. State of Maharashtra, (2021) 11 SCC 1: (2022) 1 SCC (Cri) 208: 2020 SCC OnLine SC 4 and it was held at page 34:
"58. A witness is required to be cross-examined in a criminal trial to test his veracity; to discover who he is and what his position in life is, or to shake his credit, by injuring his character, although the answer to such questions may directly or indirectly incriminate him or may directly or indirectly expose him to a penalty or forfeiture (Section 146 of the Evidence Act). A witness is required to be cross-examined to bring forth inconsistencies, and discrepancies, and to prove the untruthfulness of the witness. A-1 set up a case of his arrest on 1-9-2014 from 18: 50 hrs, therefore, it was required for him to cross-examine the truthfulness of the 25 prosecution witnesses with regard to that particular aspect. The argument that the accused was shown to be arrested around 19: 00 hrs is an incorrect reading of the arrest form (Ext. 17). In Column 8, it has been specifically mentioned that the accused was taken into custody on 2- 9-2014 at 14: 30 hrs at Wanjri Layout, Police Station, Kalamna. The time i.e. 17: 10 hrs mentioned in Column 2, appears to be when A-1 was brought to Police Station, Lakadganj. As per the IO, A-1 was called for interrogation as the suspicion was on an employee of Dr Chandak since the kidnapper was wearing a red colour t-shirt which was given by Dr Chandak to his employees. A-1 travelled from the stage of suspect to an accused only on 2-9-2014. Since no cross-examination was conducted on any of the prosecution witnesses about the place and manner of the arrest, such an argument that the accused was arrested on 1-9-2014 at 18: 50 hrs is not tenable.
59. The House of Lords in a judgment reported as Browne v. Dunn [Browne v. Dunn, (1893) 6 R 67 (HL)] considered the principles of appreciation of evidence. Lord Chancellor Herschell, held that it is absolutely essential to the proper conduct of a cause, where it is intended to suggest that a witness if not speaking the truth on a particular point, direct his attention to the fact by some questions put in cross-examination showing that imputation is intended to be made, and not to take his evidence and pass it by as a matter altogether unchallenged. It was held as under:
"Now, my Lords, I cannot help saying that it seems to me to be absolutely essential to the proper conduct of a cause, where it is intended to suggest that a witness is not speaking the truth on a particular point, to direct his attention to the fact by some questions put in cross-examination showing that that imputation is intended to be made, and not to take his evidence and pass it by as a matter altogether unchallenged, and then, when it is impossible for him to explain, as perhaps he might have been able to do if such 26 questions had been put to him, the circumstances which it is suggested indicate that the story he tells ought not to be believed, to argue that he is a witness unworthy of credit. My Lords, I have always understood that if you intend to impeach a witness you are bound, whilst he is in the box, to give him an opportunity of making any explanation which is open to him; and, as it seems to me, that is not only a rule of professional practice in the conduct of a case, but is essential to fair play and fair dealing with witnesses. Sometimes reflections have been made upon excessive cross-examination of witnesses, and it has been complained of as undue, but it seems to me that cross- examination of a witness which errs in the direction of excess may be far more fair to him than to leave him without cross-examination, and afterwards, to suggest that he is not a witness of truth, I mean upon a point on which it is not otherwise perfectly clear that he has had full notice beforehand that there is an intention to impeach the credibility of the story which he is telling."
60. Lord Halsbury, in a separate but concurring opinion, held as under:
"My Lords, with regard to the manner in which the evidence was given in this case, I cannot too heartily express my concurrence with the Lord Chancellor as to the mode in which a trial should be conducted. To my mind, nothing would be more absolutely unjust than not to cross-examine witnesses upon evidence which they have given, so as to give them notice, and to give them an opportunity of explanation, and an opportunity very often to defend their own character, and, not having given them such an opportunity, to ask the jury afterwards to disbelieve what they have said, although not one question has been directed either to their credit or to the accuracy of the facts they have deposed to."27
61. This Court in a judgment reported as State of U.P. v. Nahar Singh [State of U.P. v. Nahar Singh, (1998) 3 SCC 561: 1998 SCC (Cri) 850], quoted from Browne [Browne v. Dunn, (1893) 6 R 67 (HL)] to hold that in the absence of cross-examination on the explanation of delay, the evidence of PW 1 remained unchallenged and ought to have been believed by the High Court. Section 146 of the Evidence Act confers a valuable right of cross-examining the witness tendered in evidence by the opposite party. This Court held as under:
(Nahar Singh case [State of U.P. v. Nahar Singh, (1998) 3 SCC 561: 1998 SCC (Cri) 850], SCC pp. 566-67, para 13) "13. It may be noted here that part of the statement of PW 1 was not cross-examined by the accused. In the absence of cross-examination on the explanation of the delay, the evidence of PW 1 remained unchallenged and ought to have been believed by the High Court.
Section 138 of the Evidence Act confers a valuable right of cross-examining the witness tendered in evidence by the opposite party. The scope of that provision is enlarged by Section 146 of the Evidence Act by allowing a witness to be questioned:
(1) to test his veracity, (2) to discover who he is and what his position is in life, or (3) to shake his credit by injuring his character, although the answer to such questions might tend directly or indirectly to incriminate him or might expose or tend directly or indirectly to expose him to a penalty or forfeiture."
62. This Court in a judgment reported as Muddasani Venkata Narsaiah v. Muddasani Sarojana [Muddasani Venkata Narsaiah v. Muddasani Sarojana, (2016) 12 SCC 288: (2017) 1 SCC (Civ) 268] laid down that the party is obliged to put his case in cross-examination of witnesses of the opposite party. The rule of putting one's version in cross-examination is one of essential justice and not 28 merely a technical one. It was held as under : (SCC pp. 294-95, paras 15-16) "15. Moreover, there was no effective cross- examination made on the plaintiff's witnesses with respect to the factum of execution of the sale deed; PW 1 and PW 2 have not been cross-examined as to the factum of execution of the sale deed. The cross- examination is a matter of substance, not of procedure; one is required to put one's own version in the cross-examination of the opponent. The effect of non-cross-examination is that the statement of the witness has not been disputed. The effect of not cross- examining the witnesses has been considered by this Court in Bhoju Mandal v. Debnath Bhagat [Bhoju Mandal v. Debnath Bhagat, AIR 1963 SC 1906]. This Court repelled a submission on the ground that the same was not put either to the witnesses or suggested before the courts below. A party is required to put his version to the witness. If no such questions are put, the Court would presume that the witness account has been accepted as held in Chuni Lal Dwarka Nath v. Hartford Fire Insurance Co. Ltd. [Chuni Lal Dwarka Nath v. Hartford Fire Insurance Co. Ltd., 1957 SCC OnLine P&H 177: AIR 1958 P&H 440]
16. In Maroti Bansi Teli v. Radhabai [Maroti Bansi Teli v. Radhabai, 1943 SCC OnLine MP 128: AIR 1945 Nag 60], it has been laid down that the matters sworn to by one party in the pleadings not challenged either in pleadings or cross-examination by other party must be accepted as fully established. The High Court of Calcutta in A.E.G. Carapiet v. A.Y. Derderian [A.E.G. Carapiet v. A.Y. Derderian, 1960 SCC OnLine Cal 44: AIR 1961 Cal 359] has laid down that the party is obliged to put his case in cross-examination of witnesses of the opposite party. The rule of putting one's version in cross-examination is one of essential justice and not merely a technical one. A Division Bench of the Nagpur High Court in Kuwarlal Amritlal v. Rekhlal 29 Koduram [Kuwarlal Amritlal v. Rekhlal Koduram, 1949 SCC OnLine MP 35: AIR 1950 Nag 83] has laid down that when attestation is not specifically challenged and the witness is not cross-examined regarding details of attestation, it is sufficient for him to say that the document was attested. If the other side wants to challenge that statement, it is their duty, quite apart from raising it in the pleadings, to cross-examine the witness along those lines. A Division Bench of the Patna High Court in Karnidan Sarda v. Sailaja Kanta Mitra [Karnidan Sarda v. Sailaja Kanta Mitra, 1940 SCC OnLine Pat 288: AIR 1940 Pat 683] has laid down that it cannot be too strongly emphasised that the system of administration of justice allows of cross-examination of opposite party's witnesses for the purpose of testing their evidence, and it must be assumed that when the witnesses were not tested in that way, their evidence is to be ordinarily accepted. In the aforesaid circumstances, the High Court has gravely erred in law in reversing the findings of the first appellate court as to the factum of execution of the sale deed in favour of the plaintiff."
30. Therefore, the statement of Shanti Devi that she had not applied for any loan of ₹20,000/- has to be accepted as correct.
31. The procedure for disbursing the loan is explained by Swaran Singh Sagu (PW7). He stated that all kinds of loans are sanctioned by the Manager. Whenever the person approaches the Bank to take any kind of loan, he is interviewed by the Branch Manager. All the relevant documents are given to him after the Manager is satisfied with his eligibility. The party fills 30 the documents and submits them to the Bank. The Bank Manager scrutinises the documents and sanctions the loan if the documents are in order. The entries are made in the Manager Discretionary Power (MDP) Register, Drawing Power (DP) Register and Loan Ledger, which are duly initialled by the Manager. In case of a loan against the bank deposit, the party fills the loan documents and submits them to the Branch Manager along with security documents. The Branch Manager sanctions the loan to the party up to 75% of the value of the security document. The security, i.e. FDR/RD, are lien-marked by the Bank officer after sanction of the loan. If the party wants the loan in cash, the cash deposit voucher is prepared, which is passed by the Manager, and the payment is made to the party in cash. If the party wants the loan amount in his/her account, a debit voucher and credit voucher are prepared. Loan proceeds are transferred to the account of the party. A sanction letter is prepared for sanctioning the loan. The entries are made in the MDP register and the loan ledgers, which are verified by the Manager. He stated in his cross-examination that the bank has its own bylaws and norms. A loanee is not required to be interviewed in a loan against the bank deposit account because 31 the security is in the custody of the bank. He admitted that the second official can sanction the loan in the absence of the Manager. He volunteered to say that the sanction has to be countersigned by the Manager. He stated that the Mubarakpur Branch has only one chest. He volunteered to say that the Branch had two chests when he joined the Branch. He admitted that the signatures of the loanee have to be obtained by the officer conducting the documentation. He admitted that there is a procedure for financial inspection in the bank, and such inspection was conducted in the year 1997 to 2003. He was not aware whether any discrepancy was detected during the inspection. He had not seen any voucher for payment with respect to the loan amount. He denied that he had intentionally withheld the voucher. He denied that signatures on the MDP and DP register are signed by the Manager subsequently. He admitted that the Manager has no role to play in the repayment of the loan. He admitted that Gurmeet Singh was held negligent in the bank inquiry.
32. This witness has specifically denied that the Branch Manager used to put the signatures subsequently. A denied suggestion does not amount to any proof, and his testimony 32 does not establish the plea of the accused that he had put the signatures subsequently in good faith. Further, it was rightly submitted on behalf of the CBI that the petitioner cannot take a plea that he had put the signatures subsequently in routine because the Manager sanctions the loan, and his signatures show the sanction of the loan after completing all the formalities.
33. It was submitted that the debit voucher and sanction letter were not produced on record, which falsifies the version of the prosecution that the petitioner had sanctioned the loan. This submission proceeds on the basis that the loan was sanctioned as per the procedure. It is the case of the prosecution that the loan was sanctioned by the accused in connivance with his co- accused. No person deposed that the documents were prepared, and not much advantage can be derived from the fact that the sanction letter and debit vouchers have not been produced in the present case.
34. It was also submitted that the procedure for sanction of the loan against the bank deposit is not so stringent, and all the formalities were not required to be completed. This 33 submission will not help the accused. The accused, being the Branch Manager, had to comply with the procedure and make the entries in the relevant registers. He had to ensure that the deposit receipts were placed on record and requisite entries were made on them. This is not shown to have been done in the present case, and the accused cannot take a plea that the procedure was not required to be followed.
35. Yogeshwar Kumar Verma (PW11) explained the procedure for disbursing the loan in favour of various persons. He stated that whenever the individual approaches the Bank to take any kind of loan, the Manager discusses the case with him. The Manager hands over the application form to the applicant. The application form is to be submitted to the Bank along with the other relevant forms like the hypothecation form, quantum of installation, guarantor form, etc. The Manager sanctions the loan after satisfying himself about the correctness of the documents. The entries are thereafter made in the Loan Application Receipt Register, DP (Discretionary Power) Register, MDP (Manager's Discretionary Power) Register and Security Document Register. The entries regarding the loan sanctioned by the Head Office are made in the DP Register, and those 34 pertaining to the loan sanctioned by the Branch Manager are made in the DP as well as the MDP Register. The entries are thereafter made in the Loan Pronote Ledger containing Account Number, Loan File Number. The officer of the Bank has to verify the signatures of the applicant and mark the FDR or the RD under the Bank's lien on the face of the FDR or the RD and the ledger or in the computer. The advance against LABD is given in cash or through the parties' savings account/current account, cheque or draft. The Branch Manager has to ensure completion of the documents in all respects before sanctioning the loan. The customer has to discharge the debit voucher before the sanction of the loan. It is the responsibility of the officer to verify the signatures. The documents, complete in all respects, are given to the clerk dealing with the loan portfolio to make entries in the MDP Register before final disbursement of the loan. The debit voucher has to be discharged by the party before the loan is sanctioned to it. The sanction letter has to accompany the documents when the entries are made in the MDP register. The loan is then raised in the Loan Pronote Ledger. The loan ledger sheet has to be authenticated by the Manager/officer of the bank. The first entries on the debit and balance side have to be 35 authenticated by the Manager/Officer. He denied in his cross- examination that a loan against a bank deposit does not require any thorough investigation because the security is already with the Bank. No rule or instruction was shown to him in the Court describing the procedure for the advancement of the loan. He denied that he was giving a false statement.
36. The cross-examination of this witness shows that the procedure described by him was not challenged specifically, and it was only suggested to him that he had not seen any instruction regarding the procedure prescribed by him. Even if the rule/instruction was not shown to him, that will not take away the effect of his testimony describing the procedure adopted in the Bank regarding the disbursal of the loan.
37. His testimony makes the defence of the accused highly improbable that the accused had put his signatures subsequently without verifying the correctness of the entries. A Branch Manager cannot put the initials in routine. He has to satisfy himself regarding the eligibility of the loanee, correctness of the documents submitted by the loanee, adequacy of the security and the disbursal of the amount. The loan has to 36 be sanctioned after the completion of the formalities, and the token register has to be signed after the disbursal of the loan. His testimony proved that the signatures of the accused signify the sanction and disbursal of the loan of ₹20,000/-, and the learned Trial Court had rightly held that the plea of the accused that he had put the signatures subsequently in routine cannot be accepted.
38. G.S. Bhandari (PW8) stated that he was posted as Head Cashier in Punjab & Sind Bank, Mubarakpur branch. The Account Opening Form (Ex.PW2/1) pertaining to RD Account No. 703 in the name of Shanti Devi was filled by Sarabjeet Singh. He could identify the handwriting of Sarabjeet Singh because he had worked with him, and the DPF register (Ex.PW7/6) contained the Entry No. 109 of 1999 in the handwriting of Sarabjeet Singh, which was initialled by the accused, Gurmeet Singh. An amount of ₹20,000/- was sanctioned as a loan in favour of Shanti Devi vide this entry. Token Book (Ex.PW7/7) is in the handwriting of Sarabjeet Singh, which was initialled by Gurmeet Singh. The amount of ₹20,000/- was paid to the party on 19.8.1999. The entry (Ex.PW7/8) is in his handwriting. He made this entry based on the entry in the MDP Register and as 37 per the instructions of Branch Manager Gurmeet Singh. He also made an entry (Ex.PW7/8) at the time of monthly balancing in the MDP register. The entry in the security register at Page 71 (Ex.PW7/10) is in the handwriting of Gurmeet Singh. It does not contain any details of the security documents. Ledger Sheet (Ex.PW8/1A) regarding RD Account No. 703/6 was maintained in the Bank. Entries were made in it by Sarabjeet Singh. As per the entry in the RD Account, it was closed on 24.6.2002, and the amount was transferred to the profit account. He stated in his cross-examination that he was posted as a Head Cashier. The Branch Manager had given him written instructions to file statements of account, miscellaneous statements, etc., however, he had not seen those instructions on record. These instructions were also not handed over to the CBI. He had not mentioned that the entries were made at the instance of the Branch Manager. He did not make any inquiry about the loan documents of Shanti Devi. He volunteered to say that he had made such an inquiry, and the Branch Manager had informed him that documents were in his possession. He denied that the MDP Register is kept open in the Bank. He volunteered to say that the register is kept in the custody of the Manager alone. The register is handed over 38 to the person second in command whenever the Manager is on leave. He admitted that the entry (Ex.PW7/8) (receipt about the loan account of Shanti Devi) does not contain the initial or signatures of the Branch Manager. The payment voucher is prepared in duplicate and is approved by the Branch Manager. The cashier makes the payment after such approval. He could not say whether the loan in the present case was written off subsequently. The inquiry was conducted against him, and his services were terminated. He admitted that a recovery suit was pending against him, Prem Jeet Singh and Sarabjeet Singh. He denied that he had prepared the documents in connivance with Sarabjeet Singh and obtained the signatures of the Branch Manager subsequently. He denied that he was making a false statement.
39. The cross-examination of this witness shows that the accused did not dispute his signatures on the register. It was suggested to him that he obtained the signatures of the Branch Manager subsequently. However, he denied this suggestion. Further, the accused, being the Branch Manager, was supposed to initial the entries after satisfying himself about their correctness.
39
40. Testimony of this witness establishes the prosecution's case. He specifically stated that the MDP register bears the signatures of the accused, Gurmeet Singh. This is a register regarding the sanction of the loan. He also stated that the token register bears the signatures of the accused, Gurmeet. This register is maintained regarding the disbursal of the loan to various persons. The acknowledgement of the signatures on these documents shows that the petitioner had sanctioned the loan, and the loan was disbursed to Shanti Devi as per the entries. However, Shanti Devi (PW2) specifically stated that she had never applied for the loan, nor was any loan sanctioned in her favour. Hence, it was duly proved by the testimony of this witness that the loan was shown to have been sanctioned and disbursed to Shanti Devi; however, it was not received by her. Therefore, the learned Trial Court had rightly held that the amount of ₹20,000/- was pocketed by the accused and Sarabjeet Singh.
41. It was submitted that this person is inimical to the accused, and he was arrayed as an accused in case No. 3-S/7 of 2004, however, this will not make any difference. Merely because he was arrayed as an accused in some other case will not 40 shake his testimony. It was not disputed in his cross- examination that he was posted as a Cashier. Therefore, he would have the knowledge about the signatures and the handwriting of his colleagues. He denied the suggestion that he made a false statement to implicate the accused, and this denial is not sufficient to discredit his testimony.
42. A perusal of the Account Opening Form (Ex.PW2/1) shows that a recurring deposit of ₹1,000/- was to be made for 36 months. It mentions the date 2.7.1996. Recurring Deposit Passbook (Ex.PW2/2) shows that the 36th entry was made on 1.6.1999. Shanti Devi (PW2) stated that the money was disbursed to her in July 1999. The loan of ₹20,000/- was sanctioned as per MDP Register (Ex.PW7/6) in favour of Shanti Devi on 19.8.1999 and was disbursed as per the Token Book (Ex.PW7/C) on 19.8.1999. Shanti Devi had already been paid the majority amount in July 1999, and she had no deposit with the Bank on 19.8.1999 when the loan was sanctioned and disbursed. Therefore, the loan was sanctioned without any security or documentation. This establishes that the loan was sanctioned and disbursed without any security, and the completion of formalities, and the learned Trial Court had rightly held that 41 these circumstances show the connivance of the accused Gurmeet Singh and the cashier.
43. It was submitted that conspiracy requires a meeting of the minds, and in the absence of a meeting of the minds, a charge of conspiracy is not proved. Reliance was placed upon the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Ramsharan Chaturvedi (supra) and Maghvindra Pratap Singh alias Pankaj Singh (supra). There can be no dispute with the principle of law that the prosecution has to prove a prior meeting of the minds to establish the conspiracy between the accused, however, the conspiracy can be inferred from the surrounding circumstances, declaration or the conduct of the parties. In the present case, the accused Sarabjeet Singh made the entries in the MDP register and token register regarding the sanction and disbursal of the loan without sanction and disbursal of the loan to Shanti Devi, which means that the money was never paid to Shanti Devi and was pocketed by someone. The accused could not have initialled the entry without satisfying himself about the disbursal. The entry in the handwriting of one person and the initial by the other person, without which the loan could not have been sanctioned and disbursed, clearly show a meeting of minds to 42 pocket the loan, and the learned Trial Court had rightly drawn the inference of conspiracy in these circumstances.
44. It was submitted that the accused might have been negligent, but he had no criminal intention. This submission is not acceptable. The accused was required to follow a defined procedure, but he failed to follow it. He put the signatures on the MDP Register and the token register, which indicate the sanction and disbursal of the loan. These signatures were to be put after the formalities were completed and the loan was sanctioned and disbursed. The signatures signified the sanction and disbursal of the loan in the record, and the explanation that they were put negligently is not acceptable.
45. It was submitted that there was no loss to the Bank and no criminal case was made out. Reliance was placed upon the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in N. Raghvender (supra). This submission is not acceptable. First, there is no proof that there was no loss to the Bank. The loan was sanctioned in favour of a person who had never applied for it. It was suggested to the witness, Yoginder Kumar, that the loan was written off, clearly showing that the loan was not returned 43 to the Bank. Therefore, in these circumstances, it cannot be said that no criminal act was committed because no loss was caused to the Bank, and the cited judgment does not apply to the present case.
46. Learned Trial Court convicted the accused of the commission of offences punishable under Sections 467, 468 and 471 of the IPC. These offences deal with the forgery of documents. The term forgery has been defined in Section 463 of the IPC as under:
"463. Forgery.--Whoever makes any false documents or electronic record part of a document or electronic record with, intent to cause damage or injury], to the public or any person, or to support any claim or title, or to cause any person to part with property, or to enter into any express or implied contract, or with intent to commit fraud or that fraud may be committed, commits forgery."
47. It is apparent from the definition that a person has to make a false document before he can be said to have committed forgery. Making a false document is defined in Section 464 of the IPC. It reads as under:
464. Making a false document.--A person is said to make a false document or false electronic record.
First.--Who dishonestly or fraudulently--
(a) makes, signs, seals or executes a document or part of a document;
44
(b) makes or transmits any electronic record or part of any electronic record;
(c) affixes any electronic signature on any electronic record;
(d) makes any mark denoting the execution of a document or the authenticity of the electronic signature, with the intention of causing it to be believed that such document or part of a document, electronic record or electronic signature was made, signed, sealed, exe- cuted, transmitted or affixed by or by the authority of a person by whom or by whose authority he knows that it was not made, signed, sealed, executed or affixed; or Secondly.--Who, without lawful authority, dishonestly or fraudulently, by cancellation or otherwise, alters a docu- ment or an electronic record in any material part thereof, after it has been made, executed or affixed with elec- tronic signature either by himself or by any other person, whether such person be living or dead at the time of such alteration; or Thirdly.--Who dishonestly or fraudulently causes any per- son to sign, seal, execute or alter a document or an elec- tronic record or to affix his electronic signature on any electronic record knowing that such person by reason of unsoundness of mind or intoxication cannot, or that by reason of deception practised upon him, he does not know the contents of the document or electronic record or the nature of the alteration.
48. It was laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Mohd. Ibrahim v. State of Bihar, (2009) 8 SCC 751: (2009) 3 SCC (Cri) 929: 2009 SCC OnLine SC 1594 that the prosecution is required to prove that the accused had forged a document by creating a false document to establish the offence of forgery. A 45 false document is when a document is executed claiming to be executed by someone else or authorised by someone else, or a document is tampered with, or signatures are obtained by practising deception. It was observed at page 756: -
"14. An analysis of Section 464 of the Penal Code shows that it divides false documents into three categories:
1. The first is where a person dishonestly or fraudu-
lently makes or executes a document with the inten- tion of causing it to be believed that such document was made or executed by some other person, or by the authority of some other person, by whom or by whose authority he knows it was not made or executed.
2. The second is where a person dishonestly or fraudu- lently, by cancellation or otherwise, alters a document in any material part, without lawful authority, after it has been made or executed by either himself or any other person.
3. The third is where a person dishonestly or fraudu- lently causes any person to sign, execute or alter a document knowing that such person could not by rea- son of (a) unsoundness of mind; or (b) intoxication; or
(c) deception practised upon him, know the contents of the document or the nature of the alteration. In short, a person is said to have made a "false docu- ment", if (i) he made or executed a document claiming to be someone else or authorised by someone else; or (ii) he altered or tampered a document; or (iii) he obtained a document by practising deception, or from a person not in control of his senses.
15. The sale deeds executed by the first appellant clearly and obviously do not fall under the second and third cate- gories of "false documents". It therefore remains to be seen whether the claim of the complainant that the exe- cution of sale deeds by the first accused, who was in no 46 way connected with the land, amounted to committing forgery of the documents with the intention of taking possession of the complainant's land (and that Accused 2 to 5 as the purchaser, witness, scribe and stamp vendor, colluded with the first accused in execution and registra- tion of the said sale deeds) would bring the case under the first category."
49. In the present case, the accused had signed the documents in his own name. It is not the case of the prosecution that the signatures were put in the name of some other person who had not signed it. Merely because the entry regarding the sanction and the loan was false is not sufficient because there is a distinction between a false document and a document whose contents are false. Therefore, the learned Trial Court had erred in convicting the accused of the commission of the offences punishable under Sections 467, 468 and 471 of the IPC.
50. The accused had represented to the Bank by putting the signatures in the MDP register that Shanti Devi (PW2) had applied for the loan, the loan was sanctioned and disbursed in her favour. This representation was not correct because no loan was sanctioned and disbursed to Shanti Devi. Therefore, a misrepresentation was made to the Bank and the Bank was made to disburse the loan, which it would not have done but for the misrepresentation. Hence, the offence punishable under 47 Section 420 of the IPC was clearly made out, and the learned Trial Court had rightly convicted the accused of the commission of an offence punishable under Section 420 of the IPC.
51. Learned Trial Court convicted the accused of the commission of an offence punishable under Section 477-A of IPC, which deals with making false entry by a clerk, officer or servant. In the present case, the accused, Sarabjeet, had made a wrong entry regarding the sanction and disbursal of a loan to Shanti Devi, and the accused, Gurmeet, had initialled such an entry. The Bank was defrauded based on such an entry. Therefore, the accused was rightly convicted of the commission of an offence punishable under Section 477-A of the IPC.
52. Section 13(1)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act provides that if a person by corrupt or illegal means obtains for himself any valuable thing or pecuniary advantage is said to have committed criminal misconduct. In the present case, the accused, being a public servant, had obtained a benefit for himself of ₹20,000/- by wrongly showing the loan to have been sanctioned in favour of Shanti Devi, which was never applied for by her. Therefore, all the ingredients of Section 13(1)(d) read 48 with Section 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act were duly satisfied, and the learned Trial Court had rightly convicted the accused of the commission of the aforesaid offence.
53. Learned Trial Court convicted the accused of the commission of an offence punishable under Section 201 of IPC on the premise that he had destroyed the documents pertaining to the loan. There is insufficient evidence to show that the loan was sanctioned after completion of the necessary documents. There is no evidence that documents were executed by Shanti Devi; rather, Shanti Devi categorically stated that she had never applied for a loan, nor was any loan sanctioned in her favour. Therefore, no document was executed by her, and there was no question of the destruction of evidence.
54. Learned Trial Court had sentenced the accused to undergo rigours imprisonment for one year and pay a fine of ₹5,000/- each for the commission of offences punishable under Section 420, 467, 468, 471, 477-A, 201 and 120-B of IPC and 13(2) of the PC Act. This cannot be said to be excessive, keeping in view the position held by the accused/appellant and how the 49 position was misused by him. Therefore, no interference is required with the sentence imposed by the learned Trial Court.
55. No other point was urged.
56. In view of the above, the present appeal is partly allowed and the accused is acquitted of the offences punishable under Sections 467, 468, 471 and 201 of the IPC. The sentence imposed by the learned Trial Court for the commission of the aforesaid offences is set aside. The rest of the judgment and order passed by the learned Trial Court are upheld.
57. Modified warrants be prepared accordingly and the record be returned to the learned Trial Court along with a copy of this judgment.
(Rakesh Kainthla) Judge 30th May, 2025 (Chander)